No More Learning

As long as this spell prevails, the nonidentical has no positive existence. Therefore natural beauty remains as dispersed and uncertain as what it prom- ises, that which surpasses all human immanence. The pain in the face of beauty, nowhere more visceral than in the experience of nature, is as much the longing for what beauty promises but never unveils as it is suffering at the inadequacy of the appearance, which fails beauty while wanting to make itself like it. This pain reappears in the relation to artworks. Involuntarily and unconsciously, the ob- server enters into a contract with the work, agreeing to submit to it on condition that it speak. In the pledged receptivity of the observer, pure self-abandonment- that moment of free exhalation in nature-survives. Natural beauty shares the weakness of every promise with that promise's inextinguishability. However words may glance off nature and betray its language to one that is qualitatively different from its own, still no critique of natural teleology can dismiss those cloudless days of southern lands that seem to be waiting to be noticed. As they draw to a close with the same radiance and peacefulness with which they began, they emanate that everything is not lost, that things may yet tum out: "Death, sit down on the bed, and you hearts, listen carefully: / An old man points into the glimmering light / Under the fringe of dawn ' s first blue: / In the name of God and the unborn, / I promise you: / World, never mind your woes, / All is still yours, for the day starts anew! "8 The image of what is oldest in nature reverses dialectically into the cipher of the not-yet-existing, the possible: As its appearance this cipher is more than the existing; but already in reflecting on it this almost does it an in- justice. Any claim that this is how nature speaks cannot be judged with assurance , for its language does not make judgments; but neither is nature ' s language merely the deceptive consolation that longing reflects back to itself. In its uncertainty, natural beauty inherits the ambiguity of myth, while at the same time its echo-
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consolation-distances itself from myth in appearing nature. Contrary to that philosopher of identity, Hegel, natural beauty is close to the truth but veils itself at the moment of greatest proximity. This, too, art learned from natural beauty. The boundary established against fetishism of nature - the pantheistic subterfuge that would amount to nothing but an affirmative mask appended to an endlessly repetitive fate - is drawn by the fact that nature , as it stirs mortally and tenderly in its beauty, does not yet exist. The shame felt in the face of natural beauty stems from the damage implicitly done to what does not yet exist by taking it for exis- tent. The dignity of nature is that of the not-yet-existing; by its expression it repels intentional humanization. This dignity has been transformed into the hermetic character of art, into-as Holderlin taught-art's renunciation of any usefulness whatever, even if it were sublimated by the addition of human meaning . For com- munication is the adaptation of spirit to utility, with the result that spirit is made one commodity among the rest; and what today is called meaning participates in this disaster. What in artworks is structured, gapless, resting in itself, is an after- image of the silence that is the single medium through which nature speaks . Vis-a- vis a ruling principle , vis-a-vis a merely diffuse juxtaposition , the beauty of nature is an other; what is reconciled would resemble it.
Hegel makes the transition to art beauty from natural beauty, whose necessity he initially concedes: "Now, as the physically objective idea, life that animates na- ture is beautiful in that as life the true, the idea, is immediately present in individ- ual and adequate actuality in its first natural form. "9 This thesis, which begins by casting natural beauty as more impoverished than it is, presents a paradigm of dis- cursive aesthetics: It is deduced from the identification of the real with the ratio- nal , or more specifically, from the definition of nature as the idea in its otherness. The idea is credited, condescendingly, to natural beauty's account. The beauty of nature unfolds from Hegel's theodicy of the real: Because the idea can take no other form than that in which it is realized, its first appearance or "first natural form" is "suitable" and therefore beautiful. This concept of natural beauty is im- mediately circumscribed dialectically; the concept of nature as spirit is taken no further because-probably with a polemical eye toward Schelling-nature is to be understood as spirit in its otherness, not directly reducible to that spirit. There is no mistaking the progress of critical consciousness here. The Hegelian move- ment of the concept seeks truth-which cannot be stated immediately-in the naming of the particular and the limited: of the dead and the false. This provides for the disappearance of natural beauty when it has scarcely been introduced: "Yet, because of this purely physical immediacy, the living beauty of nature is produced neitherfor nor out of itself as beautiful, nor for the sake of a beautiful appearance. The beauty of nature is beautiful only for another, i . e . , for us, for the mind which apprehends beauty . " to Thus the essence of natural beauty , the anam- nesis of precisely what does not exist for-an-other, is let slip. This critique of nat- ural beauty follows an inner tendency ofHegel's aesthetics as a whole, follows its
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objectivistic tum against the contingence of subjective sentiment. Precisely the beautiful, which presents itself as independent from the subject, as absolutely something not made, falls under suspicion of being feebly subjective; Hegel equates this directly with the indeterminacy of natural beauty . Throughout , Hegel ' s aesthetics lacks receptivity for the speech of what is not significative; the same is true of his theory of language. ll It can be argued immanently against Hegel that his own definition of nature as spirit in its otherness not only contrasts spirit with nature but also binds them together without, however, the binding ele- ment being investigated in his system ' s Aesthetics or Philosophy ofNature. Hegel ' s objective idealism becomes crass, virtually unreftected partisanship for subjective spirit in the Aesthetics. What is true in this is that natural beauty, the unexpected promise of something that is highest, cannot remain locked in itself but is rescued only through that consciousness that is set in opposition to it. What Hegel validly opposes to natural beauty is of a part with his critique of aesthetic formalism and thus of a playful eighteenth-century hedonism that was anathema to the emanci- pated bourgeois spirit. "The form ofnatural beauty, as an abstract form, is on the one hand determinate and therefore restricted; on the other hand it contains a unity and an abstract relation to itself . . . This sort of form is what is called regularity and symmetry, also conformity to law, and finally harmony. "12 Hegel elsewhere speaks in sympathy with the advances of dissonance, though he is deaf to how much it has its locus in natural beauty . In pursuit of this intention of dissonance, aesthetic theory at its apex, in Hegel, took the lead over art; only as neutralized sanctimonious wisdom did it, after Hegel, fall behind art. In Hegel, the formal, "mathematical" relations that once supposedly grounded natural beauty are con- trasted with living spirit and rejected as subaltern and pedestrian: The beauty of regularity is "a beauty of abstract understanding. "13 His disdain for rationalistic aesthetics , however, clouds his vision for what in nature slips through the concep- tual net of this aesthetics . The concept of the subaltern occurs literally in the pas- sage of natural beauty to art beauty: "Now this essential deficiency [of natural
beauty] leads us to the necessity of the Ideal, which is not to be found in nature, and in comparison with it the beauty of nature appears subordinate. "14 Natural beauty, however, is subordinate not in itself but for those who prize it. To what- ever degree the determinacy of art surpasses that of nature, the exemplar of art is provided by what nature expresses and not by the spirit with which men endow nature. The concept of a posited ideal, one that art should follow, and one that is "purified," is external to art. The idealist disdain for what is not spirit in nature takes vengeance on what in art is more than subjective spirit. The timeless ideal becomes hollow plaster; in the history of German literature the most obvious evi- dence for this is the fate of Hebbel's dramatic works, which share much with Hegel. Hegel deduces art rationalistically enough, strangely ignoring its historical genesis, from the insufficiency of nature: "Thus it is from the deficiencies of im- mediate reality that the necessity of the beauty of art is derived. The task of art
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must therefore be firmly established in art's having a calling to display the appear- ance of life, and especially of spiritual animation (in its freedom, externally too) and to make the external correspond with its concept. Only so is the truth lifted out of its temporal setting, out of its straying away into a series of finites. At the same time it has won an external appearance through which the poverty of nature and prose no longer peeps; it has won an existence worthy of truth. "15 The inner thread of Hegel's philosophy is revealed in this passage: Natural beauty gains le- gitimacy only by its decline, in such a way that its deficiency becomes the raison d'etre of art beauty. At the same time natural beauty is subsumed on the basis of its "calling" to a purpose, and a transfiguring affirmative purpose at that, in obedi- ence to a bourgeois topos dating back at least to d'Alembert and Saint-Simon. What Hegel chalks up as the deficiency of natural beauty-the characteristic of escaping from fixed concept-is howeverthe substance ofbeauty itself. In Hegel's transition from nature to art, on the other hand, the much touted polysignificance of Aufhebung is nowhere to be found. Natural beauty flickers out without a trace of it being recognizable in art beauty. Because natural beauty is not thoroughly ruled and defined by spirit, Hegel considers it preaesthetic. But the imperious spirit is an instrument, not the content, of art. Hegel calls natural beauty prosaic. This phrase, which designates the asymmetry that Hegel overlooks in natural beauty , is at the same time unable to comprehend the development of more recent art, every aspect of which could be viewed as the infiltration of prose into formal principles. Prose is the ineradicable reflex of the disenchantment of the world in art, and not just its adaptation to narrow-minded usefulness. Whatever balks at prose becomes the prey of an arbitrarily decreed stylization. In Hegel's age the vector of this development could not yet be completely foreseen; it is in no way identical with realism, but rather is related to autonomous procedures that are free of any relation to representational realism and to topoi. In this regard Hegel's Aesthetics i s reactionary in classicist fashion. I n Kant the classicist conception of beauty was compatible with the conception of natural beauty; Hegel sacrifices natural beauty to subjective spirit, but subordinates that spirit to a classicism that is external to and incompatible with it, perhaps out of fear of a dialectic that even in the face of the idea of beauty would not come to a halt. Hegel's critique of Kant's formalism ought to have valorized nonformal concreteness. This critique was not, however, within Hegel's purview; it is perhaps for this reason that he confused the material elements of art with its representational content [Inhalt]. By rejecting the fleetingness of natural beauty, as well as virtually everything non- conceptual, Hegel obtusely makes himself indifferent to the central motif of art, which probes after truth in the evanescent and fragile. Hegel's philosophy fails vis-a-vis beauty: Because he equates reason and the real through the quintessence of their mediations, he hypostatizes the subjective preformation of the existing as the absolute; thus for him the nonidentical only figures as a restraint on subjec- tivity rather than that he determines the experience of the nonidentical as the
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telos and emancipation of the aesthetic subject. Progressive dialectical aesthetics becomes necessary to critique even Hegel's aesthetics.
The transition from natural beauty to art beauty is dialectical as a transition in the form of domination. Art beauty is what is objectively mastered in an image and which by virtue of its objectivity transcends domination. Artworks wrest them- selves from domination by transforming the aesthetic attitude, shaped by the ex- perience of natural beauty, into a type of productive labor modeled on material labor. As a human language that is both organizing as well as reconciled, art wants once again to attain what has become opaque to humans in the language of nature . Artworks have this much in common with idealist philosophy: They locate recon- ciliation in identity with the subject; in this respect idealist philosophy-as is ex- plicit in Schelling-actually has art as its model, rather than the reverse. Artworks extend the realm of human domination to the extreme, not literally, though, but rather by the strength of the establishment of a sphere existing for itself, which just through its posited immanence divides itself from real domination and thus negates the heteronomy of domination. Only through their polar opposition, not through the pseudomorphosis of art into nature, are nature and art mediated in each other. The more strictly artworks abstain from rank natural growth and the replication of nature, the more the successful ones approach nature. Aesthetic objectivity, the reflection of the being-in-itself of nature, realizes the subjective teleological element of unity; exclusively thereby do artworks become compara- ble to nature. In contrast, all particular similarity of art to nature is accidental, inert, and for the most part foreign to art. The feeling of an artwork's necessity is synonymous with this objectivity . As Benjamin showed, the concept of necessity has generally been mishandled by historians of ideas. By dubbing it necessary, they try to understand or to legitimate historical material to which there is other-
wise no relation, as for instance in the praise of a piece of dull music as a neces- sary preliminary stage to great music . The proof of such necessity can never be adduced; neither in the particular work nor in the historical relation of artworks and styles to each other is there any transparent lawfulness such as that estab- lished by the natural sciences, and as regards psychological necessity the situation is no better. The necessity of art cannot be propounded more scientifico but rather only insofar as a work, by the power of its internal unity, gives evidence ofbeing thus-and-only-thus,16 as if it absolutely must exist and cannot possibly be thought away. The being-in-itself to which artworks are devoted is not the imitation of something real but rather the anticipation of a being-in-itself that does not yet exist, of an unknown that-by way of the subject-is self-determining. Artworks say that something exists in itself, without predicating anything about it. In fact, the spiritualization that art has undergone during the past two hundred years and through which it has come to maturity has not alienated art from nature, as is the opinion ofreified consciousness; rather, in terms ofits own form, art has converged with natural beauty. A theory of art that, in conformity with SUbjective reason,
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simplistically identifies the tendency of art to subjectivization with the develop- ment of scientific reason , omits for the benefit of plausibility the content [Gehalt] and direction of artistic development. With human means art wants to realize the language of what is not human. The pure expression of artworks, freed from every thing-like interference, even from everything so-called natural, converges with nature just as in Webern's most authentic works the pure tone, to which they are reduced by the strength of subjective sensibility, reverses dialectically into a nat- ural sound: that of an eloquent nature , certainly , its language, not the portrayal of a part of nature . The total subjective elaboration of art as a nonconceptual language is the only figure, at the contemporary stage of rationality, in which something like the language of divine creation is reflected, qualified by the paradox that what is reflected is blocked. Art attempts to imitate an expression that would not be interpolated human intention. The latter is exclusively art's vehicle. The more perfect the artwork, the more it forsakes intentions. Mediate nature, the truth con- tent of art, takes shape, immediately, as the opposite of nature. If the language of nature is mute , art seeks to make this muteness eloquent; art thus exposes itself to failure through the insurmountable contradiction between the idea of making the mute eloquent, which demands a desperate effort, and the idea of what this effort would amount to, the idea of what cannot in any way be willed.
Nature is beautiful in that it appears to say more than it i s . To wrest this more from that more's contingency, to gain control of its semblance, to determine it as sem- blance as well as to negate it as unreal: This is the idea of art. This artifactual more does not in itself guarantee the metaphysical substance of art. That substance could be totally null, and still the artworks could posit a more as what appears. Artworks become artworks in the production of this more; they produce their own transcendence, rather than being its arena, and thereby they once again become separated from transcendence. The actual arena of transcendence in artworks is the nexus of their elements. By straining toward, as well as adapting to, this nexus, they go beyond the appearance that they are, though this transcendence may be unreal. Only in the achievement of this transcendence, not foremost and indeed probably never through meanings, are artworks spiritual. Their transcendence is their eloquence, their script, but it is a script without meaning or, more precisely, a script with broken or veiled meaning. Although this transcendence is subjectively mediated, it is manifested objectively, yet all the more desultorily. Art fails its concept when it does not achieve this transcendence; it loses the quality of being art. Equally, however, art betrays transcendence when it seeks to produce it as an effect. This implies an essential criterion of new art. Compositions fail as back- ground music or as the mere presentation of material , just as those paintings fail in which the geometrical patterns to which they are reducible remain factually what they are; this is the reason for the relevance of divergences from mathematical
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forms in all those works that employ them. The striven-for shudder comes to noth- ing: It does not occur. One of the paradoxes of artworks is that what they posit they are actually not permitted to posit; this is the measure of their substantiality . The more cannot be adequately described by the psychological definition of a gestalt, according to which a whole is more than its parts . For the more is not sim- ply the nexus of the elements, but an other, mediated through this nexus and yet divided from it. The artistic elements suggest through their nexus what escapes it. Here one comes up against an antinomy of the philosophy of history . In his treat- ment ofthe theme ofaura-a concept closely related to the concept ofthe appear- ance that by virtue of its internal unity points beyond itself-Benjamin showed that, beginning with Baudelaire, aura in the sense of "atmosphere" is taboo;! al- ready in Baudelaire the transcendence of the artistic appearance is at once effected and negated . From this perspective, the deaestheticization of art is not only a stage of art's liquidation but also the direction of its development. All the same, the so- cialized rebellion since Baudelaire against aura and atmosphere has not meant the simple disappearance of the crackling noise in which the more of the phenomenon announces itself in opposition to this phenomenon. One need only compare good poems by Brecht that are styled as protocol sentences with bad poems by authors whose rebellion against being poetic recoils into the preaesthetic. In Brecht's dis- enchanted poetry what is fundamentally distinct from what is simplistically stated constitutes the works' eminent rank. Erich Kahler may have been the first to recognize this; and it is best confirmed by the poem "Two Cranes. "2 Aesthetic transcendence and disenchantment converge in the moment of falling mute: in Beckett's oeuvre. A language remote from all meaning is not a speaking language and this is its affinity to muteness. Perhaps all expression, which is most akin to transcendence, is as close to falling mute as in great new music nothing is so full of expression as what flickers out-that tone that disengages itself starkly from the dense musical texture-where art by virtue of its own movement converges with its natural element.
The instant of expression in artworks is however not their reduction to the level of their materials as to something unmediated; rather, this instant is fully mediated. Artworks become appearances, in the pregnant sense of the term-that is, as the appearance of an other-when the accent falls on the unreality of their own real- ity. Artworks have the immanent character of being an act, even if they are carved in stone, and this endows them with the quality of being something momentary and sudden. This is registered by the feeling of being overwhelmed when faced with an important work. This immanent character of being an act establishes the similarity of all artworks, like that of natural beauty, to music, a similarity once evoked by the term muse. Under patient contemplation artworks begin to move. To this extent they are truly afterimages of the primordial shudder in the age of reification; the terror of that age is recapitulated vis-ii-vis reified objects. The deeper the Xroplcr? 6? between the circumscribed, particular things and the paling
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essence, the more hollowly artworks gaze, the sole anamnesis of what could exist beyond the Xropt(J/l6? . Because the shudder is past and yet survives, artworks objectivate it as its afterimage. For if at one time human beings in their power- lessness against nature feared the shudder as something real, the fear is no less intense, no less justified, that the shudder will dissipate. All enlightenment is ac- companied by the anxiety that what set enlightenment in motion in the first place and what enlightenment ever threatens to consume may disappear: truth. Thrown back on itself, enlightenment distances itself from that guileless objectivity that it would like to achieve; that is why, under the compulsion of its own ideal of truth, it is conjoined with the pressure to hold on to what it has condemned in the name of truth. Art is this mnemosyne. The instant of appearance in artworks is indeed the paradoxical unity or the balance between the vanishing and the preserved. Art- works are static as much as they are dynamic; art gemes that fall below approved culture, such as circus tableaux and revues and probably mechanisms such as the water fountains of the seventeenth century, confess to what authentic3 artworks conceal in themselves as their secret apriori. Artworks remain enlightened be- cause they would like to make commensurable to human beings the remembered shudder, which was incommensurable in the magical primordial world. This is touched upon by Hegel's formulation of art as the effort to do away with foreign- ness. 4 In the artifact the shudder is freed from the mythical deception of its being- in-itself, without however the work's being reduced to subjective spirit. The in- creasing autonomy of artworks , their objectivation by human being s , presents the shudder as something unmollified and unprecedented. The act of alienation in this objectivation, which each artwork carries out, is corrective. Artworks are neutral- ized and thus qualitatively transformed epiphanies. If the deities of antiquity were said to appear fleetingly at their cult sites, or at least were to have appeared there in the primeval age , this act of appearing became the law of the permanence of art- works, but at the price of the living incarnation of what appears. The artwork as appearance is most closely resembled by the apparition,S the heavenly vision. Artworks stand tacitly in accord with it as it rises above human beings and is carried beyond their intentions and the world of things. Artworks from which the apparition has been driven out without a trace are nothing more than husks, worse than what merely exists, because they are not even useful. Artworks are nowhere more reminiscent of mana than in their extreme opposition to it, in the subjec- tively posited construction of ineluctability. That instant-which is what artworks are-crystallized, at least in traditional works, at the point where out of their particular elements they became a totality . The pregnant moment6 of their objec- tivation is the moment that concentrates them as appearance, which is by no means just the expressive elements that are dispersed over the artworks. Artworks surpass the world of things by what is thing-like in them, their artificial objectiva- tion. They become eloquent by the force of the kindling of thing and appearance. They are things whose power it is to appear. Their immanent process is extemal-
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ized as their own act, not as what humans have done to them and not merely for humans .
The phenomenon of fireworks is prototypical for artworks , though because of its fleetingness and status as empty entertainment it has scarcely been acknowledged by theoretical consideration; only Valery pursued ideas that are at least related. Fireworks are apparition K<xi E? OX"V: They appear empirically yet are liberated from the burden of the empirical, which is the obligation of duration; they are a sign from heaven yet artifactual, an ominous warning, a script that flashes up, van- ishes , and indeed cannot be read for its meaning. The segregation of the aesthetic sphere by means of the complete afunctionality of what is thoroughly ephemeral is no formal definition of aesthetics. It is not through a higher perfection that art- works separate from the fallibly existent but rather by becoming actual, like fire- works , incandescently in an expressive appearance. They are not only the other of the empirical world: Everything in them becomes other. It is this to which the preartistic consciousness of artworks responds most intensely. This consciousness submits to the temptation that first led to art and that mediates between art and the empirical. Although the preartistic dimension becomes poisoned by its exploita- tion , to the point that artworks must eliminate it, it survives sublimated in them. It is not so much that artworks possess ideality as that by virtue of their spiritual- ization they promise a blocked or denied sensuality . That quality can be compre- hended in those phenomena from which artistic experience emancipated itself, in the relics of an art-alien art, as it were, the justly or unjustly so-called lower arts such as the circus, to which in France the cubist painters and their theoreticians turned, and to which in Germany Wedekind turned. What Wedekind called "cor- poreal art" has not only remained beneath spiritualized art, not only remained just its complement: In its intentionlessness, however, it is the archetype of spiritual- ized art. By its mere existence. every artwork. as alien artwork to what is alien- ated, conjures up the circus and yet is lost as soon as it emulates it. Art becomes an image not directly by becoming an apparition but only through the counter- tendency to it. The preartistic level of art is at the same time the memento of its anticultural character, its suspicion of its antithesis to the empirical world that
leaves this world untouched. Important artworks nevertheless seek to incorporate this art-alien layer. When, suspected of being infantile, it is absent from art, when the last trace of the vagrant fiddler disappears from the spiritual chamber musician and the illusionless drama has lost the magic of the stage, art has capitulated . The curtain lifts expectantly even at the beginning of Beckett's Endgame; plays and stagings that eliminate the curtain fumble with a shallow trick . The instant the cur- tain goes up is the expectation of the apparition. If Beckett's plays, as crepuscu- larly grey as after sunset and the end of the world, want to exorcise circus colors, they yet remain true to them in that the plays are indeed performed on stage and it is well known how much their antiheros were inspired by clowns and slapstick cinema. Despite their austerity they in no way fully renounce costumes and sets:
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The servant Clov, who wishes in vain to break out, wears the laughably outmoded costume of a traveling Englishman; and the sandhill of Happy Days bears a simi- larity to geological formations of the American West; in general, the question remains whether in their material and visual organization even the most abstract paintings do not bear elements of a representationality that they hope to remove from circulation. Even artworks that incorruptibly refuse celebration,and consola- tion do not wipe out radiance, and the greater their success, the more they gain it. Today this luster devolves precisely upon works that are inconsolable. Their distance from any purpose sympathizes, as from across the abyss of ages, with the superfluous vagrant who will not completely acquiesce to fixed property and settled civilization. Not least among the contemporary difficulties of art is that artworks are ashamed of apparition, though they are unable to shed it; no longer substantial in the Hegelian sense, having become self-transparent right into their constitutive semblance, which artworks find untrue in its transparentness, this transparentness gnaws away at their possibility. An inane Wilhelmian army joke tells of an orderly who one fine Sunday morning is sent by his superior to the zoo. He returns very worked up and declares: "Lieutenant! Animals like that do not exist!
" This form of reaction is as requisite of aesthetic experience as it is alien to art. Artworks are eliminated along with the youthful ? aulla. l;? tv; Klee's Angelus Novus arouses this astonishment much as do the semihuman creatures of Indian mythology. In each genuine artwork something appears that does not exist. It is not dreamt up out of disparate elements of the existing. Out of these elements artworks arrange constellations that become ciphers, without, however, like fan- tasies, setting up the enciphered before the eyes as something immediately exist- ing. The encipherment of the artwork , one facet of its apparition, is thus distinct from natural beauty in that while it too refuses the univocity ofjudgment, never- theless in its own form, in the way in which it turns toward the hidden, the artwork achieves a greater determinacy . Artworks thus vie with the syntheses of significa- tive thinking , their irreconcilable enemy.
The appearance of the nonexistent as if it existed motivates the question as to the truth of art. By its form alone art promises what is not; it registers objectively, however refractedly, the claim that because the nonexistent appears it must indeed be possible. The unstillable longing in the face of beauty, for which Plato found words fresh with its first experience , is the longing for the fulfillment of what was promised. Idealist aesthetics fails by its inability to dojustice to art'spromessedu bonheur. It reduces the artwork to what it in theoretical terms symbolizes and thus trespasses against the spirit in that artwork. What spirit promises, not the sensual pleasure ofthe observer, is the locus ofthe sensual element in art. -Romanticism wanted to equate what appears in the apparition with the artistic. In doing so, it grasped something essential about art, yet narrowed it to a particular, to the praise of a specific and putatively inwardly infinite comportment of art; in this, romanti- cism imagined that through reflection and thematic content it could grasp art's
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ether, whereas it is irresistible precisely because it refuses to let itself be nailed down either as an entity or as a universal concept. Its ether is bound up with par- ticularization; it epitomizes the unsubsumable and as such challenges the prevail- ing principle of reality: that of exchangeability. What appears is not interchange- able because it does not remain a dull particular for which other particulars could be substituted, nor is it an empty universal that equates everything specific that it comprehends by abstracting the common characteristics. If in empirical real- ity everything has become fungible, art holds up to the world of everything-for- something-else images of what it itself would be if it were emancipated from the schemata of imposed identification . Yet art plays over into ideology in that, as the image of what is beyond exchange, it suggests that not everything in the world is exchangeable. On behalf of what cannot be exchanged, art must through its form bring the exchangeable to critical self-consciousness. The telos of artworks is a language whose words cannot be located on the spectrum; a language whose words are not imprisoned by a prestabilized universality. An important suspense novel by Leo Perutz concerns the color "drommet red";7 subartistic genres such as science fiction credulously and therefore powerlessly make a fetish of such themes. Although the nonexisting emerges suddenly in artworks, they do not lay hold of it bodily as with the pass of a magic wand. The nonexisting is mediated to them through fragments of the existing, which they assemble into an apparition. It is not for art to decide by its existence if the nonexisting that appears indeed exists as something appearing or remains semblance. As figures of the existing, unable to summon into existence the nonexisting, artworks draw their authority from the reflection they compel on how they could be the overwhelming image of the nonexisting if it did not exist in itself. Precisely Plato's ontology, more congenial to positivism than dialectic is, took offense at art's semblance character, as if the promise made by art awakened doubt in the positive omnipresence of being and idea, for which Plato hoped to find surety in the concept. If the Platonic ideas were existence-in-itself, art would not be needed; the ontologists of antiquity mis- trusted art and sought pragmatic control over it because in their innermost being they knew that the hypostatized universal concept is not what beauty promises. Plato's critique ofart is indeed not compelling, because art negates the literal real- ity of its thematic content, which Plato had indicted as a lie. The exaltation of the concept as idea is allied with the philistine blindness for the central element of art, its form. In spite of all this, however, the blemish of mendacity obviously cannot be rubbed off art; nothing guarantees that it will keep its objective promise. There- fore every theory of art must at the same time be the critique of art. Even radical art is a lie insofar as it fails to create the possible to which it gives rise as sem- blance . Artworks draw credit from a praxis that has yet to begin and no one knows whether anything backs their letters of credit .
Artworks are images as apparition, as appearance, and not as a copy. If through the demythologization of the world consciousness freed itself from the ancient
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shudder, that shudder is permanently reproduced in the historical antagonism of subject and object. The object became as incommensurable to experience, as for- eign and frightening, as mana once was. This permeates the image character. It manifests foreignness at the same time that it seeks to make experiential what is thing-like and foreign. For artworks it is incumbent to grasp the universal - which dictates the nexus of the existing and is hidden by the existing - in the particular; it is not for art, through particularization, to disguise the ruling universality of the administered world . Totality is the grotesque heir of mana. The image character of artworks passed over into totality , which appears more truly in the individual than in the syntheses of singularities. By its relation to what in the constitution of real- ity is not directly accessible to discursive conceptualization and none the less ob- jective, art in the age of enlightenment holds true to enlightenment while provok- ing it. What appears in art is no longer the ideal, no longer harmony; the locus of its power of resolution is now exclusively in the contradictory and dissonant. En- lightenment was always also the consciousness of the vanishing of what it wanted to seize without any residue of mystery; by penetrating the vanishing-the shud- der-enlightenment not only is its critique but salvages it according to the mea- sure of what provokes the shudder in reality itself. This paradox is appropriated by artworks. If it holds true that the subjective rationality of means and ends - which is particular and thus in its innermost irrational-requires spurious irrational enclaves and treats art as such, art is nevertheless the truth of society insofar as in its most authentic products the irrationality of the rational world order is expressed. In art, denunciation and anticipation are syncopated . If apparition iIluminates and touches, the image is the paradoxical effort to transfix this most evanescent instant. In art something momentary transcends; objectivation makes the artwork into an instant. Pertinent here is Benjamin's formulation of a dialectic at a standstill, which he developed in the context of his conception of a dialectical image . If, as images, artworks are the persistence of the transient, they are concentrated in ap- pearance as something momentary . To experience art means to become conscious of its immanent process as an instant at a standstill; this may perhaps have nour- ishedthecentralconceptofLessing's aesthetics,thatofthe"pregnantmoment. "
Artworks not only produce imagines as something that endures. They become art- works just as much through the destruction of their own imagerie; for this reason art is profoundly akin to explosion. When in Wedekind's Spring Awakening Moritz Stiefel shoots himself dead with a water pistol and the curtain falls as he says: "Now I won't ever be going home again,"8 in this instant, as dusk settles over the city in the far distance, the unspeakable melancholy of the river landscape is expressed. Not only are artworks allegories, they are the catastrophic fulfillment of allegories . The shocks inflicted by the most recent artworks are the explosion of their appearance. In them appearance, previously a self-evident apriori of art, dis- solves in a catastrophe in which the essence of appearance is for the first time fully revealed: and nowhere perhaps more unequivocally than in Wols's paintingsY
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Even this volatilization of aesthetic transcendence becomes aesthetic, a measure of the degree to which artworks are mythically bound up with their antithesis . In the incineration of appearance, artworks break away in a glare from the empirical world and become the counterfigure of what lives there; art today is scarcely con- ceivable except as a form of reaction that anticipates the apocalypse. Closely ob- served, even tranquil works discharge not so much the pent-up emotions of their makers as the works' own inwardly antagonistic forces. The result of these forces is bound up with the impossibility of bringing these forces to any equilibrium; their antinomies, like those of knowledge, are unsolvable in the unreconciled world. The instant in which these forces become image, the instant in which what is in- terior becomes exterior, the outer husk is exploded; their apparition, which makes them an image, always at the same time destroys them as image. In Benjamin's in- terpretation, Baudelaire's fable of the man who lost his aureole describes not just the demise of aura but aura itself; if artworks shine , the objectivation of aura is the path by which it perishes . As a result of its determination as appearance, art bears its own negation embedded in itself as its own telos; the sudden unfolding of ap- pearance disclaims aesthetic semblance. Appearance, however, and its explosion in the artwork are essentially historical . The artwork in itself is not, as historicism would have it - as if its history accords simply with its position in real history - Being absolved from Becoming . Rather, as something that exists, the artwork has its own development. What appears in the artwork is its own inner time; the ex- plosion of appearance blasts open the continuity of this inner temporality. The artwork is mediated to real history by its monadological nucleus. History is the content of artworks. To analyze artworks means no less than to become conscious of the history immanently sedimented in them.
The image character of works, at least in traditional art, is probably a function of the "pregnant moment. " This could be illustrated by Beethoven's symphonies and above all in many of his sonata movements. Movement at a standstill is eternalized in the instant, and what has been made eternal is annihilated by its reduction to the instant. This marks the sharp difference of the image character of art from how Klages and Jung conceived it: If, after the separation of knowledge into image and sign, thought simply equates the image with truth, the untruth of the schism is in no way corrected but made all the worse, for the image is no less affected by the schism than is the concept. Aesthetic images are no more translatable into con- cepts than they are "real"; there is no imago without the imaginary; their reality is their historical content, and the images themselves, including the historical im- ages, are not to be hypostatized. -Aesthetic images are not fixed, archaic invari- ants: Artworks become images in that the processes that have congealed in them as objectivity become eloquent. Bourgeois art-religion of Diltheyian provenance confuses the imagerie of art with its opposite: with the artist's psychological repository of representations . But this repository is itself an element of the raw material forged into the artwork. The latent processes in artworks, which break
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through in the instant, are their inner historicity, sedimented external history. The binding character of their objectivation as well as the experiences from which they live are collective. The language of artworks is, like every language, consti- tuted by a collective undercurrent , especially in the case of those works popularly stigmatized as lonely and walled up in the ivory tower; the eloquence of their col- lective substance originates in their image character and not in the "testimony"- as the cliche goes-that they supposedly wish to express directly to the collective. The specifically artistic achievement is an overarching binding character to be en- snared not thematically or by the manipulation of effects but rather by presenting what is beyond the monad through immersion in the experiences that are funda- mental to this bindingness. The result of the work is as much the trajectory it traverses to its imago as it is the imago itself as the goal; it is at once static and dynamic. Subjective experience contributes images that are not images ofsome- thing, and precisely they are essentially collective; thus and in no other way is art mediated to experience. By virtue of this experiential content,1O and not primarily as a result of fixation or forming as they are usually conceived, artworks diverge from empirical reality: empiria through empirical deformation. This is the affinity of artworks to the dream, however far removed they are from dreams by their law of form. This means nothing less than that the subjective element of artworks is mediated by their being-in-themselves. The latent collectivity of this SUbjectivity frees the monadological artwork from the accidentalness of its individuation. So- ciety , the determinant of experience , constitutes artworks as their true SUbject; this is the needed response to the current reproach of subjectivism raised to art by both left and right. At every aesthetic level the antagonism between the unreality of the imago and the reality of the appearing historical content is renewed. The aesthetic images, however, emancipate themselves from mythical images by subordinating themselves to their own unreality; that is what the law of form means. This is the artworks' methexis in enlightenment. The view of art as politically engaged or di- dactic regresses back of this stage of enlightenment . Unconcerned with the reality of aesthetic images, this view shuffles away the antithesis of art to reality and in- tegrates art into the reality it opposes. Only those artworks are enlightened that, vigilantly distant from the empirical, evince true consciousness.
That through which artworks, by becoming appearance, are more than they are: This is their spirit. The determination of artworks by spirit is akin to their determi- nation as phenomenon,! ! as something that appears, and not as blind appearance. What appears in artworks and is neither to be separated from their appearance nor to be held simply identical with it- the nonfactual in their facticity - is their spirit. It makes artworks, things among things, something other than thing. In- deed, artworks are only able to become other than thing by becoming a thing, though not through their localization in space and time but only by an immanent process of reification that makes them self-same, self-identical. Otherwise one could not speak of their spirit, that is, of what is utterly unthinglike. Spirit is not
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simply spiritus, the breath that animates the work as a phenomenon; spirit is as much the force or the interior of works, the force of their objectivation; spirit par- ticipates in this force no less than in the phenomenality that is contrary to it. The spirit of artworks is their immanent mediation, which transforms their sensual moments and their objective arrangement; this is mediation in the strict sense that each and every element in the artwork becomes manifestly its own other. The aesthetic concept of spirit has been severely compromised not only by idealism but also by writings dating from the nascence of radical modernism, among them those of Kandinsky. In his justified revolt against sensualism, which even in lugendstil accorded a preponderance to sensual satisfaction, Kandinsky abstractly isolated the contrary of this principle and reified it so that it became difficult to distinguish the "You should believe in spirit" from superstition and an arts-and- crafts enthusiasm for the exalted. The spirit in artworks transcends equally their status as a thing and the sensual phenomenon, and indeed only exists insofar as these are among its elements. Put negatively: In artworks nothing is literal, least of all their words; spirit is their ether, what speaks through them, or, more pre- cisely, what makes artworks become script. Although nothing counts in artworks that does not originate in the configuration of their sensual elements-all other spirit in the artworks, particularly injected philosophical thematics and putatively expressed spirit, all discursive ingredients, are material like colors and tones-the
sensual in artworks is artistic only if in itself mediated by spirit. Even the sensually most dazzling French works achieve their rank by the involuntary transformation of their sensual elements into bearers of a spirit whose experiential content is melancholic resignation to mortal, sensual existence; never do these works relish their suaveness to the full, for that suaveness is always curtailed by the sense of form. The spirit of artworks is objective, regardless of any philosophy of objective or subjective spirit; this spirit is their own content and it passes judgment over them: It is the spirit of the thing itself that appears through the appearance. Its ob- jectivity has its measure in the power with which it infiltrates the appearance. Just how little the spirit of the work equals the spirit of the artist, which is at most one element of the former, is evident in the fact that spirit is evoked through the arti- fact, its problems, and its material. Not even the appearance of the artwork as a whole is its spirit, and least of all is it the appearance of the idea purportedly em- bodied or symbolized by the work; spirit cannot be fixated in immediate identity with its appearance. But neither does spirit constitute a level above or below ap- pearance; such a supposition would be no less of a reification. The locus of spirit is the configuration of what appears. Spirit forms appearance just as appearance forms spirit; it is the luminous source through which the phenomenon radiates and becomes a phenomenon in the most pregnant sense of the word. The sensual ex- ists in art only spiritualized and refracted. This can be elucidated by the category of "critical situation" in important artworks of the past, without the knowledge of which the analysis of works would be fruitless. Just before the beginning of the
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reprise of the first movement of Beethoven's Kreutzer sonata, which Tolstoy defamed as sensuous, the secondary subdominant produces an immense effect. Anywhere outside of the Kreutzer sonata the same chord would be more or less insignificant. The passage only gains significance through its place and function in the movement . It becomes crucially significant in that through its hie et nunc it points beyond itself and imparts the feeling of a critical situation over what pre- cedes and follows it. This feeling cannot be grasped as an isolated sensual quality , yet through the sensual constellation of two chords at a critical point it becomes as irrefutable as only something sensual can be. In its aesthetic manifestation, spirit is condemned to its locus in the phenomenon just as spirits were once thought to have been condemned to their haunts; if spirit does not appear, the artworks are as negligible as that spirit. Spirit is indifferent to the distinction drawn by the history of ideas between sensual and idealistic art. Insofar as there is sensual art, it is not simply sensual but embodies the spirit of sensuality; Wedekind' s concept of car- nal spirit registered this. Spirit, art's vital element, is bound up with art's truth content, though without coinciding with it. The spirit of works can be untruth. For truth content postulates something real as its substance, and no spirit is immedi- ately real . With an ever increasing ruthlessness , spirit determines and pulls every- thing merely sensual and factual in artworks into its own sphere. Artworks thereby become more secular, more opposed to mythology, to the illusion of spirit-even its own spirit-as real. Thus artworks radically mediated by spirit are compelled to consume themselves. Through the determinate negation of the real- ity of spirit, however, these artworks continue to refer to spirit: They do not feign spirit, rather the force they mobilize against it is spirit's omnipresence. Spirit today is not imaginable in any other form; art offers its prototype. As tension be- tween the elements of the artwork, and not as an existence sui generis, art's spirit is a process and thus it is the work itself. To know an artwork means to apprehend this process. The spirit of artworks is not a concept, yet through spirit artworks be- come commensurable to the concept . B y reading the spirit of artworks out of their configurations and confronting the elements with each other and with the spirit that appears in them, critique passes over into the truth of the spirit, which is lo- cated beyond the aesthetic configuration. This is why critique is necessary to the works. In the spirit of the works critique recognizes their truth content or distin- guishes truth content from spirit. Only in this act, and not through any philoso- phy of art that would dictate to art what its spirit must be, do art and philosophy converge .
The strict immanence ofthe spirit of artworks is contradicted on the otherhand by a countertendency that is no less immanent: the tendency of artworks to wrest themselves free of the internal unity of their own construction , to introduce within themselves caesuras that no longer permit the totality of the appearance. Because the spirit of the works is not identical with them, spirit breaks up the objective form through which it is constituted; this rupture is the instant ofapparition. Ifthe
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spirit of artworks were literally identical with their sensual elements and their organization, spirit would be nothing but the quintessence of the appearance: The repudiation of this thesis amounts to the rejection of idealism. If the spirit of art- works flashes up in their sensual appearance, it does so only as their negation: Unitary with the phenomenon, spirit is at the same time its other. The spirit of art- works is bound up with their form, but spirit is such only insofar as it points beyond that form. The claim that there is no difference between articulation and the articulated, between immanent form and content, is seductive especially as an apology for modern art, but it is scarcely tenable. This becomes evident in the realization that technological analysis does not grasp the spirit of a work even when this analysis is more than a crude reduction to elements and also emphasizes the artwork's context and its coherence as well as its real or putative initial con- stituents; it requires further reflection to grasp that spirit. Only as spirit is art the antithesis of empirical reality as the determinate negation of the existing order of the world. Art is to be construed dialectically insofar as spirit inheres in it, without however art's possessing spirit as an absolute or spirit's serving to guarantee an absolute to art. Artworks, however much they may seem to be an entity, crystallize between this spirit and its other. In Hegel's aesthetics the objectivity of the art- work was conceived as the truth of spirit that has gone over into its own otherness and become identical with this otherness. For Hegel, spirit is at one with totality, even with the aesthetic totality. Certainly spirit in artworks is not an intentional particular but an element like every particular constitutive of an artwork; true, spirit is that particular that makes an artifact art, though there is no spirit without its antithesis. In actual fact, history knows no artworks in which there is a pure identity of the spiritual and the nonspiritual. According to its own concept, spirit in artworks is not pure but rather a function of that out of which it arises. Those works that appear to embody such identity and are content with it are hardly ever the most important ones. Granted, that which in artworks is opposed to spirit is in no way the natural aspect of its materials and objects; rather, it is a limit. Materials and objects are as historically and socially preformed as are their methods; they are definitively transformed by what transpires in the works. What is hetero- geneous in artworks is immanent to them: It is that in them that opposes unity and yet is needed by unity if it is to be more than a pyrrhic victory over the unresisting . That the spirit of artworks is not to be equated with their immanent nexus-the
arrangement of their sensual elements-is evident in that they in no way consti- tute that gapless unity, that type of form to which aesthetic reflection has falsely reduced them. In terms of their own structure, they are not organisms; works of the highest rank are hostile to their organic aspect as illusory and affirmative. In all its genres, art is pervaded by intellective elements. It may suffice to note that without such elements, without listening ahead and thinking back, without expec- tation and memory , without the synthesis of the discrete and separate , great musi- cal forms would never have existed. Whereas to a certain extent these functions
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may be attributed to sensual immediacy-that is, that particular complexes of elements incorporate qualities of what is antecedent and forthcoming-artworks nevertheless achieve a critical point where this immediacy ends; where they must be "thought," not in external reflection but on their own terms; the intellective me- diation belongs to their own sensual arrangement and determines their perception. If there is something like a common characteristic of great late works, it is to be sought in the breaking through of form by spirit. This is no aberration of art but rather its fatal corrective. Its highest products are condemned to a fragmentariness that is their confession that even they do not possess what is claimed by the imma- nence of their form.
Objective idealism was the first to stress vigorously the spiritual as against the sensual element of art. It thus equated art' s objectivity with spirit: In thoughtless accord with tradition, idealism identified the sensual with the accidental. Univer- sality and necessity , which for Kant dictate the canon of aesthetic judgment even though they remain problematic, became construable for Hegel by means of the omnipotent category of spirit. The progress of this aesthetics beyond all previous thinking is evident; just as the conception of art was liberated from the last traces of feudal divertissement, its spiritual content, as its principal determination, was at least potentially wrested from the sphere of mere meaning, of intentions. Since Hegel conceives of spirit as what exists in and for itself, it is recognized in art as its substance and not as a thin, abstract layer hovering above it. This is implicit in the definition of beauty as the sensual semblance of the idea. Philosophical ideal- ism, however, was in no way as kindly disposed toward aesthetic spiritualization as the theoretical construction would perhaps indicate. On the contrary, idealism set itself up as the defender of precisely that sensuality that in its opinion was being impoverished by spiritualization; that doctrine of the beautiful as the sen- sual semblance of the idea was an apology for immediacy as something meaning- ful and, in Hegel's own words, affirmative. Radical spiritualization is antithetical to this. This progress had a high price, however, for the spiritual element of art is not what idealist aesthetics calls spirit; rather, it is the mimetic impulse fixated as totality . The sacrifice made by art for this emancipation, whose postulate has been consciously formulated ever since Kant's dubious theorem that "nothing sensu- ous is sublime," 12 is presumably already evident in modernity . With the elimina- tion of the principle of representation in painting and sculpture, and of the ex- ploitation of fragments in music, it became almost unavoidable that the elements set free-colors, sounds, absolute configurations of words-came to appear as if they already inherently expressed something. This is, however, illusory, for the el- ements become eloquent only through the context in which they occur. The super- stitious belief in the elementary and unmediated, to which expressionism paid homage and which worked its way down into arts and crafts as well as into philos- ophy , corresponds to capriciousness and accidentalness in the relation of material and expression in construction. To begin with, the claim that in itself red pos-
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sesses an expressive value was an illusion, and the putative expressive values of complex, multitonal sounds were in fact predicated on the insistent negation of traditional sounds . Reduced to "natural material" all of this is empty, and theories that mystify it have no more substance than the charlatanism of Farbton experi- ments. It is only the most recent physicalism that, in music for instance, carries out a reduction literally to elements: This is spiritualization that progressively exorcises spirit. Here the self-destructive aspect of spiritualization becomes obvi- ous. While the metaphysics of spiritualization has become philosophically ques- tionable, the concept is at the same time too universal to do justice to spirit in art. Nevertheless, the artwork continues to assert itself as essentially spiritual even when spirit is for all intents and purposes no longer to be presupposed as a sub- stance. Hegel's aesthetics does not resolve the question of how it is possible to speak of spirit as a determination of the artwork without hypostatizing its objec- tivity as absolute identity. Thereby the controversy is in a sense referred back to the Kantian court ofjustice. In Hegel, the spirit of art was deducible from the sys- tem as one level of its manifestation and was, as it were, univocal in potentially each and every genre and artwork , but only by relinquishing the aesthetic attribute of ambiguity. Aesthetics is, however, not applied philosophy but rather in itself philosophical . Hegel ' s reflection that "the science of art has greater priority than does art itself"13 is the admittedly problematical product of his hierarchical view of the relation of the domains of spirit to each other. On the other hand, in the face of growing theoretical interest in art, Hegel's theorem of the primacy of science has its prophetic truth in art's need of philosophy for the unfolding of its own con- tent.