There's an absolute
Necessity
for that.
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
And between theseM <<fL'fi two, are there not two Generations, or two pro.
/TM'>>iw>,
_-' -, ' andthatof Cessions? Deathfrom
Whynot? use.
But, fays Socrates, I am about to tell you how the now-mentiohcl Combination stands,and to lliew you the Original and Progress of each of these two
Thingswhich make uptheCompound. Praytell
me how awaking and sleeping are related. Does ? (f%c1""^ notsleepbegetwatchfulness,andwatchingsleep;* eef~
and isnot the generation of sleep, the falling asleep ; and that of watching, the awaking*
All very clear.
Now, pray view the Combination of Life and Death. IsnotDeaththecontraryofLife?
Yes. Anddoesnotonebreedtheother?
Yes, ? WhatisitthatLifebreeds? ? .
Death.
What isitthatDeathbreeds?
Itmustcertainly beLife.
Then, fays Socrates, all living Things and Men -Afuiiv,-oof
are bred from Death. So I think, fays Cebes.
And byConsequence, continues Socrates,ourSouls are lodg'd in the infernal World after our Death.
The Consequence seems just.
But ofthesetwo Generations,one,viz. Death, is very palpable ; it discovers it selfto the Eye, and istouchd bytheHand.
Most certainly.
oftheKe- fitrMm.
G g 4 Shall
? ? V>>4 Phedon : Qr, 4 Dialogue
isDeath Shall not we then attribute to Death the Virtue Aidnotfro-0? prCKiUCing itscontrary, as well as to Life? Or,
f ^ r C " shall we fay, that Nature is lame and maim'd oh
tmewoMthatscore?
bedtfetlirt. There's an absolute necessity, replies Cebes,of
ascribing to Death the Generation of itsContrary. WhatisthatContrary?
Reviving, orreturning toLife.
If there be such a thing as returning to Life, 'tis
nothing else but the Birth of the Dead returning toLife. Andthusweagree,thattheLivingareas much theProductoftheDead,astheDeadareof Living. Which isan incontestable Proof, thatthe Souls of the Dead must remain in some Place or
other,fromwhence theyreturntoLife. That,asItakeit,faysCebet,isaneceflary Con
sequence from the Principles w e have agreed on. And as 1 take it,Cebes, these Principles are well grounded:Consider'emyourself, (a)Ifallthese Contrarieshad not theirProductions and? Generati- \. ons in their turns, which make a Circle, and ifthere
were nothing but one Birth and one direct Pro duction from one to the other Contrary, without the return of the last Conttary to the first that pro- duc'd it5 were it not so, all Things would termi nate in the fame Figure, and be affected in the lame m a n n e r , a n d a t l a s t c e a s e t o b e b o r n . >?
Howdoyoufay,Socrates? "
There's no difficulty in conceiving what I now thelast *"av- *? tner*were notbingbutsleep,andifsleep
Trofosttion. did not produce watching, (b) 'tisplain that every thing would be an Emblem ofthe Fable of Endy- mion, and nothing would be seen any where, because the fame thing must happen to them that happen'd
(a) It Death did not give rife to Life, as Life does to Death, all Things would quickly be at an End, and turnble into theirPrimitive Chaos. . "'
(h) IfLife did not spring from Death, all Things would at lastsleeplikeEndymion,whom,theMoqn lull'deternallya- sleep, according to the Fable. . ' . ? . ? .
to
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul ioj
toQndymion,viz. theymustalwayssleep. Ifevery
thing were mingled, without any subsequent sepa
ration, w e should quickly see Anaxagoras\ Doctrine
fulfiU'd,andallThingsjumbledtogether. Atthe
lame rate,my dear Cebes, ifalllivingThingsdied,TbatUn
and being dead, continued such without reviving,-^ *
wouldnot allThingsunavoidably come toan end^*fj
atlast,insomuch thattherewould notbealivingqmchiy
Thing lestinbeing? For, iflivingThingsdid(c}tumbleinto. notarisefromdead ones,whenthe livingonesdie,their"Pri:
ofnecessityallThingsmustatthelastbeswallow'dTM TM
upbyDeath,and entirelyannihilated.
I t i s n e c e s s a r i l y s o , r e p l i e s C e b e s ? , a l l t h a t y o u
have said seems to be uncontestable.
As I take it, Cebes, there can be no Objection "rucertain
mad? againstthoseTruths5 neitherarewe mistakenthat^ h
i n r e c e i v i n g t h e m ; f o r 'tis c e r t a i n t h e r e is a r e t u r n y e f J t L r e toLife;'tiscertainthatthe LivingriseoutoftheilhJfwIu Dead-, that the Souls departed have a Being, andAwV. upon their return to this Life, the good Souls are <,
in a better , and the bad ones in a worse- Condi- ^XT^fs'"'
, tlOn. ^ seems only
What you now advance, fays Cebes interruptingn ownone Socrates,isonlyanecessary Consequenceofanotherreturnto Principle that I have often heard you lay down, viz. thfcf'^'
That (a) all our acquir'd Knowledge is only Re- ^h'ltoftbe membrance. For, if that Principle be true, we ^<</>>rr<<st*- must necessarily have learn'd at another time what m-
we calltomind inthis. Now that'simpossible,with
out our Soul had a Being before its being invested withthishumanform. So thatthisfamePrinciple, concludes theImmortality of the Soul.
But Cebes, fays Simmiai. interrupting him, what Demonstration havewe ofthatPrinciple? Prayre-
Cfj I've corrected this Passage, by reading ^u)jwmto j for without {/<< 'twas not Sense.
, (a) Socrates made use of that Principle* as being established
to his Hand, and a necessary Consequence os the Creation of
SoulsbeforetheBody. Buthedidnotteachitforacertain ty,aswe (hallseein Mtmm. -. ? -. -. >
-
fresh
? ? I0? Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
freshmy Memory withit,foratpresentitisout
ofmyHead.
There's a very pretty Demonstration for it, re
pliesCebes. AllMenbeingdulyinterrogated,find out all Things of themselves : Which they' could neverdowithoutKnowledgeandrightReason. Put 'em atunawaresupontheFiguresofGeometry, and other things of that nature, they presently perceive
? . '? ;
v. ' that'tisasMssaid.
Simmias,saysSocrates,ifyou willnotrelyupon this Experience, pray try whether the fame method willnotbringyouovertoourSentiments. Doyou find great difficulty in believing that Learning is on
lyRemembring? *. ? . '. . T I do not find very much, replies Simmias ; but i
*? '*? ? wouldgladlylearnthatRemembranceyouspeakof. '. ' BywhatCebeshassaid,Ialmostrememberit,and Ibeginto believeit;butthatshallnot hinderme
? ' " to hear with pleasure the Arguments you can offer
Iarguethus,repliesSocrates. We allagree,that in order to remember, a Man must have known be fore what he then calls to mind.
Most certainly. .
(b) And let us likewise agree upon this, That
? > * Knowledge coming inacertainmanner isRemem brance. Ifay,inacertainmanner;forInstance, when a'Mah by seeing, hearing,or perceiving a thing by any. ofthe Senses, knows what itisthat thus strikesthe Senses; and at the fame time imagines to himself Another thing* independent of that K n o w ledge by Virtue of a quite different Knowledge ; do-ne>twejustlylay,thattheMan remembers the
"ThfogthatcomesthusintohisMind > Howdoyoufay,repliesSimmias?
1 fbssocfjtes's Proofs only conclude a remembrance of things once inown, and afterwards forgot in thisLife ; not of things W d intheotherWorld,fortheSoulisnotcreatedbefore the Body ' This Doctrine of Remembrance is ol admirable use for making out Original Sin, as I sliew'd in the Intro
duction, j say
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 107
I say, replies Socrates, for Example, that we know a Man by one fort ofKnowledge,and a Harp by another.
that's certain, quoth Simmias.
1Well then, continues Socrates, do not you know
what happens to Lovers, when they fee the Harp,
Habit, or any other Thing that their Friends or M i
stressesus'dto makeuse of? Itisjust,asIsaidbut
now. Upon seeingand knowing the Harp, they
form in their Thoughts the Image of the Person to
whom the Harp belongs. This is Remembrance.
Thus it often falls out, that one seeing Simmias, thinksofCeies, IcouldciteathousandotherIn-Byreas? >>
stances. ThisthenisRemembrance,especiallywhenf^'I"*"
theThingscall'dtomind aresuchashadbeenfor-wi>>chn-
gotthroughlengthoftimeorbeingoutoffight. cafion'd That's very certain, quoth Simmias. the! rbeing But,continuesSocrates,upon feeingthePicture1,^*t0~
ofaHorseorHarp,may notonecalltomindthe Man ? And uponseeing thePictureofSimmias,may not one think of Qebes ?
Sure enough, says Simmias.
Much more, continues Socrates,upon seeing the Picture of Simmias, will he call to mind Simmias himself.
A y , w i t h i e a s e .
. " ? . . . -,"
F r o m all these Instances w e infer, that R e m e m
brance isoccasion'd sometimes bythingsthatare? ' ;;
l i k e t h e t h i n g r e m e m b r e d -, a n d s o m e t i m e s b y t h i n g s thatareunlike. Butwhen oneremembersathing by virtue of a likeness, does itnot neceflarily come to pals, that the Mind at first view discovers whe therthe Picture does resemblethe. thing defign'd, lamely or perfectly. . . .
Itmustneedsbe so,repliesSimmias.
? Then pray mind whether your Thoughts ofwhat HtfteJisof
Iamabouttolayagreewithmine. Isnotthereanintdli- something that we call Equality? I do not speakffhlhmt "
oftheequalityobserv'dbetweenoneTreeandano-^;'"
ther, one Stone and another, and several other . ? '? -? '? ' things
? ? |oS
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
things that are alike. I speak of abstracted equa-~
lityofthings. Shallwecallthatiomethingorno
thing ?
Surely,we shouldcallitsomething? ,butthat
willonlycometopasswhenwe meantospeakPhi losophically and of marvellous things.
ButthendoweknowthisEquality?
Without doubt.
BtmtM! t>> (AE)FromwhencedowederivethatKnowledge?
&Tw- *s**nCft^om the thinSswe mention'dbutnow> *ltdgt? (flhu'Tisupon feeing equalTrees,equalStones, andie-
inteiiigibUveralotherthingsofthatnature,thatwe form the ? Totality IdeaofthatEquality,whichis. noteithertheTrees
f^s,jein or the Stones, but something distracted from all
t^World subjects. Do notyou finditsuch>Pray takeno rthstber*? tice. Th$ Stones and the Trees are always the firemust satne, and yet do not they sometimes appear un- krtfnr'd a[ >
sotiltOtlKT. *r, , Sure enough.
What ! Do equalthingsappearunequal? Or,does equality take up the form of unequality ?
By no means,Socrates,
otherwise Then Equality and the thing which is equal are
Quality twodifferentthings.
<<ndi>>eqna- Mostcertainly.
UtyvoM But after all these equal things, which are dis-
jZZ'shL &rent from Equality, furnish us with the Idea and jett5whichKnowledge of that abstractedEquality.
* a con. tradicihit.
That's true, replies Simmias.
she cafeisthefame,whetherthisEqualitybear
a resemblance to the things that occasion'd its Idea, or not.
(<t)Socratesisoutinthinkingto provethattheknowledge of intelligible Qualities was acquir'd in the other World. That Knowledge isthe effectortheLightwithwhichGod illuminates the Soul, or the Tracks of the Impressions that arenotquitedefac'dby Sin:'TistheremainderoftheKnow ledge w e have lost, and of the Perfection w e have forfeited. So that, if the otbtr Lifebe taken in Socrttes's Sense, the Propo sition is false ; if in ours, for the slate of the Soul before Sin, 'tistrue.
? ? rof the immortality of the Soul.
i d g
Most certainly.
When, upon feeing one thing, you call to mind another. 'tisno matterifitbelikeitornot; stillit isremembrance.
Without doubt.
B u t - w h a t shall w e say'to this, continues Socrates ; *5? J/k/<<*-'
w h e n w e behold trees or other things that ate equal, / Z i f ^ w aretheyequal accordingtotheequalityofwhich/0^r/<<st<<* we havetheIdeajornot? thebad.
Very far from it.
u(R)*<*'
Thenweagreeuponthis. WhenaManfeesa thingbeforehim,andthinksitwouldbeequalto anotherthing,butatthefame timeisfarfrombe ing Ibperfectly equal, astheequalityofwhich he hastheIdea:Then,Ilay,(b)hewhothinksthus,
must necessarily have known beforehand this intel lectualBeing which the thingremsembles, butim perfectly.
There's an absolute Necessity for that.
And isnotthecasethefame,when wecompare things equal with the equality >
Sure enough, Socrates.
Then of necessity we must have known that E- quality before the time, in which we firstsaw the equal things, and thereupon thought, that they all
tended to be equal as equality it self, but could not reach it.
That's certain.
But we likewise agree upon this, That this**>>*>*>>>>"- Thought can be deriv'd from nothing else but one? /e V T '
r C r. c r*? i- ? i>><<. <"**theCon- or our benles, trom seeing, touching, or reelmg one/^we y
way or other : And the fame Conclusion will hold dramsfrom.
of all Beings, whether Intellectual or Sensible. All things will equally conclude for what you
design.
Then, 'tis from the Senses themselves that we
(b)Tho'hemusthaveknownit,itdoesnotfollowthat he knew it in the other Life, unless it be thereby meant the very instantof the Creation of the Soul.
*"f^fi-
derive
? ? rj. lp
Phedon : Oy, A Dialogue
derive this Thought ; that all the Objects of our Senses have a tendency towards this intellectual Equality,but comesshortofit. Isitnot?
Yes,without doubt, Socrates.
In effect, Simmias, (a) before we began to fee, . '. . 'feel,oruseourSenses,wemusthavehadtheknow
ledgeofthisintellectualEquality;elsewe could not be capable to compare it with the sensible things, and perceive that they have all a tendency towards it,but fall short of its Perfection.
That's a necessary Consequence from the Pre- v mises.
But is it not certain, That immediately after our Birth,wesaw,weheard,andmadeuseofourother Senses ?
Very true.
Then it follows, that before that time we had the knowledge of that Equality ?
Without doubt.
rbhConfe- (b)AndbyConsequencewewerepossess'dofit fimceis beforewewereborn.
i^we polsess'd Itbefore we were born, then we
knew things before we were born, and immediately afterour birth knew not only what isequal, what great, what small, but all other things of that na ture. For what we now advance ofEquality, is equally applicable to Goodness,Justice,Sanctityj and, in a word, to all other things that have a real
(a)Onemighthaveanswer'd,ThatwehadnotthatKnow
ledge beforewe were born,but receiv'ditafterwardsby
thegradualCommunicationofLightfromGod intotheSoul.
But, as 'tis certain that the Soul was created full of Light
and Perfection, so this Truth was known to the Pagans, and
upon that account Socrates's Friends were oblig'd to assent to
whathesaid. Andafterall,ifbythefirstLireoftheSoul, vwe . understand the very Instant of Creation, or the State of
the Soul before the Fall, the Proposition istrue.
(l>)We ""knewbeforewesinn'djwelostourKnowledge
-bysinning;andre-callitagainby VirtueoftheLightim partedbyGodtotheSon! . ' ,""
? ? w* SoIthink.
enje.
0E*
? ? ofthe Immortality of the Soul. ii%
(^Existence. So that of necessity we must have known all these thingsbefore we came into this World.
That's certain.
And being possess'dofthatKnowledge,ifwe did
not forget apace every Day, we should not only be
bornwithit,butretainitallourlife-time* Forto
know,isonlytopreservetheKnowledgewe have received,andnottoloseit. Andtoforget,isto
lose the Knowledge we enjoy'd before.
That's certain, Socrates.
Now, if, after having possess'd that Knowledge
beforewewereborn,andhavinglostitsince,we come to retrieve it by the ministry of our Senses, which we callLearning! , shall not we justly entitle it Remembrance ?
With a great deal of reason,Socrates.
(d) For we have agreed upon this-, That 'tisvery possible,thataMan seeing,hearing,orperceiving one things by any of his Senses, should frame to himself the imagination of another thing that he had forgot j to which the thing perceiv'd by the Senses has some relation, whether it resembles the
other,ornot. Sothatoneoftwothingsmustne cessarily follow. Either we were born with that Knowledge, and preserv'ditallalong;orelsere trievalitafterwardsbyway ofremembrance. Which ofthesetwo,do you pitchupon,Simmias? ,arewe b o r n w i t h t h a t K n o w l e d g e ; o r d o w e c a l l it t o m i n d after having had it and forgot if?
Indeed Socrates, I do not know which to chuse at present.
(c)The GreekExpositionisveryremarkable;itrunsthus; ThingsuponwhichwehaveputthisStamp,That'tisso. Thatis, to distinguish Things that have a true Existence, from sensi ble Things that have no true Existence. ? >
(d) Twas agreed before, Chat upon seeingone thing we c a l l t o m i n d a n o t h e r u n s e e n ;- a s u p o n s e e i n g a L u t e w e t h i n k of a Mistress ; upon seeing equal Trees, we call to mind Equality. -? -<-
* "<< '*
But
? ? I n
Phedon: (C)r, A Dialogue
inPlato?
t
i
Then you thinkallMen havenotthisKnow
ledge?
No sure.
(a) D o they call to mind then, the things they have known ?
That may be.
At what time did our Souls learn that Know ledge ? Itcannot be since we were Men.
No sure. . ,-. ,. ? ,. . . .
Then it must be some time before that i Yes, without doubt. . .
But mind what I'm about to say to you, and then let's fee which you'll chuse. A Man that knows any thing, can he give a reason of his Knowledge ornot?
Doubtlels he can, Socrates.
Itgreat
Tanegyrickfovwnat we havebeenspeakingof?
2TSE" lwislltheycould'rePliesSimmtas>>bu*I'mafraid
Modesiy tomorrowweshallhavenoneherethat'scapable wasthis tOdoit.
And do you think all Men can give a Reason
xhthisis Andbyconsequence,Simmias,? ,ourSoulshada
*/*#"' Beingbeforethat,time;thatistofay,beforethey ? Prmcipe. wgreinvefte(iwjtnahumaneForm,whiletheywere
without the Body, they thought,they knew and un derstood. ,.
Unless you'll allow, Socrates, that we learn'd it intheMinuteofourBirth. There'snoothertime left- . . . . . ;:,
Beitso,my dearSimmias,(b)butatwhatoth^r
timedid we loseit? Forwe did notbringitinto
(a)IftheyarenotthenbornwiththatKnowledgejthen
t h e y m u s t h a v e f o r g o t it, a n d r e c o v e r ' d it a g a i n b y w a y o f remembrance. A falseConsequence. . . ? <
(b)AlltheHeathen Philosophersareataloss,tofindout the time of thus forgetting. They were sensible that God created the Soul fullof Light ana Understanding, but djd notperceivethatthefirstMan lostfhatLightandKnow ledge by his Rebellion ; and . that if he had continued inno cent, he had transmitted to us those valuable Qualities toge ther with his Innocence; as Well as now he is fallen, ne transmitted to us Obscurity and Sin.
she'
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul.
H >
theWorldwith us,aswe concludedbutnow. Did weloseinthelameMinutethatweobtausdit? Or, can you assign any other time ?
No, Socrates* I did not perceive that what Ilaid was to no purpose.
* Then, Simmiat, this must be a standing Truth 5 That if the Objects of our daily Conversation, have arealExistencejImean, ifJustice,Goodness,and allthatEssencewithwhichwe comparetheObjects
of our Senses; [and which having an Existence before us, proves to be of the fame Nature with our own Essence, andistheStandard bywhichwe measure- a l l t h i n g s -, I f a y , i f a l l t h e s e t h i n g s h a v e a r e a l E $ '
istence,our Soul is likewise entitled to Existence, and t h a t b e f o r e w e w e r e b o r n -, a n d i f t h e s e t h i n g s h a v e rioBeing,thenallourDiscoursesareuseless. Isit not a standing Truth, and withal a just and necefla- ry Consequence, that the Existence of our Souls before our birth, stands and falls with that of those
things ?
ThatConsequence, repliesSimmias^seems tomeTheKarai
te be equally just and wonderful : And the result ofle}" not
thewholeDiscourseaffordssomethingveryglorious^ . ^f
and desirableon our behalf, sinceitconcludes,, that'isgliTL-
before we were born our Souls had an Existence, as%/ areno-
well as that intelligible Essence you mention'd butthinSelse
now. Formypart,Ithinkthere'snothingmores*'-fff
evident, and more sensible, than the Existence oiutlht&ul
all these Things, Goodness, Justice, & c and you have u mt God,
sufficientlymade itout. ? 'tUthercork Now forCebes,ftysSocrates*forCebesmustlike-"fGod'
wise be convine'd.
I believe,replies5/<<? >>? ;dy,tho' he is the stiffest M a n
upon Earth, and very much proofagainst Arguments,
* Socrates means to prove, that as Goodness, Justice, and all those intelligible Beings, which are the Patterns ot the sensi ble and real Beings, subsist intelligibly in God from all Eter nity;soourSoul existsbyitfell,andhasan eternalBeing m the Idea of God j and from this Idea it derives all its Knowledge.
Hh yet
? ? 114
Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
yethellownyourProoftobeveryconvincing. In the mean time, tho11am sufficientlyconvincedthat
ourSoulshadaBeingbeforewewereborn:Ihave not yet heard sufficient Proof, for its continuing af terourDeath. ForthatpopularOpinion,which Cebes mention'd but now, remains in all its force, viz. That after the death ofMan, the Soul disperses andceasestobe. AndindeedIcannotfeewhythe Soul should not be horn, or proceed from lome Part or other, and have a Being before it animates theBody in thisLife;andwhen itremoves from theBody,ceasetobe,andmake itsexitaswellas the Body.
You speakwell,Simmias,faysCebes; tomy mind, Socrates has only prov'd the halfof what he pro- pos'd. Tistrue,hehasdemonstratedthattheSoul has a Being before the Body ; but, to compleat his Demonstration, he should have prov'd that our Soul has an Existence after Death, as well as before this Life.
But I have demonstrated it to you both, replies Socrates-, and you'll be sensible of it, if you join thislastProofwith whatyou acknowledg'dbefore, viz. ThattheLivingrifefromtheDead. *Forif 'tistrue,thatourSoulwasinbeingbeforewe were born;then ofnecessitywhen itcomes tolife,it proceeds,sotospeakfromtheBosom ofDeath-, and w h y should not it lie under the lame necessity of be
ing afterDeath, sinceitmust return to. Life? Thus what you speak of is made out. But I perceive bothofyou desiretofoundthisMattertothebot tom ;and are apprehensive,likeChildren, that,when
the Soul departs the Body, the Winds run away with it and disperse it, especially when a M a n dies in an open Country in a place expos'd to the Winds.
* Tho' our Soul has no being before our coming into the World, yet it continues after Death, since it must return to Life by the Resurrection, and the Living take rise from the Dead. The'defeatofDeathisthetriumphofLife. This Proof of the necessary rile of the Living from the Dead, is an admirable iupport ibr ourChriltian Hope.
Where-
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul.
H J
Whereupon Cebes smiling,replied, Pray then So* crates, try to discuss our Fears, or rather convince us, as if we fear'd nothing : Tho indeed there be someamong uswholieunderthosechildishAppre hensions. PersuadeusthennottofearDeath,asa vain Phantome.
f ' Asforthat,faysSocrates,youmustemploySpellsTMfS? J and Exorcisms every day, till you be cur'd. afms m? Hst
But pray, Socrates, where shall we meet with belook'dfor that excellent Conjurer * since you are going toinJhe,w'("^ leave us > ? sGo<l>
Greeceislargeenough,repliesSocrates,and well'Two*from stor'dwithlearnedMen. Besides,thereareagreat'V**{<*>>-
many barbarous Nations, which you must fcour inTMlalhbar-
order to find out the Conjurer, without sparing either baroat, that Labour or Charges: For you cannot imploy yomhe<i'ri'v'<1
Money inabetter Cause. You mustlikewiselook^J^'jl foroneamongyourselves;for'tispossibletheret? at? * may be none found more capable to perform thoses0>>lUtn.
Enchantments, than your selves.
W e shall obey your Oidexs,Socrates, in looking out
for one : But in the mean while, if you please, let's resume our former Discourse.
With allmy Heart,Cebes.
Well said,Socrates.
*The firstQuestion,we oughttoaskofourselves^
fays Socrates, is, what forts of Things they are that are apt to be dissipated ; j#hat Things are liable to that accident, and what^art ofthose Things? Then we must enquireintothenatureofoutSoul,and form our Fears or Hopes accordingly.
That's very true.
mortal;
Is'it not certain, that only compounded Things,Onlynm- or such as are of a compoundible nature, admit ofp>>>>nded
i ? -l Things can * Hitherto Socrates endeavour'd to make good the Existence naturallj
of Souls before their Bodies, as being a point of the receiv'd ie ^ippa- Theology. AndforasmuchasthePrincipleisseise,'twasu^ impoflible for him to give better proof, since a Lye does not admitofdemonstration. Butnowhe'sabouttomakegcod
the future Existence and Immortality of the Soul, by solid unshaken Arguments*
H h i being
? ? n 6 Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
Headdsm-beingdissipatedatthesame ratethattheywere turally compounded? IfthereareanyuncompoundedBe-
wTiiofGod m&-> t^eJr a^one are free ftom this Accident, and nar maycon- turallyuncapableofdissipation.
troul Wo- That I think is very clear, replies Cebes.
tme. , js jt not very likely, that Things which are al-
Mange,a wavstnefame,andintheiamecondition,arenot
signofcom-atallcompounded ;andthatthosewhichareliable positions. t0perpetualchanges,andareneverthefame,are
certainly compounded >
Iam ofyourmind,Socrates,
intellectual LetusbetakeourselvestotheThingswewere B"nP>&c- speaking of but now, the Existence whereof is ne
ver contested either in Question or Answer \ are these always the same,or do they sometimes change?
Equality, Beauty , (aoodnefs , and every singular T h i n g ? , /'. e . t h e E s s e n c e i t s e l f ; d o t h e s e r e c e i v e t h e
least alteration, or are they so pure and simple that they continue always the fame, without under going the least change ?
O f necessity, replies Cebes, they must cotinue still the fame without alteration.
And all these fine things, fays Socrates, such as Men, Horses, Habits, Movables, and a great many other things of the fame nature, are they entirely opposite to the former, that they never continue in the fame condition, either with reference to them-- selves, or to others-, but are subject: to perpetual alterations. ^
They never continue in the fame condition, re plies Cebes.
N o w these are the things that are visible, touch- . able, or perceptible by some other Sense ; whereas the former, which continue still the fame, can only be reach'd by Thought , as being immaterial and
invisible.
That's true, Socrates.
It' you please, continues Socrates, I'll instance in ? two things, one visible, the other invisible ; one still
the iame, and the other betraying continual altera tions. *' With
? ? ofthe ImmortalityoftheSoul.
117
With all,my Heart,saysCebes. Let'sfeethen;arenotwe compoundedofaBo
dy and a Soul^ or is there any other Ingredient in our Composition ?
No, sure.
Which of the two kinds of things does our Body most resemble ?
AllMenownthatitismostconformabletothe visible fort. . ; c.
Andpray, mydealCebes,isourSoulvisibleor invisible ?
At least, 'tis invisible to Men.
Butwhen wespeakofvisibleorinvisiblethings,Men,'f-
wemeanwithreferencetoMen,withoutmindingv^/a/e any otherNature.
_-' -, ' andthatof Cessions? Deathfrom
Whynot? use.
But, fays Socrates, I am about to tell you how the now-mentiohcl Combination stands,and to lliew you the Original and Progress of each of these two
Thingswhich make uptheCompound. Praytell
me how awaking and sleeping are related. Does ? (f%c1""^ notsleepbegetwatchfulness,andwatchingsleep;* eef~
and isnot the generation of sleep, the falling asleep ; and that of watching, the awaking*
All very clear.
Now, pray view the Combination of Life and Death. IsnotDeaththecontraryofLife?
Yes. Anddoesnotonebreedtheother?
Yes, ? WhatisitthatLifebreeds? ? .
Death.
What isitthatDeathbreeds?
Itmustcertainly beLife.
Then, fays Socrates, all living Things and Men -Afuiiv,-oof
are bred from Death. So I think, fays Cebes.
And byConsequence, continues Socrates,ourSouls are lodg'd in the infernal World after our Death.
The Consequence seems just.
But ofthesetwo Generations,one,viz. Death, is very palpable ; it discovers it selfto the Eye, and istouchd bytheHand.
Most certainly.
oftheKe- fitrMm.
G g 4 Shall
? ? V>>4 Phedon : Qr, 4 Dialogue
isDeath Shall not we then attribute to Death the Virtue Aidnotfro-0? prCKiUCing itscontrary, as well as to Life? Or,
f ^ r C " shall we fay, that Nature is lame and maim'd oh
tmewoMthatscore?
bedtfetlirt. There's an absolute necessity, replies Cebes,of
ascribing to Death the Generation of itsContrary. WhatisthatContrary?
Reviving, orreturning toLife.
If there be such a thing as returning to Life, 'tis
nothing else but the Birth of the Dead returning toLife. Andthusweagree,thattheLivingareas much theProductoftheDead,astheDeadareof Living. Which isan incontestable Proof, thatthe Souls of the Dead must remain in some Place or
other,fromwhence theyreturntoLife. That,asItakeit,faysCebet,isaneceflary Con
sequence from the Principles w e have agreed on. And as 1 take it,Cebes, these Principles are well grounded:Consider'emyourself, (a)Ifallthese Contrarieshad not theirProductions and? Generati- \. ons in their turns, which make a Circle, and ifthere
were nothing but one Birth and one direct Pro duction from one to the other Contrary, without the return of the last Conttary to the first that pro- duc'd it5 were it not so, all Things would termi nate in the fame Figure, and be affected in the lame m a n n e r , a n d a t l a s t c e a s e t o b e b o r n . >?
Howdoyoufay,Socrates? "
There's no difficulty in conceiving what I now thelast *"av- *? tner*were notbingbutsleep,andifsleep
Trofosttion. did not produce watching, (b) 'tisplain that every thing would be an Emblem ofthe Fable of Endy- mion, and nothing would be seen any where, because the fame thing must happen to them that happen'd
(a) It Death did not give rife to Life, as Life does to Death, all Things would quickly be at an End, and turnble into theirPrimitive Chaos. . "'
(h) IfLife did not spring from Death, all Things would at lastsleeplikeEndymion,whom,theMoqn lull'deternallya- sleep, according to the Fable. . ' . ? . ? .
to
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul ioj
toQndymion,viz. theymustalwayssleep. Ifevery
thing were mingled, without any subsequent sepa
ration, w e should quickly see Anaxagoras\ Doctrine
fulfiU'd,andallThingsjumbledtogether. Atthe
lame rate,my dear Cebes, ifalllivingThingsdied,TbatUn
and being dead, continued such without reviving,-^ *
wouldnot allThingsunavoidably come toan end^*fj
atlast,insomuch thattherewould notbealivingqmchiy
Thing lestinbeing? For, iflivingThingsdid(c}tumbleinto. notarisefromdead ones,whenthe livingonesdie,their"Pri:
ofnecessityallThingsmustatthelastbeswallow'dTM TM
upbyDeath,and entirelyannihilated.
I t i s n e c e s s a r i l y s o , r e p l i e s C e b e s ? , a l l t h a t y o u
have said seems to be uncontestable.
As I take it, Cebes, there can be no Objection "rucertain
mad? againstthoseTruths5 neitherarewe mistakenthat^ h
i n r e c e i v i n g t h e m ; f o r 'tis c e r t a i n t h e r e is a r e t u r n y e f J t L r e toLife;'tiscertainthatthe LivingriseoutoftheilhJfwIu Dead-, that the Souls departed have a Being, andAwV. upon their return to this Life, the good Souls are <,
in a better , and the bad ones in a worse- Condi- ^XT^fs'"'
, tlOn. ^ seems only
What you now advance, fays Cebes interruptingn ownone Socrates,isonlyanecessary Consequenceofanotherreturnto Principle that I have often heard you lay down, viz. thfcf'^'
That (a) all our acquir'd Knowledge is only Re- ^h'ltoftbe membrance. For, if that Principle be true, we ^<</>>rr<<st*- must necessarily have learn'd at another time what m-
we calltomind inthis. Now that'simpossible,with
out our Soul had a Being before its being invested withthishumanform. So thatthisfamePrinciple, concludes theImmortality of the Soul.
But Cebes, fays Simmiai. interrupting him, what Demonstration havewe ofthatPrinciple? Prayre-
Cfj I've corrected this Passage, by reading ^u)jwmto j for without {/<< 'twas not Sense.
, (a) Socrates made use of that Principle* as being established
to his Hand, and a necessary Consequence os the Creation of
SoulsbeforetheBody. Buthedidnotteachitforacertain ty,aswe (hallseein Mtmm. -. ? -. -. >
-
fresh
? ? I0? Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
freshmy Memory withit,foratpresentitisout
ofmyHead.
There's a very pretty Demonstration for it, re
pliesCebes. AllMenbeingdulyinterrogated,find out all Things of themselves : Which they' could neverdowithoutKnowledgeandrightReason. Put 'em atunawaresupontheFiguresofGeometry, and other things of that nature, they presently perceive
? . '? ;
v. ' that'tisasMssaid.
Simmias,saysSocrates,ifyou willnotrelyupon this Experience, pray try whether the fame method willnotbringyouovertoourSentiments. Doyou find great difficulty in believing that Learning is on
lyRemembring? *. ? . '. . T I do not find very much, replies Simmias ; but i
*? '*? ? wouldgladlylearnthatRemembranceyouspeakof. '. ' BywhatCebeshassaid,Ialmostrememberit,and Ibeginto believeit;butthatshallnot hinderme
? ' " to hear with pleasure the Arguments you can offer
Iarguethus,repliesSocrates. We allagree,that in order to remember, a Man must have known be fore what he then calls to mind.
Most certainly. .
(b) And let us likewise agree upon this, That
? > * Knowledge coming inacertainmanner isRemem brance. Ifay,inacertainmanner;forInstance, when a'Mah by seeing, hearing,or perceiving a thing by any. ofthe Senses, knows what itisthat thus strikesthe Senses; and at the fame time imagines to himself Another thing* independent of that K n o w ledge by Virtue of a quite different Knowledge ; do-ne>twejustlylay,thattheMan remembers the
"ThfogthatcomesthusintohisMind > Howdoyoufay,repliesSimmias?
1 fbssocfjtes's Proofs only conclude a remembrance of things once inown, and afterwards forgot in thisLife ; not of things W d intheotherWorld,fortheSoulisnotcreatedbefore the Body ' This Doctrine of Remembrance is ol admirable use for making out Original Sin, as I sliew'd in the Intro
duction, j say
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 107
I say, replies Socrates, for Example, that we know a Man by one fort ofKnowledge,and a Harp by another.
that's certain, quoth Simmias.
1Well then, continues Socrates, do not you know
what happens to Lovers, when they fee the Harp,
Habit, or any other Thing that their Friends or M i
stressesus'dto makeuse of? Itisjust,asIsaidbut
now. Upon seeingand knowing the Harp, they
form in their Thoughts the Image of the Person to
whom the Harp belongs. This is Remembrance.
Thus it often falls out, that one seeing Simmias, thinksofCeies, IcouldciteathousandotherIn-Byreas? >>
stances. ThisthenisRemembrance,especiallywhenf^'I"*"
theThingscall'dtomind aresuchashadbeenfor-wi>>chn-
gotthroughlengthoftimeorbeingoutoffight. cafion'd That's very certain, quoth Simmias. the! rbeing But,continuesSocrates,upon feeingthePicture1,^*t0~
ofaHorseorHarp,may notonecalltomindthe Man ? And uponseeing thePictureofSimmias,may not one think of Qebes ?
Sure enough, says Simmias.
Much more, continues Socrates,upon seeing the Picture of Simmias, will he call to mind Simmias himself.
A y , w i t h i e a s e .
. " ? . . . -,"
F r o m all these Instances w e infer, that R e m e m
brance isoccasion'd sometimes bythingsthatare? ' ;;
l i k e t h e t h i n g r e m e m b r e d -, a n d s o m e t i m e s b y t h i n g s thatareunlike. Butwhen oneremembersathing by virtue of a likeness, does itnot neceflarily come to pals, that the Mind at first view discovers whe therthe Picture does resemblethe. thing defign'd, lamely or perfectly. . . .
Itmustneedsbe so,repliesSimmias.
? Then pray mind whether your Thoughts ofwhat HtfteJisof
Iamabouttolayagreewithmine. Isnotthereanintdli- something that we call Equality? I do not speakffhlhmt "
oftheequalityobserv'dbetweenoneTreeandano-^;'"
ther, one Stone and another, and several other . ? '? -? '? ' things
? ? |oS
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
things that are alike. I speak of abstracted equa-~
lityofthings. Shallwecallthatiomethingorno
thing ?
Surely,we shouldcallitsomething? ,butthat
willonlycometopasswhenwe meantospeakPhi losophically and of marvellous things.
ButthendoweknowthisEquality?
Without doubt.
BtmtM! t>> (AE)FromwhencedowederivethatKnowledge?
&Tw- *s**nCft^om the thinSswe mention'dbutnow> *ltdgt? (flhu'Tisupon feeing equalTrees,equalStones, andie-
inteiiigibUveralotherthingsofthatnature,thatwe form the ? Totality IdeaofthatEquality,whichis. noteithertheTrees
f^s,jein or the Stones, but something distracted from all
t^World subjects. Do notyou finditsuch>Pray takeno rthstber*? tice. Th$ Stones and the Trees are always the firemust satne, and yet do not they sometimes appear un- krtfnr'd a[ >
sotiltOtlKT. *r, , Sure enough.
What ! Do equalthingsappearunequal? Or,does equality take up the form of unequality ?
By no means,Socrates,
otherwise Then Equality and the thing which is equal are
Quality twodifferentthings.
<<ndi>>eqna- Mostcertainly.
UtyvoM But after all these equal things, which are dis-
jZZ'shL &rent from Equality, furnish us with the Idea and jett5whichKnowledge of that abstractedEquality.
* a con. tradicihit.
That's true, replies Simmias.
she cafeisthefame,whetherthisEqualitybear
a resemblance to the things that occasion'd its Idea, or not.
(<t)Socratesisoutinthinkingto provethattheknowledge of intelligible Qualities was acquir'd in the other World. That Knowledge isthe effectortheLightwithwhichGod illuminates the Soul, or the Tracks of the Impressions that arenotquitedefac'dby Sin:'TistheremainderoftheKnow ledge w e have lost, and of the Perfection w e have forfeited. So that, if the otbtr Lifebe taken in Socrttes's Sense, the Propo sition is false ; if in ours, for the slate of the Soul before Sin, 'tistrue.
? ? rof the immortality of the Soul.
i d g
Most certainly.
When, upon feeing one thing, you call to mind another. 'tisno matterifitbelikeitornot; stillit isremembrance.
Without doubt.
B u t - w h a t shall w e say'to this, continues Socrates ; *5? J/k/<<*-'
w h e n w e behold trees or other things that ate equal, / Z i f ^ w aretheyequal accordingtotheequalityofwhich/0^r/<<st<<* we havetheIdeajornot? thebad.
Very far from it.
u(R)*<*'
Thenweagreeuponthis. WhenaManfeesa thingbeforehim,andthinksitwouldbeequalto anotherthing,butatthefame timeisfarfrombe ing Ibperfectly equal, astheequalityofwhich he hastheIdea:Then,Ilay,(b)hewhothinksthus,
must necessarily have known beforehand this intel lectualBeing which the thingremsembles, butim perfectly.
There's an absolute Necessity for that.
And isnotthecasethefame,when wecompare things equal with the equality >
Sure enough, Socrates.
Then of necessity we must have known that E- quality before the time, in which we firstsaw the equal things, and thereupon thought, that they all
tended to be equal as equality it self, but could not reach it.
That's certain.
But we likewise agree upon this, That this**>>*>*>>>>"- Thought can be deriv'd from nothing else but one? /e V T '
r C r. c r*? i- ? i>><<. <"**theCon- or our benles, trom seeing, touching, or reelmg one/^we y
way or other : And the fame Conclusion will hold dramsfrom.
of all Beings, whether Intellectual or Sensible. All things will equally conclude for what you
design.
Then, 'tis from the Senses themselves that we
(b)Tho'hemusthaveknownit,itdoesnotfollowthat he knew it in the other Life, unless it be thereby meant the very instantof the Creation of the Soul.
*"f^fi-
derive
? ? rj. lp
Phedon : Oy, A Dialogue
derive this Thought ; that all the Objects of our Senses have a tendency towards this intellectual Equality,but comesshortofit. Isitnot?
Yes,without doubt, Socrates.
In effect, Simmias, (a) before we began to fee, . '. . 'feel,oruseourSenses,wemusthavehadtheknow
ledgeofthisintellectualEquality;elsewe could not be capable to compare it with the sensible things, and perceive that they have all a tendency towards it,but fall short of its Perfection.
That's a necessary Consequence from the Pre- v mises.
But is it not certain, That immediately after our Birth,wesaw,weheard,andmadeuseofourother Senses ?
Very true.
Then it follows, that before that time we had the knowledge of that Equality ?
Without doubt.
rbhConfe- (b)AndbyConsequencewewerepossess'dofit fimceis beforewewereborn.
i^we polsess'd Itbefore we were born, then we
knew things before we were born, and immediately afterour birth knew not only what isequal, what great, what small, but all other things of that na ture. For what we now advance ofEquality, is equally applicable to Goodness,Justice,Sanctityj and, in a word, to all other things that have a real
(a)Onemighthaveanswer'd,ThatwehadnotthatKnow
ledge beforewe were born,but receiv'ditafterwardsby
thegradualCommunicationofLightfromGod intotheSoul.
But, as 'tis certain that the Soul was created full of Light
and Perfection, so this Truth was known to the Pagans, and
upon that account Socrates's Friends were oblig'd to assent to
whathesaid. Andafterall,ifbythefirstLireoftheSoul, vwe . understand the very Instant of Creation, or the State of
the Soul before the Fall, the Proposition istrue.
(l>)We ""knewbeforewesinn'djwelostourKnowledge
-bysinning;andre-callitagainby VirtueoftheLightim partedbyGodtotheSon! . ' ,""
? ? w* SoIthink.
enje.
0E*
? ? ofthe Immortality of the Soul. ii%
(^Existence. So that of necessity we must have known all these thingsbefore we came into this World.
That's certain.
And being possess'dofthatKnowledge,ifwe did
not forget apace every Day, we should not only be
bornwithit,butretainitallourlife-time* Forto
know,isonlytopreservetheKnowledgewe have received,andnottoloseit. Andtoforget,isto
lose the Knowledge we enjoy'd before.
That's certain, Socrates.
Now, if, after having possess'd that Knowledge
beforewewereborn,andhavinglostitsince,we come to retrieve it by the ministry of our Senses, which we callLearning! , shall not we justly entitle it Remembrance ?
With a great deal of reason,Socrates.
(d) For we have agreed upon this-, That 'tisvery possible,thataMan seeing,hearing,orperceiving one things by any of his Senses, should frame to himself the imagination of another thing that he had forgot j to which the thing perceiv'd by the Senses has some relation, whether it resembles the
other,ornot. Sothatoneoftwothingsmustne cessarily follow. Either we were born with that Knowledge, and preserv'ditallalong;orelsere trievalitafterwardsbyway ofremembrance. Which ofthesetwo,do you pitchupon,Simmias? ,arewe b o r n w i t h t h a t K n o w l e d g e ; o r d o w e c a l l it t o m i n d after having had it and forgot if?
Indeed Socrates, I do not know which to chuse at present.
(c)The GreekExpositionisveryremarkable;itrunsthus; ThingsuponwhichwehaveputthisStamp,That'tisso. Thatis, to distinguish Things that have a true Existence, from sensi ble Things that have no true Existence. ? >
(d) Twas agreed before, Chat upon seeingone thing we c a l l t o m i n d a n o t h e r u n s e e n ;- a s u p o n s e e i n g a L u t e w e t h i n k of a Mistress ; upon seeing equal Trees, we call to mind Equality. -? -<-
* "<< '*
But
? ? I n
Phedon: (C)r, A Dialogue
inPlato?
t
i
Then you thinkallMen havenotthisKnow
ledge?
No sure.
(a) D o they call to mind then, the things they have known ?
That may be.
At what time did our Souls learn that Know ledge ? Itcannot be since we were Men.
No sure. . ,-. ,. ? ,. . . .
Then it must be some time before that i Yes, without doubt. . .
But mind what I'm about to say to you, and then let's fee which you'll chuse. A Man that knows any thing, can he give a reason of his Knowledge ornot?
Doubtlels he can, Socrates.
Itgreat
Tanegyrickfovwnat we havebeenspeakingof?
2TSE" lwislltheycould'rePliesSimmtas>>bu*I'mafraid
Modesiy tomorrowweshallhavenoneherethat'scapable wasthis tOdoit.
And do you think all Men can give a Reason
xhthisis Andbyconsequence,Simmias,? ,ourSoulshada
*/*#"' Beingbeforethat,time;thatistofay,beforethey ? Prmcipe. wgreinvefte(iwjtnahumaneForm,whiletheywere
without the Body, they thought,they knew and un derstood. ,.
Unless you'll allow, Socrates, that we learn'd it intheMinuteofourBirth. There'snoothertime left- . . . . . ;:,
Beitso,my dearSimmias,(b)butatwhatoth^r
timedid we loseit? Forwe did notbringitinto
(a)IftheyarenotthenbornwiththatKnowledgejthen
t h e y m u s t h a v e f o r g o t it, a n d r e c o v e r ' d it a g a i n b y w a y o f remembrance. A falseConsequence. . . ? <
(b)AlltheHeathen Philosophersareataloss,tofindout the time of thus forgetting. They were sensible that God created the Soul fullof Light ana Understanding, but djd notperceivethatthefirstMan lostfhatLightandKnow ledge by his Rebellion ; and . that if he had continued inno cent, he had transmitted to us those valuable Qualities toge ther with his Innocence; as Well as now he is fallen, ne transmitted to us Obscurity and Sin.
she'
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul.
H >
theWorldwith us,aswe concludedbutnow. Did weloseinthelameMinutethatweobtausdit? Or, can you assign any other time ?
No, Socrates* I did not perceive that what Ilaid was to no purpose.
* Then, Simmiat, this must be a standing Truth 5 That if the Objects of our daily Conversation, have arealExistencejImean, ifJustice,Goodness,and allthatEssencewithwhichwe comparetheObjects
of our Senses; [and which having an Existence before us, proves to be of the fame Nature with our own Essence, andistheStandard bywhichwe measure- a l l t h i n g s -, I f a y , i f a l l t h e s e t h i n g s h a v e a r e a l E $ '
istence,our Soul is likewise entitled to Existence, and t h a t b e f o r e w e w e r e b o r n -, a n d i f t h e s e t h i n g s h a v e rioBeing,thenallourDiscoursesareuseless. Isit not a standing Truth, and withal a just and necefla- ry Consequence, that the Existence of our Souls before our birth, stands and falls with that of those
things ?
ThatConsequence, repliesSimmias^seems tomeTheKarai
te be equally just and wonderful : And the result ofle}" not
thewholeDiscourseaffordssomethingveryglorious^ . ^f
and desirableon our behalf, sinceitconcludes,, that'isgliTL-
before we were born our Souls had an Existence, as%/ areno-
well as that intelligible Essence you mention'd butthinSelse
now. Formypart,Ithinkthere'snothingmores*'-fff
evident, and more sensible, than the Existence oiutlht&ul
all these Things, Goodness, Justice, & c and you have u mt God,
sufficientlymade itout. ? 'tUthercork Now forCebes,ftysSocrates*forCebesmustlike-"fGod'
wise be convine'd.
I believe,replies5/<<? >>? ;dy,tho' he is the stiffest M a n
upon Earth, and very much proofagainst Arguments,
* Socrates means to prove, that as Goodness, Justice, and all those intelligible Beings, which are the Patterns ot the sensi ble and real Beings, subsist intelligibly in God from all Eter nity;soourSoul existsbyitfell,andhasan eternalBeing m the Idea of God j and from this Idea it derives all its Knowledge.
Hh yet
? ? 114
Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
yethellownyourProoftobeveryconvincing. In the mean time, tho11am sufficientlyconvincedthat
ourSoulshadaBeingbeforewewereborn:Ihave not yet heard sufficient Proof, for its continuing af terourDeath. ForthatpopularOpinion,which Cebes mention'd but now, remains in all its force, viz. That after the death ofMan, the Soul disperses andceasestobe. AndindeedIcannotfeewhythe Soul should not be horn, or proceed from lome Part or other, and have a Being before it animates theBody in thisLife;andwhen itremoves from theBody,ceasetobe,andmake itsexitaswellas the Body.
You speakwell,Simmias,faysCebes; tomy mind, Socrates has only prov'd the halfof what he pro- pos'd. Tistrue,hehasdemonstratedthattheSoul has a Being before the Body ; but, to compleat his Demonstration, he should have prov'd that our Soul has an Existence after Death, as well as before this Life.
But I have demonstrated it to you both, replies Socrates-, and you'll be sensible of it, if you join thislastProofwith whatyou acknowledg'dbefore, viz. ThattheLivingrifefromtheDead. *Forif 'tistrue,thatourSoulwasinbeingbeforewe were born;then ofnecessitywhen itcomes tolife,it proceeds,sotospeakfromtheBosom ofDeath-, and w h y should not it lie under the lame necessity of be
ing afterDeath, sinceitmust return to. Life? Thus what you speak of is made out. But I perceive bothofyou desiretofoundthisMattertothebot tom ;and are apprehensive,likeChildren, that,when
the Soul departs the Body, the Winds run away with it and disperse it, especially when a M a n dies in an open Country in a place expos'd to the Winds.
* Tho' our Soul has no being before our coming into the World, yet it continues after Death, since it must return to Life by the Resurrection, and the Living take rise from the Dead. The'defeatofDeathisthetriumphofLife. This Proof of the necessary rile of the Living from the Dead, is an admirable iupport ibr ourChriltian Hope.
Where-
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul.
H J
Whereupon Cebes smiling,replied, Pray then So* crates, try to discuss our Fears, or rather convince us, as if we fear'd nothing : Tho indeed there be someamong uswholieunderthosechildishAppre hensions. PersuadeusthennottofearDeath,asa vain Phantome.
f ' Asforthat,faysSocrates,youmustemploySpellsTMfS? J and Exorcisms every day, till you be cur'd. afms m? Hst
But pray, Socrates, where shall we meet with belook'dfor that excellent Conjurer * since you are going toinJhe,w'("^ leave us > ? sGo<l>
Greeceislargeenough,repliesSocrates,and well'Two*from stor'dwithlearnedMen. Besides,thereareagreat'V**{<*>>-
many barbarous Nations, which you must fcour inTMlalhbar-
order to find out the Conjurer, without sparing either baroat, that Labour or Charges: For you cannot imploy yomhe<i'ri'v'<1
Money inabetter Cause. You mustlikewiselook^J^'jl foroneamongyourselves;for'tispossibletheret? at? * may be none found more capable to perform thoses0>>lUtn.
Enchantments, than your selves.
W e shall obey your Oidexs,Socrates, in looking out
for one : But in the mean while, if you please, let's resume our former Discourse.
With allmy Heart,Cebes.
Well said,Socrates.
*The firstQuestion,we oughttoaskofourselves^
fays Socrates, is, what forts of Things they are that are apt to be dissipated ; j#hat Things are liable to that accident, and what^art ofthose Things? Then we must enquireintothenatureofoutSoul,and form our Fears or Hopes accordingly.
That's very true.
mortal;
Is'it not certain, that only compounded Things,Onlynm- or such as are of a compoundible nature, admit ofp>>>>nded
i ? -l Things can * Hitherto Socrates endeavour'd to make good the Existence naturallj
of Souls before their Bodies, as being a point of the receiv'd ie ^ippa- Theology. AndforasmuchasthePrincipleisseise,'twasu^ impoflible for him to give better proof, since a Lye does not admitofdemonstration. Butnowhe'sabouttomakegcod
the future Existence and Immortality of the Soul, by solid unshaken Arguments*
H h i being
? ? n 6 Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
Headdsm-beingdissipatedatthesame ratethattheywere turally compounded? IfthereareanyuncompoundedBe-
wTiiofGod m&-> t^eJr a^one are free ftom this Accident, and nar maycon- turallyuncapableofdissipation.
troul Wo- That I think is very clear, replies Cebes.
tme. , js jt not very likely, that Things which are al-
Mange,a wavstnefame,andintheiamecondition,arenot
signofcom-atallcompounded ;andthatthosewhichareliable positions. t0perpetualchanges,andareneverthefame,are
certainly compounded >
Iam ofyourmind,Socrates,
intellectual LetusbetakeourselvestotheThingswewere B"nP>&c- speaking of but now, the Existence whereof is ne
ver contested either in Question or Answer \ are these always the same,or do they sometimes change?
Equality, Beauty , (aoodnefs , and every singular T h i n g ? , /'. e . t h e E s s e n c e i t s e l f ; d o t h e s e r e c e i v e t h e
least alteration, or are they so pure and simple that they continue always the fame, without under going the least change ?
O f necessity, replies Cebes, they must cotinue still the fame without alteration.
And all these fine things, fays Socrates, such as Men, Horses, Habits, Movables, and a great many other things of the fame nature, are they entirely opposite to the former, that they never continue in the fame condition, either with reference to them-- selves, or to others-, but are subject: to perpetual alterations. ^
They never continue in the fame condition, re plies Cebes.
N o w these are the things that are visible, touch- . able, or perceptible by some other Sense ; whereas the former, which continue still the fame, can only be reach'd by Thought , as being immaterial and
invisible.
That's true, Socrates.
It' you please, continues Socrates, I'll instance in ? two things, one visible, the other invisible ; one still
the iame, and the other betraying continual altera tions. *' With
? ? ofthe ImmortalityoftheSoul.
117
With all,my Heart,saysCebes. Let'sfeethen;arenotwe compoundedofaBo
dy and a Soul^ or is there any other Ingredient in our Composition ?
No, sure.
Which of the two kinds of things does our Body most resemble ?
AllMenownthatitismostconformabletothe visible fort. . ; c.
Andpray, mydealCebes,isourSoulvisibleor invisible ?
At least, 'tis invisible to Men.
Butwhen wespeakofvisibleorinvisiblethings,Men,'f-
wemeanwithreferencetoMen,withoutmindingv^/a/e any otherNature.
