No More Learning

Hence after the foregoing he adds: "Nor, when He thirsted, or hungered,
or wept, was the Lord seen to drink, or eat, or grieve. But in order to
prove the reality of the body, the body's customs were assumed, so that
the custom of our body was atoned for by the custom of our nature. Or
when He took drink or food, He acceded, not to the body's necessity,
but to its custom. " And he uses the word "necessity" in reference to
the first cause of these defects, which is sin, as above stated
([4032]Q[14], AA[1],3), so that Christ's flesh is said not to have lain
under the necessity of these defects, in the sense that there was no
sin in it. Hence he adds: "For He" (i. e. Christ) "had a body---one
proper to His origin, which did not exist through the unholiness of our
conception, but subsisted in the form of our body by the strength of
His power. " But as regards the proximate cause of these defects, which
is composition of contraries, the flesh of Christ lay under the
necessity of these defects, as was said above ([4033]Q[14] , A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: Flesh conceived in sin is subject to pain, not
merely on account of the necessity of its natural principles, but from
the necessity of the guilt of sin. Now this necessity was not in
Christ; but only the necessity of natural principles.

Reply to Objection 3: As was said above ([4034]Q[14], A[1], ad 2), by
the power of the Godhead of Christ the beatitude was economically kept
in the soul, so as not to overflow into the body, lest His passibility
and mortality should be taken away; and for the same reason the delight
of contemplation was so kept in the mind as not to overflow into the
sensitive powers, lest sensible pain should thereby be prevented.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there was sorrow in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no sorrow. For it
is written of Christ (Is. 42:4): "He shall not be sad nor troublesome. "

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:21): "Whatever shall
befall the just man, it shall not make him sad. " And the reason of this
the Stoics asserted to be that no one is saddened save by the loss of
his goods. Now the just man esteems only justice and virtue as his
goods, and these he cannot lose; otherwise the just man would be
subject to fortune if he was saddened by the loss of the goods fortune
has given him. But Christ was most just, according to Jer. 23:6: "This
is the name that they shall call Him: The Lord, our just one. "
Therefore there was no sorrow in Him.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 13,14) that all
sorrow is "evil, and to be shunned. " But in Christ there was no evil to
be shunned. Therefore there was no sorrow in Christ.

Objection 4: Furthermore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6):
"Sorrow regards the things we suffer unwillingly. " But Christ suffered
nothing against His will, for it is written (Is. 53:7): "He was offered
because it was His own will. " Hence there was no sorrow in Christ.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even
unto death. " And Ambrose says (De Trin. ii. ) that "as a man He had
sorrow; for He bore my sorrow. I call it sorrow, fearlessly, since I
preach the cross. "

I answer that, As was said above (A[5], ad 3), by Divine dispensation
the joy of contemplation remained in Christ's mind so as not to
overflow into the sensitive powers, and thereby shut out sensible pain.
Now even as sensible pain is in the sensitive appetite, so also is
sorrow. But there is a difference of motive or object; for the object
and motive of pain is hurt perceived by the sense of touch, as when
anyone is wounded; but the object and motive of sorrow is anything
hurtful or evil interiorly, apprehended by the reason or the
imagination, as was said in the [4035]FS, Q[35], AA[2],7, as when
anyone grieves over the loss of grace or money. Now Christ's soul could
apprehend things as hurtful either to Himself, as His passion and
death---or to others, as the sin of His disciples, or of the Jews that
killed Him. And hence, as there could be true pain in Christ, so too
could there be true sorrow; otherwise, indeed, than in us, in the three
ways above stated [4036](A[4]), when we were speaking of the passions
of Christ's soul in general.

Reply to Objection 1: Sorrow was not in Christ, as a perfect passion;
yet it was inchoatively in Him as a "propassion. " Hence it is written
(Mat. 26:37): "He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad. " For "it is
one thing to be sorrowful and another to grow sorrowful," as Jerome
says, on this text.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), "for the
three passions"---desire, joy, and fear---the Stoics held three
{eupatheias} i. e. good passions, in the soul of the wise man, viz. for
desire, will---for joy, delight---for fear, caution. But as regards
sorrow, they denied it could be in the soul of the wise man, for sorrow
regards evil already present, and they thought that no evil could
befall a wise man; and for this reason, because they believed that only
the virtuous is good, since it makes men good, and that nothing is
evil, except what is sinful, whereby men become wicked. Now although
what is virtuous is man's chief good, and what is sinful is man's chief
evil, since these pertain to reason which is supreme in man, yet there
are certain secondary goods of man, which pertain to the body, or to
the exterior things that minister to the body. And hence in the soul of
the wise man there may be sorrow in the sensitive appetite by his
apprehending these evils; without this sorrow disturbing the reason.
And in this way are we to understand that "whatsoever shall befall the
just man, it shall not make him sad," because his reason is troubled by
no misfortune. And thus Christ's sorrow was a propassion, and not a
passion.

Reply to Objection 3: All sorrow is an evil of punishment; but it is
not always an evil of fault, except only when it proceeds from an
inordinate affection. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9):
"Whenever these affections follow reason, and are caused when and where
needed, who will dare to call them diseases or vicious passions? "

Reply to Objection 4: There is no reason why a thing may not of itself
be contrary to the will, and yet be willed by reason of the end, to
which it is ordained, as bitter medicine is not of itself desired, but
only as it is ordained to health. And thus Christ's death and passion
were of themselves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although they were
voluntary as ordained to the end, which is the redemption of the human
race.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there was fear in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no fear in Christ. For it is
written (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a lion, shall be without
dread. " But Christ was most just. Therefore there was no fear in
Christ.

Objection 2: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. x): "I ask those who think
thus, does it stand to reason that He should dread to die, Who by
expelling all dread of death from the Apostles, encouraged them to the
glory of martyrdom? " Therefore it is unreasonable that there should be
fear in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, fear seems only to regard what a man cannot
avoid. Now Christ could have avoided both the evil of punishment which
He endured, and the evil of fault which befell others. Therefore there
was no fear in Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 4:33): Jesus "began to fear and to
be heavy. "

I answer that, As sorrow is caused by the apprehension of a present
evil, so also is fear caused by the apprehension of a future evil. Now
the apprehension of a future evil, if the evil be quite certain, does
not arouse fear. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that we do
not fear a thing unless there is some hope of avoiding it. For when
there is no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered present, and
thus it causes sorrow rather than fear. Hence fear may be considered in
two ways. First, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite naturally shrinks
from bodily hurt, by sorrow if it is present, and by fear if it is
future; and thus fear was in Christ, even as sorrow. Secondly, fear may
be considered in the uncertainty of the future event, as when at night
we are frightened at a sound, not knowing what it is; and in this way
there was no fear in Christ, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23).

Reply to Objection 1: The just man is said to be "without dread," in so
far as dread implies a perfect passion drawing man from what reason
dictates. And thus fear was not in Christ, but only as a propassion.
Hence it is said (Mk. 14:33) that Jesus "began to fear and to be
heavy," with a propassion, as Jerome expounds (Mat. 26:37).

Reply to Objection 2: Hilary excludes fear from Christ in the same way
that he excludes sorrow, i. e. as regards the necessity of fearing. And
yet to show the reality of His human nature, He voluntarily assumed
fear, even as sorrow.

Reply to Objection 3: Although Christ could have avoided future evils
by the power of His Godhead, yet they were unavoidable, or not easily
avoidable by the weakness of the flesh.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there was wonder in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no wonder. For the
Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2) that wonder results when we see an
effect without knowing its cause; and thus wonder belongs only to the
ignorant. Now there was no ignorance in Christ, as was said A[3].
Therefore there was no wonder in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that
"wonder is fear springing from the imagination of something great"; and
hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man
does not wonder. " But Christ was most magnanimous. Therefore there was
no wonder in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, no man wonders at what he himself can do. Now
Christ could do whatsoever was great. Therefore it seems that He
wondered at nothing.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 8:10): "Jesus hearing this," i. e.
the words of the centurion, "marveled. "

I answer that, Wonder properly regards what is new and unwonted. Now
there could be nothing new and unwonted as regards Christ's Divine
knowledge, whereby He saw things in the Word; nor as regards the human
knowledge, whereby He saw things by infused species. Yet things could
be new and unwonted with regard to His empiric knowledge, in regard to
which new things could occur to Him day by day. Hence, if we speak of
Christ with respect to His Divine knowledge, and His beatific and even
His infused knowledge, there was no wonder in Christ. But if we speak
of Him with respect to empiric knowledge, wonder could be in Him; and
He assumed this affection for our instruction, i. e. in order to teach
us to wonder at what He Himself wondered at. Hence Augustine says
(Super Gen. Cont. Manich. i, 8): "Our Lord wondered in order to show us
that we, who still need to be so affected, must wonder. Hence all these
emotions are not signs of a disturbed mind, but of a master teaching. "

Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was ignorant of nothing, yet new
things might occur to His empiric knowledge, and thus wonder would be
caused.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ did not marvel at the Centurion's faith as
if it was great with respect to Himself, but because it was great with
respect to others.

Reply to Objection 3: He could do all things by the Divine power, for
with respect to this there was no wonder in Him, but only with respect
to His human empiric knowledge, as was said above.
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Whether there was anger in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no anger in Christ. For it is
written (James 1:20): "The anger of man worketh not the justice of
God. " Now whatever was in Christ pertained to the justice of God, since
of Him it is written (1 Cor. 1:30): "For He [Vulg. : 'Who'] of God is
made unto us . . . justice. " Therefore it seems that there was no anger
in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, anger is opposed to meekness, as is plain from
Ethic. iv, 5. But Christ was most meek. Therefore there was no anger in
Him.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "anger that
comes of evil blinds the eye of the mind, but anger that comes of zeal
disturbs it. " Now the mind's eye in Christ was neither blinded nor
disturbed. Therefore in Christ there was neither sinful anger nor
zealous anger.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 2:17) that the words of Ps. 58:10,
"the zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," were fulfilled in Him.

I answer that, As was said in the [4037]FS, Q[46], A[3], ad 3, and
[4038]SS, Q[158], A[2], ad 3, anger is an effect of sorrow. or when
sorrow is inflicted upon someone, there arises within him a desire of
the sensitive appetite to repel this injury brought upon himself or
others. Hence anger is a passion composed of sorrow and the desire of
revenge. Now it was said [4039](A[6]) that sorrow could be in Christ.
As to the desire of revenge it is sometimes with sin, i. e. when anyone
seeks revenge beyond the order of reason: and in this way anger could
not be in Christ, for this kind of anger is sinful. Sometimes, however,
this desire is without sin---nay, is praiseworthy, e. g. when anyone
seeks revenge according to justice, and this is zealous anger. For
Augustine says (on Jn. 2:17) that "he is eaten up by zeal for the house
of God, who seeks to better whatever He sees to be evil in it, and if
he cannot right it, bears with it and sighs. " Such was the anger that
was in Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v), anger is in man in
two ways---sometimes it forestalls reason, and causes it to operate,
and in this way it is properly said to work, for operations are
attributed to the principal agent. It is in this way that we must
understand that "the anger of man worketh not the justice of God. "
Sometimes anger follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument, and
then the operation, which pertains to justice, is not attributed to
anger but to reason.

Reply to Objection 2: It is the anger which outsteps the bounds of
reason that is opposed to meekness, and not the anger which is
controlled and brought within its proper bounds by reason, for meekness
holds the mean in anger.

Reply to Objection 3: In us the natural order is that the soul's powers
mutually impede each other, i. e. if the operation of one power is
intense, the operation of the other is weakened. This is the reason why
any movement whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered by reason,
dims the mind's eye of him who contemplates. But in Christ, by control
of the Divine power, "every faculty was allowed to do what was proper
to it," and one power was not impeded by another. Hence, as the joy of
His mind in contemplation did not impede the sorrow or pain of the
inferior part, so, conversely, the passions of the inferior part
no-wise impeded the act of reason.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not at once a wayfarer and a
comprehensor. For it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the end
of beatitude, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the
end. Now to be moving towards the end and to be resting in the end
cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be at once
wayfarer and comprehensor.

Objection 2: Further, to tend to beatitude, or to obtain it, does not
pertain to man's body, but to his soul; hence Augustine says (Ep. ad
Dios. cxviii) that "upon the inferior nature, which is the body, there
overflows, not indeed the beatitude which belongs to such as enjoy and
understand, the fulness of health, i. e. the vigor of incorruption. " Now
although Christ had a passible body, He fully enjoyed God in His mind.
Therefore Christ was not a wayfarer but a comprehensor.

Objection 3: Further, the Saints, whose souls are in heaven and whose
bodies are in the tomb, enjoy beatitude in their souls, although their
bodies are subject to death, yet they are called not wayfarers, but
only comprehensors. Hence, with equal reason, would it seem that Christ
was a pure comprehensor and nowise a wayfarer, since His mind enjoyed
God although His body was mortal.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 14:8): "Why wilt Thou be as a
stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge? "

I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tending to beatitude,
and a comprehensor from having already obtained beatitude, according to
1 Cor. 9:24: "So run that you may comprehend [Douay: 'obtain']"; and
Phil. 3:12: "I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend [Douay:
'obtain']". Now man's perfect beatitude consists in both soul and body,
as stated in the [4040]FS, Q[4], A[6]. In the soul, as regards what is
proper to it, inasmuch as the mind sees and enjoys God; in the body,
inasmuch as the body "will rise spiritual in power and glory and
incorruption," as is written 1 Cor. 15:42. Now before His passion
Christ's mind saw God fully, and thus He had beatitude as far as it
regards what is proper to the soul; but beatitude was wanting with
regard to all else, since His soul was passible, and His body both
passible and mortal, as is clear from the above [4041](A[4]; Q[14],
AA[1],2). Hence He was at once comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the
beatitude proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, inasmuch
as He was tending to beatitude, as regards what was wanting to His
beatitude.

Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible to be moving towards the end and
resting in the end, in the same respect; but there is nothing against
this under a different respect---as when a man is at once acquainted
with what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what he
does not know.

Reply to Objection 2: Beatitude principally and properly belongs to the
soul with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say,
instrumentally, bodily goods are required for beatitude; thus the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8), that exterior goods minister
"organically" to beatitude.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no parity between the soul of a saint
and of Christ, for two reasons: first, because the souls of saints are
not passible, as Christ's soul was; secondly, because their bodies do
nothing by which they tend to beatitude, as Christ by His bodily
sufferings tended to beatitude as regards the glory of His body.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO CHRIST IN HIS BEING AND BECOMING
(TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the consequences of the union; and first as to
what belongs to Christ in Himself; secondly, as to what belongs to
Christ in relation with His Father; thirdly, as to what belongs to
Christ in relation to us.

Concerning the first, there occurs a double consideration. The first is
about such things as belong to Christ in being and becoming; the second
regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether this is true: "God is man"?

(2) Whether this is true: "Man is God"?

(3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man?

(4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Son
of God, and conversely?

(5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the
Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of God of the human nature?

(6) Whether this is true: "The Son of God was made man"?

(7) Whether this is true: "Man became God"?

(8) Whether this is true: "Christ is a creature"?

(9) Whether this is true: "This man," pointing out Christ, "began to
be"? or "always was"?

(10) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is a creature"?

(11) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is God"?

(12) Whether this is true: "Christ as man is a hypostasis or person"?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether this is true: "God is man"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "God is man. " For every
affirmative proposition of remote matter is false. Now this
proposition, "God is man," is on remote matter, since the forms
signified by the subject and predicate are most widely apart.
Therefore, since the aforesaid proposition is affirmative, it would
seem to be false.

Objection 2: Further, the three Divine Persons are in greater mutual
agreement than the human nature and the Divine. But in the mystery of
the Incarnation one Person is not predicated of another; for we do not
say that the Father is the Son, or conversely. Therefore it seems that
the human nature ought not to be predicated of God by saying that God
is man.

Objection 3: Further, Athanasius says (Symb. Fid. ) that, "as the soul
and the flesh are one man, so are God and man one Christ. " But this is
false: "The soul is the body. " Therefore this also is false: "God is
man. "

Objection 4: Further, it was said in the [4042]FP, Q[39], A[4] that
what is predicated of God not relatively but absolutely, belongs to the
whole Trinity and to each of the Persons. But this word "man" is not
relative, but absolute. Hence, if it is predicated of God, it would
follow that the whole Trinity and each of the Persons is man; and this
is clearly false.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:6,7): "Who being in the form of
God . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in
the likeness of man, and in habit found as a man"; and thus He Who is
in the form of God is man. Now He Who is in the form of God is God.
Therefore God is man.

I answer that, This proposition "God is man," is admitted by all
Christians, yet not in the same way by all. For some admit the
proposition, but not in the proper acceptation of the terms. Thus the
Manicheans say the Word of God is man, not indeed true, but fictitious
man, inasmuch as they say that the Son of God assumed an imaginary
body, and thus God is called man as a bronze figure is called man if it
has the figure of a man. So, too, those who held that Christ's body and
soul were not united, could not say that God is true man, but that He
is figuratively called man by reason of the parts. Now both these
opinions were disproved above ([4043]Q[2], A[5];[4044] Q[5], A[1]).

Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of man, but deny
the reality on the part of God. For they say that Christ, Who is God
and man, is God not naturally, but by participation, i. e. by grace;
even as all other holy men are called gods---Christ being more
excellently so than the rest, on account of His more abundant grace.
And thus, when it is said that "God is man," God does not stand for the
true and natural God. And this is the heresy of Photinus, which was
disproved above ([4045]Q[2], AA[10],11). But some admit this
proposition, together with the reality of both terms, holding that
Christ is true God and true man; yet they do not preserve the truth of
the predication. For they say that man is predicated of God by reason
of a certain conjunction either of dignity, or of authority, or of
affection or indwelling. It was thus that Nestorius held God to be
man---nothing further being meant than that God is joined to man by
such a conjunction that man is dwelt in by God, and united to Him in
affection, and in a share of the Divine authority and honor. And into
the same error fall those who suppose two supposita or hypostases in
Christ, since it is impossible to understand how, of two things
distinct in suppositum or hypostasis, one can be properly predicated of
the other: unless merely by a figurative expression, inasmuch as they
are united in something, as if we were to say that Peter is John
because they are somehow mutually joined together. And these opinions
also were disproved above ([4046]Q[2], AA[3],6).

Hence, supposing the truth of the Catholic belief, that the true Divine
Nature is united with true human nature not only in person, but also in
suppositum or hypostasis; we say that this proposition is true and
proper, "God is man"---not only by the truth of its terms, i. e. because
Christ is true God and true man, but by the truth of the predication.
For a word signifying the common nature in the concrete may stand for
all contained in the common nature, as this word "man" may stand for
any individual man. And thus this word "God," from its very mode of
signification, may stand for the Person of the Son of God, as was said
in the [4047]FP, Q[39], A[4]. Now of every suppositum of any nature we
may truly and properly predicate a word signifying that nature in the
concrete, as "man" may properly and truly be predicated of Socrates and
Plato. Hence, since the Person of the Son of God for Whom this word
"God" stands, is a suppositum of human nature this word man may be
truly and properly predicated of this word "God," as it stands for the
Person of the Son of God.

Reply to Objection 1: When different forms cannot come together in one
suppositum, the proposition is necessarily in remote matter, the
subject signifying one form and the predicate another. But when two
forms can come together in one suppositum, the matter is not remote,
but natural or contingent, as when I say: "Something white is musical. "
Now the Divine and human natures, although most widely apart,
nevertheless come together by the mystery of the Incarnation in one
suppositum, in which neither exists accidentally, but [both]
essentially. Hence this proposition is neither in remote nor in
contingent, but in natural matter; and man is not predicated of God
accidentally, but essentially, as being predicated of its
hypostasis---not, indeed, by reason of the form signified by this word
"God," but by reason of the suppositum, which is a hypostasis of human
nature.

Reply to Objection 2: The three Divine Persons agree in one Nature, and
are distinguished in suppositum; and hence they are not predicated one
of another. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the natures, being
distinct, are not predicated one of the other, in the abstract. For the
Divine Nature is not the human nature. But because they agree in
suppositum, they are predicated of each other in the concrete.

Reply to Objection 3: "Soul" and "flesh" are taken in the abstract,
even as Godhead and manhood; but in the concrete we say "animate" and
"carnal" or "corporeal," as, on the other hand, "God" and "man. " Hence
in both cases the abstract is not predicated of the abstract, but only
the concrete of the concrete.

Reply to Objection 4: This word "man" is predicated of God, because of
the union in person, and this union implies a relation. Hence it does
not follow the rule of those words which are absolutely predicated of
God from eternity.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether this is true: "Man is God"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Man is God. " For God is
an incommunicable name; hence (Wis. 13:10; 14:21) idolaters are rebuked
for giving the name of God, which is incommunicable, to wood and
stones. Hence with equal reason does it seem unbecoming that this word
"God" should be predicated of man.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is predicated of the predicate may be
predicated of the subject. But this is true: "God is the Father," or
"God is the Trinity. " Therefore, if it is true that "Man is God," it
seems that this also is true: "Man is the Father," or "Man is the
Trinity. " But these are false. Therefore the first is false.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ps. 80:10): "There shall be no new
God in thee. " But man is something new; for Christ was not always man.
Therefore this is false: "Man is God. "

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 9:5): "Of whom is Christ according
to the flesh, Who is over all things, God blessed for ever. " Now
Christ, according to the flesh, is man. Therefore this is true: "Man is
God. "

I answer that, Granted the reality of both natures, i. e. Divine and
human, and of the union in person and hypostasis, this is true and
proper: "Man is God," even as this: "God is man. " For this word "man"
may stand for any hypostasis of human nature; and thus it may stand for
the Person of the Son of God, Whom we say is a hypostasis of human
nature. Now it is manifest that the word "God" is truly and properly
predicated of the Person of the Son of God, as was said in the
[4048]FP, Q[39], A[4]. Hence it remains that this is true and proper:
"Man is God. "

Reply to Objection 1: Idolaters attributed the name of the Deity to
stones and wood, considered in their own nature, because they thought
there was something divine in them. But we do not attribute the name of
the Deity to the man in His human nature, but in the eternal
suppositum, which by union is a suppositum of human nature, as stated
above.

Reply to Objection 2: This word "Father" is predicated of this word
"God," inasmuch as this word "God" stands for the Person of the Father.
And in this way it is not predicated of the Person of the Son, because
the Person of the Son is not the Person of the Father. And,
consequently, it is not necessary that this word "Father" be predicated
of this word "Man," of which the Word "God" is predicated, inasmuch as
"Man" stands for the Person of the Son.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the human nature in Christ is something
new, yet the suppositum of the human nature is not new, but eternal.
And because this word "God" is predicated of man not on account of the
human nature, but by reason of the suppositum, it does not follow that
we assert a new God. But this would follow, if we held that "Man"
stands for a created suppositum: even as must be said by those who
assert that there are two supposita in Christ [*Cf. [4049] Q[2],
AA[3],6].
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Whether Christ can be called a lordly man?

[*The question is hardly apposite in English. St. Thomas explains why
we can say in Latin, e. g. 'oratio dominica' (the Lord's Prayer) or
'passio dominica' (Our Lord's Passion), but not speak of our Lord as
'homo dominicus' (a lordly man)].

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ can be called a lordly man. For
Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "we are to be counseled to
hope for the goods that were in the Lordly Man"; and he is speaking of
Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ was a lordly man.

Objection 2: Further, as lordship belongs to Christ by reason of His
Divine Nature, so does manhood belong to the human nature. Now God is
said to be "humanized," as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii,
11), where he says that "being humanized manifests the conjunction with
man. " Hence with like reason may it be said denominatively that this
man is lordly.

Objection 3: Further, as "lordly" is derived from "lord," so is Divine
derived from "Deus" [God]. But Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iv) calls Christ
the "most Divine Jesus. " Therefore with like reason may Christ be
called a lordly man.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 19): "I do not see that we
may rightly call Jesus Christ a lordly man, since He is the Lord
Himself. "

I answer that, As was said above (A[2], ad 3), when we say "the Man
Christ Jesus," we signify the eternal suppositum, which is the Person
of the Son of God, because there is only one suppositum of both
natures. Now "God" and "Lord" are predicated essentially of the Son of
God; and hence they ought not to be predicated denominatively, since
this is derogatory to the truth of the union. Hence, since we say
"lordly" denominatively from lord, it cannot truly and properly be said
that this Man is lordly, but rather that He is Lord. But if, when we
say "the Man Christ Jesus," we mean a created suppositum, as those who
assert two supposita in Christ, this man might be called lordly,
inasmuch as he is assumed to a participation of Divine honor, as the
Nestorians said. And, even in this way, the human nature is not called
"divine" by essence, but "deified"---not, indeed, by its being
converted into the Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with the
Divine Nature in one hypostasis, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide
Orth. iii, 11,17).

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine retracts these and the like words
(Retract. i, 19); hence, after the foregoing words (Retract. i, 19), he
adds: "Wherever I have said this," viz. that Christ Jesus is a lordly
man, "I wish it unsaid, having afterwards seen that it ought not to be
said although it may be defended with some reason," i. e. because one
might say that He was called a lordly man by reason of the human
nature, which this word "man" signifies, and not by reason of the
suppositum.

Reply to Objection 2: This one suppositum, which is of the human and
Divine natures, was first of the Divine Nature, i. e. from eternity.
Afterwards in time it was made a suppositum of human nature by the
Incarnation. And for this reason it is said to be "humanized"---not
that it assumed a man, but that it assumed human nature. But the
converse of this is not true, viz. that a suppositum of human nature
assumed the Divine Nature; hence we may not say a "deified" or "lordly"
man.

Reply to Objection 3: This word Divine is wont to be predicated even of
things of which the word God is predicated essentially; thus we say
that "the Divine Essence is God," by reason of identity; and that "the
Essence belongs to God," or is "Divine," on account of the different
way of signifying; and we speak of the "Divine Word," though the Word
is God. So, too, we say "a Divine Person," just as we say "the person
of Plato," on account of its different mode of signification. But
"lordly" is not predicated of those of which "lord" is predicated; for
we are not wont to call a man who is a lord, lordly; but whatsoever
belongs to a lord is called lordly, as the "lordly will," or the
"lordly hand," or the "lordly possession. " And hence the man Christ,
Who is our Lord, cannot be called lordly; yet His flesh can be called
"lordly flesh" and His passion the "lordly passion. "
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Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature cannot
be said of God. For contrary things cannot be said of the same. Now,
what belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper to God,
since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the
human nature to be created temporal and mutable. Therefore what belongs
to the human nature cannot be said of God.

Objection 2: Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems to be
derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now what
pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer,
to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human
nature can nowise be said of God.

Objection 3: Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet
it does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature
cannot be said of God.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "God
assumed the idioms," i. e. the properties, "of flesh, since God is said
to be passible, and the God of glory was crucified. "

I answer that, On this question there was a difference of opinion
between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide words
predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained to human
nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as pertained to
the Divine Nature should not be predicated of the Man. Hence Nestorius
said: "If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to the Word, let him
be anathema" [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 29]. But if there are
any words applicable to both natures, of them they predicated what
pertained to both natures, as "Christ" or "Lord. " Hence they granted
that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity; but
they did not say that God was born of a virgin, or that the Man was
from eternity. Catholics on the other hand maintained that words which
are said of Christ either in His Divine or in His human nature may be
said either of God or of man. Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus,
Part I, ch. 26]: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or substances,"
i. e. hypostases, "such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic
Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of
Himself, and believes that some are to be applied to the Man, and
apportions some to the Word alone---let him be anathema. " And the
reason of this is that, since there is one hypostasis of both natures,
the same hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus
whether we say "man" or "God," the hypostasis of Divine and human
nature is signified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs to
the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of God
may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of
human nature.

Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which
something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what
the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being
predicated. Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of
Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are predicated,
since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of
Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that belong to the human nature
are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Hence Augustine says (De
Trin. i, 11): "We must distinguish what is said by Scripture in
reference to the form of God, wherein He is equal to the Father, and
what in reference to the form of a servant, wherein He is less than the
Father": and further on he says (De Trin. i, 13): "The prudent,
careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point of view of
what is said. "

Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible for contraries to be predicated
of the same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being
predicated of the same in different aspects. And thus contraries are
predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.

Reply to Objection 2: If the things pertaining to defect were
attributed to God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since
it would be derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of wrong done
to God if they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a
discourse of the Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. 10] it is said:
"God accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man's salvation.
For no lowliness that He assumed for us injures that Nature which can
be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its own, to save our
nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless things do no harm to
the Divine Nature, but bring about our salvation, how dost thou
maintain that what was the cause of our salvation was the occasion of
harm to God? "

Reply to Objection 3: To be assumed pertains to human nature, not in
its suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not belong to God.
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Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of the Divine
Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature can be
said of the Divine Nature. For what belongs to the human nature is
predicated of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own Nature.
Therefore, what belongs to the human nature may be predicated of the
Divine Nature.

Objection 2: Further, the flesh pertains to human nature.