No More Learning

Aside from this there is only an occa- uotul citation of passages on which the author supports an inter- prrtation differing from that ordinarily adopted. The choice of material has fallen everywhere on what individual thinkers have produced that was new and fruitful, while purely individual turns °f thought, which may indeed be a welcome object for learned rnearch, but afford no philosophical interest, have found at most » brief mention.
philosophy,
ix
x Author's
Preface.
As is shown even by the external form of the exposition, chief emphasis has been laid upon the development of what is weightiest from a philosophical standpoint: the history of problems and concej- tions. To understand this as a connected and interrelated whole has been my chief purpose. The historical interweaving of the various lines of thought, out of which our theory of the world and life has grown, forms the especial object of. my work, and I am convinced that this problem is to be solved, not by any a priori logical construction, but only by an all-sided, unprejudiced investi gation of the facts. If in this exposition a relatively large part of the whole seems to be devoted to antiquity, this rests upon the
conviction that for a historical understanding of our intellectual existence, the forging out of the conceptions which the Greek mind wrested from the concrete reality found in Nature and human life, is more important than all that has since been thought —the Kantian philosophy excepted.
The task thus set required, however, a renunciation which no one can regret more than myself. The purely topical treatment of the historical movement of philosophy did not permit of giving to the personality of the philosophers an impressiveness corre sponding to their true worth. This could only be touched upon where it becomes efficient as a causal factor in the combination and transformation of ideas. The aesthetic fascination which dwells in the individual nature of the great agents of the movement, and which lends its especial charm to the academic lecture, as well as to the more extended exposition of the history of philosophy, l»ad to be given up here in favour of a better insight into the pragmatic necessity of the mental process.
Finally, I desire to express at this place also my lively gratitude to my colleague, Dr. Hensel, who has not only aided me with a part of the proofs, but has also essentially increased the usefulness of the book by a subject index.
Stkassbuko, November, 1891.
WILHELM WINDELBAND.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION •<*«<o.
A lahoe edition of my History of Philosophy had been exhausted more than two years ago, and in the meantime its use had been further extended by English and Russian translations. This per mits me to assume that the new treatment which I gave to the subject has filled an existing gap, and that the synoptical and criti cal method which I introduced
principle is concerned. While therefore I could leave the book unhanged in its main outlines when preparing this new edition, I could be all the more careful in making evidently needed improve ments and in fulfilling certain specific requests.
L'nder the head of improvements I have undertaken such correc tions, condensations, and expansions upon particular points as are requisite for a text-book which seeks to represent the present condi tion of investigation, and in this work the literature which has appeared since the first edition has been utilised. In consequence '■f the great condensation of material the exposition had become sometimes difficult to follow, and 1 have aimed in many cases to give more fluent form to the expression by breaking up some of the longer sentences, and occasionally omitting what was of merely sec ondary importance.
A desire has been expressed by readers of the book for a more extended notice of the personalities and personal relations of the I'tnlosophers. In the preface to my first edition I had myself r*i-'<mised the justice of this demand, but had disclaimed the inten tion of satisfying it because the special plan of my work and the
limitations of space prevented. Now I have sought to fulfil this demand so far as it has seemed possible within the bait of my work, by giving brief and precise characterisations of the most important thinkers.
A desire for a more extended treatment of the philosophers of the nineteenth century has also been reckoned with. The few pages originally accorded to the subject have been expanded to three times the former compass, and I hope that although one will miss one
necessary
has gained approval so far as the
xii Author's
Preface.
topic and another another, it will nevertheless be possible to gain fairly complete general view of the movements of philosophy dow to the more immediate present, in so far as this is to be expecte
from a history of principles. >
Finally, I have remade the subject index, and so expanded i
•
that in connection with the text it may, as I hope, have the value c a dictionary of the history of philosophy. This gives to my work second distinctive feature; namely, that of a work of reference c a systematic and critical sort.
By all these expansions the size of the book has been considerabl increased, and I express here to my esteemed publisher, Dr. Siebecl my heartiest gratitude for the cordial response with which he ha made possible these essential improvements.
Strassbubq, September, 1900.
WILHELM WINDKLBAND.
INTRODUCTION.
$ I. Name and Conception of Philosophy
■2•. The History of Philosophy
? 3. Division of Philosophy and of its History
PiOI
18 . . . . . . . . . 1
$ 9. { 10. 1 11. 1 12. S 13.
Metaphysics grounded anew by Epistemology and Ethics . 104 The System of Materialism 109 The System of Idealism 116 The Aristotelian Logic 182 The System of Development 139
PART II.
CONTENTS.
PART I.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS.
ImoDUCTiOH
Ciatter I. The Cosmological Period
{ 4. Conceptions of Being
f 5. Conceptions of the Cosmic Processes or Becoming { 8. Conceptions of Cognition
Chapter II. The Anthropological Period
§ 7. The Problem of Morality { 8. The Problem of Science .
Chapter III. The Systematic Period
8
23 . . . 27 31
47 57
•. . 66
72 87
09
THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY. Ietrodoction 155 Cramer I. The Ethical Period 159
f 14. f 15. 1 16.
i 17.
The Ideal of the Wise Man 163 Mechanism and Teleology 178 The Freedom of the Will and the Perfection of the Uni
verse
The Criteria of Truth
xiii
180 197
xiv
Contents.
Chapter
§ 18. § 19. § 20. § 21.
II. The
Religious
run Period 210
Authority and Revelation 219 Spirit and Matter 229 God and the World 235 The Problem of the World's History 255
•. PART III.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIDDLE AGES. Introduction
263
Chapter
. . . . . . . 270 276
287 301
. . . . 310 328 The Problem of Individuality . 337
PART IV.
First Period
22. The Metaphysics of Inner Experience
The Controversy over Universals 24. The Dualism of Body and Soul
§23.
Chapter II. Second Period
i" "^
25. 26.
$27.
The Realm of Nature and the Realm of Grace . . . . . 318
The Primacy ot the Will or of the Intellect
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE RENAISSANCE. Introduction
Chapter The Humanistic Period
28. The Struggle between the Traditions 29. Macrocosm and Microcosm
Chapter
30.
§31. 32.
II. The Natural Science Period
The Problem of Method Substance and Causality Natural Right
. . PARTV.
337 36(3
37>
383 300 425
437
• .
. 48*5
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT. Introduction
Chapter
Theoretical Questions
. . . . . . . . 447 4<>».
33. Innate Ideas
34. Knowledge of the External World
Natural Religion
. . . . . ;449
§35.
. ; . . . .
'. . . . * 348 352
:
:
§§§§§§§§§
§
I.
I.
I.
,
■") "i
Content* x\
PAGE Chapter II. Practical Questions 500
i 36. The Principles of Morals 502 $ 37. The Problem of Civilisation 518
PART VI.
THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHY.
I. vrtoDfCTio. v 629 Chapter I. Kant's Critique of the Reason 532
§ 3K. § 39. § 40.
The Object of Knowledge 537 The Categorical Imperative 551 Natural Purposiveness 559
Chapter II. The Development of Idealism 568
f 41. 5 42. J 43.
The Thing-in-itself 573 The System of Reason 590
The Metaphysics of the Irrational 615
PART VII.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. I. xtrodcction 623
j 44. 5 45. i 46.
A moron Inu
The Controversy over the Soul 634 Nature and History 648 The Problem of Values 660
68=5 699
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
INTRODUCTION.
$ 1. The Name and Conception of Philosophy.
K. Haym, Art. Philosophic in Ersch und Grllber's Encyclopadie, III. Abth. , Bd. 24.
W. Windelband, PraeludUn (Freiburg i. B. , 1884), 1 £f. [A. Seta, Art. Philosophy In Enc. Brit. ']
[G. T. Ladd, Introduction to Philosophy. N. Y. 1891. ]
By philosophy present usage understands the scientific treatment of the general questions relating to the universe and human life.
Individual philosophers, according to the presuppositions with
which they have entered upon their work, and the results which they have reached in have sought to change this indefinite idea common to all, into more precise definitions,1 which in part diverge so widely that the common element in the conception of the science may seem lost But even the more general meaning given above
itself limitation and transformation of the original significance which the Greeks connected with the name philosophy, — limita tion snd transformation brought about by the whole course of the in tellectual and spiritual life of the West, and following along with the same.
While in the first appearance in literature' of the words ^AarD^cTr" and 4*A<xro(£i'a the simple and at the same time indefinite meaning, striving after wisdom," may still be recognised, the word '• philosophy " in the literature after Socrates, particularly in the school of Plato and Aristotle, acquired the fixed significance accord-
Ched in detail in Ueberweg-Heinze, Grundriss der GeschichU der Philoso- t*>*. [Eng. trans. Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, trans, by G. S.
Mark N. Y. 1871. ]
Herodotus, 30 and 60 Thucydides, n. 40 and frequently also even in
Has, «. #. Apol. 29 Lysis, 218 A Symp. 202 ff.
; 1
I. ;
K
;
;
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11
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2 Introduction.
ing to which it denotes exactly the same as the German wor
gated and known. 3
With this first theoretical meaning of the word "philosophy"
second was very early associated. The development of Gree philosophy came at the time when the naive religious and ethics consciousness was in process of disintegration. This not onl made the questions as to man's vocation and tasks more and mor important for scientific investigation (cf. below, Part I. ch. 2), bn also made instruction in the right conduct of life appear as a essential aim, and finally as the main content of philosophy o science. Thus philosophy in the Hellenistic period received th practical meaning of an art of life, based upon scientific principles * - a meaning for which the way had already been prepared by th Sophists and Socrates.
In consequence of this change, purely theoretical interest passe over to the particular " philosophies," which now in part assume the names of their special subjects of research, historical or belong ing to natural science, while mathematics and medicine kept all th more rigorously that independence which they had possessed froi the beginning with relation to science in general. 5 The name o philosophy, however, remained attached to those scientific effort which hoped to win from the most general results of human know! edge a conviction for the direction of life, and which finally culm nated in the attempt (made by Neo-Platonism) to create from sue a philosophy a new religion to replace the old that had been lost. '
" Wissenschaft. " '
According to this meaning philosophy in general is the methodical work of thought, through which we are to kno' that which "is"; individual "philosophies" are the particular sc ences in which individual realms of the existent are to be invest
1 A conception which it is well known is of much greater compass than tl English and French " science. " [In this translation the words " science " an " scientific " are used in this larger sense. The term " natural science " will I used for the narrower meaning which " science " alone often has. If it she ml serve to remind the beginner that philosophy and scientific thought should t one, and that natural science is not ali of science, it may be of value. ]
a Plato, Rep. 480 B ; Aristotle, Met. VI. 1, 102Ba 18.
8 Plato, Thecal. 143 D. Aristotle sets the doctrine "of Being as such" (tl
later so-called Metaphysics) as " First Philosophy " over against the othi "philosophies," and distinguishes further theoretical and practical " philosi phy. " In one passage {Met. I. 6, 087 a 29) he applies the plural <t>i\oao<plai ah to the different systems of science which have followed in historical successioi as we should speak of the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, etc.
* Cf. the definition of Epicurus in Sex,. Emp. Adv. Math. XI. 169, and c the other hand that of Seneca, Epist. 89.
6 Cf. below, Part I.
6 Hence Proclus, for example, would prefer to have philosophy calls theology.
i . j Name and Conception of Philosophy. 3
There was at first little change in these relations, when the remains ■f wcient science passed over into the culture of the present peoples "f Europe as the determining forces of their intellectual life. Con- tat and task of that which the Middle Ages called philosophy coin- oied with the conception held by later antiquity. 1 And yet the
^<ining of philosophy underwent an essential change by finding pklosophy's task already performed, in a certain sense, by religion. For religion, too, afforded not only a sure conviction as a rule for •. . » guidance of personal life, but also in connection with this, a gen-
enl theoretical view of all reality, which was the more philosophical a its character, as the dogmas of Christianity had been formulated entirely under the influence of ancient philosophy. Under these
—umstances, during the unbroken dominance of Church doctrine, '■beet remained for philosophy, for the most part, only the position at i handmaid to ground, develop, and defend dogma scientifically. fat just by this means philosophy came into a certain opposition to xhfoiogy as regards method ; for what the latter taught on the cmaad of divine revelation, the former was to win and set forth by was of human knowledge. 1
Bat the infallible consequence of this relation was, that the freer mfandual thinking became in its relation to the Church, the more "sdependently philosophy began the solution of the problem which the had in common with religion ; from presentation and defence of 4-Ktriae she passed to its criticism, and finally, in complete inde pendence of religious interests, sought to derive her teaching from thftoorce* which she thought she possessed in the "natural light"
'■naian reason and experience. 3 The opposition to theology, as '-Zkidi methods, grew in this way to an opposition in the subject saner, and modern philosophy as " world-wisdom " set itself over ajvact Church dogma. 4 However manifold the aspects which this •>ac. n took on, shading from a clinging attachment to a passionate 'toiict, the office of " philosophy " remained always that which
•ft. , for example, Augustine. Solil. I. 7 ; Cnnf. V. 7; Scotus Erigena, De :•' hrnUn I. 1 (MUjne. 358) ; Anselm Pmalog. , ch. 1. (Migne, I. 227) ; I'naid. Imtrod. in Theol. II. 3 ; Raymundus Lullus, De Quinque Sap. 8.
: 7V. ma» Aquinas, Xumma Theol. I. 32, 1 ; Contr. Gent. I. 8 II. ff. '•-. a Voto. . . . Op. Or. qu. Durand de l'ourcain, In Sent- Prol. , qu. t-irniadiu of Sabunde, Theol. Natur. Prooem.
"-tar. Valla. Dialect. Dirp. III. 9; B. Telesio, De Ant. Her. Prooem. ; Ft. ^=i. De Auym. III. (Works, Spedding, 639 = 111. 336); Taurellus, <***-« Triumph. 1; Paracelsus, Paragr. (ed. JBuser) II. 23 G. Bruno, '*■-« '«■*«. etc. , IV. 107 (Lagarde,«I. it*) HoBbe\De Corpor. (Works, ■ «w»ima,
and
"karaetrristic definitions, on the one hand, in Gottsched, Ertte Griinde drr
f. ).
r**m*un WeltireUheit (Leips. 1756), pp. 97 ff. on the other hand, in the *"■*» naotophie, in the Encyrloprdie (Vol. XXV. pp. 632 ff).
■'
I. 2
I. 6
I. ;
;
I.
f. ;
f. ,
1
I. 3,
4 ;
8 ;;
1
I Introduction.
antiquity had assigned to to supply from scientific insight foundation for theory of the world and of human life, where relig ion was no longer able to meet this need, or at least to meet alone In the conviction that was equal to this task, the philosophy the eighteenth century, like that of the Greeks, considered
right and duty to enlighten men with regard to the nature of things and from this position of insight to rule the life of the individua and of society.
In this position of self-security philosophy was shaken by Kant who demonstrated the impossibility of philosophical (». «. meta physical) knowledge of the world beside of or above the individua sciences, and thereby restricted once more the conception and th< task of philosophy for after this quitclaim the realm of philosophy as a particular science, was narrowed to just that critical consideratim by Reason of itself, from which Kant had won his decisive insight, am which needed only to be extended systematically to activities othei than that of knowing. With this function could be united whal Kant called the universal or cosmical conception of philosophy, — its vocation in the practical direction of life.
It to be sure, far from true that this new and apparently final conception of philosophy gained universal acceptance at once. It rather the case that the great variety of philosophical movements the nineteenth century has left no earlier form of philosophy unre
and that a luxuriant development of the "metaphysical need " even brought back, for time, the inclination to swallow up all human knowledge in philosophy, and complete this again as at all-embracing science.
In view of these mutations through which the meaning of the word " philosophy " has passed in the course of time, seems im practicable to pretend to gain a general conception of philosophy from historical comparison. None of those brought forward for this purpose* apply to all those structures of mental activity which lay claim to the name. Even the subordination of philosophy undei the more general conception " science " questionable in the cas* of those types of teaching which place one-sided emphasis on th<
Critique of Pure Season, A. 830 B. 866.
Schopenhauer, World as Will and Idea, Vol. II. ch. 17.
Instead of criticising particular conceptions sufficient here to point
the widely diverging formulas in which the attempt has been made to perforn this impossible task cf. , for example, only the introductions to works such a> those of Krdmann, Ueberweg, Kuno Fischer, Zeller, etc. All these conception thus determined apply only in so far as the history of philosophy has yieldec the result which they express, but they do not apply with reference to the inten tions expressed by the philosophers themselves.
peated,
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is
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i Name and Conception Philosophy.
practical significance of their doctrine still less can we define the subject-matter and form of philosophy considered as special meat*, in a way that shall hold good for all cases. For even aside from the primitive or the revived standpoint for which philosophy 11 universal science,' the attempts to limit are extremely vari- oa The problems of natural science form at first almost the sole uojeets of interest for philosophy, then for long period are in-
•iided in its scope, and do not separate from until modern times. History, on the other hand, has remained an object of indifference to :u*t philosophical systems, and has emerged as an object of philo sophical investigation relatively late and in isolated cases. Meta- pCTiical doctrines, again, in which the centre of philosophy asaally sought, we see either pushed one side at important turning- (ttatt in history or declared to be entirely impossible and at sues the ability of philosophy to determine the life of the indi- T>lBal or of society emphasised, proud standpoint of pure theory ias renounced such a menial occupation. 4
From still another side has been claimed that philosophy treats *i* same subjects as the other sciences, but in another sense and by uother method but neither has this specific characteristic of form iustorical universality. That there no such acknowledged his torical method would of course be no objection only the endeavour iter each a method were a constant characteristic of all philoso- pssea This is, however, so far from being the case that in fact but philosophers imprint on their science the method of other iaciplines, e. g. of mathematics or of investigation of nature,1 while ■•tiers will have nothing at all to do with methodical treatment of their problems, and regard the philosophic activity as analogous to ue creations of genius in art.
explained also the fact that there
which
U* of definition valid for all history. Where philosophy presents iaelf as the universal science, the other sciences appear only as its
sore or less distinctly separated parts. * Where, on the contrary, /fcjosophy assigned the task of grasping the results of the par-
- to In the case of the majority of the philosophers of later antiquity. a* for Cnr. Wolf cf. his Logiea, JJ 29 ff. "
*Tfcs» m especially the case where philosophy regarded solely as science •fwcaitton. " Cf. , e. g. , W. Hamilton in his notes to Reid's works, II. 808. tM( the French at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of this oen- ^"7. pkfloeophy = analfte de Ventendement humain.
*. #. with Plotinos.
•» DiMcaitea and Bacon.
•*. for example, in the Hegelian system.
From these circumstances
Jso fixed relation
of philosophy
to the other
sciences,
capa-
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6 Introduction.
ticular sciences in their general significance, and harmonising them into a comprehensive knowledge of the world, we have as the result peculiarly complex relations : in the first place, a dependence ol philosophy upon the existing condition of insight reached in the par ticular disciplines — a dependence which expresses itself principally in the furtherance of philosophy by the prominent advances made by individual sciences;1 in the next place, an influence in the opposite direction, when philosophy takes part in the work of the particular sciences.