As dualism the truth of the antithesis of divine and
temporal
authority is cast beyond man, who is deemed to be the one at fault here, to the perfection of a being beyond man.
Education in Hegel
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I-Philosophy 151
to the life that alienates freedom from political reason. She must remain free only in the sense that she must find new ways to display her power of attraction over her man, a power which, as Rousseau makes clear, is abso- lutely grounded in her powerlessness.
Thus, while Emile has reason without the experience of political actuality, Sophie has the experience of political unfreedom without reason. Yet per- haps remarkably, there is an Aufhebung in Emile. Rousseau points out that it is in the unity of these differences between Emile and Sophie that power and powerlessness are both developed and re-formed. The power of Emile discovers its dependence upon Sophie, and in turn the powerlessness of Sophie recognizes the power that it holds over Emile. There is also recollec- tion in Emile, for Rousseau has his student come to thank him for the formative experiences he has engineered for him, seeing in hindsight how necessary they were. However, Emile has not been educated for the world as it is and will not comprehend freedom except in his relation to Sophie, but even here the freedom of the master is the freedom that has exported its own truth in vulnerability to the other, to Sophie. The return of this vulnerability, and the formal equality of Emile and Sophie remained beyond Rousseau's time.
Adulthood
The adult enjoys the certainty of himself as at one with the realities of the social world. He is reason that is in and for itself, for there is no contradic- tion between his own idea of himself and the idea that the world has of him. His thought of reality and his own lived reality are no longer at odds with each other. This is where the doubts and uncertainties of youth are sublated into the positive unity of the I and his world. This world is his world and, having negated the illusory freedom he had as a youth, where the real world was merely a beyond, it now reinforces the freedom of the sovereign ratio- nal person who is one among other such sovereign rational persons. Thus, the education of youth to adulthood becomes fixed as the rite of passage into the reality of the social world, a reality in which the I knows its respon- sibilities for work, family and community.
However, the adult seldom remembers the path that has led to this new certainty, and therefore this I appears as a natural standpoint. It forgets that the truth of reason lies in the experiences that have formed it. This is never more obvious than in the relation between adult and youth. The adult forgets his own youth when educating his children, and is particularly
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agitated with the 'attitude' of youth. It is also the case that youth cannot understand the adult for the former has not travelled the path that deter- mines the adult. Thus the adult forgets that the child moves from sense-certainty to ego-certainty, and that with the latter there is a freedom from the world that allows comment and criticism upon it without the binds of commitment to it.
There seems to be here an implicit conservatism in adulthood, particu- larly in the demand for the youth to become adult and to accept his responsibilities. This returns the I from its idealistic freedom to its complic- ity within the world it rejects. Yet Hegel does not see this conformism as suppressing entirely the possibility of new meaning in the world. In the adulthood of civil society there remains scope for 'honourable, far reaching and creative activity [for this is not] a dead, absolutely inert world but, like the life-process, a world which perpetually creates itself anew, which while merely preserving itself, at the same time progresses' (1990: 62-63, zusatz). This is the nature of the Aufhebung in Hegelian philosophical education. It is where change is arbitrary, even terroristic, unless it is able to preserve what it negates in a new, developed and negated form.
This, indeed, is the integrity of the Aufhebung; that it neither wholly dis- cards its previous shapes nor imports into itself anything from outside that will suppress the immanent power to educate and develop. Thus, the nature of 'change' that the spiritual education of the adult brings about is an edu- cation, also, about what 'change' means. We might say here that spiritual education requires one always to understand the nature of change within development, culture and Aufhebung so that one's natural consciousness does not act blindly in the world against the actuality of change and often therein against the very people one intends to benefit. This integrity is the subjective substance of the education of youth into adulthood. Thus, Hegel says, 'on the one hand we can say that the man only creates what is already there; yet on the other hand, his activity must also bring about an advance' (1990: 63, zusatz). This ambivalence is the protection against terror and has that protection as part of the change it brings about. The integrity is the ambivalence, and it is what makes youth despair of the seeming indiffer- ence of the adult world to real social change.
As reason, then, the adult can only see youth as yet to understand the totality or the real world, and is impatient at the arrogance of the self- consciousness that knows so much only because it knows so little. But the certainty of the adult now fares little better, and will undergo its own experi- ences of failures, negations and transitions. Having forgotten the path to
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adulthood, the adult is reason only immediately as far as the child and the youth are concerned, and they experience this adult as thinking himself right without having to justify this. This is reason without reason, and is the immediate appearance of the authority of the adult, an empirical but not (yet) a spiritual authority. But immediate reason cannot withstand the rela- tion to itself that thought brings about here. It cannot remain unchanged by the demand that it justify itself universally, for this means that the univer- sality of the adult must become an object for him, and therefore separated from him. The adult is called upon to think its own universality, a contradic- tion that defeats itself. Just as in the life and death struggle life made its negation other to it, so the adult here makes his negation other to him. This is the same negation that realized itself as reason out of its own unhap- piness regarding its relation to the true. Thus it makes external the experi- ence that it depends upon. It externalizes its own truth. As such, this truth appears as an object over and against it as universal law. Law here is to rea- son and the adult what death is to life. Both the adult and life have to find themselves again in that which they have eschewed. Law, a universality, is other to the adult whose truth it is. As such, this other is all rational self- conscious adults. The truth of the adult therefore is other people. This is reason as social relation, or ethical life, or again, as society. Only when the adult learns that he is this same relation to himself as he is to other people will his spiritual education be recollected by spirit as its own development. It is this spiritual education of the adult in relation to society that we will now follow.
Of course, this is not the first time that self-consciousness has become aware of ethical or social life. Indeed, as we will see in a moment, ethical life has been present throughout its education. The point is, however, that they are separated in our account of this education because that is the structure of our modern experience of spirit, that is, that the I is claimed and opposed by the political totality in which it finds itself. It is this experience, now, that will begin a new education for the adult. His relation to others has always been formative for him, but now he must recollect the ways in which this has been so. What lies ahead for this reflective person is an education about how universality as other has also grown and developed spiritually. In a sense the education of the adult must begin again, in the childhood and youth of spirit. The adult, who judges the youth, must now judge himself in the same terms, that is, about how much he knows because of how little he knows. Thus this education begins negatively with the loss of the certainty of the rational person to the totality of ethical or social life.
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I As We
Spiritual education, like that of personal education, takes its beginning from the reflective mind of the adult. This adult now seeks to understand how his dependency upon others - the We - compromises his individual sovereignty. In essence this is a sociological education. There are two truths in this sentence. His education is sociological because it is dualistic. He is trying to comprehend how society or social forms relate to the I as its truth. This means that the reflective I is still posited as that from which the enquiry into society can begin, as it was in beginning its enquiry into itself. Dualism is built in to the very structure of such a sociological enquiry, but whilst dualism carries out the enquiry, it leaves its own presupposition of itself out of the enquiry. In other words, the essence of sociological enquiry is illu- sory. This is the second truth in the sentence that in essence this is a sociological education. There is, therefore, a third partner in this sociology. There is the consciousness that knows sociology to be compromised by its own standpoint. This education teaches that the standpoint of the reflective I and of his object of study is not just a study of the contingency of the for- mer upon the latter. It is also a study carried out by contingency in the form of the dualism of self and society. The shapes that this latter contingency takes, the shapes of illusion, are the shapes of spirit now in the Phenomenol- ogy. They are present only in the ways in which they are posited. This third partner is veiled and hard to see, but it remains the meaning and the signifi- cance, the actuality, of dualism. It is this triadic relation that is intended by the dualism of I-philosophy. The third partner is present in appearing to be absent. It takes the wisdom of old age to come to know this third partner as the truth of its other 'truthful' appearances.
We will begin now to look at spirit's education regarding its own develop- ment. We will follow this education through the same phases of childhood and youth, although this time in the way they express themselves as social or collective forms rather than in individual consciousness, self-conscious- ness and reason. Nevertheless we are still following this education in the way it appears in and to the modern reflective subject. It is this subject that has the following spiritual experiences, and it is only as a result of this edu- cation that we will be able to refer this sociological education as really a spiritual education, for although they are all shapes of spirit, this only appears in the spirit's recollection of itself in its old age. Equally we will see the same structure of immediacy, mediation and Aufhebung moving this
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greater significance only when they become what is recollected. Childhood
Spirit's immediacy is, like the consciousness of the child, only knowable to itself in a recollection that knows it to be lost. In the Phenomenology this immediacy is already the collapse of consciousness as the divine law and custom of Hellenic city-states, where spirit as the child is the tradition that binds together all its members in a common substance.
For our reflective subject these 'natural' social relationships begin in the immediate relations of the individual and ethical life, that is, as love in the family and as law in custom and tradition. When these immediacies hold the individual at one with the collective through feeling and emotion, and see such allegiance as virtue, then the nation becomes a family and shared blood becomes the tie of the social bond. But the consciousness of the people, if it is to ground its sovereignty objectively, must be thought of as something permanent and sustainable in the world beyond its immediate perception and understanding of itself. This process becomes even more urgent as the immediacy of the collective bond comes into contact with other such bonds in the world. This life and death struggle of immediacies is already the end of immediate 'natural' social life and is the beginning of political life. The mind that survives the struggle exports the death of itself as other than itself, which helps in turn to define this community against that community. But it is already too late for immediate ethical life here, for the child comes to see that it, the social collective, cannot sustain itself in feelings and emotions against this will becoming self-conscious. All ethical immediacies are in this sense the spirit of the child, a spirit which carries the fundamental ambivalence of immediate belonging and life in relation to otherness. Even though the other to the collective can be used to strengthen the intensity of the immediate bond, nevertheless in the other of ethical immediacy - and other here means both the other to immediacy and the otherness of immediacy to itself - the seeds of the collapse of imme- diate ethical life are already present. The natural ethical life cannot hold out against its division into otherness, a division that at first is concrete as the I of its citizens and as the law that recognizes them.
Youth
Youthful spirit takes its beginning in the certainty of the law that guarantees the rights of the person. This law is property law because the sovereignty of
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the person is based on the exclusion from him of the vulnerability that would compromise his legal identity. This is passed to non-persons, that is, to objects and to men deemed no better than objects. This certainty, how- ever, cannot be at peace with itself. The law is a form of universality that, in eschewing vulnerability as other, denies to itself the means by which its vul- nerability might come to know itself. Spirit, here, is an alienation of itself from itself. Divine law is the truth of the vulnerability alienated from itself and become absolutely other to the truth of the legal person. This person thus enters a period of most unhappy education in which political truth cannot be reconciled with divine truth, and where all attempts at trying to do God's work on earth merely emphasizes and repeats their separation. This is experienced as dualism but is accompanied by the third partner who is present not as the two sides of the separation, but as the relation they continually misrecognize.
As dualism the truth of the antithesis of divine and temporal authority is cast beyond man, who is deemed to be the one at fault here, to the perfection of a being beyond man. Here, the alienation of freedom from itself finds truth in the only place it can, in a beyond that transcends all human imperfection. The result is a world in which truth is absent from real life and demands that it be established there. But all attempts to do so remain unaware of the third partner in the relationship. Hence they can only repeat, but not re-form, the pre-existing relation between God and man. The result is that all attempts to establish God's will and law on earth collapse in on themselves because they are only human attempts. Faith in the work goes hand-in-hand with lawlessness on earth and the result is barbarism. The harder faith struggles to bring God to earth, the greater the barbarity.
Youthful spirit mirrors here the unhappy youth of self-consciousness. The latter existed in the rupture between inner freedom and outer authority. Now, the legal person is caught between an idea of truth that is beyond him, and beyond everyone else, and a life where it becomes impossible to act for the good. It is not necessary that this person believes in God (though he may do) for that is not the philosophical significance of this form of ethical life. The significance here is Bildung, that is, the education of the reflective adult about the third partner than can express for him the contradictions in his life. His good actions turn out bad results, his noble actions turn out ignoble, his attempts to act beyond self-interest turn against themselves, each reinforcing the feeling that it is impossible to act in the world accord- ing to a good that seems to be possible only in the world beyond human weakness. He may retain faith in the idea of the good, or he may despair
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completely of the good and see intrigue as a fair response to a hopeless situ- ation abandoned by God.
It is the third partner, however, that is to prove more powerful than either of these responses. Spirit is present here as the appearance of an alienation of itself, that is, as a diremption between God and man. This appearance is known precisely in the contradictions that plague the person. His failed attempts to reform the world re-form him in and as the culture of spirit.
It is here that the reflective adult who is sceptical regarding the possibility of any common bond between his self-interest and the community will learn that this is precisely what he does have in common with everyone else. His education here is that the good act is always compromised in being enacted. Self-interest is inescapable. This self-interest and the hypocrisy of the self- less act are the new spiritual universality. It is how this person now realizes that he is in fact part of objective social life. His complicity is his new educa- tion and it is an education, again, in the hypocrisy of the stance that holds itself separate from social life. The good act cannot hide from the hypocrisy of its self-interest, but equally, self-interest cannot hide from its need for social life. This is a new shape of spirit. On the one hand, it commits to reason the superstitions that have been employed by faith in bringing God's law to earth. On the other hand, it also commits to reason the hypocrisies of earthly authorities in masking self-interest behind spiritual benevolence. Youthful spirit now finds equality and universality out of its own self-oppositions. This shape of spirit is the enlightenment of spirit that it is the work of true universality when it opposes pseudo-universality. The person now knows the third partner in ethical life has all along been spirit in which the I and the We are always related, even at those times when that relation is obscured behind the intrigue of seemingly benevolent self-interest. He knows now that wars of self-interest are barbarism but he knows also that there exists a powerful force by which to oppose this self-interest, and this is the idea of the equality of all men. This, then, is the culture of spirit, the philosophical education that finds spirit in the truth of liberty, fraternity and equality.
Adulthood
If a man would register all his opinions upon love, politics, religion, learning etc. , beginning from his youth and so go on to old age, what a bundle of inconsistencies and contradictions would appear at last.
(Swift, 1886: 112)
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Spirit now embarks on the stage of its education where its abstract unity - enlightenment - becomes an object to itself as morality. Here again our reflective subject will experience spiritual education as one where an inter- nal certainty becomes other to itself. This is the education of spirit into adulthood.
To begin with, the fervour and excitement of spirit finding itself to be the equality of all men makes it forget the negations that constituted its self- (re-)formation. Any new beginning means, again, that the third partner has become another form of natural consciousness. Enlightenment here is the immediacy of the equality of all men and is therefore only abstract. Its cer- tainty justifies collective terror over and against individuals who set themselves above this equality. But, in the demand for a justification of this terror, the immediacy of spirit's certainty must become object to itself and, again, other to itself. Its certainty therefore opposes itself in being known, for in being known the strength of reason as equal in all men is also the weakness of reason that it is in no man in particular and therefore in no man at all save those who assert it as their own. Whether he chooses as his cause equality within existing social relations or equality in revolutionized social relations, the third partner will be suppressed if formal equality is dominant over inwardness. This shape of ethical life is characterized as ter- ror not just by the state but also in those modern political revolutions where the term revolution best describes not the change that takes place but the reproduction of the suppression of spirit, of the third partner, in such upheaval.
It is in this struggle of the inner and the outer of the person that spirit becomes morality. The heterogeneity of the totality of abstract equality in formal law is now opposed to the knower whose equality it is supposed to embrace. This means that it is experienced internally as a further separa- tion of the rational person and his collective truth. This internal experience of formal universality is the education of spirit to morality, that is, to the question of whether a man should find his spiritual certainty in the duties that are commanded of him externally, or whether he should obey the duty that comes to him against this externality, that is, the duty of his own con- science. His spiritual education here is this dilemma of subjectivity opposed by substance. It has substance, however, as this dilemma, and this is what the moral individual's spiritual education now consists in.
The adult moral person might respond to this struggle by giving priority in the moral experience to his conscience, and to his well-intentioned actions in the world. Moral actions here are grounded in the certainty of truth in the I. Here moral spirit becomes only internal and undifferentiated
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from the I. The moral adult believes that he has grasped here the truth of his spiritual education, that truth in the world rests with the good inten- tions and the piety of the conscientious I. The only community he belongs to is the religious community that expresses the internal ground of con- science externally. His duty to conscience overrides his duty to the state and its laws.
But conscience already contains within it the seeds of its own higher edu- cation. It is grounded in a contradiction that it cannot survive. When conscience acts universally in the world, the world accepts it as only a par- ticular or an individual conviction. Its claims to universality are only a matter of words, contradicted by its deeds. It does what it believes to be right. It is precisely because individual conscience lacks substance that any substance will do. This is both the ground of moral judgements and therefore also their lack of ground. Spiritual education here has its revel and repose in this aporia. The moral individual pays lip service to the universal but acts only as he wishes. This education has its subject and substance in the hypoc- risy of his moral judgements. This is because the judge must judge himself and expose the opposition of universal and particular within him. Judge- ment here acts as the valet to the moral hero, knowing the details of the life behind the grand appearance. When our moral adult judges himself he has his moral actions as other to himself. In this he might expect a form of mutual recognition for in confessing his hypocrisy he is other to himself and therefore other qua other. But as we have seen, this is not the structure of spiritual education regarding self and other. The other to the confessor is a hard-hearted judge who does not believe the veracity of the confessor. Even in this negation of the I by itself, the other is not this I. This lack of mutual recognition can see the moral adult return from his outer confes- sion into an inner certainty of the beautiful soul which refuses further risk of non-mutual recognition. Lacking recognition it pursues an ascetic pin- ing for that which the world cannot provide.
However, a lack of mutual recognition is already a spiritual education regarding self and other, as we have seen elsewhere in this book. The spiri- tual education of the moral subject consists in his double loss or negation. He loses to the We the truth he found in conscience, and he loses the truth of this loss when seeking its mutual recognition in others. Here the I is already other and the other is not the I. This is the self-determinate shape of spirit in its moral development. The Aufhebung of its development and self- opposition now teaches spirit something new about itself. It cannot achieve the unification of the moral adult with all other such adults but these two losses can recollect themselves as how the I and the We are negatively related.
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It has passed through various stages of this non-achievement, from its imme- diate childhood, to its youthful culture and its sense of adult responsibility. Now in its Aufhebung it has the recollection of this development and nega- tion as the story of its own becoming. It is this education.
What is spirit to make of this? It comes to see that it is the dualism of sub- ject and substance known in and as the relation that separates them. The relation can only be known in retrospect, as its own recollection of itself. Spirit here is educated to know itself as this education, for here it has learned that what is lost is also retained in and as that learning.
Summary
Before looking at this learning in and for itself, it might be helpful to offer a summary of the spiritual education of the reflective subject that we have just described. The spiritual I begins as an ego and a will in the world which then, in its self-consciousness, has itself as its own object. This I, however, suffers from this separation in itself. It has doubt attached to everything it thinks, believing thought to be unable to hold truth in itself. Certainty therefore becomes something of a lost cause, something that can only lie in an idealism beyond the real world. This I is characterized by its unhappi- ness in this separation, an unhappiness that can take a variety of forms ranging from utter scepticism to a faith in the idea of the beyond, be it God or an alternative form of society. The way out of this unhappiness is for the I to join the real world and to receive the certainties that it can offer. The I is now an adult but he can be as far away from knowing his spiritual educa- tion here as it is possible to be, for the rewards of joining society can seduce the I away from his spiritual dilemmas.
The spiritual education of this I continues, however, when he experiences the vulnerability of such certainties. These vulnerabilities arise in his work in the social world with others like himself, when he realizes that his cer- tainties are not justified against the certainties of others. This is the beginning of his sociological education regarding his contingency upon social relations.
At first the I experiences the social bond as something missing and knows this lack because his own certainties are not universal in an immediate ethi- cal unity with others. This lack is again an unhappiness for him because the bond that he seeks seems torn between the irreconcilability of uncertain social relations and true relations posited beyond his earthly existence. It seems to him that there can be no paradise on earth, and that in fact his social life is paradise lost. But his social bond is retrieved in knowing that all rational men are equal with one another and deserve equal recognition
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and respect. However, he finds that this principle is easier in theory than in practice. His own actions in the world seem always to repeat a conflict between self-interest and universal brotherhood. In the final part of his social education he realizes that because he is rational and accountable for his own actions, he must look inwardly for the justification of his actions and not seek external justification. This is the social man for whom social responsibility rests in his own conscience. But even here there is trouble, because from the point of view of everyone else one man's conscience can justify anything. His attempts to ground a true social relation end only in an arbitrariness of action and a hypocrisy of justification.
Only here is spirit able to understand itself as having been the substance in these subjective experiences. There are two losses here: the loss of the I to the social and loss of the social to the I. These losses have their truth in the recollection or the learning that results from them. The negations are not overcome, but they are productive of themselves as subject and sub- stance in the education of the I that recollects them as its own self-(re-) formation. This is not mutual recognition, but it is the education in Hegel in which I am already other and the other is not me. This is the spiritual education in Hegel of the I that is We and the We that is I.
How is spirit now to represent this education as it looks back at the jour- ney of self and society, this time in the awareness that it was present all the time? It can find itself present in the sensuous representations of religion and art, but I do not intend to pursue here this education in representa- tion.
to the life that alienates freedom from political reason. She must remain free only in the sense that she must find new ways to display her power of attraction over her man, a power which, as Rousseau makes clear, is abso- lutely grounded in her powerlessness.
Thus, while Emile has reason without the experience of political actuality, Sophie has the experience of political unfreedom without reason. Yet per- haps remarkably, there is an Aufhebung in Emile. Rousseau points out that it is in the unity of these differences between Emile and Sophie that power and powerlessness are both developed and re-formed. The power of Emile discovers its dependence upon Sophie, and in turn the powerlessness of Sophie recognizes the power that it holds over Emile. There is also recollec- tion in Emile, for Rousseau has his student come to thank him for the formative experiences he has engineered for him, seeing in hindsight how necessary they were. However, Emile has not been educated for the world as it is and will not comprehend freedom except in his relation to Sophie, but even here the freedom of the master is the freedom that has exported its own truth in vulnerability to the other, to Sophie. The return of this vulnerability, and the formal equality of Emile and Sophie remained beyond Rousseau's time.
Adulthood
The adult enjoys the certainty of himself as at one with the realities of the social world. He is reason that is in and for itself, for there is no contradic- tion between his own idea of himself and the idea that the world has of him. His thought of reality and his own lived reality are no longer at odds with each other. This is where the doubts and uncertainties of youth are sublated into the positive unity of the I and his world. This world is his world and, having negated the illusory freedom he had as a youth, where the real world was merely a beyond, it now reinforces the freedom of the sovereign ratio- nal person who is one among other such sovereign rational persons. Thus, the education of youth to adulthood becomes fixed as the rite of passage into the reality of the social world, a reality in which the I knows its respon- sibilities for work, family and community.
However, the adult seldom remembers the path that has led to this new certainty, and therefore this I appears as a natural standpoint. It forgets that the truth of reason lies in the experiences that have formed it. This is never more obvious than in the relation between adult and youth. The adult forgets his own youth when educating his children, and is particularly
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agitated with the 'attitude' of youth. It is also the case that youth cannot understand the adult for the former has not travelled the path that deter- mines the adult. Thus the adult forgets that the child moves from sense-certainty to ego-certainty, and that with the latter there is a freedom from the world that allows comment and criticism upon it without the binds of commitment to it.
There seems to be here an implicit conservatism in adulthood, particu- larly in the demand for the youth to become adult and to accept his responsibilities. This returns the I from its idealistic freedom to its complic- ity within the world it rejects. Yet Hegel does not see this conformism as suppressing entirely the possibility of new meaning in the world. In the adulthood of civil society there remains scope for 'honourable, far reaching and creative activity [for this is not] a dead, absolutely inert world but, like the life-process, a world which perpetually creates itself anew, which while merely preserving itself, at the same time progresses' (1990: 62-63, zusatz). This is the nature of the Aufhebung in Hegelian philosophical education. It is where change is arbitrary, even terroristic, unless it is able to preserve what it negates in a new, developed and negated form.
This, indeed, is the integrity of the Aufhebung; that it neither wholly dis- cards its previous shapes nor imports into itself anything from outside that will suppress the immanent power to educate and develop. Thus, the nature of 'change' that the spiritual education of the adult brings about is an edu- cation, also, about what 'change' means. We might say here that spiritual education requires one always to understand the nature of change within development, culture and Aufhebung so that one's natural consciousness does not act blindly in the world against the actuality of change and often therein against the very people one intends to benefit. This integrity is the subjective substance of the education of youth into adulthood. Thus, Hegel says, 'on the one hand we can say that the man only creates what is already there; yet on the other hand, his activity must also bring about an advance' (1990: 63, zusatz). This ambivalence is the protection against terror and has that protection as part of the change it brings about. The integrity is the ambivalence, and it is what makes youth despair of the seeming indiffer- ence of the adult world to real social change.
As reason, then, the adult can only see youth as yet to understand the totality or the real world, and is impatient at the arrogance of the self- consciousness that knows so much only because it knows so little. But the certainty of the adult now fares little better, and will undergo its own experi- ences of failures, negations and transitions. Having forgotten the path to
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adulthood, the adult is reason only immediately as far as the child and the youth are concerned, and they experience this adult as thinking himself right without having to justify this. This is reason without reason, and is the immediate appearance of the authority of the adult, an empirical but not (yet) a spiritual authority. But immediate reason cannot withstand the rela- tion to itself that thought brings about here. It cannot remain unchanged by the demand that it justify itself universally, for this means that the univer- sality of the adult must become an object for him, and therefore separated from him. The adult is called upon to think its own universality, a contradic- tion that defeats itself. Just as in the life and death struggle life made its negation other to it, so the adult here makes his negation other to him. This is the same negation that realized itself as reason out of its own unhap- piness regarding its relation to the true. Thus it makes external the experi- ence that it depends upon. It externalizes its own truth. As such, this truth appears as an object over and against it as universal law. Law here is to rea- son and the adult what death is to life. Both the adult and life have to find themselves again in that which they have eschewed. Law, a universality, is other to the adult whose truth it is. As such, this other is all rational self- conscious adults. The truth of the adult therefore is other people. This is reason as social relation, or ethical life, or again, as society. Only when the adult learns that he is this same relation to himself as he is to other people will his spiritual education be recollected by spirit as its own development. It is this spiritual education of the adult in relation to society that we will now follow.
Of course, this is not the first time that self-consciousness has become aware of ethical or social life. Indeed, as we will see in a moment, ethical life has been present throughout its education. The point is, however, that they are separated in our account of this education because that is the structure of our modern experience of spirit, that is, that the I is claimed and opposed by the political totality in which it finds itself. It is this experience, now, that will begin a new education for the adult. His relation to others has always been formative for him, but now he must recollect the ways in which this has been so. What lies ahead for this reflective person is an education about how universality as other has also grown and developed spiritually. In a sense the education of the adult must begin again, in the childhood and youth of spirit. The adult, who judges the youth, must now judge himself in the same terms, that is, about how much he knows because of how little he knows. Thus this education begins negatively with the loss of the certainty of the rational person to the totality of ethical or social life.
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I As We
Spiritual education, like that of personal education, takes its beginning from the reflective mind of the adult. This adult now seeks to understand how his dependency upon others - the We - compromises his individual sovereignty. In essence this is a sociological education. There are two truths in this sentence. His education is sociological because it is dualistic. He is trying to comprehend how society or social forms relate to the I as its truth. This means that the reflective I is still posited as that from which the enquiry into society can begin, as it was in beginning its enquiry into itself. Dualism is built in to the very structure of such a sociological enquiry, but whilst dualism carries out the enquiry, it leaves its own presupposition of itself out of the enquiry. In other words, the essence of sociological enquiry is illu- sory. This is the second truth in the sentence that in essence this is a sociological education. There is, therefore, a third partner in this sociology. There is the consciousness that knows sociology to be compromised by its own standpoint. This education teaches that the standpoint of the reflective I and of his object of study is not just a study of the contingency of the for- mer upon the latter. It is also a study carried out by contingency in the form of the dualism of self and society. The shapes that this latter contingency takes, the shapes of illusion, are the shapes of spirit now in the Phenomenol- ogy. They are present only in the ways in which they are posited. This third partner is veiled and hard to see, but it remains the meaning and the signifi- cance, the actuality, of dualism. It is this triadic relation that is intended by the dualism of I-philosophy. The third partner is present in appearing to be absent. It takes the wisdom of old age to come to know this third partner as the truth of its other 'truthful' appearances.
We will begin now to look at spirit's education regarding its own develop- ment. We will follow this education through the same phases of childhood and youth, although this time in the way they express themselves as social or collective forms rather than in individual consciousness, self-conscious- ness and reason. Nevertheless we are still following this education in the way it appears in and to the modern reflective subject. It is this subject that has the following spiritual experiences, and it is only as a result of this edu- cation that we will be able to refer this sociological education as really a spiritual education, for although they are all shapes of spirit, this only appears in the spirit's recollection of itself in its old age. Equally we will see the same structure of immediacy, mediation and Aufhebung moving this
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greater significance only when they become what is recollected. Childhood
Spirit's immediacy is, like the consciousness of the child, only knowable to itself in a recollection that knows it to be lost. In the Phenomenology this immediacy is already the collapse of consciousness as the divine law and custom of Hellenic city-states, where spirit as the child is the tradition that binds together all its members in a common substance.
For our reflective subject these 'natural' social relationships begin in the immediate relations of the individual and ethical life, that is, as love in the family and as law in custom and tradition. When these immediacies hold the individual at one with the collective through feeling and emotion, and see such allegiance as virtue, then the nation becomes a family and shared blood becomes the tie of the social bond. But the consciousness of the people, if it is to ground its sovereignty objectively, must be thought of as something permanent and sustainable in the world beyond its immediate perception and understanding of itself. This process becomes even more urgent as the immediacy of the collective bond comes into contact with other such bonds in the world. This life and death struggle of immediacies is already the end of immediate 'natural' social life and is the beginning of political life. The mind that survives the struggle exports the death of itself as other than itself, which helps in turn to define this community against that community. But it is already too late for immediate ethical life here, for the child comes to see that it, the social collective, cannot sustain itself in feelings and emotions against this will becoming self-conscious. All ethical immediacies are in this sense the spirit of the child, a spirit which carries the fundamental ambivalence of immediate belonging and life in relation to otherness. Even though the other to the collective can be used to strengthen the intensity of the immediate bond, nevertheless in the other of ethical immediacy - and other here means both the other to immediacy and the otherness of immediacy to itself - the seeds of the collapse of imme- diate ethical life are already present. The natural ethical life cannot hold out against its division into otherness, a division that at first is concrete as the I of its citizens and as the law that recognizes them.
Youth
Youthful spirit takes its beginning in the certainty of the law that guarantees the rights of the person. This law is property law because the sovereignty of
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the person is based on the exclusion from him of the vulnerability that would compromise his legal identity. This is passed to non-persons, that is, to objects and to men deemed no better than objects. This certainty, how- ever, cannot be at peace with itself. The law is a form of universality that, in eschewing vulnerability as other, denies to itself the means by which its vul- nerability might come to know itself. Spirit, here, is an alienation of itself from itself. Divine law is the truth of the vulnerability alienated from itself and become absolutely other to the truth of the legal person. This person thus enters a period of most unhappy education in which political truth cannot be reconciled with divine truth, and where all attempts at trying to do God's work on earth merely emphasizes and repeats their separation. This is experienced as dualism but is accompanied by the third partner who is present not as the two sides of the separation, but as the relation they continually misrecognize.
As dualism the truth of the antithesis of divine and temporal authority is cast beyond man, who is deemed to be the one at fault here, to the perfection of a being beyond man. Here, the alienation of freedom from itself finds truth in the only place it can, in a beyond that transcends all human imperfection. The result is a world in which truth is absent from real life and demands that it be established there. But all attempts to do so remain unaware of the third partner in the relationship. Hence they can only repeat, but not re-form, the pre-existing relation between God and man. The result is that all attempts to establish God's will and law on earth collapse in on themselves because they are only human attempts. Faith in the work goes hand-in-hand with lawlessness on earth and the result is barbarism. The harder faith struggles to bring God to earth, the greater the barbarity.
Youthful spirit mirrors here the unhappy youth of self-consciousness. The latter existed in the rupture between inner freedom and outer authority. Now, the legal person is caught between an idea of truth that is beyond him, and beyond everyone else, and a life where it becomes impossible to act for the good. It is not necessary that this person believes in God (though he may do) for that is not the philosophical significance of this form of ethical life. The significance here is Bildung, that is, the education of the reflective adult about the third partner than can express for him the contradictions in his life. His good actions turn out bad results, his noble actions turn out ignoble, his attempts to act beyond self-interest turn against themselves, each reinforcing the feeling that it is impossible to act in the world accord- ing to a good that seems to be possible only in the world beyond human weakness. He may retain faith in the idea of the good, or he may despair
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completely of the good and see intrigue as a fair response to a hopeless situ- ation abandoned by God.
It is the third partner, however, that is to prove more powerful than either of these responses. Spirit is present here as the appearance of an alienation of itself, that is, as a diremption between God and man. This appearance is known precisely in the contradictions that plague the person. His failed attempts to reform the world re-form him in and as the culture of spirit.
It is here that the reflective adult who is sceptical regarding the possibility of any common bond between his self-interest and the community will learn that this is precisely what he does have in common with everyone else. His education here is that the good act is always compromised in being enacted. Self-interest is inescapable. This self-interest and the hypocrisy of the self- less act are the new spiritual universality. It is how this person now realizes that he is in fact part of objective social life. His complicity is his new educa- tion and it is an education, again, in the hypocrisy of the stance that holds itself separate from social life. The good act cannot hide from the hypocrisy of its self-interest, but equally, self-interest cannot hide from its need for social life. This is a new shape of spirit. On the one hand, it commits to reason the superstitions that have been employed by faith in bringing God's law to earth. On the other hand, it also commits to reason the hypocrisies of earthly authorities in masking self-interest behind spiritual benevolence. Youthful spirit now finds equality and universality out of its own self-oppositions. This shape of spirit is the enlightenment of spirit that it is the work of true universality when it opposes pseudo-universality. The person now knows the third partner in ethical life has all along been spirit in which the I and the We are always related, even at those times when that relation is obscured behind the intrigue of seemingly benevolent self-interest. He knows now that wars of self-interest are barbarism but he knows also that there exists a powerful force by which to oppose this self-interest, and this is the idea of the equality of all men. This, then, is the culture of spirit, the philosophical education that finds spirit in the truth of liberty, fraternity and equality.
Adulthood
If a man would register all his opinions upon love, politics, religion, learning etc. , beginning from his youth and so go on to old age, what a bundle of inconsistencies and contradictions would appear at last.
(Swift, 1886: 112)
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Spirit now embarks on the stage of its education where its abstract unity - enlightenment - becomes an object to itself as morality. Here again our reflective subject will experience spiritual education as one where an inter- nal certainty becomes other to itself. This is the education of spirit into adulthood.
To begin with, the fervour and excitement of spirit finding itself to be the equality of all men makes it forget the negations that constituted its self- (re-)formation. Any new beginning means, again, that the third partner has become another form of natural consciousness. Enlightenment here is the immediacy of the equality of all men and is therefore only abstract. Its cer- tainty justifies collective terror over and against individuals who set themselves above this equality. But, in the demand for a justification of this terror, the immediacy of spirit's certainty must become object to itself and, again, other to itself. Its certainty therefore opposes itself in being known, for in being known the strength of reason as equal in all men is also the weakness of reason that it is in no man in particular and therefore in no man at all save those who assert it as their own. Whether he chooses as his cause equality within existing social relations or equality in revolutionized social relations, the third partner will be suppressed if formal equality is dominant over inwardness. This shape of ethical life is characterized as ter- ror not just by the state but also in those modern political revolutions where the term revolution best describes not the change that takes place but the reproduction of the suppression of spirit, of the third partner, in such upheaval.
It is in this struggle of the inner and the outer of the person that spirit becomes morality. The heterogeneity of the totality of abstract equality in formal law is now opposed to the knower whose equality it is supposed to embrace. This means that it is experienced internally as a further separa- tion of the rational person and his collective truth. This internal experience of formal universality is the education of spirit to morality, that is, to the question of whether a man should find his spiritual certainty in the duties that are commanded of him externally, or whether he should obey the duty that comes to him against this externality, that is, the duty of his own con- science. His spiritual education here is this dilemma of subjectivity opposed by substance. It has substance, however, as this dilemma, and this is what the moral individual's spiritual education now consists in.
The adult moral person might respond to this struggle by giving priority in the moral experience to his conscience, and to his well-intentioned actions in the world. Moral actions here are grounded in the certainty of truth in the I. Here moral spirit becomes only internal and undifferentiated
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from the I. The moral adult believes that he has grasped here the truth of his spiritual education, that truth in the world rests with the good inten- tions and the piety of the conscientious I. The only community he belongs to is the religious community that expresses the internal ground of con- science externally. His duty to conscience overrides his duty to the state and its laws.
But conscience already contains within it the seeds of its own higher edu- cation. It is grounded in a contradiction that it cannot survive. When conscience acts universally in the world, the world accepts it as only a par- ticular or an individual conviction. Its claims to universality are only a matter of words, contradicted by its deeds. It does what it believes to be right. It is precisely because individual conscience lacks substance that any substance will do. This is both the ground of moral judgements and therefore also their lack of ground. Spiritual education here has its revel and repose in this aporia. The moral individual pays lip service to the universal but acts only as he wishes. This education has its subject and substance in the hypoc- risy of his moral judgements. This is because the judge must judge himself and expose the opposition of universal and particular within him. Judge- ment here acts as the valet to the moral hero, knowing the details of the life behind the grand appearance. When our moral adult judges himself he has his moral actions as other to himself. In this he might expect a form of mutual recognition for in confessing his hypocrisy he is other to himself and therefore other qua other. But as we have seen, this is not the structure of spiritual education regarding self and other. The other to the confessor is a hard-hearted judge who does not believe the veracity of the confessor. Even in this negation of the I by itself, the other is not this I. This lack of mutual recognition can see the moral adult return from his outer confes- sion into an inner certainty of the beautiful soul which refuses further risk of non-mutual recognition. Lacking recognition it pursues an ascetic pin- ing for that which the world cannot provide.
However, a lack of mutual recognition is already a spiritual education regarding self and other, as we have seen elsewhere in this book. The spiri- tual education of the moral subject consists in his double loss or negation. He loses to the We the truth he found in conscience, and he loses the truth of this loss when seeking its mutual recognition in others. Here the I is already other and the other is not the I. This is the self-determinate shape of spirit in its moral development. The Aufhebung of its development and self- opposition now teaches spirit something new about itself. It cannot achieve the unification of the moral adult with all other such adults but these two losses can recollect themselves as how the I and the We are negatively related.
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It has passed through various stages of this non-achievement, from its imme- diate childhood, to its youthful culture and its sense of adult responsibility. Now in its Aufhebung it has the recollection of this development and nega- tion as the story of its own becoming. It is this education.
What is spirit to make of this? It comes to see that it is the dualism of sub- ject and substance known in and as the relation that separates them. The relation can only be known in retrospect, as its own recollection of itself. Spirit here is educated to know itself as this education, for here it has learned that what is lost is also retained in and as that learning.
Summary
Before looking at this learning in and for itself, it might be helpful to offer a summary of the spiritual education of the reflective subject that we have just described. The spiritual I begins as an ego and a will in the world which then, in its self-consciousness, has itself as its own object. This I, however, suffers from this separation in itself. It has doubt attached to everything it thinks, believing thought to be unable to hold truth in itself. Certainty therefore becomes something of a lost cause, something that can only lie in an idealism beyond the real world. This I is characterized by its unhappi- ness in this separation, an unhappiness that can take a variety of forms ranging from utter scepticism to a faith in the idea of the beyond, be it God or an alternative form of society. The way out of this unhappiness is for the I to join the real world and to receive the certainties that it can offer. The I is now an adult but he can be as far away from knowing his spiritual educa- tion here as it is possible to be, for the rewards of joining society can seduce the I away from his spiritual dilemmas.
The spiritual education of this I continues, however, when he experiences the vulnerability of such certainties. These vulnerabilities arise in his work in the social world with others like himself, when he realizes that his cer- tainties are not justified against the certainties of others. This is the beginning of his sociological education regarding his contingency upon social relations.
At first the I experiences the social bond as something missing and knows this lack because his own certainties are not universal in an immediate ethi- cal unity with others. This lack is again an unhappiness for him because the bond that he seeks seems torn between the irreconcilability of uncertain social relations and true relations posited beyond his earthly existence. It seems to him that there can be no paradise on earth, and that in fact his social life is paradise lost. But his social bond is retrieved in knowing that all rational men are equal with one another and deserve equal recognition
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and respect. However, he finds that this principle is easier in theory than in practice. His own actions in the world seem always to repeat a conflict between self-interest and universal brotherhood. In the final part of his social education he realizes that because he is rational and accountable for his own actions, he must look inwardly for the justification of his actions and not seek external justification. This is the social man for whom social responsibility rests in his own conscience. But even here there is trouble, because from the point of view of everyone else one man's conscience can justify anything. His attempts to ground a true social relation end only in an arbitrariness of action and a hypocrisy of justification.
Only here is spirit able to understand itself as having been the substance in these subjective experiences. There are two losses here: the loss of the I to the social and loss of the social to the I. These losses have their truth in the recollection or the learning that results from them. The negations are not overcome, but they are productive of themselves as subject and sub- stance in the education of the I that recollects them as its own self-(re-) formation. This is not mutual recognition, but it is the education in Hegel in which I am already other and the other is not me. This is the spiritual education in Hegel of the I that is We and the We that is I.
How is spirit now to represent this education as it looks back at the jour- ney of self and society, this time in the awareness that it was present all the time? It can find itself present in the sensuous representations of religion and art, but I do not intend to pursue here this education in representa- tion.
