Answer: Because it is
favorable
to samddhi.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
6l4c22) gives some definitions which are completely in the style of the Abhidharmma.
For example, samddhi is defined: "The sthiti of the mind, samsthiti (teng-chu ^pQi )>> abhisphiti (hsien-chu ^ ^ ), upasthiti (chin-chu j/?
tl: )>> aviksepa (pu- luan ^j?
L)>> aghappana (pu-san ^fS( ), Mahdvyutpatti, 245.
226) samdhdrana (Pshe- ch'ih JH^p ), famatha, samddhi, and cittasyaikdgratd, is what is called samddhi" {Vibhanga, p.
217, Dhammasamgani, 11).
In the same way vedana is vedana, samvedand, pratisamvedand, vedita, that which feels, that which is included within vedana. Smrti is smrti, anusmrti, pratismrti, smarana, asampramosatd . . . cetaso'bhildpa.
112. The word kila shows that the author is presenting the opinion of the School. He explains his own doctrine in the Pancaskandhaka (Vydkhyd).
113. Compare Atthasdlini, 329: kattukamyatd. According to the Pancaskandhaka: abhiprete vastuny abhildsah. (See ii. 55c-d, iii. l, where chanda is defined as andgate prdrthand).
114. Pancaskandhaka: upapariksye vastuni pravicayo yogdyogavihito'nyathd ca.
115. Pancaskandhaka: samstute vastuny asampramosah / cetaso' bhilapanatd. See i. 33. 116. On dbhoga, S. Levi ad Sutrdlamkdra, i. 16, and Museon, 1914.
117. This term presents a difficulty. Vydkhyd: adhimuktis taddlambanasya gunato'vadhdrandda (-nam? ) rucir iti anye /' yathdniscayam dharanetiyogdcdracittdh: "Adhimukti is the consideration of the objea from the point of view of its qualities; according to others, complaisance; according
to the Ascetics (the Yogacarins), the contemplation of the objea in conformity with the decision taken. " (This last point is explained ad ii. 72, adhimuktimanaskdra).
According to the the Pancaskandhaka, adhimoksa is niscite vastuny avadhdranam.
See the Prakaranapdda, TD 26, p. 693al7.
Paramartha translates: "Adhimukti (hsiang liao $3 T ) is a dharma which makes the mind
lively {ming liao Ej ~J , papu) with respea to the charaaeristic of the objea. " This is a gloss, not a translation.
Hsiian-tsang translates: "Adhimukti, that is nengyu chingyin-k'o t H K ^ f P "I. " We can translate: "that which makes a sign of approbation with respea to the objea. " The expression^ (=mudrd) k'o (possible) is mentioned by Rosenberg in many word lists. A. Waley, who has consulted the Japanese glosses, translates: "the sign of approval given to a disciple who has understood what has been taught him. " We would thus have k'o = k'o-i = "this is allowable"(A. Debesse). Adhimukti is the approbation of the objea, the dharma by reason of which one grasps the objea under consideration; it marks the first stage of the aa of attention. See the note of Shwe Zan Aung, Compendium, p. 17 and 241, on adhimokkha: " . . . the settled state of a mind . . . ; it is deciding to attend to this, not that irrespective of more complicated prodedure as to what 'this' or 'that' appears to be. "
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Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 384b9): Approbation (ym-k'o) with respect to an object is called adhimukti. According to other masters, adhi signifies "superiority, sovereignty;" mukti siginifies vimoksa. Adhimukti is a dharma by virtue of which the mind exercises its sovereignty over an object without any obstacle; like adhiiila. Adhimukti is a separate object, for the Sutra says: "The mind, by reason of adhimukti, approves of (ym-k'o) the object. " When the mental states arise, all approve (yin) the object:; as a consequence adhimukti is a mahdbhumika. Nevertheless the Sthavira says: "It is not proven that adhimukti is a separate thing, for we see that its characteristic is not distinguished from that of knowledge (jfidna): the characteristic of adhimukti is that the mind is determined (niicita) with respect to its object. But this is not different from the characteristic of knowledge (jfidna). Consequently adhimukti is not a separate thing. " This is not correct, for approbation (yin-k'o) brings about determination.
Some say: "Adhimukti is determination (avadhdrana, niicaya). " This is to give the cause of determination (namely adhimukti) the name of its effect. If this is the case, then adhimukti and determination would not be simultaneous. No: for these two mutually condition one another: by reason of discernment (pratisamkhyd) there arise approbation, and by reason of approbation there arises determination (ni/caya). There is no contradition: thus there is no obstacle to their being simultaneous. If all thought include these two, then all the categories of mind will be approbation and determination. This objection is worthless, for it happens that their activity is damaged when they are dominated by dharmas: even if there is approbation (yin) and determination, they are small and recognized only with difficulty.
118. Pancaskandhaka: upapariksye vastuni cittasyaikdgratd.
119. According to the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 220b2, and the Prakarana: iraddhd, virya, hri, apatrapd, alobha, advesa, prairabdhi, upeksd, apramdda, avihimsd. The Mahdvyutpatti (104) lists the third root (amoha) and places virya after the roots. The Pancaskandhaka also lists the third root and has the same order as the Mahdvyutpatti with the exception that it places apramdda before upeksd.
120. In other words, sraddhd is the dharma by which (yadyogdt) the mind, troubled by the kief as and the upaklesas, becomes clear, as troubled water becomes clear by the presence of a gem which purifies water (udakaprasddakamani). Same example in Atthasdliniy 304.
121. Explanation adopted by Vasubandhu in the Pancaskandhaka.
122. Bhdvand signifies "taking possession," "frequentation" (pratilambha, nisevana) according to
vii. 27.
123. The Mahasamghikas. Diligence holds the mind safe from the dharmas of defilement
(sdmklefika).
Y2A. The Abhidhamma distinguishes passaddhi and lahutd (Dhammasamgani, 40-43) which the
Abhidharma appears to identify. Prairabdhi in the dhydnas is analyzed viii. 9.
125. According to the Japanese editor. Pancaskandhaka: "Prairabdhi is an attitude of the mind
and body, a dharma opposed to dausthulya" (S. Levi, SUtrdlamkdra, vi. 2, Wogihara, p. 29).
126. Prasrabdhisambodhyanga is twofold, cittaprairabdhi and kdyaprairabdhi (Prakaranapdda, TD 26, p. 700al6). Samyuktdgama, TD 2, p. 191c5: . . . tatra ydpi kdyaprairabdhis tad api prairabdhisambodhyangam abhijndyai sambodhaye nirvdndya samvartate /ydpi cittaprairabdhis tad api samhodhyangam. . . A shorter recension in Samyutta, v. 111. In the presence of this text,
say the Sautrantikas, how can you define prairabdhi as solely "an attitude of the mind? "
127. Compare Samyutta, v. 108.
128. The Blessed One said that the nine dghdtavastus (Anguttara, iv. 408) are vydpddanivarana.
? 129. When the Path is made up of three elements, filaskandha, samddhiskandha, and prajndskandha, resolution and effort are placed within the prajndskandha with Seeing which, alone, is prajnd by its nature. We read in the Prajndskandhanirde/a: prajHdskandhah katamah / samyagdrspih samyaksamkalpah samyagvydydmah.
130. This samskdropeksa is to be distinguished from vedanopeksa (i. 14, ii. 8c-d) and from apramdnopeksa (viii. 29). The Atthasdlini (397) lists ten upeksas: here we have a definition of jhdnupekkhd:majjhattalakkhannndandbhogarasdavydpdrapaccupapphdnd. . . (p. 174. 2).
131. Literally: There are some things difficult to know that one can know. But it is quite difficult to know (or to admit) that there is no contradiction (opposition, impossibility of coexistence) between contradictory dharmas: asti hi ndma durjndnam apt jrlayate / idam tu khalu atidurjridnam yad virodho 'py avirodhah.
132. According to Hsiian-tsang and the glosses of the Japenese editor:
The Vaibhasikas. What contradiction is there in that attention is flexion of the mind, and that
indifference is non-flexion of the mind? In fact, we consider attention and indifference to be distinct dharmas.
The Sautrantikas. Then attention and indifference will not have the same object; or rather one should admit that all mental states (greed, hatred, etc) are associated
We encounter other dharmas (vitarka, vicdra) which present the same characteristics of opposition . . .
133. The Pancaskandhaka places amoha among the kuialamahdbhUmikas (by the fact that prajfid can be "erroneous"). Alobha is the opposite of lobha, udvega and an-updddna (? ). Advesa is the opposite of dvesa, namely goodwill (maitri, viii. 29). Amoha is the opposite of moha, samyaksamkalpa (vi. 69).
134. Pancaskandhaka: "Avihimsd is compassion (karund, viii. 29), the opposite of vihimsd. "
135. Endurance is good action (kufalakriyd); for endurence in evil action is not virya, but kausidya. The Blessed One said: "The virya of persons foreign to this religion (itobdhyaka) Is kausidya" (ii. 26a). Pancaskandhaka: "Virya is the endurance of the mind in good, the opposite of kausidya. "
136. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, the Path of Seeing expells avidya, the Path of Mediation expells ajndna, and the Path of Asaiksa expells non-clearness.
137. Compare Dhammasangani, 429. 138. See above note 109.
139. Ko'yam devdndmpriyo ndma / rjukajdtiyo devdndrhpriya ity eke vydcaksate /aiapho hi devdndm prtyo bhavati /murkho devdndrhpriya ity apare /yo hiivardndm ispah sa na tddanena iiksata iti mUrkho bhavati (Vydkhyd). The Japanese editor quotes numerous glosses.
140. Pdphaprdmdnyamdtrena data klesamahdbhumikdh prdptd ity etdm eva prdptim janite (Vydkhyd).
Vasubandhu reproduces the formula of the Mahdbhdsya ad u. 4. 56 (the story of the Grammarian and the Cow-herder).
See S. Levi, JAs. 1891, ii. 549 ("Notes de chronologie indienne. Devanampriya, Acpka et Katyayana"). According to Kern, Manual, 133, the meaning of "idiot" derives from the sense of "harmless, pious": this appears to be somewhat possible. See de La Vallee Poussin's note in the Bulletin de I'Academie de Bruxelles, 1923.
141. Vydkhyd: dbhidhdrmikdh.
Perhaps by the plural (ahuh) Vasubandhu is designating Dharmatrata, the author of
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Samyukta-Abhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, number 1551, and his followers. This appears to result from the passages which follow (TD 28, p. 881bl7):
". . . The klesamahdbhumikas are: mithyddhimoksa, asamprahanya, ayonifomanaskdra, afrdddhya, kausidya, viksepa, avidyd, auddhatya, and pramdda.
"Mithyadhimoksa consists of the ten klesamahdbhumikas which are found in all defiled minds. Ahri and atrapdare called akuSalamahdbhumikas.
"The ten klesamahdbhumikas are found in all defiled minds. The ten dharmas the first of which is mithyadhimoksa, accompany all defiled minds, sense consciousnesses or mental consciousnesses, of Kamadhatu, Rupadhatu, and Arupyadhatu. They are thus klesamahd- bhumikas. Question: Styana is found in all defiled minds; why is it not counted among the klesamahdbhumikas?
Answer: Because it is favorable to samddhi. This is why stydna is not counted in the list. Is a dharma which is a mahabhumika also a klesamahdbhumika? Four alternatives: 1. mahdbhumikas without being klesamahdbhumikas . . . "
142. The author does not admit this opinion. Torpor (stydna, laya) and dissipation, which are defiled dharmas, are opposed to the "white" dharmas, like samddhi.
143. According to the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 220b4, there are five aku/alamahdbhumikas: avidyd, stydna, auddhatya, ahri, and anapatrapya. See iii. 32a-b and above note 102.
144. Hsuan-tsang translates: " . . . the dharmas of this nature (=iti) are termed parittakleU- bhumikas. "
Samghabhadra: The text says "the dharmas of this nature," in order to include aksdnti, arati dghdta, etc. (TD 29, p. 392a6).
145. Dharmatrata: Because they are abandoned through Meditation and not through the Seeing of the Truths, because they are associated with the mental consciousness and not with the five other consciousnesses, and because they do not arise with all minds and exist separately, they are parittakle/abhumika.
146. According to the Chinese. The Japanese editor explains the final et cetera by rdga (v. 2), pratigha, mdna (v. 10), and vicikitsa.
The Vydkhya reads: "kaukrtya, middha, etc. " and explains "etc. " by arati, vijrmbhitd, tendri, bhakte'samatd, etc. It continues: The kief as, rdga, etc. , are also indeterminate, for they are not classified in any of the five categories: they are not mahdbhumikas, because they are not found in any minds; they are not kus'aJamahdbhumikas, because they are repugnant to the good; they are not klesamahdbhumikas, because they are not found in any defiled mind: for there is no rdga or lust in a mind full of hatred (sapratigha).
The Acarya Vasumitra has written a summary, mnemonic Hoka\ "The tradition (smrta) is that there are eight aniyatas, namely vitarka, vicdra, kaukrtya, middha, pratigha, sakti (-rdga), mdna, and vicikitsa'. But we do not admit this number of eight. Why are the drspis (v. 3a) not aniyata? There is no mithyddrsti in a mind full of hatred or scepticism.
147. Compare Kathdvatthu, xiv. 8.
148. Dhammasangani, 1161, Atthasdlim, 784-787. 149. Compare i. 37.
150. Avenika = rdgddiprthagbhuta.
151. All drsti is samttrikdprajnd (i. 4lc-d, vii. l).
152. The mind of the First Dhyana, when it is good, contains twenty-two mental states; defiled- neutral, it contains eighteen mental states whether it is independent of, or associated with drsti, nineteen when it is associated with rdga, mdna or vicikitsa . . .
? 153. Literally: The word "also" (apt) shows that in addition to vicara, one should exclude sdthya and maya.
154. According to the Japanese editor, the Saddharmasmrti upasthdna sutra, TD 17, p. 193bl6. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 670b24.
155. By adding: "I am the great Brahma", he distinguishes himself from the other Brahmas. 156. Compare Digha, i. 219, and below iv. 8a, v. 53a-b.
157. Jndnaprasthdna, i. Para. 5 (according to Takakusu, p. 87). See TD 26, p. 924c26 and following.
158. Pratisa = guru, because fisyam pratistah.
159. Compare the definition of adhisila:. . . anumdtresv apy avadyesu bhayadarsi. . .
160. These masters observes that the two roots hri and trap (Dhdtupdta, iii. 3 and i. 399) are synonyms and signify shame (lajjd): from whence one cannot see how ahri would be disrespect and atrapd the absence of fear in the commission of transgressions.
161. Vasubandhu, in the Pancaskandhaka, adopts this definition.
162. Jndnaprasthdna, I Para. 4 (according to Takakusu, p. 87). See TD 26, p. 923a13 and
following.
163. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 151al5.
164. For one cannot have respect for impure (sdsrava) dharmas. (Note of the Japanese editor).
165. This definition comes from a Sutra which is not designated in our sources. See i. 33.
166. Seventh opinion of the Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 219b3.
167. Argument presented in the Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 269bl0, and attributed to the Darstantikas.
168. That is, "it makes the voice surge forth," vdksamutthdpaka.
169. Compare Majjhima i. 301, Samyutta ov. 293: pubbe kho . . . vitakketvd vicdretvd pacchd vdcarh bhindati. On the other hand, Vibhanga, 135: vdcisamcetand = vdcisamkhdro.
170. Samghabhadra says that vitarka and vicara are associated with each thought; but these two dharmas do not enter into aaivity, do not reveal themselves by their action (udbhutavrtti) at one and the same time: the mind and mental states are grosser when vitarka, which is always present, enters into activity . . . In the same way rdga and moha are coexistent: but a person is termed rdgacarita, acting though rdga, when rdga manifests itself . . .
171. Vitarka and vicara do not exist simultaneously, but successively (parydyena). What is the difference between vitarka and vicara} The ancient masters (pUrvdcdrya) say: "What is vitarka} A mental conversation (manojalpa) of inquiry (paryesaka), which has for its support volition (cetand) or the speculative consciousness (prajfid) depending on whether it does or does not contain deduction (abhyilha). This is the grosser state of mind. What is vicara} A mental conversation of appreciation, of judgment (pratyaveksaka), which has for its support volition . . . " According to this theory, vitarka and vicara constitute almost two identical psychological complexes: they differ in that the first includes "inquiry" and the second "judgment. " Some give
an example: Someone feels numerous pots in order to know which one is well baked, and which one is soft: this inquiry (aha) is vitarka; finally, this person arrives at the conclusion, "There are such a number of each category:" this is vicara.
The Vydkhyd, ad i. 37, quotes Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaka which is very close to the opinion
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of some ancient masters: vitarkah katamah /paryesako manojalpas cetandprajndvisesah / yd cittasyauddrikatd // vicdrah katamah / pratyaveksako manojalpas cetandprajndvisesah / yd cittasyasuksmata. //The Vydkhya adds:anabhyuhdvasthdydmcetand abhyuhdvasthdydm prajtieti vyavasthdpyate.
See Dhammasangani, 7-8, Compendium, p. 10-11, Mi/inda, 62-63. Atthasdlini, 296-297 definesvitarkaasiihanaandgivesitasolarika,whereasvicdraissukhuma. VyasaadYogasutra, i. 17: vitarka/ cittasydlambana sthilla dbhogah / suksmo vicdrah; i. 42-44.
172. Paryddiyate - samnirudhyate; see Siksasamuccaya, 177. 15, Divya, Sutrdlamkdra, 112. Sarhghabhadra's definition: yah svadharmesv eva raktasya darpas cetasah parydddnam
kufaldnyakrtydbhyupapattisamhdro madah.
173. Mada is sensation, "defiled satisfaction" {klisfa saumanasya). The Vaibhasikas do not admit this explanation: in fact, satisfaction does not exist beyond the Second DhySna: but, according to v. 53c, mada exists in the three spheres of existence.
174. Compare Dtgha, i. 21, Samyutta, ii. 94.
175. Its meaning is that it accumulates good and evil (Vydkhya). Tibetan: 'byed pas: because it
distinguishes. Atthasdlini, 293: dlambanam cintetiti cittam.
176. Dhdtupdtha, 4. 67.
177. The Vydkhya adds: bhdvandsamniveiayogena sautrdntikamatena yogacdramatena vd. Paramartha reads: citam subhdSubhair dhdtubhis tan vd cinotiti cittam. The Tibetan translates
in the same way: "because it is charged (bsags-pas) with good and evil dhdtus"
178. The consciousness (vijfidna) discerns a blue object, etc. ; sensation feels it as agreeable, etc. ; ideas grasp its characteristics, etc. Or rather: consciousness perceives the object, in a general manner, as a perceptible (upalabhyatdrupam grhndtt); the mental states perceive its specific characteristics {viiesampena)\ sensation is susceptible of being agreeably experienced (anu- bhavan*yatdrupam)\ ideas are susceptible of being defined (paricchedyatdrupam), etc (116a).
179. That is to say saha vistaraprabheddbhydm or aha vistaraprabhedena.
180. The iti indicates that one should add other viprayuktas like samghabheda (iv. 99), etc to this list. The Prakarana says: ye'py evamjatiyakah: "The dharmas which are of this type are also cittaviprayukta. " Same formula in the Skandhapancaka.
According to the Prakarana, the samskdras disassociated from the mind are: prdpti, asamjtlisamdpatti, nirodhasamdpatti, dsamjnika, jtvitendriya, nikdyasabhdga, dfrayaprdpti, dravya- prdpti (? ), dyatanaprdpti, jdti, jard, sthiti, anityatd ndmakdya, and vyanjanakaya and all the other dharmas of this type disassociated from the mind.
Prdpti is defined as dharmdndm praptih; dSrayaprdpti is airaydyatanaprapti; dravyaprdpti. (? ) is skandhdndm prdptih; dyatanaprdpti is ddhydtmikahdhydyatanaprdpti (TD 26, p. 694al9).
Prakaranapdda (p. 694al4): What is prdpti? Prdpti of the dharmas. What is asamjfiisamd- patti? The cessation of the mind and mental states haying for its antecedent the idea of departure attached to the abandoning of the defilement of the Subhakrtsanas but not to the abandoning of higher defilements. What is nirodhasamdpatti? The cessation of the mind and mental states having for its antecedent the idea of calm attached to the abandoning of the defilement of dkimcanydyatana. What is dsamjnika?
In the same way vedana is vedana, samvedand, pratisamvedand, vedita, that which feels, that which is included within vedana. Smrti is smrti, anusmrti, pratismrti, smarana, asampramosatd . . . cetaso'bhildpa.
112. The word kila shows that the author is presenting the opinion of the School. He explains his own doctrine in the Pancaskandhaka (Vydkhyd).
113. Compare Atthasdlini, 329: kattukamyatd. According to the Pancaskandhaka: abhiprete vastuny abhildsah. (See ii. 55c-d, iii. l, where chanda is defined as andgate prdrthand).
114. Pancaskandhaka: upapariksye vastuni pravicayo yogdyogavihito'nyathd ca.
115. Pancaskandhaka: samstute vastuny asampramosah / cetaso' bhilapanatd. See i. 33. 116. On dbhoga, S. Levi ad Sutrdlamkdra, i. 16, and Museon, 1914.
117. This term presents a difficulty. Vydkhyd: adhimuktis taddlambanasya gunato'vadhdrandda (-nam? ) rucir iti anye /' yathdniscayam dharanetiyogdcdracittdh: "Adhimukti is the consideration of the objea from the point of view of its qualities; according to others, complaisance; according
to the Ascetics (the Yogacarins), the contemplation of the objea in conformity with the decision taken. " (This last point is explained ad ii. 72, adhimuktimanaskdra).
According to the the Pancaskandhaka, adhimoksa is niscite vastuny avadhdranam.
See the Prakaranapdda, TD 26, p. 693al7.
Paramartha translates: "Adhimukti (hsiang liao $3 T ) is a dharma which makes the mind
lively {ming liao Ej ~J , papu) with respea to the charaaeristic of the objea. " This is a gloss, not a translation.
Hsiian-tsang translates: "Adhimukti, that is nengyu chingyin-k'o t H K ^ f P "I. " We can translate: "that which makes a sign of approbation with respea to the objea. " The expression^ (=mudrd) k'o (possible) is mentioned by Rosenberg in many word lists. A. Waley, who has consulted the Japanese glosses, translates: "the sign of approval given to a disciple who has understood what has been taught him. " We would thus have k'o = k'o-i = "this is allowable"(A. Debesse). Adhimukti is the approbation of the objea, the dharma by reason of which one grasps the objea under consideration; it marks the first stage of the aa of attention. See the note of Shwe Zan Aung, Compendium, p. 17 and 241, on adhimokkha: " . . . the settled state of a mind . . . ; it is deciding to attend to this, not that irrespective of more complicated prodedure as to what 'this' or 'that' appears to be. "
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Samghabhadra (TD 29, p. 384b9): Approbation (ym-k'o) with respect to an object is called adhimukti. According to other masters, adhi signifies "superiority, sovereignty;" mukti siginifies vimoksa. Adhimukti is a dharma by virtue of which the mind exercises its sovereignty over an object without any obstacle; like adhiiila. Adhimukti is a separate object, for the Sutra says: "The mind, by reason of adhimukti, approves of (ym-k'o) the object. " When the mental states arise, all approve (yin) the object:; as a consequence adhimukti is a mahdbhumika. Nevertheless the Sthavira says: "It is not proven that adhimukti is a separate thing, for we see that its characteristic is not distinguished from that of knowledge (jfidna): the characteristic of adhimukti is that the mind is determined (niicita) with respect to its object. But this is not different from the characteristic of knowledge (jfidna). Consequently adhimukti is not a separate thing. " This is not correct, for approbation (yin-k'o) brings about determination.
Some say: "Adhimukti is determination (avadhdrana, niicaya). " This is to give the cause of determination (namely adhimukti) the name of its effect. If this is the case, then adhimukti and determination would not be simultaneous. No: for these two mutually condition one another: by reason of discernment (pratisamkhyd) there arise approbation, and by reason of approbation there arises determination (ni/caya). There is no contradition: thus there is no obstacle to their being simultaneous. If all thought include these two, then all the categories of mind will be approbation and determination. This objection is worthless, for it happens that their activity is damaged when they are dominated by dharmas: even if there is approbation (yin) and determination, they are small and recognized only with difficulty.
118. Pancaskandhaka: upapariksye vastuni cittasyaikdgratd.
119. According to the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 220b2, and the Prakarana: iraddhd, virya, hri, apatrapd, alobha, advesa, prairabdhi, upeksd, apramdda, avihimsd. The Mahdvyutpatti (104) lists the third root (amoha) and places virya after the roots. The Pancaskandhaka also lists the third root and has the same order as the Mahdvyutpatti with the exception that it places apramdda before upeksd.
120. In other words, sraddhd is the dharma by which (yadyogdt) the mind, troubled by the kief as and the upaklesas, becomes clear, as troubled water becomes clear by the presence of a gem which purifies water (udakaprasddakamani). Same example in Atthasdliniy 304.
121. Explanation adopted by Vasubandhu in the Pancaskandhaka.
122. Bhdvand signifies "taking possession," "frequentation" (pratilambha, nisevana) according to
vii. 27.
123. The Mahasamghikas. Diligence holds the mind safe from the dharmas of defilement
(sdmklefika).
Y2A. The Abhidhamma distinguishes passaddhi and lahutd (Dhammasamgani, 40-43) which the
Abhidharma appears to identify. Prairabdhi in the dhydnas is analyzed viii. 9.
125. According to the Japanese editor. Pancaskandhaka: "Prairabdhi is an attitude of the mind
and body, a dharma opposed to dausthulya" (S. Levi, SUtrdlamkdra, vi. 2, Wogihara, p. 29).
126. Prasrabdhisambodhyanga is twofold, cittaprairabdhi and kdyaprairabdhi (Prakaranapdda, TD 26, p. 700al6). Samyuktdgama, TD 2, p. 191c5: . . . tatra ydpi kdyaprairabdhis tad api prairabdhisambodhyangam abhijndyai sambodhaye nirvdndya samvartate /ydpi cittaprairabdhis tad api samhodhyangam. . . A shorter recension in Samyutta, v. 111. In the presence of this text,
say the Sautrantikas, how can you define prairabdhi as solely "an attitude of the mind? "
127. Compare Samyutta, v. 108.
128. The Blessed One said that the nine dghdtavastus (Anguttara, iv. 408) are vydpddanivarana.
? 129. When the Path is made up of three elements, filaskandha, samddhiskandha, and prajndskandha, resolution and effort are placed within the prajndskandha with Seeing which, alone, is prajnd by its nature. We read in the Prajndskandhanirde/a: prajHdskandhah katamah / samyagdrspih samyaksamkalpah samyagvydydmah.
130. This samskdropeksa is to be distinguished from vedanopeksa (i. 14, ii. 8c-d) and from apramdnopeksa (viii. 29). The Atthasdlini (397) lists ten upeksas: here we have a definition of jhdnupekkhd:majjhattalakkhannndandbhogarasdavydpdrapaccupapphdnd. . . (p. 174. 2).
131. Literally: There are some things difficult to know that one can know. But it is quite difficult to know (or to admit) that there is no contradiction (opposition, impossibility of coexistence) between contradictory dharmas: asti hi ndma durjndnam apt jrlayate / idam tu khalu atidurjridnam yad virodho 'py avirodhah.
132. According to Hsiian-tsang and the glosses of the Japenese editor:
The Vaibhasikas. What contradiction is there in that attention is flexion of the mind, and that
indifference is non-flexion of the mind? In fact, we consider attention and indifference to be distinct dharmas.
The Sautrantikas. Then attention and indifference will not have the same object; or rather one should admit that all mental states (greed, hatred, etc) are associated
We encounter other dharmas (vitarka, vicdra) which present the same characteristics of opposition . . .
133. The Pancaskandhaka places amoha among the kuialamahdbhUmikas (by the fact that prajfid can be "erroneous"). Alobha is the opposite of lobha, udvega and an-updddna (? ). Advesa is the opposite of dvesa, namely goodwill (maitri, viii. 29). Amoha is the opposite of moha, samyaksamkalpa (vi. 69).
134. Pancaskandhaka: "Avihimsd is compassion (karund, viii. 29), the opposite of vihimsd. "
135. Endurance is good action (kufalakriyd); for endurence in evil action is not virya, but kausidya. The Blessed One said: "The virya of persons foreign to this religion (itobdhyaka) Is kausidya" (ii. 26a). Pancaskandhaka: "Virya is the endurance of the mind in good, the opposite of kausidya. "
136. According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, the Path of Seeing expells avidya, the Path of Mediation expells ajndna, and the Path of Asaiksa expells non-clearness.
137. Compare Dhammasangani, 429. 138. See above note 109.
139. Ko'yam devdndmpriyo ndma / rjukajdtiyo devdndrhpriya ity eke vydcaksate /aiapho hi devdndm prtyo bhavati /murkho devdndrhpriya ity apare /yo hiivardndm ispah sa na tddanena iiksata iti mUrkho bhavati (Vydkhyd). The Japanese editor quotes numerous glosses.
140. Pdphaprdmdnyamdtrena data klesamahdbhumikdh prdptd ity etdm eva prdptim janite (Vydkhyd).
Vasubandhu reproduces the formula of the Mahdbhdsya ad u. 4. 56 (the story of the Grammarian and the Cow-herder).
See S. Levi, JAs. 1891, ii. 549 ("Notes de chronologie indienne. Devanampriya, Acpka et Katyayana"). According to Kern, Manual, 133, the meaning of "idiot" derives from the sense of "harmless, pious": this appears to be somewhat possible. See de La Vallee Poussin's note in the Bulletin de I'Academie de Bruxelles, 1923.
141. Vydkhyd: dbhidhdrmikdh.
Perhaps by the plural (ahuh) Vasubandhu is designating Dharmatrata, the author of
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Samyukta-Abhidharmahrdaya, TD 28, number 1551, and his followers. This appears to result from the passages which follow (TD 28, p. 881bl7):
". . . The klesamahdbhumikas are: mithyddhimoksa, asamprahanya, ayonifomanaskdra, afrdddhya, kausidya, viksepa, avidyd, auddhatya, and pramdda.
"Mithyadhimoksa consists of the ten klesamahdbhumikas which are found in all defiled minds. Ahri and atrapdare called akuSalamahdbhumikas.
"The ten klesamahdbhumikas are found in all defiled minds. The ten dharmas the first of which is mithyadhimoksa, accompany all defiled minds, sense consciousnesses or mental consciousnesses, of Kamadhatu, Rupadhatu, and Arupyadhatu. They are thus klesamahd- bhumikas. Question: Styana is found in all defiled minds; why is it not counted among the klesamahdbhumikas?
Answer: Because it is favorable to samddhi. This is why stydna is not counted in the list. Is a dharma which is a mahabhumika also a klesamahdbhumika? Four alternatives: 1. mahdbhumikas without being klesamahdbhumikas . . . "
142. The author does not admit this opinion. Torpor (stydna, laya) and dissipation, which are defiled dharmas, are opposed to the "white" dharmas, like samddhi.
143. According to the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 220b4, there are five aku/alamahdbhumikas: avidyd, stydna, auddhatya, ahri, and anapatrapya. See iii. 32a-b and above note 102.
144. Hsuan-tsang translates: " . . . the dharmas of this nature (=iti) are termed parittakleU- bhumikas. "
Samghabhadra: The text says "the dharmas of this nature," in order to include aksdnti, arati dghdta, etc. (TD 29, p. 392a6).
145. Dharmatrata: Because they are abandoned through Meditation and not through the Seeing of the Truths, because they are associated with the mental consciousness and not with the five other consciousnesses, and because they do not arise with all minds and exist separately, they are parittakle/abhumika.
146. According to the Chinese. The Japanese editor explains the final et cetera by rdga (v. 2), pratigha, mdna (v. 10), and vicikitsa.
The Vydkhya reads: "kaukrtya, middha, etc. " and explains "etc. " by arati, vijrmbhitd, tendri, bhakte'samatd, etc. It continues: The kief as, rdga, etc. , are also indeterminate, for they are not classified in any of the five categories: they are not mahdbhumikas, because they are not found in any minds; they are not kus'aJamahdbhumikas, because they are repugnant to the good; they are not klesamahdbhumikas, because they are not found in any defiled mind: for there is no rdga or lust in a mind full of hatred (sapratigha).
The Acarya Vasumitra has written a summary, mnemonic Hoka\ "The tradition (smrta) is that there are eight aniyatas, namely vitarka, vicdra, kaukrtya, middha, pratigha, sakti (-rdga), mdna, and vicikitsa'. But we do not admit this number of eight. Why are the drspis (v. 3a) not aniyata? There is no mithyddrsti in a mind full of hatred or scepticism.
147. Compare Kathdvatthu, xiv. 8.
148. Dhammasangani, 1161, Atthasdlim, 784-787. 149. Compare i. 37.
150. Avenika = rdgddiprthagbhuta.
151. All drsti is samttrikdprajnd (i. 4lc-d, vii. l).
152. The mind of the First Dhyana, when it is good, contains twenty-two mental states; defiled- neutral, it contains eighteen mental states whether it is independent of, or associated with drsti, nineteen when it is associated with rdga, mdna or vicikitsa . . .
? 153. Literally: The word "also" (apt) shows that in addition to vicara, one should exclude sdthya and maya.
154. According to the Japanese editor, the Saddharmasmrti upasthdna sutra, TD 17, p. 193bl6. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 670b24.
155. By adding: "I am the great Brahma", he distinguishes himself from the other Brahmas. 156. Compare Digha, i. 219, and below iv. 8a, v. 53a-b.
157. Jndnaprasthdna, i. Para. 5 (according to Takakusu, p. 87). See TD 26, p. 924c26 and following.
158. Pratisa = guru, because fisyam pratistah.
159. Compare the definition of adhisila:. . . anumdtresv apy avadyesu bhayadarsi. . .
160. These masters observes that the two roots hri and trap (Dhdtupdta, iii. 3 and i. 399) are synonyms and signify shame (lajjd): from whence one cannot see how ahri would be disrespect and atrapd the absence of fear in the commission of transgressions.
161. Vasubandhu, in the Pancaskandhaka, adopts this definition.
162. Jndnaprasthdna, I Para. 4 (according to Takakusu, p. 87). See TD 26, p. 923a13 and
following.
163. Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 151al5.
164. For one cannot have respect for impure (sdsrava) dharmas. (Note of the Japanese editor).
165. This definition comes from a Sutra which is not designated in our sources. See i. 33.
166. Seventh opinion of the Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 219b3.
167. Argument presented in the Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 269bl0, and attributed to the Darstantikas.
168. That is, "it makes the voice surge forth," vdksamutthdpaka.
169. Compare Majjhima i. 301, Samyutta ov. 293: pubbe kho . . . vitakketvd vicdretvd pacchd vdcarh bhindati. On the other hand, Vibhanga, 135: vdcisamcetand = vdcisamkhdro.
170. Samghabhadra says that vitarka and vicara are associated with each thought; but these two dharmas do not enter into aaivity, do not reveal themselves by their action (udbhutavrtti) at one and the same time: the mind and mental states are grosser when vitarka, which is always present, enters into activity . . . In the same way rdga and moha are coexistent: but a person is termed rdgacarita, acting though rdga, when rdga manifests itself . . .
171. Vitarka and vicara do not exist simultaneously, but successively (parydyena). What is the difference between vitarka and vicara} The ancient masters (pUrvdcdrya) say: "What is vitarka} A mental conversation (manojalpa) of inquiry (paryesaka), which has for its support volition (cetand) or the speculative consciousness (prajfid) depending on whether it does or does not contain deduction (abhyilha). This is the grosser state of mind. What is vicara} A mental conversation of appreciation, of judgment (pratyaveksaka), which has for its support volition . . . " According to this theory, vitarka and vicara constitute almost two identical psychological complexes: they differ in that the first includes "inquiry" and the second "judgment. " Some give
an example: Someone feels numerous pots in order to know which one is well baked, and which one is soft: this inquiry (aha) is vitarka; finally, this person arrives at the conclusion, "There are such a number of each category:" this is vicara.
The Vydkhyd, ad i. 37, quotes Vasubandhu's Pancaskandhaka which is very close to the opinion
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of some ancient masters: vitarkah katamah /paryesako manojalpas cetandprajndvisesah / yd cittasyauddrikatd // vicdrah katamah / pratyaveksako manojalpas cetandprajndvisesah / yd cittasyasuksmata. //The Vydkhya adds:anabhyuhdvasthdydmcetand abhyuhdvasthdydm prajtieti vyavasthdpyate.
See Dhammasangani, 7-8, Compendium, p. 10-11, Mi/inda, 62-63. Atthasdlini, 296-297 definesvitarkaasiihanaandgivesitasolarika,whereasvicdraissukhuma. VyasaadYogasutra, i. 17: vitarka/ cittasydlambana sthilla dbhogah / suksmo vicdrah; i. 42-44.
172. Paryddiyate - samnirudhyate; see Siksasamuccaya, 177. 15, Divya, Sutrdlamkdra, 112. Sarhghabhadra's definition: yah svadharmesv eva raktasya darpas cetasah parydddnam
kufaldnyakrtydbhyupapattisamhdro madah.
173. Mada is sensation, "defiled satisfaction" {klisfa saumanasya). The Vaibhasikas do not admit this explanation: in fact, satisfaction does not exist beyond the Second DhySna: but, according to v. 53c, mada exists in the three spheres of existence.
174. Compare Dtgha, i. 21, Samyutta, ii. 94.
175. Its meaning is that it accumulates good and evil (Vydkhya). Tibetan: 'byed pas: because it
distinguishes. Atthasdlini, 293: dlambanam cintetiti cittam.
176. Dhdtupdtha, 4. 67.
177. The Vydkhya adds: bhdvandsamniveiayogena sautrdntikamatena yogacdramatena vd. Paramartha reads: citam subhdSubhair dhdtubhis tan vd cinotiti cittam. The Tibetan translates
in the same way: "because it is charged (bsags-pas) with good and evil dhdtus"
178. The consciousness (vijfidna) discerns a blue object, etc. ; sensation feels it as agreeable, etc. ; ideas grasp its characteristics, etc. Or rather: consciousness perceives the object, in a general manner, as a perceptible (upalabhyatdrupam grhndtt); the mental states perceive its specific characteristics {viiesampena)\ sensation is susceptible of being agreeably experienced (anu- bhavan*yatdrupam)\ ideas are susceptible of being defined (paricchedyatdrupam), etc (116a).
179. That is to say saha vistaraprabheddbhydm or aha vistaraprabhedena.
180. The iti indicates that one should add other viprayuktas like samghabheda (iv. 99), etc to this list. The Prakarana says: ye'py evamjatiyakah: "The dharmas which are of this type are also cittaviprayukta. " Same formula in the Skandhapancaka.
According to the Prakarana, the samskdras disassociated from the mind are: prdpti, asamjtlisamdpatti, nirodhasamdpatti, dsamjnika, jtvitendriya, nikdyasabhdga, dfrayaprdpti, dravya- prdpti (? ), dyatanaprdpti, jdti, jard, sthiti, anityatd ndmakdya, and vyanjanakaya and all the other dharmas of this type disassociated from the mind.
Prdpti is defined as dharmdndm praptih; dSrayaprdpti is airaydyatanaprapti; dravyaprdpti. (? ) is skandhdndm prdptih; dyatanaprdpti is ddhydtmikahdhydyatanaprdpti (TD 26, p. 694al9).
Prakaranapdda (p. 694al4): What is prdpti? Prdpti of the dharmas. What is asamjfiisamd- patti? The cessation of the mind and mental states haying for its antecedent the idea of departure attached to the abandoning of the defilement of the Subhakrtsanas but not to the abandoning of higher defilements. What is nirodhasamdpatti? The cessation of the mind and mental states having for its antecedent the idea of calm attached to the abandoning of the defilement of dkimcanydyatana. What is dsamjnika?
