, the illegitimate
political
powers that ?
Revolution and War_nodrm
240 Thus, the impression of Soviet Russia as both dangerous and
vulnerable led to repeated attempts to isolate or overthrow it, even if these efforts were not especially extensive.
Indeed, despite the widespread consensus that Bolshevism was a threat, there was little agreement on how to respond to it. The differences were based largely on competing assessments of the offense-defense balance, and in par- ticular, on the expected cost of trying to overcome the new regime. Churchill and Clemenceau thought Bolshevik Russia would be relatively easy to re- move, while Wilson and Lloyd George believed intervention would merely increase the appeal of Bolshevism both at home and abroad. And once it be- came clear that ousting the Soviet regime would require a major Western ef- fort-owing to both Russia's vast size and the Bolsheviks' unexpected staying power-the Allies abandoned their halfhearted efforts to topple it and turned to a combination of containment and accommodation instead.
Thus, perceptions of a profound offensive advantage over Soviet Russia were not universal, especially with respect to the prospects for foreign in- tervention. Although they regarded the Soviet regime as illegitimate and unpopular, the leaders of the Entente quickly realized that their own popu- lations would not support a large-scale effort to overturn it. As a result, they were forced to pin their hopes on the corrupt, contentious Whites or on still- born schemes for action by various Eastern European forces. The Allies' awareness that intervention in Russia would not be easy stands in marked contrast to the cavalier approach to intervention that France's enemies adopted in 1792-93, and is the main reason why the revolution in Russia did not lead to a larger war. 241
239 According to William Chamberlin, "probably the decisive factor in bringing about a continuation of the policy of limited intervention was the fear, by no means unreasonable or ungrounded in 1919, that Bolshevism in one form or another might spread to other European countries. " Russian Rroolution, 2:152.
240 In November 1917, the British Foreign Office reported that "Bolshevism was probably on its last legs," and U. S. ambassador David Francis declared, "This Bolshevik government can not survive. " According to Phillip Knightley, "in the two years from November 1917 to November 1919, the New York Times reported no fewer than ninety-one times that the Bol- shevikswereabouttofallor,indeed,hadalreadyfallen. "SeeRobertK. Murray,RedScare:A Study ofNational Hysteria, 1919-1920 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 40; and Phillip Knight- ley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Mythmaker (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 138.
241 Even Churchill opposed the use of conscripts in Russia, and recalled that "it would not have been right after the Great War was over, even had it been possible, to use British, French, or American troops in Russia. " Aftermath, 286.
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? The Russian Revolution
The Russian Revolution confirms that expectations about the likelihood of a revolution spreading (or collapsing) will have a powerful effect on rela- tions between a revolutionary state and its main foreign adversaries. It also suggests that states' initial assessments are not cast in stone, and the secu- rity competition sparked by a revolution can ease once each side's initial ex- pectations are dispelled.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
Uncertainty and misinformation helped magnify each side's perceptions of threat, thereby contributing to the security competition that followed the Rus- sian Revolution. During World War I, for example, British and French responses to the revolution were based on a series of unlikely scenarios-in- volving the seizure of Allied supplies, the arming of German and Austrian prisoners of war, and the possible use of Vladivostok as a German U-boat base. The worries were baseless, but the Western powers could not simply re- ject them out of hand. The United States was vulnerable to this problem as well, as revealed by Wilson's decision to send U. S. troops to northern Russia to guard Allied stores that were no longer there. France's expedition to Odessa in 1918 was based on its ignorance about conditions in the Ukraine, just as British aid to the Whites was sustained in part by inaccurate estimates of their truemilitaryprospects. Fromtheverybegingnin ,therefore,alackofinforma- tion contributed to the growing conflict between Moscow and the West.
Lack of information also undermined several early attempts at accommo- dation. The severing of diplomatic relations and the withdrawal of Western diplomats left the Allies without a reliable way to ascertain if support for Bol- shevism was growing or declining and made it difficult for either side to de- termine what the other was doing and why. Accommodation was also impeded by the near impossibility of communicating directly with the Soviet regime. The Bolsheviks had been excluded from the peace conference, and communication with Moscow was further impaired by the Allies' reluctance to take steps that might signal their acceptance of the Soviet regime. As a re- sult, the two sides were forced to rely on unreliable radio communications or on unofficial emissaries who were all too easy to disregard. These obstacles
introduced additional delays and ensured that positive efforts would be overtaken by events. The isolation of Soviet Russia also meant that the anti- Bolshevik exiles (whose ranks included many former tsarist officials) became Russia's main voice in the West. As one would expect, the exiles opposed any understanding with the new regime, and their testimony reinforced Allied intransigence at several crucial moments. 242
242 See Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile"; Kennan, Decision to Intervene, chap. 14; and Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 141-44, 173? 77.
? ? ? ? Revolution and War
Most important of all, neither the Soviets nor the Entente powers could gauge the potential for either revolution or counterrevolution in the wake of the Bolshevik victory in Russia. Fear of Bolshevism justified Western efforts to overthrow the new regime (or at least to keep it at arm's length), while Soviet hopes for world revolution accounted for the invasion of Poland in 1920 and their continued willingness to engage in counterproductive acts of revolutionary subversion.
Socialization and Learning
Finally, the early history of Soviet foreign relations lends partial-but only partial-support to neorealist claims about the socializing effects of anarchy. On the one hand, Soviet leaders did moderate their revo? utionary aims in order to advance specific diplomatic objectives, and they proved to be adept practioners of traditional balance-of-power politics. Moreover, as each side gained a more accurate estimate of the balance of threats, the level of security competition declined, prospects for cooperation increased, and Soviet for- eign relations took on a more normal cast. On the other hand, Bolshevik ide- ology continued to shape both its avowed objectives and its perceptions of foreign powers, even when the policies that emerged exacerbated its isola- tion and insecurity. Such behavior is difficult to reconcile with a purely struc- tural theory such as neorealism, which reminds us that foreign policy is never determined solely by structural factors. With hindsight, it is all too ob- vious that Leninist ideology was a serious handicap for Soviet diplomacy. Both the commitment to world revolution and the deep suspicion of other states endured because, first, the evidence against them was not clear-cut; second, they were a central part of the CPSU's claim to rule; third, they had been institutionalized in the Comintem and in the CPSU itself; and fourth, the Communist system inhibited critical debate about fundamental princi- ples. As a result, although the Soviet Union made tactical adjustments in re-
sponse to changing conditions, it did not formally abandon its revolutionary agenda until 1986, when it was already on its last legs. 243
The diplomacy of the fledgling Soviet state backs my tlheory that revolu- tions intensify security competition between states and raise the probability of war. Moscow's relations with most other states deteriorated badly after 1917, several foreign powers tried to overthrow the new regime, foreign troops occupied portions of Russian territory until 1924, and Russia and Poland fought a brief but intense war in 1920. Relations between Russia and
243 1986markedthefirsttimewhenacongressoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion omitted an assessment of the "world revolutionary process. " See Jacobson, When the Soviet
? Union Entered, 30.
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the outside world improved slightly from 1921 to 1924, but efforts to estab- lish more cordial relations ultimately failed to overcome the mutual percep- tions of threat, keeping the Soviet Union in a self-imposed state of partial isolation.
This unfortunate result was due primarily to the enduring legacy of Bol- shevik ideology. Although the revolution in Russia had not spread as they had anticipated, the Soviet leaders were unable or unwilling to give up the long-range goal of world revolution. They quickly learned to make tactical adjustments for the sake of immediate advantages (something Leninist ide- ology had long endorsed), but external pressures did not induce them to abandon the overthrow of capitalism as a long-term objective. And holding fast to this policy had very real costs, as it greatly increased the number of potential enemies the Soviets faced and would make it far more difficult to attract allies in the future.
Unlike the French case, however, the revolution in Russia did not lead to a war among the great powers. In addition to the sheer size of Soviet Russia (and the innate defensive advantage that this produced), the absence of great-power war is also explained by the massive bloodletting that had taken place between 1914 and 1918. Despite the intense fears of Bolshevism and their deep suspicion of Soviet intentions, none of the European powers was in a position to make a serious effort to oust the Soviet regime. This ob- servation reminds us that understanding the foreign relations of revolu- tionary states requires a broad perspective. Beyond the preferences and capabilities of the new regime, one must also consider the aims and capaci- ties of the other states in the system.
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
We have in reality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes.
-Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
Nobody is ever ready for a revolution.
-Gary Sick, White House aide for Iran, 1977-81
Like the French and Russian revolutions, the Islamic upheaval in Iran confirms that revolutions raise the level of security competition between states. By altering the regional balance of power, the revolution in Iran both threatened other states and created opportunities for them. It also triggered
spirals of hostility between the new regime and several other countries, which raised the level of threat even further. The fear that the revolution would spread made the danger seem greater, and lingering opposition within Iran fed the new regime's fears of foreign plots and gave its rivals the impression that it would be easy to overturn. Foreign responses to the revo- lution were also affected by uncertainty and misinformation, which exacer- bated each side's perceptions of threat.
The hopes and fears that accompanied the revolution turned out to be greatly exaggerated. Although the Iranian example did encourage funda- mentalists in other countries, it was not the sole (or even the most impor- tant) cause of the Islamic resurgence, and Iranian efforts to export the revolution to other countries have been largely unsuccessful. Foreign beliefs that the new regime would collapse turned out to be equally misguided; the Islamic Republic has survived diplomatic isolation, economic difficulties, a costly war, and internal conflicts that have endured for over fifteen years. Again we find that revolutions are both hard to spread and hard to reverse.
Finally, the Iranian Revolution offers only modest support for neorealist claims about the socializing effects of the international system. As in the So- viet case, key members of the revolutionary elite sought to moderate Iran- ian diplomacy in order to improve its international position. Their efforts were erratic and incomplete, however, for several reasons: the evidence in
? [210]
? The Iranian Revolution
favor of moderation was ambiguous, the commitment to a radical foreign policy was central to the legitimacy of the clerical regime, and the revolu- tionary government was tom between competing factions and thus unable to sustain a consistent line.
This chapter consists of three main sections. First I describe the origins of the Islamic Republic and summarize its ideological foundations. After that, I examine the foreign policy of the new regime and describe how other states responded, focusing primarily on its first decade in power. Finally, i compare the evolution of Iran's foreign relations against the propositions developed in chapter 2.
THE ORIGINS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC The Fall of the Shah
In simple terms, the regime of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi fell be- cause the shah's reformist policies alienated a broad spectrum of Iranian so- ciety that he was unable to coopt yet unwilling to suppress by brute force. 1 Opposition to the shah arose from, first, the economic and social disloca- tions generated by his rapid modernization program; second, clerical resis- tance to the intrusion of alien values and the shah's attempt to reduce their influence; and third, the widespread perception that the shah was a U. S. puppet and the head of a corrupt and decadent elite. 2
The revolutionary crisis began late in 1977, after the shah's decision to relax police controls and judicial procedures had revived the liberal opposi- tion and sparked! several clashes between antigovernment demonstrators and the shah's internal police. The challenge grew in January 1978, after an insulting attack on the radical clergy in a government newspaper triggered a series of riots by theology students, in which seventy students were killed. The riots began an escalating cycle of popular demonstrations through the
1 Accounts of the lrar nian revolution include Said Amir Arjomand, The Turbanfor the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (London: Oxford University Press, 1988); Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); Shaul Bakhash, The Reign ofthe Ay- atollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984); John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981); Farideh Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); and Misagh Parsa, Socia/ Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989).
2 Opposition to the shah included the liberal National Front, the pro-Communist Tudeh Party, the Liberation Movement (which advocated a synthesis of Islam with modem Western thought), left-wing guerrilla organizations such as the Sazman-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Iran (or Islamic Mujahedin) and the Sazaman-i Cherikha-yi Feda'i Khalq-i Iran (or Marxist Feda'i), and Muslim clerics such as Khomeini. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), chap. 10, and The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 42-56.
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spring and summer, and a mass demonstration in Tehran drew nearly five hundred thousand participants in September. The shah declared martial law and ordered the military to suppress the demonstrations, but these actions merely united the liberal opposition and the radlical clerics. By No- vember, a series of strikes had shut down the bazaars, universities, govern- ment offices, banks, and much of the oil industry.
The radicalization of the revolution was due in part to the shah's refusan either to make bold concessions or to order a massive crackdown. His inde-? cision was exacerbated by his deteriorating health and an inability to obtain clear and consistent advice from the United States, which did not appreciate the seriousness of the crisis until very late. 3 Strikes and demonstrations con- tinued through December, with the army rank and file becoming in- creasingly reluctant to use force against the opposition. Support from Washington was evaporating as well, as U. S. officials belatedly realized that the shah might be beyond saving. In desperation, the shah at last offered to negotiate with the opposition. After persuading Shahpour Bakhtiar, a prominent member of the liberal National Front, to lead a caretaker govern- ment, the shah agreed to leave the country for a "vacation" and to accept a greatly diminished role. It was a meaningless agreement, as the Pahlavi state was dissolving rapidly by this point and authority had already begun to pass into the hands of local governing bodies (or komitehs), many of which were controlled by clerics loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the
intellectual spiritual leader of the opposition. Khomeini returned to a tu- multuous welcome on February 1, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declared itself neutral ten days later. Bakhtiar immediately resigned and went into hiding, marking the final end of the Pahlavi state.
Khomeini's Revolutionary Program
Many diverse groups participated in the anti-shah coalition, but Ayatol- lah Ruhollah Khomeini was clearly its dominant figure. Khomeini had op- posed the shah's regime since the early 196os, when his criticisms of Iran's dependence on the United States had led to his arrest and subsequent exile in Iraq. He began extolling a radical doctrine of Islamic government while in exile and built an extensive network of supporters among the clergy. This
3 Accounts of U. S. handling of the revolution vary in assigning blame, but all agree that American decision-makers were deeply divided and U. S. advice was inconsistent. See Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 191! 5); James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy ofAmerican-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19f! 8), chap. 7; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs ofthe National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), 354? ; William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, 19f! 1); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Rev- olution, chap. 14. The shah's memoirs place the blame for his ouster on the United States; see Mohammad Reza Shah, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 19&).
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combination of ideology and organization would prove to be a potent revo- lutionary weapon. 4
The central element of Khomeini's revolutionary program was his insis-. tence that the shah's regime be replaced by a government based on Islamic law. Khomeini also argued that the clergy should play an active and direct role in the political system, to ensure that it conformed to Islamic princi- ples. 5 In the absence of direct guidance from the Prophet Muhammed or his chosen successors, he argued, Islamic government should be based on the
"guardianship of the jurisprudent" (velayet-e faqih). "Since the rule of Islam is the rule of law," he wrote, "only the jurists, and no one else, should be in charge of the government. They are the ones who can govern as God or- dered. "6 Thus, not only did Khomeini reject the separation of religion and politics, but his vision of Islamic government placed the clergy in a position of primacy?
Khomeini' s blueprint for Islamic government rested on several other core beliefs. First, he regarded all other forms of government as illegitimate, because they were not based on Islam, and believed that the major world powers were innately hostile and aggressive. Dividing the world into "op- pressors" (the superpowers, their allies, and their various puppets) and the "oppressed" (the victims of imperialist exploitation, such as Iran), Khomeini
accused the Western powers of deliberately seeking "to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so that they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands, and our human resources. " For this reason, he argued, the imperialist powers had "separated the various seg- ments of the Islamic ummah (community) from each other and artificially
4 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 35-44; Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 475-79, and Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 1o-12; and Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 94-102.
5 Khomeini declared that "Islam is political or it is nothing" and insisted that "this slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them. " Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations ofImam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, Calif. : Mizan Press, 1981), 37-38.
6 Quoted in Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 477?
7 "If a worthy individual possessing [knowledge of the law and justice) arises and estab- lishes a government, he will possess the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger [the Prophet Mohammed) . . . and it will be the duty of all people to obey him. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 62. For summaries of Khomeini's theory of Islamic government, see Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View: Khomeini on Man, the State, and International Politics (Lan- ham, Md. : University Press of America, 1983); David Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision: Nation- alism or World Order? " in his edited Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1990); Marvin Zonis and Daniel Bromberg, Khomeini, the Islamic Republic ofIran, and the Arab World (Cambridge: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1987); and Greg- ory Rose, "Velayet-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ismfrom Quietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki Ked- die (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
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created separate nations. " In addition to "corrupting the minds and morals of the people," the oppressors had replaced the judicial process and poHti- cal laws of Islam with "European importations" and "installed their agents in power. " According to Khomeini, therefore, the only way to end foreign exploitation was to overthrow agents such as the shah and establish a gov- ernment based on Islamic principles. 8
This Manichean worldview precluded any compromise with the shah or his foreign patrons. Khomeini told his followers in November 1978, "If you give [the shah] a breathing spell, tomorrow neither Islam nor your country nor your family will be left for you. Do not give him a chance; squeeze his neck until he is strangled. " He was particularly suspicious of the United States, whose support for the shah qualified it as the "Great Satan," but the Soviet Union and the other major powers were seen as equally hostile. 9 For Khomeini, the superpowers were driven by an incor- rigible lust for power and were especially dangerous for Iran. Even after the shah was gone, Khomeini warned that the great powers sought "to break Iran into pieces, to stage a coup d'etat and pave the way for the . . . supervision of foreigners. " Neither patience nor conciliation could remove the danger, because the "Satans are making plans [against Islam] for a cen- tury from now. "10
Second, Khomeini rejected existing state boundaries as "the product of the deficient human mind" and emphasized that "Muslims are one family, even if they are subject to different governments and even if they live in re- gions remote from one another. " Accordingly, he called for active efforts to spread the revolution beyond Iran's borders, declaring that "we have in re- ality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppres- sive, and criminal regimes. " He also argued that his doctrine of Islamic government would end the artificial divisions imposed by the West al! 1ld
8 "It is the duty of all of us to overthrow the taghut, i. e.
, the illegitimate political powers that ? now rule fthe entire Islamic world. The government apparatus of tyrannical and anti-popular regimes must be replaced by institutions serving the public good and administered accord- ing to Islamic law. In this way an Islamic government will gradually come into existence. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 34-35, 48-50, 136, 147. See also Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 37-41; . and Richard Cottam, "Iran-Motives behind Its Foreign Policy," Survival 28, no. 6
( 1 986).
9 In 1964, Khomeini had declared, "America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of them. " For these quotations, see Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 102; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 185.
10 Khomeini also warned, "Neither the West nor the East will leave us alone. They will try everything in their power to prevent Iran from settling down. " Quoted in W. R. Campbell and Djamchid Darvich, "Global Implications of the Islamic Revolution for the Status Quo in the Persian Gulf," Journal ofSoutli Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 5, no. 1 (1981), 42; and see also Rajaee, Islamic Values, 75-78; and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, "Iran's Foreign Devils," For- eign Policy 38 (198o).
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
recreate a unified Muslim ummah. And though the Muslim world was the
primary object of his revolutionary ambitions, Khomeini and his followers
occasionally suggested that the ultimate goal was the creation of a global
community that would transcend the existing state system altogether. 11 In
addition, Khomeini argued that failure to spread the revolution would leave
Iran vulnerable to the "oppressors" or their various puppets. Once in
power, he declared, "We should try to export our revolution to the world.
. . . If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. "
Thus, there were both offensive and defensive justifications for an expan-
sionist policy; although he repeatedly denied that it would involve the use
of force, spreading the revolution beyond Iran was both a means to ensure
Iran's security and an end in itself. 12
Third, like other revolutionary ideologies, Khomeini's worldview com- bined long-term optimism with an emphasis on sacrifice andl discipline. He preached, "The Quran says 'And hold fast . . . to the cable of Allah, and do not separate. . . . [All your] political social and economic problems will be solved. " Similarly, he exhorted his followers, "Know that it is your duty to es-
tablish an Islamic government. Have confidence in yourselves and know that you are capable of fulfilling this task. "13 Noting that "all the prophets began as lonely individuals, . . . but they persisted," he emphasized that "it is only through the active, intentional pursuit of martyrdom that unjust rulers can be toppled. "14 Indeed, he suggested, a single individual could spark a revo- lution: "Even if only one true human being appears, [the imperialists] fear
11 Quotations from Rouhallah K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 2o-21; Rajaee, Islamic Values, 77; Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 43; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 47-48, 5o-51. Khomeini also sftated, "We say w e want t o export our revolution t o a H Islamic countries as well as to the oppressed countries. . . . Export of our revolution means that all nations grow aware and save themselves. " Quoted in Maziar Behrooz, "Trends in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic," in Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 14-15.
?
? 12 Quoted in Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 24-26, and "Khumayni's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy," in Islam in Foreign Policy, ed. Adeed Dawisha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 19-2. 0; Rajaee, Islamic Values, 82-85; and Campbell and Darvich, "Global Impli- cations," 44-46.
13 He also stressed the need for action, advising Iranians, "Rid yourselves of your depres- sion and apathy. . . . An Islamic government will definitely be established," and he stated that the "unity of truth and . . . the expression of God's oneness . . . will guarantee victory. " The quotations are from Rajaee, Islamic Values, 85; Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 37, 137; and Rose, "Velayet-efaqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity," 186-87.
14 Quoted in Rajaee, Islamic Values, 85; and Zonis and Bromberg, Khomeini, Iran, Arab World, 27-28; and Khomeini's speech in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, South Asia, July 15, 1983, I I 1-3. Ten years after the revolution, Khomeini recalleol, "Anyone who did not believe in struggle 100 percent would easily flee the arena under the pressure and threats of the pseudo-pious. . . . The only way available was struggle through blood; and God paved the way for such a course. " See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East/South Asia, February 23, 1989, 45?
? ? Revolution and War
him, because others will follow him and he will have an impact that can de- stroy the whole foundation of tyranny, imperialism, and government by puppets. "15
Not surprisingly, the ideology of the Iranian revolutionaries left them deeply suspicious of most foreign powers (especially the United States). Khomein. i and his followers also saw their revolution as a model for othe1r states-e- specially other Muslim countries-and favored active efforts to spread the revolution beyond Iran's borders. Finally, their own success re- inforced the growing belief that revolutionary Islam was an irresistible force that could overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles.
The Consolidation ofClerical Power
Clerical power was consolidated in three main phases. During the firsfr, from February to November 1979, the main institutions of the new state were established and the more moderate forces were checked by pressure from the dergy and the radical left. Khomeini selected a moderate politi- cian, Mehdi Bazargan, to head the Provisional Government, but Bazargan was forced to share power with the so-called Revolutionary Council, a se- cret group of mostly clerical advisors. Bazargan submitted a draft constitu- tion in June, but protests from the clergy and the left led to the convening of an "Assembly of Experts" that proceeded to transform the original docu- ment into a blueprint for a theocratic state. 16 The final blow against Bazargan came when the shah's entry into the United States for medical treatment ignited a wave of protests in Iran and demands that the shah be returned to Iran to stand trial. Bazargan met with U. S. national security ad- visor Zbigniew Brzezinski in an attempt to resolve the dlispute, and Kho- meini issued a statement urging Iranian students "to expand with all their
might their attacks against the United States and Israel" in order to compell the return of the shah. 17 When a group of students seized the U. S. embassy on November 4 and Khomeini endorsed their action, Bazargan had no choice but to resign.
The second phase, from November 1979 to June 1981, was dominated by . a prolonged struggle for power between the new president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, and the clerical forces of the Islamic Republic Party led by the Ay- atollah Muhammed Beheshti. Unlike Bazargan, Bani-Sadr favored a radical
15 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 39; and see also Mary Heglund, "Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village," in Keddie, Religion and Politics, esp. 228-30; and Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 99-100.
? 16 The text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is reprinted in Middle East Journal(hereafterME/)J4, no. 2 (198o), 181-204; and see also Bakhash, Reign oftheAyatollahs, 74-75 ?
17 See "Chronology," ME/ J4, no. 1 (198o), 50.
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transformation of Iran along Islamic lines. 18 He opposed direct clerical rule, however, and believed that government positions should be given to indi- viduals with technical expertise rather than religious qualifications. He also sought to improve Iran's international position by resolving the hostage cri- sis with the Uruted States. 19
These positions placed Bani-Sadr at odds with the radical clergy, which waged a relentless campaign to limit his power. The IRP dominated the par- liamentary elections in March 1980, and Bani-Sadr found himself in a pro- tracted struggle against the party's efforts to expand its control? 0 Although Khomeini impllored the two sides to resolve their differences and even formed a three-man commission to mediate between them in March 1981, disputes between the clergy and the president remained intense. 21 Bani-Sadr eventually sought support from liberals, moderate clerics, and the left-wing Islamic Mujahedin, and this step convinced Khomeini that Bani-Sadr had become a threat to the clerical regime. The ayatollah relieved him from his position as commander-in-chief in June and the Majlis (Parliament) soon or-
dered his arrest, forcing Bani-Sadr to flee into exile in July.
The third phase, from July 1981 to February 1983, featured a violent struggle between the IRP and the radical left. 22 The Mujahedin launched a bloody wave olf terrorism following Bani-Sadr's removal. Abomb blast at the headquarters of the IRP in June killed seventy-four IRP officials, in-
cluding the Ayatollah Beheshti. Bani-Sadr's successor,. Mohammed Rajai, was killed by another bomb on August 30 (along with Prime Minister Muhammed Bahonar). The clergy responded with a brutal campaign of re- pression. Official executions totaled over twenty-six hundred by Novem- ber 1981, and over twelve thousand dissidents were killed in clashes with the Revolutionary Guards or in official executions between 1981 and 1985. 23
18 The son. of an ayatollah, Bani-Sadr had studied sociology and law in Tehran and was jailed for opposition activities in the 196os. He became part of Khomeini's entourage during the latter's exile in France and returned with him to Tehran in February 1979.
19 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 114-17; Behrooz, "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Re- public," 18-19; and Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution, and Secret Deals with the United States, trans. William Ford (Washington, D. C. : Brassey's, 1991), 22-25.
20 See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 6o-65; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, esp. 10o-110; and David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990}, 1JJ-J5, 168-74, 181-83.
21 Khomeini asked the contestants to settle their differences and serve "the interest of the nation" in September and implored them to stop "biting one another like scorpions" in Feb- ruary. See "Chronology," ME/ 35, no. 1 (198o), 46; no. 2 (1981), 215; no. 3 (1981), 367.
22 The principal left-wing groups in Iran were the Islamic Mujahedin, the Marxist Feda'i, and the Communist Tudeh Party. All three groups favored radical domestic change and an end to imperialist exploitation but opposed the establishment of a theocratic state.
23 The chief prosecutor, Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, declared that "these deaths are not merely permissible, they are necessary. " See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 68-69, 219-22.
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The threat from the Mujahedin was largely eliminated by the end of 1982, and in February 1983, the government moved to suppress the (Communist) Tudeh Party, removing the last independent political organization of any consequence. The presidency, prime ministry, and speakership of the Majlis were all in derical hands, the IRP dominated the Majlis, and the clergy had established effective control over the armed forces and Revolutionary Guards. Although low-level opposition continued throughout the rest of the decade and splits among the religious leaders became more and more ap- parent, the leaders of the Islamic Republic no longer faced a serious threat to their rule.
Conflict and Compromise in the Islamic Republic
The basic institutions of the Islamic Republic were in place by the end of 1983. The IRP dominated the Majlis and the ministries, and the army and Revolutionary Guards were all controlied by clerics loyal to Khomeini. The new regime had begun to reorder Iranian society along Islamic lines, bring- ing dramatic changes in law, education, and popular mores. 24 Opposition from within the senior clergy had been stilled as well, leaving Khomeini as the ultimate arbiter of Iran's Islamic future. 25
Despite these achievements, deep political differences soon began to di- vide Iran's new rulers. 26 In broad terms, the contest pitted a comparatively moderate group led by Majlis speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Pres- ident Said Alii Khamenei, and Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati against a more radical faction led by Prime Minister Mir-Husayn Musavi, Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri, and Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashemi. The pragma- tists downplayed the importance of exporting the revolution, supported the private sector, and advocated enhancing Iran's international position by in- creasing its ties with other countries. By contrast, the radicals sought to maintain the ideological purity of the revolution, and they emphasized the
24 See Menashri, Iran, 137-38, 192-97, 225-28, 271-76.
25 Khomeini was the only grand ayatollah to endorse direct clerical rule, and several equally eminent clerics (most notably Kazem Shariatmadari) criticized Khomeini's position as contrary to Islam. Shariatmadari's personal prestige was no match for Khomeini's control over the main state institutions, however, and he was placed under house arrest and subse- quently discredited by his later involvement in an unsuccessful coup. See Menashri, Iran, 7o--n 129-30, 239-40; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 67? 8, Scr9o, 223; Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 139-43, 21s-19; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Clerical Politics in Iran since 1979,'' in The Iranian Revolution and Islamic Republic, ed. Nikki Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 5? 2, 8s-89.
26 In September 1984, Majlis speaker Rafsanjani admitted that the Islamic Republican Party's Central Council "does not enjoy a unity which is a sine qua non for its ability to be ac- tive and advance the [party's) goals," and he described "this very fundamental problem" as "a significant challenge. " See Menashri, Iran, 307-308; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Elite Fac- tionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran," MET 41, no. 2 (1987), 184.
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export of Islamic fundamentalism, the use of state power to aid the "op- pressed," the removal of Western influence, and steadfast opposition to the United States and its regional allies. 27
The pragmatists slowly gained the upper hand throughout the 198os, al- though the process was erratic and the basic divisions would remain intact after Khomeini's death in 1989. Khomeini called repeatedly for the "elimi- nation of differences," but he also shifted his own position in order to pre- vent either faction from gaining undisputed control. As a result, periods of deradicalization alternated with occasional outbursts of extremism. By 1985, Rafsanjani and his supporters had begun to curb the excesses of "Islamiza- tion" and Iranian officials were signaling their desire to restore Iran's con- tacts with the outside world. In addition to a detente with Saudi Arabia and several Western states, Iran began seeking advanced U. S. weaponry from a number of Israeli intermediaries. This policy was a direct response to the de- mands imposed by Iran's war with Iraq and marked a noteworthy depar- ture from its public antipathy toward! Israel and the "Great Satan. "28 The initiative came to an abrupt end when Rafsanjani's internal opponents leaked word of his negotiations with the United States. The news brought intense criticism from the radicals, but Khomeini condemned this new
threat to unity, and Rafsanjani and the moderates emerged in an even stronger position. Khomeini continued to back them, and the trial and sub- sequent execution of Mehdi Hashemi, former head of the bureau dealing with foreign revolutionaries, was a major setback for the radicals. 29
As Rafsanjani and the pragmatists continued to consolidate their posi- tion during 1988, evidence of a renewed drive toward moderation was ap- parent. The most obvious sign was the ceasefire with Iraq-which entailed abandoning the oft-repeated goal of toppling Saddam Hussein-but Khomeini also agreed to a series of administrative initiatives that curtailed the role of religious authorities. Both Khomeini and Rafsanjani made state- ments stressing that religious principles must "adapt to the requirements of time and place," and the speaker later declared that although "the law
27 The membership of each faction changed over time, and some individuals supported one side on certain issues but not on others. See Akhavi, "Elite Factionalism"; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy"; Middle East Contemporary Survey (hereafter MECS), vol. 8: 1983-84 (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies/ Shiloah Center, 1986), 43(}-33; MECS 1988 (Boulde1; Colo. : Westview, 1990), 493-<)4; and Shireen T. Hunter, Iran after Kho- meini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 36-39.
28 See Menashri, Iran, 322-25, 374-75.
29 Hashemi was believed to be responsible for leaking word of the arms deals. Another sign of internal differences was the decision to disband the Islamic Revolution Party in 1987. Raf- sanjani admitted in 1986 that there were "two relatively powerful factions in our country. . . . They may in fact be regarded as two parties without names. " He termed the decision to dis- band the party "temporary" and said that it might be revived "if the consensus which Jed to its formation in 1979 is available again. " See Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 162.
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should follow Islamic doctrine . . . priority will be given to government de- cisions over doctrine. " Khomeini also issued a formal edict (orfatwa) de- claring that the authority of the Islamic state was the same as it had been in the time of Muhammed, implying that government decisions could super- sede Islamic law.
vulnerable led to repeated attempts to isolate or overthrow it, even if these efforts were not especially extensive.
Indeed, despite the widespread consensus that Bolshevism was a threat, there was little agreement on how to respond to it. The differences were based largely on competing assessments of the offense-defense balance, and in par- ticular, on the expected cost of trying to overcome the new regime. Churchill and Clemenceau thought Bolshevik Russia would be relatively easy to re- move, while Wilson and Lloyd George believed intervention would merely increase the appeal of Bolshevism both at home and abroad. And once it be- came clear that ousting the Soviet regime would require a major Western ef- fort-owing to both Russia's vast size and the Bolsheviks' unexpected staying power-the Allies abandoned their halfhearted efforts to topple it and turned to a combination of containment and accommodation instead.
Thus, perceptions of a profound offensive advantage over Soviet Russia were not universal, especially with respect to the prospects for foreign in- tervention. Although they regarded the Soviet regime as illegitimate and unpopular, the leaders of the Entente quickly realized that their own popu- lations would not support a large-scale effort to overturn it. As a result, they were forced to pin their hopes on the corrupt, contentious Whites or on still- born schemes for action by various Eastern European forces. The Allies' awareness that intervention in Russia would not be easy stands in marked contrast to the cavalier approach to intervention that France's enemies adopted in 1792-93, and is the main reason why the revolution in Russia did not lead to a larger war. 241
239 According to William Chamberlin, "probably the decisive factor in bringing about a continuation of the policy of limited intervention was the fear, by no means unreasonable or ungrounded in 1919, that Bolshevism in one form or another might spread to other European countries. " Russian Rroolution, 2:152.
240 In November 1917, the British Foreign Office reported that "Bolshevism was probably on its last legs," and U. S. ambassador David Francis declared, "This Bolshevik government can not survive. " According to Phillip Knightley, "in the two years from November 1917 to November 1919, the New York Times reported no fewer than ninety-one times that the Bol- shevikswereabouttofallor,indeed,hadalreadyfallen. "SeeRobertK. Murray,RedScare:A Study ofNational Hysteria, 1919-1920 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 40; and Phillip Knight- ley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Mythmaker (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 138.
241 Even Churchill opposed the use of conscripts in Russia, and recalled that "it would not have been right after the Great War was over, even had it been possible, to use British, French, or American troops in Russia. " Aftermath, 286.
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The Russian Revolution confirms that expectations about the likelihood of a revolution spreading (or collapsing) will have a powerful effect on rela- tions between a revolutionary state and its main foreign adversaries. It also suggests that states' initial assessments are not cast in stone, and the secu- rity competition sparked by a revolution can ease once each side's initial ex- pectations are dispelled.
Uncertainty and Misinformation
Uncertainty and misinformation helped magnify each side's perceptions of threat, thereby contributing to the security competition that followed the Rus- sian Revolution. During World War I, for example, British and French responses to the revolution were based on a series of unlikely scenarios-in- volving the seizure of Allied supplies, the arming of German and Austrian prisoners of war, and the possible use of Vladivostok as a German U-boat base. The worries were baseless, but the Western powers could not simply re- ject them out of hand. The United States was vulnerable to this problem as well, as revealed by Wilson's decision to send U. S. troops to northern Russia to guard Allied stores that were no longer there. France's expedition to Odessa in 1918 was based on its ignorance about conditions in the Ukraine, just as British aid to the Whites was sustained in part by inaccurate estimates of their truemilitaryprospects. Fromtheverybegingnin ,therefore,alackofinforma- tion contributed to the growing conflict between Moscow and the West.
Lack of information also undermined several early attempts at accommo- dation. The severing of diplomatic relations and the withdrawal of Western diplomats left the Allies without a reliable way to ascertain if support for Bol- shevism was growing or declining and made it difficult for either side to de- termine what the other was doing and why. Accommodation was also impeded by the near impossibility of communicating directly with the Soviet regime. The Bolsheviks had been excluded from the peace conference, and communication with Moscow was further impaired by the Allies' reluctance to take steps that might signal their acceptance of the Soviet regime. As a re- sult, the two sides were forced to rely on unreliable radio communications or on unofficial emissaries who were all too easy to disregard. These obstacles
introduced additional delays and ensured that positive efforts would be overtaken by events. The isolation of Soviet Russia also meant that the anti- Bolshevik exiles (whose ranks included many former tsarist officials) became Russia's main voice in the West. As one would expect, the exiles opposed any understanding with the new regime, and their testimony reinforced Allied intransigence at several crucial moments. 242
242 See Tongour, "Diplomacy in Exile"; Kennan, Decision to Intervene, chap. 14; and Ullman, Britain and the Russian Civil War, 141-44, 173? 77.
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Most important of all, neither the Soviets nor the Entente powers could gauge the potential for either revolution or counterrevolution in the wake of the Bolshevik victory in Russia. Fear of Bolshevism justified Western efforts to overthrow the new regime (or at least to keep it at arm's length), while Soviet hopes for world revolution accounted for the invasion of Poland in 1920 and their continued willingness to engage in counterproductive acts of revolutionary subversion.
Socialization and Learning
Finally, the early history of Soviet foreign relations lends partial-but only partial-support to neorealist claims about the socializing effects of anarchy. On the one hand, Soviet leaders did moderate their revo? utionary aims in order to advance specific diplomatic objectives, and they proved to be adept practioners of traditional balance-of-power politics. Moreover, as each side gained a more accurate estimate of the balance of threats, the level of security competition declined, prospects for cooperation increased, and Soviet for- eign relations took on a more normal cast. On the other hand, Bolshevik ide- ology continued to shape both its avowed objectives and its perceptions of foreign powers, even when the policies that emerged exacerbated its isola- tion and insecurity. Such behavior is difficult to reconcile with a purely struc- tural theory such as neorealism, which reminds us that foreign policy is never determined solely by structural factors. With hindsight, it is all too ob- vious that Leninist ideology was a serious handicap for Soviet diplomacy. Both the commitment to world revolution and the deep suspicion of other states endured because, first, the evidence against them was not clear-cut; second, they were a central part of the CPSU's claim to rule; third, they had been institutionalized in the Comintem and in the CPSU itself; and fourth, the Communist system inhibited critical debate about fundamental princi- ples. As a result, although the Soviet Union made tactical adjustments in re-
sponse to changing conditions, it did not formally abandon its revolutionary agenda until 1986, when it was already on its last legs. 243
The diplomacy of the fledgling Soviet state backs my tlheory that revolu- tions intensify security competition between states and raise the probability of war. Moscow's relations with most other states deteriorated badly after 1917, several foreign powers tried to overthrow the new regime, foreign troops occupied portions of Russian territory until 1924, and Russia and Poland fought a brief but intense war in 1920. Relations between Russia and
243 1986markedthefirsttimewhenacongressoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion omitted an assessment of the "world revolutionary process. " See Jacobson, When the Soviet
? Union Entered, 30.
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the outside world improved slightly from 1921 to 1924, but efforts to estab- lish more cordial relations ultimately failed to overcome the mutual percep- tions of threat, keeping the Soviet Union in a self-imposed state of partial isolation.
This unfortunate result was due primarily to the enduring legacy of Bol- shevik ideology. Although the revolution in Russia had not spread as they had anticipated, the Soviet leaders were unable or unwilling to give up the long-range goal of world revolution. They quickly learned to make tactical adjustments for the sake of immediate advantages (something Leninist ide- ology had long endorsed), but external pressures did not induce them to abandon the overthrow of capitalism as a long-term objective. And holding fast to this policy had very real costs, as it greatly increased the number of potential enemies the Soviets faced and would make it far more difficult to attract allies in the future.
Unlike the French case, however, the revolution in Russia did not lead to a war among the great powers. In addition to the sheer size of Soviet Russia (and the innate defensive advantage that this produced), the absence of great-power war is also explained by the massive bloodletting that had taken place between 1914 and 1918. Despite the intense fears of Bolshevism and their deep suspicion of Soviet intentions, none of the European powers was in a position to make a serious effort to oust the Soviet regime. This ob- servation reminds us that understanding the foreign relations of revolu- tionary states requires a broad perspective. Beyond the preferences and capabilities of the new regime, one must also consider the aims and capaci- ties of the other states in the system.
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We have in reality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppressive, and criminal regimes.
-Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
Nobody is ever ready for a revolution.
-Gary Sick, White House aide for Iran, 1977-81
Like the French and Russian revolutions, the Islamic upheaval in Iran confirms that revolutions raise the level of security competition between states. By altering the regional balance of power, the revolution in Iran both threatened other states and created opportunities for them. It also triggered
spirals of hostility between the new regime and several other countries, which raised the level of threat even further. The fear that the revolution would spread made the danger seem greater, and lingering opposition within Iran fed the new regime's fears of foreign plots and gave its rivals the impression that it would be easy to overturn. Foreign responses to the revo- lution were also affected by uncertainty and misinformation, which exacer- bated each side's perceptions of threat.
The hopes and fears that accompanied the revolution turned out to be greatly exaggerated. Although the Iranian example did encourage funda- mentalists in other countries, it was not the sole (or even the most impor- tant) cause of the Islamic resurgence, and Iranian efforts to export the revolution to other countries have been largely unsuccessful. Foreign beliefs that the new regime would collapse turned out to be equally misguided; the Islamic Republic has survived diplomatic isolation, economic difficulties, a costly war, and internal conflicts that have endured for over fifteen years. Again we find that revolutions are both hard to spread and hard to reverse.
Finally, the Iranian Revolution offers only modest support for neorealist claims about the socializing effects of the international system. As in the So- viet case, key members of the revolutionary elite sought to moderate Iran- ian diplomacy in order to improve its international position. Their efforts were erratic and incomplete, however, for several reasons: the evidence in
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favor of moderation was ambiguous, the commitment to a radical foreign policy was central to the legitimacy of the clerical regime, and the revolu- tionary government was tom between competing factions and thus unable to sustain a consistent line.
This chapter consists of three main sections. First I describe the origins of the Islamic Republic and summarize its ideological foundations. After that, I examine the foreign policy of the new regime and describe how other states responded, focusing primarily on its first decade in power. Finally, i compare the evolution of Iran's foreign relations against the propositions developed in chapter 2.
THE ORIGINS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC The Fall of the Shah
In simple terms, the regime of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi fell be- cause the shah's reformist policies alienated a broad spectrum of Iranian so- ciety that he was unable to coopt yet unwilling to suppress by brute force. 1 Opposition to the shah arose from, first, the economic and social disloca- tions generated by his rapid modernization program; second, clerical resis- tance to the intrusion of alien values and the shah's attempt to reduce their influence; and third, the widespread perception that the shah was a U. S. puppet and the head of a corrupt and decadent elite. 2
The revolutionary crisis began late in 1977, after the shah's decision to relax police controls and judicial procedures had revived the liberal opposi- tion and sparked! several clashes between antigovernment demonstrators and the shah's internal police. The challenge grew in January 1978, after an insulting attack on the radical clergy in a government newspaper triggered a series of riots by theology students, in which seventy students were killed. The riots began an escalating cycle of popular demonstrations through the
1 Accounts of the lrar nian revolution include Said Amir Arjomand, The Turbanfor the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (London: Oxford University Press, 1988); Dilip Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); Shaul Bakhash, The Reign ofthe Ay- atollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1984); John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981); Farideh Farhi, States and Urban-Based Revolutions: Iran and Nicaragua (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); and Misagh Parsa, Socia/ Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989).
2 Opposition to the shah included the liberal National Front, the pro-Communist Tudeh Party, the Liberation Movement (which advocated a synthesis of Islam with modem Western thought), left-wing guerrilla organizations such as the Sazman-i Mujahedin-i Khalq-i Iran (or Islamic Mujahedin) and the Sazaman-i Cherikha-yi Feda'i Khalq-i Iran (or Marxist Feda'i), and Muslim clerics such as Khomeini. See Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), chap. 10, and The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, 42-56.
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spring and summer, and a mass demonstration in Tehran drew nearly five hundred thousand participants in September. The shah declared martial law and ordered the military to suppress the demonstrations, but these actions merely united the liberal opposition and the radlical clerics. By No- vember, a series of strikes had shut down the bazaars, universities, govern- ment offices, banks, and much of the oil industry.
The radicalization of the revolution was due in part to the shah's refusan either to make bold concessions or to order a massive crackdown. His inde-? cision was exacerbated by his deteriorating health and an inability to obtain clear and consistent advice from the United States, which did not appreciate the seriousness of the crisis until very late. 3 Strikes and demonstrations con- tinued through December, with the army rank and file becoming in- creasingly reluctant to use force against the opposition. Support from Washington was evaporating as well, as U. S. officials belatedly realized that the shah might be beyond saving. In desperation, the shah at last offered to negotiate with the opposition. After persuading Shahpour Bakhtiar, a prominent member of the liberal National Front, to lead a caretaker govern- ment, the shah agreed to leave the country for a "vacation" and to accept a greatly diminished role. It was a meaningless agreement, as the Pahlavi state was dissolving rapidly by this point and authority had already begun to pass into the hands of local governing bodies (or komitehs), many of which were controlled by clerics loyal to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the
intellectual spiritual leader of the opposition. Khomeini returned to a tu- multuous welcome on February 1, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declared itself neutral ten days later. Bakhtiar immediately resigned and went into hiding, marking the final end of the Pahlavi state.
Khomeini's Revolutionary Program
Many diverse groups participated in the anti-shah coalition, but Ayatol- lah Ruhollah Khomeini was clearly its dominant figure. Khomeini had op- posed the shah's regime since the early 196os, when his criticisms of Iran's dependence on the United States had led to his arrest and subsequent exile in Iraq. He began extolling a radical doctrine of Islamic government while in exile and built an extensive network of supporters among the clergy. This
3 Accounts of U. S. handling of the revolution vary in assigning blame, but all agree that American decision-makers were deeply divided and U. S. advice was inconsistent. See Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 191! 5); James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy ofAmerican-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19f! 8), chap. 7; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs ofthe National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), 354? ; William Sullivan, Mission to Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, 19f! 1); and Stempel, Inside the Iranian Rev- olution, chap. 14. The shah's memoirs place the blame for his ouster on the United States; see Mohammad Reza Shah, Answer to History (New York: Stein and Day, 19&).
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combination of ideology and organization would prove to be a potent revo- lutionary weapon. 4
The central element of Khomeini's revolutionary program was his insis-. tence that the shah's regime be replaced by a government based on Islamic law. Khomeini also argued that the clergy should play an active and direct role in the political system, to ensure that it conformed to Islamic princi- ples. 5 In the absence of direct guidance from the Prophet Muhammed or his chosen successors, he argued, Islamic government should be based on the
"guardianship of the jurisprudent" (velayet-e faqih). "Since the rule of Islam is the rule of law," he wrote, "only the jurists, and no one else, should be in charge of the government. They are the ones who can govern as God or- dered. "6 Thus, not only did Khomeini reject the separation of religion and politics, but his vision of Islamic government placed the clergy in a position of primacy?
Khomeini' s blueprint for Islamic government rested on several other core beliefs. First, he regarded all other forms of government as illegitimate, because they were not based on Islam, and believed that the major world powers were innately hostile and aggressive. Dividing the world into "op- pressors" (the superpowers, their allies, and their various puppets) and the "oppressed" (the victims of imperialist exploitation, such as Iran), Khomeini
accused the Western powers of deliberately seeking "to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so that they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands, and our human resources. " For this reason, he argued, the imperialist powers had "separated the various seg- ments of the Islamic ummah (community) from each other and artificially
4 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 35-44; Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 475-79, and Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 1o-12; and Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 94-102.
5 Khomeini declared that "Islam is political or it is nothing" and insisted that "this slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeat them. " Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations ofImam Khomeini, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, Calif. : Mizan Press, 1981), 37-38.
6 Quoted in Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 477?
7 "If a worthy individual possessing [knowledge of the law and justice) arises and estab- lishes a government, he will possess the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger [the Prophet Mohammed) . . . and it will be the duty of all people to obey him. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 62. For summaries of Khomeini's theory of Islamic government, see Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Values and World View: Khomeini on Man, the State, and International Politics (Lan- ham, Md. : University Press of America, 1983); David Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision: Nation- alism or World Order? " in his edited Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1990); Marvin Zonis and Daniel Bromberg, Khomeini, the Islamic Republic ofIran, and the Arab World (Cambridge: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1987); and Greg- ory Rose, "Velayet-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," in Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ismfrom Quietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki Ked- die (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
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created separate nations. " In addition to "corrupting the minds and morals of the people," the oppressors had replaced the judicial process and poHti- cal laws of Islam with "European importations" and "installed their agents in power. " According to Khomeini, therefore, the only way to end foreign exploitation was to overthrow agents such as the shah and establish a gov- ernment based on Islamic principles. 8
This Manichean worldview precluded any compromise with the shah or his foreign patrons. Khomeini told his followers in November 1978, "If you give [the shah] a breathing spell, tomorrow neither Islam nor your country nor your family will be left for you. Do not give him a chance; squeeze his neck until he is strangled. " He was particularly suspicious of the United States, whose support for the shah qualified it as the "Great Satan," but the Soviet Union and the other major powers were seen as equally hostile. 9 For Khomeini, the superpowers were driven by an incor- rigible lust for power and were especially dangerous for Iran. Even after the shah was gone, Khomeini warned that the great powers sought "to break Iran into pieces, to stage a coup d'etat and pave the way for the . . . supervision of foreigners. " Neither patience nor conciliation could remove the danger, because the "Satans are making plans [against Islam] for a cen- tury from now. "10
Second, Khomeini rejected existing state boundaries as "the product of the deficient human mind" and emphasized that "Muslims are one family, even if they are subject to different governments and even if they live in re- gions remote from one another. " Accordingly, he called for active efforts to spread the revolution beyond Iran's borders, declaring that "we have in re- ality, then, no choice but to . . . overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppres- sive, and criminal regimes. " He also argued that his doctrine of Islamic government would end the artificial divisions imposed by the West al! 1ld
8 "It is the duty of all of us to overthrow the taghut, i. e.
, the illegitimate political powers that ? now rule fthe entire Islamic world. The government apparatus of tyrannical and anti-popular regimes must be replaced by institutions serving the public good and administered accord- ing to Islamic law. In this way an Islamic government will gradually come into existence. " Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 34-35, 48-50, 136, 147. See also Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in Revolutionary Decade (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 37-41; . and Richard Cottam, "Iran-Motives behind Its Foreign Policy," Survival 28, no. 6
( 1 986).
9 In 1964, Khomeini had declared, "America is worse than Britain; Britain is worse than America. The Soviet Union is worse than both of them. " For these quotations, see Arjomand, Turbanfor the Crown, 102; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 185.
10 Khomeini also warned, "Neither the West nor the East will leave us alone. They will try everything in their power to prevent Iran from settling down. " Quoted in W. R. Campbell and Djamchid Darvich, "Global Implications of the Islamic Revolution for the Status Quo in the Persian Gulf," Journal ofSoutli Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 5, no. 1 (1981), 42; and see also Rajaee, Islamic Values, 75-78; and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, "Iran's Foreign Devils," For- eign Policy 38 (198o).
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
recreate a unified Muslim ummah. And though the Muslim world was the
primary object of his revolutionary ambitions, Khomeini and his followers
occasionally suggested that the ultimate goal was the creation of a global
community that would transcend the existing state system altogether. 11 In
addition, Khomeini argued that failure to spread the revolution would leave
Iran vulnerable to the "oppressors" or their various puppets. Once in
power, he declared, "We should try to export our revolution to the world.
. . . If we remain in an enclosed environment we shall definitely face defeat. "
Thus, there were both offensive and defensive justifications for an expan-
sionist policy; although he repeatedly denied that it would involve the use
of force, spreading the revolution beyond Iran was both a means to ensure
Iran's security and an end in itself. 12
Third, like other revolutionary ideologies, Khomeini's worldview com- bined long-term optimism with an emphasis on sacrifice andl discipline. He preached, "The Quran says 'And hold fast . . . to the cable of Allah, and do not separate. . . . [All your] political social and economic problems will be solved. " Similarly, he exhorted his followers, "Know that it is your duty to es-
tablish an Islamic government. Have confidence in yourselves and know that you are capable of fulfilling this task. "13 Noting that "all the prophets began as lonely individuals, . . . but they persisted," he emphasized that "it is only through the active, intentional pursuit of martyrdom that unjust rulers can be toppled. "14 Indeed, he suggested, a single individual could spark a revo- lution: "Even if only one true human being appears, [the imperialists] fear
11 Quotations from Rouhallah K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 2o-21; Rajaee, Islamic Values, 77; Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 43; and Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 47-48, 5o-51. Khomeini also sftated, "We say w e want t o export our revolution t o a H Islamic countries as well as to the oppressed countries. . . . Export of our revolution means that all nations grow aware and save themselves. " Quoted in Maziar Behrooz, "Trends in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic," in Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union, and the United States, ed. Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 14-15.
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? 12 Quoted in Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 24-26, and "Khumayni's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy," in Islam in Foreign Policy, ed. Adeed Dawisha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 19-2. 0; Rajaee, Islamic Values, 82-85; and Campbell and Darvich, "Global Impli- cations," 44-46.
13 He also stressed the need for action, advising Iranians, "Rid yourselves of your depres- sion and apathy. . . . An Islamic government will definitely be established," and he stated that the "unity of truth and . . . the expression of God's oneness . . . will guarantee victory. " The quotations are from Rajaee, Islamic Values, 85; Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 37, 137; and Rose, "Velayet-efaqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity," 186-87.
14 Quoted in Rajaee, Islamic Values, 85; and Zonis and Bromberg, Khomeini, Iran, Arab World, 27-28; and Khomeini's speech in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, South Asia, July 15, 1983, I I 1-3. Ten years after the revolution, Khomeini recalleol, "Anyone who did not believe in struggle 100 percent would easily flee the arena under the pressure and threats of the pseudo-pious. . . . The only way available was struggle through blood; and God paved the way for such a course. " See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East/South Asia, February 23, 1989, 45?
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him, because others will follow him and he will have an impact that can de- stroy the whole foundation of tyranny, imperialism, and government by puppets. "15
Not surprisingly, the ideology of the Iranian revolutionaries left them deeply suspicious of most foreign powers (especially the United States). Khomein. i and his followers also saw their revolution as a model for othe1r states-e- specially other Muslim countries-and favored active efforts to spread the revolution beyond Iran's borders. Finally, their own success re- inforced the growing belief that revolutionary Islam was an irresistible force that could overcome seemingly insurmountable obstacles.
The Consolidation ofClerical Power
Clerical power was consolidated in three main phases. During the firsfr, from February to November 1979, the main institutions of the new state were established and the more moderate forces were checked by pressure from the dergy and the radical left. Khomeini selected a moderate politi- cian, Mehdi Bazargan, to head the Provisional Government, but Bazargan was forced to share power with the so-called Revolutionary Council, a se- cret group of mostly clerical advisors. Bazargan submitted a draft constitu- tion in June, but protests from the clergy and the left led to the convening of an "Assembly of Experts" that proceeded to transform the original docu- ment into a blueprint for a theocratic state. 16 The final blow against Bazargan came when the shah's entry into the United States for medical treatment ignited a wave of protests in Iran and demands that the shah be returned to Iran to stand trial. Bazargan met with U. S. national security ad- visor Zbigniew Brzezinski in an attempt to resolve the dlispute, and Kho- meini issued a statement urging Iranian students "to expand with all their
might their attacks against the United States and Israel" in order to compell the return of the shah. 17 When a group of students seized the U. S. embassy on November 4 and Khomeini endorsed their action, Bazargan had no choice but to resign.
The second phase, from November 1979 to June 1981, was dominated by . a prolonged struggle for power between the new president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, and the clerical forces of the Islamic Republic Party led by the Ay- atollah Muhammed Beheshti. Unlike Bazargan, Bani-Sadr favored a radical
15 Khomeini, Islam and Revolution, 39; and see also Mary Heglund, "Two Images of Husain: Accommodation and Revolution in an Iranian Village," in Keddie, Religion and Politics, esp. 228-30; and Arjomand, Turban for the Crown, 99-100.
? 16 The text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is reprinted in Middle East Journal(hereafterME/)J4, no. 2 (198o), 181-204; and see also Bakhash, Reign oftheAyatollahs, 74-75 ?
17 See "Chronology," ME/ J4, no. 1 (198o), 50.
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transformation of Iran along Islamic lines. 18 He opposed direct clerical rule, however, and believed that government positions should be given to indi- viduals with technical expertise rather than religious qualifications. He also sought to improve Iran's international position by resolving the hostage cri- sis with the Uruted States. 19
These positions placed Bani-Sadr at odds with the radical clergy, which waged a relentless campaign to limit his power. The IRP dominated the par- liamentary elections in March 1980, and Bani-Sadr found himself in a pro- tracted struggle against the party's efforts to expand its control? 0 Although Khomeini impllored the two sides to resolve their differences and even formed a three-man commission to mediate between them in March 1981, disputes between the clergy and the president remained intense. 21 Bani-Sadr eventually sought support from liberals, moderate clerics, and the left-wing Islamic Mujahedin, and this step convinced Khomeini that Bani-Sadr had become a threat to the clerical regime. The ayatollah relieved him from his position as commander-in-chief in June and the Majlis (Parliament) soon or-
dered his arrest, forcing Bani-Sadr to flee into exile in July.
The third phase, from July 1981 to February 1983, featured a violent struggle between the IRP and the radical left. 22 The Mujahedin launched a bloody wave olf terrorism following Bani-Sadr's removal. Abomb blast at the headquarters of the IRP in June killed seventy-four IRP officials, in-
cluding the Ayatollah Beheshti. Bani-Sadr's successor,. Mohammed Rajai, was killed by another bomb on August 30 (along with Prime Minister Muhammed Bahonar). The clergy responded with a brutal campaign of re- pression. Official executions totaled over twenty-six hundred by Novem- ber 1981, and over twelve thousand dissidents were killed in clashes with the Revolutionary Guards or in official executions between 1981 and 1985. 23
18 The son. of an ayatollah, Bani-Sadr had studied sociology and law in Tehran and was jailed for opposition activities in the 196os. He became part of Khomeini's entourage during the latter's exile in France and returned with him to Tehran in February 1979.
19 See Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 114-17; Behrooz, "Foreign Policy of the Islamic Re- public," 18-19; and Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution, and Secret Deals with the United States, trans. William Ford (Washington, D. C. : Brassey's, 1991), 22-25.
20 See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 6o-65; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, esp. 10o-110; and David Menashri, Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990}, 1JJ-J5, 168-74, 181-83.
21 Khomeini asked the contestants to settle their differences and serve "the interest of the nation" in September and implored them to stop "biting one another like scorpions" in Feb- ruary. See "Chronology," ME/ 35, no. 1 (198o), 46; no. 2 (1981), 215; no. 3 (1981), 367.
22 The principal left-wing groups in Iran were the Islamic Mujahedin, the Marxist Feda'i, and the Communist Tudeh Party. All three groups favored radical domestic change and an end to imperialist exploitation but opposed the establishment of a theocratic state.
23 The chief prosecutor, Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali, declared that "these deaths are not merely permissible, they are necessary. " See Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin, 68-69, 219-22.
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The threat from the Mujahedin was largely eliminated by the end of 1982, and in February 1983, the government moved to suppress the (Communist) Tudeh Party, removing the last independent political organization of any consequence. The presidency, prime ministry, and speakership of the Majlis were all in derical hands, the IRP dominated the Majlis, and the clergy had established effective control over the armed forces and Revolutionary Guards. Although low-level opposition continued throughout the rest of the decade and splits among the religious leaders became more and more ap- parent, the leaders of the Islamic Republic no longer faced a serious threat to their rule.
Conflict and Compromise in the Islamic Republic
The basic institutions of the Islamic Republic were in place by the end of 1983. The IRP dominated the Majlis and the ministries, and the army and Revolutionary Guards were all controlied by clerics loyal to Khomeini. The new regime had begun to reorder Iranian society along Islamic lines, bring- ing dramatic changes in law, education, and popular mores. 24 Opposition from within the senior clergy had been stilled as well, leaving Khomeini as the ultimate arbiter of Iran's Islamic future. 25
Despite these achievements, deep political differences soon began to di- vide Iran's new rulers. 26 In broad terms, the contest pitted a comparatively moderate group led by Majlis speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Pres- ident Said Alii Khamenei, and Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati against a more radical faction led by Prime Minister Mir-Husayn Musavi, Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri, and Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashemi. The pragma- tists downplayed the importance of exporting the revolution, supported the private sector, and advocated enhancing Iran's international position by in- creasing its ties with other countries. By contrast, the radicals sought to maintain the ideological purity of the revolution, and they emphasized the
24 See Menashri, Iran, 137-38, 192-97, 225-28, 271-76.
25 Khomeini was the only grand ayatollah to endorse direct clerical rule, and several equally eminent clerics (most notably Kazem Shariatmadari) criticized Khomeini's position as contrary to Islam. Shariatmadari's personal prestige was no match for Khomeini's control over the main state institutions, however, and he was placed under house arrest and subse- quently discredited by his later involvement in an unsuccessful coup. See Menashri, Iran, 7o--n 129-30, 239-40; Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 67? 8, Scr9o, 223; Hiro, Iran under the Ayatollahs, 139-43, 21s-19; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Clerical Politics in Iran since 1979,'' in The Iranian Revolution and Islamic Republic, ed. Nikki Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 5? 2, 8s-89.
26 In September 1984, Majlis speaker Rafsanjani admitted that the Islamic Republican Party's Central Council "does not enjoy a unity which is a sine qua non for its ability to be ac- tive and advance the [party's) goals," and he described "this very fundamental problem" as "a significant challenge. " See Menashri, Iran, 307-308; and Shahrough Akhavi, "Elite Fac- tionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran," MET 41, no. 2 (1987), 184.
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export of Islamic fundamentalism, the use of state power to aid the "op- pressed," the removal of Western influence, and steadfast opposition to the United States and its regional allies. 27
The pragmatists slowly gained the upper hand throughout the 198os, al- though the process was erratic and the basic divisions would remain intact after Khomeini's death in 1989. Khomeini called repeatedly for the "elimi- nation of differences," but he also shifted his own position in order to pre- vent either faction from gaining undisputed control. As a result, periods of deradicalization alternated with occasional outbursts of extremism. By 1985, Rafsanjani and his supporters had begun to curb the excesses of "Islamiza- tion" and Iranian officials were signaling their desire to restore Iran's con- tacts with the outside world. In addition to a detente with Saudi Arabia and several Western states, Iran began seeking advanced U. S. weaponry from a number of Israeli intermediaries. This policy was a direct response to the de- mands imposed by Iran's war with Iraq and marked a noteworthy depar- ture from its public antipathy toward! Israel and the "Great Satan. "28 The initiative came to an abrupt end when Rafsanjani's internal opponents leaked word of his negotiations with the United States. The news brought intense criticism from the radicals, but Khomeini condemned this new
threat to unity, and Rafsanjani and the moderates emerged in an even stronger position. Khomeini continued to back them, and the trial and sub- sequent execution of Mehdi Hashemi, former head of the bureau dealing with foreign revolutionaries, was a major setback for the radicals. 29
As Rafsanjani and the pragmatists continued to consolidate their posi- tion during 1988, evidence of a renewed drive toward moderation was ap- parent. The most obvious sign was the ceasefire with Iraq-which entailed abandoning the oft-repeated goal of toppling Saddam Hussein-but Khomeini also agreed to a series of administrative initiatives that curtailed the role of religious authorities. Both Khomeini and Rafsanjani made state- ments stressing that religious principles must "adapt to the requirements of time and place," and the speaker later declared that although "the law
27 The membership of each faction changed over time, and some individuals supported one side on certain issues but not on others. See Akhavi, "Elite Factionalism"; Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy"; Middle East Contemporary Survey (hereafter MECS), vol. 8: 1983-84 (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center for Middle East and African Studies/ Shiloah Center, 1986), 43(}-33; MECS 1988 (Boulde1; Colo. : Westview, 1990), 493-<)4; and Shireen T. Hunter, Iran after Kho- meini (New York: Praeger, 1992), 36-39.
28 See Menashri, Iran, 322-25, 374-75.
29 Hashemi was believed to be responsible for leaking word of the arms deals. Another sign of internal differences was the decision to disband the Islamic Revolution Party in 1987. Raf- sanjani admitted in 1986 that there were "two relatively powerful factions in our country. . . . They may in fact be regarded as two parties without names. " He termed the decision to dis- band the party "temporary" and said that it might be revived "if the consensus which Jed to its formation in 1979 is available again. " See Robin Wright, In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 162.
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should follow Islamic doctrine . . . priority will be given to government de- cisions over doctrine. " Khomeini also issued a formal edict (orfatwa) de- claring that the authority of the Islamic state was the same as it had been in the time of Muhammed, implying that government decisions could super- sede Islamic law.
