: "The belly and the organs of generation are neighbors,
that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in
vice.
that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in
vice.
Summa Theologica
In one way,
through the wine being too strong, without the drinker being cognizant
of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin,
especially if it is not through his negligence, and thus we believe
that Noah was made drunk as related in Gn. 9. In another way
drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine:
in this way it is accounted a sin, and is comprised under gluttony as a
species under its genus. For gluttony is divided into "surfeiting
[Douay:,'rioting'] and drunkenness," which are forbidden by the Apostle
(Rom. 13:13).
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11),
insensibility which is opposed to temperance "is not very common," so
that like its species which are opposed to the species of intemperance
it has no name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and
yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of
molesting nature grievously, he would not be free from sin.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection regards the resulting defect which
is involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is
in this that the sin consists.
Reply to Objection 3: Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows
not the strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to
drink excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind
of person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be
lacking neither is excused from sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be
foregone, as stated above ([3505]Q[33], A[6]). Hence Augustine says in
a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), "Meseems, such things are cured
not by bitterness, severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than
commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be
followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should
be treated with severity. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For
Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to
St. Augustine's works] that "drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is
a mortal sin. " Now assiduity denotes a circumstance which does not
change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate a sin
infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as shown above
([3506]FS, Q[88], A[5]). Therefore if drunkenness /is not a mortal sin
for some other reason, neither is it for this.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St.
Augustine's works]: "Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is
necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins. " Now the
lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is caused
by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.
Objection 3: Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of
medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician, that
they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink
drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli,
xlii): "A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or
gambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a
subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either give
them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity. " Now such
punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins. Therefore
drunkenness is a mortal sin.
I answer that, The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing
Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. Now
this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows not the
drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness may be
without sin, as stated above [3507](A[1]). Secondly, so that he
perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be
intoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly,
it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate and
intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from drink.
Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals take their
species not from things that occur accidentally and beside the
intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way
drunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly
deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs virtuous
deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running the risk of
falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i. ]):
"We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which prevents us from
avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when sober, we
unknowingly commit through drunkenness. " Therefore drunkenness,
properly speaking, is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on
account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is impossible
for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to
drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many times
experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to drunkenness.
Reply to Objection 2: To take more meat or drink than is necessary
belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but
knowingly to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a
mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Drunkenness is far
from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full
feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3508]Q[141], A[6]), meat and
drink should be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's
health. Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink
which are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so
too it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man
is moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or
drinks much at the physician's advice in order to provoke vomiting, he
is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There is,
however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting,
since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore this is no
sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. For
Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth. ) that "nothing gains the devil's
favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices. "
And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante omnia):
"Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by the clergy,
for it foments and fosters all the vices. "
Objection 2: Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good
of reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of
drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.
Objection 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of
its punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely;
for Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that "there would be no
slavery, were there no drunkards. " Therefore drunkenness is the
greatest of sins.
On the contrary, According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), spiritual
vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one of the
carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.
I answer that, A thing is said to be evil because it removes a good.
Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver the evil.
Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a human good.
Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are graver than the
sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human
reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Man is most prone to sins of intemperance,
because such like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us,
and for this reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the
devil, not for being graver than other sins, but because they occur
more frequently among men.
Reply to Objection 2: The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in
one way by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which
takes away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has
more the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of
reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by
drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue,
which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are always
good.
Reply to Objection 3: Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery,
in so far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants,
for having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But
slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether drunkenness excuses from sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "the drunkard deserves
double punishment. " Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of
excusing from it.
Objection 2: Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases
it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as
man's reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But
concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is
drunkenness.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43), Lot
was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.
I answer that, Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as stated
above [3509](A[1]), namely the resulting defect and the preceding act.
on the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is
fettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes
an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of the
preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if the
drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the subsequent
sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case of Lot. If,
however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not altogether
excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered
voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch as
it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into the
subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished, even as
the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore Augustine says
(Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that "Lot's guilt is to be measured, not by
the incest, but by his drunkenness. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard
deserves more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment
for his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the
law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered
"those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished than
if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than one. "
In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), "he seems to have
considered the advantage," namely of the prevention of wrong, "rather
than the leniency which one should have for drunkards," seeing that
they are not in possession of their faculties.
Reply to Objection 2: Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the
point of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that
results from it, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the
reason, as drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to
make a man insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin,
because it is less grievous to sin through weakness than through
malice.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CHASTITY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: (2)
virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the contrary
vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether chastity is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a general virtue?
(3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?
(4) Of its relation to purity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether chastity is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we
are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs
to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a
certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore
chastity is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is "a voluntary habit," as stated in
Ethic. ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can
be taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore
it seems that chastity is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some
unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But
chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore chastity
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de
Tempore]): "Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since
chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust,
while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious. "
I answer that, Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason
"chastises" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue
consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above
([3510]FS, Q[64], A[1]). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its
subject, though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity
that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the
judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), "so long
as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy
even in body, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her
body of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering
continency. " He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "in the mind there
is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved
to suffer any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil. "
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "it is
impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it
possible to be just unless one live by faith. " Whence he argues that in
unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue,
because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds
(Contra Julian. iv, 3) "virtues are distinguished from vices not by
their functions," i. e. their acts, "but by their ends. "
Reply to Objection 4: Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in
accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is
reckoned among the fruits.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether chastity is a general virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For
Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that "chastity of the mind is the
well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to
the greater things. " But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore
chastity is a general virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement"
[*Cf. A[1] ]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be
chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some
movement of the appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.
Objection 3: Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But
fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written
(Ps. 72:27): "Thou shalt destroy [Vulg. : 'hast destroyed'] all them
that go awhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee. " Therefore
chastity is a general virtue.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be a
part of temperance.
I answer that, The word "chastity" is employed in two ways. First,
properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter,
namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the
word "chastity" is employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of
bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of
chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the spiritual union of
the mind with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the matter
of a spiritual chastity metaphorically speaking, as well as of a
spiritual fornication likewise metaphorically so called. For if the
human mind delight in the spiritual union with that to which it
behooves it to be united, namely God, and refrains from delighting in
union with other things against the requirements of the order
established by God, this may be called a spiritual chastity, according
to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present
you as a chaste virgin to Christ. " If, on the other hand, the mind be
united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the
Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to
Jer. 3:1, "But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers. " Taking
chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue
withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful
things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists principally
in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the human mind is
united to God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical
sense.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above [3511](A[1]; Q[142], A[2]), the
concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a
child, because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially
of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature.
Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by
consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child
left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these pleasures
stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently chastity
is applied antonomastically to such like concupiscences, even as
fortitude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need
of strength of mind.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers spiritual fornication
metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, as
stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue from
abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, one
virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same
sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which
are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the
matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity is not
a distinct virtue from abstinence.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices
of intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now "chastity"
takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary vices. Since then
certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is
chastity.
Objection 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern
of temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are
the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the
matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the
matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf.
Gratian, Dist. xliv. ], commenting on Titus 1:7, "Not given to wine, no
striker," etc.
: "The belly and the organs of generation are neighbors,
that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in
vice. " Therefore abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues.
On the contrary, The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5,6) reckons "chastity" together
with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.
I answer that, As stated above ([3512]Q[141], A[4]), temperance is
properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that
where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different
virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate to
the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5:
and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food whereby
the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically from
actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the nature
of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is about
venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which is
about pleasures of the palate.
Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch,
not as regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch.
which judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but
as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in Ethic. iii,
10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in
character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though they
regard the one sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are
more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and
therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since
if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and
weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i,
10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its
heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which
belong to the married state. "
Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain
to the maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are
directed to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such
pleasures there is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the
pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal
pleasures, are essentially directed to the preservation of man's life:
wherefore by their very nature they have a special virtue, although
this virtue which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as
its end.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?
Objection 1: It would seem that purity does not belong especially to
chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity is a
virtue of the soul. " Therefore it is not something belonging to
chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.
Objection 2: Further, "pudicitia" [purity] is derived from "pudor,"
which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De
Fide Orth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to
all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to
the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "every
kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach. " Now it would seem
to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach.
Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not
especially to chastity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): "We must give
praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a
lawful use the organs intended for procreation. " Now the use of these
organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity belongs
properly to chastity.
I answer that, As stated above (OBJ[2]), "pudicitia" [purity] takes its
name from "pudor," which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs be
properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are
most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei xiv,
18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the
honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and this
because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject to the
command of reason, as are the movements of the other external members.
Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the
signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). Consequently
purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially the signs
thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the
latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather these
external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore
purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but
as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless the one is
sometimes used to designate the other.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is here speaking of purity as
designating chastity.
Reply to Objection 2: Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the
vices of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above
([3513]Q[142], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins
are most deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination
of the genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason
is absorbed.
__________________________________________________________________
OF VIRGINITY (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five
points of inquiry:
(1) In what does virginity consist?
(2) Whether it is lawful?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;
(5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity does not consist in integrity
of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. ) [*The quotation
is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "virginity is the continual
meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh. " But meditation does
not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not situated in the
flesh.
Objection 2: Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the soul. " Therefore
virginity is not incorruption of the flesh.
Objection 3: Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist
in the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken
without loss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that
"those organs may be injured through being wounded by mischance.
Physicians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes
one shudder to see: and a midwife has been known to destroy by touch
the proof of virginity that she sought. " And he adds: "Nobody, I think,
would be so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even
bodily sanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ. "
Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.
Objection 4: Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in
resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation,
whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost
without copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that "virginal
integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse
is the portion of angels. " Therefore virginity does not consist in
incorruption of the flesh.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "virginity is
continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and
observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh. "
I answer that, Virginity takes its name apparently from "viror"
[freshness], and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining
its freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too,
virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared by the
heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the greatest
bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence, Ambrose
says (De Virgin. i, 5) that "virginal chastity is integrity free of
pollution. "
Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first
is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of
virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the soul
and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of the
semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part of
the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of these three
the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such must be
considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the relation
of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions are the matters
of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of form and
complement, because the essence of morality is perfected in that which
concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in freedom from the
aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity of the bodily organ
is accidental to virginity; while freedom from pleasure in resolution
of the semen is related thereto materially; and the purpose of
perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and completive
element in virginity.
Reply to Objection 1: This definition of Augustine's expresses directly
that which is formal in virginity. For "meditation" denotes reason's
purpose; and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a virgin must
always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in
mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is
expressed indirectly by the words "on incorruption in a corruptible
body. " This is added to show the difficulty of virginity: for if the
flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a
perpetual meditation on incorruption.
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in
the soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same
with virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that
"although virginity resides in the flesh," and for this reason is a
bodily quality, "yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency
fosters and preserves. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ
is accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely
abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily
organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other
way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of a
hand or foot.
Reply to Objection 4: Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may
arise in two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it
destroys virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine,
however, mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the
ordinary and natural result thereof. In another way this may happen
beside the purpose of the mind, either during sleep, or through
violence and without the mind's consent, although the flesh derives
pleasure from it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case
of those who are subject to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is
not forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity
which excludes virginity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity is unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is
contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as the
words of Gn. 2:16, "Of every tree" that is in "paradise, thou shalt
eat," indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the
preservation of the individual, so also the words of Gn. 1:28,
"Increase and multiply, and fill the earth," express a precept of the
natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species. Therefore
just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this would be to
act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a sin to
abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to act
against the good of the species.
Objection 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is
apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue,
since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 2), that "he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains
from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from all is
loutish and insensible. " Therefore virginity is something sinful.
Objection 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in
olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius
Maximus asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to Augustine
(De Vera Relig. iii) Plato "is said to have sacrificed to nature, in
order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as though it
were a sin. " Therefore virginity is a sin.
On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But virginity is
a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor. 7:25):
"Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give
counsel. " Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.
I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which are against right
reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end should
be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man's good is
threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things,
for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third,
consisting in the goods of the soul among which the goods of the
contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life, as
the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord declared (Lk.
10:42), "Mary hath chosen the better part. " Of these goods those that
are external are directed to those which belong to the body, and those
which belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the
soul; and furthermore those which belong to the active life are
directed to those which belong to the life of contemplation.
Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use external goods in a
measure proportionate to the body, and in like manner as regards the
rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing certain things (which
otherwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of his body's
good, or of the contemplation of truth, this is not sinful, but in
accord /with right reason. In like manner if a man abstain from bodily
pleasures, in order more freely to give himself to the contemplation of
truth, this is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy
virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to
have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
7:34): "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of
the Lord: that she may be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that
is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her
husband. " Therefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful
is worthy of praise.
Reply to Objection 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above
([3514]Q[122], A[1]). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the
duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind
cannot be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by
the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding
on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many obligations
which cannot be discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one
person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of
natural law which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each
individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other
hand, the precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men,
which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance
spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human
multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while
others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of
Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus
too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and
others fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the
multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.
Reply to Objection 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right
reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for
pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does
not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal:
and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now
the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to
right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the
magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of quantity he goes to the
extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows the mean. "
Reply to Objection 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more
frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained
from all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth:
as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through
thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but "because he yielded
to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen," as Augustine remarks
(De Vera Relig. iii).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no
virtue is in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now
virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born.
Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated
above ([3515]FS, Q[65], A[1]). Yet some have other virtues without
having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom
without virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would
involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But
virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii
ad Eustoch. ]: "Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the
virgin after her downfall. " Therefore seemingly virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is
lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and
conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity
moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we
should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree. "
I answer that, As stated above [3516](A[1]), the formal and completive
element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal
pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far,
to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things:
while the material element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free
of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a
good action has a special matter through having a special excellence,
there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is
about great expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct
from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to
keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an
excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself
free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a
special virtue being related to chastity as magnificence to liberality.
Reply to Objection 1: Men have from their birth that which is material
in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal
experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely
the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake, which
purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says
(De Virgin. xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but,
because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency. "
Reply to Objection 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that
which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as
stated above ([3517]Q[129], A[3], ad 2), but not by reason of that
which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from
providing the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another
virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of
magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues
lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the
flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity, his
mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this
same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so:
even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose of
being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so:
or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind as to purpose
bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the
mind no man can be virtuous.
Reply to Objection 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards
that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material
therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does
not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person
who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of
virginity but the purpose of virginity.
As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be
miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which
we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else
which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has
experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For
God cannot make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in
the [3518]FP, Q[25] , A[4].
Reply to Objection 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose,
confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says
(De Virgin. viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed,
consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and
flesh. " Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.
through the wine being too strong, without the drinker being cognizant
of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin,
especially if it is not through his negligence, and thus we believe
that Noah was made drunk as related in Gn. 9. In another way
drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine:
in this way it is accounted a sin, and is comprised under gluttony as a
species under its genus. For gluttony is divided into "surfeiting
[Douay:,'rioting'] and drunkenness," which are forbidden by the Apostle
(Rom. 13:13).
Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11),
insensibility which is opposed to temperance "is not very common," so
that like its species which are opposed to the species of intemperance
it has no name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and
yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of
molesting nature grievously, he would not be free from sin.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection regards the resulting defect which
is involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is
in this that the sin consists.
Reply to Objection 3: Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows
not the strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to
drink excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind
of person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be
lacking neither is excused from sin.
Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be
foregone, as stated above ([3505]Q[33], A[6]). Hence Augustine says in
a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), "Meseems, such things are cured
not by bitterness, severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than
commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be
followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should
be treated with severity. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For
Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to
St. Augustine's works] that "drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is
a mortal sin. " Now assiduity denotes a circumstance which does not
change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate a sin
infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as shown above
([3506]FS, Q[88], A[5]). Therefore if drunkenness /is not a mortal sin
for some other reason, neither is it for this.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St.
Augustine's works]: "Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is
necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins. " Now the
lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is caused
by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.
Objection 3: Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of
medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician, that
they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink
drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli,
xlii): "A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or
gambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a
subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either give
them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity. " Now such
punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins. Therefore
drunkenness is a mortal sin.
I answer that, The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing
Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. Now
this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows not the
drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness may be
without sin, as stated above [3507](A[1]). Secondly, so that he
perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be
intoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly,
it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate and
intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from drink.
Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals take their
species not from things that occur accidentally and beside the
intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way
drunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly
deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs virtuous
deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running the risk of
falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i. ]):
"We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which prevents us from
avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when sober, we
unknowingly commit through drunkenness. " Therefore drunkenness,
properly speaking, is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 1: Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on
account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is impossible
for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to
drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many times
experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to drunkenness.
Reply to Objection 2: To take more meat or drink than is necessary
belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but
knowingly to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a
mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): "Drunkenness is far
from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full
feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3508]Q[141], A[6]), meat and
drink should be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body's
health. Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink
which are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so
too it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man
is moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or
drinks much at the physician's advice in order to provoke vomiting, he
is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There is,
however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting,
since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore this is no
sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. For
Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth. ) that "nothing gains the devil's
favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices. "
And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante omnia):
"Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by the clergy,
for it foments and fosters all the vices. "
Objection 2: Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good
of reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of
drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.
Objection 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of
its punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely;
for Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that "there would be no
slavery, were there no drunkards. " Therefore drunkenness is the
greatest of sins.
On the contrary, According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), spiritual
vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one of the
carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.
I answer that, A thing is said to be evil because it removes a good.
Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver the evil.
Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a human good.
Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are graver than the
sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human
reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Man is most prone to sins of intemperance,
because such like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us,
and for this reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the
devil, not for being graver than other sins, but because they occur
more frequently among men.
Reply to Objection 2: The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in
one way by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which
takes away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has
more the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of
reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by
drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue,
which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are always
good.
Reply to Objection 3: Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery,
in so far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants,
for having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But
slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether drunkenness excuses from sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin.
For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that "the drunkard deserves
double punishment. " Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of
excusing from it.
Objection 2: Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases
it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as
man's reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But
concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is
drunkenness.
On the contrary, According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43), Lot
was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.
I answer that, Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as stated
above [3509](A[1]), namely the resulting defect and the preceding act.
on the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is
fettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes
an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of the
preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if the
drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the subsequent
sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case of Lot. If,
however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not altogether
excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered
voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch as
it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into the
subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished, even as
the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore Augustine says
(Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that "Lot's guilt is to be measured, not by
the incest, but by his drunkenness. "
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard
deserves more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment
for his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the
law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered
"those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished than
if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than one. "
In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), "he seems to have
considered the advantage," namely of the prevention of wrong, "rather
than the leniency which one should have for drunkards," seeing that
they are not in possession of their faculties.
Reply to Objection 2: Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the
point of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that
results from it, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3: Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the
reason, as drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to
make a man insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin,
because it is less grievous to sin through weakness than through
malice.
__________________________________________________________________
OF CHASTITY (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: (2)
virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the contrary
vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether chastity is a virtue?
(2) Whether it is a general virtue?
(3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?
(4) Of its relation to purity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether chastity is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we
are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs
to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a
certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore
chastity is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, virtue is "a voluntary habit," as stated in
Ethic. ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can
be taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore
it seems that chastity is not a virtue.
Objection 3: Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some
unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.
Objection 4: Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But
chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore chastity
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de
Tempore]): "Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since
chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust,
while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious. "
I answer that, Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason
"chastises" concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the
Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue
consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above
([3510]FS, Q[64], A[1]). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a
virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its
subject, though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity
that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the
judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.
Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), "so long
as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy
even in body, not even the violence of another's lust can deprive her
body of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering
continency. " He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "in the mind there
is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved
to suffer any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil. "
Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), "it is
impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it
possible to be just unless one live by faith. " Whence he argues that in
unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue,
because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds
(Contra Julian. iv, 3) "virtues are distinguished from vices not by
their functions," i. e. their acts, "but by their ends. "
Reply to Objection 4: Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in
accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is
reckoned among the fruits.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether chastity is a general virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For
Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that "chastity of the mind is the
well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to
the greater things. " But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore
chastity is a general virtue.
Objection 2: Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement"
[*Cf. A[1] ]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be
chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some
movement of the appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.
Objection 3: Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But
fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written
(Ps. 72:27): "Thou shalt destroy [Vulg. : 'hast destroyed'] all them
that go awhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee. " Therefore
chastity is a general virtue.
On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be a
part of temperance.
I answer that, The word "chastity" is employed in two ways. First,
properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter,
namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the
word "chastity" is employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of
bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of
chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the spiritual union of
the mind with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the matter
of a spiritual chastity metaphorically speaking, as well as of a
spiritual fornication likewise metaphorically so called. For if the
human mind delight in the spiritual union with that to which it
behooves it to be united, namely God, and refrains from delighting in
union with other things against the requirements of the order
established by God, this may be called a spiritual chastity, according
to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present
you as a chaste virgin to Christ. " If, on the other hand, the mind be
united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the
Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to
Jer. 3:1, "But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers. " Taking
chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue
withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful
things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists principally
in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the human mind is
united to God.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical
sense.
Reply to Objection 2: As stated above [3511](A[1]; Q[142], A[2]), the
concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a
child, because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially
of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature.
Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by
consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child
left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these pleasures
stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently chastity
is applied antonomastically to such like concupiscences, even as
fortitude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need
of strength of mind.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers spiritual fornication
metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, as
stated.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?
Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue from
abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, one
virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same
sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which
are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the
matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity is not
a distinct virtue from abstinence.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices
of intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now "chastity"
takes its name from "chastisement" of the contrary vices. Since then
certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is
chastity.
Objection 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern
of temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are
the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the
matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the
matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf.
Gratian, Dist. xliv. ], commenting on Titus 1:7, "Not given to wine, no
striker," etc.
: "The belly and the organs of generation are neighbors,
that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in
vice. " Therefore abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues.
On the contrary, The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5,6) reckons "chastity" together
with "fastings" which pertain to abstinence.
I answer that, As stated above ([3512]Q[141], A[4]), temperance is
properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that
where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different
virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate to
the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5:
and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food whereby
the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically from
actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the nature
of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is about
venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which is
about pleasures of the palate.
Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch,
not as regards the sense's judgment concerning the objects of touch.
which judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but
as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in Ethic. iii,
10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in
character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though they
regard the one sense.
Reply to Objection 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are
more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and
therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since
if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and
weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i,
10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its
heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which
belong to the married state. "
Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain
to the maintenance of man's nature, except in so far as they are
directed to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such
pleasures there is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the
pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal
pleasures, are essentially directed to the preservation of man's life:
wherefore by their very nature they have a special virtue, although
this virtue which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as
its end.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?
Objection 1: It would seem that purity does not belong especially to
chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity is a
virtue of the soul. " Therefore it is not something belonging to
chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.
Objection 2: Further, "pudicitia" [purity] is derived from "pudor,"
which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De
Fide Orth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to
all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to
the other virtues.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that "every
kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach. " Now it would seem
to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach.
Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not
especially to chastity.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): "We must give
praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a
lawful use the organs intended for procreation. " Now the use of these
organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity belongs
properly to chastity.
I answer that, As stated above (OBJ[2]), "pudicitia" [purity] takes its
name from "pudor," which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs be
properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are
most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei xiv,
18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the
honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and this
because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject to the
command of reason, as are the movements of the other external members.
Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the
signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). Consequently
purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially the signs
thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the
latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather these
external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore
purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but
as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless the one is
sometimes used to designate the other.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is here speaking of purity as
designating chastity.
Reply to Objection 2: Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the
vices of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above
([3513]Q[142], A[4]).
Reply to Objection 3: Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins
are most deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination
of the genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason
is absorbed.
__________________________________________________________________
OF VIRGINITY (FIVE ARTICLES)
We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five
points of inquiry:
(1) In what does virginity consist?
(2) Whether it is lawful?
(3) Whether it is a virtue?
(4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;
(5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity does not consist in integrity
of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. ) [*The quotation
is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "virginity is the continual
meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh. " But meditation does
not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not situated in the
flesh.
Objection 2: Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the soul. " Therefore
virginity is not incorruption of the flesh.
Objection 3: Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist
in the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken
without loss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that
"those organs may be injured through being wounded by mischance.
Physicians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes
one shudder to see: and a midwife has been known to destroy by touch
the proof of virginity that she sought. " And he adds: "Nobody, I think,
would be so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even
bodily sanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ. "
Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.
Objection 4: Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in
resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation,
whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost
without copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that "virginal
integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse
is the portion of angels. " Therefore virginity does not consist in
incorruption of the flesh.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "virginity is
continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and
observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh. "
I answer that, Virginity takes its name apparently from "viror"
[freshness], and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining
its freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too,
virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared by the
heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the greatest
bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence, Ambrose
says (De Virgin. i, 5) that "virginal chastity is integrity free of
pollution. "
Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first
is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of
virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the soul
and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of the
semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part of
the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of these three
the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such must be
considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the relation
of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions are the matters
of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of form and
complement, because the essence of morality is perfected in that which
concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in freedom from the
aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity of the bodily organ
is accidental to virginity; while freedom from pleasure in resolution
of the semen is related thereto materially; and the purpose of
perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and completive
element in virginity.
Reply to Objection 1: This definition of Augustine's expresses directly
that which is formal in virginity. For "meditation" denotes reason's
purpose; and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a virgin must
always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in
mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is
expressed indirectly by the words "on incorruption in a corruptible
body. " This is added to show the difficulty of virginity: for if the
flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a
perpetual meditation on incorruption.
Reply to Objection 2: It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in
the soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same
with virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that
"although virginity resides in the flesh," and for this reason is a
bodily quality, "yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency
fosters and preserves. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ
is accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely
abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily
organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other
way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of a
hand or foot.
Reply to Objection 4: Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may
arise in two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it
destroys virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine,
however, mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the
ordinary and natural result thereof. In another way this may happen
beside the purpose of the mind, either during sleep, or through
violence and without the mind's consent, although the flesh derives
pleasure from it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case
of those who are subject to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is
not forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity
which excludes virginity.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity is unlawful?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is
contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as the
words of Gn. 2:16, "Of every tree" that is in "paradise, thou shalt
eat," indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the
preservation of the individual, so also the words of Gn. 1:28,
"Increase and multiply, and fill the earth," express a precept of the
natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species. Therefore
just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this would be to
act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a sin to
abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to act
against the good of the species.
Objection 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is
apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue,
since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says
(Ethic. ii, 2), that "he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains
from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from all is
loutish and insensible. " Therefore virginity is something sinful.
Objection 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in
olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius
Maximus asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to Augustine
(De Vera Relig. iii) Plato "is said to have sacrificed to nature, in
order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as though it
were a sin. " Therefore virginity is a sin.
On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But virginity is
a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor. 7:25):
"Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give
counsel. " Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.
I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which are against right
reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end should
be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man's good is
threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things,
for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third,
consisting in the goods of the soul among which the goods of the
contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life, as
the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord declared (Lk.
10:42), "Mary hath chosen the better part. " Of these goods those that
are external are directed to those which belong to the body, and those
which belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the
soul; and furthermore those which belong to the active life are
directed to those which belong to the life of contemplation.
Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use external goods in a
measure proportionate to the body, and in like manner as regards the
rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing certain things (which
otherwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of his body's
good, or of the contemplation of truth, this is not sinful, but in
accord /with right reason. In like manner if a man abstain from bodily
pleasures, in order more freely to give himself to the contemplation of
truth, this is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy
virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to
have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the Apostle says (1 Cor.
7:34): "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of
the Lord: that she may be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that
is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her
husband. " Therefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful
is worthy of praise.
Reply to Objection 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above
([3514]Q[122], A[1]). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the
duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind
cannot be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by
the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding
on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many obligations
which cannot be discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one
person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of
natural law which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each
individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other
hand, the precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men,
which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance
spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human
multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while
others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of
Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus
too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and
others fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the
multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.
Reply to Objection 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right
reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for
pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does
not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal:
and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now
the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to
right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the
magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that "in point of quantity he goes to the
extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows the mean. "
Reply to Objection 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more
frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained
from all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth:
as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through
thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but "because he yielded
to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen," as Augustine remarks
(De Vera Relig. iii).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether virginity is a virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For "no
virtue is in us by nature," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now
virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born.
Therefore virginity is not a virtue.
Objection 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated
above ([3515]FS, Q[65], A[1]). Yet some have other virtues without
having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom
without virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would
involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But
virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii
ad Eustoch. ]: "Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the
virgin after her downfall. " Therefore seemingly virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is
lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a
virtue.
Objection 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and
conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity
is not a virtue.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): "Love of virginity
moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we
should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree. "
I answer that, As stated above [3516](A[1]), the formal and completive
element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal
pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far,
to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things:
while the material element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free
of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a
good action has a special matter through having a special excellence,
there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is
about great expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct
from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to
keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an
excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself
free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a
special virtue being related to chastity as magnificence to liberality.
Reply to Objection 1: Men have from their birth that which is material
in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal
experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely
the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God's sake, which
purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says
(De Virgin. xi): "Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but,
because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency. "
Reply to Objection 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that
which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as
stated above ([3517]Q[129], A[3], ad 2), but not by reason of that
which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from
providing the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another
virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of
magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues
lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the
flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity, his
mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this
same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so:
even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose of
being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so:
or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind as to purpose
bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the
mind no man can be virtuous.
Reply to Objection 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards
that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material
therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does
not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person
who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of
virginity but the purpose of virginity.
As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be
miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which
we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else
which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has
experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For
God cannot make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in
the [3518]FP, Q[25] , A[4].
Reply to Objection 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose,
confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says
(De Virgin. viii) that "by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed,
consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and
flesh. " Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.
