ii, 16) that "anger is
fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of
the bile.
fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of
the bile.
Summa Theologica
.
be put away from you.
"].
Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons
{akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls
{pikroi} [bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and
some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they never rest until
they have retaliated [*Cf. [1427]SS, Q[158], A[5]].
Reply to Objection 1: All those things which give anger some kind of
perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently
nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference
thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to
pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain
quickness of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no
reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor,"
should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in
being avenged.
Reply to Objection 3: These degrees are distinguished according to
various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in
the very movement of anger.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)
[*There is no further mention of these remedies in the text, except in A[4]. ]
We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the
one who is angry?
(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?
(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;
(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is
angry.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is
angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always
something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning,
can do nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): "If thy
iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? " And yet God
is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, according to
Ps. 105:40: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people. " Therefore
it is not always on account of something done against him, that a man
is angry.
Objection 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may
desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not
always angry on account of something done against us.
Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is
angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest
in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise
philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the
philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us
angry.
Objection 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults
him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii,
in Ep. ad Rom. ). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm.
Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done
against him.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise
without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we
think him such. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1428]Q[46], A[6]), anger is the desire
to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some
injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any
injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the
person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its
own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by
anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done
against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always
something done against him.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of
the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take
vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any
actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God
in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments.
Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; which injury
redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's
providence and protection.
Reply to Objection 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and
seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong
in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least
because of the nature we have in common.
Reply to Objection 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we
look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as
though we ourselves were despised and injured.
Reply to Objection 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he
thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a
slight is an action.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole
motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are
angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury. " But
one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore
a slight is not the only motive of anger.
Objection 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to
the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they
are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger,
when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore a
slight is not the sole motive of anger.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other
causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others
should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our
evils; being hindered from doing as we like. " Therefore being slighted
is not the only motive for being angry.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a
desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done
unbecomingly. "
I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For
slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt,"
"despiteful treatment," i. e. hindering one from doing one's will, and
"insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. Two
reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's
hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance
in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only for that
which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always
something considered in the light of an injustice. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry---if they think
they have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that account;
because there is no anger at what is just. " Now injury is done to
another in three ways: namely, through ignorance, through passion, and
through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he
does an injury from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as
stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those
who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some
one has done us an injury through ignorance or through passion, either
we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do
anything through ignorance or through passion takes away from the
notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and
forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who do an injury on purpose,
seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of
all. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not
angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through
anger, because they do not seem to have acted slightingly. "
The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence:
because "men think little of things that are not worth much ado" (Rhet.
ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods.
Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is
derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.
Reply to Objection 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which
a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt
or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of
itself the cause of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as
such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with
anything derogatory thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of
slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the
more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a
man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this
seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show
signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care little
about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying out
his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to
care much for his friendship. Consequently all those things, in so far
as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of
his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2)
that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance,
the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed. " But these things
seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence
makes one prone to anger.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are
very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing
or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion;
but if they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble. " But
a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather
than excellence is a cause of a man being angry.
Objection 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man
agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men
are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor
when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and
well-founded hope. " Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence
makes men prone to anger.
I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be
taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus
excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the
motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above [1429](A[2]). Now
it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a
slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Consequently those
who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be slighted in
that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in
his eloquence, and so forth.
Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be
considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive
aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a
hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a
cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily
hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other
defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he
evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser
thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less
angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly
despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks
that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through
ignorance, or some other like cause.
Reply to Objection 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they
hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke
anger, because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?
Objection 1: It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for
being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble
themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs
bite not those who sit down. " But these things savor of littleness and
defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less
angry with him.
Objection 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger
ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not
provoke anger against him.
Objection 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being
friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they
offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): "If my
enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it. " Therefore a
person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man
is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like
manner the prince is angry with his subject. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1430]AA[2],3) unmerited contempt more
than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency
or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase
our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised.
For just as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is
despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising.
Thus a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if
by a fool; a master, if by a servant.
If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited
contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way
those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done
wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according
to Prov. 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they
seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they
humble themselves.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the
sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and
sensation; and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom
they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have
attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who
are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of
just retaliation.
Reply to Objection 3: To be despised by one's friends seems also a
greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by
failing to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which
we are angry with those who are beneath us.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger causes pleasure?
(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?
(3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether it causes taciturnity?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because
sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with
pain. " Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that
"vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for
pain": whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from
vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent
of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect
united with pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is
conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet.
ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that
anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109
[trl. Pope]).
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures,
chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: and
therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we
to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of thirst
which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has
been said ([1431]Q[47], AA[1],3), that the movement of anger arises
from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is
sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present,
pleasure ensues, and so much the greater according as the sorrow was
greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure
ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement of anger
ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to
the angry man in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry
except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above ([1432]Q[46], A[1]); in
another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that
desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what he
desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly
an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about vengeance. This
pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and
consequently anger.
Reply to Objection 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the
same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in
the thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as
its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused
by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from
ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in
taking vengeance follows from anger.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?
Objection 1: It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of
anger. For fervor, as stated above ([1433]Q[28], A[5];[1434] Q[37],
A[2]), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and
cause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more powerful than
its effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor.
Objection 2: Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor,
increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer it lasts.
But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger. " Therefore fervor is not
the proper effect of anger.
Objection 3: Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor.
But "the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger,"
as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause
fervor.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii, 16) that "anger is
fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of
the bile. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1435]Q[44], A[1]), the bodily
transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate
to the movement of the appetite. Now it is evident that every appetite,
even the natural appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which
is contrary to it, if it be present: hence we see that hot water
freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot
object. Since then the appetitive movement of anger is caused by some
injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it follows that the
appetite tends with great force to repel the injury by the desire of
vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence and impetuosity in the
movement of anger. And because the movement of anger is not one of
recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of
prosecution, which corresponds to the action of heat, the result is
that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital
spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's
passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being so
disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in
their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) "the heart
that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body
trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes
grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the
mouth indeed he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows not what it
says. "
Reply to Objection 1: "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the
absence of the beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12).
Consequently when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that
he loves, he feels his love thereof the more: the result being that his
heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object
of his love; so that anger increases the fervor of love and makes it to
be felt more.
Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is
to be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor of love has a
certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one
loves: whence it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood.
For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and
hence the saying that "love springs from the liver," because of the
blood being formed there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has a
certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be
avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to the heat of fire
and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
16) that it "results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its
name {chole}. "
Reply to Objection 2: Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the
causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is
weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from
our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong done.
Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time
goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether. Moreover a wrong seems
greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is gradually
lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past.
The same applies to love, so long as the cause of love is in the memory
alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "if a
friend's absence lasts long, it seems to make men forget their
friendship. " But in the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship
is continually being multiplied by time: wherefore the friendship
increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its cause
continually multiplied.
Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the
strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent having burnt
up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies
away.
Reply to Objection 3: Every power that is divided in itself is
weakened. Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes
angry with another, by this very fact his anger with the former is
weakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be
greater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will,
in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned greater, seem to
be of little or no account.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of
reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem
to hinder the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as stated
in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason.
Objection 2: Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a
man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"an angry man is not cunning but is open. " Therefore anger does not
seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is
cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6. ).
Objection 3: Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by
juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more
clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger:
for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are more angry if they
receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be
dishonored": and so forth. Therefore the same cause increases anger,
and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does not hinder
the judgment of reason.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger "withdraws the
light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind. "
I answer that, Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily
organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers
for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered
when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any
disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is
clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated
[1436](A[2]) that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in the
region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members.
Consequently, of all the passions, anger is the most manifest obstacle
to the judgment of reason, according to Ps. 30:10: "My eye is troubled
with wrath. "
Reply to Objection 1: The beginning of anger is in the reason, as
regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger.
But the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as
though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the
commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the
material element of anger. In this respect it hinders the judgment of
reason.
Reply to Objection 2: An angry man is said to be open, not because it
is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly,
without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason
being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what
done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the
dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an
effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man
(Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . .
. and speaks and acts openly. " Desire, on the other hand, is said to
lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable
things that are desired, savor of shame and voluptuousness, wherein man
wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and
excellence, such as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger
begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with
another facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it
increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or wealth,
suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account
of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. Consequently it causes
greater grief: just as a great good, through being received
unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the increase
of the grief that precedes, anger is increased also.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity.
Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger
conduces to speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down
by Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): where He says: "Whosoever is angry with his
brother"; and " . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'"; and
" . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool. '" Therefore
anger does not cause taciturnity.
Objection 2: Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes
breaks out into unbecoming words: hence it is written (Prov. 25:28):
"As a city that lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man
that cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking. " But anger, above all,
hinders the judgment of reason, as stated above [1437](A[3]).
Consequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words.
Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 12:34): "Out of the abundance
of the heart the mouth speaketh. " But anger, above all, causes a
disturbance in the heart, as stated above [1438](A[2]). Therefore above
all it conduces to speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not
vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more
fiercely. "
I answer that, As stated above [1439](A[3]; Q[46], A[4]), anger both
follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both respects
it may cause taciturnity. On the part of the reason, when the judgment
of reason prevails so far, that although it does not curb the appetite
in its inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from
unbridled speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): "Sometimes
when the mind is disturbed, anger, as if in judgment, commands
silence. " On the part of the impediment to reason because, as stated
above [1440](A[2]), the disturbance of anger reaches to the outward
members, and chiefly to those members which reflect more distinctly the
emotions of the heart, such as the eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, as
observed above [1441](A[2]), "the tongue stammers, the countenance
takes fire, the eyes grow fierce. " Consequently anger may cause such a
disturbance, that the tongue is altogether deprived of speech; and
taciturnity is the result.
Reply to Objection 1: Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the
reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so
as to paralyze the tongue and other outward members.
And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The disturbance of the heart may sometimes
superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are
hindered by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue
taciturnity and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even
death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great, then "out of the
abundance of the heart" thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds to speak.
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TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)
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OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the
consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic
principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle
is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the FP, Q[77],
seqq. , it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second
place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which
are the principles of human acts.
Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First,
the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of
their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are
distinguished from one another.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habit is a quality?
(2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?
(3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?
(4) Of the necessity of habit.
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Whether habit is a quality?
Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine
says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the verb
'to have. '" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the
other categories: for we speak of ourselves as "having" quantity and
money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.
Objection 2: Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as
may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). But
one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not
a quality.
Objection 3: Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in
the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the
order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But
this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not a
quality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments
(Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change. "
I answer that, This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to
have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way,
inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in
another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet]
either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard
to anything that is "had," is common to the various predicaments. And
so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so
called because they result from the various predicaments; as, for
instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among
things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there
are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that which
is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and
quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium,
but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a
companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a
medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner
of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers,
and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher
says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an
action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case
in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these
constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the
predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text.
25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is
clothed. "
But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard
to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since
this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition
whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this,
either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a
habit. " And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say
that habit is a quality.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes "to have" in the general
sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes habit in the sense in which
we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is
had: and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 3: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order
of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the
Philosopher goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely,
"either as to place, or as to power, or as to species. " "In saying
this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments,
"he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to
place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is the
order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all
those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived
at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when
he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are
called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.
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Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?
Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of
quality. Because, as we have said [1442](A[1]), habit, in so far as it
is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is
disposed well or ill. " But this happens in regard to any quality: for a
thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and
in like manner, in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such
things. Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the
Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or
habits, just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is
not distinct from the other species of quality.
Objection 3: Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference
belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or
passion. Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a
difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a
genus," as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore,
since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not to be a
distinct species of quality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments
(Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition. "
I answer that, The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor.
vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. Now
Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the
difference of these species as follows. He says "that some qualities
are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are
always there: but some are adventitious, being caused from without, and
these can be lost. Now the latter," i. e. those which are adventitious,
"are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or
difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, some regard a thing in the
point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the
second species of quality: while others regard a thing which is in act;
and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply
rooted, we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we
have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is the
shape of an animated being. " But this distinction of the species of
quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like
qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also
many dispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health,
beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the
species, since that which is the more natural is always first.
Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and
habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, implies a
certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
iv, 3), "is that which a measure determines": wherefore it implies a
certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just
as that in accordance with which the material potentiality [potentia
materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called quality,
which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance
with the potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental
being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of
difference, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19).
Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be
taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to
action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are
matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or
determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have
the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, considered in
itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of good or
evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a
thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or slowly transitory.
But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or
passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality. And
therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with
ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them,
we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil:
because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end, whereas
good and evil are said in respect of an end.
On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard
to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality,
which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii,
text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the body, that
they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I
mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature. " And since
the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause why
a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we
consider both evil and good, and also changeableness, whether easy or
difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and
movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph.
Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons
{akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls
{pikroi} [bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and
some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they never rest until
they have retaliated [*Cf. [1427]SS, Q[158], A[5]].
Reply to Objection 1: All those things which give anger some kind of
perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently
nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference
thereof.
Reply to Objection 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to
pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain
quickness of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no
reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor,"
should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in
being avenged.
Reply to Objection 3: These degrees are distinguished according to
various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in
the very movement of anger.
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OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)
[*There is no further mention of these remedies in the text, except in A[4]. ]
We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies.
Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the
one who is angry?
(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?
(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;
(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is
angry.
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Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is
angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always
something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning,
can do nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): "If thy
iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? " And yet God
is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, according to
Ps. 105:40: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people. " Therefore
it is not always on account of something done against him, that a man
is angry.
Objection 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may
desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not
always angry on account of something done against us.
Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is
angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest
in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise
philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the
philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us
angry.
Objection 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults
him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii,
in Ep. ad Rom. ). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm.
Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done
against him.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise
without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we
think him such. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1428]Q[46], A[6]), anger is the desire
to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some
injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any
injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the
person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its
own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by
anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done
against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always
something done against him.
Reply to Objection 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of
the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take
vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any
actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God
in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments.
Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; which injury
redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's
providence and protection.
Reply to Objection 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and
seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong
in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least
because of the nature we have in common.
Reply to Objection 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we
look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as
though we ourselves were despised and injured.
Reply to Objection 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he
thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a
slight is an action.
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Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole
motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are
angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury. " But
one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore
a slight is not the only motive of anger.
Objection 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to
the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they
are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger,
when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore a
slight is not the sole motive of anger.
Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other
causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others
should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our
evils; being hindered from doing as we like. " Therefore being slighted
is not the only motive for being angry.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a
desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done
unbecomingly. "
I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For
slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt,"
"despiteful treatment," i. e. hindering one from doing one's will, and
"insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. Two
reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's
hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance
in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only for that
which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always
something considered in the light of an injustice. Wherefore the
Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry---if they think
they have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that account;
because there is no anger at what is just. " Now injury is done to
another in three ways: namely, through ignorance, through passion, and
through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he
does an injury from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as
stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those
who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some
one has done us an injury through ignorance or through passion, either
we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do
anything through ignorance or through passion takes away from the
notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and
forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who do an injury on purpose,
seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of
all. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not
angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through
anger, because they do not seem to have acted slightingly. "
The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence:
because "men think little of things that are not worth much ado" (Rhet.
ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods.
Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is
derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.
Reply to Objection 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which
a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt
or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of
itself the cause of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as
such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with
anything derogatory thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of
slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the
more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a
man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this
seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show
signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care little
about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying out
his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to
care much for his friendship. Consequently all those things, in so far
as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger.
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Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of
his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2)
that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance,
the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed. " But these things
seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence
makes one prone to anger.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are
very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing
or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion;
but if they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble. " But
a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather
than excellence is a cause of a man being angry.
Objection 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man
agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men
are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor
when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and
well-founded hope. " Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence
makes men prone to anger.
I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be
taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus
excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the
motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above [1429](A[2]). Now
it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a
slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Consequently those
who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be slighted in
that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in
his eloquence, and so forth.
Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be
considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive
aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a
hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a
cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily
hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other
defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he
evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser
thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less
angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly
despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks
that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through
ignorance, or some other like cause.
Reply to Objection 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they
hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke
anger, because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone.
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Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?
Objection 1: It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for
being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,
3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble
themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs
bite not those who sit down. " But these things savor of littleness and
defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less
angry with him.
Objection 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger
ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not
provoke anger against him.
Objection 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being
friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they
offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): "If my
enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it. " Therefore a
person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man
is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like
manner the prince is angry with his subject. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1430]AA[2],3) unmerited contempt more
than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency
or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase
our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised.
For just as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is
despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising.
Thus a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if
by a fool; a master, if by a servant.
If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited
contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way
those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done
wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according
to Prov. 15:1: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they
seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they
humble themselves.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the
sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and
sensation; and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom
they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have
attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who
are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of
just retaliation.
Reply to Objection 3: To be despised by one's friends seems also a
greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by
failing to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which
we are angry with those who are beneath us.
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OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are
four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether anger causes pleasure?
(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?
(3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?
(4) Whether it causes taciturnity?
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Whether anger causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because
sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, as
stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with
pain. " Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that
"vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for
pain": whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from
vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent
of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect
united with pleasure.
Objection 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is
conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet.
ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that
anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109
[trl. Pope]).
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures,
chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: and
therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we
to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of thirst
which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has
been said ([1431]Q[47], AA[1],3), that the movement of anger arises
from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is
sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present,
pleasure ensues, and so much the greater according as the sorrow was
greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure
ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement of anger
ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to
the angry man in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry
except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above ([1432]Q[46], A[1]); in
another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that
desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what he
desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly
an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about vengeance. This
pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and
consequently anger.
Reply to Objection 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the
same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in
the thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as
its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused
by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.
Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from
ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in
taking vengeance follows from anger.
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Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?
Objection 1: It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of
anger. For fervor, as stated above ([1433]Q[28], A[5];[1434] Q[37],
A[2]), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and
cause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more powerful than
its effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor.
Objection 2: Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor,
increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer it lasts.
But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger. " Therefore fervor is not
the proper effect of anger.
Objection 3: Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor.
But "the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger,"
as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause
fervor.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth.
ii, 16) that "anger is
fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of
the bile. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1435]Q[44], A[1]), the bodily
transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate
to the movement of the appetite. Now it is evident that every appetite,
even the natural appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which
is contrary to it, if it be present: hence we see that hot water
freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot
object. Since then the appetitive movement of anger is caused by some
injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it follows that the
appetite tends with great force to repel the injury by the desire of
vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence and impetuosity in the
movement of anger. And because the movement of anger is not one of
recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of
prosecution, which corresponds to the action of heat, the result is
that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital
spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's
passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being so
disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in
their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) "the heart
that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body
trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes
grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the
mouth indeed he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows not what it
says. "
Reply to Objection 1: "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the
absence of the beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12).
Consequently when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that
he loves, he feels his love thereof the more: the result being that his
heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object
of his love; so that anger increases the fervor of love and makes it to
be felt more.
Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is
to be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor of love has a
certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one
loves: whence it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood.
For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and
hence the saying that "love springs from the liver," because of the
blood being formed there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has a
certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be
avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to the heat of fire
and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,
16) that it "results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its
name {chole}. "
Reply to Objection 2: Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the
causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is
weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from
our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong done.
Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time
goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether. Moreover a wrong seems
greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is gradually
lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past.
The same applies to love, so long as the cause of love is in the memory
alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "if a
friend's absence lasts long, it seems to make men forget their
friendship. " But in the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship
is continually being multiplied by time: wherefore the friendship
increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its cause
continually multiplied.
Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the
strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent having burnt
up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies
away.
Reply to Objection 3: Every power that is divided in itself is
weakened. Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes
angry with another, by this very fact his anger with the former is
weakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be
greater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will,
in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned greater, seem to
be of little or no account.
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Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of
reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem
to hinder the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as stated
in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason.
Objection 2: Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a
man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that
"an angry man is not cunning but is open. " Therefore anger does not
seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is
cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6. ).
Objection 3: Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by
juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more
clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger:
for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are more angry if they
receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be
dishonored": and so forth. Therefore the same cause increases anger,
and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does not hinder
the judgment of reason.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger "withdraws the
light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind. "
I answer that, Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily
organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers
for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered
when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any
disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is
clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated
[1436](A[2]) that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in the
region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members.
Consequently, of all the passions, anger is the most manifest obstacle
to the judgment of reason, according to Ps. 30:10: "My eye is troubled
with wrath. "
Reply to Objection 1: The beginning of anger is in the reason, as
regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger.
But the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as
though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the
commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the
material element of anger. In this respect it hinders the judgment of
reason.
Reply to Objection 2: An angry man is said to be open, not because it
is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly,
without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason
being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what
done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the
dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an
effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man
(Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . .
. and speaks and acts openly. " Desire, on the other hand, is said to
lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable
things that are desired, savor of shame and voluptuousness, wherein man
wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and
excellence, such as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger
begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with
another facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it
increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or wealth,
suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account
of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. Consequently it causes
greater grief: just as a great good, through being received
unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the increase
of the grief that precedes, anger is increased also.
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Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity.
Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger
conduces to speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down
by Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): where He says: "Whosoever is angry with his
brother"; and " . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'"; and
" . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool. '" Therefore
anger does not cause taciturnity.
Objection 2: Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes
breaks out into unbecoming words: hence it is written (Prov. 25:28):
"As a city that lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man
that cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking. " But anger, above all,
hinders the judgment of reason, as stated above [1437](A[3]).
Consequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words.
Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.
Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 12:34): "Out of the abundance
of the heart the mouth speaketh. " But anger, above all, causes a
disturbance in the heart, as stated above [1438](A[2]). Therefore above
all it conduces to speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not
vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more
fiercely. "
I answer that, As stated above [1439](A[3]; Q[46], A[4]), anger both
follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both respects
it may cause taciturnity. On the part of the reason, when the judgment
of reason prevails so far, that although it does not curb the appetite
in its inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from
unbridled speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): "Sometimes
when the mind is disturbed, anger, as if in judgment, commands
silence. " On the part of the impediment to reason because, as stated
above [1440](A[2]), the disturbance of anger reaches to the outward
members, and chiefly to those members which reflect more distinctly the
emotions of the heart, such as the eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, as
observed above [1441](A[2]), "the tongue stammers, the countenance
takes fire, the eyes grow fierce. " Consequently anger may cause such a
disturbance, that the tongue is altogether deprived of speech; and
taciturnity is the result.
Reply to Objection 1: Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the
reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so
as to paralyze the tongue and other outward members.
And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: The disturbance of the heart may sometimes
superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are
hindered by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue
taciturnity and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even
death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great, then "out of the
abundance of the heart" thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds to speak.
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TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)
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OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)
After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the
consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic
principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle
is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the FP, Q[77],
seqq. , it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second
place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which
are the principles of human acts.
Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First,
the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of
their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are
distinguished from one another.
Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habit is a quality?
(2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?
(3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?
(4) Of the necessity of habit.
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Whether habit is a quality?
Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine
says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): "this word 'habit' is derived from the verb
'to have. '" But "to have" belongs not only to quality, but also to the
other categories: for we speak of ourselves as "having" quantity and
money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.
Objection 2: Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as
may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). But
one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not
a quality.
Objection 3: Further, "every habit is a disposition," as is stated in
the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is "the
order of that which has parts," as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But
this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not a
quality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments
(Categor. vi) that "habit is a quality which is difficult to change. "
I answer that, This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to
have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way,
inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in
another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet]
either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.
Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard
to anything that is "had," is common to the various predicaments. And
so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so
called because they result from the various predicaments; as, for
instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among
things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there
are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that which
is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and
quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium,
but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a
companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a
medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner
of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers,
and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher
says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an
action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case
in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these
constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the
predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text.
25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is
clothed. "
But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard
to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since
this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition
whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this,
either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a
habit. " And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say
that habit is a quality.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes "to have" in the general
sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes habit in the sense in which
we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is
had: and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 3: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order
of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the
Philosopher goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely,
"either as to place, or as to power, or as to species. " "In saying
this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments,
"he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to
place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is the
order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all
those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived
at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when
he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are
called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.
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Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?
Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of
quality. Because, as we have said [1442](A[1]), habit, in so far as it
is a quality, is "a disposition whereby that which is disposed is
disposed well or ill. " But this happens in regard to any quality: for a
thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and
in like manner, in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such
things. Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality.
Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the
Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or
habits, just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is
not distinct from the other species of quality.
Objection 3: Further, "difficult to change" is not a difference
belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or
passion. Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a
difference of another genus; but "differences should be proper to a
genus," as the Philosopher says in Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore,
since habit is "a quality difficult to change," it seems not to be a
distinct species of quality.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments
(Categor. vi) that "one species of quality is habit and disposition. "
I answer that, The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor.
vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. Now
Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the
difference of these species as follows. He says "that some qualities
are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are
always there: but some are adventitious, being caused from without, and
these can be lost. Now the latter," i. e. those which are adventitious,
"are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or
difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, some regard a thing in the
point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the
second species of quality: while others regard a thing which is in act;
and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply
rooted, we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we
have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is the
shape of an animated being. " But this distinction of the species of
quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like
qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also
many dispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health,
beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the
species, since that which is the more natural is always first.
Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and
habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, implies a
certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
iv, 3), "is that which a measure determines": wherefore it implies a
certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just
as that in accordance with which the material potentiality [potentia
materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called quality,
which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance
with the potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental
being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of
difference, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19).
Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be
taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to
action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are
matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or
determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have
the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, considered in
itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of good or
evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a
thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or slowly transitory.
But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or
passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality. And
therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with
ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them,
we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil:
because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end, whereas
good and evil are said in respect of an end.
On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard
to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality,
which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii,
text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the body, that
they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I
mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature. " And since
the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause why
a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we
consider both evil and good, and also changeableness, whether easy or
difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and
movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph.
