No More Learning

Let us not deceive ourselves! When a man
hears the whisper of the moral imperative in his


## p. 237 (#261) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
237
breast, as altruism would have him hear it, he shows
thereby that he belongs to the herd. When a
man is conscious of the opposite feelings,—that
is to say, when he sees his danger and his undoing
in disinterested and unselfish actions,—then he
does not belong to the herd.
287.
My philosophy aims at a new order of rank:
not at an individualistic morality. * The spirit of
the herd should rule within the herd—but not
beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a
fundamentally different valuation for their actions,
as do also the independent ones or the beasts of
prey, etc.
3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING
MORALITY.
288.
Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing
human pride. —The "Free-Will” theory is anti-
religious. Its ultimate object is to bestow the
right upon man to regard himself as the cause of
his highest states and actions : it is a form of the
growing feeling of pride.
Man feels his power his “happiness"; as they
say: there must be a will behind these states-
:
»
* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. —Here is a broad distinction be.
tween Nietzsche and Herbert Spencer.


## p. 238 (#262) ############################################

238
THE WILL TO POWER.
otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is
an attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past
or present, as the necessary antecedent to every
exalted and strong feeling of happiness: if the
will to certain actions is regularly present in
consciousness, a sensation of power may be inter-
preted as its result. This is a merely psychological
point of view, based upon the false assumption
that nothing belongs to us which we have not
consciously willed. The whole of the teaching of
responsibility relies upon the ingenuous psycho-
logical rule that the will is the only cause, and
that one must have been aware of having willed
in order to be able to regard one's self as a cause.
Then comes the counter-movement-that of the
moral-philosophers. These men still labour under
the delusion that a man is responsible only for
what he has willed. The value of man is then
made a moral value: thus morality becomes a
causa prima; for this there must be some kind
of principle in man, and " free will” is posited as
prima causa. The arrière pensée is always this :
If man is not a causa prima through his will, he
must be irresponsible,—therefore he does not
come within the jurisdiction of morals,—virtue or
vice is automatic and mechanical.
In short: in order that man may respect
himself he must be capable of becoming evil.
»
.
.
.
289.
Theatricalness regarded as the result of “Free
Will ” morality. It is a step in the development


## p. 239 (#263) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
239
:
.
of the feeling of power itself, to believe one's self to
be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's
perfection) and to have willed them. . .
(Criticism : all perfect action is precisely un-
conscious and not deliberate; consciousness is
often the expression of an imperfect and often
morbid constitution. Personal perfection regarded
as determined by will, as an act of consciousness, as
reason with dialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self-
contradiction. Any degree of consciousness
renders perfection impossible.
. . . A form of
theatricalness. )
290.
The moral hypothesis, designed with a view
to justifying God, said: evil must be voluntary
(simply in order that the voluntariness of goodness
might be believed in); and again, all evil and
suffering have an object which is salvation.
The notion "guilt” was considered as some-
thing which had no connection at all with the
ultimate cause of existence, and
of existence, and the notion
“punishment” was held to be an educating and
beneficent act, consequently an act proceeding from
a good God.
The absolute dominion of moral valuations over
all others: nobody doubted that God could not
be evil and could do no harm-that is to say,
perfection was understood merely as moral per-
fection.
291.
How false is the supposition that an action
must depend upon what has preceded it in


## p. 240 (#264) ############################################

240
THE WILL TO POWER,
consciousness! And morality has been measured
in the light of this supposition, as also crimin-
ality. . . .
The value of an action must be judged by its
results, say the utilitarians: to measure
it
according to its origin involves the impossibility
of knowing that origin.
But do we know its results ?
Five stages
ahead, perhaps. Who can tell what an action
provokes and sets in motion ? As a stimulus ?
As the spark which fires a powder-magazine ?
Utilitarians are simpletons. . . And finally,
they would first of all have to know what is
useful ; here also their sight can travel only over
five stages or so. . . . They have no notion of
the great economy which cannot dispense with evil.
We do not know the origin or the results:
has an action, then, any value ?
We have yet the action itself to consider : the
states of consciousness that accompany it, the yea
or nay which follows upon its performance: does
the value of an action lie in the subjective states
which accompany it? (In that case, the value of
music would be measured according to the pleasure
or displeasure which it occasions in us . . . which
it gives to the composer. . . . ) Obviously feelings
of value must accompany it, a sensation of power,
restraint, or impotence for instance, freedom or
lightsomeness. Or, putting the question differently:
could the value of an action be reduced to physio-
logical terms ? could it be the expression of
completely free or constrained life -Maybe its
biological value is expressed in this way. .


## p. 241 (#265) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY,
241
If, then, an action can be judged neither in the
light of its origin, nor its results, nor its accom-
paniments in consciousness, then its value must be
x, unknown.
.
292.
It amounts to a denaturalisation of morality to
separate an action from a man; to direct hatred
or contempt against "sin"; to believe that there
are actions which are good or bad in themselves.
The re-establishment of "Nature": an action in
itself is quite devoid of value; the whole question
is this: who performed it? One and the same
“crime” may, in one case, be the greatest privi-
lege, in the other infamy. As a matter of fact, it
is the selfishness of the judges which interprets an
action (in regard to its author) according as to
whether it was useful or harmful to themselves (or
in relation to its degree of likeness or unlikeness
to them).
"
293
The concept "reprehensible action presents us
with some difficulties. Nothing in all that happens
can be reprehensible in itself: one would not dare
to eliminate it completely; for everything is so
bound up with everything else, that to exclude
one part would mean to exclude the whole.
A reprehensible action, therefore, would mean a
reprehensible world as a whole. .
And even then, in a reprehensible world even
reprehending would be reprehensible. . . . And
the consequence of an attitude of mind that
e
VOL. 1.


## p. 242 (#266) ############################################

242
THE WILL TO POWER.
condemns everything, would be the affirmation of
everything in practice. . . . If Becoming is a huge
ring, everything that forms a part of it is of equal
value, is eternal and necessary. -In all correlations
of yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love
and hate, all that is expressed is a certain point
of view, peculiar to the interests of a certain type
of living organism: everything that lives says yea
by the very fact of its existence.
294.
a
Criticism of the subjective feelings of value. -
Conscience. Formerly people argued: conscience
condemns this action, therefore this action is
reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience
condemns an action because that action has been
condemned for a long period of time: all conscience
does is to imitate: it does not create values. That
which first led to the condemnation of certain
actions, was not conscience: but the knowledge of
(or the prejudice against) its consequences. . . .
The approbation of conscience, the feeling of well-
being, of “inner peace,” is of the same order of
emotions as the artist's joy over his work—it
proves nothing. . . .
. . Self-contentment proves no
more in favour of that which gives rise to it, than
its absence can prove anything against the value
of the thing which fails to give rise to it.
far too ignorant to be able to judge of the value
of our actions: in this respect we lack the ability
to regard things objectively. Even when we
condemn an action, we do not do so as judges,
.
We are


## p. 243 (#267) ############################################

A ERITICISM OF MORALITY.
243
but as adversaries. When noble sentiments
accompany an action, they prove nothing in its
favour: an artist may present us with an absolutely
insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of
the most exalted pathos during its production. It
were wiser to regard these sentiments as misleading:
they actually beguile our eye and our power, away
from criticism, from caution and from suspicion,
and the result often is that we make fools of our-
selves . . they actually make fools of us.
295.
We are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and
self-crucifixion of two thousand years : in these two
practices lie perhaps our longest efforts at becoming
perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety; we
have affiliated natural propensities with a heavy
conscience
An attempt to produce an entirely opposite
state of affairs would be possible: that is to say,
to affiliate all desires of a beyond, all sympathy
with things which are opposed to the senses, the
intellect, and nature in fact, all the ideals that
have existed hitherto (which were all anti-worldly),
with a heavy conscience.
296.
The great crimes in psychology:
(1) That all pain and unhappiness should have
been falsified by being associated with what is
wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed of its
innocence. )


## p. 244 (#268) ############################################

244
THE WILL TO POWER.
(2) That all strong emotions (wantonness,
voluptuousness, triumph, pride, audacity, know-
ledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were
branded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious.
(3) That feelings of weakness, inner acts of
cowardice, lack of personal courage, should have
decked themselves in the most beautiful words,
and have been taught as desirable in the highest
degree.
(4) That greatness in man should have been
given the meaning of disinterestedness, self-sacrifice
for another's good, for other people; that even in
the scientist and the artist, the elimination of the
individual personality is presented as the cause of
the greatest knowledge and ability.
(5) That love should have been twisted round
to mean submission (and altruism), whereas it is
in reality an act of appropriation or of bestowal,
resulting in the last case from a superabundance
in the wealth of a given personality. Only the
wholest people can love; the disinterested ones,
the “objective” ones, are the worst lovers (just
ask the girls ! ). This principle also applies to the
love of God or of the “home country": a man
must be able to rely absolutely upon himself.
(Egotism may be regarded as the pre-eminence of
the ego, altruism as the pre-eminence of others. )
,
(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness
as a means of seduction); the passions regarded
as devilish; confidence in one's self as godless.
The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles,
a sort of barricade built out of fear; on the one
hand we find the masses (the botched and bungled,
"


## p. 245 (#269) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
245
the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of
it, against the strong (and finally destroying them
in their growth . . ); on the other hand, we
find all the instincts with which these classes are
best able to prosper, sanctified and alone held in
honour by them. Let any one examine the
Jewish priesthood.
297.
The vestiges of the depreciation of Nature through
moral transcendence: The value of disinterested-
ness, the cult of altruism ; the belief in a reward in
the play of natural consequences; the belief in
goodness” and in genius itself, as if the one, like
the other, were the result of disinterestedness; the
continuation of the Church's sanction of the life of
the citizen; the absolutely deliberate misunder-
standing of history (as a means of educating up to
morality) or pessimism in the attitude taken up
towards history (the latter is just as much a
result of the depreciation of Nature, as is that
pseudo-justification of history, that refusal to see
history as the pessimist sees it).
298.
“Morality for its own sake"—this is an im-
portant step in the denaturalisation of morals: in
itself it appears as a final value. In this phase
religion has generally become saturated with it:
as, for instance, in the case of Judaism. It likewise
goes through a phase in which it separates itself


## p. 246 (#270) ############################################

246
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
from religion, and in which no God is “ moral”
enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal
ideal.
This is how the case stands at
present.
“Art
for Art's sake": this is a similarly dangerous
principle: by this means a false contrast is lent
to things—it culminates in the slander of reality
(“idealising” into the hateful). When an ideal
is severed from reality, the latter is debased, im-
poverished, and calumniated. “Beauty for Beauty's
sake," “ Truth for Truth's sake," « Goodness for
Goodness' sake "these are three forms of the evil
eye for reality.
Art, knowledge, and morality are means :
instead of recognising a life-promoting tendency
in them, they have been associated with the
opposite of Lifewith “God,"—they have also
been regarded as revelations of a higher world,
which here and there transpires through them. . .
Beautiful” and “ugly," "true" and "false,"
"good" and "evil”—these things are distinctions
and antagonisms which betray the preservative
and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily
of man alone, but of all stable and enduring
organisms which take up a definite stand against
their opponents. The war which thus ensues is
the essential factor: it is a means of separating
things, leading to stronger isolation. . . .
C
299
Moral naturalism : The tracing back of ap-
parently independent and supernatural values to


## p. 247 (#271) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
247
»
-
their real “nature"_that is to say, to natural
immorality, to natural “ utility," etc.
Perhaps I may designate the tendency of these
observations by the term moral naturalism: my
object is to re-translate the moral values which
have apparently become independent and un-
natural into their real nature—that is to say,
into their natural “ immorality. ”
N. B. —Refer to Jewish “holiness” and its
natural basis. The case is the same in regard
to the moral law which has been made sovereign,
emancipated from its real nature (until it is
almost the opposite of Nature).
The stages in the denaturalisation of morality
(or so-called “ Idealisation') :
First it is a road to individual happiness,
then it is the result of knowledge,
then it is a Categorical Imperative,
then it is a way to Salvation,
then it is a denial of the will to live.
(The gradual progress of the hostility of morality
to Life. )
300.
The suppressed and effaced Heresy in morality.
-Concepts: paganism, master-morality, virtù.
301.
My problem : What harm has mankind suffered
hitherto from morals, as also from its own
morality ? Intellectual harm, etc.
,


## p. 248 (#272) ############################################

248
THE WILL TO POWER.
302.
Why are not human values once more deposited
nicely in the rut to which they alone have a right
- as routinary values ? Many species of animals
have already become extinct; supposing man
were also to disappear, nothing would be lacking
on earth. A man should be enough of a philo-
sopher to admire even this "nothing” (Nil
admirari).
303
Man, a small species of very excitable animals,
which—fortunately—has its time. Life in general
on earth is a matter of a moment, an incident,
an exception that has no consequence, something
which is of no importance whatever to the general
character of the earth; the earth itself is, like
every star, a hiatus between two nonentities, an
event without a plan, without reason, will, or self-
consciousness-the worst kind of necessity-
foolish necessity. . . . Something in us rebels
against this view; the serpent vanity whispers to
our hearts, “ All this must be false because it is
revolting. . . . Could not all this be appearance?
And man in spite of all, to use Kant's words”.
4. How VIRTUE IS MADE TO DOMINATE.
304
Concerning the ideal of the moralist. -In this
treatise we wish to speak of the great politics of


## p. 249 (#273) ############################################

A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
249
>
3
.
virtue. We wrote it for the use of all those who
are interested, not so much in the process of
becoming virtuous as in that of making others
virtuous-in how virtue is made to dominate. I
even intend to prove that in order to desire this
one thing—the dominion of virtue-the other
must be systematically avoided; that is to say,
one must renounce all hopes of becoming virtuous.
This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps
a sufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even
greater sacrifices ! . . . And some of the most
famous moralists have risked as much.
For these,
indeed, had already recognised and anticipated
the truth which is to be revealed for the first time
in this treatise: that the dominion of virtue is
absolutely attainable only by the use of the same
means which are employed in the attainment of
any other dominion, in any case not by means of
virtue itself. . . .
As I have already said, this treatise deals with
the politics of virtue: it postulates an ideal of
these politics; it describes it as it ought to be,
if anything at all can be perfect on this earth.
Now, no philosopher can be in any doubt as to
what the type of perfection is in politics; it is, of
course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism
which is pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa
force, dans toute son âpreté, is superhuman, divine,
transcendental, and can never be achieved by
man—the most he can do is to approximate it.
Even in this narrower kind of politics—in the
politics of virtue—the ideal never seems to have
been realised. Plato, too, only bordered upon it.


## p. 250 (#274) ############################################

250
THE WILL TO POWER.
Granted that one have eyes for concealed things,
one can discover, even in the most guileless and
most conscious moralists (and this is indeed the
name of these moral politicians and of the
founders of all newer moral forces), traces showing
that they too paid their tribute to human weak-
ness. They all aspired to virtue on their own
account--at least in their moments of weariness;
and this is the leading and most capital error on
the part of any moralist—whose duty it is to be
an immoralist in deeds. That he must not exactly
appear to be the latter, is another matter. Or
rather it is not another matter : systematic self-
denial of this kind (or, expressed morally: dis-
simulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of,
the moralist's canon and of his self-imposed
duties : without it he can never attain to his
particular kind of perfection. Freedom from
morality and from truth when enjoyed for that
purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for the
sake of making morality dominate—that is the
canon, Moralists are in need of the attitudes of
virtue, as also of the attitudes of truth; their
error begins when they yield to virtue, when they
lose control of virtue, when they themselves become
moral or true. A great moralist is, among other
things, necessarily a great actor; his only danger
is that his pose may unconsciously become a
second nature, just like his ideal, which is to keep
his esse and his operari apart in a divine way;
everything he does must be done sub specie boni
-a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal ! A divine
ideal! And, as a matter of fact, they say that


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
251
the moralist thus imitates a model which is no less
than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist
in deeds that exists, but who nevertheless under-
stands how to remain what He is, the good
God. .
305.
The dominion of virtue is not established by
means of virtue itself; with virtue itself, one re-
nounces power, one loses the Will to Power.
306.
The victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the
same “immoral” means as any other victory:
violence, lies, slander, injustice.
307
He who knows the way fame originates will be
suspicious even of the fame virtue enjoys.
308.
Morality is just as “immoral”
as any other
thing on earth; morality is in itself a form of
immorality.
The great relief which this conviction brings.
The contradiction between things disappears, the
unity of all phenomena is saved
309.
There are some who seek for the immoral
side of things. When they say:
" this is


## p. 252 (#276) ############################################

252
THE WILL TO POWER.
wrong," they believe it ought to be done away
with or altered. On the other hand, I do not
rest until I am quite clear concerning the im-
morality of any particular thing which happens
to come under my notice. When I discover it,
I recover my equanimity.
9
310.
A. The ways which lead to power : the presenta-
tion of the new virtue under the name of an old
one, the awakening of “interest” concerning it
(“ happiness” declared to be its reward, and vice
verså),-artistic slandering of all that stands in
its way,—the exploitation of advantages and
accidents with the view of glorifying it,—the con-
version of its adherents into fanatics by means
of sacrifices and separations,-symbolism on a
grand scale.
B. Power attained : (1) Means of constraint of
virtue; (2) seductive means of virtue; (3) the
(court) etiquette of virtue.
311.
By what means does a virtue attain to power? -
With precisely the same means as a political party :
slander, suspicion, the undermining of opposing
virtues that happen to be already in power, the
changing of their names, systematic persecution
and scorn; in short, by means of acts of general
“immorality. "
How does a desire behave towards itself in


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
253
order to become a virtue -A process of re-
christening; systematic denial of its intentions ;
practice in misunderstanding itself; alliance with
established and recognised virtues; ostentatious
enmity towards its adversaries. If possible, too,
the protection of sacred powers must be purchased;
people must also be intoxicated and fired with
enthusiasm ; idealistic humbug must be used, and
a party must be won, which either triumphs or
perishes—one must be unconscious and naïf.
312.
Cruelty has become transformed and elevated
into tragic pity, so that we no longer recognise
it as such. The same has happened to the love
of the sexes which has become amour-passion;
the slavish attitude of mind appears as Christian
obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the
disease of the nervus sympathicus, for instance, is
eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc.
313.
We should begin to entertain doubts concerning
a man if we heard that he required reasons in
order to remain respectable: we should, in any
case, certainly avoid his society. The little word
“ for” in certain cases may be compromising;
sometimes a single "for” is enough to refute one.
If we should hear, in course of time, that such-and-
such an aspirant for virtue was in need of bad
reasons in order to remain respectable, it would not
>


## p. 254 (#278) ############################################

254
THE WILL TO POWER.
conduce to increasing our respect for him.
But
he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us
quite openly: “You disturb my morality with
your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you cannot
believe in my bad reasons,—that is to say, in my
God, in a disciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc. ,-
you put obstacles in the way of my virtue. . . .
Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent
the moralisation of the masses. ”
.
314.
Our most sacred convictions, those which are
permanent in us concerning the highest values,
are judgments emanating from our muscles.
315
Morality in the valuation of races and classes. -
In view of the fact that the passions and funda-
mental instincts in every race and class express
the means which enable the latter to preserve
themselves (or at least the means which have
enabled them to live for the longest period of
time), to call them “virtuous” practically means :
That they change their character, shed their
skins, and blot out their past.
It means that they should cease from differen-
tiating themselves from others.
It means that they are getting to resemble each
other in their needs and aspirations—or, more
exactly, that they are declining.
It means that the will to one kind of morality


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
255
is merely the tyranny of the particular species,
which is adapted to that kind of morality, over
other species : it means a process of annihilation
or general levelling in favour of the prevailing
species (whether it be to render the non-prevailing
species harmless, or to exploit them); the
“ Abolition of Slavery”-a so-called tribute to
“human dignity"; in truth, the annihilation of
a fundamentally different species (the under-
mining of its values and its happiness).
The qualities which constitute the strength of
an opposing race or class are declared to be the
most evil and pernicious things it has: for by
means of them it may be harmful to us (its
virtues are slandered and rechristened).
When a man or a people harm us, their action
constitutes an objection against them: but from
their point of view we are desirable, because we
are such as can be useful to them.
The insistence upon spreading “humaneness
(which guilelessly starts out with the assumption
that it is in possession of the formula “What is
human”) is all humbug, beneath the cover of
which a certain definite type of man strives to
attain to power: or, more precisely, a very
particular kind of instinct—the gregarious instinct.
“ The equality of men”: this is what lies concealed
behind the tendency of making ever more and
more men alike as men.
The “ interested nature" of the morality of
ordinary people. (The trick was to elevate the
great passions for power and property to the
positions of protectors of virtue. )


## p. 256 (#280) ############################################

256
THE WILL TO POWER.
To what extent do all kinds of business men
and money-grabbers—all those who give and
take credit-find it necessary to promote the
levelling of all characters and notions of value?
the commerce and the exchange of the world leads
to, and almost purchases, virtue.
The State exercises the same influence, as does
also any sort of ruling power at the head of
officials and soldiers; science acts in the same
way, in order that it may work in security and
economise its forces. And the priesthood does
the same.
Communal morality is thus promoted here,
because it is advantageous; and, in order to make
it triumph, war and violence are waged against
immorality-with
what
"right"? Without
any right whatsoever ; but in accordance with
the instinct of self-preservation. The
. The same
classes avail themselves of immorality when it
serves their purpose to do so.
316.
Observe the hypocritical colour which all
civil institutions are painted, just as if they were
the offshoots of morality-for instance: marriage,
work, calling, patriotism, the family, order, and
rights. But as they were all established in
favour of the most mediocre type of man, to
protect him from exceptions and the need of
exceptions, one must not be surprised to find them
sown with lies.


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
257
-
317.
Virtue must be defended against its preachers :
they are its worst enemies. For they teach virtue
as an ideal for all; they divest virtue of the
charm which consists in its rareness, its inimit-
ableness, its exceptional and
non - average
character—that is to say, of its aristocratic charm. Ł
A stand must also be made against those
embittered idealists who eagerly tap all pots and
are satisfied to hear them ring hollow: what in-
genuousness to demand great and rare things,
and then to declare, with anger and contempt of
one's fellows, that they do not exist It is obvious,
for instance, that a marriage is worth only as
much as those are worth whom it joins—that is
to say, that on the whole it is something wretched
and indecent: no priest or registrar can make
anything else of it.
Virtue * has all the instincts of the average
man against it: it is not profitable, it is not
prudent, and it isolates. It is related to passion,
and not very accessible to reason; it spoils the
character, the head, and the senses—always, of
course, subject to the medium standard of men;
it provokes hostility towards order, and towards
the lies which are concealed beneath all order,
all institutions, and all reality-when seen in
the light of its pernicious influence upon others,
it is the worst of vices.
* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. –Virtue is used here, of course,
in the sense of “the excellence of man,' not in the sense of
the Christian negative virtue.
R
VOL. I.


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258
THE WILL TO POWER.
I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not
insist upon being recognised; (2) it does not
presuppose the existence of virtue everywhere,
but precisely something else ; (3) it does not suffer
from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather
as a relation of perspective which throws virtue
into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it
makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to
pose as judge because it is always a personal
virtue; (6) it does precisely what is generally
forbidden: virtue as I understand it is the actual
vetitum within all gregarious legislation; (7) in
short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the
Renaissance style virtù free from all moralic
acid. .
318.
In the first place, * Messrs. Virtue-mongers, you
have no superiority over us; we should like to
make you take modesty a little more to heart:
it is wretched personal interests and prudence which
suggest your virtue to you. And if you had
more strength and courage in your bodies you
would not lower yourselves thus to the level of
virtuous nonentities. You make what you can of
yourselves : partly what you are obliged to make,
—that is to say, what your circumstances force
you to make,-partly what suits your pleasure and
partly what seems useful to you. But if you do
only what is in keeping with your inclinations,
* TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. —Here Nietzsche returns to
Christian virtue which is negative and moral.


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
259
or what necessity exacts from you, or what is
useful to you, you ought neither to praise your-
selves nor let others praise you ! . . One is a
thoroughly puny kind of man when one is only
virtuous: nothing should mislead you in this
regard! Men who have to be considered at all,
were never such donkeys of virtue: their inmost
instinct, that which determined their quantum of
power, did not find its reckoning thus: whereas
with your minimum amount of power nothing
can
more full of wisdom to you than
virtue. But the multitude are on your side: and
because you tyrannise over us, we shall fight
you. •
seem
319.
A virtuous man is of a lower species because,
in the first place, he has no "personality," but
acquires his value by conforming with a certain
human scheme which has been once and for ever
fixed. He has no independent value: he may
be compared; he has his equals, he must not be
an individual.
Reckoning up the qualities of the good man,
why is it they appear pleasant to us? Because
they urge us neither to war, to mistrust, to
caution, to the accumulating of forces, nor to
severity: our laziness, our good nature, and our
levity, have a good time. This, our feeling of
well-being, is what we project into the good man
in the form of a quality, in the form of a valuable
possession,


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260
THE WILL TO POWER,
320.
Under certain circumstances, virtue is merely a
venerable form of stupidity: who could blame
her for it? And this form of virtue, has not
been outlived even to-day. A sort of honest
peasant-simplicity, which is possible, however, in all
classes of society, and which one cannot meet with
anything else than a respectful smile, still thinks
to-day that everything is in good hands that is
to say, in “God's hands”: and when it supports
this proposition with that same modest assurance
as that with which it would assert that two and
two are four, we others naturally refrain from
contradiction.
Why disturb this pure foolery? Why darken
it with our cares concerning man, people, goals,
the future? Even if we wished to do so, we
shouldn't succeed. In all things these people see
the reflection of their own venerable stupidity and
goodness (in them the old God-deus myops-
still lives); we others see something else in
everything: our problematic nature, our contra-
dictions, our deeper, more painful, and more
suspicious wisdom.
321.
He who finds a particular virtue an easy
matter, ultimately laughs at it. Seriousness
cannot be maintained once virtue is attained. As
soon as a man has reached virtue, he jumps out
of it-whither ? Into devilry.
Meanwhile, how intelligent all our evil tend-


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
261
encies and impulses have become !
What an
amount of scientific inquisitiveness torments them!
They are all fishhooks of knowledge!
322,
• The idea is to associate vice with something so
terrible that at last one is obliged to run away
from it in order to be rid of its associations.
This is the well-known case of Tannhäuser.
Tannhäuser, brought to his wits' end by Wagner-
ian music, cannot endure life any longer even in
the company of Mrs. Venus: suddenly virtue
begins to have a charm for him; a Thuringian
virgin goes up in price, and what is even worse
still, he shows a liking for Wolfram von Eschen-
bach's melody
323.
The Patrons of Virtue. —Lust of property, lust
of power, laziness, simplicity, fear; all these things
are interested in virtue; that is why it stands so
securely.
324.
Virtue is no longer believed in; its powers of
attraction are dead; what is needed is some one
who will once more bring it into the market in the
form of an outlandish kind of adventure and of
dissipation. It exacts too much extravagance and
narrow-mindedness from its believers to allow of
conscience not being against it to-day. Certainly,
for people without either consciences or scruples,


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262
THE WILL TO POWER,
this may constitute its new charm: it is now
what it has never been before a vice.
325.
Virtue is still the most expensive vice : let it
remain so!
326.
Virtues are as dangerous as vices, in so far as
they are allowed to rule over one as authorities and
laws coming from outside, and not as qualities one
develops one's self. The latter is the only right
way; they should be the most personal means of
defence and most individual needs--the determin-
ing factors of precisely our existence and growth,
which ve recognise and acknowledge independ-
ently of the question whether others grow with us
with the help of the same or of different principles.
This view of the danger of the virtue which is
understood as impersonal and objective also holds
good of modesty: through modesty many of the
choicest intellects perish. The morality of modesty
is the worst possible softening influence for those
souls for which it is pre-eminently necessary that
they become hard betimes.
327.
The domain of morality must be reduced and
limited step by step; the names of the instincts
which are really active in this sphere must be
drawn into the light of day and honoured, after


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A CRITICISM OF MORALITY.
263
they have lain all this time in the concealment of
hypocritical names of virtue. Out of respect for
one's "honesty," which makes itself heard ever
more and more imperiously, one ought to unlearn
the shame which makes one deny and "explain
away” all natural instincts. The extent to which
one can dispense with virtue is the measure of
one's strength; and a height may be imagined
'where the notion "virtue” is understood in such a
way as to be reminiscent of virtù-the virtue of
the Renaissance-free from moralic acid. But
for the moment-how remote this ideal seems!
The reduction of the domain of morality is a
sign of its progress.