No More Learning

.
(i. e. It is not because it is written in the Abhidharma that it is absolutely true: We have already shown that it is absurd to pretend that one can have a direct perception of an object. So the teachings on this subject in the Abhidharma should not be taken as absolute, but merely as adapted skillful means for those not ready for the subtle emptiness, as provisional truths requiring further interpretation. They are not definitive truths like taught in the Heart of Wisdom Sutras, or in the teachings of Nagarjuna and his disciples. )
.
(-- Assertion ab: The reason proving the pot empty of true existence is meaningless and ineffectual, for wherever there is a directly perceptible pot, that truly existent pot is, according to us, established by direct perception.
-- Answer cd: In relation to the thesis of proponents establishing emptiness of true existence through reasoning, reasons appearing in their opponents' textual systems are unacceptable, because they are engaged in rejecting them.
-- Question: Then are reasons from these textual systems inappropriate in all cases?
-- Answer: Elsewhere there is no incompatibility, since they pertain where both protagonists' tenets are similar. )
.
L6: [b. Since emptiness exists, its opposite, true existence, is not feasible]
.
\ ###
\ 382.
\ When there is nothing that is not empty,
\ How can emptiness be so?
\ When the one does not exist,
\ Why should the antidote exist?
.
(i. e. Even emptiness is a mere temporary adapted skillful means: Emptiness is the antidote to inherent existence (realism), like Dependent Origination is the antidote to complete non-existence (nihilism). But none of them is the final absolute truth. Once one has completely eradicated the belief in inherent existence, there is no more need for its antidote. The same for dependent origination. )
.
(Emptiness is not a characteristic of something really existing:
-- As part of a final refutation of extreme views, the fact that even emptiness lacks true existence is emphasized. If Madhyamika asserted that emptiness were truly existent, the phenomena which act as its basis would necessarily also be truly existent. However since no such assertion is made, how can these phenomena have true existence?
-- Assertion: You proponents of emptiness accept the entity of emptiness, and since emptiness is not feasible unless it relies on non-emptiness, things are truly existent.
-- Answer: It follows that the existence of emptiness does not establish its opposite, that there is true existence.
-- If emptiness were truly existent, truly existent things as its basis would be feasible, but as there is nothing that is not empty of true existence, how can emptiness be truly existent? Its basis cannot possibly be truly existent. Why, when the basis does not have true existence, would the antidote negating it be truly existent? For emptiness to be truly existent, its basis would have to have a truly existent nature. Fundamental Wisdom says:
~ If the slightest thing were not empty
~ Emptiness would have some existence and so forth. The Two Truths says:
~ Since the object of negation is non-existent,
~ The negation clearly does not exist as [its own] reality. ) .
L4: [B. Refuting adherence to theses which fall into extremes]
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L5: [1. Actual refutation - [the dharma door of non-duality]] L6: [a. Refuting that the non-thesis is a thesis]
.
\ ###
\ 383.
\ If there were a thesis, absence of the thesis
\ Would in entity be a thesis,
\ But where there is no thesis
\ What can be the counter-thesis?
.
(i. e. Transcending all dualities: Let's consider the duality Dependent Origination (based on inherently existing causes, effects, causality, particles, space, time, . . . ) and Emptiness (the negation of their inherent existence). Facing such duality (thesis and counter-thesis) some say that necessarily one is true and the other false, others might say that both are true, or that none of them is true, that it is something else that would include the opposites, a big One. Those are the four usual positions in relation to the polarity in any duality. These four positions corresponds to the usual Tetralemma. The solution presented here points toward the transcendence of the duality: not taking one side as true and rejecting the other, not taking both sides together, not rejecting both sides. And this is done by realizing the real nature of the duality, that there is no real opposition, that it is just an illusion. For example, between existence and non- existence, the solution is : not existence, not non-existence, not both, not neither. That is staying away from the four usual extremes; that is the Middle Way. As for this real nature of the duality of existence and non-existence, it has to be directly seen beyond all conceptualization. - In the case of thesis (emptiness) and counter-thesis (inherent existence or Dependent Origination as taught in the Abhidharma), one has to realize that both poles are empty of inherent existence because co-dependently arisen concepts. This permits to transcend the duality. This could be applied to any dualities, to any dharma in the three realms. )
.
(About the thesis polarity: The opponent say that thesis are in polarity, if one is proven false, then the other must be true. But, both side, and the polarity itself, are illusions. If one side could be proven as truly existent, then the other one would be proven as existent, but none can be proven as truly existent. Each side cannot exist on its own, independent of the other side. In dualities, it is never one, nor the another, nor both, nor neither. -- So, even if emptiness is not an absolutely true absolute thesis, having its own absurdity, it does not prove that "existence" is a valid thesis. Both are dependent.
-- This is followed by a summary of various refutations of true existence introduced in previous chapters.
-- Assertion: Since there is not even the slightest emptiness, it cannot constitute one's thesis. Nevertheless by accepting the absence of a system of one's own as one's system, one is asserting a thesis. Since there is no thesis which does not depend on a counter-thesis, truly existent things--the counter-thesis--exist.
-- Answer: If we had any thesis of existence by way of a thing's own entity, the absence of a thesis would in entity be a thesis existent by way of its own entity. However since we do not have any thesis of existence byway of a thing's own entity, a counter-thesis dependent upon that is also impossible. Moreover all theses concerning truly existent things have already been refuted above. Thus if the absence of a thesis does not exist by way of its own entity, what truly existent thing could constitute the counter-thesis? Neither thesis nor counter-thesis have even an atom of true existence. By this we refute truly existent emptiness as our system, which should not, however, be interpreted as showing that we have no system. )
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L6: [b. Refuting proof that there are truly existent things]
L7: [(1) It is not feasible that there is true existence on the grounds that specific functional things are truly existent]
.
\ ###
\ 384.
\ How can fire be hot,
\ When things do not exist?
\ This was refuted above: it was said
\ That even hot fire does not exist.
.
(i. e. Even elementary components are empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen: this was covered above. ) .
(-- When one examines how fire exists, whether a thing and its parts are inherently one or different or how particles exist, one finds that nothing is truly existent but that everything depends on other factors. -- see Stanza 341
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-- Assertion: There are truly existent things, because specific things like fire and so forth exist.
-- Answer: How can fire be hot by way of its own entity? It cannot, for there are no truly existent things. Above it was said that even hot fire does not exist inherently.
[Stanza 341] says:
~ That which is hot is fire but how
~ Can that burn which is not hot?
~ Thus so-called fuel does not exist,
~ And without it fire too does not.
~ This point has already been refuted. ) .
L7: [(2) Refuting the four extremes by reasoning]
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\ ###
\ 385.
\ If through seeing things one could refute
\ The statement that things do not exist,
\ Who then sees the elimination
\ Of fallacies regarding ALL FOUR THESES.
.
(i. e. The Middle Way about the Tetralemma: Tetralemma: There are four usual positions regarding existence: existence, non-existence, both, neither. There is no other possibility. None is the final view, the absolute truth. But they are antidotes to each other. Existence (or Dependent Origination) is the antidote to non-existence (nihilism or too much Emptiness). Emptiness is the antidote to existence (realism or too much Dependent Origination). Dualism and Oneness are antidotes to each other. The Middle Way consists of not accepting any of those four extremes as an absolute, an not rejecting them as if completely useless, meaningless - they could be used as adapted skillful means depending on the immediate problem. We have no choice, we cannot use the real absolute truth right now because it is beyond conceptualization, and we have not directly realized it yet. But when this will be done we would have transcended all of those dualities, all views and will need no more antidotes. Until then we need to use both method and wisdom together without falling into either of them. This could be applied to any dualities, to any dharma in the three realms. )
.
(-- Moreover, even if, one seeing the thing which is fire, it were appropriate to refute the statement that fire does not exist truly, who sees the elimination of fallacies associated with the true existence of oneness and difference and of all four theses such as existence and non-existence and so forth exposed by the reasoning of dependent arising? Since all four theses are seen to be flawed, one should not accept any thesis of true existence. - see verse 346)
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L7: [(3) Not even the smallest particle of true existence can be observed]
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\ ###
\ 386.
\ When there is nowhere, even in particles,
\ A truly existent entity, how can it occur?
\ Even for Buddhas, it does not exist.
\ Thus it is irrelevant.
.
(i. e. Emptiness of everything means no inherent production: Using the methods described above we come to the conclusion that everything is empty of inherent existence. How can there be inherently production of anything then, as described in the teaching of Dependent Origination in the Abhidharma. There is conventional dependent origination, but there is no inherent cause, effect, causality, particles, space, time, etc. There is conventional production, but no inherent production. All productions are like illusions. - When Dependent Origination and Emptiness are correctly understood, there is no more opposition between the two as perceived by the opponents here. In fact, one implies the other. They are interdependent, and both empty of inherent existence. That is how this duality is transcended. When perfectly understood by a single mind it is called the Perfect Union of The Two truths. Then one is a Buddha. )
.
(-- When one examines how fire exists, whether a thing and its parts are inherently one or different or how particles exist, one finds that nothing is truly existent but that everything depends on other factors.
-- For the following reason, too, it is incorrect to assert true existence:
-- As explained in the context of [stanza 305],
~ This also applies when one examines
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~ Whether particles have parts.
If there were a truly existent entity, it should be observable even in extremely small things such as particles, but it is not observable. How can truly existent production occur for that which does not exist anywhere? It is totally incorrect to accept as existent that which is non-existent to the perception of Buddhas, the sun-like radiance of whose consummate understanding of the suchness of things dispels all darkness of ignorance. Asserting true existence is thus unrelated to any feasible thesis. )
.
L6: [c. Showing that everything is equally free from extremes] L7: [(1) Actual meaning]
.
\ ###
\ 387.
\ If they are not twofold, how can
\ Anything have an existent entity?
\ If that is reasonable to you also,
\ Why raise further arguments?
.
(i. e. The duality existence and non-existence is itself an illusion. We could apply the treatment described above (V. 383) to solve the opposition in the duality of existence and non-existence itself. We then find that existence and non-existence cannot exist one without the other, and they cannot exist together as two separate entities. They are interdependent, two co-dependently arisen concepts. Meaning that everything is: not existent, not non-existent, not both, not neither. The real nature of everything is beyond this duality, beyond all conceptualization. - But realizing the real nature of this duality it is easy to generalize the emptiness of inherent existence to everything that is thought to be inherently existent, or inherently non-existent, . . . )
.
(Since the duality [existent, non existent] is flawed:
-- If there is no twofold division into truly existent and not truly existent, what, such as particles and so forth, could have a truly existent entity, since all forms of true existence have been precludes? If for the very reasons we have explained, it is appropriate for you to accept the system which has eliminated the two extremes, why do you cling to the thesis of true existence and raise further arguments against us? )
.
L7: [(2) Inappropriateness of asserting differentiation of truly existent and not truly existent with regard to any phenomenon]
.
\ ###
\ 388.
\ Regarding the non-functional [aspect] of all things,
\ Differentiation are inappropriate.
\ That which is seen in all substantial entities
\ Is not differentiable.
.
(i. e. No absolute basis for discrimination - everything is already equal & pure: Since everything is empty of inherent existence (there is no real existence I the duality existence vs non-existence), there is no absolute basis for discrimination. All criteria of differentiation are relative to an infinity of causes and conditions, among which is the very mind making the choices, and its accumulated karma. There is no impartial direct perception of any absolute characteristics or objects. All dualities like pure-impure, good-bad, desirable-not-desirable, stillness-occurrence, are illusions that need to be transcended. So, in that sense, everything is already pure. There is nothing to do or not do, nothing to get or drop, nothing to directly see or not see. Nirvana is not caused or produced through our own effort, or not. We already have the Buddha-nature.
? -- No absolute basis for non-discrimination - everything exist conventionally: On the other hand, because those are not completely non-existent either (there is no real non-existence in the duality existence vs non-existence), we should think everything is the same, not drop all discrimination, do nothing, drop all paths. That would be like killing ourselves; we cannot escape samsara like that. They do exist conventionally, and are still dependently arisen and functional. There is still Dependent Origination, the Wheel of Life, karma formation and its consequences; they are just not inherently existent or absolute.
? -- The Middle Way in discrimination: Everything is not different, not the same; non-dual: not two, not one. )
.
(-- From the point of view of their fundamental nature, there are no distinctions among phenomena, for everything is
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equally empty of true existence.
-- If any reasoning could disprove the thesis concerning emptiness of true existence, we would be convinced, but since things cannot be proved truly existent, you should accept only our thesis.
-- If the nature of internal and external things were truly existent, they would not depend on causes and conditions.
Also differentiations of truly existent and not truly existent are inappropriate with regard to the absence of truly existent things. There are no differences in the entity of space, because it is a mere absence of obstructing form. Similarly regarding emptiness of true existence, the nature seen in all substantial entities, [stanza 191] says:
~ Whoever sees one thing,
~ Is said to see all.
~ That which is the emptiness of one
~ Is the emptiness of all.
-- Sutra says, "Whoever has come to know the non-functional with regard to functional things has no attachment to functional things. " There are no distinctions of truly existent and not truly existent with regard to any phenomenon whatsoever. )
.
L5: [2. Refuting the justification]
L6: [a. Appropriateness of accepting the thesis of emptiness of true existence]
.
\ ###
\ 389.
\ If owing to non-existence you claim
\ No reply is made to the other's thesis,
\ Why would you not also prove
\ Your own thesis which is refuted by reasons?
.
(i. e. Failure to prove any side of a duality: If you still think dualities are real and that one of the two opposite thesis must be right and the other false, then how come you cannot prove your thesis ? Your failure only proves that taking side in any duality is never wise; we need to transcend all dualities, because all views are flawed (never absolute), because everything is empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. )
.
(-- If opponents of the Middle Way nevertheless choose to dispute this thesis, they must convincingly establish their own position, yet they repeatedly fail to do so.
-- Challenge: After first analyzing, you should either accept emptiness or make a reply.
-- Objection: It would be appropriate to make a reply if the slightest thing were accepted as truly existent, but since according to you everything is non-existent, how can any reply be made?
-- Answer: If you claim that no reply is made to the Madhyamika thesis because everything is non-existent, why should it not also be proper to prove your own thesis which is refuted by the reasons that prove emptiness? Since one cannot refute another's thesis without proving one's own, yours has become non-existent. )
.
L6: [b. Difficulty of finding a thesis refuting emptiness of true existence]
.
\ ###
\ 390.
\ Though the world says it is easy
\ To find reasons with which to refute,
.
(i. e. Assertion: Even if one is unable to prove one's thesis, it is said and well known in the world that reasons which refute others' theses are easy to find. )
.
\ Why can the errors regarding
\ The others' thesis not be stated?
.
(i. e. The perfection of emptiness is not refutable because it is not a thesis, not a view, not a system. It is a negation without affirming anything. It is like space, like true cessation. It depends on nothing. It is not produced. )
.
(-- Thus finding cogent arguments that invalidate the Madhyamika position is obviously not as simple as they claim.
-- Assertion: Even if one is unable to prove one's thesis, it is said and well known in the world that reasons which refute others' theses are easy to find.
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-- Answer:
-- Since in that case you too must be in possession of those easily found reasons with which to refute, why are even you unable to fault the others' thesis, that of the Madhyamikas? Thus as you are unable to fault the others' thesis, reasons refuting emptiness are not easy to find. )
.
L4: [C. Showing parity of reasoning with regard to true existence or lack of true existence] L5: [1. Both emptiness of true existence and true existence
are either equally established or not established merely by words]
.
\ ###
\ 391.
\ If just by saying "They exist"
\ Things really did exist,
\ Why should they not also be non-existent
\ Just by saying "They do not exist"?
.
(i. e. It is not because it is written in the Abhidharma that it is absolutely true: We have already shown that it is absurd to pretend that things are inherently existing. So the teachings on this subject in the Abhidharma should not be taken as absolute, but merely as adapted skillful means for those not ready for the subtle emptiness, as provisional truths requiring further interpretation. They are not definitive truths like taught in the Heart of Wisdom Sutras, or in the teachings of Nagarjuna and his disciples. )
.
(-- If things were truly existent merely because one says they are, they would, by the same argument, be empty of true existence merely by saying they are; words alone do not affect reality.
-- If even without reasoning, but merely by saying the words "They exist," things existed as their own suchness, why should their emptiness of true existence not also be established merely by our saying the words "They do not exist truly"? The reasoning is the same in all respects. Therefore, rejecting assertions regarding the two extremes, we both should firmly establish the textual system free from all fabrications which asserts non-existence of the two extremes. )
.
L5: [2. Mere designation as truly existent will not make it so]
.
\ ###
\ 392.
\ If a thing is not non-existent
\ Because the term "existent" is ascribed,
\ Neither is it existent
\ because the term "existent" is applied.
.
(i. e. Otherwise, there are other books that says other things . . . And it is not because someone say that this was said by the Buddha that it makes it an absolute truth. It only proves that it was used as another adapted skilful means in a certain occasion by the Buddha. The Buddha said to stay away from all extremes. )
.
(-- Assertion: If things do not exist ultimately, the designation "things exist" is incorrect and as unreasonable as terming a barren woman's child existent.
-- Answer: If things do not lack true existence because the designation "they are and exist" is ascribed, neither are they truly existent because the designation "they exist truly" is applied. Calling someone with good eyesight blind or someone with a short life long-lived does not make them so. Besides, if things could be accomplished by words alone, it would be just as reasonable to accept that they lack true existence as to think they are truly existent. )
.
L5: [3. If there were true existence because ordinary people use the verbal convention that things are truly existent, then being conventionally existent they could not exist as their own suchness]
.
\ ###
\ 393.
\ If everything is a convention
\ Because expressed by ordinary people,
\ How can anything which exists
\ As [its own] suchness be a convention?
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.
(i. e. They could exist conventionally : On the other hand, it is ok to accept them as existing conventionally if they are
so. But obviously this means that they do not exist on their own, inherently; they are mere conventions, like illusion. We do not deny that. )
.
(-- Another's assertion: Words do not reveal an object's entity. If they did, one's mouth would burn when saying "fire" or be full when saying "pot. " Therefore we assert that ordinary people all have means of expression and terms for that which is being expressed which do not touch an object's own entity.
-- Answer: Supposedly things all exist inherently and as conventions because ordinary people speak of them by means of words which do not touch their entity. But how can anything that exists inherently, existing as its own suchness, be a convention? It could only be ultimately existent. )
.
L4: [D. Refuting non-existence as the thesis]
L5: [1. Refuting that negation of truly existent things makes things utterly non-existent]
.
\ ###
\ 394.
\ If things are non-existent because
\ Things all do not exist,
\ In that case it is incorrect that all these
\ Concern the non-existence of things.
.
(i. e. Emptiness doesn't mean complete non-existence: that would be falling to the other extreme, nihilism. Even if everything is empty of inherent existence, they are still dependently arisen and functional. Everything is dependent on the mind labeling it, but still not from the mind only. Nothing is really existent, non-existent, both, neither. The duality existence vs non-existence has to be transcended by directly seeing the real nature of the duality itself - not taking one side and rejecting the other, nor accepting both, nor rejecting both. )
.
(-- Assertion: Since you deny that things have true existence, things are non-existent.
-- Answer: If even the slightest thing is non-existent because things are not truly existent, it is incorrect that all Madhyamika theses concern the non-existence of things through refutation of previously existent truly established things, for there has never been any true existence. )
.
L5: [2. As there are no truly existent things that which is non-functional cannot be truly existent either]
.
\ ###
\ 395.
\ Since a thing does not exist
\ A non-thing cannot exist.
\ Without a thing's existence,
\ How can a non-thing be established?
.
(i. e. Another reason - Because something that has never inherently existed cannot be completely non-existent later: If there is no inherent production of anything, if everything is empty of inherent existence, then there could be no inherent cessation or anything. So emptiness could not mean complete-non-existence. - Nirvana is not produced by dropping everything, since nothing was existent in the first place. It is just a matter of directly seeing this, which is like seeing luminous space. )
.
(-- Since truly existent functional things, the object of negation, do not exist, their non-functional negation cannot be truly existent. In the world a completely disintegrated thing is said to be non-functional. In keeping with this, a completely disintegrated pot would not be feasible if the pot had never existed. Thus how could the non-functional be truly existent, when there are no truly existent functional things? The existence of a dependent thing is not feasible without that on which it depends. )
.
L4: [E. Refuting that things are not empty because analogies and reasons to establish emptiness exist]
L5: [1. Showing the invalidity in the form of absurd consequences [of asserting that] there is true existence because there are reasons]
.
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\ ###
\ 396.
\ If things are not empty because
\ They are empty by virtue of reasons,
\ The thesis would not be distinct from the reasons,
\ And thus the reasons would not exist.
.
(i. e. Could emptiness be an effect of a certain type of logic - reasons? : Let's suppose that it is a series of reasons that makes things empty of inherent existence, that they were not like this before the reasoning. This would mean the emptiness depends on those reasons, depends on a certain type of logic. That makes those reasons the "causes" and emptiness the "effect". Again using the method described above we could observe that this production is not inherent because the causes and the effect cannot be different or separate in time, nor the same or simultaneous. In other words there is no absolute causes (reasons) that could produce the effect (emptiness), and no absolute effect. Both are interdependent, co-dependently arisen concepts, empty of inherent existence because dependently arisen. And all this only confirm that everything is already empty even before any reasoning. )
.
(-- It is a mistake to think that things were previously truly existent, but are rendered non-existent through refutation of their true existence. They never existed in this way in the first place.
-- Assertion: In order to prove emptiness you must adduce reasons. Thus since the reasons exist, things are not empty, for like the reasons everything else is also truly existent.
-- Answer: If things were not empty because emptiness of true existence is established through reasons, and the thesis and reasons were inherently distinct, they would be unrelated. If the thesis were not inherently distinct from the reason but inherently one with it, they would have to be one and therefore what is to be proved could not be understood by depending on the reason. Then it follows that there are no correct reasons, since the fallacy of there being no reasons arises when one asserts truly existent things. Therefore all phenomena are established as lacking inherent existence. )
.
L5: [2. Showing the invalidity in the form of absurd consequences [of asserting that] things are not empty because there
are analogies]
.
\ ###
\ 397.
\ If things are not empty because
\ There are analogies for emptiness,
\ Can one say, "Just like the crow,
\ So too the self is black"?
.
(i. e. Could emptiness be an effect of a certain type of logic - analogies? : Same reasoning as the previous verse in the case of "logical analogies", otherwise everything would be possible like the example in this verse. )
.
(About thesis and analogies:
-- Neither the existence of reasons nor analogies establishing emptiness can be used to support the thesis that things are truly existent, for the reasons and analogies themselves lack true existence.
-- Assertion: Since there are analogies for emptiness of inherent existence, such as the reflection and so forth, everything else, like those analogies, exists and is not empty.
-- Answer: Is the analogy related or unrelated to the reason's meaning? The first has already been precluded by the reasoning which refutes truly existent reasons. In the second case, if the meaning is established through an analogy unrelated to the reason, is one able to say, "Just as the crow is black, so too is the self," because they are alike in being functional things? One should be able to do so. Yet an analogy, merely by virtue of its existence, is not suitable as an analogy for true existence. )
.
L4: [F. Explaining the purpose of teaching emptiness]
.
\ ###
\ 398.
\ If things exist inherently
\ What good is it to perceive emptiness?
\ Perception by way of conception binds.
\ This is refuted here.
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.
(i. e. The Middle Way about logic: The fact that all logic - reasons, analogies, . . . - are empty of inherent existence doesn't mean that it is completely non-existent, useless, meaningless. We still can use illusions to help to go over other illusions - the important is that there is a progression toward reality. Even if emptiness and Dependent Origination are both empty of inherent existence, they are still dependently arisen and functional. They are efficient antidotes in their proper situation.