Emptiness
doesn't deny dependent origination; one implies the other.
Aryadeva - Four Hundred Verses
However, since a pot and blue are directly perceptible, all functional thing are in fact inherently existent.
-- Answer: It follow that direct perception of a pot which exists by way of its own entity is not feasible. If it were, the awareness perceiving the visible form of the pot should perceive all its parts. Yet when visual consciousness perceives the pot's form, it does not in fact perceive every single part of the pot. Who that knows the reality of things would claim that the pot is directly perceptible? "Also" refers to also blue existent by way of its own character.
The pot is imputed in dependence on eight substances and therefore cannot exist by way of its own character, nor by seeing one part can one see all its parts. Similarly, if fire existed by way of its own entity, the fallacy that it should always keep burning would arise, since it would not require fuel.
Dialecticians contradict both reasoning and common knowledge when they call awareness arising in dependence upon an individual sense organ direct perception, and assert that an awareness free from conceptuality in which a sound image and a generic image may be apprehended as merged is direct perception. Each individual moment of consciousness cannot be a direct perceiver. In the world objects like the waxing moon which are directly perceived by many people, are commonly held to be directly perceptible, whereas that which perceives these objects is not. Furthermore since they assert that sense consciousness is a direct perceiver, it is inconsistent to think that it is also a valid perceiver. An extensive explanation of this may be found in Candrakirti's commentary. it has not been included here for fear that it would be too long. )
.
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L7: [(2) Applying this reasoning to other instances]
.
\ ###
\ 302.
\ By means of this very analysis
\ Those with superior intelligence
\ Should refute individuality
\ All that is fragrant, sweet and soft.
.
(i. e. This applies to all five senses; there is no direct perception, no objective perception. )
.
(-- This same analogy procedure should be applied to the objects of the other senses: to sounds, smells, tastes and tactile objects. One will discover that none of these are truly existent directly perceptible objects.
-- By means of this very analysis using the reasoning which refutes the assertion that sense consciousness is a direct perceiver in relation to a pot, blue and so forth, existent by way of their own entity, the wise with superior intelligence refute separately in each case the contention that sense consciousnesses are direct perceivers in relation to fragrances such as the fragrance of jasmine flowers, sweet tastes and that which is soft to touch, all existent by way of their own entity. Since one cannot make distinction such as seeing one part but not seeing others, or distinctions with regard to what touches and what does not, or with regard to closeness and distant in relation to truly existent functional things, such fallacies ensue. )
.
L7: [(3) Absurdity of positing that other parts are seen because visible form existent by way of its own character is seen]
.
\ ###
\ 303.
\ If because the form is seen
\ Everything is seen,
\ Why because of what is not seen
\ Would the form not be unseen?
.
(i. e. We perceive only part of it. )
.
(-- Assertion: All parts of the pot are seen when its visual form is seen, for the pot is not a separate entity from its visual form.
-- Answer: If on the grounds that visual consciousness sees the pot's form one can posit that all parts of the pot are seen, why on the grounds that visual consciousness does not perceive the pot's smell would even the visible form, which is accepted as seen, not be unseen? If one posits that all parts are seen because one part is seen, even that which is accepted as seen cannot be posited as seen if one part is not perceived. )
.
L7: [(4) Refuting direct perception of just visible form existent by way of its own character]
.
\ ###
\ 304.
\ There is no direct perception
\ of just the form alone,
\ Because it has a close and distant
\ As well as a central part.
.
(i. e. We perceive only a part of its form. )
.
(-- A close analysis then follows which establishes that all the components that make up a composite, . . .
-- Assertion: Though the pot is not a directly perceptible object of comprehension, its visible form is established by direct perception and thus, indirectly, the pot existing by way of its own entity is also directly perceptible.
-- Answer: It follows that there is no direct perception of just the visible form alone existent by way of its own entity, because the visible form too has many parts, such as close, distant and central parts, and is thus imputed in dependence upon many parts. There is not the slightest thing existent by way of its own entity that is directly perceptible to any kind of awareness. )
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L7: [(5) Showing that the proof and what is to be proved are alike]
.
\ ###
\ 305.
\ This also applies when one examines
\ Whether particles have parts or not.
\ Thus to prove a thesis by that
\ Which must be proved is not feasible.
.
(i. e. And we cannot conclude that the form exist because we see the particles composing it because this is not proven. In fact the same argument about seeing only a part of it also applies to particles. )
.
(. . . even particles, have parts.
-- When all the parts are separated, that form is finally reduced to the smallest particles. An investigation of whether particles have parts or not applies to those particles too. If they have parts like a front and a back, they are, like the pot, imputed in dependence upon many parts, in which case they no longer are the smallest particles. If they do not have parts, they cannot exist because of being inapprehensible. Thus it is not feasible to prove that the pot exists by way of its entity as a directly perceptible object of comprehension by means of that which must be proved, for things do not exist by way of their own character. )
.
L7: [(6) Showing other lines of reasoning]
.
\ ###
\ 306.
\ EVERYTHING TOO IS A COMPONENT
\ AS WELL AS BEING A COMPOSITE.
\ Thus even a spoken syllable
\ Does not have existence here.
.
(i. e. Everything is empty because everything is composed of parts, and there is no direct perception because we see
only part of any object - we assume the rest. And this applies to the parts, . . . Everything is empty of inherent existence because dependent on its parts. That is how perception works: we receive stimuli based on an endless flow of interdependence, and through habituation we imagine invariants (entities . . . ) in it in our attempt to try to control it. But all those objects, characteristics, relations, are mere hypothesis, created by our own mind and by conventions. We just forget that they are our own fabrications and think they exist by themselves independently of our own mind out there. Everything is merely imputed by the mind. )
.
(-- Thus each is simultaneously a component as well as a composite.
-- Moreover when objects apprehended by the physical sense organs are examined, all are components in relation to their composites as well as composites in relation to their components and are therefore merely imputed in dependence upon their parts. As with the analysis of the smallest particle, names, which are ultimately reduced to spoken syllables such as "a," are also just conventions in this world and do not exist by way of their own entity. Thus you must recognize all dependently arising phenomena as mere names and terms. )
.
L5: [2. Individual refutations]
L6: [a. Refuting that sense organs apprehend objects existing by way of their own entity] L7: [(1) Refuting truly existent visible objects]
L8: [(a) Refuting objects]
L9: [1: Refuting our own sectarians' contentions]
L9: [a: Refutation by examining whether the color and shape constituting a visible form existing by way of its own character taken as object of apprehension
by a visual consciousness are inherently one or different]
.
\ ###
\ 307.
\ If a shape is distinct from color
\ How is shape apprehended?
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\ If not distinct, why would the body
\ Not also apprehend color?
.
(i. e. Even parts like shape and color are not directly perceived, not inherently existing characteristics: We do not directly perceive objects through directly perceiving their shape and color, . . . Even (parts like) shape and colors are not inherently existing characteristics, independent of anything else, and directly perceptible as if truly existent on their own out there. Here it is proven that shape and color are not two, not one; they are interdependent, thus not existing on their own, not inherently existing. Those characteristics are also dependent on many many other factors. So we first receive stimuli (part of parts), compare them to memory, filter them through accumulated karma, and assume the rest like shape and colors, and then label the object, and then we have the illusion of perceiving the object as if it truly exist on its own. All the possible mistakes (optical illusions, color change due to other factors, miss-identification . . . ), proves that there is no objective perception of anything. )
.
(-- Assertion: The pot is directly perceptible since visual consciousness sees the pot's visible form existent by way of its own character, consisting of color and shape.
-- Answer: Are color and shape inherently one or distinct? If shape such as length and so forth is inherently distinct from color, how can a visual consciousness take shape as its object of apprehension? It follows that it cannot because shape is an entity distinct from color. Alternatively, if they are not distinct but inherently one, why does touch not apprehend color in the dark just as it apprehends shape? It follows that it should because they are one. )
.
L9: [b: Refutation through the consequence that because the elements are present, a visual consciousness taking a visible form as its object would apprehend both]
.
\ ###
\ 308.
\ Only the form is visible
\ But the form's causes are not seen.
\ If indeed it is thus,
\ Why are both not also
\ Perceived by just the eyes?
.
(i. e. Even parts like the so called elementary components are not inherently existing, or directly perceived: We cannot use the assumption of the elementary components to prove that a form really exist on its own. This is circular reasoning; they are assume based on the resulting form. Those elementary components have not been proven to exist on their own. In fact it is easy to prove that they could not exist as such as done in a previous chapter. )
.
(-- An analysis of the relationship between the four elements and their outcome, visual form, is then made to demonstrate that they are neither inherently one nor different.
-- Assertion: The visible form source exists because the four great elements which are causal forms exist.
-- Answer ab: Only the resultant form is visible but the form's causes such as the earth element are not seen. Since causal form is imputed in dependence upon resultant form, they cannot be inherently different. If they are inherently one, they must be one.
-- cde: In that case why does just visual consciousness itself not apprehend both the causal and resultant forms? It follows that it should because they are one. )
.
L9: [c: Showing what invalidates this contention]
.
\ ###
\ 309.
\ Earth is seen as firm and stable
\ And is apprehended by the body.
\ Only that which is tangible
\ Is referred to as earth.
.
(i. e. No possible direct visual perception of the elementary components: In fact the characteristics of those so called elementary components are based on their tactile sensation and have nothing to do with visual perception. So we cannot say we have direct perception of a form because we directly perceive those elementary components. )
.
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( -- Earth is seen as firm and stable and furthermore is apprehended by tactile consciousness. Thus only that which is tangible is referred to as earth. Therefore since visible forms are objects apprehended by visual consciousness and the four elements are objects apprehended by tactile consciousness, they are different. If one accepts them as truly existent, they are unrelated. It would thereby follow that visible form is causeless. )
.
L9: [2: Refuting contentions of other sectarians]
.
\ ###
\ 310.
\ Since it was produced as something visible,
\ It is of no use at all to the pot.
\ As with the production of visibility,
\ It lacks even the entity of existence.
.
(i. e. The case of the "visibility" characteristic: And "visibility" is not another directly perceptible, inherently existing elementary characteristic. This characteristic is also dependently arisen. )
.
(-- Vaisesika assertion: A pot is not visible by way of its own entity but neither is it not a visible object, since it is directly perceptible by virtue of possessing visibility, a separate generality.
-- Answer ab: This too is unacceptable. Has the pot come into existence as something visible through its own causes or not? In the first case it would follow that an association with the separate generality of visibility is of no use in making the pot directly perceptible, because it has come into existence as something visible through its own causes. For this reason the generality of visibility is not produced in relation to the pot.
-- cd: Further, a pot that has no connection with visibility and is not something visible lacks any inherently established entity of existence. Therefore the pot could not be either actually or imputedly directly perceptible as you contend. )
.
L8: [(b) Refuting that which perceives objects]
L9: [1: Refuting that the eye is by way of its own entity an instrument of looking at form]
.
\ ###
\ 311.
\ The eye, like the ear, is an outcome of
\ The elements. The eyes see while the others do not.
\ Certainly therefore the Subduer said
\ The fruition of actions is inconceivable.
.
(i. e. The Middle Way about the sense organs: There is no inherently existing sense organs either. The eye is also composed of parts, dependent on multiple factors, the fruit of evolution or accumulated karma. It is not a perfect organ capable of true objective perception, of direct perception. All of its mistakes are proof of that. As everything is samsara it is based on mistaken assumptions, illusions, ignorance and accumulated karma. The emptiness of the sense organs, and of the objects of the senses, doesn't mean that they are completely non-existent, it only means that they are dependently arisen, not independent, not existing on their own.
Emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination; one implies the other. )
.
(-- The sense and the process of perception are examined next. Confusing lack of true existence with total non- existence, the opponent argues that the Madhyamika presentation of the senses contradicts what was said by the Buddha about the eyes and so forth being the maturation of past actions. In answer it is established that although nothing can sustain ultimate analysis, since nothing is findable when subjected to this kind of investigation, our experience confirms the existence of our senses and other phenomena. Thus the Buddha's statements about the relationship between actions and their effects are in no way contradicted, since such statements refer to the conventional existence of actions and their effects.
-- Assertion: Because sense organs exist -- such as the eyes, which are instruments of perception -- directly perceptible objects such as visible exist.
-- Answer ab: Regarding the subject, the eye organ: since the eye perceives visual stimuli while other senses do not, it does not perceive visual form by way of its own entity, for like the nose sense organ it is an outcome of the elements. A demonstration of the valid reasons which invalidate the entailment is given below.
-- Objection: If the eye and so forth do not exist it contradicts explanations concerning the maturation of actions.
-- Answer: But even we do not refute that.
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-- Question: Why is that not refuted?
-- Answer: We refute that things exist by way of their own entity but far from refuting the existence of all that is dependent arising, we affirm it in our own system.
-- cd: Although it cannot sustain investigation by the reasoning which analyzes suchness and though it is not established by way of its own entity, it is undeniable that the eye sees visible form and does not hear sound. Thus recognizing that the maturation of actions is inconceivable, one should accept it without applying analysis by reasoning. Certainly therefore the Subduer said that the fruition of actions is inconceivable. Sutra says:
~ The maturation of sentient beings' actions is inconceivable.
~ Thus this whole world comes into existence through causes. ) .
L9: [2: Refuting consciousness as agent]
.
\ ###
\ 312.
\ Because the conditions are incomplete
\ There is no awareness before looking,
\ While afterwards awareness is of no use.
\ The instrument is of no use in the third case.
.
(i. e. There is no truly existing consciousness: As for consciousnesses of the senses, that is also a false assumption. There could be no such thing as a truly existing consciousness of a sense. This is also another co-dependently arisen concept. Consciousness of an object is happening after having labeled the objects, after having received all the stimuli, comparing with memory patterns, assuming a lot by filtering them though accumulated karma . . . It is an illusion of something inherently existing based on accumulated karma. )
.
(-- Inquiry is then made as to whether the eye and the visual perception it induces function simultaneously or consecutively, . . . ; if motion is involved, does it occur before, during or after perception?
-- Assertion: The eye and so forth are inherently existent because one experiences consciousness, their effect.
-- Answer: A visual consciousness does not exist before looking at a form, for prior to that the conditions which produce it are incomplete. Alternatively if it exist after looking at the form, it follows that the eye consciousness is of no use in looking at the form, because looking takes place before it exists. As a third possibility one might think that that which looks and consciousness are simultaneous. It would then follow that the instrument of looking would be of no use in the production of that visual consciousness because the two would exist simultaneously and would be unrelated. )
.
L9: [3: Refuting the eye as agent]
L9: [a: Absurdity if the eye travels to look at visible form]
.
\ ###
\ 313.
\ If the eye travels, that which is
\ Distant would take long to see.
\ Why are extremely close
\ And very distant forms not clear?
.
(i. e. Refuting another old hypothesis of direct perception by the eye. Now the hypothesis is that it is the light (radiation) that travels between the object and the eyes. And it proves that we are seeing only parts of an object and assuming the rest. This also applies to our so called elementary components of matter. )
.
(. . . and whether the eye goes toward its object or not . . . If no motion is involved, all objects should be equally visible.
-- Assertion; The eye is the instrument of looking.
-- Answer: When the eye looks at a form, does it look after traveling to the object or without doing so? In the first case, if when the eye looked at a form there were motion of traveling toward the object, it should take longer to see distant objects. If the eye perceived through contact, why would the eye ointment and spatula, which are extremely close, and very distant forms not be equally clear? It follows that they would be because of being perceived through contact. )
.
L9: [b: Purposelessness if it travels to look at the form after it is seen]
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\ 314.
\ If the eye travels when the form is seen
\ Its movement is of no benefit.
\ Alternatively it is false to say
\ What it intends to view is ascertained.
.
(i. e. Refuting another old hypothesis of direct perception by the eye. )
.
( -- If the eye traveled to the form after seeing it, its movement would be of no benefit, for though it does so to view the form, that form has already been seen. Alternatively, if it approached without seeing the form which it intended to view, it would be false to say it had definitely been seen, for it approaches what is to be viewed without seeing it, like a blind man. )
.
L9: [c: Consequence that all objects would be seen if the eye by way of its own entity perceived form without traveling]
.
\ ###
\ 315.
\ If the eye perceives without traveling
\ It would see all these phenomena.
\ For that which does not travel there is
\ Neither distance not obscuration.
.
(i. e. Refuting another old hypothesis of direct perception by the eye. )
.
( -- To avoid these errors one might assert that it perceives form by way of its own entity without traveling. In that case the eye which stays here see all of these phenomena: the close, as well as the obscured and unobscured. For an eye which does not approach the object there should be no difference between close or distant, obscured or unobscured objects. )
.
L9: [4: Consequence that the eye is an instrument of looking in relation to the eye]
.
\ ###
\ 316.
\ If the nature of all things
\ First appears in themselves,
\ Why would the eye not
\ Be perceived by the eye itself?
.
(i. e. There is no true direct perceiver because the eye cannot see itself: The old theories could not explain why the eye cannot see itself - it should if there were true direct perception. )
.
(-- If the eye were an inherent instrument of perception, its function would not depend on a multitude of other factors. In that case it should also see itself. None of the factors involved in the process of perception -- neither objects, sense organs nor their related perception -- exist inherently or operate independently.
-- Just as the fragrance of the magnolia or blue lotus is first found at its source and afterwards, through contact, on a sesame seed and so forth, it is the way of all things that their nature first appears in themselves. Since it cannot relinquish its nature even in relation to itself, if it is an instrument of looking by way of its own entity, why does the eye not perceive itself? It follows that it should since the eye organ even with the eye as its object cannot give up its nature as an instrument of looking. Yet valid cognition negates that the eye perceives itself. Thus the subject, the eye, is not an instrument of looking at form by way of its own entity, because it does not look at itself. )
.
L9: [5: Refuting a combination of three factors as the instrument of looking at visible form]
.
\ ###
\ 317.
\ The eye does not have consciousness
\ And consciousness lacks that which looks.
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\ If form has neither of these,
\ How can they see form?
.
(i. e. The theory of the contact between the three: the sense organ, the object perceived, and the consciousness of a sense, doesn't make sense when looked at in details. It should not be taken as an absolute truth; it is just another skillful means. Those three could not exist independently of each other nor be the same. They are also co-dependently arisen concepts. This is explained in more details in the Karikas. )
.
(-- Assertion: The eye alone does not have the ability to view form. The form is seen in dependence upon a combination of three factors.
-- Answer: Since the eye is matter it is not conscious of the object. Consciousness is not that which looks at the object. The form, the objective condition, is neither that which looks nor consciousness. How can form be seen by way of its own entity through a combination of these three factors? It follows that it is not feasible because visible form which is none of them has no ability to see. )
.
L7: [(2) Refuting truly existent auditory objects]
L8: [(a) Refutation by examining whether sound is a maker of noise]
.
\ ###
\ 318.
\ If sound makes a noise as it travels
\ Why should it not be a speaker?
\ Yet if it travels noiselessly, how could
\ Awareness arise in relation to it?
.
(i. e. The case of sounds: There is also no direct perception of sounds; sounds are also not existing on their own, inherently existing, independently of anything else. )
.
(-- A similar investigation is then carried out in relation to sound and its perception. Does sound emit noise or travel silently?
-- Just as form cannot be looked at in terms of its own suchness, sound too cannot be listened to in this way.
.
When sound is heard, does hearing occur because it approaches as an object of that which listens or not? In the first case, if it approaches as an object of auditory consciousness, does it do so emitting sound or silently? If it travels toward auditory consciousness making a noise as it travels, why is it not a speaker, since like Devadatta it travels, emitting sounds? If this is accepted, it follows that it would not be sound. Alternatively, if it travels toward auditory consciousness noiselessly, how could awareness focusing on the sound be produced, since no sound is emitted? )
.
L8: [(b) Refutation by examining whether or not sound is apprehended through contact]
.
\ ###
\ 319.
\ If sound is apprehended through contact,
\ What apprehends the beginning of sound?
\ If sound does not come alone,
\ How can it be apprehended in isolation?
.
(i. e. The theory of the contact between the three: the sense organ, the object perceived, and the consciousness of a sense, doesn't make sense when looked at in details. It should not be taken as an absolute truth; it is just another skillful means. Those three could not exist independently of each other nor be the same. They are also co-dependently arisen concepts. This is explained in more details in the Karikas. )
.
(-- Is it apprehended through contact or not?
-- Furthermore, if sound is apprehended through contact with the ear organ, what apprehends the beginning of sound before contact occurs? It follows that there is nothing with which to apprehend it, since neither the ear organ nor any other does so. If this is accepted, it follows that it would not be sound. Sound consists of nine substances and thus since it does not come alone, how can sound in isolation be apprehends? It follows that smell and so forth which are inseparably combined with it would also not be apprehended, for according to you they must, like the sound, have
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L8: [(c) Showing the flaws of this contention]
.
\ ###
\ 320.
\ While sound is not heard, it is not sound.
\ It is impossible
\ For that which is not sound
\ Finally to turn into sound.
.
(i. e. There is no inherently existing sounds: it is dependent on many factors among which is the mind perceiving it, and its accumulated karma. )
.
(-- Question: What is wrong if the beginning of sound is not apprehended?
-- Answer: It would fail to be sound. Until it is heard it is not sound because, like smell, it is not the ear's object. It becomes sound when it is heard. If initially it was not sound but later became sound, it would follow that smell and so forth could do so too, but that is unacceptable with regard to permanent functional thing. Sutra says:
~ For instance, in dependence upon the strings and wood
~ And the hand's effort -- through these three together --
~ Sound is produced and issues from
~ Instruments like the vina and flute. ~.
~ When the wise investigate and think
~ From where it has come and where it has gone,
~ Searching in the main and intermediate directions,
~ They find no coming nor going of sound. ) .
L6: [b. Refuting apprehension by mental consciousness]
.
\ ###
\ 321.
\ Without the sense organs what will mind
\ Do after it has gone?
\ If it were so, why would that which lives
\ Not always be without mind?
.
(i. e.
-- Answer: It follow that direct perception of a pot which exists by way of its own entity is not feasible. If it were, the awareness perceiving the visible form of the pot should perceive all its parts. Yet when visual consciousness perceives the pot's form, it does not in fact perceive every single part of the pot. Who that knows the reality of things would claim that the pot is directly perceptible? "Also" refers to also blue existent by way of its own character.
The pot is imputed in dependence on eight substances and therefore cannot exist by way of its own character, nor by seeing one part can one see all its parts. Similarly, if fire existed by way of its own entity, the fallacy that it should always keep burning would arise, since it would not require fuel.
Dialecticians contradict both reasoning and common knowledge when they call awareness arising in dependence upon an individual sense organ direct perception, and assert that an awareness free from conceptuality in which a sound image and a generic image may be apprehended as merged is direct perception. Each individual moment of consciousness cannot be a direct perceiver. In the world objects like the waxing moon which are directly perceived by many people, are commonly held to be directly perceptible, whereas that which perceives these objects is not. Furthermore since they assert that sense consciousness is a direct perceiver, it is inconsistent to think that it is also a valid perceiver. An extensive explanation of this may be found in Candrakirti's commentary. it has not been included here for fear that it would be too long. )
.
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L7: [(2) Applying this reasoning to other instances]
.
\ ###
\ 302.
\ By means of this very analysis
\ Those with superior intelligence
\ Should refute individuality
\ All that is fragrant, sweet and soft.
.
(i. e. This applies to all five senses; there is no direct perception, no objective perception. )
.
(-- This same analogy procedure should be applied to the objects of the other senses: to sounds, smells, tastes and tactile objects. One will discover that none of these are truly existent directly perceptible objects.
-- By means of this very analysis using the reasoning which refutes the assertion that sense consciousness is a direct perceiver in relation to a pot, blue and so forth, existent by way of their own entity, the wise with superior intelligence refute separately in each case the contention that sense consciousnesses are direct perceivers in relation to fragrances such as the fragrance of jasmine flowers, sweet tastes and that which is soft to touch, all existent by way of their own entity. Since one cannot make distinction such as seeing one part but not seeing others, or distinctions with regard to what touches and what does not, or with regard to closeness and distant in relation to truly existent functional things, such fallacies ensue. )
.
L7: [(3) Absurdity of positing that other parts are seen because visible form existent by way of its own character is seen]
.
\ ###
\ 303.
\ If because the form is seen
\ Everything is seen,
\ Why because of what is not seen
\ Would the form not be unseen?
.
(i. e. We perceive only part of it. )
.
(-- Assertion: All parts of the pot are seen when its visual form is seen, for the pot is not a separate entity from its visual form.
-- Answer: If on the grounds that visual consciousness sees the pot's form one can posit that all parts of the pot are seen, why on the grounds that visual consciousness does not perceive the pot's smell would even the visible form, which is accepted as seen, not be unseen? If one posits that all parts are seen because one part is seen, even that which is accepted as seen cannot be posited as seen if one part is not perceived. )
.
L7: [(4) Refuting direct perception of just visible form existent by way of its own character]
.
\ ###
\ 304.
\ There is no direct perception
\ of just the form alone,
\ Because it has a close and distant
\ As well as a central part.
.
(i. e. We perceive only a part of its form. )
.
(-- A close analysis then follows which establishes that all the components that make up a composite, . . .
-- Assertion: Though the pot is not a directly perceptible object of comprehension, its visible form is established by direct perception and thus, indirectly, the pot existing by way of its own entity is also directly perceptible.
-- Answer: It follows that there is no direct perception of just the visible form alone existent by way of its own entity, because the visible form too has many parts, such as close, distant and central parts, and is thus imputed in dependence upon many parts. There is not the slightest thing existent by way of its own entity that is directly perceptible to any kind of awareness. )
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L7: [(5) Showing that the proof and what is to be proved are alike]
.
\ ###
\ 305.
\ This also applies when one examines
\ Whether particles have parts or not.
\ Thus to prove a thesis by that
\ Which must be proved is not feasible.
.
(i. e. And we cannot conclude that the form exist because we see the particles composing it because this is not proven. In fact the same argument about seeing only a part of it also applies to particles. )
.
(. . . even particles, have parts.
-- When all the parts are separated, that form is finally reduced to the smallest particles. An investigation of whether particles have parts or not applies to those particles too. If they have parts like a front and a back, they are, like the pot, imputed in dependence upon many parts, in which case they no longer are the smallest particles. If they do not have parts, they cannot exist because of being inapprehensible. Thus it is not feasible to prove that the pot exists by way of its entity as a directly perceptible object of comprehension by means of that which must be proved, for things do not exist by way of their own character. )
.
L7: [(6) Showing other lines of reasoning]
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\ ###
\ 306.
\ EVERYTHING TOO IS A COMPONENT
\ AS WELL AS BEING A COMPOSITE.
\ Thus even a spoken syllable
\ Does not have existence here.
.
(i. e. Everything is empty because everything is composed of parts, and there is no direct perception because we see
only part of any object - we assume the rest. And this applies to the parts, . . . Everything is empty of inherent existence because dependent on its parts. That is how perception works: we receive stimuli based on an endless flow of interdependence, and through habituation we imagine invariants (entities . . . ) in it in our attempt to try to control it. But all those objects, characteristics, relations, are mere hypothesis, created by our own mind and by conventions. We just forget that they are our own fabrications and think they exist by themselves independently of our own mind out there. Everything is merely imputed by the mind. )
.
(-- Thus each is simultaneously a component as well as a composite.
-- Moreover when objects apprehended by the physical sense organs are examined, all are components in relation to their composites as well as composites in relation to their components and are therefore merely imputed in dependence upon their parts. As with the analysis of the smallest particle, names, which are ultimately reduced to spoken syllables such as "a," are also just conventions in this world and do not exist by way of their own entity. Thus you must recognize all dependently arising phenomena as mere names and terms. )
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L5: [2. Individual refutations]
L6: [a. Refuting that sense organs apprehend objects existing by way of their own entity] L7: [(1) Refuting truly existent visible objects]
L8: [(a) Refuting objects]
L9: [1: Refuting our own sectarians' contentions]
L9: [a: Refutation by examining whether the color and shape constituting a visible form existing by way of its own character taken as object of apprehension
by a visual consciousness are inherently one or different]
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\ ###
\ 307.
\ If a shape is distinct from color
\ How is shape apprehended?
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\ If not distinct, why would the body
\ Not also apprehend color?
.
(i. e. Even parts like shape and color are not directly perceived, not inherently existing characteristics: We do not directly perceive objects through directly perceiving their shape and color, . . . Even (parts like) shape and colors are not inherently existing characteristics, independent of anything else, and directly perceptible as if truly existent on their own out there. Here it is proven that shape and color are not two, not one; they are interdependent, thus not existing on their own, not inherently existing. Those characteristics are also dependent on many many other factors. So we first receive stimuli (part of parts), compare them to memory, filter them through accumulated karma, and assume the rest like shape and colors, and then label the object, and then we have the illusion of perceiving the object as if it truly exist on its own. All the possible mistakes (optical illusions, color change due to other factors, miss-identification . . . ), proves that there is no objective perception of anything. )
.
(-- Assertion: The pot is directly perceptible since visual consciousness sees the pot's visible form existent by way of its own character, consisting of color and shape.
-- Answer: Are color and shape inherently one or distinct? If shape such as length and so forth is inherently distinct from color, how can a visual consciousness take shape as its object of apprehension? It follows that it cannot because shape is an entity distinct from color. Alternatively, if they are not distinct but inherently one, why does touch not apprehend color in the dark just as it apprehends shape? It follows that it should because they are one. )
.
L9: [b: Refutation through the consequence that because the elements are present, a visual consciousness taking a visible form as its object would apprehend both]
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\ ###
\ 308.
\ Only the form is visible
\ But the form's causes are not seen.
\ If indeed it is thus,
\ Why are both not also
\ Perceived by just the eyes?
.
(i. e. Even parts like the so called elementary components are not inherently existing, or directly perceived: We cannot use the assumption of the elementary components to prove that a form really exist on its own. This is circular reasoning; they are assume based on the resulting form. Those elementary components have not been proven to exist on their own. In fact it is easy to prove that they could not exist as such as done in a previous chapter. )
.
(-- An analysis of the relationship between the four elements and their outcome, visual form, is then made to demonstrate that they are neither inherently one nor different.
-- Assertion: The visible form source exists because the four great elements which are causal forms exist.
-- Answer ab: Only the resultant form is visible but the form's causes such as the earth element are not seen. Since causal form is imputed in dependence upon resultant form, they cannot be inherently different. If they are inherently one, they must be one.
-- cde: In that case why does just visual consciousness itself not apprehend both the causal and resultant forms? It follows that it should because they are one. )
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L9: [c: Showing what invalidates this contention]
.
\ ###
\ 309.
\ Earth is seen as firm and stable
\ And is apprehended by the body.
\ Only that which is tangible
\ Is referred to as earth.
.
(i. e. No possible direct visual perception of the elementary components: In fact the characteristics of those so called elementary components are based on their tactile sensation and have nothing to do with visual perception. So we cannot say we have direct perception of a form because we directly perceive those elementary components. )
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( -- Earth is seen as firm and stable and furthermore is apprehended by tactile consciousness. Thus only that which is tangible is referred to as earth. Therefore since visible forms are objects apprehended by visual consciousness and the four elements are objects apprehended by tactile consciousness, they are different. If one accepts them as truly existent, they are unrelated. It would thereby follow that visible form is causeless. )
.
L9: [2: Refuting contentions of other sectarians]
.
\ ###
\ 310.
\ Since it was produced as something visible,
\ It is of no use at all to the pot.
\ As with the production of visibility,
\ It lacks even the entity of existence.
.
(i. e. The case of the "visibility" characteristic: And "visibility" is not another directly perceptible, inherently existing elementary characteristic. This characteristic is also dependently arisen. )
.
(-- Vaisesika assertion: A pot is not visible by way of its own entity but neither is it not a visible object, since it is directly perceptible by virtue of possessing visibility, a separate generality.
-- Answer ab: This too is unacceptable. Has the pot come into existence as something visible through its own causes or not? In the first case it would follow that an association with the separate generality of visibility is of no use in making the pot directly perceptible, because it has come into existence as something visible through its own causes. For this reason the generality of visibility is not produced in relation to the pot.
-- cd: Further, a pot that has no connection with visibility and is not something visible lacks any inherently established entity of existence. Therefore the pot could not be either actually or imputedly directly perceptible as you contend. )
.
L8: [(b) Refuting that which perceives objects]
L9: [1: Refuting that the eye is by way of its own entity an instrument of looking at form]
.
\ ###
\ 311.
\ The eye, like the ear, is an outcome of
\ The elements. The eyes see while the others do not.
\ Certainly therefore the Subduer said
\ The fruition of actions is inconceivable.
.
(i. e. The Middle Way about the sense organs: There is no inherently existing sense organs either. The eye is also composed of parts, dependent on multiple factors, the fruit of evolution or accumulated karma. It is not a perfect organ capable of true objective perception, of direct perception. All of its mistakes are proof of that. As everything is samsara it is based on mistaken assumptions, illusions, ignorance and accumulated karma. The emptiness of the sense organs, and of the objects of the senses, doesn't mean that they are completely non-existent, it only means that they are dependently arisen, not independent, not existing on their own.
Emptiness doesn't deny dependent origination; one implies the other. )
.
(-- The sense and the process of perception are examined next. Confusing lack of true existence with total non- existence, the opponent argues that the Madhyamika presentation of the senses contradicts what was said by the Buddha about the eyes and so forth being the maturation of past actions. In answer it is established that although nothing can sustain ultimate analysis, since nothing is findable when subjected to this kind of investigation, our experience confirms the existence of our senses and other phenomena. Thus the Buddha's statements about the relationship between actions and their effects are in no way contradicted, since such statements refer to the conventional existence of actions and their effects.
-- Assertion: Because sense organs exist -- such as the eyes, which are instruments of perception -- directly perceptible objects such as visible exist.
-- Answer ab: Regarding the subject, the eye organ: since the eye perceives visual stimuli while other senses do not, it does not perceive visual form by way of its own entity, for like the nose sense organ it is an outcome of the elements. A demonstration of the valid reasons which invalidate the entailment is given below.
-- Objection: If the eye and so forth do not exist it contradicts explanations concerning the maturation of actions.
-- Answer: But even we do not refute that.
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Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
-- Question: Why is that not refuted?
-- Answer: We refute that things exist by way of their own entity but far from refuting the existence of all that is dependent arising, we affirm it in our own system.
-- cd: Although it cannot sustain investigation by the reasoning which analyzes suchness and though it is not established by way of its own entity, it is undeniable that the eye sees visible form and does not hear sound. Thus recognizing that the maturation of actions is inconceivable, one should accept it without applying analysis by reasoning. Certainly therefore the Subduer said that the fruition of actions is inconceivable. Sutra says:
~ The maturation of sentient beings' actions is inconceivable.
~ Thus this whole world comes into existence through causes. ) .
L9: [2: Refuting consciousness as agent]
.
\ ###
\ 312.
\ Because the conditions are incomplete
\ There is no awareness before looking,
\ While afterwards awareness is of no use.
\ The instrument is of no use in the third case.
.
(i. e. There is no truly existing consciousness: As for consciousnesses of the senses, that is also a false assumption. There could be no such thing as a truly existing consciousness of a sense. This is also another co-dependently arisen concept. Consciousness of an object is happening after having labeled the objects, after having received all the stimuli, comparing with memory patterns, assuming a lot by filtering them though accumulated karma . . . It is an illusion of something inherently existing based on accumulated karma. )
.
(-- Inquiry is then made as to whether the eye and the visual perception it induces function simultaneously or consecutively, . . . ; if motion is involved, does it occur before, during or after perception?
-- Assertion: The eye and so forth are inherently existent because one experiences consciousness, their effect.
-- Answer: A visual consciousness does not exist before looking at a form, for prior to that the conditions which produce it are incomplete. Alternatively if it exist after looking at the form, it follows that the eye consciousness is of no use in looking at the form, because looking takes place before it exists. As a third possibility one might think that that which looks and consciousness are simultaneous. It would then follow that the instrument of looking would be of no use in the production of that visual consciousness because the two would exist simultaneously and would be unrelated. )
.
L9: [3: Refuting the eye as agent]
L9: [a: Absurdity if the eye travels to look at visible form]
.
\ ###
\ 313.
\ If the eye travels, that which is
\ Distant would take long to see.
\ Why are extremely close
\ And very distant forms not clear?
.
(i. e. Refuting another old hypothesis of direct perception by the eye. Now the hypothesis is that it is the light (radiation) that travels between the object and the eyes. And it proves that we are seeing only parts of an object and assuming the rest. This also applies to our so called elementary components of matter. )
.
(. . . and whether the eye goes toward its object or not . . . If no motion is involved, all objects should be equally visible.
-- Assertion; The eye is the instrument of looking.
-- Answer: When the eye looks at a form, does it look after traveling to the object or without doing so? In the first case, if when the eye looked at a form there were motion of traveling toward the object, it should take longer to see distant objects. If the eye perceived through contact, why would the eye ointment and spatula, which are extremely close, and very distant forms not be equally clear? It follows that they would be because of being perceived through contact. )
.
L9: [b: Purposelessness if it travels to look at the form after it is seen]
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\ 314.
\ If the eye travels when the form is seen
\ Its movement is of no benefit.
\ Alternatively it is false to say
\ What it intends to view is ascertained.
.
(i. e. Refuting another old hypothesis of direct perception by the eye. )
.
( -- If the eye traveled to the form after seeing it, its movement would be of no benefit, for though it does so to view the form, that form has already been seen. Alternatively, if it approached without seeing the form which it intended to view, it would be false to say it had definitely been seen, for it approaches what is to be viewed without seeing it, like a blind man. )
.
L9: [c: Consequence that all objects would be seen if the eye by way of its own entity perceived form without traveling]
.
\ ###
\ 315.
\ If the eye perceives without traveling
\ It would see all these phenomena.
\ For that which does not travel there is
\ Neither distance not obscuration.
.
(i. e. Refuting another old hypothesis of direct perception by the eye. )
.
( -- To avoid these errors one might assert that it perceives form by way of its own entity without traveling. In that case the eye which stays here see all of these phenomena: the close, as well as the obscured and unobscured. For an eye which does not approach the object there should be no difference between close or distant, obscured or unobscured objects. )
.
L9: [4: Consequence that the eye is an instrument of looking in relation to the eye]
.
\ ###
\ 316.
\ If the nature of all things
\ First appears in themselves,
\ Why would the eye not
\ Be perceived by the eye itself?
.
(i. e. There is no true direct perceiver because the eye cannot see itself: The old theories could not explain why the eye cannot see itself - it should if there were true direct perception. )
.
(-- If the eye were an inherent instrument of perception, its function would not depend on a multitude of other factors. In that case it should also see itself. None of the factors involved in the process of perception -- neither objects, sense organs nor their related perception -- exist inherently or operate independently.
-- Just as the fragrance of the magnolia or blue lotus is first found at its source and afterwards, through contact, on a sesame seed and so forth, it is the way of all things that their nature first appears in themselves. Since it cannot relinquish its nature even in relation to itself, if it is an instrument of looking by way of its own entity, why does the eye not perceive itself? It follows that it should since the eye organ even with the eye as its object cannot give up its nature as an instrument of looking. Yet valid cognition negates that the eye perceives itself. Thus the subject, the eye, is not an instrument of looking at form by way of its own entity, because it does not look at itself. )
.
L9: [5: Refuting a combination of three factors as the instrument of looking at visible form]
.
\ ###
\ 317.
\ The eye does not have consciousness
\ And consciousness lacks that which looks.
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\ If form has neither of these,
\ How can they see form?
.
(i. e. The theory of the contact between the three: the sense organ, the object perceived, and the consciousness of a sense, doesn't make sense when looked at in details. It should not be taken as an absolute truth; it is just another skillful means. Those three could not exist independently of each other nor be the same. They are also co-dependently arisen concepts. This is explained in more details in the Karikas. )
.
(-- Assertion: The eye alone does not have the ability to view form. The form is seen in dependence upon a combination of three factors.
-- Answer: Since the eye is matter it is not conscious of the object. Consciousness is not that which looks at the object. The form, the objective condition, is neither that which looks nor consciousness. How can form be seen by way of its own entity through a combination of these three factors? It follows that it is not feasible because visible form which is none of them has no ability to see. )
.
L7: [(2) Refuting truly existent auditory objects]
L8: [(a) Refutation by examining whether sound is a maker of noise]
.
\ ###
\ 318.
\ If sound makes a noise as it travels
\ Why should it not be a speaker?
\ Yet if it travels noiselessly, how could
\ Awareness arise in relation to it?
.
(i. e. The case of sounds: There is also no direct perception of sounds; sounds are also not existing on their own, inherently existing, independently of anything else. )
.
(-- A similar investigation is then carried out in relation to sound and its perception. Does sound emit noise or travel silently?
-- Just as form cannot be looked at in terms of its own suchness, sound too cannot be listened to in this way.
.
When sound is heard, does hearing occur because it approaches as an object of that which listens or not? In the first case, if it approaches as an object of auditory consciousness, does it do so emitting sound or silently? If it travels toward auditory consciousness making a noise as it travels, why is it not a speaker, since like Devadatta it travels, emitting sounds? If this is accepted, it follows that it would not be sound. Alternatively, if it travels toward auditory consciousness noiselessly, how could awareness focusing on the sound be produced, since no sound is emitted? )
.
L8: [(b) Refutation by examining whether or not sound is apprehended through contact]
.
\ ###
\ 319.
\ If sound is apprehended through contact,
\ What apprehends the beginning of sound?
\ If sound does not come alone,
\ How can it be apprehended in isolation?
.
(i. e. The theory of the contact between the three: the sense organ, the object perceived, and the consciousness of a sense, doesn't make sense when looked at in details. It should not be taken as an absolute truth; it is just another skillful means. Those three could not exist independently of each other nor be the same. They are also co-dependently arisen concepts. This is explained in more details in the Karikas. )
.
(-- Is it apprehended through contact or not?
-- Furthermore, if sound is apprehended through contact with the ear organ, what apprehends the beginning of sound before contact occurs? It follows that there is nothing with which to apprehend it, since neither the ear organ nor any other does so. If this is accepted, it follows that it would not be sound. Sound consists of nine substances and thus since it does not come alone, how can sound in isolation be apprehends? It follows that smell and so forth which are inseparably combined with it would also not be apprehended, for according to you they must, like the sound, have
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contact with the ear organ. ) .
Aryadeva - The Treatise of the Four Hundred Stanzas on the Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas [3. 2]
L8: [(c) Showing the flaws of this contention]
.
\ ###
\ 320.
\ While sound is not heard, it is not sound.
\ It is impossible
\ For that which is not sound
\ Finally to turn into sound.
.
(i. e. There is no inherently existing sounds: it is dependent on many factors among which is the mind perceiving it, and its accumulated karma. )
.
(-- Question: What is wrong if the beginning of sound is not apprehended?
-- Answer: It would fail to be sound. Until it is heard it is not sound because, like smell, it is not the ear's object. It becomes sound when it is heard. If initially it was not sound but later became sound, it would follow that smell and so forth could do so too, but that is unacceptable with regard to permanent functional thing. Sutra says:
~ For instance, in dependence upon the strings and wood
~ And the hand's effort -- through these three together --
~ Sound is produced and issues from
~ Instruments like the vina and flute. ~.
~ When the wise investigate and think
~ From where it has come and where it has gone,
~ Searching in the main and intermediate directions,
~ They find no coming nor going of sound. ) .
L6: [b. Refuting apprehension by mental consciousness]
.
\ ###
\ 321.
\ Without the sense organs what will mind
\ Do after it has gone?
\ If it were so, why would that which lives
\ Not always be without mind?
.
(i. e.
