All
the chief nobles were concerned in it, especially Margrave Ekbert of
## p.
the chief nobles were concerned in it, especially Margrave Ekbert of
## p.
Cambridge Medieval History - v5 - Contest of Empire and the Papacy
Royal control of
appointments to bishoprics and abbeys was a reality and at the same
time a necessity; and the royal chapel, which was a natural centre for the
training of ecclesiastics, was also a stepping-stone to advancement. From
among the royal chaplains, trained under the king's eye and experienced
often in the work of his chancery, appointments were commonly made to
vacant bishoprics.
This was bound to lead sooner or later to conflict with the reformed
Papacy, though the conflict might have been delayed and would certainly
have been less fatal in result had not this control of the German king in
ecclesiastical matters been extended to Italy and to the Papacy itself. To
the crown of Germany were attached the crowns of Burgundy and Italy,
and finally the imperial crown as well. These additional dignities brought
little real advantage to the German king. In Burgundy, the royal
authority was slight and rarely asserted; it was, however, of some impor-
tance to the Emperor that his suzerainty and not that of the French king
should be recognised. In Italy, the royal domain and episcopal support
were sometimes of definite advantage, but usually the interest of the king
in his Italian kingdom prejudiced his position in Germany. And the
imperial title was a similar handicap'. It magnified the importance of his
office and gave him increased prestige, but it added enormously to his
responsibilities and prevented him from concentrating on his real interests.
The imperial title added nothing to the royal authority in Germany. In
a sense it added nothing in Italy either. The title “ rex Romanorum
was used before imperial coronation occasionally by Henry IV, frequently
>
1 B. Heusinger, op. cit. Cf, especially, p. 70, “Für das 11 Jahrhundert ergibt
sich also, dass das deutsche Königtum in stärkstem Masse, vielleicht überwiegend
auf den bischöflichen Servitien ruhte. ”
2 Cf. U. Stutz, Die Eigenkirche als Element des mittelalterlich-germanischen
Kirchenrechtes, pp. 32 sqq.
3 See, for a discussion of this question, and a consideration of opposing views on
the revival of the Empire by Otto I, G. von Below, op. cit. pp. 353-369.
## p. 125 (#171) ############################################
Henry IV's policy
125
by Henry V, and as Emperor-designate the king acted with full imperial
authority in Italy and with regard to the Pope. But the imperial crown
was the right of the German king, to his mind an essential right, and it
was by virtue of this right that he claimed the control from which
the Papacy was now beginning to free itself, with results fatal to the
monarchy in Germany.
The task that Henry IV set before himself was to undo the damage
that had been wrought during his minority and to restore imperial
authority both in Germany and Italy; he was determined to be master
as his father had been at the height of his power. In Germany, he had
first of all to build up the royal domain, to force the nobles to a direct
subordination to his will, and to break down the independence of Saxony.
In Italy, where imperial authority was practically ignored, there were the
special problems of Tuscany', the Normans, and above all the Papacy.
But, determined as he was to revive the authority over the Papacy that
his father had exercised from 1046 until his death, the question of Ger-
many had to come first, and so for a time he was willing to make
concessions. Control of the Church in Germany and Italy was so essential
to him that he could not be in sympathy with the reform policy of the
Papacy. This was now beginning to be directed not only against the
simony and secularisation that resulted from lay control but against the
lay control itself; and it was a definite feature of that policy to demand
from the higher clergy an obedience to papal authority which could not
fail to be prejudicial to the royal interests. But at present the king was
anxious to keep on good terms with the Pope; as he was obedient to his
orders on the divorce question in 1069, so in 1070 he allowed Charles,
whom he had invested as Bishop of Constance, to be deposed for simony,
and in 1072 Abbot Robert of Reichenau to suffer the same penalty? The
Papacy was given no indication of his real intentions.
His compliant attitude to the Papacy on this question was in accor-
dance with his general policy. He worked patiently for his ends, and
strove to do the task first that lay within his power, careful to separate
his adversaries and to placate one while he was overcoming the other.
Adversity always displayed him at his best. Again and again he revived
his fortunes, shewing a speedy recognition and making a wise use of the
1 The death of Duke Godfrey in 1069 removed one great obstacle from Henry's
path. His son Godfrey (Gibbosus) succeeded to the duchy of Lower Lorraine and
was already the husband of Countess Matilda. But he quarrelled with his wife and
confined his interests to his German duchy, where he remained loyal to Henry.
2 In these cases, as also in the case of Bishop Herman of Bamberg in 1075,
when his attitude to the Pope was dictated by the same motives, he protested his
own innocence of simony in the appointments. There is no evidence against him.
Probably the offenders had paid money to court-favourites, whose influence had
secured the appointinents.
CH. III.
## p. 126 (#172) ############################################
126
His character
possibilities at his disposal, dividing his enemies by concessions and by
stimulating causes of ill-feeling between them, biding his time patiently
till his opportunity came. Nor was he prevented from following out his
plan by considerations of personal humiliation. Not only at Canossa but
also in 1073 a personal humiliation was his surest road to success, and he
took it. He was not the typically direct and brutal knight of the Middle
Ages, and he was not usually successful in battle; he generally avoided a
pitched battle, in contrast to his rival Rudolf, to whom he really owed
his one great victory in the field-over the Saxons in 1075. He recog-
nised his limitations. His armies were rarely as well-equipped as those of
his opponents: they were often composed of ministeriales, royal and
episcopal, and of levies from the towns, which were not a match for the
Saxon knights; also he had more to lose than they had by staking all on
the result of a battle. In an unstatesmanlike generation he shewed many
statesmanly qualities, which was the more remarkable in that he had
received so little training in the duties of his office. His enemies, when
they comment with horror on his guile and cunning, are really testifying
to these qualities; for it was natural that they should give an evil name
to the ability which so often overcame their perfidy and disloyalty.
But, as his greatness is best seen in adversity, so in the moment of
victory were the weaknesses of his character revealed. He allowed himself
to be overcome by the arrogance of success both in 1072 and 1075.
Having decisively defeated his Saxon enemies, he made a vindictive use
of his victory, when clemency was the right policy; by his arbitrary
actions he alienated the other nobles whose assistance had ensured his
success, and they formed a coalition against him to anticipate his too
clearly revealed intentions against themselves. His victory gave him so
false a sense of security that on both occasions he chose the moment to
throw down the challenge to the Pope, entirely miscalculating both the
reality of his position in Germany and the strength of his new adversary.
He profited by his lesson later, but never again did he have the same
opportunity. He certainly shewed a clear sense of the strength of the
papal position in the years 1077–1080, and also of the means by which this
strength could be discounted. On the whole he was a good judge of the
men with whom he had to deal. It may appear short-sighted in him to
pardon so readily a man like Otto of Nordheim and to advance him to a
position of trust in 1075; but he was faced with treachery on every side
and he had to attempt to bind men to his cause by their interests. At
any rate he was successful with Otto's sons, and also even in detaching
Duke Magnus himself from the party of Rudolf. The only occasions
when he was really overwhelmed were when the treachery came from his
own sons, and there is no more moving document in this period than his
letter to King Philip of France, in which he relates the calculated perfidy
and perjury of his son Henry V. For he was naturally of an affectionate and
sympathetic disposition, a devoted father and a kind master, especially to
## p. 127 (#173) ############################################
The peculiar position of Saxony
127
the non-noble classes throughout his dominions. Even if we discount the
glowing panegyric of the author of the Vita Heinrici IV, we cannot ignore
the passionate devotion of the people of Liège, who, scorning the wrath
of all the powers of Church and kingdom, refused to dissemble their grief
or to refrain from the last tokens of respect over the body of their beloved
master. That tribute was repeated again at Spires; and, though for five
years his body was denied the rites of Christian burial, few kings have
had so genuine a mourning.
The reconciliation of Henry with his wife in 1069 marked a definite
stage in his career. From this time he devoted himself wholeheartedly
to affairs of state, and his policy at once began to take shape. The par-
ticularist tendencies of the German princes in general had to be overcome,
but the extreme form which particularism took was to be found in Saxony.
Saxony, ever since it had ceased to supply the king to Germany, had
held itself aloof and independent. In various ways was its distinctive
character marked. It held proudly to its own more primitive customs,
which it had translated into rights, and the maintenance of which had
been guaranteed to it by Conrad II and Henry III; especially was the
royal system of justice, with inquest and oath-takers, foreign to Saxon
custom', which stood as a permanent bar to unity of government. These
customary rights formed a link between the classes in Saxony, giving it
a homogeneity lacking in the other duchies. Allodial lands were more ex-
tensive here than elsewhere, and the nobles accordingly more independent.
Among them the duke took the leading place, but only in precedence.
Margraves and counts did not recognise his authority over them; on the
other hand, the ducal office was hereditary in the Billung family, and so
it was not at the free disposal of the king. Finally, beneath the nobles,
the proportion of free men was exceptionally high; they were trained to
arms, and, though they usually fought on foot, were formidable soldiers
in an age when cavalry was regarded as the decisive arm. It was a bold
policy for a young king to attempt, at the beginning of his reign, to
grasp the Saxon nettle. It was essential that he should obtain assistance
from the other duchies, and this he might expect. The Saxons looked
with contempt on the other German peoples, who in their turn were
jealous of the Saxons and irritated by their aloofness. The ill-feeling
between the two was always a factor on which he could count.
But the determination of Henry IV to attack the problem of Saxony
had a further and more immediate cause. The effects of his minority had
not merely been to give the opportunity to particularism, here as else-
where. It had been disastrous also to the royal domain, that essential
basis of royal power, which had suffered from neglect or deliberate
squandering at the hands of the unscrupulous archbishops who had con-
trolled the government for their own advantage. The first task of the
· K. Hampe, Deutsche Kaisergeschichte im Zeitalter der Salier und Staufen, p. 40.
CH. III.
## p. 128 (#174) ############################################
128
The importance of the royal domain in Saxony
young king was to concentrate on the domain, to fill up gaps and make
compact areas where possible, to take effective measures to recover services
that had been lost, and finally to protect it against further usurpation.
It was natural that his attention should first be directed to eastern Saxony
and Thuringia, where lay by far the richest portion of the domain', and
which afforded the best opportunity for creating a compact royal territory.
It was here, moreover, that the domain had suffered most; it had not
only been wasted by grants, but also services had been withheld, minis-
teriales had usurped their freedom', and probably neighbouring lords had
made encroachments. One of Henry's first measures was the building of
castles on an extensive scale in this region, designed primarily for the
recovery and maintenance of the domain and the services attached to it,
and having at the same time the strategic advantage of being situated so
as to divide the duchy and in case of revolt to prevent a coalition of
Saxon princes. This was a menace to the independent spirit of the Saxons,
and he irritated them still more by appointing royal ministeriales from
South Germanyó as officials in the domain-lands and as garrisons in the
castles. There were clearly grievances on both sides, which only made the
subsequent contest the more bitter. The Saxons had infringed royal
rights by neglect and usurpation. The South German ministeriales in
their turn shewed little respect for Saxon customs, and acted in an op-
pressive manner in making requisitions and forcing labour. And probably
the Saxons were right in their suspicion that the king would take every
1 This is evident from the Indiculus curiarum ad mensam regis Romanorum perti-
nentium (best text in Neu. Arch. Vol. xli, pp. 572–4). A comprehensive survey of
this has been made by B. Heusinger, Servitium regis (Archiv für Urkundenforschung,
Vol. viii, pp. 26–159). M. Stimming, Das deutsche Königsgut, pp. 86 sqq. , has elabo-
rated the central importance of the domain on Henry's policy in Saxony and on the
subsequent Saxon revolt. J. Haller, Das Verzeichnis der Tafelgüter des römischen
Königs (Neu. Arch. Vol. xlv, pp. 48–81), rejects the accepted date (1065) of the Indi-
culus and dates it 1185. His arguments seem to me to be untenable, and to raise
more difficulties than they solve. I am convinced that it was drawn up at any rate
for one of the last two Salian kings, and that it is a rough draft prepared at a time
when an imperial coronation was anticipated. Anyhow, the statement in the text
is not really affected by the date of the Indiculus.
? Lampert of Hersfeld, sub 1066, ed. Holder-Egger, SGUS, p.
100.
3 Bruno, c. 16, ed. Wattenbach, SGUS, p. 11. Cf. Stimming, op. cit. p. 93.
4 Cf. Stimming (op. cit. pp. 98 sqq. ), who supports the view that the policy was
originated by Archbishop Adalbert of Bremen. He also points out the contiguity
of the chief leaders of the Saxon revolt, bishops as well as lay nobles, to the royal
domain.
• The Saxons especially complained of the low-born “Swabians” employed by
the king on official and garrison duty in their duchy. The term Swabian in their
mouth seems to be a generic term for the rest of Germany (or, at any rate, for
Franconia and Swabia), just as in southern Europe we find Alemannia used for
Germany (ef. Gregorii VII Reg. 11, 15), a use which has been continued to the
present day in France. There cannot have been many royal ministeriales in the
duchy of Swabia.
## p. 129 (#175) ############################################
ما
The revolt of Duke Otto of Bavaria
129
opportunity of increasing the royal domain at their expense, and that he
was anxious to suppress their customary rights which stood in the way of
the centralising policy of the monarchy.
It is significant in this connexion, firstly, that the two nobles men-
tioned as Anno's colleagues in his coups d'état at Kaiserswerth in 1062
and at Tribur in 1066 were Otto of Nordheim and Ekbert of Brunswick,
whose allodial territories were adjacent to the main portion of the royal
domain and were so extensive as to make them, next to the duke, the
most powerful nobles in Saxony. Otto was already Duke of Bavaria, and
in 1067 Ekbert was appointed Margrave of Meissen; on his death in
1068 his son Ekbert II succeeded to the margravate as well as to Bruns-
wick. Similarly adjacent, and equally concerned in the great revolt of
1073, were Anno's two relatives, Archbishop Werner of Magdeburg and
Bishop Burchard of Halberstadt. In the second place, the actual outbreak
of civil war, which was to be henceforth almost continuous, had its origin
in the downfall of Duke Otto in 1070. Probably Henry rather seized
than created the opportunity. Otto's military skill had been of consider-
able assistance to him on more than one occasion, and there is no actual
evidence either to justify the charge of treachery brought against Otto
or to convict Henry of a deliberate intention to ruin the duke. A diet
at Mayence left the decision to the test of battle between Otto and his
low-born accuser. Otto refused to submit to the indignity of such a
contest, and was accordingly condemned in his absence by a diet of Saxon
nobles at Goslar and deprived of his possessions in Saxony. His duchy
was forfeited and, at the special instance of Duke Rudolf of Swabia, was
given by Henry to Welf, the first of the new line of that name? The
fall of Otto was not viewed with alarm in Upper Germany; the replace-
ment of a Saxon by a Swabian noble was rather a cause for congratulation.
The ill-feeling of the rest of Germany towards Saxony was very pronounced,
and only identity of interest against the king could lead to common
action.
In Saxony, however, where Otto immediately took refuge, he obtained
the powerful support of Magnus, son and heir of Duke Ordulf. This
brought the king into direct conflict with the Billung family. The rebels
were not able to resist for long-revolt was not yet organised—and they
had to submit unconditionally to the king in 1071. Otto, after a year's
detention, was released, and was allowed to retain his hereditary
possessions in Saxony; Magnus was kept in close confinement at the
castle of Harzburg. In this can be seen the influence of Archbishop
1 As he was of Saxon origin, his case, in accordance with constitutional practice,
had to be decided by Saxons.
2 The male line had died out with Welf III, whose sister Cuniza (Cunegunda)
had married Marquess Azzo of Este. Their son Welf IV, who had become Duke of
Bavaria, had acquired his uncle's estates in Germany, which lay in Swabia and on
the borders of Bavaria.
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. III.
9
## p. 130 (#176) ############################################
130
Henry's victory. His over-confidence
Adalbert, who in the last year of his life entered into public affairs again
to revenge himself for the humiliations he had suffered from the Billungs
in 1066. He brought about a meeting with King Svein of Denmark, and
a regular coalition was concerted against the Billungs. The king's
interests were all in the same direction. Magnus, by his marriage with
the sister of Géza, cousin and rival of Henry's brother-in-law Salomo, had
allied himself with the anti-imperial party in Hungary. Moreover, when
Duke Ordulf died in 1072, Magnus was recognised as duke throughout
Saxony. Henry did not deny Magnus' right of succession, but it was the
more necessary to him to retain so important a hostage. The king's
policy in Saxony could now be definitely advanced in both directions.
The building of the castles was continued and extended, and the king
took possession of Lüneburg, the chief town of the Billungs, and placed
in its castle a garrison of seventy men under Count Eberhard of Nellen-
burg
The victory had been an easy one: too easy, because it deluded him
as to the strength of the forces he had to counteract. Saxony was
thoroughly alarmed, and in the mood for a more serious revolt than the
previous one; with Magnus in his hands, Henry perhaps discounted this
danger. But the other German princes were alarmed too. Henry had
shewn his hand too plainly, and it was a fatal misjudgment that led him
to rely on their further concurrence against the Saxons. To him, however,
it seemed that he had recovered his position in Germany, and that the
necessity to humour the Pope no longer existed. It can hardly be due to
chance that at this very time he threw down a deliberate challenge to the
Pope, to whose injunctions he had previously so meekly submitted, over
the archbishopric of Milan. Just before his death, at the Lenten synod of
1073, Alexander II replied by excommunicating the counsellors of the
king. Henry did not refrain from communion with them, and so, when
Alexander died and Gregory VII became Pope, there was a breach
between the German king and the Roman Church.
In spite of his commitments in Saxony and Italy, Henry chose the
occasion for an emphatic assertion of imperial majesty in another quarter.
In 1071 the Dukes of Poland and Bohemia had been summoned to appear
before the king at Meissen, and had received the royal command to keep
the peace. This was significant of the recovery that Henry had already
effected, and, when the Duke of Poland disobeyed the injunction in 1073,
it was necessary to take immediate measures to punish him. The king
accordingly summoned an expedition against Poland to assemble on
22 August, and came to Goslar himself, probably to ensure obedience to
the summons. The expedition was not destined to take place. Under
cover of the assembling of troops for the Polish campaign, a formidable
conspiracy was organised in eastern Saxony. The bishops, led by Werner
of Magdeburg and Burchard of Halberstadt, played a leading part.
All
the chief nobles were concerned in it, especially Margrave Ekbert of
## p. 131 (#177) ############################################
The Saxon revolt of 1073
131
Meissen and the Margraves of the North and East Marks. Count Otto of
Nordheim was soon induced to join. Count Herman, uncle of Magnus
and so the acting-head of the Billung family, needed no inducement.
Moreover, the Thuringians, equally affected by the building of the
castles, with customary rights of their own to defend, and having a
private grievance arising out of the claims of the Archbishop of Mayence
to the payment of tithes', soon threw in their lot with the Saxons. Their
plans were concerted to anticipate the date for the expedition, and so to
take Henry by surprise before the troops from the rest of Germany were
assembled.
The plot was successful. Taken completely by surprise, the king sought
refuge in his castle at Harzburg, but the sudden appearance of a large
Saxon army made his further stay there impossible. On the night of
9-10 August he made his escape with a few followers, and after four days
of hardship and peril arrived at the monastery of Hersfeld. Count
Herman had recaptured Lüneburg and taken captive the royal
garrison; to effect their release the king on 15 August had to consent to
the surrender of Magnus; the castles were now closely besieged, and his
hold on Saxony was lost. But the day appointed for the Polish expedition
(22 August) was close at hand. The army was assembling, and he
determined to use it against the Saxons. He summoned the princes to
meet him at the village of Kappel near Hersfeld, to obtain their consent
to this change of plan. And now the fundamental insecurity of his
position was to be revealed to him. The princes debated, and finally
decided to postpone the expedition to October. They were determined to
make it clear that on their will was the king dependent, and the royal
authority suffered a blow more serious than defeat in battle. Henry had
to submit, and he retired to the Rhine district, conscious that the
initiative had passed from his hands. There he came to a wise decision.
Germany must for the time engage his whole attention; the challenge to
the Papacy must be postponed to a more favourable opportunity. He
wrote, accordingly, to the Pope a humble letter acknowledging his faults
and asking for absolution. The Pope, as anxious as Henry for peace,
welcomed this apparent repentance, and the breach was healed. This left
the king free to concentrate on Germany. Enlightened at last as to the
true state of affairs, he shewed remarkable judgment in appreciating the
factors that could be turned to his advantage, and great patience and skill
in so making use of them that he was able gradually to build up again
the shaken edifice of royal power.
He had, first of all, to endure further humiliation. The princes met
in October for the deferred expedition, but having obtained the upper
hand they were determined to maintain it; in place of an expedition they
1 A synod at Erfurt at the beginning of 1073 had just decided this question in
the archbishop's favour.
CH, III.
942
## p. 132 (#178) ############################################
132
Henry's humiliation. Help from the towns
instituted negotiations on their own account with the Saxons. Henry had
no choice but to acquiesce; he was sovereign in name only. But at this
crisis he found assistance in a new quarter. Coming to Worms, whose
bishop, Adalbert, was his constant foe for more than thirty years, he
met with an enthusiastic reception from the citizens, who expelled their
bishop on news of the king's approach. In return he granted them, on
18 January 1074, the first charter given directly to the citizens of a
town', and in the preamble he expressed his gratitude for the loyalty which
set so striking an example amid the disloyalty of all the magnates of the
kingdom. The action of Worms was contagious, and from this time he
was able to rely on the support of the Rhine towns, whatever the attitude
of the bishops. The serious rising of the trading classes at Cologne in
1074, on the occasion of the Easter fair, against Archbishop Anno, was
probably inspired by the example of Worms? The towns indeed had
everything to gain from royal favour. A strong central authority, able to
enforce peace and order throughout the kingdom, was a necessity if trade
was to flourish and expand, and from the king alone could the privileges
dear to the trading classes be obtained.
The king's circumstances were immediately improved, and he was
able, in spite of the aloofness of the leading nobles, to raise an army and
march north again; he was accompanied by a number of bishops, who in
view of the independent action of the towns found it to their interest to
render material support to the king once more. But he was not yet
strong enough to meet the Saxons in the field, and was forced to come to
terms with them, which were confirmed in an assembly at Gerstungen on
2 February 1074. The castles built by both sides during his reign were
to be destroyed, a general amnesty was to be proclaimed, and the Saxons
returned to his allegiance on condition that in matters concerning their
duchy the king should be advised by Saxons only. He had to pardon the
rebels, but the peace was a sign of recovered authority. The South
German dukes had no part in it, and did not readily forgive the Saxons 3
for thus depriving them of their control of the king's actions. Henry by
this peace divided his enemies in Germany.
The peace had an immediate result in the changed attitude of the
dukes, who were reconciled with Henry just after Easter, at the same
time that he made his formal reconciliation with the Pope. In the mean-
time, an outrage had occurred which he was able to turn to his own
advantage. In accordance with the peace terms at Gerstungen, the forti-
fications of Harzburg had been destroyed; but the church and other
ecclesiastical buildings remained intact. The local peasantry, indignant
1 See supra, pp. 119–120.
2 Lampert of Hersfeld, ed. Holder-Egger, SGUS, p. 187. In this case, as with
Adalbert at Worms, the loyalty of Anno was certainly suspect. It was his friends
and relatives who were primarily responsible for the Saxon revolt.
3 Bruno, cc. 31 and 44, ed. Wattenbach, SGUS, pp. 20, 29.
## p. 133 (#179) ############################################
Henry's victory on the Unstrut, 1075
133
that a stone of this obnoxious place should be left standing, took the law
into their own hands and violently demolished the sacred buildings, even
in their passion going so far as to scatter to the winds the bones of Henry's
son and brother who had died there in infancy. The Saxon nobles
protested that the crime was the work of a few ignorant peasants (though
indeed they took no steps to punish them), but Henry was determined to
fasten the guilt of it on the whole people, and proclaimed far and wide
that the Saxons had broken the peace. He was able to use this argument
with effect upon the South German princes, who were already irritated
against the Saxons on their own account. Before the year was out he had
succeeded in obtaining their agreement to an expedition against the
Saxons in the following spring.
Hungary had, meanwhile, occupied Henry's attention. The rivalry
between King Salomo, Henry's brother-in-law, and his cousin Géza had
resulted eventually in the success of Géza. Salomo with his wife took
refuge in Germany, placed his kingdom under Henry's overlordship, and
appealed to him for help. Henry led an expedition into Hungary in the
autumn, but without success, and imperial authority was not recovered.
The Pope tried to avail himself of the opportunity, giving his support to
Géza and declaring Salomo's deposition a judgment of God upon him for
handing over to the Empire a kingdom which was subject to St Peter.
But Géza, though he had sought papal aid while his position was still
insecure, was determined to be free of Pope and Emperor alike and to
break every link which bound Hungary to the West; and in the following
year he had himself crowned king with a crown which he received from
the Eastern Emperor, Michael VII.
The opening months of 1075 were occupied with preparations for the
reduction of Saxony. The Saxons in alarm endeavoured to appease the
king; they further claimed to be judged by a diet of all the nobles, and
appealed to the South German princes, trying to establish direct negotia-
tions with them as in 1073. Their efforts were wholly unavailing: the
king was determined to be revenged, the nobles could not forgive the
peace made without their concurrence. Henry issued his summons to the
host, which assembled at Bredingen on 8 June; never again was he to be
at the head of so powerful and representative an army. The Dukes of
Swabia, Bavaria, Carinthia, Upper and Lower Lorraine, and Bohemia
were all present with strong contingents, and all the other leading nobles,
lay and spiritual'. On 9 June, the day after the army had assembled, the
king by a forced march surprised the Saxons encamped by the river
Unstrut. Duke Rudolf, claiming the Swabian privilege of fighting in the
van of the royal host, led the charge, supported by Duke Welf with the
Bavarians. It was a battle of knights, and, when the superior numbers
of the king's army had finally decided the issue, the Saxon foot-soldiers
Except of course Archbishop Anno, who pleaded age and infirmity. He died
the following December.
CH, III.
## p. 134 (#180) ############################################
134
His challenge to the Pope
suffered severely. The losses indeed were heavy on both sides, but the
king won a decisive victory and advanced to the invasion of Saxony. Lack
of provisions caused him to disband his troops in July, and another ex-
pedition was arranged for October. On 22 October the army assembled
at Gerstungen, but this time the Dukes of Swabia, Bavaria, and Carinthia
were absent, on the insufficient plea of their losses in June. The king,
however, was strong enough without them, and was probably not sorry
to be independent of them. The Saxons had lost their cohesion; the
common soldiers in particular felt that they had been selfishly sacri-
ficed on the Unstrut. The nobles, therefore, made an unconditional
surrender, throwing themselves on the king's mercy. Contrary to expecta-
tion, but in accordance with his fixed determination, he treated them
with great severity: all the leaders, both laymen and ecclesiastics, were
imprisoned in different parts of Germany, entrusted to the custody of
South German nobles. Much of their territory was confiscated and given
to his supporters or added to the royal domain, and the building of the
castles was taken in hand once more. When the king disbanded his army
in November, he seemed to have won a complete triumph.
The situation was remarkably similar to that in 1072. The Saxon
rebels had been forced to an unconditional surrender and their leaders
were in captivity. Now, as then, the situation at Milan gave the oppor-
tunity to the king, at what seemed a particularly favourable moment, to
re-assert imperial authority in Italy by a direct challenge to the Pope.
The defeat of the Pataria and the election of Tedald by the suffragan
bishops of Milan had occurred earlier in the year, but Henry was then
perhaps contemplating imperial coronation, and even the victory on the
Unstrut had not achieved the submission of Saxony. When this was
certain, he invested Tedald with the archbishopric and sent the embassy
to Italy which was, probably designedly, responsible for the rupture with
the Pope. Once more his position in Germany seemed strong enough to
justify the recovery of the authority that had been lost in Italy. And
the moment seemed to be well-chosen, because he could count on the
enthusiastic support of the episcopate in Germany and in North Italy in
any venture against Gregory VII. But he had grievously miscalculated
the strength of the spiritual power and the greatness of his opponent,
and once more he had misunderstood, or foolishly disregarded, the real
feelings of the German princes. The absence of the three dukes from the
final campaign against the Saxons was ominous, and was certainly not
sufficiently accounted for by their plea of the losses they had suffered in
the June campaign. As before, it was the completeness of the royal
victory, and the arbitrary use that Henry made of it, that caused them to
stand aloof. Though their absence was at the time satisfactory to him,
he ought to have realised its import and that they too needed to be
mastered before he could take in hand the new task of Italy and the
Papacy.
## p. 135 (#181) ############################################
Henry's excommunication and its results
135
The king spent Christmas 1075 at Goslar, and the nobles there
present took an oath to accept his son Conrad, born in February 1074,
as his successor. Some measure of leniency was shewn in allowing the
exiled Saxon bishops to return to their sees pending trial, but of the
lay princes Count Otto of Nordheim alone received the king's clemency,
and he was even advanced to high office and power in his native land.
The king was still at Goslar at the beginning of January 1076 when the
papal embassy arrived with the verbal message threatening excommuni-
cation if the king refused obedience. This was as unexpected as it was
distasteful to the royal dignity. In an uncontrolled passion, which was
unusual with him, he summoned the Council of Worms that pronounced
Gregory's deposition, and dispatched to Piacenza and then to Rome the
messenger to the Lenten synod. Before the papal sentence at the synod
reached the king, the murder of Duke Godfrey of Lower Lorraine in
February had deprived him of one of his staunchest adherents, and of a
strong support of the Empire on its western frontier, where Robert the
Frisian, successful in Flanders, whose intrigues probably brought about
the murder of Godfrey, was a constant menace. Still confident in his own
position, Henry bestowed the duchy on his infant son Conrad, and
Godfrey's nephew and heir, Godfrey of Bouillon, had to be content with
the Mark of Antwerp.
Then at Easter came the news of the Lenten synod and its decrees,
and both the strength of the spiritual power and the weakness of his own
position were speedily revealed to the king. The excommunication had
an immediate effect in alienating from him his lay subjects. The German
bishops, too, who had welcomed the deposition of the Pope, trembled
before the papal sentence and again hastily abandoned the cause of the
king. Accordingly his summons to diets at Worms and Mayence were
practically disregarded, and he was rapidly becoming isolated. His weak-
ness was the Saxon opportunity. The Saxon leaders were able to effect
their escape from captivity, or were deliberately released by the nobles to
whose custody they had been entrusted. Bishop Burchard took the lead
in a new revolt, and, Otto of Nordheim turning traitor once more, the
whole of East Saxony was in arms. Henry's one faithful ally, Duke
Vratislav of Bohemia, was driven from Meissen by Margrave Ekbert. The
victory of 1075 had been completely undone. And, finally, the dukes of
Upper Germany saw their opportunity and took it. Acting in unison
they had been able to make their intervention effective whether against
the king or against the Saxons. Satisfied with the Saxon defeat in June
1075, they had abstained from the further expedition in October, but the
king's ability to bring the Saxons to submission without their aid, and
his high-handed treatment of them when he had obtained the mastery,
must have already determined them to throw their weight into the
balance against him. The excommunication and its results gave them the
decisive voice in the government of the kingdom. Meeting at Ulm, they
CH, III.
## p. 136 (#182) ############################################
136
The Diet of Tribur
decided on a diet at Tribur, where the future of the kingdom was to be
debated and the royal authority made subservient to particularist interests.
To this diet the Saxon nobles were invited, and the grievances of 1074
were forgotten.
The diet met at Tribur on 16 October 1076. The Saxons came in
force, and the papal legates were present, to give spiritual sanction to the
triumph of the nobles. The king, to whom this assembly was in the highest
degree dangerous, arrived at Oppenheim on the other side of the Rhine
with an army. But his chief supporters deserted him to obtain absolution
from the papal legates, and he was abandoned to the tender mercies of
the diet. The Saxons advocated his deposition and the appointment of
a new king. For this revolutionary step the other princes were not yet
prepared. The choice of a successor would raise difficulties and jealousies
that might dissolve the harmony, and such an action would compromise
the high moral pose which they had adopted in their attitude against
Henry. The deliberations of the diet were complicated too by the ill-
feeling, with difficulty restrained, which still persisted between Saxons and
South Germans. But in one respect they were all of one mind: the king
must be humiliated, and the government of Germany must be subject to
the dictation of the princes. Towards the victory over the king, the papal
sentence first, the papal legates later, had largely contributed. The
nobles were anxious to retain the valuable papal support, and to represent
themselves as fighting for the cause of right against a wicked king. The
Papacy, therefore, must be given an important share in the fruits of
victory. So, first of all, the king was forced to publish his repentance and
his promise of obedience and amendment for the future—to do justice in
both the papal and the feudal sense. The diet then proceeded to make
two important decisions. Firstly, recognising the validity of the papal
sentence, they decreed that Henry would lose his kingdom if he failed to
obtain absolution within a year and a day of his excommunication
(22 February); secondly, recognising the papal claim to a principal share
in the final judgment, they invited the Pope to a council at Augsburg on
2 February 1077, where under his presidency the future of the kingdom
was to be decided.
This shews the lengths to which the nobles were prepared to
go
for
their own selfish interests to satisfy papal claims which in different
circumstances they were fully prepared to repudiate. It also shews that
the Pope held the key to the whole situation, a fact which he and Henry
alike were swift to recognise. If it promised the immediate realisation of
the Pope's highest ideals, it at the same time revealed to the king the
avenue of escape from his dangerous position. The conjunction of his
enemies in Germany meant the final ruin of his power; if he could obtain
absolution from the Pope in Italy, he not only removed opposition from
1 The regular period of grace, the period too within which a vacant office had to
be filled up. This treatment of the royal office by the nobles is significant.
## p. 137 (#183) ############################################
Canossa
137
that quarter for a time but also deprived the German nobles of their most
effective weapon against him. With this aim in view he made his escape
and his memorable journey over the Mont Cenis pass, finally arriving
in January 1077 outside the fortress of Canossa. Here by his humiliation
and outward penitence he was able to force the Pope to grant him absolu-
tion, and the purpose of his journey was achieved. Though the importance
of the royal humiliation has been grossly exaggerated, it is equally absurd
to proclaim the absolution at Canossa as a striking victory for the king.
He had been forced to accept the justice of the papal excommunication,
and consequently the right of the Pope to sit in judgment upon him) and
by this acceptance the relations of the two powers had been fundamentally
altered. The absolution was in a sense a recognition of the king's defeat;
on the other hand, it limited the extent of the defeat and prevented a
far worse calamity.
Yet, as far as Henry's enemies in Germany were concerned, it was a
real victory for the king, and they were staggered at the news. The
absolution of Henry they regarded as a betrayal of their cause, and they
expressed their indignation as strongly as they dared. They could not,
indeed, risk alienating the Pope, whose alliance was so necessary to them;
but they were not impressed by his optimistic view that the decision to
hold the council in Germany still held good. They did what they could,
however, to nullify the effect of the absolution. The story soon became
current among them that the absolution had been granted on certain
conditions which Henry immediately broke, so that it became void and
the king returned to his state of excommunication? The papal legates,
though not the Pope, gave encouragement to this view.
Their more immediate need, however, was to complete what had been
begun at Tribur, and, with papal co-operation if possible, to prevent the
restoration of Henry's authority in Germany and so to counteract the
disastrous effects of Canossa. A preliminary meeting at Ulm, in issuing
summons to a diet at Forchheim in Franconia, where the last of the
German Carolingians (Louis the Child) and the first of his successors
(Conrad I) had been elected, shewed that the Saxon proposals had been
1 Bruno, c. 90, SGUS, pp. 66-7, states this very definitely, and it confuses not only
his narrative but also his chronology. As the excommunication of 1076, according
to his view, prevailed throughout, he makes no mention of that of 1080, and places
together in 1076 the documents of both dates. Neither his editor in SGUS,
W. Wattenbach, nor K. Heidrich, who in Neu. Arch. Vol. xxx investigated the dating
of the numerous documents in Bruno, noted that this essential misunderstanding,
whether wilful or ignorant, of the facts of Canossa is responsible for his muddled
chronology. A complete revision of Bruno's chronology from this point of view is
badly needed. I should like to call attention to the possibility that Henry's letter
to the Romans (in Bruno, c. 66, and nowhere else) was written in 1080 and not in
1076. I cannot go into the whole question here, but two points may be mentioned :
(1) any manifesto (as that in c. 73) dealing with 1080 would have been dated by
him to 1076; (2) there is no evidence that Henry appealed to the Romans in 1076,
though he did so regularly in 1080 and following years.
CH. III.
## p. 138 (#184) ############################################
138
The election of Rudolf as anti-king
accepted. The diet met on 13 March and, in the presence and with the
approval of two papal legates, Duke Rudolf of Swabia, with all the
customary formalities of procedure, was designated and elected king.
This was a reactionary and indeed a revolutionary step, recalling the
anarchy of the later Carolingians. The electoral right of the nobles,
when it was not a mere formality, had been strictly limited in practice.
Ever since the Saxon kings had restored the monarchy, the hereditary
principle had been dominant; when there was no son to succeed, the king
had been chosen from a collateral branch of the royal family. Now the
electors usurped a plenary power—the power to depose the established
king and to exercise complete freedom of choice as to his successor.
Behind this lay the theory that the relation of king and nobles was one
of contract, and that an unlawful exercise of his power justified the breach
of their oath of fealty. The bishops at Worms in 1076 had taken this
line with regard to the Pope. It was a natural development of feudal
ideas, which were not, however, to prevail in the Church as they did in
the kingdom. There were other points of novelty in this election. In the
first place, the formal right of election, which was the prerogative of all
the princes, was here assumed by a small minority. This minority included,
indeed, the Archbishop of Mayence, whose right to the prima vox was
uncontested', numerous Saxon nobles, and the three South German dukes;
perhaps these latter, in anticipation of fourteenth-century conditions,
regarded themselves as adequate to represent their duchies. Secondly,
the presence of the papal legates was a recognition of the Pope's claim
to a share in the election. And, finally, the electors emphasised the con-
tractual nature of the royal office, and ensured the maintenance of their
own control, by imposing conditions on the king of their choice: Rudolf
had to renounce the hereditary right of his son and royal control of
episcopal elections, while he also made a promise of obedience to the
Pope. But the German princes at Forchheim got no advantage from
their triumphant particularism; the revolt gained no additional supporter
from the fact that its leader styled himself king. On the contrary, their
attempt to ride roughshod over tradition and legitimacy put Henry in
a strong position; the bishops (except in Saxony), the lesser nobility,
the peasantry, and above all the towns, preferred a single ruler, however
absolute, to a government dominated by the selfish interests of the princes.
All the more, then, had Rudolf and his party to depend on the
support of the Church. The Pope certainly recognised the electoral
rights of the princes, and accepted the election of Rudolf as a lawful
election. He did not, however, recognise their power to depose Henry;
this he regarded as a matter for his own decision, and in the meanwhile
spoke continually of two kings. Yet his legates had been quite decided
1 Cf. Wipo's account of the election of Conrad II (c. 2, SGUS, p. 14), and the
statement of Frederick Barbarossa (Otto et Rahewin, Gesta Friderici imperatoris, Bk.
III, c.
appointments to bishoprics and abbeys was a reality and at the same
time a necessity; and the royal chapel, which was a natural centre for the
training of ecclesiastics, was also a stepping-stone to advancement. From
among the royal chaplains, trained under the king's eye and experienced
often in the work of his chancery, appointments were commonly made to
vacant bishoprics.
This was bound to lead sooner or later to conflict with the reformed
Papacy, though the conflict might have been delayed and would certainly
have been less fatal in result had not this control of the German king in
ecclesiastical matters been extended to Italy and to the Papacy itself. To
the crown of Germany were attached the crowns of Burgundy and Italy,
and finally the imperial crown as well. These additional dignities brought
little real advantage to the German king. In Burgundy, the royal
authority was slight and rarely asserted; it was, however, of some impor-
tance to the Emperor that his suzerainty and not that of the French king
should be recognised. In Italy, the royal domain and episcopal support
were sometimes of definite advantage, but usually the interest of the king
in his Italian kingdom prejudiced his position in Germany. And the
imperial title was a similar handicap'. It magnified the importance of his
office and gave him increased prestige, but it added enormously to his
responsibilities and prevented him from concentrating on his real interests.
The imperial title added nothing to the royal authority in Germany. In
a sense it added nothing in Italy either. The title “ rex Romanorum
was used before imperial coronation occasionally by Henry IV, frequently
>
1 B. Heusinger, op. cit. Cf, especially, p. 70, “Für das 11 Jahrhundert ergibt
sich also, dass das deutsche Königtum in stärkstem Masse, vielleicht überwiegend
auf den bischöflichen Servitien ruhte. ”
2 Cf. U. Stutz, Die Eigenkirche als Element des mittelalterlich-germanischen
Kirchenrechtes, pp. 32 sqq.
3 See, for a discussion of this question, and a consideration of opposing views on
the revival of the Empire by Otto I, G. von Below, op. cit. pp. 353-369.
## p. 125 (#171) ############################################
Henry IV's policy
125
by Henry V, and as Emperor-designate the king acted with full imperial
authority in Italy and with regard to the Pope. But the imperial crown
was the right of the German king, to his mind an essential right, and it
was by virtue of this right that he claimed the control from which
the Papacy was now beginning to free itself, with results fatal to the
monarchy in Germany.
The task that Henry IV set before himself was to undo the damage
that had been wrought during his minority and to restore imperial
authority both in Germany and Italy; he was determined to be master
as his father had been at the height of his power. In Germany, he had
first of all to build up the royal domain, to force the nobles to a direct
subordination to his will, and to break down the independence of Saxony.
In Italy, where imperial authority was practically ignored, there were the
special problems of Tuscany', the Normans, and above all the Papacy.
But, determined as he was to revive the authority over the Papacy that
his father had exercised from 1046 until his death, the question of Ger-
many had to come first, and so for a time he was willing to make
concessions. Control of the Church in Germany and Italy was so essential
to him that he could not be in sympathy with the reform policy of the
Papacy. This was now beginning to be directed not only against the
simony and secularisation that resulted from lay control but against the
lay control itself; and it was a definite feature of that policy to demand
from the higher clergy an obedience to papal authority which could not
fail to be prejudicial to the royal interests. But at present the king was
anxious to keep on good terms with the Pope; as he was obedient to his
orders on the divorce question in 1069, so in 1070 he allowed Charles,
whom he had invested as Bishop of Constance, to be deposed for simony,
and in 1072 Abbot Robert of Reichenau to suffer the same penalty? The
Papacy was given no indication of his real intentions.
His compliant attitude to the Papacy on this question was in accor-
dance with his general policy. He worked patiently for his ends, and
strove to do the task first that lay within his power, careful to separate
his adversaries and to placate one while he was overcoming the other.
Adversity always displayed him at his best. Again and again he revived
his fortunes, shewing a speedy recognition and making a wise use of the
1 The death of Duke Godfrey in 1069 removed one great obstacle from Henry's
path. His son Godfrey (Gibbosus) succeeded to the duchy of Lower Lorraine and
was already the husband of Countess Matilda. But he quarrelled with his wife and
confined his interests to his German duchy, where he remained loyal to Henry.
2 In these cases, as also in the case of Bishop Herman of Bamberg in 1075,
when his attitude to the Pope was dictated by the same motives, he protested his
own innocence of simony in the appointments. There is no evidence against him.
Probably the offenders had paid money to court-favourites, whose influence had
secured the appointinents.
CH. III.
## p. 126 (#172) ############################################
126
His character
possibilities at his disposal, dividing his enemies by concessions and by
stimulating causes of ill-feeling between them, biding his time patiently
till his opportunity came. Nor was he prevented from following out his
plan by considerations of personal humiliation. Not only at Canossa but
also in 1073 a personal humiliation was his surest road to success, and he
took it. He was not the typically direct and brutal knight of the Middle
Ages, and he was not usually successful in battle; he generally avoided a
pitched battle, in contrast to his rival Rudolf, to whom he really owed
his one great victory in the field-over the Saxons in 1075. He recog-
nised his limitations. His armies were rarely as well-equipped as those of
his opponents: they were often composed of ministeriales, royal and
episcopal, and of levies from the towns, which were not a match for the
Saxon knights; also he had more to lose than they had by staking all on
the result of a battle. In an unstatesmanlike generation he shewed many
statesmanly qualities, which was the more remarkable in that he had
received so little training in the duties of his office. His enemies, when
they comment with horror on his guile and cunning, are really testifying
to these qualities; for it was natural that they should give an evil name
to the ability which so often overcame their perfidy and disloyalty.
But, as his greatness is best seen in adversity, so in the moment of
victory were the weaknesses of his character revealed. He allowed himself
to be overcome by the arrogance of success both in 1072 and 1075.
Having decisively defeated his Saxon enemies, he made a vindictive use
of his victory, when clemency was the right policy; by his arbitrary
actions he alienated the other nobles whose assistance had ensured his
success, and they formed a coalition against him to anticipate his too
clearly revealed intentions against themselves. His victory gave him so
false a sense of security that on both occasions he chose the moment to
throw down the challenge to the Pope, entirely miscalculating both the
reality of his position in Germany and the strength of his new adversary.
He profited by his lesson later, but never again did he have the same
opportunity. He certainly shewed a clear sense of the strength of the
papal position in the years 1077–1080, and also of the means by which this
strength could be discounted. On the whole he was a good judge of the
men with whom he had to deal. It may appear short-sighted in him to
pardon so readily a man like Otto of Nordheim and to advance him to a
position of trust in 1075; but he was faced with treachery on every side
and he had to attempt to bind men to his cause by their interests. At
any rate he was successful with Otto's sons, and also even in detaching
Duke Magnus himself from the party of Rudolf. The only occasions
when he was really overwhelmed were when the treachery came from his
own sons, and there is no more moving document in this period than his
letter to King Philip of France, in which he relates the calculated perfidy
and perjury of his son Henry V. For he was naturally of an affectionate and
sympathetic disposition, a devoted father and a kind master, especially to
## p. 127 (#173) ############################################
The peculiar position of Saxony
127
the non-noble classes throughout his dominions. Even if we discount the
glowing panegyric of the author of the Vita Heinrici IV, we cannot ignore
the passionate devotion of the people of Liège, who, scorning the wrath
of all the powers of Church and kingdom, refused to dissemble their grief
or to refrain from the last tokens of respect over the body of their beloved
master. That tribute was repeated again at Spires; and, though for five
years his body was denied the rites of Christian burial, few kings have
had so genuine a mourning.
The reconciliation of Henry with his wife in 1069 marked a definite
stage in his career. From this time he devoted himself wholeheartedly
to affairs of state, and his policy at once began to take shape. The par-
ticularist tendencies of the German princes in general had to be overcome,
but the extreme form which particularism took was to be found in Saxony.
Saxony, ever since it had ceased to supply the king to Germany, had
held itself aloof and independent. In various ways was its distinctive
character marked. It held proudly to its own more primitive customs,
which it had translated into rights, and the maintenance of which had
been guaranteed to it by Conrad II and Henry III; especially was the
royal system of justice, with inquest and oath-takers, foreign to Saxon
custom', which stood as a permanent bar to unity of government. These
customary rights formed a link between the classes in Saxony, giving it
a homogeneity lacking in the other duchies. Allodial lands were more ex-
tensive here than elsewhere, and the nobles accordingly more independent.
Among them the duke took the leading place, but only in precedence.
Margraves and counts did not recognise his authority over them; on the
other hand, the ducal office was hereditary in the Billung family, and so
it was not at the free disposal of the king. Finally, beneath the nobles,
the proportion of free men was exceptionally high; they were trained to
arms, and, though they usually fought on foot, were formidable soldiers
in an age when cavalry was regarded as the decisive arm. It was a bold
policy for a young king to attempt, at the beginning of his reign, to
grasp the Saxon nettle. It was essential that he should obtain assistance
from the other duchies, and this he might expect. The Saxons looked
with contempt on the other German peoples, who in their turn were
jealous of the Saxons and irritated by their aloofness. The ill-feeling
between the two was always a factor on which he could count.
But the determination of Henry IV to attack the problem of Saxony
had a further and more immediate cause. The effects of his minority had
not merely been to give the opportunity to particularism, here as else-
where. It had been disastrous also to the royal domain, that essential
basis of royal power, which had suffered from neglect or deliberate
squandering at the hands of the unscrupulous archbishops who had con-
trolled the government for their own advantage. The first task of the
· K. Hampe, Deutsche Kaisergeschichte im Zeitalter der Salier und Staufen, p. 40.
CH. III.
## p. 128 (#174) ############################################
128
The importance of the royal domain in Saxony
young king was to concentrate on the domain, to fill up gaps and make
compact areas where possible, to take effective measures to recover services
that had been lost, and finally to protect it against further usurpation.
It was natural that his attention should first be directed to eastern Saxony
and Thuringia, where lay by far the richest portion of the domain', and
which afforded the best opportunity for creating a compact royal territory.
It was here, moreover, that the domain had suffered most; it had not
only been wasted by grants, but also services had been withheld, minis-
teriales had usurped their freedom', and probably neighbouring lords had
made encroachments. One of Henry's first measures was the building of
castles on an extensive scale in this region, designed primarily for the
recovery and maintenance of the domain and the services attached to it,
and having at the same time the strategic advantage of being situated so
as to divide the duchy and in case of revolt to prevent a coalition of
Saxon princes. This was a menace to the independent spirit of the Saxons,
and he irritated them still more by appointing royal ministeriales from
South Germanyó as officials in the domain-lands and as garrisons in the
castles. There were clearly grievances on both sides, which only made the
subsequent contest the more bitter. The Saxons had infringed royal
rights by neglect and usurpation. The South German ministeriales in
their turn shewed little respect for Saxon customs, and acted in an op-
pressive manner in making requisitions and forcing labour. And probably
the Saxons were right in their suspicion that the king would take every
1 This is evident from the Indiculus curiarum ad mensam regis Romanorum perti-
nentium (best text in Neu. Arch. Vol. xli, pp. 572–4). A comprehensive survey of
this has been made by B. Heusinger, Servitium regis (Archiv für Urkundenforschung,
Vol. viii, pp. 26–159). M. Stimming, Das deutsche Königsgut, pp. 86 sqq. , has elabo-
rated the central importance of the domain on Henry's policy in Saxony and on the
subsequent Saxon revolt. J. Haller, Das Verzeichnis der Tafelgüter des römischen
Königs (Neu. Arch. Vol. xlv, pp. 48–81), rejects the accepted date (1065) of the Indi-
culus and dates it 1185. His arguments seem to me to be untenable, and to raise
more difficulties than they solve. I am convinced that it was drawn up at any rate
for one of the last two Salian kings, and that it is a rough draft prepared at a time
when an imperial coronation was anticipated. Anyhow, the statement in the text
is not really affected by the date of the Indiculus.
? Lampert of Hersfeld, sub 1066, ed. Holder-Egger, SGUS, p.
100.
3 Bruno, c. 16, ed. Wattenbach, SGUS, p. 11. Cf. Stimming, op. cit. p. 93.
4 Cf. Stimming (op. cit. pp. 98 sqq. ), who supports the view that the policy was
originated by Archbishop Adalbert of Bremen. He also points out the contiguity
of the chief leaders of the Saxon revolt, bishops as well as lay nobles, to the royal
domain.
• The Saxons especially complained of the low-born “Swabians” employed by
the king on official and garrison duty in their duchy. The term Swabian in their
mouth seems to be a generic term for the rest of Germany (or, at any rate, for
Franconia and Swabia), just as in southern Europe we find Alemannia used for
Germany (ef. Gregorii VII Reg. 11, 15), a use which has been continued to the
present day in France. There cannot have been many royal ministeriales in the
duchy of Swabia.
## p. 129 (#175) ############################################
ما
The revolt of Duke Otto of Bavaria
129
opportunity of increasing the royal domain at their expense, and that he
was anxious to suppress their customary rights which stood in the way of
the centralising policy of the monarchy.
It is significant in this connexion, firstly, that the two nobles men-
tioned as Anno's colleagues in his coups d'état at Kaiserswerth in 1062
and at Tribur in 1066 were Otto of Nordheim and Ekbert of Brunswick,
whose allodial territories were adjacent to the main portion of the royal
domain and were so extensive as to make them, next to the duke, the
most powerful nobles in Saxony. Otto was already Duke of Bavaria, and
in 1067 Ekbert was appointed Margrave of Meissen; on his death in
1068 his son Ekbert II succeeded to the margravate as well as to Bruns-
wick. Similarly adjacent, and equally concerned in the great revolt of
1073, were Anno's two relatives, Archbishop Werner of Magdeburg and
Bishop Burchard of Halberstadt. In the second place, the actual outbreak
of civil war, which was to be henceforth almost continuous, had its origin
in the downfall of Duke Otto in 1070. Probably Henry rather seized
than created the opportunity. Otto's military skill had been of consider-
able assistance to him on more than one occasion, and there is no actual
evidence either to justify the charge of treachery brought against Otto
or to convict Henry of a deliberate intention to ruin the duke. A diet
at Mayence left the decision to the test of battle between Otto and his
low-born accuser. Otto refused to submit to the indignity of such a
contest, and was accordingly condemned in his absence by a diet of Saxon
nobles at Goslar and deprived of his possessions in Saxony. His duchy
was forfeited and, at the special instance of Duke Rudolf of Swabia, was
given by Henry to Welf, the first of the new line of that name? The
fall of Otto was not viewed with alarm in Upper Germany; the replace-
ment of a Saxon by a Swabian noble was rather a cause for congratulation.
The ill-feeling of the rest of Germany towards Saxony was very pronounced,
and only identity of interest against the king could lead to common
action.
In Saxony, however, where Otto immediately took refuge, he obtained
the powerful support of Magnus, son and heir of Duke Ordulf. This
brought the king into direct conflict with the Billung family. The rebels
were not able to resist for long-revolt was not yet organised—and they
had to submit unconditionally to the king in 1071. Otto, after a year's
detention, was released, and was allowed to retain his hereditary
possessions in Saxony; Magnus was kept in close confinement at the
castle of Harzburg. In this can be seen the influence of Archbishop
1 As he was of Saxon origin, his case, in accordance with constitutional practice,
had to be decided by Saxons.
2 The male line had died out with Welf III, whose sister Cuniza (Cunegunda)
had married Marquess Azzo of Este. Their son Welf IV, who had become Duke of
Bavaria, had acquired his uncle's estates in Germany, which lay in Swabia and on
the borders of Bavaria.
C. MED. H. VOL. V. CH. III.
9
## p. 130 (#176) ############################################
130
Henry's victory. His over-confidence
Adalbert, who in the last year of his life entered into public affairs again
to revenge himself for the humiliations he had suffered from the Billungs
in 1066. He brought about a meeting with King Svein of Denmark, and
a regular coalition was concerted against the Billungs. The king's
interests were all in the same direction. Magnus, by his marriage with
the sister of Géza, cousin and rival of Henry's brother-in-law Salomo, had
allied himself with the anti-imperial party in Hungary. Moreover, when
Duke Ordulf died in 1072, Magnus was recognised as duke throughout
Saxony. Henry did not deny Magnus' right of succession, but it was the
more necessary to him to retain so important a hostage. The king's
policy in Saxony could now be definitely advanced in both directions.
The building of the castles was continued and extended, and the king
took possession of Lüneburg, the chief town of the Billungs, and placed
in its castle a garrison of seventy men under Count Eberhard of Nellen-
burg
The victory had been an easy one: too easy, because it deluded him
as to the strength of the forces he had to counteract. Saxony was
thoroughly alarmed, and in the mood for a more serious revolt than the
previous one; with Magnus in his hands, Henry perhaps discounted this
danger. But the other German princes were alarmed too. Henry had
shewn his hand too plainly, and it was a fatal misjudgment that led him
to rely on their further concurrence against the Saxons. To him, however,
it seemed that he had recovered his position in Germany, and that the
necessity to humour the Pope no longer existed. It can hardly be due to
chance that at this very time he threw down a deliberate challenge to the
Pope, to whose injunctions he had previously so meekly submitted, over
the archbishopric of Milan. Just before his death, at the Lenten synod of
1073, Alexander II replied by excommunicating the counsellors of the
king. Henry did not refrain from communion with them, and so, when
Alexander died and Gregory VII became Pope, there was a breach
between the German king and the Roman Church.
In spite of his commitments in Saxony and Italy, Henry chose the
occasion for an emphatic assertion of imperial majesty in another quarter.
In 1071 the Dukes of Poland and Bohemia had been summoned to appear
before the king at Meissen, and had received the royal command to keep
the peace. This was significant of the recovery that Henry had already
effected, and, when the Duke of Poland disobeyed the injunction in 1073,
it was necessary to take immediate measures to punish him. The king
accordingly summoned an expedition against Poland to assemble on
22 August, and came to Goslar himself, probably to ensure obedience to
the summons. The expedition was not destined to take place. Under
cover of the assembling of troops for the Polish campaign, a formidable
conspiracy was organised in eastern Saxony. The bishops, led by Werner
of Magdeburg and Burchard of Halberstadt, played a leading part.
All
the chief nobles were concerned in it, especially Margrave Ekbert of
## p. 131 (#177) ############################################
The Saxon revolt of 1073
131
Meissen and the Margraves of the North and East Marks. Count Otto of
Nordheim was soon induced to join. Count Herman, uncle of Magnus
and so the acting-head of the Billung family, needed no inducement.
Moreover, the Thuringians, equally affected by the building of the
castles, with customary rights of their own to defend, and having a
private grievance arising out of the claims of the Archbishop of Mayence
to the payment of tithes', soon threw in their lot with the Saxons. Their
plans were concerted to anticipate the date for the expedition, and so to
take Henry by surprise before the troops from the rest of Germany were
assembled.
The plot was successful. Taken completely by surprise, the king sought
refuge in his castle at Harzburg, but the sudden appearance of a large
Saxon army made his further stay there impossible. On the night of
9-10 August he made his escape with a few followers, and after four days
of hardship and peril arrived at the monastery of Hersfeld. Count
Herman had recaptured Lüneburg and taken captive the royal
garrison; to effect their release the king on 15 August had to consent to
the surrender of Magnus; the castles were now closely besieged, and his
hold on Saxony was lost. But the day appointed for the Polish expedition
(22 August) was close at hand. The army was assembling, and he
determined to use it against the Saxons. He summoned the princes to
meet him at the village of Kappel near Hersfeld, to obtain their consent
to this change of plan. And now the fundamental insecurity of his
position was to be revealed to him. The princes debated, and finally
decided to postpone the expedition to October. They were determined to
make it clear that on their will was the king dependent, and the royal
authority suffered a blow more serious than defeat in battle. Henry had
to submit, and he retired to the Rhine district, conscious that the
initiative had passed from his hands. There he came to a wise decision.
Germany must for the time engage his whole attention; the challenge to
the Papacy must be postponed to a more favourable opportunity. He
wrote, accordingly, to the Pope a humble letter acknowledging his faults
and asking for absolution. The Pope, as anxious as Henry for peace,
welcomed this apparent repentance, and the breach was healed. This left
the king free to concentrate on Germany. Enlightened at last as to the
true state of affairs, he shewed remarkable judgment in appreciating the
factors that could be turned to his advantage, and great patience and skill
in so making use of them that he was able gradually to build up again
the shaken edifice of royal power.
He had, first of all, to endure further humiliation. The princes met
in October for the deferred expedition, but having obtained the upper
hand they were determined to maintain it; in place of an expedition they
1 A synod at Erfurt at the beginning of 1073 had just decided this question in
the archbishop's favour.
CH, III.
942
## p. 132 (#178) ############################################
132
Henry's humiliation. Help from the towns
instituted negotiations on their own account with the Saxons. Henry had
no choice but to acquiesce; he was sovereign in name only. But at this
crisis he found assistance in a new quarter. Coming to Worms, whose
bishop, Adalbert, was his constant foe for more than thirty years, he
met with an enthusiastic reception from the citizens, who expelled their
bishop on news of the king's approach. In return he granted them, on
18 January 1074, the first charter given directly to the citizens of a
town', and in the preamble he expressed his gratitude for the loyalty which
set so striking an example amid the disloyalty of all the magnates of the
kingdom. The action of Worms was contagious, and from this time he
was able to rely on the support of the Rhine towns, whatever the attitude
of the bishops. The serious rising of the trading classes at Cologne in
1074, on the occasion of the Easter fair, against Archbishop Anno, was
probably inspired by the example of Worms? The towns indeed had
everything to gain from royal favour. A strong central authority, able to
enforce peace and order throughout the kingdom, was a necessity if trade
was to flourish and expand, and from the king alone could the privileges
dear to the trading classes be obtained.
The king's circumstances were immediately improved, and he was
able, in spite of the aloofness of the leading nobles, to raise an army and
march north again; he was accompanied by a number of bishops, who in
view of the independent action of the towns found it to their interest to
render material support to the king once more. But he was not yet
strong enough to meet the Saxons in the field, and was forced to come to
terms with them, which were confirmed in an assembly at Gerstungen on
2 February 1074. The castles built by both sides during his reign were
to be destroyed, a general amnesty was to be proclaimed, and the Saxons
returned to his allegiance on condition that in matters concerning their
duchy the king should be advised by Saxons only. He had to pardon the
rebels, but the peace was a sign of recovered authority. The South
German dukes had no part in it, and did not readily forgive the Saxons 3
for thus depriving them of their control of the king's actions. Henry by
this peace divided his enemies in Germany.
The peace had an immediate result in the changed attitude of the
dukes, who were reconciled with Henry just after Easter, at the same
time that he made his formal reconciliation with the Pope. In the mean-
time, an outrage had occurred which he was able to turn to his own
advantage. In accordance with the peace terms at Gerstungen, the forti-
fications of Harzburg had been destroyed; but the church and other
ecclesiastical buildings remained intact. The local peasantry, indignant
1 See supra, pp. 119–120.
2 Lampert of Hersfeld, ed. Holder-Egger, SGUS, p. 187. In this case, as with
Adalbert at Worms, the loyalty of Anno was certainly suspect. It was his friends
and relatives who were primarily responsible for the Saxon revolt.
3 Bruno, cc. 31 and 44, ed. Wattenbach, SGUS, pp. 20, 29.
## p. 133 (#179) ############################################
Henry's victory on the Unstrut, 1075
133
that a stone of this obnoxious place should be left standing, took the law
into their own hands and violently demolished the sacred buildings, even
in their passion going so far as to scatter to the winds the bones of Henry's
son and brother who had died there in infancy. The Saxon nobles
protested that the crime was the work of a few ignorant peasants (though
indeed they took no steps to punish them), but Henry was determined to
fasten the guilt of it on the whole people, and proclaimed far and wide
that the Saxons had broken the peace. He was able to use this argument
with effect upon the South German princes, who were already irritated
against the Saxons on their own account. Before the year was out he had
succeeded in obtaining their agreement to an expedition against the
Saxons in the following spring.
Hungary had, meanwhile, occupied Henry's attention. The rivalry
between King Salomo, Henry's brother-in-law, and his cousin Géza had
resulted eventually in the success of Géza. Salomo with his wife took
refuge in Germany, placed his kingdom under Henry's overlordship, and
appealed to him for help. Henry led an expedition into Hungary in the
autumn, but without success, and imperial authority was not recovered.
The Pope tried to avail himself of the opportunity, giving his support to
Géza and declaring Salomo's deposition a judgment of God upon him for
handing over to the Empire a kingdom which was subject to St Peter.
But Géza, though he had sought papal aid while his position was still
insecure, was determined to be free of Pope and Emperor alike and to
break every link which bound Hungary to the West; and in the following
year he had himself crowned king with a crown which he received from
the Eastern Emperor, Michael VII.
The opening months of 1075 were occupied with preparations for the
reduction of Saxony. The Saxons in alarm endeavoured to appease the
king; they further claimed to be judged by a diet of all the nobles, and
appealed to the South German princes, trying to establish direct negotia-
tions with them as in 1073. Their efforts were wholly unavailing: the
king was determined to be revenged, the nobles could not forgive the
peace made without their concurrence. Henry issued his summons to the
host, which assembled at Bredingen on 8 June; never again was he to be
at the head of so powerful and representative an army. The Dukes of
Swabia, Bavaria, Carinthia, Upper and Lower Lorraine, and Bohemia
were all present with strong contingents, and all the other leading nobles,
lay and spiritual'. On 9 June, the day after the army had assembled, the
king by a forced march surprised the Saxons encamped by the river
Unstrut. Duke Rudolf, claiming the Swabian privilege of fighting in the
van of the royal host, led the charge, supported by Duke Welf with the
Bavarians. It was a battle of knights, and, when the superior numbers
of the king's army had finally decided the issue, the Saxon foot-soldiers
Except of course Archbishop Anno, who pleaded age and infirmity. He died
the following December.
CH, III.
## p. 134 (#180) ############################################
134
His challenge to the Pope
suffered severely. The losses indeed were heavy on both sides, but the
king won a decisive victory and advanced to the invasion of Saxony. Lack
of provisions caused him to disband his troops in July, and another ex-
pedition was arranged for October. On 22 October the army assembled
at Gerstungen, but this time the Dukes of Swabia, Bavaria, and Carinthia
were absent, on the insufficient plea of their losses in June. The king,
however, was strong enough without them, and was probably not sorry
to be independent of them. The Saxons had lost their cohesion; the
common soldiers in particular felt that they had been selfishly sacri-
ficed on the Unstrut. The nobles, therefore, made an unconditional
surrender, throwing themselves on the king's mercy. Contrary to expecta-
tion, but in accordance with his fixed determination, he treated them
with great severity: all the leaders, both laymen and ecclesiastics, were
imprisoned in different parts of Germany, entrusted to the custody of
South German nobles. Much of their territory was confiscated and given
to his supporters or added to the royal domain, and the building of the
castles was taken in hand once more. When the king disbanded his army
in November, he seemed to have won a complete triumph.
The situation was remarkably similar to that in 1072. The Saxon
rebels had been forced to an unconditional surrender and their leaders
were in captivity. Now, as then, the situation at Milan gave the oppor-
tunity to the king, at what seemed a particularly favourable moment, to
re-assert imperial authority in Italy by a direct challenge to the Pope.
The defeat of the Pataria and the election of Tedald by the suffragan
bishops of Milan had occurred earlier in the year, but Henry was then
perhaps contemplating imperial coronation, and even the victory on the
Unstrut had not achieved the submission of Saxony. When this was
certain, he invested Tedald with the archbishopric and sent the embassy
to Italy which was, probably designedly, responsible for the rupture with
the Pope. Once more his position in Germany seemed strong enough to
justify the recovery of the authority that had been lost in Italy. And
the moment seemed to be well-chosen, because he could count on the
enthusiastic support of the episcopate in Germany and in North Italy in
any venture against Gregory VII. But he had grievously miscalculated
the strength of the spiritual power and the greatness of his opponent,
and once more he had misunderstood, or foolishly disregarded, the real
feelings of the German princes. The absence of the three dukes from the
final campaign against the Saxons was ominous, and was certainly not
sufficiently accounted for by their plea of the losses they had suffered in
the June campaign. As before, it was the completeness of the royal
victory, and the arbitrary use that Henry made of it, that caused them to
stand aloof. Though their absence was at the time satisfactory to him,
he ought to have realised its import and that they too needed to be
mastered before he could take in hand the new task of Italy and the
Papacy.
## p. 135 (#181) ############################################
Henry's excommunication and its results
135
The king spent Christmas 1075 at Goslar, and the nobles there
present took an oath to accept his son Conrad, born in February 1074,
as his successor. Some measure of leniency was shewn in allowing the
exiled Saxon bishops to return to their sees pending trial, but of the
lay princes Count Otto of Nordheim alone received the king's clemency,
and he was even advanced to high office and power in his native land.
The king was still at Goslar at the beginning of January 1076 when the
papal embassy arrived with the verbal message threatening excommuni-
cation if the king refused obedience. This was as unexpected as it was
distasteful to the royal dignity. In an uncontrolled passion, which was
unusual with him, he summoned the Council of Worms that pronounced
Gregory's deposition, and dispatched to Piacenza and then to Rome the
messenger to the Lenten synod. Before the papal sentence at the synod
reached the king, the murder of Duke Godfrey of Lower Lorraine in
February had deprived him of one of his staunchest adherents, and of a
strong support of the Empire on its western frontier, where Robert the
Frisian, successful in Flanders, whose intrigues probably brought about
the murder of Godfrey, was a constant menace. Still confident in his own
position, Henry bestowed the duchy on his infant son Conrad, and
Godfrey's nephew and heir, Godfrey of Bouillon, had to be content with
the Mark of Antwerp.
Then at Easter came the news of the Lenten synod and its decrees,
and both the strength of the spiritual power and the weakness of his own
position were speedily revealed to the king. The excommunication had
an immediate effect in alienating from him his lay subjects. The German
bishops, too, who had welcomed the deposition of the Pope, trembled
before the papal sentence and again hastily abandoned the cause of the
king. Accordingly his summons to diets at Worms and Mayence were
practically disregarded, and he was rapidly becoming isolated. His weak-
ness was the Saxon opportunity. The Saxon leaders were able to effect
their escape from captivity, or were deliberately released by the nobles to
whose custody they had been entrusted. Bishop Burchard took the lead
in a new revolt, and, Otto of Nordheim turning traitor once more, the
whole of East Saxony was in arms. Henry's one faithful ally, Duke
Vratislav of Bohemia, was driven from Meissen by Margrave Ekbert. The
victory of 1075 had been completely undone. And, finally, the dukes of
Upper Germany saw their opportunity and took it. Acting in unison
they had been able to make their intervention effective whether against
the king or against the Saxons. Satisfied with the Saxon defeat in June
1075, they had abstained from the further expedition in October, but the
king's ability to bring the Saxons to submission without their aid, and
his high-handed treatment of them when he had obtained the mastery,
must have already determined them to throw their weight into the
balance against him. The excommunication and its results gave them the
decisive voice in the government of the kingdom. Meeting at Ulm, they
CH, III.
## p. 136 (#182) ############################################
136
The Diet of Tribur
decided on a diet at Tribur, where the future of the kingdom was to be
debated and the royal authority made subservient to particularist interests.
To this diet the Saxon nobles were invited, and the grievances of 1074
were forgotten.
The diet met at Tribur on 16 October 1076. The Saxons came in
force, and the papal legates were present, to give spiritual sanction to the
triumph of the nobles. The king, to whom this assembly was in the highest
degree dangerous, arrived at Oppenheim on the other side of the Rhine
with an army. But his chief supporters deserted him to obtain absolution
from the papal legates, and he was abandoned to the tender mercies of
the diet. The Saxons advocated his deposition and the appointment of
a new king. For this revolutionary step the other princes were not yet
prepared. The choice of a successor would raise difficulties and jealousies
that might dissolve the harmony, and such an action would compromise
the high moral pose which they had adopted in their attitude against
Henry. The deliberations of the diet were complicated too by the ill-
feeling, with difficulty restrained, which still persisted between Saxons and
South Germans. But in one respect they were all of one mind: the king
must be humiliated, and the government of Germany must be subject to
the dictation of the princes. Towards the victory over the king, the papal
sentence first, the papal legates later, had largely contributed. The
nobles were anxious to retain the valuable papal support, and to represent
themselves as fighting for the cause of right against a wicked king. The
Papacy, therefore, must be given an important share in the fruits of
victory. So, first of all, the king was forced to publish his repentance and
his promise of obedience and amendment for the future—to do justice in
both the papal and the feudal sense. The diet then proceeded to make
two important decisions. Firstly, recognising the validity of the papal
sentence, they decreed that Henry would lose his kingdom if he failed to
obtain absolution within a year and a day of his excommunication
(22 February); secondly, recognising the papal claim to a principal share
in the final judgment, they invited the Pope to a council at Augsburg on
2 February 1077, where under his presidency the future of the kingdom
was to be decided.
This shews the lengths to which the nobles were prepared to
go
for
their own selfish interests to satisfy papal claims which in different
circumstances they were fully prepared to repudiate. It also shews that
the Pope held the key to the whole situation, a fact which he and Henry
alike were swift to recognise. If it promised the immediate realisation of
the Pope's highest ideals, it at the same time revealed to the king the
avenue of escape from his dangerous position. The conjunction of his
enemies in Germany meant the final ruin of his power; if he could obtain
absolution from the Pope in Italy, he not only removed opposition from
1 The regular period of grace, the period too within which a vacant office had to
be filled up. This treatment of the royal office by the nobles is significant.
## p. 137 (#183) ############################################
Canossa
137
that quarter for a time but also deprived the German nobles of their most
effective weapon against him. With this aim in view he made his escape
and his memorable journey over the Mont Cenis pass, finally arriving
in January 1077 outside the fortress of Canossa. Here by his humiliation
and outward penitence he was able to force the Pope to grant him absolu-
tion, and the purpose of his journey was achieved. Though the importance
of the royal humiliation has been grossly exaggerated, it is equally absurd
to proclaim the absolution at Canossa as a striking victory for the king.
He had been forced to accept the justice of the papal excommunication,
and consequently the right of the Pope to sit in judgment upon him) and
by this acceptance the relations of the two powers had been fundamentally
altered. The absolution was in a sense a recognition of the king's defeat;
on the other hand, it limited the extent of the defeat and prevented a
far worse calamity.
Yet, as far as Henry's enemies in Germany were concerned, it was a
real victory for the king, and they were staggered at the news. The
absolution of Henry they regarded as a betrayal of their cause, and they
expressed their indignation as strongly as they dared. They could not,
indeed, risk alienating the Pope, whose alliance was so necessary to them;
but they were not impressed by his optimistic view that the decision to
hold the council in Germany still held good. They did what they could,
however, to nullify the effect of the absolution. The story soon became
current among them that the absolution had been granted on certain
conditions which Henry immediately broke, so that it became void and
the king returned to his state of excommunication? The papal legates,
though not the Pope, gave encouragement to this view.
Their more immediate need, however, was to complete what had been
begun at Tribur, and, with papal co-operation if possible, to prevent the
restoration of Henry's authority in Germany and so to counteract the
disastrous effects of Canossa. A preliminary meeting at Ulm, in issuing
summons to a diet at Forchheim in Franconia, where the last of the
German Carolingians (Louis the Child) and the first of his successors
(Conrad I) had been elected, shewed that the Saxon proposals had been
1 Bruno, c. 90, SGUS, pp. 66-7, states this very definitely, and it confuses not only
his narrative but also his chronology. As the excommunication of 1076, according
to his view, prevailed throughout, he makes no mention of that of 1080, and places
together in 1076 the documents of both dates. Neither his editor in SGUS,
W. Wattenbach, nor K. Heidrich, who in Neu. Arch. Vol. xxx investigated the dating
of the numerous documents in Bruno, noted that this essential misunderstanding,
whether wilful or ignorant, of the facts of Canossa is responsible for his muddled
chronology. A complete revision of Bruno's chronology from this point of view is
badly needed. I should like to call attention to the possibility that Henry's letter
to the Romans (in Bruno, c. 66, and nowhere else) was written in 1080 and not in
1076. I cannot go into the whole question here, but two points may be mentioned :
(1) any manifesto (as that in c. 73) dealing with 1080 would have been dated by
him to 1076; (2) there is no evidence that Henry appealed to the Romans in 1076,
though he did so regularly in 1080 and following years.
CH. III.
## p. 138 (#184) ############################################
138
The election of Rudolf as anti-king
accepted. The diet met on 13 March and, in the presence and with the
approval of two papal legates, Duke Rudolf of Swabia, with all the
customary formalities of procedure, was designated and elected king.
This was a reactionary and indeed a revolutionary step, recalling the
anarchy of the later Carolingians. The electoral right of the nobles,
when it was not a mere formality, had been strictly limited in practice.
Ever since the Saxon kings had restored the monarchy, the hereditary
principle had been dominant; when there was no son to succeed, the king
had been chosen from a collateral branch of the royal family. Now the
electors usurped a plenary power—the power to depose the established
king and to exercise complete freedom of choice as to his successor.
Behind this lay the theory that the relation of king and nobles was one
of contract, and that an unlawful exercise of his power justified the breach
of their oath of fealty. The bishops at Worms in 1076 had taken this
line with regard to the Pope. It was a natural development of feudal
ideas, which were not, however, to prevail in the Church as they did in
the kingdom. There were other points of novelty in this election. In the
first place, the formal right of election, which was the prerogative of all
the princes, was here assumed by a small minority. This minority included,
indeed, the Archbishop of Mayence, whose right to the prima vox was
uncontested', numerous Saxon nobles, and the three South German dukes;
perhaps these latter, in anticipation of fourteenth-century conditions,
regarded themselves as adequate to represent their duchies. Secondly,
the presence of the papal legates was a recognition of the Pope's claim
to a share in the election. And, finally, the electors emphasised the con-
tractual nature of the royal office, and ensured the maintenance of their
own control, by imposing conditions on the king of their choice: Rudolf
had to renounce the hereditary right of his son and royal control of
episcopal elections, while he also made a promise of obedience to the
Pope. But the German princes at Forchheim got no advantage from
their triumphant particularism; the revolt gained no additional supporter
from the fact that its leader styled himself king. On the contrary, their
attempt to ride roughshod over tradition and legitimacy put Henry in
a strong position; the bishops (except in Saxony), the lesser nobility,
the peasantry, and above all the towns, preferred a single ruler, however
absolute, to a government dominated by the selfish interests of the princes.
All the more, then, had Rudolf and his party to depend on the
support of the Church. The Pope certainly recognised the electoral
rights of the princes, and accepted the election of Rudolf as a lawful
election. He did not, however, recognise their power to depose Henry;
this he regarded as a matter for his own decision, and in the meanwhile
spoke continually of two kings. Yet his legates had been quite decided
1 Cf. Wipo's account of the election of Conrad II (c. 2, SGUS, p. 14), and the
statement of Frederick Barbarossa (Otto et Rahewin, Gesta Friderici imperatoris, Bk.
III, c.
