You also show that this applies equally to both
corporeal
and incorporeal substances, since the former have their being through their capacity to be, in the same way that the latter, through their capacity to be, have their being: all of which you have demonstrated by other strong arguments to those who ponder them deeply and fully grasp them.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
?
?
?
.
Togetbacktothepoint,awomanisbutmatter.
Ifyoudo not know what a woman is because you do not know what matter is, study the Peripatetics a little; they will teach you what a woman is by teaching you about matter.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I see that, with that Peripatetic brain of yours, you have learnt little or nothing from what Teofilo said yesterday about the essence and potency of matter.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Be that as it may. I hold to the point that one must con- demn the appetite of both woman and matter, which is the cause of all evil, all affliction, defect, ruin and corruption. Do you not think that, if matter were satisfied with its present form, no alteration or affliction would hold sway over us, we would not die, we would be incorruptible and eternal?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Andwhatwouldyousayifitweresatisfiedwiththeformit had fifty years ago? Would you be Poliinnio? If it had remained what it was forty years ago, would you be so adulterous (I mean, adult), so perfect and so learned? Thus, just as you are pleased that your other forms have given way to the current one, so it is nature's will, which orders the universe, that all forms yield to all others. Not to mention that it is much more dignified for that substance, which is our substance, to become everything by receiv- ing all forms, than to remain fragmentary by holding onto only one. In that way, it shares a likeness with that which is all, in all.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It seems to be you are shedding your natural habits and beginning to be learned. Apply yourself, if you can, a simili [by similitude], to showing the dignity to be found in woman.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ThatIwilldoeasily. ButhereisTeofilo.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . And Dicsono. Another time, then. De iis hactenus [Let us stop there].
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Have we not seen that the Peripatetics, like the Platonists, divide substance by the specific difference of corporeal and incorporeal? Just as these specific differences are reduced to the potency of a single 14 Refers to the same woman, Marie de Castelnau, ne? e Bochetel.
? ? ?
Fourth dialogue
? genus, so the forms must be of two kinds: some are transcendent, that is, higher than genus, and are called principles, such as 'entity', 'unity', 'one', 'thing', 'something', and their like; other forms belong to a given insofar as it is distinct from another genus, such as 'substantiality' and 'accidentality'. The forms of the first sort do not distinguish matter or make of matter here one thing, there another, but, as absolutely universal terms embracing cor- poreal as well as incorporeal substances, they signify the absolutely uni- versal, absolutely common and undivided matter of both. Moreover, as Avicebron has said, 'Just as we identify the matter of the substantial form (matter which is part of the composite), before we identify the matter of the accidental forms (that is, the composite), what prevents us, before recognizing the matter that is contracted under corporeal forms, from rec- ognizing a single potency, which is distinguishable through the form of corporeal nature and that of incorporeal nature, the one dissoluble, the other indissoluble? ' Again, if everything that exists (beginning with the supreme and sovereign being) possesses a certain order and constitutes a hierarchy, a ladder where one climbs from the composite to the simple things, and from those to the most simple and absolute things, by means of proportional and copulative middle terms which participate in the nature of the one and the other extreme, yet possess their own, independent value, there is no order which does not involve a certain participation, nor par- ticipation which does not involve a certain union, nor union which does not involve a certain participation. It is therefore necessary that there be a sin- gle principle of subsistence for all existing things. Add to this the fact that reason, itself, cannot help presupposing, for anything which can be differentiated, something undifferentiated (I speak of things that exist, for I do not think the distinction between 'being' and 'non-being' is real, but merely verbal and nominal). This undifferentiated thing is a common nature to which the difference, the distinctive form, is joined. And surely one cannot deny that, since everything sensible presupposes a substratum of sensible matter, everything intelligible presupposes a substratum of intelligible matter. Therefore, something must exist which corresponds to the common nature of the one and the other substratum, for every essence is necessarily founded on some being, except for the first essence, which is identical with its being, since its potency is its act, and since it is all it can be, as we said yesterday. What is more, if matter is not a body (in the opinion of our adversaries, themselves), but by its nature precedes the cor- poreal being, why, then, would it be so inimical to the substances called
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? incorporeal? Peripatetics are not lacking who hold that, just as in corporeal substances something formal and divine is found, so in divine substances something material should be found, so that the lower things should con- form with the higher, and the order of the former should depend on that of the latter. As for the theologians, although some are nurtured on Aristotelian doctrine, if they will concede that they are more indebted to Scripture than to philosophy and natural reason, they should not be annoyed with me concerning this point. 'Do not worship me', said one of their angels to the patriarch Job, 'for I am your brother. '15 Now, if the one who pronounces these words is an intellectual substance (for that it how they conceive it), and if he claims by his words that the man and he, him- self, share in the reality of a substratum, whatever their formal differences may be, it follows that the oracle of these theologians testifies in favour of the philosophers.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I know you say that with reverence, since you know that it does not suit us to go begging in places outside our domain.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You speak well and truly. But I did not bring in that refer- ence to prove or confirm a point, but as far as possible to spare myself a scruple. I am just as afraid of appearing to be an enemy of theology as I am to be one.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Discerning theologians will always admit natural reasons, whatever course they may take, as long as those arguments do not go against divine authority.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Myargumentsareandeverwillbethesame.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Good. Pleasegoon.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Plotinus, also, in his book on matter16 says that 'if there is a
multitude and a plurality of species in the intelligible world, there must be something common underlying the peculiarity and the difference of each. That which is common has the function of matter; that which is individ- ual and which differentiates them has the function of form'. He adds that 'if this sensible world is an imitation of the intelligible one, the composi- tion of one is an imitation of that of the other. Moreover, if the intelligible world lacked diversity, it would lack order, and if it lacked order, it would possess neither beauty nor ornament. All this is related to matter'. This is why the superior world should not be deemed totally indivisible, but in
15 The angel does not speak to Jacob, but to Saint John in Apocalypse, ? ? ? , ? ? , where, in any case, it is clear that the angel's speech is addressed not to Jacob, but to John himself.
16 Enneads, ? ? , ? , ? .
? ? ?
Fourth dialogue
? some ways divisible and differentiated - a division and a differentiation which are incomprehensible if there is not some underlying matter. And, although I claim that all this multiplicity comes together in a single indi- visible being which is beyond any kind of dimension, I still assert that this being is the matter in which so many forms are united. Before it was con- ceived as being varied and multiform, it was conceived uniformly, and before being conceived as formed, it was conceived as unformed.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You have briefly set out many strong arguments enabling you to conclude that there is a single matter, a single potency, by which everything that exists does so in act.
You also show that this applies equally to both corporeal and incorporeal substances, since the former have their being through their capacity to be, in the same way that the latter, through their capacity to be, have their being: all of which you have demonstrated by other strong arguments to those who ponder them deeply and fully grasp them. Even so, I would like you to spell out (if not for the sake of per- fecting the doctrine, then at least for clarification) how there can be any- thing unformed and indeterminate in those most excellent beings which are the incorporeal things. How can they share in the same matter, without the advent of form and act resulting in bodies? How, when there is no muta- tion, generation, or corruption, can you say there is matter, when matter has never been posited for any other ends? How can we say that the intel- ligible nature is simple, and yet claim that matter and act are in it? I do not ask these questions on my own behalf, for whom the truth is clear; I ask, perhaps, for others who may be reluctant and difficult, like masters Poliinnio and Gervasio, for example.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Cedo[Iconcur].
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I approve, and thank you, Dicsono, for considering the needs of those who dare not ask, in keeping with the etiquette of transalpine meals, which forbids those who occupy the lesser seats at table to stick a fin- ger outside the range of their own plates. There you must wait until a morsel is handed to you, and you cannot take a single bite without first having to pay for it with a 'thank you'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Toresolvethewholequestion:justasaman,accordingtohis specific human nature, is different from a lion, according to his particular nature, but both are indistinct and identical in their common animal nature, corporeal substance and other similar determinations, just so, according to its proper essence, the matter of corporeal things is different from that of incorporeal things. All that you say, then, concerning the fact
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? of being a constitutive cause of corporeal nature, the fact of being the sub- stratum of all sorts of transformations, and the fact of being a part of com- posites, agrees with matter in its proper essence. For the same matter (or, to put it more clearly), the same that can be made, or that can exist, is either made, and it exists through the dimensions and extension of the substra- tum and the qualities that have their existence in quantity - and this is called corporeal substance and presupposes a corporeal matter - or else it is made (supposing that its being has an inception) and is without those dimensions, extensions and qualities, and it is called incorporeal substance, and similarly presupposes the above mentioned matter. Thus, to an active potency, in the case of both corporeal and incorporeal things - that is, to both corporeal and incorporeal beings - there corresponds a passive potency, which is both corporeal and incorporeal, and a possibility of being which is both corporeal and incorporeal. If, then, we wish to speak of com- position in the one nature as much as in the other, we must understand it in two different senses. We must also consider that, in eternal things, we speak of matter which is always under the same act, while in variable things, matter contains now one, now another act. With the former case, matter possesses, at once, always and together, all it can possess, and is all it can be; with the latter case, it has all it can possess and is all it can be, but at different times and according to a certain order of succession.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Some, though they admit matter in incorporeal things, understand it in a very different sense.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . However different their particular natures are, through which one thing descends to corporeal being and the other does not, and one thing receives sensible qualities and the other not, and however impos- sible it seems that there can be an essence common to, on the one hand, that matter which is incompatible with quantity and with the fact of being the substratum of qualities which have their existence in dimensions, and, on the other hand, that matter which is neither incompatible with the one nor with the other, nevertheless, they are one and the same thing, and the whole difference (as has been said many times) depends on the contraction of matter into corporeal being or incorporeal being. Similarly, in the animal being, all beings endowed with sense are one, but if we contract the genus to a particular species, the essence of a man is incompatible with that of a lion, and that of the lion with another animal. To this I add, if you please (since you might say that what is never found must be considered impos- sible, and unnatural rather than natural), that, primary matter never
? ?
Fourth dialogue
? acquiring dimensions, one must consider corporeal matter as contrary to its nature, and that if this is so, it would not be likely that the two sorts of matter should have a common nature before one of them is conceived as being contracted to corporeal matter. I add, as I was saying, that we can just as well attribute to that first matter the necessity of having all dimensional acts, than (as you would have it) their impossibility. Since this matter is, in act, all that it can be, it has all measures and has all species of figures and dimensions. Because it has them all, it has none of them, since what is so many different things is necessarily none of them in particular. What is everything must exclude all particular being.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Do you claim, then, that matter is act? Do you also claim that matter in incorporeal things coincides with act?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes, as the possibility to be coincides with being. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,itdoesnotdifferfromform?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It does not differ at all in the absolute potency and absolute
act, and, because it is absolutely all, is therefore absolutely pure, simple, indivisible and unified. If it possessed definite dimensions, a definite being, a definite property and a definite individuality, it would not be absolute, nor would it be all.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, everything which comprises all the genuses is indi- visible?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly, because the form which comprises all the qualities is itself none of them; that which comprises all figures does not itself pos- sess any; that which possesses all sensible being is not, for that reason, accessible to the senses. That which possesses all natural being is highly indivisible; that which possesses all intellectual being is still more highly indivisible; that which possesses all that can be is the most highly indivisible of all.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You hold that there exists a ladder of the possibility to be, like the ladder of being? And you hold that material nature ascends along the one just as formal nature ascends along the other?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatistrue.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You give a lofty and profound definition of matter and potency.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Trueagain.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butthistruthwillnotbegraspedbyeveryone,foritisindeed hard to understand how it is possible to possess all the species of dimen- sions without having any, and to possess all formal being, and yet no form.
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Do you, yourself, understand how this can be?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe so, for I understand that, in order to be all things, the act cannot be any one thing.
? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I see that, with that Peripatetic brain of yours, you have learnt little or nothing from what Teofilo said yesterday about the essence and potency of matter.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Be that as it may. I hold to the point that one must con- demn the appetite of both woman and matter, which is the cause of all evil, all affliction, defect, ruin and corruption. Do you not think that, if matter were satisfied with its present form, no alteration or affliction would hold sway over us, we would not die, we would be incorruptible and eternal?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Andwhatwouldyousayifitweresatisfiedwiththeformit had fifty years ago? Would you be Poliinnio? If it had remained what it was forty years ago, would you be so adulterous (I mean, adult), so perfect and so learned? Thus, just as you are pleased that your other forms have given way to the current one, so it is nature's will, which orders the universe, that all forms yield to all others. Not to mention that it is much more dignified for that substance, which is our substance, to become everything by receiv- ing all forms, than to remain fragmentary by holding onto only one. In that way, it shares a likeness with that which is all, in all.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It seems to be you are shedding your natural habits and beginning to be learned. Apply yourself, if you can, a simili [by similitude], to showing the dignity to be found in woman.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ThatIwilldoeasily. ButhereisTeofilo.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . And Dicsono. Another time, then. De iis hactenus [Let us stop there].
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Have we not seen that the Peripatetics, like the Platonists, divide substance by the specific difference of corporeal and incorporeal? Just as these specific differences are reduced to the potency of a single 14 Refers to the same woman, Marie de Castelnau, ne? e Bochetel.
? ? ?
Fourth dialogue
? genus, so the forms must be of two kinds: some are transcendent, that is, higher than genus, and are called principles, such as 'entity', 'unity', 'one', 'thing', 'something', and their like; other forms belong to a given insofar as it is distinct from another genus, such as 'substantiality' and 'accidentality'. The forms of the first sort do not distinguish matter or make of matter here one thing, there another, but, as absolutely universal terms embracing cor- poreal as well as incorporeal substances, they signify the absolutely uni- versal, absolutely common and undivided matter of both. Moreover, as Avicebron has said, 'Just as we identify the matter of the substantial form (matter which is part of the composite), before we identify the matter of the accidental forms (that is, the composite), what prevents us, before recognizing the matter that is contracted under corporeal forms, from rec- ognizing a single potency, which is distinguishable through the form of corporeal nature and that of incorporeal nature, the one dissoluble, the other indissoluble? ' Again, if everything that exists (beginning with the supreme and sovereign being) possesses a certain order and constitutes a hierarchy, a ladder where one climbs from the composite to the simple things, and from those to the most simple and absolute things, by means of proportional and copulative middle terms which participate in the nature of the one and the other extreme, yet possess their own, independent value, there is no order which does not involve a certain participation, nor par- ticipation which does not involve a certain union, nor union which does not involve a certain participation. It is therefore necessary that there be a sin- gle principle of subsistence for all existing things. Add to this the fact that reason, itself, cannot help presupposing, for anything which can be differentiated, something undifferentiated (I speak of things that exist, for I do not think the distinction between 'being' and 'non-being' is real, but merely verbal and nominal). This undifferentiated thing is a common nature to which the difference, the distinctive form, is joined. And surely one cannot deny that, since everything sensible presupposes a substratum of sensible matter, everything intelligible presupposes a substratum of intelligible matter. Therefore, something must exist which corresponds to the common nature of the one and the other substratum, for every essence is necessarily founded on some being, except for the first essence, which is identical with its being, since its potency is its act, and since it is all it can be, as we said yesterday. What is more, if matter is not a body (in the opinion of our adversaries, themselves), but by its nature precedes the cor- poreal being, why, then, would it be so inimical to the substances called
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? incorporeal? Peripatetics are not lacking who hold that, just as in corporeal substances something formal and divine is found, so in divine substances something material should be found, so that the lower things should con- form with the higher, and the order of the former should depend on that of the latter. As for the theologians, although some are nurtured on Aristotelian doctrine, if they will concede that they are more indebted to Scripture than to philosophy and natural reason, they should not be annoyed with me concerning this point. 'Do not worship me', said one of their angels to the patriarch Job, 'for I am your brother. '15 Now, if the one who pronounces these words is an intellectual substance (for that it how they conceive it), and if he claims by his words that the man and he, him- self, share in the reality of a substratum, whatever their formal differences may be, it follows that the oracle of these theologians testifies in favour of the philosophers.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I know you say that with reverence, since you know that it does not suit us to go begging in places outside our domain.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You speak well and truly. But I did not bring in that refer- ence to prove or confirm a point, but as far as possible to spare myself a scruple. I am just as afraid of appearing to be an enemy of theology as I am to be one.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Discerning theologians will always admit natural reasons, whatever course they may take, as long as those arguments do not go against divine authority.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Myargumentsareandeverwillbethesame.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Good. Pleasegoon.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Plotinus, also, in his book on matter16 says that 'if there is a
multitude and a plurality of species in the intelligible world, there must be something common underlying the peculiarity and the difference of each. That which is common has the function of matter; that which is individ- ual and which differentiates them has the function of form'. He adds that 'if this sensible world is an imitation of the intelligible one, the composi- tion of one is an imitation of that of the other. Moreover, if the intelligible world lacked diversity, it would lack order, and if it lacked order, it would possess neither beauty nor ornament. All this is related to matter'. This is why the superior world should not be deemed totally indivisible, but in
15 The angel does not speak to Jacob, but to Saint John in Apocalypse, ? ? ? , ? ? , where, in any case, it is clear that the angel's speech is addressed not to Jacob, but to John himself.
16 Enneads, ? ? , ? , ? .
? ? ?
Fourth dialogue
? some ways divisible and differentiated - a division and a differentiation which are incomprehensible if there is not some underlying matter. And, although I claim that all this multiplicity comes together in a single indi- visible being which is beyond any kind of dimension, I still assert that this being is the matter in which so many forms are united. Before it was con- ceived as being varied and multiform, it was conceived uniformly, and before being conceived as formed, it was conceived as unformed.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You have briefly set out many strong arguments enabling you to conclude that there is a single matter, a single potency, by which everything that exists does so in act.
You also show that this applies equally to both corporeal and incorporeal substances, since the former have their being through their capacity to be, in the same way that the latter, through their capacity to be, have their being: all of which you have demonstrated by other strong arguments to those who ponder them deeply and fully grasp them. Even so, I would like you to spell out (if not for the sake of per- fecting the doctrine, then at least for clarification) how there can be any- thing unformed and indeterminate in those most excellent beings which are the incorporeal things. How can they share in the same matter, without the advent of form and act resulting in bodies? How, when there is no muta- tion, generation, or corruption, can you say there is matter, when matter has never been posited for any other ends? How can we say that the intel- ligible nature is simple, and yet claim that matter and act are in it? I do not ask these questions on my own behalf, for whom the truth is clear; I ask, perhaps, for others who may be reluctant and difficult, like masters Poliinnio and Gervasio, for example.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Cedo[Iconcur].
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I approve, and thank you, Dicsono, for considering the needs of those who dare not ask, in keeping with the etiquette of transalpine meals, which forbids those who occupy the lesser seats at table to stick a fin- ger outside the range of their own plates. There you must wait until a morsel is handed to you, and you cannot take a single bite without first having to pay for it with a 'thank you'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Toresolvethewholequestion:justasaman,accordingtohis specific human nature, is different from a lion, according to his particular nature, but both are indistinct and identical in their common animal nature, corporeal substance and other similar determinations, just so, according to its proper essence, the matter of corporeal things is different from that of incorporeal things. All that you say, then, concerning the fact
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? of being a constitutive cause of corporeal nature, the fact of being the sub- stratum of all sorts of transformations, and the fact of being a part of com- posites, agrees with matter in its proper essence. For the same matter (or, to put it more clearly), the same that can be made, or that can exist, is either made, and it exists through the dimensions and extension of the substra- tum and the qualities that have their existence in quantity - and this is called corporeal substance and presupposes a corporeal matter - or else it is made (supposing that its being has an inception) and is without those dimensions, extensions and qualities, and it is called incorporeal substance, and similarly presupposes the above mentioned matter. Thus, to an active potency, in the case of both corporeal and incorporeal things - that is, to both corporeal and incorporeal beings - there corresponds a passive potency, which is both corporeal and incorporeal, and a possibility of being which is both corporeal and incorporeal. If, then, we wish to speak of com- position in the one nature as much as in the other, we must understand it in two different senses. We must also consider that, in eternal things, we speak of matter which is always under the same act, while in variable things, matter contains now one, now another act. With the former case, matter possesses, at once, always and together, all it can possess, and is all it can be; with the latter case, it has all it can possess and is all it can be, but at different times and according to a certain order of succession.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Some, though they admit matter in incorporeal things, understand it in a very different sense.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . However different their particular natures are, through which one thing descends to corporeal being and the other does not, and one thing receives sensible qualities and the other not, and however impos- sible it seems that there can be an essence common to, on the one hand, that matter which is incompatible with quantity and with the fact of being the substratum of qualities which have their existence in dimensions, and, on the other hand, that matter which is neither incompatible with the one nor with the other, nevertheless, they are one and the same thing, and the whole difference (as has been said many times) depends on the contraction of matter into corporeal being or incorporeal being. Similarly, in the animal being, all beings endowed with sense are one, but if we contract the genus to a particular species, the essence of a man is incompatible with that of a lion, and that of the lion with another animal. To this I add, if you please (since you might say that what is never found must be considered impos- sible, and unnatural rather than natural), that, primary matter never
? ?
Fourth dialogue
? acquiring dimensions, one must consider corporeal matter as contrary to its nature, and that if this is so, it would not be likely that the two sorts of matter should have a common nature before one of them is conceived as being contracted to corporeal matter. I add, as I was saying, that we can just as well attribute to that first matter the necessity of having all dimensional acts, than (as you would have it) their impossibility. Since this matter is, in act, all that it can be, it has all measures and has all species of figures and dimensions. Because it has them all, it has none of them, since what is so many different things is necessarily none of them in particular. What is everything must exclude all particular being.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Do you claim, then, that matter is act? Do you also claim that matter in incorporeal things coincides with act?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes, as the possibility to be coincides with being. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,itdoesnotdifferfromform?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It does not differ at all in the absolute potency and absolute
act, and, because it is absolutely all, is therefore absolutely pure, simple, indivisible and unified. If it possessed definite dimensions, a definite being, a definite property and a definite individuality, it would not be absolute, nor would it be all.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, everything which comprises all the genuses is indi- visible?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Exactly, because the form which comprises all the qualities is itself none of them; that which comprises all figures does not itself pos- sess any; that which possesses all sensible being is not, for that reason, accessible to the senses. That which possesses all natural being is highly indivisible; that which possesses all intellectual being is still more highly indivisible; that which possesses all that can be is the most highly indivisible of all.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You hold that there exists a ladder of the possibility to be, like the ladder of being? And you hold that material nature ascends along the one just as formal nature ascends along the other?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatistrue.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You give a lofty and profound definition of matter and potency.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Trueagain.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Butthistruthwillnotbegraspedbyeveryone,foritisindeed hard to understand how it is possible to possess all the species of dimen- sions without having any, and to possess all formal being, and yet no form.
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Do you, yourself, understand how this can be?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe so, for I understand that, in order to be all things, the act cannot be any one thing.
? ? ? ?
