Not only did Nietzsche lack con-
254 THE ETERl'\AL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
ceptual rigor, even his enthusiasm for artistic creation boiled down to a fascination with technical achievement: the greatest stimulans to life was ultimately no more than an object of calculative thought, a pre- scription for "genius.
254 THE ETERl'\AL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
ceptual rigor, even his enthusiasm for artistic creation boiled down to a fascination with technical achievement: the greatest stimulans to life was ultimately no more than an object of calculative thought, a pre- scription for "genius.
Heidegger - Nietzsche - v1-2
The juxtaposition of these two strategies-close contact and vast distance, detail and perspective, thrust and feint, reading and writing-lends the lecture course its particular tension.
Nevertheless, the entire drama develops but one theme.
The first sentence of the first section of the first division reads: "Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysi-
242 THE ETERNAL RECURREI'<CE OF THE SAME
cal position is captured in his doctrine of the eternal return of the same.
The first major division presents Nietzsche's own communications of eternal return. Yet a curious rift threatens its very structure. In the middle of his account of "On the Vision and the Riddle" (in section 6) Heidegger stops abruptly. The occasion for the caesura is that curious shift of scene in the vision-from the gateway "Moment" to the strick- en shepherd. Heidcgger does not recommence his account of the latter until section 24. In other words, sections 7 to 23, the bulk of the course as such, constitute a kind of parenthesis in Heidegger's analysis of the second (and principal) communication of eternal recurrence. The larger part of that parenthesis deals with Nietzsche's unpublished notes on eternal return. However, no matter how vital Heidegger be- lieves such notes to be, he carefully inserts his entire discussion of them into that communication of Nietzsche's entitled Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In fact, he begins to discuss the notes only after he has moved forward unobtrusively to the themes of Zarathustra's solitude, his animals, and his convalescence (sections 7 and 8). He even ad- vances to Nietzsche's third communication of eternal return, in Beyond Good and Evil. In retrospect, this unobtrusive move forward to "The Convalescent," seeking as it does to define the thought that is hardest to bear in terms of Nietzsche's own communication of it, is the most communicative gesture of the entire lecture course.
Heidegger begins (section 1) by affirming eternal recurrence as the fundamental thought of Nietzsche's philosophy. As a thought that reaches out toward being as a whole, eternal return of the same stands in vigorous opposition to the fundamental metaphysical positions represented by Platonism and by the Christian tradition as a whole. Nietzsche's fundamental thought has its immediate genesis (section 2) in the landscape of the Oberengadin, which Nietzsche first saw in 1881; yet echoes of it can be found in an early autobiographical sketch and in the late work Ecce Homo. Heidegger ventures into these auto- biographical texts, not in order to reduce eternal return to a mere confession of faith on Nietzsche's part, but to establish as the funda- mental task of Nietzsche's life the thinking of eternal recurrence of the
Analysis 243
same. Nietzsche communicates the thought only reluctantly, crypti- cally, and leaves most of his notes concerning it unpublished. His first communication of it (section 3), in The Gay Science, portrays eternal recurrence as "the greatest burden," that is, a thought that both in- quires into being as a whole and testifies to the thinker's "loneliest loneliness. " The affirmation of existence-of our lives as we have lived them-and of the ceaseless reiteration of the same is tied to what Hei- degger calls the "authentic appropriation" of our existence as a "self. " Perhaps for that reason the thought of return (section 4) is said to be the hardest to bear of all thoughts, the tragic thought par excellence. To think it is to join Zarathustra in the fateful and fatal adventure of downgoing (Untergang) and transition (Ubergang). The "eternity" of eternal return provides nothing resembling sanctuary from time, death, or decision.
The second communication of the thought (section 5) occurs in and as Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Nietzsche creates the figure of Zarathustra for the express purpose of communicating his thought of thoughts. The thought itself appears in that work in "figures of speech," meta- phors, images, simulacra of all kinds; the how of the communication is at least as important as the what. The book Thus Spoke Zarathustra, written for everyone and no one, is for those who are learning to be beneficent to life. Yet the difficulties of reading-plus Heidegger's reservations concerning his own procedure-make all complacency impossible. The crucial section of the book proves to be "On the Vi- sion and the Riddle," which Heidegger proceeds to discuss (section 6). After a mammoth interruption (sections 7 to 23), he takes up the thread of the riddle in section 24, the culminating section of the first
major division of his course.
In section 6 Heidegger suggests that the riddle has to do with the
"loneliest loneliness" of the thinker who thinks the truth-that is, the openness and unconcealment, aletheia--of being as a whole. He re- counts Zarathustra's tale of his encounter with the spirit of gravity, the dwarf, at the gateway Augenblick, "Glance of an Eye," or "Moment. " The eternity that each avenue at the gateway traverses--one forward, the other rearward-is for the dwarf a matter of contempt. Thus a
244 THE ETERl\AL RECURREI\:CE OF THE SAME
common interpretation of eternal recurrence (as the cyclical nature of sacred time and the perfect ring of truth) is placed in the mouth of the dwarf who takes things too easily. For the thought itself, suggesting that "in an infinite time the course of a finite world is necessarily already completed," threatens to cripple all action in the present. When Zara- thustra poses his second question to the dwarf, whether "I and you in the gateway" must not have recurred countless times, the dwarf not only fails to reply but vanishes altogether. The spirit of gravity cannot adopt a stance of its own in the Moment and so must disappear, leav- ing riddlers to pose a number of questions concerning the gateway and its avenues--questions such as (l) the infinity of past and future time, (2) the reality or actuality of time as something more than a mere form of intuition, and (3) the finite existence of beings in time. These are among the questions that propel Heidegger to Nietzsche's unpublished notes.
However, before he takes up the suppressed notes Heidegger turns his attention to the animals that accompany Zarathustra up to a certain point in his convalescence (sections 7-8) and to the third communica- tion of eternal return as circulus vitiosus deus (section 9). These sec- tions constitute no mere interlude in Heidegger's account. In "The Convalescent" (section 8), which we must now recall more closely, Heidegger in fact appears to reach the core of Nietzsche's second com- munication of eternal return.
Zarathustra's animals, his proud eagle and discerning serpent, are the companions and enforcers of his solitude. Their conjunction, a vortex of coils and rings, yields the most compelling emblem of recur- rence. The animals speak to Zarathustra of eternal return during the latter's convalescence, which is the culmination of his downgoing. Their master must recuperate from the encounter with his own most abysmal thought, his own ultimate recess, which he has not yet truly incorporated. The circle of recurrence proves to be the circle of life and suffering; however much the eagle of its emblem soars, the circle itself tends to Untergang. Under the weight of his most abysmal thought, Zarathustra collapses. Seven days and nights he lies prostrate, feeding on the red and yellow berries his pride has fetched, berries of semblance and passionate creativity, the colors of will to power as
Analysis 245
eternal recurrence. The animals now try to seduce Zarathustra back into the world, as though it were a garden of delights rather than the theater of tragedy. The thought of eternal return-seduction and so- briety, intoxication and lucidity, contemptuous grumbling and rhap- sodic song, satyr-play and tragedy, the conjunction in each case bridging the smallest gap-must now become Zarathustra's thought. Yet the suspicion obtrudes that Zarathustra's animals are humming the dwarfs own ditty. How can the difference between the thought's two modes of reception be preserved? What decides whether there is any difference at all? Not for nothing is the thought of return both the hardest to bear and the most difficult: to think being as a whole as eternal displacement of the goal is to utter "a cry of distress and calami- ty," and . not to whistle a happy tune.
What turns the doctrine into a ditty? The assurance that all is bound for Emersonian compensation-though, to be fair, Emerson too, as Nietzsche well knew, had recurrent doubts-implies that we may dis- pense with all decision. Thus the dwarf makes light of the thought of return. He refuses to abandon his perch on the periphery and to enter the gateway itself. He declines to stand in the Moment. Viewed from the sidelines, the two avenues diverge as if to meet indifferently in some distant eternity. Yet when a self stands in the gateway where past and future "affront one another" and "collide," existence ceases to be a spectator sport. In the "flash of an eye" the thinker must look both fore and aft, "turned in two ways," and must study the internecine strife of time. "Whoever stands in the Moment lets what runs counter to itself come to collision, though not to a standstill, by cultivating and sustaining the strife between what is assigned him as a task and what has been given him as his endowment. " It is the effrontery of time that in it we collide against mortality and strive with it, closing in the glance of an eye and not in some remote infinity. Nevertheless, the strife of time dare not provoke our revulsion or antagonism; it is not effrontery after all but an affronting, or better, a confronting. To stand in the Moment-to be the Moment-is to decide how everything recurs. Certain matters are of course already decided. The eternal re- turn of the Last Man, the little man, for example. As though he had as much right to the gateway as one's self. Zarathustra's heroism rests in
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his having gone to meet his supreme suffering-the eternal recurrence of the Last Man-as well as his supreme hope-the inception of over- man. At this juncture Heidegger reminds us of the motto inscribed over his own lecture course, as over a gateway: "Everything in the hero's sphere turns to tragedy. . . . " With Zarathustra the tragic era begins. Tragic insight has nothing to do with either pessimism or opti- mism, "inasmuch as in its willing and in its knowing it adopts a stance toward being as a whole, and inasmuch as the basic law of being as a whole consists in struggle. " In such struggle the teacher of eternal return must come to understand himself as transition and demise, Obergang and Untergang. "In the end, Zarathustra hears which eterni- ty it is that his animals are proclaiming to him, the eternity of the Moment that embraces everything in itself at once: the downgoing. "
Thus the entire discussion of Nietzsche's first two communications of eternal return, in The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, respectively, comes to a head in section 8, "The Convalescent. " The first communication stresses the essentially tragic nature of beings in general, the second the tragic insight gained in the glance of the e y e - eternity as the Moment. These communications converge, according to Heidegger, in the matter of thinking, namely, thinking eternal recurrence in the essential context of the question of being as a whole, in pursuit of Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position. The third communication of eternal return (section 9) takes us one step closer to that position.
The third communication proceeds from "Zarathustra the godless" to "the quintessence of religion. " The latter is the circulus vitiosus deus, the "ring" of recurrence that conjoins divinity and " 'world' per- haps? " Because the Christian God of morality is utterly dead, the ques- tion of world, of being as a whole, becomes compelling. The question itself necessitates the creation of gods and the re-creation of humanity. Reason enough to call it the greatest burden! The circulus vitiosus itself exhibits the trajectory of downgoing, the descensional movement of tragic inquiry.
Heidegger's reading of the posthumously published notes on eternal recurrence (sections 10-21) is preceded by a warning "that Nietzsche's own mode of communication" in his published writings must set the
Analysis 247
standard. Heidegger recognizes that his own procedure is duplex and even duplicitous: his interpretation must be guided by a prior sense of the questions at stake in eternal recurrence-lest it be a mere rehash;- and yet that interpretation must be undertaken in a spirit of "meticu- lous deference" to Nietzsche's own texts. Heidegger divides the sup- pressed notes (section 10) into three principal groups: (1) those stemming from the initial discovery of the thought of return in 1881- 82; (2) those from the period of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 1883-84; and (3) those pertaining to plans for a major work, roughly, 1884-88. He criticizes the lack of order in the first group as presented in the Gross- oktav edition and the editors' division of the notes into "theoretical" and "poetical" groups. Principal themes in the first group are those of "incorporation," foreshadowing the lesson of Zarathustra's convales- cence, and of "teaching" and "decision," the latter to have an impact on being as a whole now that mankind has reached its "midday. " Heidegger attempts a summary presentation (section 12) of Nietzsche's doctrine as contained in the first group of notes: eternal return applies to the world in its collective character, or to being as a whole, whether animate or inanimate; that character shows itself as force, limited force, the world totality thus proving to be finite; although "infinite" in
the sense of "immeasurable," the world totality exists as exertions of limited force in bounded space and unlimited time ("eternity"). Force, finitude, perpetual Becoming, immeasurability, bounded space, and infinite time are all predicates of chaos. Yet the crucial issue turns out to be, not this or that cosmological speculation on chaos, but Nietz- sche's "negative ontology," as it were, in which one must be on guard against every humanization and deification of being as a whole. For Nietzsche the world as such is an arreton. The "necessitous" character of cosmic chaos is to guide us toward the notion of eternal return. Bl! t how? It is precisely in the thought of return that the circle or ring of humanity and being as a whole is joined (section 13). Thus it is a matter neither of pseudo-scientific skepticism nor of religious faith, but of questioning being as a whole. Such questioning bears a special rela- tion to language. Yet neither Nietzsche nor philosophy prior to him raises that question adequately.
Whatever his notebooks might suggest, Nietzsche does not try to
248 TilE ETER:>;AL RECURREt\0: OF THE SAi\·ll~
"prove" eternal return "scientifically" (sections 14-16). The finitude of Becoming and the necessary recurrence of the same in infinite time remain staples of Nietzsche's thought; yet Nietzsche himself is keenly aware of the dilemma in which his passion to eliminate anthropomor- phisms places him with regard to all such staples, When he opts for both dehumanization and maximal humanization in will to power, he compels but does not elaborate the question of Da-sein. The thought of return cannot be designated as a "belief" (section 17), unless we are willing and able to reinterpret the meaning of religion and of all tak- ing-for-true. The latter is not only an expression of Nietzsche's passion to dehumanize, however; Heidegger stresses the sense of creative knowing, giving, and loving-the sense of thoughtful possibility. The thought of return therefore involves the problem of freedom and neces- sity (section 18), not as an antinomy of reason, but as an invitation to rethink the temporality of the moment as a matter of and for decision. Such decision, Heidegger says, is a taking up of one's self into the willing act. Yet precisely how this is to occur Nietzsche never managed to communicate. Heidegger suggests that while such taking up is an authentic appropriation of self it is also the propriative event for histori- cal mankind as a whole. As Ereignis, eternal recurrence of the same displays the covert, essential relationship of time to being as a whole. Yet it is a time, we might add, which for Heidegger hovers somewhere between the ecstatic temporality of individualized Dasein and the essentially historical unfolding of Being. The latter, in 1937, is still beguiled by the hollow rhetoric of "peoples" and "nations" in "com- petition with one another. "
The posthumously published notes from 1881-82 (section 19) al- ready stress the fact that the thought of return refers to being as a whole and to the need for a thinker and teacher to execute its thinking. The notes from the Zarathustra period (section 20) demonstrate that the thought of return is most resistant to incorporation, unless it be con- ceived as redemption from the flux of Becoming. Such redemption does not freeze the flow of Becoming, but, in the moment of decision, prevents Becoming from being reduced to endless repetition. All de- pends on how the possibility of recurrence is thought through. "Nietz- sche knows only thoughts that have to be wrestled with. " Finally, the
Analysis 249
unpublished materials from 1884 to 1888 (section 21) indicate the way in which eternal recurrence dominates Nietzsche's philosophy of will to power. Eternal return is the culminating thought for will to power, both as an interpretation of all occurrence and as a revaluation of all values. Eternal return is the essential counterthrust to nihilism. Hei- degger's principal question directed to the notes taken up into The Will to Power, is as follows: "How do will to power, as the pervasive consti- tution of beings, and the eternal return of the same, as the mode of Being of beings as a whole, relate to one another? " The relationship cannot be expressed in terms of conditions or presuppositions.
Yet what if the will to power, according to Nietzsche's most proper and intrinsic intentions, were in itself nothing else than a willing back to that which was and a willing forward to everything that has to be? What if eternal recurrence of the same--as occurrence--were nothing other than the will to power, precisely in the way Nietzsche himself understands this phrase. . . ? If matters stood this way, then the designation of being as will to power would only be an elaboration of the original and primary projection of being as eternal recurrence of the same. In truth, matters do stand this way.
Thus it is not so much that Nietzsche's thinking of will to power and eternal return must be reduced to the metaphysical categories of es- sentia and existentia. It is rather that the mysterious coherence of these two notions impels the question "as to what is being thought here in general and how it is being thought. " The conjunction of the what and how Heidegger formulates as Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position.
In order to bring the first major division of his course to its question, Heidegger inquires into the "configuration" of the doctrine of return (section 22) and its "domain" (section 23). By configuration, Gestalt, Heidegger means the inner structure of the doctrine's truth, that is, the openness of being that shows itself in it. His strategy is to study the three axes in Nietzsche's plans for a magnum opus, to wit, eternal return, will to power, and revaluation of all values. Yet Heidegger is aware that merely to juggle these titles is an extrinsic procedure that may never catch sight of the "inner structure" of Nietzsche's philos- ophy. Because the thought of return involves the thinker and his his-
250 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
torical moment, the question of its domain, Bereich, assumes preemi- nence. The thought's domain is staked out by nihilism, the event in which being as a whole comes to nothing. Nietzsche's thought is a countermovement to nihilism, eternal recurrence its counterthought. Eternal recurrence shares in the essence of nihilism inasmuch as it commits the goallessness of being to eternity-"the nothing ('meaning- lessness') eternally! "-and yet its creative impulse, "in its character as decision, the character of the moment," shows that eternal return is "the thought that wends its way toward the need as such. " Hence Heidegger's return to the crucial matter of the Augenblick, the mo- ment of eternal recurrence, in section 24.
Section 24 is to bring the first major division of Heidegger's course to a close. Heidegger returns to that point in Zarathustra's account of "The Vision and the Riddle" where a baying hound announces a strik- ing change of scene. The change is to indicate what is decisive in the image of the gateway "Moment" or "Glance of an Eye. " The dog's howling sends Zarathustra racing back to his childhood-the period in Nietzsche's life which Heidegger associates with Schopenhauerian pes- simism and Wagnerian delirium. Yet the vision of the young shepherd and his black snake is a matter of nihilism, not pessimism. Nihilism must be overcome from the inside, bitten off at the head; that bite alone introduces man to golden laughter and the gay science. It now becomes clear why Heidegger moved forward (in section 8) to "The Convalescent," inasmuch as it is here that we learn the identity of the young shepherd-it is Zarathustra himself, seeking to recover from the poison of his contempt for man. It also becomes clear why Zarathustra cannot be fooled by eternal recurrence as a hurdy-gurdy song. To think return is to bite decisively into the repulsive snake of nihilism; it is to choose between the two ways to say "It is all alike," the two ways to define man's fundamental position within being as a whole.
Eternal return thus has its proper content, not in the trite assertion "Everything turns in a circle," but in a dual movement by which the thought recoils on the thinker and the thinker is drawn into the thought. That dual movement occurs when eternal recurrence is thought, first, in terms of the moment, "the temporality of indepen- dent action and decision," and second, in terms of nihilism, the "con-
Analysis 251
clition of need" that defines both the task and the endowment be- queathed to contemporary man. Heidegger stresses the first, "the mo- ment of being-a-self," in an explicit reference back to the analysis of Dasein in Being and Time. Yet the "moment" is now a far more "epochal" gateway than it was in 1927: the focus falls equally on the propriative event of nihilism. The recoil of eternal recurrence on Mar- tin Heidegger is felt in the insistent question of the relation between thought and thinker-the question of what calls on us to think. In the present case, that is how the thinker "slips into the ring of eternal recurrence, indeed in such a way as to help achieve the ring, help decide it. "
The fragmentary "second major division" of Heidegger's course in- quires into the essence and possibility of "fundamental metaphysical positions" in Western philosophy (section 25), as well as into the spe- cific matter of Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position (section 26). Its ironic thesis is that in Western philosophy the metaphysical
Grundstellung is such that the Grundfrage never gets asked: the guid- ing question "What is being? " is not explicated as such. Heidegger's question with regard to Nietzsche is why the relationship of thought and thinker, "the recoil that includes and the inclusion that recoils," becomes so conspicuous with him; presumably, that question is not unrelated to Heidegger's own unrelenting efforts to unfold and develop the guiding question of metaphysics. Philosophy inquires into the arche, the rise and dominion of being as a whole; it takes the beings of physis or "nature" as definitive, although the role of man among the various regions of beings vies with nature for preeminence; it seeks an answer to the question of what being is. The one thing it does not do is unfold the guiding question itself, pose the historical grounding question. The latter confronts something which again may not be to- tally unrelated to Nietzsche, namely, the nothing that surrounds and insidiously pervades the field of being as a whole.
Thus the most durable and unfailing touchstone of genuineness and force- fulness of thought in a philosopher is the question as to whether or not he or she experiences in a direct and fundamental manner the nearness of the nothing in the Being of beings. Whoever fails to experience it remains forever outside the realm of philosophy, without hope of entry.
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Finally, Heidegger's effort to unfold the guiding question by way of the grounding question notes that each time the guiding question is raised one region of beings rises to set the definitive standard for being as a whole; and this may have something to do with the theme of "humani- zation" discussed so penetratingly in section 13.
The original title of Heidegger's lecture course as listed in the uni- versity catalogue was "Nietzsche's Fundamental Metaphysical Position in Western Thinking: the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence of the Same. " Perhaps the principal difficulty the course encounters is that whereas Nietzsche's position is identified as the end, accomplishment, or fulfillment of metaphysics, the doctrine of return is seen (at least partly) as a response to the traditional, undeveloped guiding question of metaphysics. Heidegger begins by aligning Nietzsche's two replies to that question-will to power and eternal return-with the traditional distinction between the constitution of being (essentia) and its way to be (existentia). He asserts the coherence of these two answers. Yet before proceeding to demonstrate that coherence Heidegger further de- fines Nietzsche's position at the end of metaphysics. It is the end, Heidegger suggests, because it reaches back to the pseudo-Par- menidean and pseudo-Heraclitean responses to the guiding question, insisting that being both becomes and is. Thus Nietzsche interlocks these responses in such a way that they yield no further food for thought. However, because these responses are in effect derivative Platonistic interpretations of early Greek thinking, the commencement of Western thought remains curiously untouched by the Nietzschean closure. The interlocking takes place when Nietzsche delineates being as both perpetual creation (hence Becoming) and ineluctable fixation (hence Being as permanence of presence). Creative transfiguration too, and not merely metaphysico-moral thought, require the stability that fixation alone grants. The entire question of Nietzsche's fundamental
metaphysical position therefore rests on the further question of what it means that we wish to "imprint the emblem of eternity on our life! " A "recoining" and creative transfiguration of Becoming are to occur. In such reconfiguration Becoming would attain subsistence (Bestand), subsistence of course being the principal metaphysical designation of
Analysis 253
Being as permanence (Bestiindigkeit). However, Heidegger does not push the interpretation in this obvious direction; he insists on creation as transcendence and surpassment, confrontation in the moment of decision. He nonetheless fails to elaborate a positive interpretation of the mythic figure of Dionysos as a way of avoiding any Platonistic (mis)interpretation of creation. Instead, he insists that the Nietzschean inversion of the Platonic hierarchy represents the virtual entrenchment of Platonism. Entrenchment versus end: such is the ambivalence that characterizes Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche from start to finish.
At the end of his lecture course Heidegger tries to limn three intri- cate subjects with as many strokes of the pen, peremptory, suggestive, incomplete. First, he juxtaposes Nietzsche's ostensible position with his own Janus-headed counterposition vis-a-vis the commencement, the latter referring both to the beginnings of Western thought and the inauguration of "another" kind of thinking. Second, he discusses briefly the phrase amor fati in terms of both will to power and eternal return as expressions of resolute creativity in thought. Third, he offers a glimpse into his major philosophical work of the 1930s, Contributions
to Philosophy, when he invokes "telling silence" and the theme of language generally in his "other" commencement. The motto from Beyond Good and Evil on tragedy, satyr-play, and world recurs as an epigram of both commencement and close.
More than fifteen years separate the public lecture "Who Is Nietz- sche's Zarathustra? " from the lecture course on eternal recurrence. Yet the consistency of theme is remarkable. Not that the Heidegger/Nietz- sche confrontation experienced no ups and downs. In the early 1940s Heidegger's waxing anxiety concerning the will-to-will that then seemed on the rampage drew Nietzsche into its somber sphere. In·
1939, while lecturing on "Will to Power as Knowledge," Heidegger was jotting a number of notes on "Nietzsche's Metaphysics" that were devastatingly critical and even polemical: he called Nietzsche's meta- physics the most extreme form of alienation from Greek civilization, a turgid expression of planetary technology, a pan-European rather than a truly "German" style of thinking.
Not only did Nietzsche lack con-
254 THE ETERl'\AL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
ceptual rigor, even his enthusiasm for artistic creation boiled down to a fascination with technical achievement: the greatest stimulans to life was ultimately no more than an object of calculative thought, a pre- scription for "genius. " And so on.
The patient, measured reading of "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? " is thus a bit of a surprise. It seems as though in the early 1950s Heideg- ger executed a sympathetic return to Nietzsche-not primarily as the metaphysician of will to power and technician of artistic frenzy but as the thinker of eternal recurrence. The lecture "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? " springs from the 1951-52 lecture course at Freiburg en- titled "What Calls for Thinking? " There Heidegger calls Nietzsche, not the last metaphysician, but the last thinker of the Western world. 1 Here too Heidegger stresses the difficulty of Nietzsche's thought in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra: no matter how intoxicating its language may be, the book's "fundamental thought" and "provenance" remain sobering challenges. In "What Calls for Thinking? " Heidegger advises his students to equip themselves for these challenges by studying Aristotle for ten or fifteen years! In "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? " (as in the second part of "What Calls for Thinking? ") Heidegger conjoins the names of Nietzsche and Parmenides.
Zarathustra is the advocate of life, suffering, and the circle. He teaches the doctrines of eternal recurrence and overman. The circle of life and suffering and the coherence of will to power, eternal return, and overman take center stage in Heidegger's reflections. At the begin- ning and end of his lecture stands the emblem of Zarathustra's ani- mals, the sign of both Nietzsche's and Heidegger's longing. Eagle and serpent are totems of Zarathustra, the thinker of eternal return, and talismans for Heidegger, who thinks the relationship of Being and hu- man being. The teaching of eternal recurrence is nothing whimsical: dismay marks Zarathustra's very style, consternation in the face of his most abysmal thought. Nor is the doctrine of overman an expression of boldness and presumption. "Over-man" Heidegger defines as "that hu-
1 Martin Heidegger, Was heisst Denken? (Tiibingen: M. Niemeyer, 1954), p. 61. English translation by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, What Is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 46.
Analysis 255
man being who goes beyond prior humanity solely in order to conduct such humanity for the first time to its essence. " Overman is Nietz- sche's answer to the question of whether man is prepared to assume dominion over the earth. Heidegger's own reflection has less to do with achieving dominion than with rescuing the earth; yet he puts this dif- ference in abeyance and focuses on Zarathustra as the teacher of eter- nal return. That teaching points the way of transition to the overman, although the destination itself remains remote. If dismay is the first of Zarathustra's characteristics, then the second is longing. The episode "On the Great Longing" begins with Zarathustra's invocation of "To- day," "One day," and "Formerly" as aspects of the perpetual now of eternity. True, Nietzsche's is an eternity of recurrence rather than a
nunc stans; yet the tendency of Heidegger's argument here is to reduce the doctrine of return to familiar metaphysical structures.
A second thrust of inquiry now intervenes and proves to be less familiar. Once again the theme of time occupies the spotlight, when Heidegger asks about the bridge to overman. That bridge is called "Redemption from the Spirit of Revenge," and revenge is defined as man's ill will toward time and its "It was. " Nietzsche diagnoses such revenge at the heart of all the tradition held most sacrosanct, including its ''best reflection. " His understanding of revenge is thus metaphysi- cal, in the sense that he understands it as having determined man's relation to all being. If in modern metaphysics man's best reflection is
representation (Vorstellen), the shadow of representation is persecution (Nachstellen). In the defiant projection of beings in modern meta- physics and science, in its aggressive disparagement of transiency, Hei- degger discerns something that more than resembles revenge. He will later shrink from the full consequences of his own discovery and en- deavor to "leave the question open"; yet these pages on revenge, which the earlier lecture course needed but did not find, retain their own force.
The introduction of Schelling's identification of primal Being as willing has a double edge in Heidegger's text. One edge cuts Nietz- sche, the philosopher of will; the other cuts metaphysics, the tradition of ill will. It remains to be seen whether Heidegger himself escapes
256 THE ETERl'\AL RECURREI\CE OF THE SAl\1E
unscathed. The forceful analysis of revenge now deepens into an in- quiry into time. Most surprising perhaps is the fact that now the "It was" of time all but swallows the two remaining ecstases or phases of time. Whereas in Being and Time and the writings surrounding it the priority of the future is emphasized again and again as the origin of transcendence, projection, and existentiality, it is now the passing away of time that marks time's essential unfolding: time, and that means, its "It was. " From Plato's disparagement of me on to Schel- ling's embrace of "eternity" and "independence from time" the ill will toward time and transiency vents its subtle spleen. Yet Heidegger em- phasizes not the deprecation of the sensuous realm as such but the sheer distinction between being and a supratemporal ideality, the cho- rismos or gap, that runs through metaphysics from its inception to its end.
What may grant redemption from the revulsion against time? Nietz- sche does not embrace the Schopenhauerian solution-dissolution of the will as such. He wills instead that transiency perdure. Such perdur- ance can obtain only as eternal recurrence of the same. Heidegger is quick to remind us that in traditional metaphysics "eternity" is predi- cated of primal Being. At this point he once again invokes the essential coherence of eternal return and overman. Eternal return appears to assume preeminence-as the thought that would liberate reflection from revenge and so lead to the overman. Once again Heidegger in- vokes the spectacle of Zarathustra's animals, the emblem of interfused circles, as indicative of the essential affinity of Nietzsche's two princi- pal doctrines and as mimetic of the very Being of beings, eternal recur- rence. And once again the "Recapitulation" note (WM, 617) assumes its central place in Heidegger's interpretation. On the basis of that note Heidegger attributes to Nietzsche himselfthe supreme will to power, that is, the will to stamp Being (as perdurance, stability, fixity, perma- nence of presence) on Becoming. Overlooking the second sentence in that note, which begins, "Twofold falsification. . . ," Heidegger asks whether eternal recurrence itself may not be reduced to such coinage, whether it therefore does not conceal in itself an even more highly spiritualized spirit of revenge than that contained in prior reflection.
He adduces a note from the Nachlass which attributes an "extreme
Analysis 257
exuberance of revenge" to Nietzsche's own will to be life's advocate. And so the case seems to be closed. 2
The lecture "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? " reaches its climax in Heidegger's avowal that Zarathustra's doctrine of eternal return fails to achieve redemption from revenge. His avowal is not meant as a refuta- tion or critique of the Nietzschean philosophy but as a query-an inquiry into the extent to which "Nietzsche's thought too is animated
2 It may be worthwhile noting that Heidegger's reduction of eternal return to a "stamp- ing" of Being on Becoming, overlooking as it does the reservations in WM, 617 ("two- fold falsification"; "closest approximation"), brings his interpretation discomfitingly close to that of Alfred Baeumler. In Chapter Seven of Nietzsche: Philosopher and Politician (Leipzig: P. Reclam, 1931), pp. 79 ff. , Baeumler writes:
At its highpoint the philosophy of will to power and eternal Becoming shifts to the concept of Being. Being is. . . . The problem of the transition from Becoming to Being greatly preoccupied Nietzsche. The doctrine of eternal return belongs among the most famous elements of his philosophy. Objectively considered, this doctrine is nothing else than an attempt to cancel the image of eternal Becoming and to substi- tute for it an image of eternal Being. . . .
Baeumler proceeds to cite WM, 617 precisely in the way Heidegger will later cite it, that is, omitting the second sentence ("Zwiefache Fiilschung . . . ") and indeed the bulk of the note. The result is that eternal recurrence ceases to be the "closest approximation" of a world of Becoming to one of Being, and is reduced to a metaphysical conception pure and simple-hence a conception that could hardly redeem prior reflection from the spirit of revenge. The notion of eternal recurrence, says Baeumler, threatens to "cancel the system" by imposing Parmenidean Being on Heraclitean flux. His formulation here too foreshadows Heidegger's own. Yet for Baeumler eternal return is "without impor- tance" when viewed from the standpoint of Nietzsche's system. Whereas will to power is a "formula for occurrence in general" and thus has "objective sense," eternal recurrence of the same-arising as it does during a time when Nietzsche was "still underway to the system of will to power," a time when he was still "transported by the pipes of the Dionysian Pied Piper" and "led down the garden path" (85)-is no more than a "subjec- tive," "personal," and "religious" Erlebnis (80-81). From the outset of his lecture series on Nietzsche, Heidegger is determined to resist Baeumler's repudiation of eternal recur- rence. Nevertheless, his own reading of WM, 617 brings him perilously close to the. point where Baeumler's exclusion of eternal return seems the only option.
Yet a footnote to this footnote is called for, lest the introduction ofBaeumler's reading of WM, 617 imply something like guilt by association. For Baeumler and Heidegger are by no means alone in reading the note this way: the late Giorgio Colli, principal editor of the new Kritische Gesamtausgabe of Nietzsche's works, surely one who harbored no sympathy for Alfred Baeumler, also cites the note in Baeumlerian fashion, designating it "a specifically metaphysical confession, a declaration on behalf of 'Being' ! " (See the Studienausgabe, CM, /3, 655. )
258 THE ETERI\'AL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
by the spirit of prior reflection. " Finally, Heidegger withdraws or re- treats from Nietzschean suspicion, he leaves "open" the question of revenge in prior thinking; at the same time he imputes to Nietzsche a mere inversion of the Platonic hierarchy, the inversion itself retaining the metaphysical distinction between true being and nonbeing. (The imputation, both here and in the 1937 lecture course, is all the more surprising inasmuch as in his first lecture course on Nietzsche Heideg- ger had shown that when the true world "finally becomes a fable" the very horizon for the Platonic hierarchy evanesces. ) Here once again the theme of Dionysos is not taken up positively but is equated with a still metaphysical conception of the sensuous. The upshot is that Zara- thustra the teacher remains a figure that appears within metaphysics at metaphysics' completion. Heidegger abandons the riddle of Zarathus- tra for the latter's enigmatic emblem, descrying in the encirclements of eagle and serpent a presentiment of "the relation of Being to that living being, man. "
Surely the most curious part of Heidegger's text is its addendum on eternal recurrence of the same. Eternal return, the "last thought of Western metaphysics," remains a riddle which we dare not try to es- cape. The first possible subterfuge, which declares that the thought is sheer mysticism, by now needs no further discussion-and, indeed, Heidegger's introduction of the Adamsian dynamo as an exemplar of eternal recurrence is nothing if not an embarrassment. More intriguing is the way in which criticism of the second possible subterfuge-attri- bution of the thought of eternal recurrence to earlier figures in the tradition such as Heraclitus, Plato, or Leibniz-recoils on Heidegger's own text. If one were to recall Heidegger's use of Schelling with regard to will, one might wonder whether Heidegger's "Note" does not blunt the edge that he would turn against Nietzsche. Similarly, the final words of the "Note," while they do reduce the meaning of Dionysos to metaphysics, concede that Nietzsche's most abysmal and abyssal thought "conceals something unthought, something which at the same time remains a sealed door to metaphysical thinking. "
As this outsized resume draws to a close, we shall have to find our way to some questions. Herewith a first attempt. Hcidegger's inquiry into revenge, the will's ill will toward time and transiency, marks an
Analysis 259
important advance over the 1937 lecture course. In section 12 of that course Heidegger complained that Nietzsche's notes on time-frag- mentary and all too traditional in import-revealed the fact that Nietz- sche had attained no insight into the role of time in the development of the guiding question of metaphysics. Why did the Nietzschean theme of revenge elude him then? Why even in 1953 does he pursue Nietzsche's analysis closely and convincingly, then abandon it in order to leave the matter "open"? Does this eluding, along with the apparent neglect of the emblem of Dionysos, reflect something of Heidegger's perennial fascination with Nietzsche as a thinker-even after he had apparently located Nietzsche securely within metaphysics, in order to proceed unencumbered toward his own "other" commencement?
II. CONTEXTS
The structure and movement of Heidegger's 1937 lecture course, especially its first major division, indicates that Heidegger felt obliged to divide his attention between Nietzsche's published and unpublished writings on eternal return. In no other lecture course does Heidegger pay such scrupulous attention to Nietzsche's communication of his thought in the figures, images, emblems, and tropes of Nietzsche's texts; and nowhere else does Heidegger devote so much time and ener- gy to a thoughtful reconstruction of the Nietzschean Nachlass. Here we find the fitting context for matters touching philology in Heideg- ger's reading of Nietzsche.
In 1935 Heidegger had asked his students whether what they were hearing in his courses was "a mere product of the violent and onesided Heideggerian method of exegesis, which has already become proverb- ial. "3 In the meantime it has become a commonplace in criticism of Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation that there is more to Nietzsche than meets Heidegger's eye; much of that criticism has placed the blame on Heidegger's evaluation and treatment of the posthumously published notes.
3 Martin Heidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik (Tiibingen: M. Niemeyer, 1953), p. 134; English translation by Ralph Manheim, An Introduction to Metaphysics (Gar- den City: Anchor-Doubleday, 1961), p. 147.
260 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
A more finely differentiated criticism is called for. In the confined space of these "contexts" I would like to examine at least three aspects of the problem: first, Hcideggcr's treatment of the early notes on eter- nal recurrence from the years 1881-82; second, his treatment of Nietz- sche's plans for a magnum opus during the years 1884 to 1888, plans dominated during the middle years by the title Der Wille zur Macht, with special reference to the position of eternal return in those plans; and third, the nature of Hcidegger's own research at the Nietzsche- Archive in Wcimar in the late 1930s and early 1940s and the extent of his familiarity with the holograph materials. Discussion of these three aspects may contribute to a more balanced critique and appreciation of that truly proverbial Heidcggerian method of exegesis.
Nietzsche's earliest notes on eternal recurrence of the same appear in the notebook labeled M III 1 in the Nietzsche-Archive. 4 This notebook embraces a great variety of themes-although such variety is typical of almost all the notebooks-from the mild aroma of tea and the stimulus of coffee to the depredations of Occidental moralities. The sheer variety tempts one to adopt the minimalist strategy of Jacques Derrida, who suggests that all of Nietzsche's notes arc as resistant to interpretation as one we find in the subsequent notebook (N V 7 [62]): "'I forgot my umbrella. '"5 However playful Derrida's minimalism may be-inasmuch as his own willingness to interpret Nietzsche's texts quite seriously is visible throughout Spurs-it serves as a warning to all who trespass on the Nachlass. Particular fragments leap out at the reader (different ones to different readers) and there is no way to take a high, abstract view of these materials. Walter Kaufmann phrase! d it well years ago: " . . . we look into a vast studio, full of sketches, drafts, abandoned attempts, and unfinished dreams. And in the end we should be less tempted than ever to mistake a random quotation for an ultimate position. "6
4 In CM this notebook is found at V/2, 339-474; in the Studienausgabe, which I will be citing throughout the Analysis, at 9, 44I-575.
5 See Jacques Derrida, Eperons (Paris: Garnier Flammarion, 1978), pp. 103 If. Read- ers will be relieved to know that the missing umbrella has been found and returned to the pages of Research in Phenomenology, XIII (1983), 175-82.
6 See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 557.
Analysis 26I
That said, I do want to compare my own reading of M III I to Heidegger's. In my view the following three points may safely be made concerning the contents of this notebook. First, notes on a variety of problems in the natural sciences obtrude, reflecting Nietzsche's study of a number of "popularizing" works on mechanics, chemistry, and physiology. 7 The notes on eternal recurrence are thus embedded in preoccupations with the notion of Kraft, physical, cosmic, and organic force or energy. Second, many of the notes contained in M III I are early drafts of passages in The Gay Science. For example, a number of the words whispered by that demon who steals upon us in our loneliest loneliness appear scattered throughout the notebook in slightly different form. Whereas the demon of The Gay Science speculates in what way the thought of eternal return would transform you "if that thought carrie to prevail in you" (Wenn jener Gedanke iiber dich
Gewalt bekiime), the earlier note [I43] betrays a more naturalistic flavor: "If you incorporate the thought of thoughts into yourself. . . . " (Wenn du dir den Gedanken der Gedanken einverleibst. . . ). And third, the notes (especially the outlines and plans) concerning eternal return do seem to possess the special significance in M III I that Heidegger ascribes to them. Whatever unity the notebook manifests derives from the thought of recurrence. There is in fact a great deal of material on "the world's circulation" that Heidegger does not cite in support of his interpretation. Yet these same notes also betray a more tentative and "experimental" character than the material Heidegger presents. Specifically, Nietzsche is undecided about whether or not a finite source of cosmic energy can in an infinite time produce situations that are precisely the same: the return of the "same" is not confidently proclaimed here as a doctrine but debated back and forth as a possibility. The greater number of notes support the "conclusion" that recurrence of the same is plausible, but a considerable range of
7 Among these works are: (I) J. R. Mayer, Thermal Mechanics, 1874; (2) the first volume of J. G. Vogt, Force: a Realist-Monistic View of the World, 1878, which treats "the energy of contraction, the single ultimate mechanical-causal form by which the world substrate works its effects"; (3) Wilhelm Roux, The Struggle ofParts in the Organ- ism, 1881, which represents "the doctrine of mechanistic teleology", and (4) a transla- tion of Herbert Spencer's Ethics published in 1879.
262 THE ETER! \:AL RECURRENCE m· THE SAME
notes cast doubt on the entire matter. 8 Perhaps the principal flaw in Heidegger's presentation of these notes and plans from late summer, 1881, is that it pays insufficient heed to the tensions and misgivings that pervade the thought of recurrence. The principal virtue of his presentation is its avoidance of the selection of notes taken up into The Will to Power and its detailed criticisms of the Grossoktavausgabe treatment of M III 1.
Turning now to the second area of inquiry, we may ask whether Heidegger's treatment of the plans from the period 1884-88 (the so- called "Will to Power" period) is adequate. Since Heidegger depended on the GOA for the Nachlass texts-in spite of whatever direct access he may have had in the 1930s to the manuscripts themselves-this question implies a further one: How satisfactory is the GOA selection of those plans? Finally, what is the relationship between the thought of eternal recurrence and the hypothesis of will to power during these years? Does eternal return retain its early supremacy as Nietzsche's thought of thoughts up to the end?
In an effort to reply to these questions I have catalogued some 140 plans and titles projected by Nietzsche for his major philosophical work between 1884 and 1889. I should emphasize that I deliberately overlooked several series of plans, namely, those that seemed mere reiterations or only slight modifications of immediately preceding ones. Merely to list the catalogue numbers of these notes would fill a page of text, so that in what follows I will refer to but a small selection of the relevant materials.
Our first response to these questions must be that Heidegger does follow the GOA in streamlining the astonishing variety and complexity of Nietzsche's plans for a magnum opus. For instance, in the year 1884 alone we find plans and titles (most of them foreshadowing themes taken up into Beyond Good and Evil) such as the following: Philosophy ofthe Future, Wisdom and Love ofWisdom, The Way to
8 Among the many notes that affirm the plausibility of a repetition of the "same," see numbers 152, 232, 245, 269, and 305; doubts are forcefully expressed however in frag- ments such as 202, 254, 292, 293, 311, 313, and 321. It is also noteworthy that one of the earliest references to the notion of will to power in Nietzsche's thought occurs in the second-to-last note of this same notebook: number 346.
Analysis 263
Wisdom, To the Wind "Mistral", The New Hierarchy, To the Higher Men, The New Enlightenment, The Good European, and Knowledge and Conscience. Nevertheless, Heidegger is correct when he asserts that the thought of eternal return dominates the plans and titles early in this period, during the years 1884-85. A representative example is the following plan (W I 1 [6]; cf. [323]) from the spring of 1884:
The Eternal Return
A Prophecy First Major Division "It Is Time! "
Second Major Division
The Magnificent Midday
Third Major Division
The Oathtakers
The thought of eternal recurrence appears to suffer eclipse in the course of the year 1885, especially as the notion of will to power,"the ultimate fact we come down to" (WI 7a [61]), assumes preeminence. Yet in a list of his "Collected Works" drawn up in late summer of 1885 (W I 5 [1]) Nietzsche cites after Thus Spoke Zarathustra a projected work with the following title: Midday and Eternity: A Seer's Legacy. In the plans for the volume to be entitled The Will to Power the thought of return at first seems to retreat, only to emerge once again as the very culmination of that project. Among plans from late 1885 through 1886 (W I 8 [70-75]) we find both will to power and eternal recurrence at first subordinated to the themes of Beyond Good and Evil, but then eternal return and "Midday and Eternity" reappear as main titles. Eter- nal return is often the fourth and culminating division of such plans, so that, as Heidegger suggests, will to power indeed appears to be in service to Nietzsche's "most burdensome thought. " In a plan from the summer of 1886 [100] the thought of eternal return seems to have
receded before the issues of nihilism, revaluation, legislation, and "the hammer,"all of which (except perhaps the last) Heidegger would con- sider manifestations of value thinking, Wertdenken. Yet later in the same notebook we find a plan [129] for a separate volume with "eternal return" as its title:
264 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
TI1e Eternal Return Zarathustran Dances and Processions First Part: God's Wake
by Friedrich Nietzsche
I. God's Wake
2.
242 THE ETERNAL RECURREI'<CE OF THE SAME
cal position is captured in his doctrine of the eternal return of the same.
The first major division presents Nietzsche's own communications of eternal return. Yet a curious rift threatens its very structure. In the middle of his account of "On the Vision and the Riddle" (in section 6) Heidegger stops abruptly. The occasion for the caesura is that curious shift of scene in the vision-from the gateway "Moment" to the strick- en shepherd. Heidcgger does not recommence his account of the latter until section 24. In other words, sections 7 to 23, the bulk of the course as such, constitute a kind of parenthesis in Heidegger's analysis of the second (and principal) communication of eternal recurrence. The larger part of that parenthesis deals with Nietzsche's unpublished notes on eternal return. However, no matter how vital Heidegger be- lieves such notes to be, he carefully inserts his entire discussion of them into that communication of Nietzsche's entitled Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In fact, he begins to discuss the notes only after he has moved forward unobtrusively to the themes of Zarathustra's solitude, his animals, and his convalescence (sections 7 and 8). He even ad- vances to Nietzsche's third communication of eternal return, in Beyond Good and Evil. In retrospect, this unobtrusive move forward to "The Convalescent," seeking as it does to define the thought that is hardest to bear in terms of Nietzsche's own communication of it, is the most communicative gesture of the entire lecture course.
Heidegger begins (section 1) by affirming eternal recurrence as the fundamental thought of Nietzsche's philosophy. As a thought that reaches out toward being as a whole, eternal return of the same stands in vigorous opposition to the fundamental metaphysical positions represented by Platonism and by the Christian tradition as a whole. Nietzsche's fundamental thought has its immediate genesis (section 2) in the landscape of the Oberengadin, which Nietzsche first saw in 1881; yet echoes of it can be found in an early autobiographical sketch and in the late work Ecce Homo. Heidegger ventures into these auto- biographical texts, not in order to reduce eternal return to a mere confession of faith on Nietzsche's part, but to establish as the funda- mental task of Nietzsche's life the thinking of eternal recurrence of the
Analysis 243
same. Nietzsche communicates the thought only reluctantly, crypti- cally, and leaves most of his notes concerning it unpublished. His first communication of it (section 3), in The Gay Science, portrays eternal recurrence as "the greatest burden," that is, a thought that both in- quires into being as a whole and testifies to the thinker's "loneliest loneliness. " The affirmation of existence-of our lives as we have lived them-and of the ceaseless reiteration of the same is tied to what Hei- degger calls the "authentic appropriation" of our existence as a "self. " Perhaps for that reason the thought of return (section 4) is said to be the hardest to bear of all thoughts, the tragic thought par excellence. To think it is to join Zarathustra in the fateful and fatal adventure of downgoing (Untergang) and transition (Ubergang). The "eternity" of eternal return provides nothing resembling sanctuary from time, death, or decision.
The second communication of the thought (section 5) occurs in and as Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Nietzsche creates the figure of Zarathustra for the express purpose of communicating his thought of thoughts. The thought itself appears in that work in "figures of speech," meta- phors, images, simulacra of all kinds; the how of the communication is at least as important as the what. The book Thus Spoke Zarathustra, written for everyone and no one, is for those who are learning to be beneficent to life. Yet the difficulties of reading-plus Heidegger's reservations concerning his own procedure-make all complacency impossible. The crucial section of the book proves to be "On the Vi- sion and the Riddle," which Heidegger proceeds to discuss (section 6). After a mammoth interruption (sections 7 to 23), he takes up the thread of the riddle in section 24, the culminating section of the first
major division of his course.
In section 6 Heidegger suggests that the riddle has to do with the
"loneliest loneliness" of the thinker who thinks the truth-that is, the openness and unconcealment, aletheia--of being as a whole. He re- counts Zarathustra's tale of his encounter with the spirit of gravity, the dwarf, at the gateway Augenblick, "Glance of an Eye," or "Moment. " The eternity that each avenue at the gateway traverses--one forward, the other rearward-is for the dwarf a matter of contempt. Thus a
244 THE ETERl\AL RECURREI\:CE OF THE SAME
common interpretation of eternal recurrence (as the cyclical nature of sacred time and the perfect ring of truth) is placed in the mouth of the dwarf who takes things too easily. For the thought itself, suggesting that "in an infinite time the course of a finite world is necessarily already completed," threatens to cripple all action in the present. When Zara- thustra poses his second question to the dwarf, whether "I and you in the gateway" must not have recurred countless times, the dwarf not only fails to reply but vanishes altogether. The spirit of gravity cannot adopt a stance of its own in the Moment and so must disappear, leav- ing riddlers to pose a number of questions concerning the gateway and its avenues--questions such as (l) the infinity of past and future time, (2) the reality or actuality of time as something more than a mere form of intuition, and (3) the finite existence of beings in time. These are among the questions that propel Heidegger to Nietzsche's unpublished notes.
However, before he takes up the suppressed notes Heidegger turns his attention to the animals that accompany Zarathustra up to a certain point in his convalescence (sections 7-8) and to the third communica- tion of eternal return as circulus vitiosus deus (section 9). These sec- tions constitute no mere interlude in Heidegger's account. In "The Convalescent" (section 8), which we must now recall more closely, Heidegger in fact appears to reach the core of Nietzsche's second com- munication of eternal return.
Zarathustra's animals, his proud eagle and discerning serpent, are the companions and enforcers of his solitude. Their conjunction, a vortex of coils and rings, yields the most compelling emblem of recur- rence. The animals speak to Zarathustra of eternal return during the latter's convalescence, which is the culmination of his downgoing. Their master must recuperate from the encounter with his own most abysmal thought, his own ultimate recess, which he has not yet truly incorporated. The circle of recurrence proves to be the circle of life and suffering; however much the eagle of its emblem soars, the circle itself tends to Untergang. Under the weight of his most abysmal thought, Zarathustra collapses. Seven days and nights he lies prostrate, feeding on the red and yellow berries his pride has fetched, berries of semblance and passionate creativity, the colors of will to power as
Analysis 245
eternal recurrence. The animals now try to seduce Zarathustra back into the world, as though it were a garden of delights rather than the theater of tragedy. The thought of eternal return-seduction and so- briety, intoxication and lucidity, contemptuous grumbling and rhap- sodic song, satyr-play and tragedy, the conjunction in each case bridging the smallest gap-must now become Zarathustra's thought. Yet the suspicion obtrudes that Zarathustra's animals are humming the dwarfs own ditty. How can the difference between the thought's two modes of reception be preserved? What decides whether there is any difference at all? Not for nothing is the thought of return both the hardest to bear and the most difficult: to think being as a whole as eternal displacement of the goal is to utter "a cry of distress and calami- ty," and . not to whistle a happy tune.
What turns the doctrine into a ditty? The assurance that all is bound for Emersonian compensation-though, to be fair, Emerson too, as Nietzsche well knew, had recurrent doubts-implies that we may dis- pense with all decision. Thus the dwarf makes light of the thought of return. He refuses to abandon his perch on the periphery and to enter the gateway itself. He declines to stand in the Moment. Viewed from the sidelines, the two avenues diverge as if to meet indifferently in some distant eternity. Yet when a self stands in the gateway where past and future "affront one another" and "collide," existence ceases to be a spectator sport. In the "flash of an eye" the thinker must look both fore and aft, "turned in two ways," and must study the internecine strife of time. "Whoever stands in the Moment lets what runs counter to itself come to collision, though not to a standstill, by cultivating and sustaining the strife between what is assigned him as a task and what has been given him as his endowment. " It is the effrontery of time that in it we collide against mortality and strive with it, closing in the glance of an eye and not in some remote infinity. Nevertheless, the strife of time dare not provoke our revulsion or antagonism; it is not effrontery after all but an affronting, or better, a confronting. To stand in the Moment-to be the Moment-is to decide how everything recurs. Certain matters are of course already decided. The eternal re- turn of the Last Man, the little man, for example. As though he had as much right to the gateway as one's self. Zarathustra's heroism rests in
246 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
his having gone to meet his supreme suffering-the eternal recurrence of the Last Man-as well as his supreme hope-the inception of over- man. At this juncture Heidegger reminds us of the motto inscribed over his own lecture course, as over a gateway: "Everything in the hero's sphere turns to tragedy. . . . " With Zarathustra the tragic era begins. Tragic insight has nothing to do with either pessimism or opti- mism, "inasmuch as in its willing and in its knowing it adopts a stance toward being as a whole, and inasmuch as the basic law of being as a whole consists in struggle. " In such struggle the teacher of eternal return must come to understand himself as transition and demise, Obergang and Untergang. "In the end, Zarathustra hears which eterni- ty it is that his animals are proclaiming to him, the eternity of the Moment that embraces everything in itself at once: the downgoing. "
Thus the entire discussion of Nietzsche's first two communications of eternal return, in The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, respectively, comes to a head in section 8, "The Convalescent. " The first communication stresses the essentially tragic nature of beings in general, the second the tragic insight gained in the glance of the e y e - eternity as the Moment. These communications converge, according to Heidegger, in the matter of thinking, namely, thinking eternal recurrence in the essential context of the question of being as a whole, in pursuit of Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position. The third communication of eternal return (section 9) takes us one step closer to that position.
The third communication proceeds from "Zarathustra the godless" to "the quintessence of religion. " The latter is the circulus vitiosus deus, the "ring" of recurrence that conjoins divinity and " 'world' per- haps? " Because the Christian God of morality is utterly dead, the ques- tion of world, of being as a whole, becomes compelling. The question itself necessitates the creation of gods and the re-creation of humanity. Reason enough to call it the greatest burden! The circulus vitiosus itself exhibits the trajectory of downgoing, the descensional movement of tragic inquiry.
Heidegger's reading of the posthumously published notes on eternal recurrence (sections 10-21) is preceded by a warning "that Nietzsche's own mode of communication" in his published writings must set the
Analysis 247
standard. Heidegger recognizes that his own procedure is duplex and even duplicitous: his interpretation must be guided by a prior sense of the questions at stake in eternal recurrence-lest it be a mere rehash;- and yet that interpretation must be undertaken in a spirit of "meticu- lous deference" to Nietzsche's own texts. Heidegger divides the sup- pressed notes (section 10) into three principal groups: (1) those stemming from the initial discovery of the thought of return in 1881- 82; (2) those from the period of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 1883-84; and (3) those pertaining to plans for a major work, roughly, 1884-88. He criticizes the lack of order in the first group as presented in the Gross- oktav edition and the editors' division of the notes into "theoretical" and "poetical" groups. Principal themes in the first group are those of "incorporation," foreshadowing the lesson of Zarathustra's convales- cence, and of "teaching" and "decision," the latter to have an impact on being as a whole now that mankind has reached its "midday. " Heidegger attempts a summary presentation (section 12) of Nietzsche's doctrine as contained in the first group of notes: eternal return applies to the world in its collective character, or to being as a whole, whether animate or inanimate; that character shows itself as force, limited force, the world totality thus proving to be finite; although "infinite" in
the sense of "immeasurable," the world totality exists as exertions of limited force in bounded space and unlimited time ("eternity"). Force, finitude, perpetual Becoming, immeasurability, bounded space, and infinite time are all predicates of chaos. Yet the crucial issue turns out to be, not this or that cosmological speculation on chaos, but Nietz- sche's "negative ontology," as it were, in which one must be on guard against every humanization and deification of being as a whole. For Nietzsche the world as such is an arreton. The "necessitous" character of cosmic chaos is to guide us toward the notion of eternal return. Bl! t how? It is precisely in the thought of return that the circle or ring of humanity and being as a whole is joined (section 13). Thus it is a matter neither of pseudo-scientific skepticism nor of religious faith, but of questioning being as a whole. Such questioning bears a special rela- tion to language. Yet neither Nietzsche nor philosophy prior to him raises that question adequately.
Whatever his notebooks might suggest, Nietzsche does not try to
248 TilE ETER:>;AL RECURREt\0: OF THE SAi\·ll~
"prove" eternal return "scientifically" (sections 14-16). The finitude of Becoming and the necessary recurrence of the same in infinite time remain staples of Nietzsche's thought; yet Nietzsche himself is keenly aware of the dilemma in which his passion to eliminate anthropomor- phisms places him with regard to all such staples, When he opts for both dehumanization and maximal humanization in will to power, he compels but does not elaborate the question of Da-sein. The thought of return cannot be designated as a "belief" (section 17), unless we are willing and able to reinterpret the meaning of religion and of all tak- ing-for-true. The latter is not only an expression of Nietzsche's passion to dehumanize, however; Heidegger stresses the sense of creative knowing, giving, and loving-the sense of thoughtful possibility. The thought of return therefore involves the problem of freedom and neces- sity (section 18), not as an antinomy of reason, but as an invitation to rethink the temporality of the moment as a matter of and for decision. Such decision, Heidegger says, is a taking up of one's self into the willing act. Yet precisely how this is to occur Nietzsche never managed to communicate. Heidegger suggests that while such taking up is an authentic appropriation of self it is also the propriative event for histori- cal mankind as a whole. As Ereignis, eternal recurrence of the same displays the covert, essential relationship of time to being as a whole. Yet it is a time, we might add, which for Heidegger hovers somewhere between the ecstatic temporality of individualized Dasein and the essentially historical unfolding of Being. The latter, in 1937, is still beguiled by the hollow rhetoric of "peoples" and "nations" in "com- petition with one another. "
The posthumously published notes from 1881-82 (section 19) al- ready stress the fact that the thought of return refers to being as a whole and to the need for a thinker and teacher to execute its thinking. The notes from the Zarathustra period (section 20) demonstrate that the thought of return is most resistant to incorporation, unless it be con- ceived as redemption from the flux of Becoming. Such redemption does not freeze the flow of Becoming, but, in the moment of decision, prevents Becoming from being reduced to endless repetition. All de- pends on how the possibility of recurrence is thought through. "Nietz- sche knows only thoughts that have to be wrestled with. " Finally, the
Analysis 249
unpublished materials from 1884 to 1888 (section 21) indicate the way in which eternal recurrence dominates Nietzsche's philosophy of will to power. Eternal return is the culminating thought for will to power, both as an interpretation of all occurrence and as a revaluation of all values. Eternal return is the essential counterthrust to nihilism. Hei- degger's principal question directed to the notes taken up into The Will to Power, is as follows: "How do will to power, as the pervasive consti- tution of beings, and the eternal return of the same, as the mode of Being of beings as a whole, relate to one another? " The relationship cannot be expressed in terms of conditions or presuppositions.
Yet what if the will to power, according to Nietzsche's most proper and intrinsic intentions, were in itself nothing else than a willing back to that which was and a willing forward to everything that has to be? What if eternal recurrence of the same--as occurrence--were nothing other than the will to power, precisely in the way Nietzsche himself understands this phrase. . . ? If matters stood this way, then the designation of being as will to power would only be an elaboration of the original and primary projection of being as eternal recurrence of the same. In truth, matters do stand this way.
Thus it is not so much that Nietzsche's thinking of will to power and eternal return must be reduced to the metaphysical categories of es- sentia and existentia. It is rather that the mysterious coherence of these two notions impels the question "as to what is being thought here in general and how it is being thought. " The conjunction of the what and how Heidegger formulates as Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position.
In order to bring the first major division of his course to its question, Heidegger inquires into the "configuration" of the doctrine of return (section 22) and its "domain" (section 23). By configuration, Gestalt, Heidegger means the inner structure of the doctrine's truth, that is, the openness of being that shows itself in it. His strategy is to study the three axes in Nietzsche's plans for a magnum opus, to wit, eternal return, will to power, and revaluation of all values. Yet Heidegger is aware that merely to juggle these titles is an extrinsic procedure that may never catch sight of the "inner structure" of Nietzsche's philos- ophy. Because the thought of return involves the thinker and his his-
250 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
torical moment, the question of its domain, Bereich, assumes preemi- nence. The thought's domain is staked out by nihilism, the event in which being as a whole comes to nothing. Nietzsche's thought is a countermovement to nihilism, eternal recurrence its counterthought. Eternal recurrence shares in the essence of nihilism inasmuch as it commits the goallessness of being to eternity-"the nothing ('meaning- lessness') eternally! "-and yet its creative impulse, "in its character as decision, the character of the moment," shows that eternal return is "the thought that wends its way toward the need as such. " Hence Heidegger's return to the crucial matter of the Augenblick, the mo- ment of eternal recurrence, in section 24.
Section 24 is to bring the first major division of Heidegger's course to a close. Heidegger returns to that point in Zarathustra's account of "The Vision and the Riddle" where a baying hound announces a strik- ing change of scene. The change is to indicate what is decisive in the image of the gateway "Moment" or "Glance of an Eye. " The dog's howling sends Zarathustra racing back to his childhood-the period in Nietzsche's life which Heidegger associates with Schopenhauerian pes- simism and Wagnerian delirium. Yet the vision of the young shepherd and his black snake is a matter of nihilism, not pessimism. Nihilism must be overcome from the inside, bitten off at the head; that bite alone introduces man to golden laughter and the gay science. It now becomes clear why Heidegger moved forward (in section 8) to "The Convalescent," inasmuch as it is here that we learn the identity of the young shepherd-it is Zarathustra himself, seeking to recover from the poison of his contempt for man. It also becomes clear why Zarathustra cannot be fooled by eternal recurrence as a hurdy-gurdy song. To think return is to bite decisively into the repulsive snake of nihilism; it is to choose between the two ways to say "It is all alike," the two ways to define man's fundamental position within being as a whole.
Eternal return thus has its proper content, not in the trite assertion "Everything turns in a circle," but in a dual movement by which the thought recoils on the thinker and the thinker is drawn into the thought. That dual movement occurs when eternal recurrence is thought, first, in terms of the moment, "the temporality of indepen- dent action and decision," and second, in terms of nihilism, the "con-
Analysis 251
clition of need" that defines both the task and the endowment be- queathed to contemporary man. Heidegger stresses the first, "the mo- ment of being-a-self," in an explicit reference back to the analysis of Dasein in Being and Time. Yet the "moment" is now a far more "epochal" gateway than it was in 1927: the focus falls equally on the propriative event of nihilism. The recoil of eternal recurrence on Mar- tin Heidegger is felt in the insistent question of the relation between thought and thinker-the question of what calls on us to think. In the present case, that is how the thinker "slips into the ring of eternal recurrence, indeed in such a way as to help achieve the ring, help decide it. "
The fragmentary "second major division" of Heidegger's course in- quires into the essence and possibility of "fundamental metaphysical positions" in Western philosophy (section 25), as well as into the spe- cific matter of Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position (section 26). Its ironic thesis is that in Western philosophy the metaphysical
Grundstellung is such that the Grundfrage never gets asked: the guid- ing question "What is being? " is not explicated as such. Heidegger's question with regard to Nietzsche is why the relationship of thought and thinker, "the recoil that includes and the inclusion that recoils," becomes so conspicuous with him; presumably, that question is not unrelated to Heidegger's own unrelenting efforts to unfold and develop the guiding question of metaphysics. Philosophy inquires into the arche, the rise and dominion of being as a whole; it takes the beings of physis or "nature" as definitive, although the role of man among the various regions of beings vies with nature for preeminence; it seeks an answer to the question of what being is. The one thing it does not do is unfold the guiding question itself, pose the historical grounding question. The latter confronts something which again may not be to- tally unrelated to Nietzsche, namely, the nothing that surrounds and insidiously pervades the field of being as a whole.
Thus the most durable and unfailing touchstone of genuineness and force- fulness of thought in a philosopher is the question as to whether or not he or she experiences in a direct and fundamental manner the nearness of the nothing in the Being of beings. Whoever fails to experience it remains forever outside the realm of philosophy, without hope of entry.
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Finally, Heidegger's effort to unfold the guiding question by way of the grounding question notes that each time the guiding question is raised one region of beings rises to set the definitive standard for being as a whole; and this may have something to do with the theme of "humani- zation" discussed so penetratingly in section 13.
The original title of Heidegger's lecture course as listed in the uni- versity catalogue was "Nietzsche's Fundamental Metaphysical Position in Western Thinking: the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence of the Same. " Perhaps the principal difficulty the course encounters is that whereas Nietzsche's position is identified as the end, accomplishment, or fulfillment of metaphysics, the doctrine of return is seen (at least partly) as a response to the traditional, undeveloped guiding question of metaphysics. Heidegger begins by aligning Nietzsche's two replies to that question-will to power and eternal return-with the traditional distinction between the constitution of being (essentia) and its way to be (existentia). He asserts the coherence of these two answers. Yet before proceeding to demonstrate that coherence Heidegger further de- fines Nietzsche's position at the end of metaphysics. It is the end, Heidegger suggests, because it reaches back to the pseudo-Par- menidean and pseudo-Heraclitean responses to the guiding question, insisting that being both becomes and is. Thus Nietzsche interlocks these responses in such a way that they yield no further food for thought. However, because these responses are in effect derivative Platonistic interpretations of early Greek thinking, the commencement of Western thought remains curiously untouched by the Nietzschean closure. The interlocking takes place when Nietzsche delineates being as both perpetual creation (hence Becoming) and ineluctable fixation (hence Being as permanence of presence). Creative transfiguration too, and not merely metaphysico-moral thought, require the stability that fixation alone grants. The entire question of Nietzsche's fundamental
metaphysical position therefore rests on the further question of what it means that we wish to "imprint the emblem of eternity on our life! " A "recoining" and creative transfiguration of Becoming are to occur. In such reconfiguration Becoming would attain subsistence (Bestand), subsistence of course being the principal metaphysical designation of
Analysis 253
Being as permanence (Bestiindigkeit). However, Heidegger does not push the interpretation in this obvious direction; he insists on creation as transcendence and surpassment, confrontation in the moment of decision. He nonetheless fails to elaborate a positive interpretation of the mythic figure of Dionysos as a way of avoiding any Platonistic (mis)interpretation of creation. Instead, he insists that the Nietzschean inversion of the Platonic hierarchy represents the virtual entrenchment of Platonism. Entrenchment versus end: such is the ambivalence that characterizes Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche from start to finish.
At the end of his lecture course Heidegger tries to limn three intri- cate subjects with as many strokes of the pen, peremptory, suggestive, incomplete. First, he juxtaposes Nietzsche's ostensible position with his own Janus-headed counterposition vis-a-vis the commencement, the latter referring both to the beginnings of Western thought and the inauguration of "another" kind of thinking. Second, he discusses briefly the phrase amor fati in terms of both will to power and eternal return as expressions of resolute creativity in thought. Third, he offers a glimpse into his major philosophical work of the 1930s, Contributions
to Philosophy, when he invokes "telling silence" and the theme of language generally in his "other" commencement. The motto from Beyond Good and Evil on tragedy, satyr-play, and world recurs as an epigram of both commencement and close.
More than fifteen years separate the public lecture "Who Is Nietz- sche's Zarathustra? " from the lecture course on eternal recurrence. Yet the consistency of theme is remarkable. Not that the Heidegger/Nietz- sche confrontation experienced no ups and downs. In the early 1940s Heidegger's waxing anxiety concerning the will-to-will that then seemed on the rampage drew Nietzsche into its somber sphere. In·
1939, while lecturing on "Will to Power as Knowledge," Heidegger was jotting a number of notes on "Nietzsche's Metaphysics" that were devastatingly critical and even polemical: he called Nietzsche's meta- physics the most extreme form of alienation from Greek civilization, a turgid expression of planetary technology, a pan-European rather than a truly "German" style of thinking.
Not only did Nietzsche lack con-
254 THE ETERl'\AL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
ceptual rigor, even his enthusiasm for artistic creation boiled down to a fascination with technical achievement: the greatest stimulans to life was ultimately no more than an object of calculative thought, a pre- scription for "genius. " And so on.
The patient, measured reading of "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? " is thus a bit of a surprise. It seems as though in the early 1950s Heideg- ger executed a sympathetic return to Nietzsche-not primarily as the metaphysician of will to power and technician of artistic frenzy but as the thinker of eternal recurrence. The lecture "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? " springs from the 1951-52 lecture course at Freiburg en- titled "What Calls for Thinking? " There Heidegger calls Nietzsche, not the last metaphysician, but the last thinker of the Western world. 1 Here too Heidegger stresses the difficulty of Nietzsche's thought in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra: no matter how intoxicating its language may be, the book's "fundamental thought" and "provenance" remain sobering challenges. In "What Calls for Thinking? " Heidegger advises his students to equip themselves for these challenges by studying Aristotle for ten or fifteen years! In "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? " (as in the second part of "What Calls for Thinking? ") Heidegger conjoins the names of Nietzsche and Parmenides.
Zarathustra is the advocate of life, suffering, and the circle. He teaches the doctrines of eternal recurrence and overman. The circle of life and suffering and the coherence of will to power, eternal return, and overman take center stage in Heidegger's reflections. At the begin- ning and end of his lecture stands the emblem of Zarathustra's ani- mals, the sign of both Nietzsche's and Heidegger's longing. Eagle and serpent are totems of Zarathustra, the thinker of eternal return, and talismans for Heidegger, who thinks the relationship of Being and hu- man being. The teaching of eternal recurrence is nothing whimsical: dismay marks Zarathustra's very style, consternation in the face of his most abysmal thought. Nor is the doctrine of overman an expression of boldness and presumption. "Over-man" Heidegger defines as "that hu-
1 Martin Heidegger, Was heisst Denken? (Tiibingen: M. Niemeyer, 1954), p. 61. English translation by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, What Is Called Thinking? (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 46.
Analysis 255
man being who goes beyond prior humanity solely in order to conduct such humanity for the first time to its essence. " Overman is Nietz- sche's answer to the question of whether man is prepared to assume dominion over the earth. Heidegger's own reflection has less to do with achieving dominion than with rescuing the earth; yet he puts this dif- ference in abeyance and focuses on Zarathustra as the teacher of eter- nal return. That teaching points the way of transition to the overman, although the destination itself remains remote. If dismay is the first of Zarathustra's characteristics, then the second is longing. The episode "On the Great Longing" begins with Zarathustra's invocation of "To- day," "One day," and "Formerly" as aspects of the perpetual now of eternity. True, Nietzsche's is an eternity of recurrence rather than a
nunc stans; yet the tendency of Heidegger's argument here is to reduce the doctrine of return to familiar metaphysical structures.
A second thrust of inquiry now intervenes and proves to be less familiar. Once again the theme of time occupies the spotlight, when Heidegger asks about the bridge to overman. That bridge is called "Redemption from the Spirit of Revenge," and revenge is defined as man's ill will toward time and its "It was. " Nietzsche diagnoses such revenge at the heart of all the tradition held most sacrosanct, including its ''best reflection. " His understanding of revenge is thus metaphysi- cal, in the sense that he understands it as having determined man's relation to all being. If in modern metaphysics man's best reflection is
representation (Vorstellen), the shadow of representation is persecution (Nachstellen). In the defiant projection of beings in modern meta- physics and science, in its aggressive disparagement of transiency, Hei- degger discerns something that more than resembles revenge. He will later shrink from the full consequences of his own discovery and en- deavor to "leave the question open"; yet these pages on revenge, which the earlier lecture course needed but did not find, retain their own force.
The introduction of Schelling's identification of primal Being as willing has a double edge in Heidegger's text. One edge cuts Nietz- sche, the philosopher of will; the other cuts metaphysics, the tradition of ill will. It remains to be seen whether Heidegger himself escapes
256 THE ETERl'\AL RECURREI\CE OF THE SAl\1E
unscathed. The forceful analysis of revenge now deepens into an in- quiry into time. Most surprising perhaps is the fact that now the "It was" of time all but swallows the two remaining ecstases or phases of time. Whereas in Being and Time and the writings surrounding it the priority of the future is emphasized again and again as the origin of transcendence, projection, and existentiality, it is now the passing away of time that marks time's essential unfolding: time, and that means, its "It was. " From Plato's disparagement of me on to Schel- ling's embrace of "eternity" and "independence from time" the ill will toward time and transiency vents its subtle spleen. Yet Heidegger em- phasizes not the deprecation of the sensuous realm as such but the sheer distinction between being and a supratemporal ideality, the cho- rismos or gap, that runs through metaphysics from its inception to its end.
What may grant redemption from the revulsion against time? Nietz- sche does not embrace the Schopenhauerian solution-dissolution of the will as such. He wills instead that transiency perdure. Such perdur- ance can obtain only as eternal recurrence of the same. Heidegger is quick to remind us that in traditional metaphysics "eternity" is predi- cated of primal Being. At this point he once again invokes the essential coherence of eternal return and overman. Eternal return appears to assume preeminence-as the thought that would liberate reflection from revenge and so lead to the overman. Once again Heidegger in- vokes the spectacle of Zarathustra's animals, the emblem of interfused circles, as indicative of the essential affinity of Nietzsche's two princi- pal doctrines and as mimetic of the very Being of beings, eternal recur- rence. And once again the "Recapitulation" note (WM, 617) assumes its central place in Heidegger's interpretation. On the basis of that note Heidegger attributes to Nietzsche himselfthe supreme will to power, that is, the will to stamp Being (as perdurance, stability, fixity, perma- nence of presence) on Becoming. Overlooking the second sentence in that note, which begins, "Twofold falsification. . . ," Heidegger asks whether eternal recurrence itself may not be reduced to such coinage, whether it therefore does not conceal in itself an even more highly spiritualized spirit of revenge than that contained in prior reflection.
He adduces a note from the Nachlass which attributes an "extreme
Analysis 257
exuberance of revenge" to Nietzsche's own will to be life's advocate. And so the case seems to be closed. 2
The lecture "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? " reaches its climax in Heidegger's avowal that Zarathustra's doctrine of eternal return fails to achieve redemption from revenge. His avowal is not meant as a refuta- tion or critique of the Nietzschean philosophy but as a query-an inquiry into the extent to which "Nietzsche's thought too is animated
2 It may be worthwhile noting that Heidegger's reduction of eternal return to a "stamp- ing" of Being on Becoming, overlooking as it does the reservations in WM, 617 ("two- fold falsification"; "closest approximation"), brings his interpretation discomfitingly close to that of Alfred Baeumler. In Chapter Seven of Nietzsche: Philosopher and Politician (Leipzig: P. Reclam, 1931), pp. 79 ff. , Baeumler writes:
At its highpoint the philosophy of will to power and eternal Becoming shifts to the concept of Being. Being is. . . . The problem of the transition from Becoming to Being greatly preoccupied Nietzsche. The doctrine of eternal return belongs among the most famous elements of his philosophy. Objectively considered, this doctrine is nothing else than an attempt to cancel the image of eternal Becoming and to substi- tute for it an image of eternal Being. . . .
Baeumler proceeds to cite WM, 617 precisely in the way Heidegger will later cite it, that is, omitting the second sentence ("Zwiefache Fiilschung . . . ") and indeed the bulk of the note. The result is that eternal recurrence ceases to be the "closest approximation" of a world of Becoming to one of Being, and is reduced to a metaphysical conception pure and simple-hence a conception that could hardly redeem prior reflection from the spirit of revenge. The notion of eternal recurrence, says Baeumler, threatens to "cancel the system" by imposing Parmenidean Being on Heraclitean flux. His formulation here too foreshadows Heidegger's own. Yet for Baeumler eternal return is "without impor- tance" when viewed from the standpoint of Nietzsche's system. Whereas will to power is a "formula for occurrence in general" and thus has "objective sense," eternal recurrence of the same-arising as it does during a time when Nietzsche was "still underway to the system of will to power," a time when he was still "transported by the pipes of the Dionysian Pied Piper" and "led down the garden path" (85)-is no more than a "subjec- tive," "personal," and "religious" Erlebnis (80-81). From the outset of his lecture series on Nietzsche, Heidegger is determined to resist Baeumler's repudiation of eternal recur- rence. Nevertheless, his own reading of WM, 617 brings him perilously close to the. point where Baeumler's exclusion of eternal return seems the only option.
Yet a footnote to this footnote is called for, lest the introduction ofBaeumler's reading of WM, 617 imply something like guilt by association. For Baeumler and Heidegger are by no means alone in reading the note this way: the late Giorgio Colli, principal editor of the new Kritische Gesamtausgabe of Nietzsche's works, surely one who harbored no sympathy for Alfred Baeumler, also cites the note in Baeumlerian fashion, designating it "a specifically metaphysical confession, a declaration on behalf of 'Being' ! " (See the Studienausgabe, CM, /3, 655. )
258 THE ETERI\'AL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
by the spirit of prior reflection. " Finally, Heidegger withdraws or re- treats from Nietzschean suspicion, he leaves "open" the question of revenge in prior thinking; at the same time he imputes to Nietzsche a mere inversion of the Platonic hierarchy, the inversion itself retaining the metaphysical distinction between true being and nonbeing. (The imputation, both here and in the 1937 lecture course, is all the more surprising inasmuch as in his first lecture course on Nietzsche Heideg- ger had shown that when the true world "finally becomes a fable" the very horizon for the Platonic hierarchy evanesces. ) Here once again the theme of Dionysos is not taken up positively but is equated with a still metaphysical conception of the sensuous. The upshot is that Zara- thustra the teacher remains a figure that appears within metaphysics at metaphysics' completion. Heidegger abandons the riddle of Zarathus- tra for the latter's enigmatic emblem, descrying in the encirclements of eagle and serpent a presentiment of "the relation of Being to that living being, man. "
Surely the most curious part of Heidegger's text is its addendum on eternal recurrence of the same. Eternal return, the "last thought of Western metaphysics," remains a riddle which we dare not try to es- cape. The first possible subterfuge, which declares that the thought is sheer mysticism, by now needs no further discussion-and, indeed, Heidegger's introduction of the Adamsian dynamo as an exemplar of eternal recurrence is nothing if not an embarrassment. More intriguing is the way in which criticism of the second possible subterfuge-attri- bution of the thought of eternal recurrence to earlier figures in the tradition such as Heraclitus, Plato, or Leibniz-recoils on Heidegger's own text. If one were to recall Heidegger's use of Schelling with regard to will, one might wonder whether Heidegger's "Note" does not blunt the edge that he would turn against Nietzsche. Similarly, the final words of the "Note," while they do reduce the meaning of Dionysos to metaphysics, concede that Nietzsche's most abysmal and abyssal thought "conceals something unthought, something which at the same time remains a sealed door to metaphysical thinking. "
As this outsized resume draws to a close, we shall have to find our way to some questions. Herewith a first attempt. Hcidegger's inquiry into revenge, the will's ill will toward time and transiency, marks an
Analysis 259
important advance over the 1937 lecture course. In section 12 of that course Heidegger complained that Nietzsche's notes on time-frag- mentary and all too traditional in import-revealed the fact that Nietz- sche had attained no insight into the role of time in the development of the guiding question of metaphysics. Why did the Nietzschean theme of revenge elude him then? Why even in 1953 does he pursue Nietzsche's analysis closely and convincingly, then abandon it in order to leave the matter "open"? Does this eluding, along with the apparent neglect of the emblem of Dionysos, reflect something of Heidegger's perennial fascination with Nietzsche as a thinker-even after he had apparently located Nietzsche securely within metaphysics, in order to proceed unencumbered toward his own "other" commencement?
II. CONTEXTS
The structure and movement of Heidegger's 1937 lecture course, especially its first major division, indicates that Heidegger felt obliged to divide his attention between Nietzsche's published and unpublished writings on eternal return. In no other lecture course does Heidegger pay such scrupulous attention to Nietzsche's communication of his thought in the figures, images, emblems, and tropes of Nietzsche's texts; and nowhere else does Heidegger devote so much time and ener- gy to a thoughtful reconstruction of the Nietzschean Nachlass. Here we find the fitting context for matters touching philology in Heideg- ger's reading of Nietzsche.
In 1935 Heidegger had asked his students whether what they were hearing in his courses was "a mere product of the violent and onesided Heideggerian method of exegesis, which has already become proverb- ial. "3 In the meantime it has become a commonplace in criticism of Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation that there is more to Nietzsche than meets Heidegger's eye; much of that criticism has placed the blame on Heidegger's evaluation and treatment of the posthumously published notes.
3 Martin Heidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik (Tiibingen: M. Niemeyer, 1953), p. 134; English translation by Ralph Manheim, An Introduction to Metaphysics (Gar- den City: Anchor-Doubleday, 1961), p. 147.
260 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
A more finely differentiated criticism is called for. In the confined space of these "contexts" I would like to examine at least three aspects of the problem: first, Hcideggcr's treatment of the early notes on eter- nal recurrence from the years 1881-82; second, his treatment of Nietz- sche's plans for a magnum opus during the years 1884 to 1888, plans dominated during the middle years by the title Der Wille zur Macht, with special reference to the position of eternal return in those plans; and third, the nature of Hcidegger's own research at the Nietzsche- Archive in Wcimar in the late 1930s and early 1940s and the extent of his familiarity with the holograph materials. Discussion of these three aspects may contribute to a more balanced critique and appreciation of that truly proverbial Heidcggerian method of exegesis.
Nietzsche's earliest notes on eternal recurrence of the same appear in the notebook labeled M III 1 in the Nietzsche-Archive. 4 This notebook embraces a great variety of themes-although such variety is typical of almost all the notebooks-from the mild aroma of tea and the stimulus of coffee to the depredations of Occidental moralities. The sheer variety tempts one to adopt the minimalist strategy of Jacques Derrida, who suggests that all of Nietzsche's notes arc as resistant to interpretation as one we find in the subsequent notebook (N V 7 [62]): "'I forgot my umbrella. '"5 However playful Derrida's minimalism may be-inasmuch as his own willingness to interpret Nietzsche's texts quite seriously is visible throughout Spurs-it serves as a warning to all who trespass on the Nachlass. Particular fragments leap out at the reader (different ones to different readers) and there is no way to take a high, abstract view of these materials. Walter Kaufmann phrase! d it well years ago: " . . . we look into a vast studio, full of sketches, drafts, abandoned attempts, and unfinished dreams. And in the end we should be less tempted than ever to mistake a random quotation for an ultimate position. "6
4 In CM this notebook is found at V/2, 339-474; in the Studienausgabe, which I will be citing throughout the Analysis, at 9, 44I-575.
5 See Jacques Derrida, Eperons (Paris: Garnier Flammarion, 1978), pp. 103 If. Read- ers will be relieved to know that the missing umbrella has been found and returned to the pages of Research in Phenomenology, XIII (1983), 175-82.
6 See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 557.
Analysis 26I
That said, I do want to compare my own reading of M III I to Heidegger's. In my view the following three points may safely be made concerning the contents of this notebook. First, notes on a variety of problems in the natural sciences obtrude, reflecting Nietzsche's study of a number of "popularizing" works on mechanics, chemistry, and physiology. 7 The notes on eternal recurrence are thus embedded in preoccupations with the notion of Kraft, physical, cosmic, and organic force or energy. Second, many of the notes contained in M III I are early drafts of passages in The Gay Science. For example, a number of the words whispered by that demon who steals upon us in our loneliest loneliness appear scattered throughout the notebook in slightly different form. Whereas the demon of The Gay Science speculates in what way the thought of eternal return would transform you "if that thought carrie to prevail in you" (Wenn jener Gedanke iiber dich
Gewalt bekiime), the earlier note [I43] betrays a more naturalistic flavor: "If you incorporate the thought of thoughts into yourself. . . . " (Wenn du dir den Gedanken der Gedanken einverleibst. . . ). And third, the notes (especially the outlines and plans) concerning eternal return do seem to possess the special significance in M III I that Heidegger ascribes to them. Whatever unity the notebook manifests derives from the thought of recurrence. There is in fact a great deal of material on "the world's circulation" that Heidegger does not cite in support of his interpretation. Yet these same notes also betray a more tentative and "experimental" character than the material Heidegger presents. Specifically, Nietzsche is undecided about whether or not a finite source of cosmic energy can in an infinite time produce situations that are precisely the same: the return of the "same" is not confidently proclaimed here as a doctrine but debated back and forth as a possibility. The greater number of notes support the "conclusion" that recurrence of the same is plausible, but a considerable range of
7 Among these works are: (I) J. R. Mayer, Thermal Mechanics, 1874; (2) the first volume of J. G. Vogt, Force: a Realist-Monistic View of the World, 1878, which treats "the energy of contraction, the single ultimate mechanical-causal form by which the world substrate works its effects"; (3) Wilhelm Roux, The Struggle ofParts in the Organ- ism, 1881, which represents "the doctrine of mechanistic teleology", and (4) a transla- tion of Herbert Spencer's Ethics published in 1879.
262 THE ETER! \:AL RECURRENCE m· THE SAME
notes cast doubt on the entire matter. 8 Perhaps the principal flaw in Heidegger's presentation of these notes and plans from late summer, 1881, is that it pays insufficient heed to the tensions and misgivings that pervade the thought of recurrence. The principal virtue of his presentation is its avoidance of the selection of notes taken up into The Will to Power and its detailed criticisms of the Grossoktavausgabe treatment of M III 1.
Turning now to the second area of inquiry, we may ask whether Heidegger's treatment of the plans from the period 1884-88 (the so- called "Will to Power" period) is adequate. Since Heidegger depended on the GOA for the Nachlass texts-in spite of whatever direct access he may have had in the 1930s to the manuscripts themselves-this question implies a further one: How satisfactory is the GOA selection of those plans? Finally, what is the relationship between the thought of eternal recurrence and the hypothesis of will to power during these years? Does eternal return retain its early supremacy as Nietzsche's thought of thoughts up to the end?
In an effort to reply to these questions I have catalogued some 140 plans and titles projected by Nietzsche for his major philosophical work between 1884 and 1889. I should emphasize that I deliberately overlooked several series of plans, namely, those that seemed mere reiterations or only slight modifications of immediately preceding ones. Merely to list the catalogue numbers of these notes would fill a page of text, so that in what follows I will refer to but a small selection of the relevant materials.
Our first response to these questions must be that Heidegger does follow the GOA in streamlining the astonishing variety and complexity of Nietzsche's plans for a magnum opus. For instance, in the year 1884 alone we find plans and titles (most of them foreshadowing themes taken up into Beyond Good and Evil) such as the following: Philosophy ofthe Future, Wisdom and Love ofWisdom, The Way to
8 Among the many notes that affirm the plausibility of a repetition of the "same," see numbers 152, 232, 245, 269, and 305; doubts are forcefully expressed however in frag- ments such as 202, 254, 292, 293, 311, 313, and 321. It is also noteworthy that one of the earliest references to the notion of will to power in Nietzsche's thought occurs in the second-to-last note of this same notebook: number 346.
Analysis 263
Wisdom, To the Wind "Mistral", The New Hierarchy, To the Higher Men, The New Enlightenment, The Good European, and Knowledge and Conscience. Nevertheless, Heidegger is correct when he asserts that the thought of eternal return dominates the plans and titles early in this period, during the years 1884-85. A representative example is the following plan (W I 1 [6]; cf. [323]) from the spring of 1884:
The Eternal Return
A Prophecy First Major Division "It Is Time! "
Second Major Division
The Magnificent Midday
Third Major Division
The Oathtakers
The thought of eternal recurrence appears to suffer eclipse in the course of the year 1885, especially as the notion of will to power,"the ultimate fact we come down to" (WI 7a [61]), assumes preeminence. Yet in a list of his "Collected Works" drawn up in late summer of 1885 (W I 5 [1]) Nietzsche cites after Thus Spoke Zarathustra a projected work with the following title: Midday and Eternity: A Seer's Legacy. In the plans for the volume to be entitled The Will to Power the thought of return at first seems to retreat, only to emerge once again as the very culmination of that project. Among plans from late 1885 through 1886 (W I 8 [70-75]) we find both will to power and eternal recurrence at first subordinated to the themes of Beyond Good and Evil, but then eternal return and "Midday and Eternity" reappear as main titles. Eter- nal return is often the fourth and culminating division of such plans, so that, as Heidegger suggests, will to power indeed appears to be in service to Nietzsche's "most burdensome thought. " In a plan from the summer of 1886 [100] the thought of eternal return seems to have
receded before the issues of nihilism, revaluation, legislation, and "the hammer,"all of which (except perhaps the last) Heidegger would con- sider manifestations of value thinking, Wertdenken. Yet later in the same notebook we find a plan [129] for a separate volume with "eternal return" as its title:
264 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE SAME
TI1e Eternal Return Zarathustran Dances and Processions First Part: God's Wake
by Friedrich Nietzsche
I. God's Wake
2.
