All these now reside in (the)
particular
states.
Hamilton - 1834 - Life on Hamilton - v2
" "The present national government
has no precedent, or experience to support it," and the
"general opinion was, that certain additional powers ought
to be given to congress. "
He was followed by Patterson, who observed, first, that
their plan accorded with their powers; second, that it ac-
cords with the "sentiments of the people. If the confed-
eration was radically defective, we ought to return to our
states and tell them so. He came not here to sport senti-
ments of his own, but to speak the sense of his constitu-
ents. " The "states treat as equal; the present compact
gives one vote to each state. By the articles of the con-
federation, 'alterations are to be made by congress, and all
the legislatures. ' All the parties to a contract must as-
sent to its dissolution. The states collectively have advan-
tages, in which the smaller states do not participate; there-
fore individual rules do not apply. "
The "force of government," he observed, "will not de-
pend on the proportion of representation, but on the quan-
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? 478 THE LIFE OF
tity of power. " "A check is not necessary in a general
government of communities, but in an individual state the
spirit of faction is to be checked. " "How have congress
hitherto conducted themselves? The people approve of
congress, but think they have not power enough. "
On a comparison of the different schemes of govern-
ment then before the convention, it is seen that Pinckney
would have clothed the legislature with the powers vested
in congress by the confederation, and also with the regu-
lation of commerce, the raising money by impost, and with
the control of the national force. The Virginia plan
would have conferred on the government powers supreme
in all questions of national interest; a negative on the laws
of the states, with an express declaration of a power to
exert the common force against a delinquent state.
Pinckney also proposed a single executive, while the
Virginia plan, having confided unlimited powers to the
legislature, would have vested the execution of those pow-
ers in a plural magistracy, ineligible a second time, con-
trolled by a council of revision constituted from the judi-
ciary, which would thus have become a political agent--
those powers to be exercised by a resort to force; to ob-
viate which, Madison is seen to have proposed a negative
on the laws of the states.
The Jersey plan was more objectionable. It created a
single legislative body, with the command of the purse and
the sword; derived its authority from the states; estab-
lished an equality of suffrage; proposed that a minority
should govern; contemplated partial objects of legisla-
tion ;* gave no negative upon that of the states; created
a plural executive, removable on the application of a ma-
jority of the executives of the states, without any negative
on the national legislature; and a judiciary, to be appoint-
* The revenue was to be derived from imposts, stamps, and postage.
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? HAMILTON.
479
ed by the executive, with power to try impeachments of
federal officers, but without any other original jurisdiction,
and without inferior tribunals.
Such were the forms of government in contemplation
for an empire of almost boundless territory, and destined
to contain a countless population.
As neither of these forms was adopted, and as the final
result was a compromise, it becomes necessary, in order
to judge correctly of the extent of Hamilton's influence
upon the character of that compromise, to trace the suc-
cessive opinions of leading members of the convention.
With this view, it will be remarked, while the plan of
Madison and Randolph submitted it as an open question,
whether " the right of suffrage in the national legislature
ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or
to the number of free inhabitants," that Hamilton was the
first to urge the latter as the true basis of a republican
government. *
Both Hamilton and Madison agreed that the choice of
the first branch of it should be by the people; but while
Hamilton would have derived the second branch, or senate,
also from the people. f Madison preferred that it should be
chosen by the first branch.
The proposition of Virginia gave the choice of the ex-
ecutive department of the government to the national
legislature. Hamilton, pursuing the great principle of a
popular government, was in favour of an executive to be
chosen by the people in districts through the medium of
electors.
Madison was the advocate of a plural executive, and
* Journal of Fed. Con. , pp. 67-83. "It was moved by Mr. Hamilton,
seconded by Mr. Spaight, that the resolution be altered so as to read: Re-
solved, that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be pro-
portioned to the number of free inhabitants. "
t Journal, 112. ,
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? ,180
THE LIFE OF
would have associated with it a revisionary council, to be
formed of the national judiciary, having a qualified nega-
tive. Hamilton, on the other hand, would have imposed
on a single executive an undivided responsibility, without
a council of revision. He would have given the appoint-
ment of the judiciary to the executive, and would have
charged it solely with judicial duties. The judiciary of
Madison was to be appointed by the second branch, to be
connected with the executive, to act politically as its con-
trolling council, and also as the court of impeachments on
the national officers.
Passing from the structure to the powers of the govern-
ment--while Hamilton would have provided that the ex-
ecutive should take care that the laws were faithfully ex-
ecuted, Madison would have authorized the legislature to
delegate to it, from time to time, such other powers, not le-
gislative or judiciary in their nature, as it might choose ;*
and would have given it a negative on the laws of the
states.
As to the national legislature, he would have empowered
it to "negative all laws" of the states " which to them shall
appear improper. "f has been seen that while he thought
that perhaps this negative "might create a mutual depen-
dence between the general and particular authorities," and
thus " that the necessity of operating by force on the col-
lective will of a state might be precluded," he said, " the
right of coercion should be expressly declared. " This was
by far the highest toned form of government submitted to
the convention, and as it intermingled injuriously the dif-
ferent departments, and derived them all from the first le-
gislative branch, would have resulted in an odious and in-
tolerable tyrarny, in which the executive and senate
would have been the creatures and mere instruments
? Journal, p. 89. t Ibid. p. 107.
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? HAMILTON.
481
of the arbitrary will of the popular branch of the legisla-
ture.
In two most important particulars, a common sentiment
is seen in the convention: the determination to lay a re-
publican basis, in the pledge by an unanimous vote to
"guarantee to each state a republican constitution, and its
existing laws;" and that the national judiciary should hold
their offices during good behaviour.
To establish a stable and enduring government of com-
petent powers, founded on the consent of the people, and
to combine a vigorous execution of the laws with a due
regard to liberty, by a judicious application of a system of
checks as far as was practicable, consistently with the ge-
nius of a republic, were the great objects to be sought.
Neither of the plans before the convention promised to
effect these objects.
During its sitting, Hamilton had been engaged in framing
a plan of government, in which, while he adhered strictly
to the republican theory, he sought to blend with that form
the advantages of a monarchy.
On the eighteenth of June, upon a resolution of Dickin-
son, " that the articles of confederation ought to be revised
and amended, so as to render the government of the United
States adequate to the exigencies, the preservation, and
prosperity of the union," Hamilton addressed the com-
mittee. As no report approaching to accuracy has been
given of this memorable speech, it is deemed expedient to
publish the brief as it exists among his manuscripts.
INTRODUCTION.
I. Importance of the occasion.
II. A solid plan, without regard to temporary opinions.
III. If an ineffectual plan be again proposed, it will beget
despair, and no government will grow out of con-
sent.
01
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? 482
THE LIFE OF
IV. There seem to be but three lines of conduct.
I. A league offensive, treaty of commerce, and appor-
tionment of the public debt.
II. An amendment of the present confederation, by add-
ing such powers as the public mind seems nearest
being matured to grant.
III. The forming a new government to pervade the whole,
with decisive powers; in short, with complete
sovereignty.
Last seems to be the prevailing sentiment.
I. Its practicability to be examined.
Immense extent unfavourable to representation.
Vast expense.
Double sets of officers.
Difficulty of judging of local circumstances.
Distance has a physical effect on men's minds.
Difficulty of drawing proper characters from home.
Execution of laws, feeble at a distance from govern-
ment--particularly in the collection of revenue.
Sentiment of obedience-- )
opinion. >
I. Objections to the present confederation.
Intrusts the great interests of the nation to hands
incapable of managing them.
All matters in which foreigners are concerned.
The care of the public peace--debts.
Power of treaty, without power of execution.
Common defence, without power to raise troops--
have a fleet--raise money.
Power to contract debts, without the power to pay.
These great interests of the state must be well man-
aged, or the public prosperity must be the victim.
Legislates upon communities.
Where the legislatures are to act, they will delib-
erate.
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? HAMILTON. 483
To ask money, not to collect it, and by an unjust
measure.
No sanction! !
Amendment of confederation according to present
ideas.
1. Difficult because not agreed upon any thing. Ex--
Impost.
Commerce--different theories.
To ascertain the practicability of this, let us examine
the principles of civil obedience.
SUPPORTS OF GOVERNMENT.
I. Interest to support it.
II. Opinion of utility and necessity.
III. Habitual sense of obligation.
IV. Force.
V. Influence.
I. Interest--particular and general interests.
Esprit de corps.
Vox populi, Vox Dei.
II. Opinion of utility and necessity.
First will decrease with the growth of the states.
Necessity.
This does not apply to federal government.
This may dissolve, and yet the order of the commu-
nity continue.
Anarchy not a necessary consequence.
III. Habitual sense of obligation.
This results from administration of private justice.
Demand of service or money odious.
IV. Force--of two kinds.
Coercion of laws--Coercion of arms.
First does not exist--and the last useless.
Attempt to use it, a war between the states.
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? 484
THE LIFE OF
Foreign aid.
Delinquency not confined to one.
V. Influence--
1. From municipal jurisdiction.
2. Appointment of officers.
3. Military jurisdiction.
4. Fiscal jurisdiction.
All these now reside in (the) particular states.
Their governments are the chief sources of hon-
our and emolument.
AMBITION AVARICE.
To effect any thing, passions must be turned towards
the general government.
Present confederation cannot be amended, unless the
most important powers be given to congress constituted
as they are.
This would be liable to all (the) objections against any
form of general government, with the addition of the want
of checks.
Perpetual effort in each member.
Influence of individuals in office to excite jealousy and
clamour--state leaders.
Experience corresponds.
Grecian republics.
Demosthenes says--Athens seventy-three years--Lace-
dsemon twenty-seven--Thebans after battle of Leuctra.
Phocions--consecrated ground--Philip, &c.
Germanic empire.
Charlemagne and his successors.
-Diet--recesses.
Electors now seven, excluding others.
Swiss Cantons.
Two diets.
Opposite alliances.
Berne--Lucerne.
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? HAMILTON. 485
To strengthen the federal government, powers too great
must be given to a single hand.
League offensive and defensive, &c.
Particular governments might exert themselves, &c.
But liable to usual vicissitudes. )
Internal peace affected.
Proximity of situation--natural enemies.
Partial confederacies from unequal extent.
Power inspires ambition.
Weakness begets jealousy.
Western territory.
Objn. --Genius of republics pacific.
Answer. Jealousy of commerce as well as jealousy of
power, begets war.
Sparta--Athens--Thebes--Rome--Carthage--Venice
--Hanseatic League.
England as many popular as royal wars.
Lewis the XIV. --Austria--Bourbons--William and
Anne.
Wars depend upon trifling circumstances.
Where--Dutchess of Marlborough's glove.
Foreign conquest.
Dismemberment--Poland.
Foreign influence.
Distractions set afloat vicious humours.
Standing armies by dissensions.
Domestic factions--Montesquieu.
Monarchy in southern states.
DCr* Federal rights--Fisheries.
Wars--destructive.
Loss of advantages.
Foreign nations would not respect our rights nor grant
us reciprocity.
Would reduce us to a passive commerce.
Fisheries--navigation of the lakes--Mississippi--Fleet.
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? 48G
THE LIFE OF
The general government must, in this case, not only have
a strong soul, but strong organs by which that soul is to
operate.
Here I shall give my sentiments of the best form of gov-
ernment--not as a thing attainable by us, but as a model
which we ought to approach as near as possible.
British constitution best form.
Aristotle--Cicero--Montesquieu--Neckar. *
Society naturally divides itself into two political di-
visions--the few and the many, who have distinct interests.
If government in the hands of the few, they will tyran-
nize over the many.
If (in) the hands of the many, they will tyrannize over
the few. It ought to be in the hands of both; and they
should be separated.
This separation must be permanent.
Representation a! one will not do.
Demagogues will generally prevail.
And if separated, they will need a mutual check.
This check is a monarch.
Each principle ought to exist in full force, or it will not
answer its end.
The democracy must be derived immediately from the
people.
The aristocracy ought to be entirely separated; their
power should be permanent, and they should have the
caritas liberorum.
* In Madison's very imperfect report of this speech, the authority of
Neckar is alone adduced. The opinion entertained of him at that time, is
seen in the eloquent commendation of Edmund Burke. "I behold a fabric
laid on the natural and solid foundation of trust and confidence among
men, and rising by fair gradation, order above order, according to the just
rules of symmetry and art--principle, method, regularity, economy, frugality,
justice to individuals and care of the people, are the resources with which
France makes war upon Great Britain. --The minister who does these things
is a great man. "
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? HAMILTON.
487
They should be so circumstanced that they can have no
interest in a change--as to have an effectual weight in the
constitution.
Their duration should be the earnest of wisdom and
stability.
'Tis essential there should be a permanent will in a com-
munity. ,
Vox populi, vox Dei.
Source of government--the unreasonableness of the
people--separate interests--debtors and creditors, &c.
There ought to be a principle in government capable
of resisting the popular current.
No periodical duration will come up to this.
This will always imply hopes and fears.
Creature and Creator.
Popular assemblies governed by a few individuals.
These individuals seeing their dissolution approach, will
sacrifice.
The principle of representation will influence.
The most popular branch will acquire an influence over
the other.
The other may check in ordinary cases, in which there
is no strong public passion; but it will not in cases where
there is--the cases in which such a principle is most ne-
cessary.
DCP Suppose duration seven years, and rotation.
One-seventh will have only one year to serve.
One-seventh two years.
One-seventh three years.
One-seventh four years.
A majority will look to a dissolution in four years by
instalments.
The monarch must have proportional strength. He
ought to be hereditary, and to have so much power, that it
will not be his interest to risk much to acquire more.
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? 488
THE IIFE OF
The advantage of a monarch is this--he is above cor-
ruption--he must always intend, in respect to foreign na-
tions, the true interest and glory of the people.
Republics liable to foreign corruption and intrigue--
Holland--Athens.
Effect of the British government.
, A vigorous execution of the laws--and a vigorous
defence of the people, will result.
Better chance for a good administration.
It is said a republican government does not admit a
vigorous execution.
It is therefore bad; for the goodness of a government
consists in a vigorous execution.
The principle chiefly intended to be established is this--
that there must be a permanent will.
Gentlemen say we need to be rescued from the democ-
racy. But what the means proposed?
A democratic assembly is to be checked by a democratic
senate, and both these by a democratic chief magistrate.
The end will not be answered--the means will not be
equal to the object.
It will, therefore, be feeble and inefficient.
RECAPITULATION.
I. Impossible to secure the union by any modification
of fcederal government.
II. League, offensive and defensive, full of certain evils
and greater dangers.
III. General government, very difficult, if not impracti-
cable, liable to various objections.
What is to be done?
Answer. Balance inconveniences and dangers, and
choose that which seems to have the fewest objections.
Expense admits of this answer. The expense of the
state governments will be proportionably diminished.
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? HAMILTON.
480
Interference of officers not so great, because the objects
of the general government and the particular ones will not
be the same--Finance--Administration of private justice.
Energy will not be wanting in essential points, because
the administration of private justice will be carried home
to men's doors by the particular governments.
And the revenues may be collected from imposts. , ex-
cises, &c. If necessary to go further, the general gov-
ernment may make use of the particular governments.
The attendance of members near the seat of govern-
ment may be had in the lower branch.
And the upper branch may be so constructed as to in-
duce the attendance of members from any part.
But this proves that the government must be so consti-
tuted as to offer strong motives.
In short, to interest all the passions of individuals.
And turn them into that channel.
After having stated his theoretical opinion of govern-
ment, Hamilton declared "that the republican theory
ought to be adhered to in this country, as long as there
was any chance to its success--that the idea of a perfect
equality of political rights among the citizens, exclusive of
all permanent or hereditary distinctions, was of a nature to
engage the good wishes of every good man, whatever
might be his theoretic doubts; thajjt merited his best efforts
to give success to it in practi<g; that hitherto, from an in-
competent structure of the government, it had not had a
fair trial, and that the endeavour ought then to be to secure
to it a better chance of success by a government more
The speech of which this brief is given, occupied in the
delivery between five and six hours, and was pronounced
capable of energy and ordejv
* Hamilton to Washington, post
62
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? 490
THE LIFE OF
by a competent judge,* "the most able and impressive he
had ever heard. "f
In the course of this speech, he read his plan of govern-
ment, not the propositions which are found in the printed
* Gouvemeur Morris.
t On a comparison of this brief with Madison's report, it is not possible to
give credence to his statement, " that Hamilton happened to call upon him
when putting the last hand to it, who acknowledged its fidelity, without sug-
gesting more than a very few verbal alterations, which were made. "
Neither in the general outline, nor in the subdivisions, does it approach so
near to accuracy as by possibility to have received the sanction of its author.
A few of the discrepancies will be indicated.
In Madison's report of the preliminary remarks, to show that the states
may have had in view a reference to the people at large, he ascribes this ob-
servation to Hamilton:--" In the senate of New-York a proviso was moved,
that no act of the convention should be binding until it should be referred to the
people, and ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only; the rea-
son assigned being, that it might probably be found an inconvenient shackle. "
Had this proviso been moved, it must have been moved on the 28th of Feb-
ruary, 1787, upon a resolution introduced by Hamilton in the assembly on
the 26th, and proposed by Schuyler in the senate on that day. No such pro-
viso was moved.
The proviso actually moved was that of Yates, an adherent of Clinton,
who proposed to insert a declaration that" the alterations and provisions in the
articles of confederation should be not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the
constitution of the state," and it was lost by a single vote.
Thus Hamilton is represented as sanctioning the accuracy of a speech,
which contains a statement of an occurrence that did not take place, when
he was a principal actor in, and was familiar with all the particulars of what
had occurred at an interval of less than four months.
As the ground of the opposition of his colleagues, and that on which they
soon after withdrew from the convention, was, that it was exceeding its pow-
ers, it is obvious, if he had made such a statement, that it would have been
controverted by them, and shown to have been erroneous by referring to the
journals of New-York. As no such statement was made by Hamilton, no
contradiction of it is found in the notes of Yates; but his actual representa-
tion, and which corresponds with the fact, is there correctly given. "Nor
can we," he observed, in reply to Lansing,} "suppose an annihilation of our
powers by forming a national government, as many of the states have made
t Yalee' Debates. 130. New-York Journal* 1787. pp. 44, 45, February 28th.
? ?
has no precedent, or experience to support it," and the
"general opinion was, that certain additional powers ought
to be given to congress. "
He was followed by Patterson, who observed, first, that
their plan accorded with their powers; second, that it ac-
cords with the "sentiments of the people. If the confed-
eration was radically defective, we ought to return to our
states and tell them so. He came not here to sport senti-
ments of his own, but to speak the sense of his constitu-
ents. " The "states treat as equal; the present compact
gives one vote to each state. By the articles of the con-
federation, 'alterations are to be made by congress, and all
the legislatures. ' All the parties to a contract must as-
sent to its dissolution. The states collectively have advan-
tages, in which the smaller states do not participate; there-
fore individual rules do not apply. "
The "force of government," he observed, "will not de-
pend on the proportion of representation, but on the quan-
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? 478 THE LIFE OF
tity of power. " "A check is not necessary in a general
government of communities, but in an individual state the
spirit of faction is to be checked. " "How have congress
hitherto conducted themselves? The people approve of
congress, but think they have not power enough. "
On a comparison of the different schemes of govern-
ment then before the convention, it is seen that Pinckney
would have clothed the legislature with the powers vested
in congress by the confederation, and also with the regu-
lation of commerce, the raising money by impost, and with
the control of the national force. The Virginia plan
would have conferred on the government powers supreme
in all questions of national interest; a negative on the laws
of the states, with an express declaration of a power to
exert the common force against a delinquent state.
Pinckney also proposed a single executive, while the
Virginia plan, having confided unlimited powers to the
legislature, would have vested the execution of those pow-
ers in a plural magistracy, ineligible a second time, con-
trolled by a council of revision constituted from the judi-
ciary, which would thus have become a political agent--
those powers to be exercised by a resort to force; to ob-
viate which, Madison is seen to have proposed a negative
on the laws of the states.
The Jersey plan was more objectionable. It created a
single legislative body, with the command of the purse and
the sword; derived its authority from the states; estab-
lished an equality of suffrage; proposed that a minority
should govern; contemplated partial objects of legisla-
tion ;* gave no negative upon that of the states; created
a plural executive, removable on the application of a ma-
jority of the executives of the states, without any negative
on the national legislature; and a judiciary, to be appoint-
* The revenue was to be derived from imposts, stamps, and postage.
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? HAMILTON.
479
ed by the executive, with power to try impeachments of
federal officers, but without any other original jurisdiction,
and without inferior tribunals.
Such were the forms of government in contemplation
for an empire of almost boundless territory, and destined
to contain a countless population.
As neither of these forms was adopted, and as the final
result was a compromise, it becomes necessary, in order
to judge correctly of the extent of Hamilton's influence
upon the character of that compromise, to trace the suc-
cessive opinions of leading members of the convention.
With this view, it will be remarked, while the plan of
Madison and Randolph submitted it as an open question,
whether " the right of suffrage in the national legislature
ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or
to the number of free inhabitants," that Hamilton was the
first to urge the latter as the true basis of a republican
government. *
Both Hamilton and Madison agreed that the choice of
the first branch of it should be by the people; but while
Hamilton would have derived the second branch, or senate,
also from the people. f Madison preferred that it should be
chosen by the first branch.
The proposition of Virginia gave the choice of the ex-
ecutive department of the government to the national
legislature. Hamilton, pursuing the great principle of a
popular government, was in favour of an executive to be
chosen by the people in districts through the medium of
electors.
Madison was the advocate of a plural executive, and
* Journal of Fed. Con. , pp. 67-83. "It was moved by Mr. Hamilton,
seconded by Mr. Spaight, that the resolution be altered so as to read: Re-
solved, that the rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be pro-
portioned to the number of free inhabitants. "
t Journal, 112. ,
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would have associated with it a revisionary council, to be
formed of the national judiciary, having a qualified nega-
tive. Hamilton, on the other hand, would have imposed
on a single executive an undivided responsibility, without
a council of revision. He would have given the appoint-
ment of the judiciary to the executive, and would have
charged it solely with judicial duties. The judiciary of
Madison was to be appointed by the second branch, to be
connected with the executive, to act politically as its con-
trolling council, and also as the court of impeachments on
the national officers.
Passing from the structure to the powers of the govern-
ment--while Hamilton would have provided that the ex-
ecutive should take care that the laws were faithfully ex-
ecuted, Madison would have authorized the legislature to
delegate to it, from time to time, such other powers, not le-
gislative or judiciary in their nature, as it might choose ;*
and would have given it a negative on the laws of the
states.
As to the national legislature, he would have empowered
it to "negative all laws" of the states " which to them shall
appear improper. "f has been seen that while he thought
that perhaps this negative "might create a mutual depen-
dence between the general and particular authorities," and
thus " that the necessity of operating by force on the col-
lective will of a state might be precluded," he said, " the
right of coercion should be expressly declared. " This was
by far the highest toned form of government submitted to
the convention, and as it intermingled injuriously the dif-
ferent departments, and derived them all from the first le-
gislative branch, would have resulted in an odious and in-
tolerable tyrarny, in which the executive and senate
would have been the creatures and mere instruments
? Journal, p. 89. t Ibid. p. 107.
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? HAMILTON.
481
of the arbitrary will of the popular branch of the legisla-
ture.
In two most important particulars, a common sentiment
is seen in the convention: the determination to lay a re-
publican basis, in the pledge by an unanimous vote to
"guarantee to each state a republican constitution, and its
existing laws;" and that the national judiciary should hold
their offices during good behaviour.
To establish a stable and enduring government of com-
petent powers, founded on the consent of the people, and
to combine a vigorous execution of the laws with a due
regard to liberty, by a judicious application of a system of
checks as far as was practicable, consistently with the ge-
nius of a republic, were the great objects to be sought.
Neither of the plans before the convention promised to
effect these objects.
During its sitting, Hamilton had been engaged in framing
a plan of government, in which, while he adhered strictly
to the republican theory, he sought to blend with that form
the advantages of a monarchy.
On the eighteenth of June, upon a resolution of Dickin-
son, " that the articles of confederation ought to be revised
and amended, so as to render the government of the United
States adequate to the exigencies, the preservation, and
prosperity of the union," Hamilton addressed the com-
mittee. As no report approaching to accuracy has been
given of this memorable speech, it is deemed expedient to
publish the brief as it exists among his manuscripts.
INTRODUCTION.
I. Importance of the occasion.
II. A solid plan, without regard to temporary opinions.
III. If an ineffectual plan be again proposed, it will beget
despair, and no government will grow out of con-
sent.
01
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THE LIFE OF
IV. There seem to be but three lines of conduct.
I. A league offensive, treaty of commerce, and appor-
tionment of the public debt.
II. An amendment of the present confederation, by add-
ing such powers as the public mind seems nearest
being matured to grant.
III. The forming a new government to pervade the whole,
with decisive powers; in short, with complete
sovereignty.
Last seems to be the prevailing sentiment.
I. Its practicability to be examined.
Immense extent unfavourable to representation.
Vast expense.
Double sets of officers.
Difficulty of judging of local circumstances.
Distance has a physical effect on men's minds.
Difficulty of drawing proper characters from home.
Execution of laws, feeble at a distance from govern-
ment--particularly in the collection of revenue.
Sentiment of obedience-- )
opinion. >
I. Objections to the present confederation.
Intrusts the great interests of the nation to hands
incapable of managing them.
All matters in which foreigners are concerned.
The care of the public peace--debts.
Power of treaty, without power of execution.
Common defence, without power to raise troops--
have a fleet--raise money.
Power to contract debts, without the power to pay.
These great interests of the state must be well man-
aged, or the public prosperity must be the victim.
Legislates upon communities.
Where the legislatures are to act, they will delib-
erate.
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? HAMILTON. 483
To ask money, not to collect it, and by an unjust
measure.
No sanction! !
Amendment of confederation according to present
ideas.
1. Difficult because not agreed upon any thing. Ex--
Impost.
Commerce--different theories.
To ascertain the practicability of this, let us examine
the principles of civil obedience.
SUPPORTS OF GOVERNMENT.
I. Interest to support it.
II. Opinion of utility and necessity.
III. Habitual sense of obligation.
IV. Force.
V. Influence.
I. Interest--particular and general interests.
Esprit de corps.
Vox populi, Vox Dei.
II. Opinion of utility and necessity.
First will decrease with the growth of the states.
Necessity.
This does not apply to federal government.
This may dissolve, and yet the order of the commu-
nity continue.
Anarchy not a necessary consequence.
III. Habitual sense of obligation.
This results from administration of private justice.
Demand of service or money odious.
IV. Force--of two kinds.
Coercion of laws--Coercion of arms.
First does not exist--and the last useless.
Attempt to use it, a war between the states.
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Foreign aid.
Delinquency not confined to one.
V. Influence--
1. From municipal jurisdiction.
2. Appointment of officers.
3. Military jurisdiction.
4. Fiscal jurisdiction.
All these now reside in (the) particular states.
Their governments are the chief sources of hon-
our and emolument.
AMBITION AVARICE.
To effect any thing, passions must be turned towards
the general government.
Present confederation cannot be amended, unless the
most important powers be given to congress constituted
as they are.
This would be liable to all (the) objections against any
form of general government, with the addition of the want
of checks.
Perpetual effort in each member.
Influence of individuals in office to excite jealousy and
clamour--state leaders.
Experience corresponds.
Grecian republics.
Demosthenes says--Athens seventy-three years--Lace-
dsemon twenty-seven--Thebans after battle of Leuctra.
Phocions--consecrated ground--Philip, &c.
Germanic empire.
Charlemagne and his successors.
-Diet--recesses.
Electors now seven, excluding others.
Swiss Cantons.
Two diets.
Opposite alliances.
Berne--Lucerne.
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? HAMILTON. 485
To strengthen the federal government, powers too great
must be given to a single hand.
League offensive and defensive, &c.
Particular governments might exert themselves, &c.
But liable to usual vicissitudes. )
Internal peace affected.
Proximity of situation--natural enemies.
Partial confederacies from unequal extent.
Power inspires ambition.
Weakness begets jealousy.
Western territory.
Objn. --Genius of republics pacific.
Answer. Jealousy of commerce as well as jealousy of
power, begets war.
Sparta--Athens--Thebes--Rome--Carthage--Venice
--Hanseatic League.
England as many popular as royal wars.
Lewis the XIV. --Austria--Bourbons--William and
Anne.
Wars depend upon trifling circumstances.
Where--Dutchess of Marlborough's glove.
Foreign conquest.
Dismemberment--Poland.
Foreign influence.
Distractions set afloat vicious humours.
Standing armies by dissensions.
Domestic factions--Montesquieu.
Monarchy in southern states.
DCr* Federal rights--Fisheries.
Wars--destructive.
Loss of advantages.
Foreign nations would not respect our rights nor grant
us reciprocity.
Would reduce us to a passive commerce.
Fisheries--navigation of the lakes--Mississippi--Fleet.
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The general government must, in this case, not only have
a strong soul, but strong organs by which that soul is to
operate.
Here I shall give my sentiments of the best form of gov-
ernment--not as a thing attainable by us, but as a model
which we ought to approach as near as possible.
British constitution best form.
Aristotle--Cicero--Montesquieu--Neckar. *
Society naturally divides itself into two political di-
visions--the few and the many, who have distinct interests.
If government in the hands of the few, they will tyran-
nize over the many.
If (in) the hands of the many, they will tyrannize over
the few. It ought to be in the hands of both; and they
should be separated.
This separation must be permanent.
Representation a! one will not do.
Demagogues will generally prevail.
And if separated, they will need a mutual check.
This check is a monarch.
Each principle ought to exist in full force, or it will not
answer its end.
The democracy must be derived immediately from the
people.
The aristocracy ought to be entirely separated; their
power should be permanent, and they should have the
caritas liberorum.
* In Madison's very imperfect report of this speech, the authority of
Neckar is alone adduced. The opinion entertained of him at that time, is
seen in the eloquent commendation of Edmund Burke. "I behold a fabric
laid on the natural and solid foundation of trust and confidence among
men, and rising by fair gradation, order above order, according to the just
rules of symmetry and art--principle, method, regularity, economy, frugality,
justice to individuals and care of the people, are the resources with which
France makes war upon Great Britain. --The minister who does these things
is a great man. "
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? HAMILTON.
487
They should be so circumstanced that they can have no
interest in a change--as to have an effectual weight in the
constitution.
Their duration should be the earnest of wisdom and
stability.
'Tis essential there should be a permanent will in a com-
munity. ,
Vox populi, vox Dei.
Source of government--the unreasonableness of the
people--separate interests--debtors and creditors, &c.
There ought to be a principle in government capable
of resisting the popular current.
No periodical duration will come up to this.
This will always imply hopes and fears.
Creature and Creator.
Popular assemblies governed by a few individuals.
These individuals seeing their dissolution approach, will
sacrifice.
The principle of representation will influence.
The most popular branch will acquire an influence over
the other.
The other may check in ordinary cases, in which there
is no strong public passion; but it will not in cases where
there is--the cases in which such a principle is most ne-
cessary.
DCP Suppose duration seven years, and rotation.
One-seventh will have only one year to serve.
One-seventh two years.
One-seventh three years.
One-seventh four years.
A majority will look to a dissolution in four years by
instalments.
The monarch must have proportional strength. He
ought to be hereditary, and to have so much power, that it
will not be his interest to risk much to acquire more.
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? 488
THE IIFE OF
The advantage of a monarch is this--he is above cor-
ruption--he must always intend, in respect to foreign na-
tions, the true interest and glory of the people.
Republics liable to foreign corruption and intrigue--
Holland--Athens.
Effect of the British government.
, A vigorous execution of the laws--and a vigorous
defence of the people, will result.
Better chance for a good administration.
It is said a republican government does not admit a
vigorous execution.
It is therefore bad; for the goodness of a government
consists in a vigorous execution.
The principle chiefly intended to be established is this--
that there must be a permanent will.
Gentlemen say we need to be rescued from the democ-
racy. But what the means proposed?
A democratic assembly is to be checked by a democratic
senate, and both these by a democratic chief magistrate.
The end will not be answered--the means will not be
equal to the object.
It will, therefore, be feeble and inefficient.
RECAPITULATION.
I. Impossible to secure the union by any modification
of fcederal government.
II. League, offensive and defensive, full of certain evils
and greater dangers.
III. General government, very difficult, if not impracti-
cable, liable to various objections.
What is to be done?
Answer. Balance inconveniences and dangers, and
choose that which seems to have the fewest objections.
Expense admits of this answer. The expense of the
state governments will be proportionably diminished.
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? HAMILTON.
480
Interference of officers not so great, because the objects
of the general government and the particular ones will not
be the same--Finance--Administration of private justice.
Energy will not be wanting in essential points, because
the administration of private justice will be carried home
to men's doors by the particular governments.
And the revenues may be collected from imposts. , ex-
cises, &c. If necessary to go further, the general gov-
ernment may make use of the particular governments.
The attendance of members near the seat of govern-
ment may be had in the lower branch.
And the upper branch may be so constructed as to in-
duce the attendance of members from any part.
But this proves that the government must be so consti-
tuted as to offer strong motives.
In short, to interest all the passions of individuals.
And turn them into that channel.
After having stated his theoretical opinion of govern-
ment, Hamilton declared "that the republican theory
ought to be adhered to in this country, as long as there
was any chance to its success--that the idea of a perfect
equality of political rights among the citizens, exclusive of
all permanent or hereditary distinctions, was of a nature to
engage the good wishes of every good man, whatever
might be his theoretic doubts; thajjt merited his best efforts
to give success to it in practi<g; that hitherto, from an in-
competent structure of the government, it had not had a
fair trial, and that the endeavour ought then to be to secure
to it a better chance of success by a government more
The speech of which this brief is given, occupied in the
delivery between five and six hours, and was pronounced
capable of energy and ordejv
* Hamilton to Washington, post
62
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? 490
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by a competent judge,* "the most able and impressive he
had ever heard. "f
In the course of this speech, he read his plan of govern-
ment, not the propositions which are found in the printed
* Gouvemeur Morris.
t On a comparison of this brief with Madison's report, it is not possible to
give credence to his statement, " that Hamilton happened to call upon him
when putting the last hand to it, who acknowledged its fidelity, without sug-
gesting more than a very few verbal alterations, which were made. "
Neither in the general outline, nor in the subdivisions, does it approach so
near to accuracy as by possibility to have received the sanction of its author.
A few of the discrepancies will be indicated.
In Madison's report of the preliminary remarks, to show that the states
may have had in view a reference to the people at large, he ascribes this ob-
servation to Hamilton:--" In the senate of New-York a proviso was moved,
that no act of the convention should be binding until it should be referred to the
people, and ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only; the rea-
son assigned being, that it might probably be found an inconvenient shackle. "
Had this proviso been moved, it must have been moved on the 28th of Feb-
ruary, 1787, upon a resolution introduced by Hamilton in the assembly on
the 26th, and proposed by Schuyler in the senate on that day. No such pro-
viso was moved.
The proviso actually moved was that of Yates, an adherent of Clinton,
who proposed to insert a declaration that" the alterations and provisions in the
articles of confederation should be not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the
constitution of the state," and it was lost by a single vote.
Thus Hamilton is represented as sanctioning the accuracy of a speech,
which contains a statement of an occurrence that did not take place, when
he was a principal actor in, and was familiar with all the particulars of what
had occurred at an interval of less than four months.
As the ground of the opposition of his colleagues, and that on which they
soon after withdrew from the convention, was, that it was exceeding its pow-
ers, it is obvious, if he had made such a statement, that it would have been
controverted by them, and shown to have been erroneous by referring to the
journals of New-York. As no such statement was made by Hamilton, no
contradiction of it is found in the notes of Yates; but his actual representa-
tion, and which corresponds with the fact, is there correctly given. "Nor
can we," he observed, in reply to Lansing,} "suppose an annihilation of our
powers by forming a national government, as many of the states have made
t Yalee' Debates. 130. New-York Journal* 1787. pp. 44, 45, February 28th.
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