If her troops are out
to pieces, they will by her policy (and a wonderful policy it is) be improved, and will be supplied with much better men.
to pieces, they will by her policy (and a wonderful policy it is) be improved, and will be supplied with much better men.
Edmund Burke
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the Manilla ransom, which had been extinguished and abandoned by their predecessors.
They treated their sovereign with decency; with reverence. They discountenanced, and, it is hoped, forever abolished, the dangerous and Imconstitutional practice of removing military officers for their votes in Parliament. They firmly adhered to those friends
of liberty, who had run all hazards in its cause ; and provided for them in preference to every other claim. With the Earl of Bute they had no personal connec tion; no correspondence of councils. They neither
courted him nor persecuted him. They practised no corruption; nor were they even suspected of it. They sold no offices. They obtained no reversions or pensions, either coming in or going out, for them selves, their families, or their dependents.
In the prosecution of their measures they were traversed by an opposition of a new and singular character ; an opposition of placemen and pensioners. They were supported by the confidence of the nation. And having held their offices under many difficulties and discouragemcnts, they left them at the express command, as they had accepted them at the earnest request, of their royal master.
These are plain facts; of a clear and public na ture; neither extended by elaborate reasoning, nor heightened by the coloring of eloquence. They are the services of a single year.
The removal of that administration from power is not to them premature ; since they were in office long enough to accomplish many plans of public utility; and, by their perseverance and resolution, rendered
the way smooth and easy to their successors ; having left their king and their country in a much better
? ? ? ? ACCOUNT or A LATE SHORT ADMINISTRATION.
condition than they found them. By the temper they manifest, they seem to have now no other wish than that their successors may do the public as real and as faithful service as they have done.
268
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on A LATE PUBLICATION,
INTITULED
"THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NATION. "
? "O Tite, si quid ego adjuvem curarnve levasso, Quse nunc te coquit, ct versat sub pectore fixa,
Ecquid erit pretii? " I769.
ENN. ap. Clo.
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on A LATE PUBLICATION, lN'lTl'ULED
"THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NATION. "
PARfoTrYdivisions,whetheronthewholeoperating good or evil, are things inseparable from free government. This is a truth which, I believe, admits
little dispute, having been established by the uniform experience of all ages. The part a good citizen ought to take in these divisions has been a matter of much deeper controversy. But God forbid that any contro
versy relating to our essential morals should admit of no decision. It appears to me, that this question, like most of the others which regard our duties in life, is to be determined by our station in it. Private men may be wholly neutral, and entirely innocent: but they who are legally invested with public trust,
or stand on the high ground of rank and dignity, which is trust implied, can hardly in any case remain indifferent, without the certainty of sinking into in significance ; and thereby in effect deserting that post
in which, with the fullest authority, and for the wis est purposes, the laws and institutions of their coun try have fixed them. However, if it be the office of those who are thus circumstanced, to take a decided part, it is no less their duty that it should be a sober one. It ought to be circumscribed by the same laws
? ? ? ? "III!
272 OBSERVATIONS on A LATE PUBLICATION
of decorum, and balanced by the same temper, which bound and regulate all the virtues. In a word, we ought to act in party with all the moderation which does not absolutely enervate that vigor, and quench that fervency of spirit, without which the best wishes for the public good must evaporate in empty specula tion.
It is probably from some such motives that the
friends of a very respectable party in this kingdom have been hitherto silent. For these two years past, from one and the same quarter of politics, a continual fire has been kept upon them; sometimes from the unwieldy column of quartos and octavos; sometimes from the light squadrons of occasional pamphlets and flying sheets. Every month has brought on its peri odical calumny. The abuse has taken every shape which the ability of the writers could give it; plain invective, clumsy raillery, misrepresented anecdote? ' No method of vilifying the measures, the abilities, the intentions, or the persons which compose that body, has been omitted.
On their part nothing was opposed but patience and character. It was a matter of the most serious and indignant affliction to persons who thought them selves in conscience bound to oppose a ministry dan gerous from its very constitution, as well as its measures, to find themselves, whenever they faced their adversaries, continually attacked on the rear by a set of men who pretended to be actuated by mo tives similar to theirs. They saw that the plan long pursued, with but too fatal a success, was to break the strength of this kingdom, by frittering down the
* History of the Minority. History of the Repeal of the Stamp Act. Considerations on Trade and Finance. Political Register, &c. , Sac.
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? ? ? ? ON rnn PRESENT sum or THE NATION. 273
bodies which compose by fomenting bitter and sanguinary animosities, and by dissolving every tie of social affection and public trust. These virtuous men, such am warranted by public opinion to call them, were resolved rather to endure everything, than co-operate in that design. A diversity of opin ion upon almost every principle of politics had in deed drawn strong line of separation between them and some others. However, they were desirous not to extend the misfortune by unnecessary bitterness; they wished to prevent difference of opinion on the commonwealth from festering into rancorou and incurable hostility. Accordingly they endeavored that all past controversies should be forgotten; and
that enough for the day should be the evil thereof. There however limit at which forbearance ceases to be virtue. Men may tolerate injuries whilst they are only personal to themselves. But not the first of virtues to bear with moderation the in dignities that are offered to our country. A piece has at length appeared, from the quarter of all the
former attacks, which upon every public considera tion demands an answer. Whilst persons more equal to this business may be engaged in affairs of greater
moment, hope shall be excused, in few hours of a time not very important, and from such matc
rials as have by me (more than enough however for this purpose), undertake to set the facts and argu ments of this wonderful performance in proper
? will endeavor to state what this piece is; the purpose for which take to have been written
and
light.
the effects (supposing should have any effect
at all)
VOL. I. 18
must necessarily produce.
This piece called " The Present State of the
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Nation. " It may be considered as a sort of digest of
the avowed maxims of a certain political school, the effects of whose doctrines and practices this country
will feel long and severely. It is made up of afar
rago of almost every topic which has been agitated on national affairs in parliamentary debate, or private conversation, for these last seven years. The oldest controversies are hauled out of the dust with which
time and neglect had covered them. Arguments ten times repeated, a thousand times answered before,
are here repeated again. Public accounts formerly printed and reprinted revolve once more, and find
their old station in this sober meridian. All the commonplace lamentations'upon the decay of trade,
the increase of taxes, and the high price of labor and provisions, are here retailed again and again in the l same tone with which they have drawled through col umns of Gazetteers. and Advertisers for a century to gether. Paradoxes which affront common sense, and uninteresting barren truths. which generate no con clusion, are thrown in to augment unwieldy bulk, without adding anything to weight. Because two accusations are better than one, contradictions are
set staring one another in the face, without even an attempt to reconcile them. And, to give the whole a sort of portentous air of labor and information, the table of the House of Commons is swept into this grand reservoir of politics. '
As to the composition, it bears a striking and whim sical resemblance to a funeral sermon, not only in the pathetic prayer with which it concludes, but in the style and tenor of the whole performance. It is pitc ously doleful, nodding every now and then towards dulness ; well stored with pious frauds, and, like most
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discourses of the sort, much better calculated for the private advantage of the preacher than the edification
'
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The author has indeed so involved his subject, that
it is frequently far from being easy to comprehend his meaning. It is happy for the public that it is never difficult to fathom his design. The apparent inten tion of this author is to draw the most aggravated, hideous and deformed picture of the state of this country, which his querulous eloquence, aided by the arbitrary dominion he assumes over fact, is capable of exhibiting. Had he attributed our misfortunes to their true cause, the injudicious tampering of bold, improvident, and visionary ministers at one period, or to their supine negligence and traitorous dissen sions at another, the complaint had been just, and
might have been useful. But far the greater and much the worst part of the state which he exhibits is owing, according to his representation, not to ac cidental and extrinsic mischiefs attendant on the
nation, but to its radical weakness and constitutional distempers. All this however is not without purpose. The author is in hopes, that, when we are fallen into a fanatical terror for the national salvation, we shall
then be ready to throw ourselves,--in a sort of pre cipitate trust, some strange disposition of the mind jumbled up of presumption and despair,--into the hands of the most pretending a1Id forward under
taker. One such undertaker at least he has in readi ness for our service. But let me assure this gener ous person, that however he may. succeed in exciting our fears for the public danger, he will find it hard indeed to engage us to place any confidence in the
system he proposes for our security.
ofthe hearers.
275
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His undertaking is great. The purpose of this pamphlet, at which it aims directly or obliquely in every page, is to persuade the public of three or four of the most difficult points in the world,-- that all the
of the late war were on the part of the Bourbon alliance; that the peace of Paris perfectly consulted the dignity and interest of this country; and that the American Stamp Act was a masterpiece of policy and finance; that the only good minister this nation has enjoyed since his Majesty's accession, is the Earl of Bute; and the only good managers of revenue we have seen are Lord Despenser and Mr. George Grenville ; and, under the description of men of virtue and ability, he holds them out to us as the only persons fit to put our affairs in order. Let not the reader mistake me: he does not actually name these persons; but having highly applauded their conduct in all its parts, and heavily censured every other set of men in the kingdom, he then recom
mends us to his men of virtue and ability.
Such is the author's scheme. Whether it will
answer his purpose I know not. But surely that pur pose ought to be a wonderfully good one, to warrant the methods he has taken to compass it. If the facts and reasonings in this piece are admitted, it is all over with us. ' The continuance of our tranquillity depends upon the compassion of our rivals. Unable to secure to ourselves the advantages of peace, we are at the same time utterly unfit for war. It is im possible, if this state of things be credited abroad, that we can have 'any alliance; all nations will fly from so dangerous a connection, lest, instead of being partakers of our strength, they should only become sharers in our ruin. If it is believed at home, all
? advantages
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that firmness of mind, and dignified national courage, which used to be the great support of this isle against the powers of the world, must melt away, and fail within us.
In such a state of things can it be amiss if I aim at holding out some comfort to the nation ; another sort of comfort, indeed, than that which this writer pro vides for it; a comfort not from its physician, but from its constitution: if I attempt to show that all the arguments upon which he founds the decay of that constitution, and the necessity of that physician,
are vain and frivolous? I will follow the author closely in his own long career, through the war, the peace, the finances, our trade, and our foreign poli tics: not for the sake of the particular measures
? which he discusses ; that can be of no use ; they are all decided; their good is all enjoyed, or their evil incurred: but for the sake of the principles of war, peace, trade, and finances. These principles are of
infinite moment. They must come again and again under consideration ; and it imports the public, of all things, that those of its ministers be enlarged, and
just, and well confirmed, upon all these subjects. What notions this author entertains we shall see presently; notions i11 my opinion very irrational, and
extremely dangerous ; and which, ifthey should crawl from pamphlets into counsels, and be realized from private speculation into national measures, cannot fail of hastening and completing our ruin.
This author, aftcr having paid his compliment to the showy appearances of the late war in our favor, is
in the utmost haste to tell you that these appearances werefallacio/us, that they were no more than an im
p0s2'ti0n. --I
fear I must trouble the reader with 8.
? ? ? 278 OBSERVATIONS on A LATE PUBLICATION
pretty long quotation, in order to set before him the more clearly this author's peculiar way of conceiving and reasoning :
" Happily (the K. ) was then advised by ministers, who did not suffer themselves to be dazzled by the glare of brilliant appearances ; but, knowing them to be fallacious, they wisely resolved to profit of their splendor before our enemies should also discover the imposition. --The increase in the exports was found to have been occasioned chiefly by the demands of our own fleets and armies, and, instead of bringing wealth to the nation, was to be paid for by oppressive taxes upon the people of England. While the Brit ish seamen were consuming 0n board our men of war and privateers, foreign ships and foreign seamen were employed in the transportation of our merchandise; and the carrying trade, so great a source of wealth and marine, was entirely engrossed by the neutral na tions. The number of British ships annually arriv ing in our ports was reduced 1756 sail, containing 92,559 tons, on a medium of the six years' war,
compared with the six years of peace preceding it. --- The conquest of the Havannah had, indeed, stopped the remittance of specie from Mexico to Spain; but it had not enabled England to seize it :" on the con trary, our merchants suffered by the detention of the galleons, as their correspondents in Spain were dis abled from paying them for their goods sent to America.
The loss of the trade to Old'S]>ain was a further bar to
an influx ofspecie; and the attempt upon Portugal had not only deprived us of an import of bullion from thence, but the payment of our troops employed in its defence was a fresh drain opened for the dim inution of our circulating specie. --The high pre
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? ? ? ? ON THE PBESEST STATE OF THE NATION.
miums given for new loans had sunk the price of the old stock near a third of its original value; so that the purchasers had an obligation from the state to repay them with an addition of 33 per cent to their capital. Every new loan required new taxes to be imposed; new taxes must add to the price of our manufactures, and lessen their consumption among for eigners. The decay of our trade must necessarily occasion a decrease of the public revenue; and a defi ciency of our funds must either be made up by fresh taxes, which would only add to the calamity, or our national credit must be destroyed, by showing the public creditors the inability of the nation to repay them their principal money. --Bounties had already been given for recruits which exceeded the year's wages of the plough1nan and reaper; and as these were exhausted, and husbandry stood still for want of hands, the manufacturers were next to be tempted to
quit the anvil and the loom by higher offers. --France, bankrupt France, had no such calamities impending over her; her distresses were great, but they were im mediate and temporary; her want of credit preserved her from a great increase of debt, and the loss of her ultramarine dominions lessened her expenses. Her colo nies had, indeed, put themselves into the hands of the English ; but the property of her subjects had been pre served by capitulations, and a way opened for making
her those remittances which the war had before sus
pended, with as much security as in time of peace. -- Hcr armies in Germany had been hitherto prevented from seizing upon Hanover; but they continued to encan1p on the same ground on which the first battle was fought; and, as it must ever happen from the policy of that government, the last troops she sent into
? ? ? ? 280 OBSERVATIONS ox A LATE PUBLICATION
the field were always found to be the best, and her fre quent losses only served to fill her regiments with better soldiers. The conquest of Hanover became therefore every campaign more probable. --It is to be noted,
that the French troops received subsistence only, for
the last three years of the war; and that, although large arrears were due to thcm at its conclusion, the charge was the less during its col1tinuance. " * l
If any one be willing to see to how much greater lengths the author carries these ideas, he will recur to the book. This is sufficient for a specimen of his manner of thinking. I believe one reflection i1ni formly obtrudes itself upon every reader of these par agraphs. For what purpose, in any cause, shall we hereafter contend with France ? Can we ever flatter ourselves that we shall wage a more successful war? If, 0n our part, in a war the most prosperous we ever carried on, by sea and by land, and in every part of the globe, attended with the unparalleled circumstance of an immense increase of trade and augmentation of revenue; if a continued series of disappointments, disgraces, and defeats, followed by
public bankruptcy, on the part of France; if all these still leave her a gainer on the whole bal ance, will it not be downright frenzy in us ever to look her in the face again, or to contend with her any, even the most essential points, since victory and defeat, though by diiferent ways, equally con duct us to our ruin ? Subjection to France without a struggle will indeed be less for our honor, but on every principle of our author it must be more for our advantage. According to his representation of things, the question is only concerning the most easy
* Pages 6 -10.
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fall. France had not discovered, our statesman tells us, at the end of that war, the triumphs of defeat, and the resources which are derived from bankruptcy. For my poor part, I do not wonder . at their blind ness. But the English ministers saw fLu'ther. Our
author has at length let foreigners also into the se cret, and made them altogether as wise as ourselves. It is their own fault if (milgato imperii arcano) they are imposed upon any longer. They now are ap prised of the sentiments which the great candidate for the government of this great empire entertains; and they will act accordingly. They are taught our
weakness and their own advantages.
He tells the world,* that if France carries on the
war against us in Germany, every loss she sustains contributes to the achievement of her conquest. If her armies are three years unpaid, she is the less ex hausted by expense. If her credit is destroyed, she is the less oppressed with debt.
If her troops are out
to pieces, they will by her policy (and a wonderful policy it is) be improved, and will be supplied with much better men. If the war is carried on in the colonies, he tells them1' that the loss of her ultra marine dominions-lessens her expenses, and insures
her remittances:
Per damna, per csedes, ab ipso Dncit opes animumqus ferro.
If so, what is it we can do to hurt her? --it will be 'all an imposition, all fallacio'u. s. Why, the result
? must be, --
Occidit, oecidit Spes omnis, et fortuna nostri
Nominis.
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The only way which the author's principles leave for our escape, is to reverse our condition into that of France, and to take her losing cards into our hands. But though his principles drive him to his politics will not suffer him to walk on this ground. Talking at our ease and of other countries, we may bear to diverted with such speculations; but in England we
shall never be taught to look upon the annihilation of our trade, the ruin of our credit, the defeat of our armies, and the loss of our ultramarine dominions (whatever the author may think of them), to be the high road to prosperity and greatness.
The reader does not, hope, imagine that mean seriously to set about the refutation of these uninge nious paradoxes and reveries without imagination. state them only that we may discern little in the questions of war and peace, the most weighty of all questions, what the wisdom of those men who are held out to us as the only hope of an expiring nation. The present ministry indeed of strange character: at once indolent and distracted. But ministerial system should be formed, actuated by such maxims as are avowed in this piece, the vices of the present ministry would become their virtues their indolence would be the greatest of all public benefits, and distraction that entirely defeated every one of their schemes would be our only security from destruction.
To have stated these reasonings enough, pre sume, to do their business. But they are accompa nied with facts and records, which may seem of little more weight. trust, however, that the facts of this author will be as far from bearing the touch stone, as his arguments. On little inquiry, they will be found as great an imposition as the successes
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they are meant to depreciate ; for they are all either
false or fallaciously applied ; or not in the least to the
purpose for which they are produced.
First the author, in order to support his favorite
paradox, that ou'r possession of the French colonies was of no detriment to France, has thought proper to inform us, that * " they put themselves into the hands of the English. " He uses the same assertion, in nearly the same words, in another place;1' " her colonies had put themselves into o\n' hands. " Now, in justice, not only to fact and common sense, but to the incomparable valor and perseverance of our mili tary and naval forces thus unhandsomely traduced,
? I must tell this author, that the French colonies did not " put themselves into the hands of the English. " They were compelled to submit; they were subdued by dint of English valor. Will the five years' war carried on in Canada, in which fell one of the princi pal hopes of this nation, and all the battles lost and
gained during that anxious period, convince this au thor of his mistake? Let him inquire of Sir Jeffery Amherst, under whose conduct that war was carried on ; of Sir Charles Saunders, whose steadiness and presence of mind saved our fleet, and were so emi nently serviceable in the whole course of the siege of Quebec ; of General Monckton, who was shot through
the body there, whether France " put her colonies in
to the hands of the English. "
Though he has made no exception, yet I would be
liberal to him ; perhaps he means to confine himself to her colonies in the West Indies. But surely it will fare as ill with him there as in North America, whilst we remember that in our first attempt at Martinico
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we were actually defeated; that it was three months before we reduced Guadaloupe; and that the con quest of the Havannah was achieved by the highest conduct, aided by circumstances of the greatest good fortune. He knows the expense both of men and treasure at which we bought that place. However,
if it had so pleased the peacemakers, it was no dear
for it was decisive of the fortune of the war and the terms of the treaty: the Duke of Niver nois thought so; France, England, Europe, consid ered it in that light; all the world, except the then friends of the then ministry, who wept for our victc ries, and were in haste to get rid of the burden of our conquests. This author knows that France did not put those colonies into the hands of England; but he well knows who did put the most valuable of them into the hands of France.
In the next place, our author* is pleased to con sider the conquest of those colonies in no other light than as a convenience for the remittances to France, which he asserts that the war had before
but for which a way was opened (by our conquest) as secure as in time of peace. I charitably hope he knows nothing of the subject. I referred him lately to our commanders, for the resistance of the French
purchase;
? I now wish he would apply to our custom
colonies ;
house entries, and our merchants, for the advantages which we derived from them.
In 1761, there was no entry of goods from any of the conquered places but Guadaloupe ; in that year it stood thus : ---
Imports from Guadaloupe, value, ? 482,179 * Page 9.
suspended,
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In 1762, when we had not yet delivered up our conquests, the account was,
Guadaloupe . . . . . . . . ? 513,244
Martinico. . . . . . . . .
Total imports in 1762, value, ? 801,669
In 1763, after we had delivered up the sovereignty of these islands, but kept open a communication with them, the imports were,
Guadaloupe . . Martinico . . . Havannah . . . . . . . . .
? 412,303 344,161 249,386
288,425
? Total imports in 1763, value, b? 1 005 8. 50 77
Besides, I find, in the account of bullion imported and brought to the Bank, that,_during that period in which the intercourse with the Havannah was open, we received at that one shop, in treasure, from that one place, 559,810l. ; in the year 1763, 389,450l. ;
so that the import from these places in that year amounted to 1,395,300l.
On this state the reader will observe, that I take the imports from, and not the exports to, these con quests, as the measure of the advantages which we derived from them. I do so for reasons which will
be somewhat worthy the attention of such readers as are fond of this species of inquiry. I say therefore I choose the import article, as the best, and indeed the
only standard we can have, of the value of the West India trade. Our export entry does not comprehend the greatest trade we carry on with any of the West India. islands, the sale of negroesz nor does it give
? ? ? OBSERVATIONS on A LATE PUBLICATION
any idea of two other advantages we draw from them; the remittances for money spent here, and the pay ment of part of the balance of the North American trade. It is therefore quite ridiculous, to strike a balance merely on the face _of an excess of imports and exports, in that commerce; though, in most for eign branches, it on the whole, the best method. If we should take that standard, would
288
appear, that the balance with our own islands annually,
several hundred thousand pounds against this coun try. * Such its aspect 0n the custom-house entries; but we know the direct contrary to be the fact. We know that the West-Indians are always indebted our merchants, and that the value of every shilling of West India produce English property. So that our import from them, and not our export, ought always to be _considered as their true value and this corrective ought to be applied to all general balances of our trade, which are formed on the ordinary prin ciples.
If possible, this was more emphatically true of the French West India islands, whilst they continued in our hands. That none or only vcry contemptible part, of the value of this produce could be remitted to France, the author will see, perhaps with unwill ingness, but with the clearest conviction, he con siders, that in the year 1763, after we had ceased to export to the isles of Guadaloupe and Martinico, and to the Havannah, and after the colonies were
? 'F Total imports from the West Indies in 1764 . Exports to ditto in ditto . . .
Excess ofimports .
In this, which the common way of stating the balance, itwill
appear upwards of two millions against us, which ridiculous.
. ? 2,909,411 896,511
. . ? 2,0l2,900
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free to send all their produce to Old France and Spain, if they had any remittance to make; he will see, that we imported from those places, in that year, to the amount of 1,395,. 300l. So far was the whole annual produce of these islands from being adequate to the payments of their annual call upon us, that this mighty additional importation was necessary, though not quite sufficient, to dis charge the debts contracted in the few y,ears we held
them. The property, therefore, of their whole prod uce was ours ; not only during the war, but even for more than a year after the peace. The author, I hope, will not again venture upon so rash and dis couraging a proposition concerning the nature and effect of those conquests, as to call them a conven
ience to the remittances of France; he sees, by this account, that what he asserts is not only without foundation, but even impossible to be true.
As to our trade at that time, he labors with all his might to represent it as absolutely ruined, or"on the very edge of ruin. Indeed, as usual with him, he is often as equivocal in his expression as he is clear in his design. Sometimes he more than insinuates a decay of our commerce in that war; sometimes he
admits an increase of exports; but it is in order to depreciate the advantages we might appear to derive from that increase, whenever it should come to be
proved against him. He tells you,* "that it was chiefly occasioned by the demands our own fleets and armies, and, instead or bringing wealth to the nation, was to be paid for by oppressive taxes upon the people of England. " Never was anything more destitute of foundation. It might be proved, with
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the greatest ease, from the nature and quality of the goods exported, as well as from the situation of the places to which our merchandise was sent, and which the war could no wise affect, that the supply of our fleets and armies could not have been the cause of this wonderful increase of trade: its cause was evi dent to the whole world; the ruin of the trade of France, and our possession of her colonies. What wbnderful effects this cause produced the reader will see below ; * and he will form on that account some judgment of the author's candor or information.
Ditto of foreign goods in time . . . . 2,910,836 14 9 Ditto of ditto out of time . . . . . . 559,485 2 10
Total exports of all kinds . . . . . . 11,7s1,s2s 12 10 Totalimports . . . . . . . . . s,09s,472150
Balance in favor of England . . . . ? 3,694,355 17 10
1754.
* Total export of British goods . . . value, 8,317,506 15 3
1761.
Total export of British goods . . . . 10,649,581 12 6 Ditto of foreign goods in time . . 3,553,692 7 1 Dittoofdittooutoftime. . . . . . 355,01502
Total exports of all kinds .
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the Manilla ransom, which had been extinguished and abandoned by their predecessors.
They treated their sovereign with decency; with reverence. They discountenanced, and, it is hoped, forever abolished, the dangerous and Imconstitutional practice of removing military officers for their votes in Parliament. They firmly adhered to those friends
of liberty, who had run all hazards in its cause ; and provided for them in preference to every other claim. With the Earl of Bute they had no personal connec tion; no correspondence of councils. They neither
courted him nor persecuted him. They practised no corruption; nor were they even suspected of it. They sold no offices. They obtained no reversions or pensions, either coming in or going out, for them selves, their families, or their dependents.
In the prosecution of their measures they were traversed by an opposition of a new and singular character ; an opposition of placemen and pensioners. They were supported by the confidence of the nation. And having held their offices under many difficulties and discouragemcnts, they left them at the express command, as they had accepted them at the earnest request, of their royal master.
These are plain facts; of a clear and public na ture; neither extended by elaborate reasoning, nor heightened by the coloring of eloquence. They are the services of a single year.
The removal of that administration from power is not to them premature ; since they were in office long enough to accomplish many plans of public utility; and, by their perseverance and resolution, rendered
the way smooth and easy to their successors ; having left their king and their country in a much better
? ? ? ? ACCOUNT or A LATE SHORT ADMINISTRATION.
condition than they found them. By the temper they manifest, they seem to have now no other wish than that their successors may do the public as real and as faithful service as they have done.
268
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OBSERVATIONS
on A LATE PUBLICATION,
INTITULED
"THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NATION. "
? "O Tite, si quid ego adjuvem curarnve levasso, Quse nunc te coquit, ct versat sub pectore fixa,
Ecquid erit pretii? " I769.
ENN. ap. Clo.
I
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on A LATE PUBLICATION, lN'lTl'ULED
"THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NATION. "
PARfoTrYdivisions,whetheronthewholeoperating good or evil, are things inseparable from free government. This is a truth which, I believe, admits
little dispute, having been established by the uniform experience of all ages. The part a good citizen ought to take in these divisions has been a matter of much deeper controversy. But God forbid that any contro
versy relating to our essential morals should admit of no decision. It appears to me, that this question, like most of the others which regard our duties in life, is to be determined by our station in it. Private men may be wholly neutral, and entirely innocent: but they who are legally invested with public trust,
or stand on the high ground of rank and dignity, which is trust implied, can hardly in any case remain indifferent, without the certainty of sinking into in significance ; and thereby in effect deserting that post
in which, with the fullest authority, and for the wis est purposes, the laws and institutions of their coun try have fixed them. However, if it be the office of those who are thus circumstanced, to take a decided part, it is no less their duty that it should be a sober one. It ought to be circumscribed by the same laws
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272 OBSERVATIONS on A LATE PUBLICATION
of decorum, and balanced by the same temper, which bound and regulate all the virtues. In a word, we ought to act in party with all the moderation which does not absolutely enervate that vigor, and quench that fervency of spirit, without which the best wishes for the public good must evaporate in empty specula tion.
It is probably from some such motives that the
friends of a very respectable party in this kingdom have been hitherto silent. For these two years past, from one and the same quarter of politics, a continual fire has been kept upon them; sometimes from the unwieldy column of quartos and octavos; sometimes from the light squadrons of occasional pamphlets and flying sheets. Every month has brought on its peri odical calumny. The abuse has taken every shape which the ability of the writers could give it; plain invective, clumsy raillery, misrepresented anecdote? ' No method of vilifying the measures, the abilities, the intentions, or the persons which compose that body, has been omitted.
On their part nothing was opposed but patience and character. It was a matter of the most serious and indignant affliction to persons who thought them selves in conscience bound to oppose a ministry dan gerous from its very constitution, as well as its measures, to find themselves, whenever they faced their adversaries, continually attacked on the rear by a set of men who pretended to be actuated by mo tives similar to theirs. They saw that the plan long pursued, with but too fatal a success, was to break the strength of this kingdom, by frittering down the
* History of the Minority. History of the Repeal of the Stamp Act. Considerations on Trade and Finance. Political Register, &c. , Sac.
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? ? ? ? ON rnn PRESENT sum or THE NATION. 273
bodies which compose by fomenting bitter and sanguinary animosities, and by dissolving every tie of social affection and public trust. These virtuous men, such am warranted by public opinion to call them, were resolved rather to endure everything, than co-operate in that design. A diversity of opin ion upon almost every principle of politics had in deed drawn strong line of separation between them and some others. However, they were desirous not to extend the misfortune by unnecessary bitterness; they wished to prevent difference of opinion on the commonwealth from festering into rancorou and incurable hostility. Accordingly they endeavored that all past controversies should be forgotten; and
that enough for the day should be the evil thereof. There however limit at which forbearance ceases to be virtue. Men may tolerate injuries whilst they are only personal to themselves. But not the first of virtues to bear with moderation the in dignities that are offered to our country. A piece has at length appeared, from the quarter of all the
former attacks, which upon every public considera tion demands an answer. Whilst persons more equal to this business may be engaged in affairs of greater
moment, hope shall be excused, in few hours of a time not very important, and from such matc
rials as have by me (more than enough however for this purpose), undertake to set the facts and argu ments of this wonderful performance in proper
? will endeavor to state what this piece is; the purpose for which take to have been written
and
light.
the effects (supposing should have any effect
at all)
VOL. I. 18
must necessarily produce.
This piece called " The Present State of the
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Nation. " It may be considered as a sort of digest of
the avowed maxims of a certain political school, the effects of whose doctrines and practices this country
will feel long and severely. It is made up of afar
rago of almost every topic which has been agitated on national affairs in parliamentary debate, or private conversation, for these last seven years. The oldest controversies are hauled out of the dust with which
time and neglect had covered them. Arguments ten times repeated, a thousand times answered before,
are here repeated again. Public accounts formerly printed and reprinted revolve once more, and find
their old station in this sober meridian. All the commonplace lamentations'upon the decay of trade,
the increase of taxes, and the high price of labor and provisions, are here retailed again and again in the l same tone with which they have drawled through col umns of Gazetteers. and Advertisers for a century to gether. Paradoxes which affront common sense, and uninteresting barren truths. which generate no con clusion, are thrown in to augment unwieldy bulk, without adding anything to weight. Because two accusations are better than one, contradictions are
set staring one another in the face, without even an attempt to reconcile them. And, to give the whole a sort of portentous air of labor and information, the table of the House of Commons is swept into this grand reservoir of politics. '
As to the composition, it bears a striking and whim sical resemblance to a funeral sermon, not only in the pathetic prayer with which it concludes, but in the style and tenor of the whole performance. It is pitc ously doleful, nodding every now and then towards dulness ; well stored with pious frauds, and, like most
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discourses of the sort, much better calculated for the private advantage of the preacher than the edification
'
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The author has indeed so involved his subject, that
it is frequently far from being easy to comprehend his meaning. It is happy for the public that it is never difficult to fathom his design. The apparent inten tion of this author is to draw the most aggravated, hideous and deformed picture of the state of this country, which his querulous eloquence, aided by the arbitrary dominion he assumes over fact, is capable of exhibiting. Had he attributed our misfortunes to their true cause, the injudicious tampering of bold, improvident, and visionary ministers at one period, or to their supine negligence and traitorous dissen sions at another, the complaint had been just, and
might have been useful. But far the greater and much the worst part of the state which he exhibits is owing, according to his representation, not to ac cidental and extrinsic mischiefs attendant on the
nation, but to its radical weakness and constitutional distempers. All this however is not without purpose. The author is in hopes, that, when we are fallen into a fanatical terror for the national salvation, we shall
then be ready to throw ourselves,--in a sort of pre cipitate trust, some strange disposition of the mind jumbled up of presumption and despair,--into the hands of the most pretending a1Id forward under
taker. One such undertaker at least he has in readi ness for our service. But let me assure this gener ous person, that however he may. succeed in exciting our fears for the public danger, he will find it hard indeed to engage us to place any confidence in the
system he proposes for our security.
ofthe hearers.
275
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His undertaking is great. The purpose of this pamphlet, at which it aims directly or obliquely in every page, is to persuade the public of three or four of the most difficult points in the world,-- that all the
of the late war were on the part of the Bourbon alliance; that the peace of Paris perfectly consulted the dignity and interest of this country; and that the American Stamp Act was a masterpiece of policy and finance; that the only good minister this nation has enjoyed since his Majesty's accession, is the Earl of Bute; and the only good managers of revenue we have seen are Lord Despenser and Mr. George Grenville ; and, under the description of men of virtue and ability, he holds them out to us as the only persons fit to put our affairs in order. Let not the reader mistake me: he does not actually name these persons; but having highly applauded their conduct in all its parts, and heavily censured every other set of men in the kingdom, he then recom
mends us to his men of virtue and ability.
Such is the author's scheme. Whether it will
answer his purpose I know not. But surely that pur pose ought to be a wonderfully good one, to warrant the methods he has taken to compass it. If the facts and reasonings in this piece are admitted, it is all over with us. ' The continuance of our tranquillity depends upon the compassion of our rivals. Unable to secure to ourselves the advantages of peace, we are at the same time utterly unfit for war. It is im possible, if this state of things be credited abroad, that we can have 'any alliance; all nations will fly from so dangerous a connection, lest, instead of being partakers of our strength, they should only become sharers in our ruin. If it is believed at home, all
? advantages
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that firmness of mind, and dignified national courage, which used to be the great support of this isle against the powers of the world, must melt away, and fail within us.
In such a state of things can it be amiss if I aim at holding out some comfort to the nation ; another sort of comfort, indeed, than that which this writer pro vides for it; a comfort not from its physician, but from its constitution: if I attempt to show that all the arguments upon which he founds the decay of that constitution, and the necessity of that physician,
are vain and frivolous? I will follow the author closely in his own long career, through the war, the peace, the finances, our trade, and our foreign poli tics: not for the sake of the particular measures
? which he discusses ; that can be of no use ; they are all decided; their good is all enjoyed, or their evil incurred: but for the sake of the principles of war, peace, trade, and finances. These principles are of
infinite moment. They must come again and again under consideration ; and it imports the public, of all things, that those of its ministers be enlarged, and
just, and well confirmed, upon all these subjects. What notions this author entertains we shall see presently; notions i11 my opinion very irrational, and
extremely dangerous ; and which, ifthey should crawl from pamphlets into counsels, and be realized from private speculation into national measures, cannot fail of hastening and completing our ruin.
This author, aftcr having paid his compliment to the showy appearances of the late war in our favor, is
in the utmost haste to tell you that these appearances werefallacio/us, that they were no more than an im
p0s2'ti0n. --I
fear I must trouble the reader with 8.
? ? ? 278 OBSERVATIONS on A LATE PUBLICATION
pretty long quotation, in order to set before him the more clearly this author's peculiar way of conceiving and reasoning :
" Happily (the K. ) was then advised by ministers, who did not suffer themselves to be dazzled by the glare of brilliant appearances ; but, knowing them to be fallacious, they wisely resolved to profit of their splendor before our enemies should also discover the imposition. --The increase in the exports was found to have been occasioned chiefly by the demands of our own fleets and armies, and, instead of bringing wealth to the nation, was to be paid for by oppressive taxes upon the people of England. While the Brit ish seamen were consuming 0n board our men of war and privateers, foreign ships and foreign seamen were employed in the transportation of our merchandise; and the carrying trade, so great a source of wealth and marine, was entirely engrossed by the neutral na tions. The number of British ships annually arriv ing in our ports was reduced 1756 sail, containing 92,559 tons, on a medium of the six years' war,
compared with the six years of peace preceding it. --- The conquest of the Havannah had, indeed, stopped the remittance of specie from Mexico to Spain; but it had not enabled England to seize it :" on the con trary, our merchants suffered by the detention of the galleons, as their correspondents in Spain were dis abled from paying them for their goods sent to America.
The loss of the trade to Old'S]>ain was a further bar to
an influx ofspecie; and the attempt upon Portugal had not only deprived us of an import of bullion from thence, but the payment of our troops employed in its defence was a fresh drain opened for the dim inution of our circulating specie. --The high pre
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? ? ? ? ON THE PBESEST STATE OF THE NATION.
miums given for new loans had sunk the price of the old stock near a third of its original value; so that the purchasers had an obligation from the state to repay them with an addition of 33 per cent to their capital. Every new loan required new taxes to be imposed; new taxes must add to the price of our manufactures, and lessen their consumption among for eigners. The decay of our trade must necessarily occasion a decrease of the public revenue; and a defi ciency of our funds must either be made up by fresh taxes, which would only add to the calamity, or our national credit must be destroyed, by showing the public creditors the inability of the nation to repay them their principal money. --Bounties had already been given for recruits which exceeded the year's wages of the plough1nan and reaper; and as these were exhausted, and husbandry stood still for want of hands, the manufacturers were next to be tempted to
quit the anvil and the loom by higher offers. --France, bankrupt France, had no such calamities impending over her; her distresses were great, but they were im mediate and temporary; her want of credit preserved her from a great increase of debt, and the loss of her ultramarine dominions lessened her expenses. Her colo nies had, indeed, put themselves into the hands of the English ; but the property of her subjects had been pre served by capitulations, and a way opened for making
her those remittances which the war had before sus
pended, with as much security as in time of peace. -- Hcr armies in Germany had been hitherto prevented from seizing upon Hanover; but they continued to encan1p on the same ground on which the first battle was fought; and, as it must ever happen from the policy of that government, the last troops she sent into
? ? ? ? 280 OBSERVATIONS ox A LATE PUBLICATION
the field were always found to be the best, and her fre quent losses only served to fill her regiments with better soldiers. The conquest of Hanover became therefore every campaign more probable. --It is to be noted,
that the French troops received subsistence only, for
the last three years of the war; and that, although large arrears were due to thcm at its conclusion, the charge was the less during its col1tinuance. " * l
If any one be willing to see to how much greater lengths the author carries these ideas, he will recur to the book. This is sufficient for a specimen of his manner of thinking. I believe one reflection i1ni formly obtrudes itself upon every reader of these par agraphs. For what purpose, in any cause, shall we hereafter contend with France ? Can we ever flatter ourselves that we shall wage a more successful war? If, 0n our part, in a war the most prosperous we ever carried on, by sea and by land, and in every part of the globe, attended with the unparalleled circumstance of an immense increase of trade and augmentation of revenue; if a continued series of disappointments, disgraces, and defeats, followed by
public bankruptcy, on the part of France; if all these still leave her a gainer on the whole bal ance, will it not be downright frenzy in us ever to look her in the face again, or to contend with her any, even the most essential points, since victory and defeat, though by diiferent ways, equally con duct us to our ruin ? Subjection to France without a struggle will indeed be less for our honor, but on every principle of our author it must be more for our advantage. According to his representation of things, the question is only concerning the most easy
* Pages 6 -10.
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fall. France had not discovered, our statesman tells us, at the end of that war, the triumphs of defeat, and the resources which are derived from bankruptcy. For my poor part, I do not wonder . at their blind ness. But the English ministers saw fLu'ther. Our
author has at length let foreigners also into the se cret, and made them altogether as wise as ourselves. It is their own fault if (milgato imperii arcano) they are imposed upon any longer. They now are ap prised of the sentiments which the great candidate for the government of this great empire entertains; and they will act accordingly. They are taught our
weakness and their own advantages.
He tells the world,* that if France carries on the
war against us in Germany, every loss she sustains contributes to the achievement of her conquest. If her armies are three years unpaid, she is the less ex hausted by expense. If her credit is destroyed, she is the less oppressed with debt.
If her troops are out
to pieces, they will by her policy (and a wonderful policy it is) be improved, and will be supplied with much better men. If the war is carried on in the colonies, he tells them1' that the loss of her ultra marine dominions-lessens her expenses, and insures
her remittances:
Per damna, per csedes, ab ipso Dncit opes animumqus ferro.
If so, what is it we can do to hurt her? --it will be 'all an imposition, all fallacio'u. s. Why, the result
? must be, --
Occidit, oecidit Spes omnis, et fortuna nostri
Nominis.
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The only way which the author's principles leave for our escape, is to reverse our condition into that of France, and to take her losing cards into our hands. But though his principles drive him to his politics will not suffer him to walk on this ground. Talking at our ease and of other countries, we may bear to diverted with such speculations; but in England we
shall never be taught to look upon the annihilation of our trade, the ruin of our credit, the defeat of our armies, and the loss of our ultramarine dominions (whatever the author may think of them), to be the high road to prosperity and greatness.
The reader does not, hope, imagine that mean seriously to set about the refutation of these uninge nious paradoxes and reveries without imagination. state them only that we may discern little in the questions of war and peace, the most weighty of all questions, what the wisdom of those men who are held out to us as the only hope of an expiring nation. The present ministry indeed of strange character: at once indolent and distracted. But ministerial system should be formed, actuated by such maxims as are avowed in this piece, the vices of the present ministry would become their virtues their indolence would be the greatest of all public benefits, and distraction that entirely defeated every one of their schemes would be our only security from destruction.
To have stated these reasonings enough, pre sume, to do their business. But they are accompa nied with facts and records, which may seem of little more weight. trust, however, that the facts of this author will be as far from bearing the touch stone, as his arguments. On little inquiry, they will be found as great an imposition as the successes
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they are meant to depreciate ; for they are all either
false or fallaciously applied ; or not in the least to the
purpose for which they are produced.
First the author, in order to support his favorite
paradox, that ou'r possession of the French colonies was of no detriment to France, has thought proper to inform us, that * " they put themselves into the hands of the English. " He uses the same assertion, in nearly the same words, in another place;1' " her colonies had put themselves into o\n' hands. " Now, in justice, not only to fact and common sense, but to the incomparable valor and perseverance of our mili tary and naval forces thus unhandsomely traduced,
? I must tell this author, that the French colonies did not " put themselves into the hands of the English. " They were compelled to submit; they were subdued by dint of English valor. Will the five years' war carried on in Canada, in which fell one of the princi pal hopes of this nation, and all the battles lost and
gained during that anxious period, convince this au thor of his mistake? Let him inquire of Sir Jeffery Amherst, under whose conduct that war was carried on ; of Sir Charles Saunders, whose steadiness and presence of mind saved our fleet, and were so emi nently serviceable in the whole course of the siege of Quebec ; of General Monckton, who was shot through
the body there, whether France " put her colonies in
to the hands of the English. "
Though he has made no exception, yet I would be
liberal to him ; perhaps he means to confine himself to her colonies in the West Indies. But surely it will fare as ill with him there as in North America, whilst we remember that in our first attempt at Martinico
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we were actually defeated; that it was three months before we reduced Guadaloupe; and that the con quest of the Havannah was achieved by the highest conduct, aided by circumstances of the greatest good fortune. He knows the expense both of men and treasure at which we bought that place. However,
if it had so pleased the peacemakers, it was no dear
for it was decisive of the fortune of the war and the terms of the treaty: the Duke of Niver nois thought so; France, England, Europe, consid ered it in that light; all the world, except the then friends of the then ministry, who wept for our victc ries, and were in haste to get rid of the burden of our conquests. This author knows that France did not put those colonies into the hands of England; but he well knows who did put the most valuable of them into the hands of France.
In the next place, our author* is pleased to con sider the conquest of those colonies in no other light than as a convenience for the remittances to France, which he asserts that the war had before
but for which a way was opened (by our conquest) as secure as in time of peace. I charitably hope he knows nothing of the subject. I referred him lately to our commanders, for the resistance of the French
purchase;
? I now wish he would apply to our custom
colonies ;
house entries, and our merchants, for the advantages which we derived from them.
In 1761, there was no entry of goods from any of the conquered places but Guadaloupe ; in that year it stood thus : ---
Imports from Guadaloupe, value, ? 482,179 * Page 9.
suspended,
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In 1762, when we had not yet delivered up our conquests, the account was,
Guadaloupe . . . . . . . . ? 513,244
Martinico. . . . . . . . .
Total imports in 1762, value, ? 801,669
In 1763, after we had delivered up the sovereignty of these islands, but kept open a communication with them, the imports were,
Guadaloupe . . Martinico . . . Havannah . . . . . . . . .
? 412,303 344,161 249,386
288,425
? Total imports in 1763, value, b? 1 005 8. 50 77
Besides, I find, in the account of bullion imported and brought to the Bank, that,_during that period in which the intercourse with the Havannah was open, we received at that one shop, in treasure, from that one place, 559,810l. ; in the year 1763, 389,450l. ;
so that the import from these places in that year amounted to 1,395,300l.
On this state the reader will observe, that I take the imports from, and not the exports to, these con quests, as the measure of the advantages which we derived from them. I do so for reasons which will
be somewhat worthy the attention of such readers as are fond of this species of inquiry. I say therefore I choose the import article, as the best, and indeed the
only standard we can have, of the value of the West India trade. Our export entry does not comprehend the greatest trade we carry on with any of the West India. islands, the sale of negroesz nor does it give
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any idea of two other advantages we draw from them; the remittances for money spent here, and the pay ment of part of the balance of the North American trade. It is therefore quite ridiculous, to strike a balance merely on the face _of an excess of imports and exports, in that commerce; though, in most for eign branches, it on the whole, the best method. If we should take that standard, would
288
appear, that the balance with our own islands annually,
several hundred thousand pounds against this coun try. * Such its aspect 0n the custom-house entries; but we know the direct contrary to be the fact. We know that the West-Indians are always indebted our merchants, and that the value of every shilling of West India produce English property. So that our import from them, and not our export, ought always to be _considered as their true value and this corrective ought to be applied to all general balances of our trade, which are formed on the ordinary prin ciples.
If possible, this was more emphatically true of the French West India islands, whilst they continued in our hands. That none or only vcry contemptible part, of the value of this produce could be remitted to France, the author will see, perhaps with unwill ingness, but with the clearest conviction, he con siders, that in the year 1763, after we had ceased to export to the isles of Guadaloupe and Martinico, and to the Havannah, and after the colonies were
? 'F Total imports from the West Indies in 1764 . Exports to ditto in ditto . . .
Excess ofimports .
In this, which the common way of stating the balance, itwill
appear upwards of two millions against us, which ridiculous.
. ? 2,909,411 896,511
. . ? 2,0l2,900
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free to send all their produce to Old France and Spain, if they had any remittance to make; he will see, that we imported from those places, in that year, to the amount of 1,395,. 300l. So far was the whole annual produce of these islands from being adequate to the payments of their annual call upon us, that this mighty additional importation was necessary, though not quite sufficient, to dis charge the debts contracted in the few y,ears we held
them. The property, therefore, of their whole prod uce was ours ; not only during the war, but even for more than a year after the peace. The author, I hope, will not again venture upon so rash and dis couraging a proposition concerning the nature and effect of those conquests, as to call them a conven
ience to the remittances of France; he sees, by this account, that what he asserts is not only without foundation, but even impossible to be true.
As to our trade at that time, he labors with all his might to represent it as absolutely ruined, or"on the very edge of ruin. Indeed, as usual with him, he is often as equivocal in his expression as he is clear in his design. Sometimes he more than insinuates a decay of our commerce in that war; sometimes he
admits an increase of exports; but it is in order to depreciate the advantages we might appear to derive from that increase, whenever it should come to be
proved against him. He tells you,* "that it was chiefly occasioned by the demands our own fleets and armies, and, instead or bringing wealth to the nation, was to be paid for by oppressive taxes upon the people of England. " Never was anything more destitute of foundation. It might be proved, with
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the greatest ease, from the nature and quality of the goods exported, as well as from the situation of the places to which our merchandise was sent, and which the war could no wise affect, that the supply of our fleets and armies could not have been the cause of this wonderful increase of trade: its cause was evi dent to the whole world; the ruin of the trade of France, and our possession of her colonies. What wbnderful effects this cause produced the reader will see below ; * and he will form on that account some judgment of the author's candor or information.
Ditto of foreign goods in time . . . . 2,910,836 14 9 Ditto of ditto out of time . . . . . . 559,485 2 10
Total exports of all kinds . . . . . . 11,7s1,s2s 12 10 Totalimports . . . . . . . . . s,09s,472150
Balance in favor of England . . . . ? 3,694,355 17 10
1754.
* Total export of British goods . . . value, 8,317,506 15 3
1761.
Total export of British goods . . . . 10,649,581 12 6 Ditto of foreign goods in time . . 3,553,692 7 1 Dittoofdittooutoftime. . . . . . 355,01502
Total exports of all kinds .
