No More Learning

Objection 4: Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct
from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a middle time
between every two instants. Therefore there was an interval between his
creation and his fall.

On the contrary, It is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44): "He stood not in
the truth": and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), "we must
understand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not
remain in it. "

I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the more
probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the
Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his
creation. This must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act
of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was
created in grace; as we have said ([557]Q[62], A[3]). For since the
angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said above
([558]Q[62], A[5]), if the devil, created in grace, merited in the
first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that
first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning.

If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace,
or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant,
then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between
his creation and fall.

Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual
instantaneous movements are represented by corporeal movements which
are measured by time. In this way by "walking" we are to understand the
movement of free-will tending towards good.

Reply to Objection 2: Origen says, "The serpent of old did not from the
first walk upon his breast and belly," because of the first instant in
which he was not wicked.

Reply to Objection 3: An angel has an inflexible free-will after once
choosing; consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a
natural movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to
beatitude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with man;
and therefore the argument does not hold good.

Reply to Objection 4: It is true to say that there is a middle time
between every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is
proved Phys. vi, text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the
heavenly movement, which is primarily measured by continuous time, time
is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of their
affections. So the first instant in the angels is understood to respond
to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects itself by
its evening knowledge because on the first day evening is mentioned,
but not morning. This operation was good in them all. From such
operation some of them were converted to the praise of the Word by
their morning knowledge while others, absorbed in themselves, became
night, "swelling up with pride," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv,
24). Hence the first act was common to them all; but in their second
they were separated. Consequently they were all of them good in the
first instant; but in the second the good were set apart from the
wicked.
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Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all?

Objection 1: It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned
was not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezech. 28:14): "Thou wast
a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy
mountain of God. " Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order of
the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii). Therefore, the
highest angel among those who sinned was not the highest of all.

Objection 2: Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it
might attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels
sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the
noblest creature which is unfitting.

Objection 3: Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything,
so much the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is,
so much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the less
can he turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the angel
who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels.

On the contrary, Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev. ) says that the chief angel
who sinned, "being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed them in
brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among them. "

I answer that, Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the
proneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels
we consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels were
less likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over the
terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view of the
Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6,7; x, 9,10,11).
For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some of the demons
were good, and some bad; naming as 'gods' the intellectual substances
which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of "demons"
the intellectual substances which are beneath it, yet higher than men
in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary
to faith; because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God
through the angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently
there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were
divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies, the higher over
the higher bodies; and the highest to stand before God. And in this
sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the
lower grade of angels; yet in that order some of them remained good.

But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed in
the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said
[559](A[2]), the demons' sin was pride; and the motive of pride is
excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory says
that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be the
more probable view: because the angels' sin did not come of any
proneness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that argument seems
to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet
this must not be prejudicial to the other view; because there might be
some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower
angels.

Reply to Objection 1: Cherubim is interpreted "fulness of knowledge,"
while "Seraphim" means "those who are on fire," or "who set on fire. "
Consequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible
with mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity,
which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who
sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub.

Reply to Objection 2: The Divine intention is not frustrated either in
those who sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the
end of both; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His
goodness, and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual
creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this
unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intellectual creature
was so made by God, that it lies within its own will to act for its
end.

Reply to Objection 3: However great was the inclination towards good in
the highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him:
consequently it was in his power not to follow it.
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Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not
the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect.
But, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one
time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others'
sinning.

Objection 2: Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was
shown above [560](A[2]). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more
contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to
a superior; and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by
desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the
sin of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if he
had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear that
the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.

Objection 3: Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to
another against God, than to wish to be over another against God;
because there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the
foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning, in that he induced
them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would have
sinned more deeply than the highest one; which is contrary to a gloss
on Ps. 103:26: "This dragon which Thou hast formed---He who was the
more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in malice. "
Therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others
sinning.

On the contrary, It is said (Apoc. 12:4) that the dragon "drew" with
him "the third part of the stars of heaven. "

I answer that, The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others
sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind of
exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are
subjects of that highest one; as is evident from our Lord's words: "Go
[Vulg. 'Depart from Me'], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was
prepared for the devil and his angels" (Mat. 25:41). For the order of
Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil
suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to
(2 Pet. 2:19): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the
slave. "

Reply to Objection 1: Although the demons all sinned in the one
instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For
an angel needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as
man, who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and
vocal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time.
And it is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant
when he takes thought; and in the last instant of speech, another who
catches his meaning can assent to what is said; as is especially
evident with regard to primary concepts, "which everyone accepts
directly they are heard" [*Boethius, De Hebdom. ].

Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is
required in us; in the same instant in which the highest angel
expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the
others to consent thereto.

Reply to Objection 2: Other things being equal, the proud would rather
be subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to
be subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an
advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior.
Consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to
serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they wanted to have him
as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their ultimate
beatitude of their own natural powers; especially because in the order
of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel.

Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above ([561]Q[62], A[6]), an
angel has nothing in him to retard his action, and with his whole might
he is moved to whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently
since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower
angels, he fell into sin with intenser energy, and therefore he became
the greater in malice.
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Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm?

Objection 1: It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm.
For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Evil is in many, but good
is in few. "

Objection 2: Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way
in men and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found than
good; according to Eccles. 1:15: "The number of fools is infinite. "
Therefore for the same reason it is so with the angels.

Objection 3: Further, the angels are distinguished according to persons
and orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it would
appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders.

On the contrary, It is said (4 Kings 6:16): "There are more with us
than with them": which is expounded of the good angels who are with us
to aid us, and the wicked spirits who are our foes.

I answer that, More angels stood firm than sinned. Because sin is
contrary to the natural inclination; while that which is against the
natural order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its
effects either always, or more often than not.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men,
in whom evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which
are known to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason,
which good is known to the few. In the angels there is only an
intellectual nature; hence the argument does not hold.

And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty.

Reply to Objection 3: According to those who hold that the chief devil
belonged to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly
affairs, it is evident that some of every order did not fall, but only
those of the lowest order. According to those who maintain that the
chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some fell of
every order; just as men are taken up into every order to supply for
the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty of free-will is more
established; which in every degree of creature can be turned to evil.
In the Sacred Scripture, however, the names of some orders, as of
Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to demons; since they are
derived from the ardor of love and from God's indwelling, which are not
consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of Cherubim, Powers, and
Principalities are attributed to them; because these names are derived
from knowledge and from power, which can be common to both good and
bad.
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THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

It now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons;
under which heading there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Of their darkness of intellect;

(2) Of their obstinacy of will;

(3) Of their grief;

(4) Of their place of punishment.
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Whether the demons' intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of
all truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons' intellect is darkened by
being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For it they knew any
truth at all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to know
separated substances. But this is not in keeping with their
unhappiness: for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as
that some writers have assigned as man's last happiness the knowledge
of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all
knowledge of truth.

Objection 2: Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be
specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the same is
not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of our
intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes from
the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of the
sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most manifest of Himself,
because He is the sovereign truth; and this is because they are not
clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore neither can
they know other things.

Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22), the
proper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely, morning and evening.
But the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do not see
things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowledge, because this
evening knowledge refers the things known to the Creator's praise
(hence, after "evening" comes "morning" [Gn. 1]). Therefore the demons
can have no knowledge of things.

Objection 4: Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of
the kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei
xi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: "for if they had
known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory," as is
said 1 Cor. 2:8. Therefore, for the same reason, they are deprived of
all other knowledge of truth.

Objection 5: Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either
naturally, as we know first principles; or by deriving it from someone
else, as we know by learning; or by long experience, as the things we
learn by discovery. Now, the demons cannot know the truth by their own
nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33), the good
angels are separated from them as light is from darkness; and every
manifestation is made through light, as is said Eph. 5:13. In like
manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor by learning from the good
angels: because "there is no fellowship of light with darkness [*Vulg. :
'What fellowship hath . . . ? ']" (2 Cor. 6:14). Nor can they learn by
long experience: because experience comes of the senses. Consequently
there is no knowledge of truth in them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, "certain gifts
were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at
all, but remain entire and most brilliant. " Now, the knowledge of truth
stands among those natural gifts. Consequently there is some knowledge
of truth in them.

I answer that, The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes of
nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of
grace is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when
Divine secrets are imparted to an individual; the other is effective,
and produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the gift
of wisdom.

Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor
lessened in the demons. For it follows from the very nature of the
angel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on
account of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be withdrawn
from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural
powers, as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or a foot or
of something else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the
natural gifts remain entire in them. Consequently their natural
knowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, however,
which comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been utterly
taken away from them, but lessened; because, of these Divine secrets
only so much is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is done
either by means of the angels, or "through some temporal workings of
Divine power," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 21); but not in the
same degree as to the holy angels, to whom many more things are
revealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of the third
knowledge, as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived.

Reply to Objection 1: Happiness consists in self-application to
something higher. The separated substances are above us in the order of
nature; hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated
substances, although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the
first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for one separate
substance to know another; as it is natural for us to know sensible
natures. Hence, as man's happiness does not consist in knowing sensible
natures; so neither does the angel's happiness consist in knowing
separated substances.

Reply to Objection 2: What is most manifest in its nature is hidden
from us by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely
because our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine
substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect, but
even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his own
nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the perfection of his
intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God than man
can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons. Although
they do not possess the purity which comes with grace, nevertheless
they have purity of nature; and this suffices for the knowledge of God
which belongs to them from their nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The creature is darkness in comparison with the
excellence of the Divine light; and therefore the creature's knowledge
in its own nature is called "evening" knowledge. For the evening is
akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when the light fails
utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of things in their own
nature, when referred to the praise of the Creator, as it is in the
good angels, has something of the Divine light, and can be called
evening knowledge; but if it be not referred to God, as is the case
with the demons, it is not called evening, but "nocturnal" knowledge.
Accordingly we read in Gn. 1:5 that the darkness, which God separated
from the light, "He called night. "

Reply to Objection 4: All the angels had some knowledge from the very
beginning respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found its
completion in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were
beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never had.
Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it; hence the
demons much less fully understood the mystery of the Incarnation, when
Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix,
21), "It was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels, who
enjoy a participated eternity of the Word; but it was made known by
some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into them. " For had they
fully and certainly known that He was the Son of God and the effect of
His passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion of the Lord
of glory.

Reply to Objection 5: The demons know a truth in three ways: first of
all by the subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened by
privation of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light
of their intellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the holy
angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will, they do
agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual nature,
according to which they can accept what is manifested by others:
thirdly, they know by long experience; not as deriving it from the
senses; but when the similitude of their innate intelligible species is
completed in individual things, they know some things as present, which
they previously did not know would come to pass, as we said when
dealing with the knowledge of the angels ([562]Q[57], A[3], ad 3).
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Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will of the demons is not obstinate
in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual
being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said above
[563](A[1]). But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained to
good rather than to evil.
Therefore the demons' will is not so
obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good.

Objection 2: Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than
the demons' malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the malice
of sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy. Therefore
the demons can likewise return from their state of malice to the state
of justice.

Objection 3: Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then
their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they fell.
But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the motive
for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore the demon
is not obstinate in malice.

Objection 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that man can be
reinstated by another, since he fell through another. But, as was
observed already ([564]Q[63], A[8]), the lower demons fell through the
highest one. Therefore their fall can be repaired by another.
Consequently they are not obstinate in malice.

Objection 5: Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs
any good work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses
the truth, saying to Christ: "I know Who Thou art, the holy one of God"
(Mk. 1:24). "The demons" also "believe and tremble" (Jam. 2:19). And
Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that "they desire what is good and
best, which is, to be, to live, to understand. " Therefore they are not
obstinate in malice.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that hate
Thee, ascendeth continually"; and this is understood of the demons.
Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice.

I answer that, It was Origen's opinion [*Peri Archon i. 6] that every
will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to good and
evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of the union
of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of true
beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature of true
beatitude; hence it is termed "life everlasting. " It is also contrary
to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that demons and
wicked men shall be sent "into everlasting punishment," and the good
brought "into everlasting life. " Consequently such an opinion must be
considered erroneous; while according to Catholic Faith, it must be
held firmly both that the will of the good angels is confirmed in good,
and that the will of the demons is obstinate in evil.

We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of the
sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. For as Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to men, what the fall is to the
angels. " Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave or less
grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they are
without remission and endure for ever.

To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind
that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the
apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For the
sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks the
universal good, as was said above ([565]Q[59], A[1]); as also the sense
apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers
universals. Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this
respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we
apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit
of "intelligence"; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably,
passing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by
which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's
will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and
of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres fixedly
and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its
adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite
(namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he
has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that
man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after
choice; but the angel's free-will is flexible either opposite before
the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to
justice, were confirmed therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are
obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who
are damned (SP, [566]Q[98], AA[1], 2).

Reply to Objection 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but
according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said.

Reply to Objection 2: God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent.
But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and
are not delivered by the Divine mercy.

Reply to Objection 3: The devil's first sin still remains in him
according to desire; although not as to his believing that he can
obtain what he desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can
commit murder, and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is
taken from him; nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so
that he would he had done it, or still would do it if he could.

Reply to Objection 4: The fact that man sinned from another's
suggestion, is not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable.
Consequently the argument does not hold good.

Reply to Objection 5: A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate
will; and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the
demon's part is always wicked; because, although at times he does
something good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth
in order to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not
willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act
is natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to the
goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there is sorrow in the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For
since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the same
subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing against
the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: "The devil has power
over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices over this
sinister power. " Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons.

Objection 2: Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things
cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are
present. But there is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41:24,
"Who was made to fear no one. " Therefore there is no grief in the
demons.

Objection 3: Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the
demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at least
for the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience.

On the contrary, The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man is
punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin, according
to Apoc. 18:7, "As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in
delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her. " Consequently
much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow, because he
especially glorified himself.

I answer that, Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are
passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the
sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According,
however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the
demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because
sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the
resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is evident
that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are, and others
to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they would wish others to be
damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in
them: and especially because it is of the very notion of punishment for
it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are deprived of
happiness, which they desire naturally; and their wicked will is curbed
in many respects.

Reply to Objection 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are
opposites, but not about different things. Hence there is nothing to
hinder a man from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another;
especially so far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will;
because, not merely in different things, but even in one and the same
thing, there can be something that we will, and something that we will
not.

Reply to Objection 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present
evil, so also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, "He
was made to fear no one," this is to be understood of the fear of God
which restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that "the devils
believe and tremble" (James 2:19).

Reply to Objection 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the
sin bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin
is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, for the evil of
sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the goodness of
nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that "sorrow for good lost by punishment,
is the witness to a good nature. " Consequently, since the demon has a
perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin.
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Whether our atmosphere is the demons' place of punishment?

Objection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons'
place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual
nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no place of
punishment for demons.

Objection 2: Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But
man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the
demons' place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome
atmosphere.

Objection 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire.
But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the darksome
atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the
darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment
day. "

I answer that, The angels in their own nature stand midway between God
and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it
procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But
man's welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of
all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil;
and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way,
indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against
opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be
brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be
of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of
punishment is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this
is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the
darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment.

Now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment
day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with demons
endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to us
here; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial:
although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they
have led astray; just as some of the good angels are with the holy
souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men
and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.

Reply to Objection 1: A place is not penal to angel or soul as if
affecting the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by
saddening it: because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a
place not agreeable to its will.

Reply to Objection 2: One soul is not set over another in the order of
nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature; consequently
there is no parallel.

Reply to Objection 3: Some have maintained that the pain of sense for
demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the
beatitude of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day.
But this is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2
Cor. 5:1): "If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we
have a house in heaven. " Others, again, while not admitting the same of
souls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same
judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good
souls and good angels.

Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs
to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their
coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the same
way as we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is not
actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said, that
although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of hell
while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their punishment
is none the less; because they know that such confinement is their due.
Hence it is said in a gloss upon James 3:6: "They carry fire of hell
with them wherever they go. " Nor is this contrary to what is said (Lk.
8:31), "They besought the Lord not to cast them into the abyss"; for
they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for them to be cast
out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it is stated, "They
[Vulg. 'He'] besought Him that He would not expel them [Vulg. 'him']
out of the country" (Mk. 5:10).
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TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ[65]-74)
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THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES (FOUR ARTICLES)

From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of
corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture
makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as
given in the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth";
the work of distinction as given in the words, "He divided the light
from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the
waters that are under the firmament"; and the work of adornment,
expressed thus, "Let there be lights in the firmament. "

First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the work
of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the first
head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?

(2) Whether they were created on account of God's goodness?

(3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels?

(4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from
God.
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Whether corporeal creatures are from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God.
For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works which
God hath made, continue for ever. " But visible bodies do not continue
for ever, for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): "The things which are seen are
temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. " Therefore God
did not make visible bodies.

Objection 2: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all things that
He had made, and they were very good. " But corporeal creatures are
evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in
serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called
evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are
not from God.

Objection 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God,
but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God.
Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18): "While we look not at the things which
are seen. " Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 145:6): "Who made heaven and earth,
the sea, and all things that are in them. "

I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not
created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof
of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), "The god of this
world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers. " But this position is
altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point,
there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in
nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different
things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these
different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as
different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being
is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There
must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in
whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and
spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of
this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him,
of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense, "Whose god
is their belly" (Phil. 3:19).

Reply to Objection 1: All the creatures of God in some respects
continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will
never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a
creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is
immovable. For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their
matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But
incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though
they are mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the
heavenly bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the
Apostle's words, "The things which are seen are temporal," though true
even as regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as
every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to
movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they
are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these
visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure for
ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor. 4:17): "It worketh for us . . . an
eternal weight of glory. "

Reply to Objection 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are
good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the
consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities,
though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate
things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can
derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems
simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious
to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves
the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And
this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.

Reply to Objection 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from
God, but lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of God are clearly
seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). If,
then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them
foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): "Creatures are turned into a
snare to the feet of the unwise. " And the very fact that they can thus
withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot
lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good
that they have from Him.
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Whether corporeal things were made on account of God's goodness?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on
account of God's goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God "created
all things that they might be. " Therefore all things were created for
their own being's sake, and not on account of God's goodness.

Objection 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the
greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual
creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to
the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of
spiritual creatures, and not on account of God's goodness.

Objection 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to
the unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God
must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not
created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all
inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now,
corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the
former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on
account of God's goodness.

On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all
things for Himself. "

I answer that, Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii. ] that corporeal
creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in
punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that
God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal
nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God,
and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher
or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from
God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the
degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the
first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after
narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins,
"God saw that it was good" (Gn. 1), as if to say that everything was
brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be.