Petersburg
and all the other capitals of Europe expected the probable
defeat of Prussia, and at first were seriously alarmed at
the brilliant successes of our troops.
and all the other capitals of Europe expected the probable
defeat of Prussia, and at first were seriously alarmed at
the brilliant successes of our troops.
Treitschke - 1914 - Life and Works
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 275
author condescendingly expresses it, had modestly
renounced all wishes of bringing about a union of the
German States. His policy was peaceful, as it was obliged
to be; it shunned a decisive contest for which at that
time all the preliminary conditions were lacking, but as
soon as affairs in the new provinces were, to some extent,
settled, he began at once to work for the commercial and
political unifying of Germany. In this difficult task,
which in very truth laid the foundation for the new
German Empire, Prussia encountered at every step the
opposition of Austria, England, and France. Russia
alone among all the Great Powers preserved a friendly
neutrality. This one fact is sufficient to justify the
King in attaching great importance to Russia's friend-
ship.
This partiality of his, however, was by no means blind,
for nothing is more absurd than the author's assertion
that Prussia, by the mediation which brought about the
Peace of Adrianople, had merely done the Russian Court
an unselfish service. When the war of 1828 broke out
the King had openly told the Czar that he disapproved
of his declaration of war. The next year, at the com-
mencement of the second campaign, the European
situation assumed a very threatening aspect. The Vienna
Cabinet, alarmed in the highest degree by the progress
of the Russian arms, exerted itself in conjunction with
England to bring about a great alliance against Russia;
on the other hand, the King knew from his son-in-law's
mouth (the Czar's autograph note is still preserved in
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? 276 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
the Berlin State Archives) that there was a secret under-
standing between Nicholas and Charles X of France.
If matters were allowed to go their course there was
danger of a European war, which might oblige Prussia
to fight simultaneously against Russia and France, and
that about a question remote from our interests. In
order to avert this danger, and thus acting for the best
for his own country, the King resolved to act as a
mediator, and brought about a peace which, as matters
then were, was acceptable to both contending parties.
Prince Metternich was certainly alarmed at this success
of Prussian policy, and the reactionary party in Berlin,
Duke Karl of Mecklenburg, Ancillon, Schuckmann,
Knesebeck, who were all staunch adherents of the Vienna
diplomat, were alarmed; but the ablest men at the Court,
Bernstoff, Witzleven, Eichhorn, and above all the younger
Prince William, approved the King's well-considered pro-
ceeding. The resolve of the King was obviously connected
with the brilliant successes which his finance minister,
Motz, had won at the same time in the struggles of German
commercial policy. To a calm historical judgment the
years 1828 and 1829 appear as a fortunate turning-point
in the history of that uneventful period; it was the time
when Prussia again began to take up a completely
independent position in relation to the Austrian Court.
Among the Liberals, indeed, who had lately been admiring
the Greeks, and now were suddenly enthusiastic for the
Turks, there arose a supplementary party-legend, that
Prussia had only undertaken the office of mediator in
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 277
order to save the Russian Army from certain destruction.
This discovery, however, is already contradicted by the
calendar. On August 19th Diebitch's army appeared
before Adrianople; and it was here that the victor's
embarrassments first began, and here, first, it was evident
how much his fighting power had been reduced by
sickness and the wear and tear of the campaign. But
Prussia had commenced acting as mediator as early as
July; when General Muffling received his instructions
the Russian Army was victorious everywhere.
Later on, also, the sober-mindedness of King Frederick
William never favoured the Czar's designs against the
Porte; he rather did his best to strengthen the resisting
power of the Ottoman Empire. The only partly effective
reform which the decaying Turkish State succeeded in
carrying through--the reconstitution of its Army--was,
as is well known, the work of Prussian officers. All the
reports which the embittered scandal-seeking opposition
party of that time circulated, regarding the influence of
Russia in the domestic concerns of Prussia, are mere
inventions. The King alone deserves blame or praise
for the course of domestic policy; his son-in-law never
refused to pay him filial reverence. Even the eccen-
tricities of the Berlin Court at that period, the love for
parades, the bestowing of military decorations, which
were stigmatized by the Liberals as " Russian manners,"
were simply due to the personal predilection of the King,
and it is difficult to decide whether Russia has learnt
more in this respect from Germany, or vice versu. During
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? 278 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
the anxious days of the July revolution the King ex-
hibited again, with all his modesty, an independent and
genuinely Prussian attitude. Frederick William resisted
the legitimist outbursts of his son-in-law, and hindered the
crusade against France which had been planned in
St. Petersburg. The next year he resisted with equal
common sense the foolish enthusiasm of the Liberals for
the Poles, and, by occupying the eastern frontier, assisted
in the suppression of that Polish insurrection, which was
as dangerous for our Posen as for Russian Poland. The
Baltic anonymous author conceals his vexation at this
intelligent policy of self-assertion behind the thoughtful
remark that we had, as is well known, "paid for ren-
dering this assistance with the valuable life of Gneisenau. "
Should we, then, perhaps enter in our ledger, on the
Russian debit side, the cholera which swept away our
heroes?
During the whole period from 1815 to 1840 I know only
of a single fact which can be alleged to give real occasion
to the reproach that the King, for the sake of Russia's
friendship, neglected an important interest of his State.
In constrast to the ruthless commercial policy of Russia,
Prussia showed a moderation which bordered on weak-
ness. But this matter, also, is not so simple as our
anonymous author thinks. He reproaches Russia with
the non-fulfilment of the Vienna Treaty of May 3rd, 1815,
and overlooks the fact that Prussia herself hardly wished
in earnest the carrying out of this agreement. It was soon
enough proved that Hardenberg had been over-reached
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 279
at Vienna by Prince Czartoryski. The apparently
harmless agreements regarding free transit and free
trade with the products of all formerly Polish territories
imposed upon our State, through which the transit took
place, only duties, without conferring any corresponding
advantages. In order to carry out the treaty literally
Prussia would have had to divide its Polish provinces from
its other territories by a line of custom-houses. But the
Poles saw in the treaty a welcome means of carrying their
national propaganda into our Polish territories by settle-
ments of commercial agents. Thus it happened that
Prussia, after futile negotiations, proceeded on her own
account; and by the customs-law of 1818 placed her Polish
territories on precisely the same footing as her other
eastern provinces. After this necessary step Prussia
was no more in the position to appeal successfully to the
Vienna Treaty. And what means did we, in fact, possess
to compel the neighbouring State to give up a foolish
commercial policy, which was injurious for his own
country? Only the two-edged weapon of retaliatory
duties. The relation of the two countries assumed quite
a different aspect under Frederick William IV. It will
always be one of the most bitter memories of our history
how lacking in counsel and wavering in purpose the
clever new King proved, in contrast to the strong-willed
Czar, how cruelly he knew, by countless failures, the fact
that in the stern struggles for power of national life
character is always superior to talent, and how at last,
for truth will out, he actually feared those narrow minds.
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? 280 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
Here our author has good reason for sharp judgments,
and here also he gives us, along with some questionable
anecdotes, some reliable matter-of-fact information
regarding the history of the confusions of 1848-50. It is
quite true that the Czar Nicholas in the autumn of 1848
asked General Count Friedrich Dohna whether he would
not be the Prussian General Monk, and march with the
first army-corps on Berlin, to restore order there; the
whole Russian army would act as his reserve in case of
need. The memories of the count, printed in autograph,
confirm the correctness of this story, with the exception
of some trifling details. But even here the author cannot
rise to an unprejudiced historical estimate of the events
in question. He conceals the fact that not only Russia but
all the Great Powers were against the rise of a Prussian-
German Empire. The position which the Powers had
assumed with regard to the question of German unity
had not changed since 1814. He similarly ignores the
fact that all the Great Powers opposed the liberation
of Schleswig-Holstein; and it is undeniable that Russia,
according to the traditions of the old diplomacy, had
better grounds to adopt such an attitude than the other
Powers; for all the Cabinets believed then decidedly
--although wrongly--that Prussia wished to use the
struggle with Denmark as a means of possessing herself
of the Kiel harbour. The Russian State, as a Baltic
Power, could not welcome this prospect.
Russian policy, in contrast to that of England, France,
and Austria, was also peculiar in this, that it resisted the
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 281
Prussian constitutional movement. The Czar Nicholas
did not merely behave as the head of the cause of royalty
in all Europe, but actually felt himself such; and it was
precisely this which secured him a strong following among
the Prussian Conservatives. It is far from my intention
to defend, in any way, the wretched policy which came
to grief at Warsaw and Olmiitz; we, the old Gotha
party, have all grown up as opponents of this tendency.
Meanwhile, after the lapse of a whole generation, it seems,
however, to be time to appreciate the natural motives
which drove so many valiant patriots into the Russian
camp. It is enough to remember only the King's ride
through mutinous Berlin, the retreat of the victorious
guards before the defeated barricade-fighters, and all the
terrible humiliation which the weakness of Frederick
William IV brought on the throne of the Hohenzollerns.
The old Prussian royalists felt as though the world were
coming to an end; they saw all that they counted most
venerable desecrated; and amid the universal chaos
the Czar Nicholas appeared to them to be the last stay
of Monarchy. Therefore, in order to save royalty in
Prussia they adhered to Russia. They made a grievous
error, but only blind hatred, as with our author, can con-
demn them abruptly as betrayers of their country. The
head of the pro-Russian party in Berlin was, at the begin-
ning of the 'fifties, the same Field-Marshal Dohna who
had instantly rejected with Prussian pride the above-
mentioned contemptible proposal of the Czar; of him a
diplomat said: "So long as this old standard remains
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? 282 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
upright, I feel easy. " Strongly Conservative in political
and ecclesiastical matters though he was, this son-in-law
of Scharnhorst had never surrendered the ideal of the
War of Liberation, the hope of German unity. What
brought the noble German into the ranks of the re-
actionists was certainly not regard for Russia, but that
hopeless confusion of our affairs which had brought about
such a close connection between the great cause of German
unity and the follies of the revolution; the Imperial
Crown of Frankfort seemed to him as to his King to be a
couronne de pavi.
As regards the Crimean War, all unprejudiced judges
believe, nowadays, that Prussia had, as an exception,
and for once in a way, undeserved good fortune. The
crushing superiority of Russia was broken by the Western
Powers without our interference, and yet our friendly
relations with our eastern neighbour, which were to be
so fruitful in results for Germany's future, remained
unbroken. Even a less undecided, less inactive govern-
ment than Manteuffel's Ministry could scarcely have
obtained a more favourable result than this. Our author
himself tepidly acknowledges that it was not Prussia's
duty to side with the Western Powers, and thus help on
the schemes of Bonapartism. A really brilliant states-
man perhaps might, as soon as the military forces of
France were locked up in the East, have suddenly made an
alliance with Russia, and attempted the conquest of
Schleswig-Holstein, and the solution of the German
question, without troubling himself about mistaken
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 283
public opinion. But it is obvious how difficult this was,
and how impossible for a personality like the King's.
Instead of quietly appreciating the difficulty of the
circumstances, our author only vehemently denounces
Russia's pride and Prussia's servility. He also again
ignores the fact that Prussia then, unfortunately, had
fallen into a state of being regarded as negligible by the
whole world, and the arrogance of the Western Powers
was not less than that of Russia. Everyone knows the
letters of Prince Albert, and Napoleon III's remark,
regarding the deference which Prussia showed towards
Russia; the cold, disparaging contempt displayed in
the letters of the Prince Consort, who was himself a
German, and accustomed to weigh his words carefully,
is, in my opinion, more insulting than the coarse words of
abuse which the harsh despotic Nicholas is said to have
blurted out in moments of sudden anger. Our author
also ignores the fact that the Czar Nicholas declared
himself ready to purchase Prussia's help in the field by
surrendering Warsaw. In the camp of the English
and French allies they were willing to pay a price also,
but only offered a slight rectification of the frontier on
the left bank of the Rhine. Which of the offers was the
more favourable?
This whole section of the book is a mixture of truth
and falsehood, of ingenious remarks and tasteless gossip.
We will give one specimen of the author's manner of
relating history. He prints in spaced letters the following:
"In February, 1854, a Prussian State secret--the just
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? 284 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
completed plan of mobilisation--was revealed to the Court
of St. Petersburg. " Then he relates how one of our
noblest patriots, a well-known writer, conveyed the news
of this betrayal, of course in perfect good faith, to a Berlin
lithographic correspondence agency; and in consequence
a secret order was issued for the writer's arrest. I happen
to be exactly acquainted with the affair, and can confirm
the statement that the order for arrest was certainly
issued--a characteristic occurrence in that time of petty
panics on the part of the police. But more important
than this secondary matter is the question whether
that piece of information was reliable, and whether that
betrayal really took place. The author has here again
concealed something. The report was that a brother of
the King had committed the treachery. This remarkable
disclosure, however, did not originate with anyone who
was really conversant with affairs, but with an honourable,
though at the same time very credulous and hot-headed,
Liberal deputy of the Landtag,* who had nothing to do
with the Court. Is it exaggerated loyalty when we
Prussians demand from the Baltic anonymous author
at least some attempt at a proof, before we resolve to
regard one of our royal princes as a traitor to his country?
The story simply belongs to the series of innumerable
scandals which were only too gladly believed by the
malicious Liberalism of the 'fifties. It was, we must
remember, the time when Varnhagen von Ense was
flourishing. In accordance with the general tenor of his
? Parliament of a single State.
^
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 285
book the author naturally does not relish the indisput-
able fact that the policy of Alexander II atoned for
many of the wrongs which the Czar Nicholas had
committed against Germany. He seeks rather, during
this period of Russian history, to hunt up every trace of
movements hostile to Germany. It is, for instance, a
well-known fact that, after the Peace of Paris, Russia
sought for a rapprochement to France; and it may also
be safely assumed that Prince Gortschakoff, from the
commencement of his political career, regarded an alli-
ance with France as the most suitable for Russia. But it
is a long way from such general wishes to the acts of State-
policy. For whole decades the great majority of French
statesmen, without distinction of party, have given a lip-
adherence to the Russian Alliance; even Lamartine,
the enthusiast for freedom, spoke of this alliance as a
geographical necessity and the "cry of nature. " And
yet the course of the world's history went another way.
Then came the Polish rising of 1863. The Court of
St. Petersburg learned to know thoroughly the secret
intrigues of Bonapartism, and in Prussia's watchful
aid found a proof of the value of German friendship.
Since then, for a whole decade, its attitude has remained
favourable to our interests, whatever fault the Baltic
anonymous author may find in details. Certainly it
was only the will of one man which gave this direction
to Russian policy. The Russo-Prussian Alliance has
never denied its origin; it has never evoked a warm
friendship between the two nations; while the great
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? 286 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
majority of Germans regarded Russian affairs with com-
plete indifference, there awoke in the educated circles of
Russian society, as soon as the great decisive days of our
history approached, a bitter hatred against Germany,
which increased from year to year. But that one will,
which was friendly to us, governed the German State;
and so long as this condition lasted the intelligent German
Press was bound to treat the neighbouring Power with
forbearance. When the Baltic author expresses contempt
for our Press because of this, and blames it for want of
national pride, he merely shows that he has no compre-
hension for the first and most important tasks of German
policy. His thoughts continually revolve round Reval,
Riga, and Mitau.
That the dislocation of the equilibrium among the
Baltic Powers and the advance of Prussia in the Cimbric
Peninsula must have appeared serious matters to the St.
Petersburg Court is obvious. But at last it let the old
deeply-rooted tradition drop, and accommodated itself
with as good a grace as possible to the fait accompli.
Similarly it is evident that the formation of the North
German Confederation could not be agreeable to it.
When the war of 1866 broke out people at St.
Petersburg
and all the other capitals of Europe expected the probable
defeat of Prussia, and at first were seriously alarmed at
the brilliant successes of our troops. But this time also
a sense of fairness prevailed. The Czar Alexander
accepted the new order of things in Germany as soon as
he ascertained what schemes were cherished by the
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 287
Court of the Tuileries against the left bank of the Rhine.
In the next year (1870) this attitude of our friend and
neighbour underwent its severest test. Austria, Italy,
and Denmark, as is well known, were on the point of
concluding an alliance against Germany when the victories
of Worth and Spicheren intervened. England did not
dare to forbid the French to make the attack, which a
single word from the Queen of the Seas could have pre-
vented, and afterwards she prolonged the war by her
sale of arms and by the one-sided manner in which she
maintained her neutrality. The Czar Alexander, on the
other hand, greeted each victory of his royal uncle with
sincere joy. That was the important point, and not
the ill-humour of Prince Gortschakoff which our author
depicts with so much satisfaction. Russia was the only
Great Power whose head displayed friendly sentiments
towards us during that difficult time. And if we wish to
realise how valuable Russian friendship was for us
also in the following years, we must compare the present
state of things with the past. As long as the alliance of
the three Emperors lasted a European war was quite
out of the question, for the notorious war crisis of 1875
has in reality never existed. Since Russia has separated
from the other two Imperial Powers we are at any rate
within sight of the possibility of a European war, and may
perhaps be suddenly compelled to act on two frontiers
simultaneously.
The most welcome task for an author who openly
preaches war against Russia was obviously to show in
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? 288 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
detail through what circumstances the old alliance after
the Peace of San Stefano was loosened and finally
dissolved. I know no more of these matters than anyone
else. I only know that in Russia there is deep vexation
at the course taken by the Berlin Congress, and that a
great deal of the blame is imputed to the German Empire.
I have heard of secret negotiations regarding a Franco-
Russian Alliance, and am without further argument
convinced that Prince Bismarck would not have given
German policy its latest direction without very solid
reasons. But I have no more exact knowledge of the
matter. Therefore it was with easily intelligible curiosity
that I began to read the last section of the book. I
hoped to learn something about the transactions between
Russia and France; I hoped to learn whether the senti-
ments of the Czar Alexander have changed, or whether
the monarch does not now more personally direct
the foreign policy of his kingdom, etc. But our author
himself knows nothing about such matters; he deceives
himself or others when he pretends to be initiated. He
only produces lengthy extracts from the Germanophobe
articles of the Russian Press. Every publicist who is
at all an expert knows just as many fine and pithy
passages in Muscovite papers. In Hansen's "Coulisses
de la diplomatic " the author, who loves historical sources
of this kind, might discover similar outpourings of
Russian politicians. But all that proves very little.
The question is much rather whether the Russian Press,
which, as is well known, only enjoys a certain degree of
\
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 289
freedom in the two capitals and remains quite unknown
to the mass of the people, is powerful enough to influence
the course of Russia's foreign policy. To this question
the author gives no answer.
So we lay the book aside without any information on
the present state of affairs, but not without a feeling of
shame. When two who have been friends for many
years have broken with each other, it is not only unchival-
rous for one to tax his old companions with sins com-
mitted long ago, but unwise; the reproach always
falls back on the reproacher. The last impression which
the reader carries away from this work is much more
unfavourable for Prussia than for Russia; therefore even
the foreign Press greeted it at once with well-deserved
contempt. Anyone who believes the author must
come to the conclusion that King Frederick William III
and his two successors had conducted a Russian and not
a Prussian policy. Happily this view is quite false.
But we would remind the Baltic publicist, who, under the
disguise of a Prussian patriot, draws such a nattering
picture of our history, of an old Prussian story which still
has its application. In the Rhine campaign of 1793 a
Prussian grenadier was inveighing vigorously against
King Frederick William II; but when an Austrian fellow-
soldier chimed in the Prussian gave him a box on the ear
and said, "/ may talk like that, but not you; for I am a
Prussian. "
The author's remarks on the future are based upon the
tacit assumption that the European Powers fall naturally
T
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? 2go TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
into two groups--Austria, England, and Germany on the
one side, Italy, Russia, and France on the other. In the
short time since the book came out this assumption has
already been made void; the English elections have
reminded the world very forcibly of the instability of
grouping in the system of States. If the author had
commenced his work only four weeks later it would
probably not have appeared in the book market at all or
have done so in a very different shape.
But there is one truth, though certainly no new one,
in the train of thought which is apparent in this book;
it is only too correct that hostility to everything German
is constantly on the increase in influential Russian society.
But we do not at all believe that an intelligent Russian
Government, not misled by the dreams of Pan-slavism,
must necessarily cherish such a feeling towards us. We
regard a war against Russia as a great calamity, for who,
now, when the period of colonising absolutism lies far
behind us, can seriously wish to encumber our State with
the possession of Warsaw, and with millions of Poles and
Jews? But many signs indicate that the next great
European crisis will find the Russians in the ranks of
our enemies. All the more important therefore is our
newly-confirmed friendship with Austria.
This alliance is, as a matter of course, sure of the
involuntary sympathy of our people; if it endures it
may have the useful effect of strengthening the German
element in Austria, and finally checking the melancholy
decay of our civilisation in Bohemia and Hungary, in
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 291
Krain and the Tyrol. Our interests in the East coincide,
for the present, with those of the Danube Empire. After
the occupation of Bosnia has once taken place Austria
cannot again surrender the position she has taken up,
without preparing a triumph for our common enemy,
Pan-slavism. Nevertheless, we cannot join our Baltic J
author in prophesying that the treaty of friendship with
Austria will be as lasting and immovable as the unity
of the German Empire. Germany has plenty of enemies
in the medley of peoples which exist in Austria: all
the Slavs, even the ultramontane Germans, hate us;
nay, more, the Magyars, our political friends, suppress
German civilisation in the Saxon districts of Transylvania
much more severely than the Russians ever ventured to
do in their Baltic provinces. It is not in our power to keep
these hostile forces for ever aloof from the guidance
of Russia. The unity of our Empire, on the other hand,
rests on our own power alone, and on the loyalty which
we owe to ourselves; therefore it will last, whatever
changes may take place among the European alliances.
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? FREEDOM.
When shall we see the last of those timid spirits who
find it needful to increase the burden of life by self-
created torture, to whom every advance of the human
mind is but one sign more of the decay of our race--of the
approach of the Day of Judgment? The great majority
of our contemporaries are again beginning, thank
Heaven! to believe quite sturdily and heartily in
themselves; yet we are weak enough to repeat some, at
least, of the gloomy predictions of those atrabilious
spirits. It has become a commonplace assumption
that all-conquering culture will at last supplant national
morality by a morality of mankind, and transform the
world into a cosmopolitan, primitive pap. But the same
law holds good of nations as of individuals, who show less
differentiation in childhood than in mature years. In
other words, if a people has vitality enough to keep itself
and its nationality going in the merciless race-struggle
of history, every advance in civilisation will certainly
bring its external life in closer contact with other peoples,
but it will bring into clearer relief its more refined, its
deeper idiosyncrasies. We all follow the Paris fashions,
we are linked with neighbouring nations, by a thousand
292
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? FREEDOM 293
different interests; yet our feelings and ideas, so far as
the French and British intellectual world is concerned,
are undoubtedly more independent than they were
seven hundred years ago, when the peasant all over
Europe spent his life fettered by patriarchal custom,
whilst the ecclesiastic in every country derived his
knowledge from the same sources, and the nobility of
Latin Christendom created for itself a common code of
honour and morality under the walls of Jerusalem.
That lively exchange of ideas between nations, on which
the present generation rightly plumes itself, has never
been a mere give-and-take.
We are fortified in this consoling knowledge when we
see how the ideas of a German classic about the highest
object of human thought--about freedom--have recently
been developed in a very individual way by two dis-
tinguished political thinkers of France and England.
When Wilhelm von Humboldt's essay on the limits of
the operations of the State appeared for the first time
in complete form a few years ago, some sensation was
caused by that brilliant work in Germany too. We were
rejoiced to get a deeper insight into the evolution of one
of our chief men. The more refined minds delightedly
detected the inspiring breath of the Golden Age of German
humanity, for it is indeed only in Schiller's nearly-related
letters on the aesthetic education of the human race that
the bright ideal of a beautiful humanity, which fascinated
Germans during that period, has been depicted with
equal eloquence and distinction. The gifted youth who
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? 294 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
had just had his first look into the self-complacent red-
tapeism of Frederick William IPs bureaucracy, and had
turned away, chilled by its lifeless formalities, in order
to live a life of aesthetic leisure at home--he was certainly
to be forgiven for thinking very poorly of the State.
Dalberg had asked him to write the little book--a prince
who had the intention of lavishing profusely on his country
all the good things of life by means of an administration
that would know everything and look after everything.
The young thinker emphasized all the more keenly the
fact that the State is nothing but an institution for pur-
poses of security; that it must never again interfere
directly or indirectly with a nation's morals or character;
that a man was freest when the State was least active.
We, of the present generation, know only too well that
the true cause of the ruin of the old German State was
that all free minds set themselves in such morbid opposi-
tion to the State that they fled from it like young
Humboldt, instead of serving it like Humboldt when
grown to a man, and elevating it by the nobility of their
free human development. The doctrine which sees in
the State merely a hindrance, a necessary evil, seems
obsolete to the German of to-day. Curiously enough,
though, this youthful work of Humboldt's is now being
glorified by John Stuart Mill in his book on liberty,
and by Edward Laboulaye in his essay " L'? tat et ses
limites," as a mine of political wisdom for the troubles
of the present time.
Mill is a faithful son of those genuinely German middle
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? FREEDOM 295
classes of England, which, since the days of Richard II
have preferentially represented our country's inner essence,
its spiritual work, both in good and bad respects, both by
an earnest desire for truth and by a gloomy, fanatical zeal
in religious belief. He has become a rich man since he
discovered and recognised the most precious jewel of
our people, German idealism. Speaking from that free
watch-tower he utters words of reproach, bitter words,
against his fellow-countrymen's confused thinking; and
unfortunately, also, against the present generation, bitter
words such as only the honoured national economist
would dare to speak unpunished. But, like a true-born
Englishman, as a pupil of Bentham, he tests Kant's ideas
by the standard of the useful, the " well-comprehended,
permanent" utility of course, and therein shows in his
own person the deep abyss which will always separate
the two nations' intellectual activities. He wavers
between the English and German views of the world--
in his book on liberty, just as in his latest work,
"Utilitarianism "--and finally gets out of the difficulty
by attributing an ideal meaning to Bentham's purely
materialistic thoughts, which brings them close to the
German view. With the help of the apostle of German
humanity he contrives to praise the North American
State-methods, which owe little, or nothing, to the beauti-
ful humanity of German-Hellenic classicism. Laboulaye,
on the other hand, belongs to that small school of keen-
sighted Liberals, which feels the weakness of their country
to reside in French centralisation, and endeavours to
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? 296 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
re-awaken the germs of German civilisation which are
there slumbering under the Celtic-Roman regime. The
talented author deals with historical facts, rather boldly
than thoroughly; briefly, he is of opinion that Christianity
was the first to recognise the worth and dignity of the
individual. Well, then, our glorious heathen Humboldt
must be a downright Christian philosopher, and with
the nineteenth century the age must be approaching
when the ideas of Christianity shall be completely realised,
and the individual, not the State, shall rule. The French-
man will only convince a small group of believers among
bis numerous readers. Mill's book, on the other hand,
has been received with the greatest applause by his fellow-
countrymen. They have called it the gospel of the nine-
teenth century. As a fact, both works stiike notes which
have a mighty echo in the heart of every modern man;
it is therefore instructive to investigate whether they
really expound the principles of genuine freedom.
Although we have learnt to assign a deeper foundation
and a richer meaning to the words of the Greek philo-
sopher, no thinker has surpassed the interpretation of
freedom which Aristotle discovered. He thinks, in his
exhaustive, empirical way, that freedom embraces
two things: the suitability of the citizens to live
as they prefer, and the sharing of the citizens in
the State-government (ruling, and at the same time
being ruled). That one-sidedness, which is the lever of
all human progress, brought it about that the nations
have hardly ever aspired to the full conception of freedom.
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? FREEDOM 297
It is, on the contrary, well known that the Greeks
preferred political freedom in a narrower sense, and
readily sacrificed the free activity of the individual to
a beautiful and sound existence as a community. The
love of political liberty on the part of the ancients
was certainly by no means so exclusive as is generally
believed. That definition of the Greek thinker proves
that they were by no means lacking in the comprehension
of a life lived after its own will and pleasure, of civic,
personal freedom. Aristotle knows very well that a
State-administration is even thinkable which does not
include the national life, taken in sum; he expressly
declares that States are particularly distinguished from
each other, by the question whether everything, or nothing,
or how much is shared by the citizens. At any rate, the
idea was dominant in the mature State of antiquity
that the citizen is only a part of the State, that true virtue
is realised only in the State. Political thinkers among
the ancients, therefore, occupy themselves solely with the
questions: Who shall rule in the State? and, How shall
the State be protected? Only occasionally, as a slight
misgiving, is the deeper question stirred: How shall
the citizen be protected from the State? The ancients
were assured that a power which a people exercises over
itself needs no limitation. How different are the German
conceptions of freedom, which lay chief emphasis on the
unlimited right of personality! In the Middle Age the
State began everywhere, with an implacable combat of
the State-power against the desire for independence on
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? 298 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
the part of individuals, guilds, classes, which was
hostile to the State; and we Germans experienced in our
own persons with what loss of power and genuine
freedom the libcrtat of the minor princes, the
"freedoms of the honourable classes" were bought.
If, at length, in the course of this struggle, which in later
times was gloriously settled by an absolute Monarchy,
the majesty, the unity of the State was preserved, a
transformation would take place in the people's ideas of
freedom, and a fresh quarrel would start. No longer
is the attempt made to separate the individual from a
State-power whose necessity has been understood. But
there is a demand that the State-power should not be
independent of the people; it should become an actual
popular administration, working within established
forms, and bound by the will of the majority of the
citizens.
Everybody knows how immeasurably far from that
goal our Fatherland still is. What Vittorio Alfieri
proposed to himself as his object in life nearly a hundred
years ago:
"Di far con penna ai falsi imperj offesa,"
is still a difficult, toilsome task for the Germans. On
the Fulda, on the Leine, and probably also on the
Spree, a pusillanimous German might even to-day repeat
Alfieri's question: Ought a man who is steeped in the
feeling of civism to take the responsibility of bringing
children into the world under the yoke of a tyranny?
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 275
author condescendingly expresses it, had modestly
renounced all wishes of bringing about a union of the
German States. His policy was peaceful, as it was obliged
to be; it shunned a decisive contest for which at that
time all the preliminary conditions were lacking, but as
soon as affairs in the new provinces were, to some extent,
settled, he began at once to work for the commercial and
political unifying of Germany. In this difficult task,
which in very truth laid the foundation for the new
German Empire, Prussia encountered at every step the
opposition of Austria, England, and France. Russia
alone among all the Great Powers preserved a friendly
neutrality. This one fact is sufficient to justify the
King in attaching great importance to Russia's friend-
ship.
This partiality of his, however, was by no means blind,
for nothing is more absurd than the author's assertion
that Prussia, by the mediation which brought about the
Peace of Adrianople, had merely done the Russian Court
an unselfish service. When the war of 1828 broke out
the King had openly told the Czar that he disapproved
of his declaration of war. The next year, at the com-
mencement of the second campaign, the European
situation assumed a very threatening aspect. The Vienna
Cabinet, alarmed in the highest degree by the progress
of the Russian arms, exerted itself in conjunction with
England to bring about a great alliance against Russia;
on the other hand, the King knew from his son-in-law's
mouth (the Czar's autograph note is still preserved in
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? 276 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
the Berlin State Archives) that there was a secret under-
standing between Nicholas and Charles X of France.
If matters were allowed to go their course there was
danger of a European war, which might oblige Prussia
to fight simultaneously against Russia and France, and
that about a question remote from our interests. In
order to avert this danger, and thus acting for the best
for his own country, the King resolved to act as a
mediator, and brought about a peace which, as matters
then were, was acceptable to both contending parties.
Prince Metternich was certainly alarmed at this success
of Prussian policy, and the reactionary party in Berlin,
Duke Karl of Mecklenburg, Ancillon, Schuckmann,
Knesebeck, who were all staunch adherents of the Vienna
diplomat, were alarmed; but the ablest men at the Court,
Bernstoff, Witzleven, Eichhorn, and above all the younger
Prince William, approved the King's well-considered pro-
ceeding. The resolve of the King was obviously connected
with the brilliant successes which his finance minister,
Motz, had won at the same time in the struggles of German
commercial policy. To a calm historical judgment the
years 1828 and 1829 appear as a fortunate turning-point
in the history of that uneventful period; it was the time
when Prussia again began to take up a completely
independent position in relation to the Austrian Court.
Among the Liberals, indeed, who had lately been admiring
the Greeks, and now were suddenly enthusiastic for the
Turks, there arose a supplementary party-legend, that
Prussia had only undertaken the office of mediator in
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 277
order to save the Russian Army from certain destruction.
This discovery, however, is already contradicted by the
calendar. On August 19th Diebitch's army appeared
before Adrianople; and it was here that the victor's
embarrassments first began, and here, first, it was evident
how much his fighting power had been reduced by
sickness and the wear and tear of the campaign. But
Prussia had commenced acting as mediator as early as
July; when General Muffling received his instructions
the Russian Army was victorious everywhere.
Later on, also, the sober-mindedness of King Frederick
William never favoured the Czar's designs against the
Porte; he rather did his best to strengthen the resisting
power of the Ottoman Empire. The only partly effective
reform which the decaying Turkish State succeeded in
carrying through--the reconstitution of its Army--was,
as is well known, the work of Prussian officers. All the
reports which the embittered scandal-seeking opposition
party of that time circulated, regarding the influence of
Russia in the domestic concerns of Prussia, are mere
inventions. The King alone deserves blame or praise
for the course of domestic policy; his son-in-law never
refused to pay him filial reverence. Even the eccen-
tricities of the Berlin Court at that period, the love for
parades, the bestowing of military decorations, which
were stigmatized by the Liberals as " Russian manners,"
were simply due to the personal predilection of the King,
and it is difficult to decide whether Russia has learnt
more in this respect from Germany, or vice versu. During
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? 278 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
the anxious days of the July revolution the King ex-
hibited again, with all his modesty, an independent and
genuinely Prussian attitude. Frederick William resisted
the legitimist outbursts of his son-in-law, and hindered the
crusade against France which had been planned in
St. Petersburg. The next year he resisted with equal
common sense the foolish enthusiasm of the Liberals for
the Poles, and, by occupying the eastern frontier, assisted
in the suppression of that Polish insurrection, which was
as dangerous for our Posen as for Russian Poland. The
Baltic anonymous author conceals his vexation at this
intelligent policy of self-assertion behind the thoughtful
remark that we had, as is well known, "paid for ren-
dering this assistance with the valuable life of Gneisenau. "
Should we, then, perhaps enter in our ledger, on the
Russian debit side, the cholera which swept away our
heroes?
During the whole period from 1815 to 1840 I know only
of a single fact which can be alleged to give real occasion
to the reproach that the King, for the sake of Russia's
friendship, neglected an important interest of his State.
In constrast to the ruthless commercial policy of Russia,
Prussia showed a moderation which bordered on weak-
ness. But this matter, also, is not so simple as our
anonymous author thinks. He reproaches Russia with
the non-fulfilment of the Vienna Treaty of May 3rd, 1815,
and overlooks the fact that Prussia herself hardly wished
in earnest the carrying out of this agreement. It was soon
enough proved that Hardenberg had been over-reached
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 279
at Vienna by Prince Czartoryski. The apparently
harmless agreements regarding free transit and free
trade with the products of all formerly Polish territories
imposed upon our State, through which the transit took
place, only duties, without conferring any corresponding
advantages. In order to carry out the treaty literally
Prussia would have had to divide its Polish provinces from
its other territories by a line of custom-houses. But the
Poles saw in the treaty a welcome means of carrying their
national propaganda into our Polish territories by settle-
ments of commercial agents. Thus it happened that
Prussia, after futile negotiations, proceeded on her own
account; and by the customs-law of 1818 placed her Polish
territories on precisely the same footing as her other
eastern provinces. After this necessary step Prussia
was no more in the position to appeal successfully to the
Vienna Treaty. And what means did we, in fact, possess
to compel the neighbouring State to give up a foolish
commercial policy, which was injurious for his own
country? Only the two-edged weapon of retaliatory
duties. The relation of the two countries assumed quite
a different aspect under Frederick William IV. It will
always be one of the most bitter memories of our history
how lacking in counsel and wavering in purpose the
clever new King proved, in contrast to the strong-willed
Czar, how cruelly he knew, by countless failures, the fact
that in the stern struggles for power of national life
character is always superior to talent, and how at last,
for truth will out, he actually feared those narrow minds.
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? 280 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
Here our author has good reason for sharp judgments,
and here also he gives us, along with some questionable
anecdotes, some reliable matter-of-fact information
regarding the history of the confusions of 1848-50. It is
quite true that the Czar Nicholas in the autumn of 1848
asked General Count Friedrich Dohna whether he would
not be the Prussian General Monk, and march with the
first army-corps on Berlin, to restore order there; the
whole Russian army would act as his reserve in case of
need. The memories of the count, printed in autograph,
confirm the correctness of this story, with the exception
of some trifling details. But even here the author cannot
rise to an unprejudiced historical estimate of the events
in question. He conceals the fact that not only Russia but
all the Great Powers were against the rise of a Prussian-
German Empire. The position which the Powers had
assumed with regard to the question of German unity
had not changed since 1814. He similarly ignores the
fact that all the Great Powers opposed the liberation
of Schleswig-Holstein; and it is undeniable that Russia,
according to the traditions of the old diplomacy, had
better grounds to adopt such an attitude than the other
Powers; for all the Cabinets believed then decidedly
--although wrongly--that Prussia wished to use the
struggle with Denmark as a means of possessing herself
of the Kiel harbour. The Russian State, as a Baltic
Power, could not welcome this prospect.
Russian policy, in contrast to that of England, France,
and Austria, was also peculiar in this, that it resisted the
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 281
Prussian constitutional movement. The Czar Nicholas
did not merely behave as the head of the cause of royalty
in all Europe, but actually felt himself such; and it was
precisely this which secured him a strong following among
the Prussian Conservatives. It is far from my intention
to defend, in any way, the wretched policy which came
to grief at Warsaw and Olmiitz; we, the old Gotha
party, have all grown up as opponents of this tendency.
Meanwhile, after the lapse of a whole generation, it seems,
however, to be time to appreciate the natural motives
which drove so many valiant patriots into the Russian
camp. It is enough to remember only the King's ride
through mutinous Berlin, the retreat of the victorious
guards before the defeated barricade-fighters, and all the
terrible humiliation which the weakness of Frederick
William IV brought on the throne of the Hohenzollerns.
The old Prussian royalists felt as though the world were
coming to an end; they saw all that they counted most
venerable desecrated; and amid the universal chaos
the Czar Nicholas appeared to them to be the last stay
of Monarchy. Therefore, in order to save royalty in
Prussia they adhered to Russia. They made a grievous
error, but only blind hatred, as with our author, can con-
demn them abruptly as betrayers of their country. The
head of the pro-Russian party in Berlin was, at the begin-
ning of the 'fifties, the same Field-Marshal Dohna who
had instantly rejected with Prussian pride the above-
mentioned contemptible proposal of the Czar; of him a
diplomat said: "So long as this old standard remains
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? 282 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
upright, I feel easy. " Strongly Conservative in political
and ecclesiastical matters though he was, this son-in-law
of Scharnhorst had never surrendered the ideal of the
War of Liberation, the hope of German unity. What
brought the noble German into the ranks of the re-
actionists was certainly not regard for Russia, but that
hopeless confusion of our affairs which had brought about
such a close connection between the great cause of German
unity and the follies of the revolution; the Imperial
Crown of Frankfort seemed to him as to his King to be a
couronne de pavi.
As regards the Crimean War, all unprejudiced judges
believe, nowadays, that Prussia had, as an exception,
and for once in a way, undeserved good fortune. The
crushing superiority of Russia was broken by the Western
Powers without our interference, and yet our friendly
relations with our eastern neighbour, which were to be
so fruitful in results for Germany's future, remained
unbroken. Even a less undecided, less inactive govern-
ment than Manteuffel's Ministry could scarcely have
obtained a more favourable result than this. Our author
himself tepidly acknowledges that it was not Prussia's
duty to side with the Western Powers, and thus help on
the schemes of Bonapartism. A really brilliant states-
man perhaps might, as soon as the military forces of
France were locked up in the East, have suddenly made an
alliance with Russia, and attempted the conquest of
Schleswig-Holstein, and the solution of the German
question, without troubling himself about mistaken
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 283
public opinion. But it is obvious how difficult this was,
and how impossible for a personality like the King's.
Instead of quietly appreciating the difficulty of the
circumstances, our author only vehemently denounces
Russia's pride and Prussia's servility. He also again
ignores the fact that Prussia then, unfortunately, had
fallen into a state of being regarded as negligible by the
whole world, and the arrogance of the Western Powers
was not less than that of Russia. Everyone knows the
letters of Prince Albert, and Napoleon III's remark,
regarding the deference which Prussia showed towards
Russia; the cold, disparaging contempt displayed in
the letters of the Prince Consort, who was himself a
German, and accustomed to weigh his words carefully,
is, in my opinion, more insulting than the coarse words of
abuse which the harsh despotic Nicholas is said to have
blurted out in moments of sudden anger. Our author
also ignores the fact that the Czar Nicholas declared
himself ready to purchase Prussia's help in the field by
surrendering Warsaw. In the camp of the English
and French allies they were willing to pay a price also,
but only offered a slight rectification of the frontier on
the left bank of the Rhine. Which of the offers was the
more favourable?
This whole section of the book is a mixture of truth
and falsehood, of ingenious remarks and tasteless gossip.
We will give one specimen of the author's manner of
relating history. He prints in spaced letters the following:
"In February, 1854, a Prussian State secret--the just
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? 284 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
completed plan of mobilisation--was revealed to the Court
of St. Petersburg. " Then he relates how one of our
noblest patriots, a well-known writer, conveyed the news
of this betrayal, of course in perfect good faith, to a Berlin
lithographic correspondence agency; and in consequence
a secret order was issued for the writer's arrest. I happen
to be exactly acquainted with the affair, and can confirm
the statement that the order for arrest was certainly
issued--a characteristic occurrence in that time of petty
panics on the part of the police. But more important
than this secondary matter is the question whether
that piece of information was reliable, and whether that
betrayal really took place. The author has here again
concealed something. The report was that a brother of
the King had committed the treachery. This remarkable
disclosure, however, did not originate with anyone who
was really conversant with affairs, but with an honourable,
though at the same time very credulous and hot-headed,
Liberal deputy of the Landtag,* who had nothing to do
with the Court. Is it exaggerated loyalty when we
Prussians demand from the Baltic anonymous author
at least some attempt at a proof, before we resolve to
regard one of our royal princes as a traitor to his country?
The story simply belongs to the series of innumerable
scandals which were only too gladly believed by the
malicious Liberalism of the 'fifties. It was, we must
remember, the time when Varnhagen von Ense was
flourishing. In accordance with the general tenor of his
? Parliament of a single State.
^
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 285
book the author naturally does not relish the indisput-
able fact that the policy of Alexander II atoned for
many of the wrongs which the Czar Nicholas had
committed against Germany. He seeks rather, during
this period of Russian history, to hunt up every trace of
movements hostile to Germany. It is, for instance, a
well-known fact that, after the Peace of Paris, Russia
sought for a rapprochement to France; and it may also
be safely assumed that Prince Gortschakoff, from the
commencement of his political career, regarded an alli-
ance with France as the most suitable for Russia. But it
is a long way from such general wishes to the acts of State-
policy. For whole decades the great majority of French
statesmen, without distinction of party, have given a lip-
adherence to the Russian Alliance; even Lamartine,
the enthusiast for freedom, spoke of this alliance as a
geographical necessity and the "cry of nature. " And
yet the course of the world's history went another way.
Then came the Polish rising of 1863. The Court of
St. Petersburg learned to know thoroughly the secret
intrigues of Bonapartism, and in Prussia's watchful
aid found a proof of the value of German friendship.
Since then, for a whole decade, its attitude has remained
favourable to our interests, whatever fault the Baltic
anonymous author may find in details. Certainly it
was only the will of one man which gave this direction
to Russian policy. The Russo-Prussian Alliance has
never denied its origin; it has never evoked a warm
friendship between the two nations; while the great
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? 286 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
majority of Germans regarded Russian affairs with com-
plete indifference, there awoke in the educated circles of
Russian society, as soon as the great decisive days of our
history approached, a bitter hatred against Germany,
which increased from year to year. But that one will,
which was friendly to us, governed the German State;
and so long as this condition lasted the intelligent German
Press was bound to treat the neighbouring Power with
forbearance. When the Baltic author expresses contempt
for our Press because of this, and blames it for want of
national pride, he merely shows that he has no compre-
hension for the first and most important tasks of German
policy. His thoughts continually revolve round Reval,
Riga, and Mitau.
That the dislocation of the equilibrium among the
Baltic Powers and the advance of Prussia in the Cimbric
Peninsula must have appeared serious matters to the St.
Petersburg Court is obvious. But at last it let the old
deeply-rooted tradition drop, and accommodated itself
with as good a grace as possible to the fait accompli.
Similarly it is evident that the formation of the North
German Confederation could not be agreeable to it.
When the war of 1866 broke out people at St.
Petersburg
and all the other capitals of Europe expected the probable
defeat of Prussia, and at first were seriously alarmed at
the brilliant successes of our troops. But this time also
a sense of fairness prevailed. The Czar Alexander
accepted the new order of things in Germany as soon as
he ascertained what schemes were cherished by the
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 287
Court of the Tuileries against the left bank of the Rhine.
In the next year (1870) this attitude of our friend and
neighbour underwent its severest test. Austria, Italy,
and Denmark, as is well known, were on the point of
concluding an alliance against Germany when the victories
of Worth and Spicheren intervened. England did not
dare to forbid the French to make the attack, which a
single word from the Queen of the Seas could have pre-
vented, and afterwards she prolonged the war by her
sale of arms and by the one-sided manner in which she
maintained her neutrality. The Czar Alexander, on the
other hand, greeted each victory of his royal uncle with
sincere joy. That was the important point, and not
the ill-humour of Prince Gortschakoff which our author
depicts with so much satisfaction. Russia was the only
Great Power whose head displayed friendly sentiments
towards us during that difficult time. And if we wish to
realise how valuable Russian friendship was for us
also in the following years, we must compare the present
state of things with the past. As long as the alliance of
the three Emperors lasted a European war was quite
out of the question, for the notorious war crisis of 1875
has in reality never existed. Since Russia has separated
from the other two Imperial Powers we are at any rate
within sight of the possibility of a European war, and may
perhaps be suddenly compelled to act on two frontiers
simultaneously.
The most welcome task for an author who openly
preaches war against Russia was obviously to show in
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? 288 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
detail through what circumstances the old alliance after
the Peace of San Stefano was loosened and finally
dissolved. I know no more of these matters than anyone
else. I only know that in Russia there is deep vexation
at the course taken by the Berlin Congress, and that a
great deal of the blame is imputed to the German Empire.
I have heard of secret negotiations regarding a Franco-
Russian Alliance, and am without further argument
convinced that Prince Bismarck would not have given
German policy its latest direction without very solid
reasons. But I have no more exact knowledge of the
matter. Therefore it was with easily intelligible curiosity
that I began to read the last section of the book. I
hoped to learn something about the transactions between
Russia and France; I hoped to learn whether the senti-
ments of the Czar Alexander have changed, or whether
the monarch does not now more personally direct
the foreign policy of his kingdom, etc. But our author
himself knows nothing about such matters; he deceives
himself or others when he pretends to be initiated. He
only produces lengthy extracts from the Germanophobe
articles of the Russian Press. Every publicist who is
at all an expert knows just as many fine and pithy
passages in Muscovite papers. In Hansen's "Coulisses
de la diplomatic " the author, who loves historical sources
of this kind, might discover similar outpourings of
Russian politicians. But all that proves very little.
The question is much rather whether the Russian Press,
which, as is well known, only enjoys a certain degree of
\
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 289
freedom in the two capitals and remains quite unknown
to the mass of the people, is powerful enough to influence
the course of Russia's foreign policy. To this question
the author gives no answer.
So we lay the book aside without any information on
the present state of affairs, but not without a feeling of
shame. When two who have been friends for many
years have broken with each other, it is not only unchival-
rous for one to tax his old companions with sins com-
mitted long ago, but unwise; the reproach always
falls back on the reproacher. The last impression which
the reader carries away from this work is much more
unfavourable for Prussia than for Russia; therefore even
the foreign Press greeted it at once with well-deserved
contempt. Anyone who believes the author must
come to the conclusion that King Frederick William III
and his two successors had conducted a Russian and not
a Prussian policy. Happily this view is quite false.
But we would remind the Baltic publicist, who, under the
disguise of a Prussian patriot, draws such a nattering
picture of our history, of an old Prussian story which still
has its application. In the Rhine campaign of 1793 a
Prussian grenadier was inveighing vigorously against
King Frederick William II; but when an Austrian fellow-
soldier chimed in the Prussian gave him a box on the ear
and said, "/ may talk like that, but not you; for I am a
Prussian. "
The author's remarks on the future are based upon the
tacit assumption that the European Powers fall naturally
T
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? 2go TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
into two groups--Austria, England, and Germany on the
one side, Italy, Russia, and France on the other. In the
short time since the book came out this assumption has
already been made void; the English elections have
reminded the world very forcibly of the instability of
grouping in the system of States. If the author had
commenced his work only four weeks later it would
probably not have appeared in the book market at all or
have done so in a very different shape.
But there is one truth, though certainly no new one,
in the train of thought which is apparent in this book;
it is only too correct that hostility to everything German
is constantly on the increase in influential Russian society.
But we do not at all believe that an intelligent Russian
Government, not misled by the dreams of Pan-slavism,
must necessarily cherish such a feeling towards us. We
regard a war against Russia as a great calamity, for who,
now, when the period of colonising absolutism lies far
behind us, can seriously wish to encumber our State with
the possession of Warsaw, and with millions of Poles and
Jews? But many signs indicate that the next great
European crisis will find the Russians in the ranks of
our enemies. All the more important therefore is our
newly-confirmed friendship with Austria.
This alliance is, as a matter of course, sure of the
involuntary sympathy of our people; if it endures it
may have the useful effect of strengthening the German
element in Austria, and finally checking the melancholy
decay of our civilisation in Bohemia and Hungary, in
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? RUSSIAN AND PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE 291
Krain and the Tyrol. Our interests in the East coincide,
for the present, with those of the Danube Empire. After
the occupation of Bosnia has once taken place Austria
cannot again surrender the position she has taken up,
without preparing a triumph for our common enemy,
Pan-slavism. Nevertheless, we cannot join our Baltic J
author in prophesying that the treaty of friendship with
Austria will be as lasting and immovable as the unity
of the German Empire. Germany has plenty of enemies
in the medley of peoples which exist in Austria: all
the Slavs, even the ultramontane Germans, hate us;
nay, more, the Magyars, our political friends, suppress
German civilisation in the Saxon districts of Transylvania
much more severely than the Russians ever ventured to
do in their Baltic provinces. It is not in our power to keep
these hostile forces for ever aloof from the guidance
of Russia. The unity of our Empire, on the other hand,
rests on our own power alone, and on the loyalty which
we owe to ourselves; therefore it will last, whatever
changes may take place among the European alliances.
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? FREEDOM.
When shall we see the last of those timid spirits who
find it needful to increase the burden of life by self-
created torture, to whom every advance of the human
mind is but one sign more of the decay of our race--of the
approach of the Day of Judgment? The great majority
of our contemporaries are again beginning, thank
Heaven! to believe quite sturdily and heartily in
themselves; yet we are weak enough to repeat some, at
least, of the gloomy predictions of those atrabilious
spirits. It has become a commonplace assumption
that all-conquering culture will at last supplant national
morality by a morality of mankind, and transform the
world into a cosmopolitan, primitive pap. But the same
law holds good of nations as of individuals, who show less
differentiation in childhood than in mature years. In
other words, if a people has vitality enough to keep itself
and its nationality going in the merciless race-struggle
of history, every advance in civilisation will certainly
bring its external life in closer contact with other peoples,
but it will bring into clearer relief its more refined, its
deeper idiosyncrasies. We all follow the Paris fashions,
we are linked with neighbouring nations, by a thousand
292
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? FREEDOM 293
different interests; yet our feelings and ideas, so far as
the French and British intellectual world is concerned,
are undoubtedly more independent than they were
seven hundred years ago, when the peasant all over
Europe spent his life fettered by patriarchal custom,
whilst the ecclesiastic in every country derived his
knowledge from the same sources, and the nobility of
Latin Christendom created for itself a common code of
honour and morality under the walls of Jerusalem.
That lively exchange of ideas between nations, on which
the present generation rightly plumes itself, has never
been a mere give-and-take.
We are fortified in this consoling knowledge when we
see how the ideas of a German classic about the highest
object of human thought--about freedom--have recently
been developed in a very individual way by two dis-
tinguished political thinkers of France and England.
When Wilhelm von Humboldt's essay on the limits of
the operations of the State appeared for the first time
in complete form a few years ago, some sensation was
caused by that brilliant work in Germany too. We were
rejoiced to get a deeper insight into the evolution of one
of our chief men. The more refined minds delightedly
detected the inspiring breath of the Golden Age of German
humanity, for it is indeed only in Schiller's nearly-related
letters on the aesthetic education of the human race that
the bright ideal of a beautiful humanity, which fascinated
Germans during that period, has been depicted with
equal eloquence and distinction. The gifted youth who
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? 294 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
had just had his first look into the self-complacent red-
tapeism of Frederick William IPs bureaucracy, and had
turned away, chilled by its lifeless formalities, in order
to live a life of aesthetic leisure at home--he was certainly
to be forgiven for thinking very poorly of the State.
Dalberg had asked him to write the little book--a prince
who had the intention of lavishing profusely on his country
all the good things of life by means of an administration
that would know everything and look after everything.
The young thinker emphasized all the more keenly the
fact that the State is nothing but an institution for pur-
poses of security; that it must never again interfere
directly or indirectly with a nation's morals or character;
that a man was freest when the State was least active.
We, of the present generation, know only too well that
the true cause of the ruin of the old German State was
that all free minds set themselves in such morbid opposi-
tion to the State that they fled from it like young
Humboldt, instead of serving it like Humboldt when
grown to a man, and elevating it by the nobility of their
free human development. The doctrine which sees in
the State merely a hindrance, a necessary evil, seems
obsolete to the German of to-day. Curiously enough,
though, this youthful work of Humboldt's is now being
glorified by John Stuart Mill in his book on liberty,
and by Edward Laboulaye in his essay " L'? tat et ses
limites," as a mine of political wisdom for the troubles
of the present time.
Mill is a faithful son of those genuinely German middle
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? FREEDOM 295
classes of England, which, since the days of Richard II
have preferentially represented our country's inner essence,
its spiritual work, both in good and bad respects, both by
an earnest desire for truth and by a gloomy, fanatical zeal
in religious belief. He has become a rich man since he
discovered and recognised the most precious jewel of
our people, German idealism. Speaking from that free
watch-tower he utters words of reproach, bitter words,
against his fellow-countrymen's confused thinking; and
unfortunately, also, against the present generation, bitter
words such as only the honoured national economist
would dare to speak unpunished. But, like a true-born
Englishman, as a pupil of Bentham, he tests Kant's ideas
by the standard of the useful, the " well-comprehended,
permanent" utility of course, and therein shows in his
own person the deep abyss which will always separate
the two nations' intellectual activities. He wavers
between the English and German views of the world--
in his book on liberty, just as in his latest work,
"Utilitarianism "--and finally gets out of the difficulty
by attributing an ideal meaning to Bentham's purely
materialistic thoughts, which brings them close to the
German view. With the help of the apostle of German
humanity he contrives to praise the North American
State-methods, which owe little, or nothing, to the beauti-
ful humanity of German-Hellenic classicism. Laboulaye,
on the other hand, belongs to that small school of keen-
sighted Liberals, which feels the weakness of their country
to reside in French centralisation, and endeavours to
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? 296 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
re-awaken the germs of German civilisation which are
there slumbering under the Celtic-Roman regime. The
talented author deals with historical facts, rather boldly
than thoroughly; briefly, he is of opinion that Christianity
was the first to recognise the worth and dignity of the
individual. Well, then, our glorious heathen Humboldt
must be a downright Christian philosopher, and with
the nineteenth century the age must be approaching
when the ideas of Christianity shall be completely realised,
and the individual, not the State, shall rule. The French-
man will only convince a small group of believers among
bis numerous readers. Mill's book, on the other hand,
has been received with the greatest applause by his fellow-
countrymen. They have called it the gospel of the nine-
teenth century. As a fact, both works stiike notes which
have a mighty echo in the heart of every modern man;
it is therefore instructive to investigate whether they
really expound the principles of genuine freedom.
Although we have learnt to assign a deeper foundation
and a richer meaning to the words of the Greek philo-
sopher, no thinker has surpassed the interpretation of
freedom which Aristotle discovered. He thinks, in his
exhaustive, empirical way, that freedom embraces
two things: the suitability of the citizens to live
as they prefer, and the sharing of the citizens in
the State-government (ruling, and at the same time
being ruled). That one-sidedness, which is the lever of
all human progress, brought it about that the nations
have hardly ever aspired to the full conception of freedom.
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? FREEDOM 297
It is, on the contrary, well known that the Greeks
preferred political freedom in a narrower sense, and
readily sacrificed the free activity of the individual to
a beautiful and sound existence as a community. The
love of political liberty on the part of the ancients
was certainly by no means so exclusive as is generally
believed. That definition of the Greek thinker proves
that they were by no means lacking in the comprehension
of a life lived after its own will and pleasure, of civic,
personal freedom. Aristotle knows very well that a
State-administration is even thinkable which does not
include the national life, taken in sum; he expressly
declares that States are particularly distinguished from
each other, by the question whether everything, or nothing,
or how much is shared by the citizens. At any rate, the
idea was dominant in the mature State of antiquity
that the citizen is only a part of the State, that true virtue
is realised only in the State. Political thinkers among
the ancients, therefore, occupy themselves solely with the
questions: Who shall rule in the State? and, How shall
the State be protected? Only occasionally, as a slight
misgiving, is the deeper question stirred: How shall
the citizen be protected from the State? The ancients
were assured that a power which a people exercises over
itself needs no limitation. How different are the German
conceptions of freedom, which lay chief emphasis on the
unlimited right of personality! In the Middle Age the
State began everywhere, with an implacable combat of
the State-power against the desire for independence on
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? 298 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
the part of individuals, guilds, classes, which was
hostile to the State; and we Germans experienced in our
own persons with what loss of power and genuine
freedom the libcrtat of the minor princes, the
"freedoms of the honourable classes" were bought.
If, at length, in the course of this struggle, which in later
times was gloriously settled by an absolute Monarchy,
the majesty, the unity of the State was preserved, a
transformation would take place in the people's ideas of
freedom, and a fresh quarrel would start. No longer
is the attempt made to separate the individual from a
State-power whose necessity has been understood. But
there is a demand that the State-power should not be
independent of the people; it should become an actual
popular administration, working within established
forms, and bound by the will of the majority of the
citizens.
Everybody knows how immeasurably far from that
goal our Fatherland still is. What Vittorio Alfieri
proposed to himself as his object in life nearly a hundred
years ago:
"Di far con penna ai falsi imperj offesa,"
is still a difficult, toilsome task for the Germans. On
the Fulda, on the Leine, and probably also on the
Spree, a pusillanimous German might even to-day repeat
Alfieri's question: Ought a man who is steeped in the
feeling of civism to take the responsibility of bringing
children into the world under the yoke of a tyranny?
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