No More Learning

Certain masters observe that the category of the akusalamaha-
272
bhumikas, at first unknown, has been added later; and the Sutras
273 would suggest this idea.
[The Vaibhasikas:] If sensation is later than contact, you have to take into account the Sutra, "By reason of the eye and visible things there arises visual consciousness; the coming together of the three is contact;
274 together there arises (sahajdbd) sensation, ideas, volition. "
[The Sautrantikas:] This Sutra say that sensation, ideas and volition
arise together; it does not say that they arise together with contact: we
275
say that they arise together among themselves. Let us observe also
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that the word "together" (saha) is used, not only to indicate simultaneity,
but also to indicate immediate succession. The Sutra, for example, says,
with compassion. " Now compassion, which is always "worldly," evidently cannot be simultaneous to a part of Bodhi: for the parts of Bodhi are always transworldly. Thus the Sutra not only does not prove that sensation is simultaneous to contact; it does not even prove that sensation, ideas and volition are associated with, and simultaneous to consciousness (visual consciousness, etc).
[The Sarvastivadins:] But the Sutra says, "The dharmas of sensation, ideas, volition, and consciousness are mixed; they are not
277
separate. " "Mixed" signifies "arisen together. " From this Sutra we
conclude that there are no consciousnesses, sensations, ideas or volitions which are not simultaneous.
"He cultivates the part of Bodhi called mindfulness together (sahagata) 276
[The Sautrantikas:] But what is the meaning of the word "mixed", 278
samsrspa! We read in the Sutra that you have just quoted, "That which
he feels (vedayata), he thinks of (cetayate)\ that about which he thinks,
he discerns (vijandti)" In other words, the same thing is the object (alambana) of sensation, volition, and consciousness. The question is thus posed whether sensation, volition and ideas are called mixed because they have the same object--which is our opinion--or because they are simultaneous, as you say.
28
[The Vaibhasikas: ? ] The word samsrspa refers to simultaneous
samsrspa. They cannot be samsrspa except through simultaneity, not by the fact that they would have a common object, since they do not have any object. Furthermore the Sutra says, "The coming together of the three is contact. " How could there be a consciousness without there being a coming together of the three? How could there be encounter of the three without there being contact? Thus all consciousness is accompanied by contact and all contact is accompanied by sensation, etc.
But this discussion is carrying us too far afield. Let us return to our subject.
he grasps an idea of (samjandti)\ that about which he grasps an idea of, 219
things. It is said in fact that life (ayus) and warmth (usmaka) are 281
***
? We have explained, in summary, mental (caitast) sensation. 32c-d. This same sensation is of eighteen types by reason of the
22 objects of the mind (manopavicdras). *
Mental sensation is made up of eighteen types, because there are six upavicdras of satisfaaion (samanasya), six of dissatisfaaion {daurma- nasya), and six of indifference (upeksa) (ii. 7): these are the upavicdras of satisfaaion relating to visible things, sounds, color, tastes, tangible things, and the dharmas; the same for the upavicdras of dissatisfaaion and indifference.
How does one distinguish these eighteen?
In considering their nature, their quality of being sensation, the
upavicdras are three: of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and indifference;
considering their quality of associates, they are one, all being associated
with the mental consciousness; and considering their objeas, they are
six: having visible things, sounds, etc. , for their objeas. We answer then
that one must take into account, at one and the same time, these three
283 qualities.
There is no variety in the object of the first fifteen upavicdras: the
objea of manopavicdra relating to visible things is only these visible
things. . . But, as for the three dharmopavkdras--the three upavicdras
(satisfaaion, etc. ) relating to the dharmas--one would distinguish: they
can arise relating to the distina dharmas of the five sense objects; in this
case, their objea presents no variety, and is not mixed; they can bear on
one, two, three,. . . six categories of dharmas (visible things, sounds,. . .
284
dharmas); in this case, their objea is mixed
What is the meaning of the expression manopavicdra?
Why are the different types of mental sensation (satisfaaion, etc. )
called manopavicdra}
The Vaibhasikas say wrongly, "Because satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion,
and indifference are supported by the manas in order to grasp visible 2
things, etc. , as an objea (upavicaranti = dlambante). " *^
According to another opinion, "Because satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion,
and indifference cause the manas to reconsider {upavicdrayanti) visible 286
things, etc. " For it is by reason of sensation (sensation of satisfaction, etc. ) that the manas repeatedly considers visible things, etc.
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? sphere of a single manas, not placed among the manopavicara} 288
***
Objections or difficulties. 1. Why not define bodily (kdyikt) sensation as manopavicdra.
Without doubt bodily sensation has the manas for its support, but it also has the material organs (eye, etc) for its support. It is free from vikalpa (like the visual consciousness, etc, to which it is associated, i. 33,
trans, p. 97); and it is no longer upavicarikd, [that is9 susceptible of 27
"consideration," samthikd]. *
2. But why is the sukha of the Third Dhyana (viii. 9b), which is of the
[The Vaibhasikas say (wrongly), ] "Because, initially, that is, in Kamadhatu, there is no sukha which is of the sphere of the manas, [In Kamadhatu, sukha is solely bodily sensation]; and because there does not exist any duhkha-upavicdra which would oppose the sukha- upavicdra that you imagine. "
3. But, if the upavicdras are only of the sphere of the manas, you have
to take into account the Sutra which says, "Having seen visible things
through the eye, he considers (upavicdrati) the visible things which 289
satisfy {saumanasyasthdntya). " The relationship is characterized, in the Sutra, by the visual organ and by upavicdra.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] 1. The Blessed One expresses himself in this manner because he takes into consideration the fact that the upavicdras can be produced by the five sense consciousnesses. The upavicdras are no less that the sphere of the single manas: in the same way, for example, that the aiubhds (meditation on a cadaver turning blue, etc, vi. 9), which are produced by the visual consciousness, are of the sphere of the manas: these meditations, in fact, suppose absorption; 2. on the other hand, the Suutra says, "Having seen visible things. . . ," it does not say, "Seeing visible things . . . ," which would justify your objection; 3. there is upavicdra of the visible things, etc, without having seen them, etc (For example one can "consider" the visible things that one intends to speak of, with satisfaction). If it were otherwise, a being
in Kamadhatu could not "consider" the visible things, sounds and tangible things of Rupadhatu [which he does not perceive], and a being of Rupadhatu would not be able to consider the smells and tastes of Kamadhatu; 4. the Sutra says, "Having seen visible things . . . he
? considers visible things," because his "consideration" is "clearer" when it bears on an object which is "experienced. " It is not doubtful that, having seen a visible thing, one cannot consider the sound [which accompaned the visible thing]; there is here "consideration" or upavkdra, of a sound not experienced: but the text, in order to avoid any confusion, makes a correspondence between the organs and the objeas which correspond to them.
***
The objects are given, in the Sutra, as saumanasyasthdmya, etc. , "which produce satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion, or indifference. " Are they such by their natures?
No. The same objea can be saumanasthaniya for one person, but daurmanasyasthdniya for another. It all depends on the "series," on the dispositions of the mind itself.
#*#
Among the manopavicdras, how many are in Kamadhatu? Which Dhatu takes the manopavicdras of Kamadhatu for its objea? The same questions for the other two Dhatus.
33a. In Kamadhatu all of the manopavicdras have their own Dhatu for their objea.
The eighteen manopavicdras are produced among beings in Kamadhatu, but all can have Kamadhatu for their objea.
33b. Rupadhatu is the objea of twelve.
Twelve of them can have Rupadhatu for their objea, with the exception of the three manopavicdras (of satisfaaion, dissatisfaaion, and indifference) relative to odor and the three relative to taste, since odors and tastes do not exist in Rupadhatu (i. 30b).
33c. The highest Dhatu (=Arupyadhatu) is the objea of three.
Three, namely the dharmanopavicdras, can have Arupyadhatu for their objea, but not the fifteen others, since visible things, etc. , do not
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exist in Arupyadhatu (viii. 3c).
***
In Rupadhatu, one must distinguish the first two Dhyanas and the last two.
33d. In two Dhyanas, twelve.
In Rupadhatu the upavicdras of dissatisfaction (daurmanasya) are completely absent. [In the first two Dhyanas there exists six upavicdras of satisfaaion and six of indifference].
34a. All have Kamadhatu for their object. These twelve can have Kamadhatu for their object.
34b. Eight have their own Dhatu for their object.
Eight of them can have Rupadhatu for their object, with the
exception of the upavicdras of odor and taste.
34c. Two have Arupyadhatu for their object.
Two can have Arupyadhatu for their object, namely the dhanno- pavicdras of satisfaaion and indifference.
34d. But, in the other two Dhyanas, six.
The upavicdras of dissatisfaction and satisfaaion are absent in the last two Dhyanas.
34e. Kamadhatu is the objea of six.
There remains then the six upavicdras of indifference which have the visible things, sounds, odors, tastes, tangible things, and dharmas of Kamadhatu for their objea.
34f. Of their own Dhatu, four.
The visible things, sounds, tangible things, and dharmas of Rupadhatu.
34g. The highest Dhatu (=Arupyadhatu) is the objea of one.
290
? The dharmas of Arupyadhaatu. ***
In Arupyadhatu, one must distinguish the preliminary absorption of Aka? anantyayatana and the absorption which follows it:
35a. In the preliminary stage of Arupyadhatu
In the Karika, the word "ampisamanta" signifies Akasanantyayata- nasamantaka (viii. 22). Four upavicaras: the upavicaras of indifference (upeksa) with regard to visible things, sounds, tangible things and dharmas of the Fourth Dhyana are produced in this absorption.
35b. four have Rupadhatu for their object.
This is the opinion of the masters who think that the mind of this absorption is vyavacchinndlambana, that is, that it considers visible things, sounds, etc. , separately.
According to other masters, this mind is paripinditdlambana: it considers the five skandhas of the Fourth Dhyana without any distinction; for these masters, this absorption is thus made up of only one upavicdra which has for its objea the Fourth Dhyana, namely the dharmopavicara of mixed objects.
35c. One has the highest sphere for its objea.
In this same absorption, in Arupyadhatu, there is only the
dharmopavicara.
35d In Arupyadhatu itself, one, 291
In the principle (maula) Dhatu, or Arupyadhatu itself, there is only one upavicdra, dharmopavicara
35e. which has its own Dhatu for its objea.
which has Arupyadhatu for its objea. As we shall see, the mind, in the principle absorption of Arupyadhatu, does not grasp lower Dhatus for its objea (viii. 21).
35f. All of these eighteen are impure.
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There is no upavicdra which is pure.
A being born in Kamadhatu who has not taken possession of a good mind of Rupadhatu [by penetration into Anagamya, viii. 22; who is all the more not detached from Kamadhatu and who has not entered into the Dhyanas], is in possession of (samanvdga$a\ ii. 36b): 1. the eighteen upavicdras of Kamadhatu; 2. the eight upavicdras of the First and Second Dhyana (four of satisfaction and four of indifference, having visible things, sounds, tangible things and dharmas for their objects). The upavicdras of satisfactfon and indifference, having for their objea the odors and tastes of Kamadhatu, which are produced in the Dhyanas, are not defiled [since the possessor of the Dhyanas is in Kamadhatu]: hence the being in question is not filled with these upavicdras [for a being in an lower sphere is filled with the defiled dharmas of the superior spheres]; 3. the four upavkdras (of indifference) of the last two Dhyanas [same remark as for 2]; and 4. an upavicdra (dharmopavkdra) of the sphere of Arupyadhatu, also defiled
When this being has obtained a good mind of Rupadhatu [by penetrating into Anagamya], but is not detached from Kamadhatu, he is filled with: 1. the eighteen upavicdras of Kamadhatu; 2. the ten upavicdras of the First Dhyana: four upavicdras\ defiled, of satisfaction, by omitting the upavicdras of odor and taste, and the six upavicdras of indifference of the sphere of Anagamya; 3. as above for the other Dhyanas and Arupyadhatu.
One can decide any other case on the basis of these principles.
A being in one sphere of Dhyana is in possession of a single upavicdra of Kamadhatu, the dharmopavkdra of indifference associated
with a mind capable of creating fictive beings (nirmdnacitta, vii. 49c). *#*
292
Another master: It is in this way that the Vaibhasikas understand
the upavicdras\ but we understand the Sutra in a different way. One cannot say of one who is detached {vitardga) from an object, a visible thing, etc. , that he produces upavicdras with regard to this objea. All the satisfaaions, etc. (saumanasya, etc. ), are not upavicdras, though they are impure. They are upavicdras when they are "defiling" (sdmklesika), following the expression of the Sutra, "when one has sympathy,
? antipathy, or indifference not proceeding from exact consciousness/' And it is in order to combat these upavicdras that the six "manners of
293
being, or perpetual methods" (satatavihdra) are taught, "Having seen
a visible thing with the eye, there is no sympathy and no antipathy: he
294 remains indifferent in full mindfulness and conscious . . . " We can
show that our interpietation is correct by observing that the Arhat is not
withoutexperiencingasatisfaaionofaworldlyorder (andconsequently 295
impure), but good, having a dharma for its object (that is, the dharmaydtana, i. 24, or the adhigama or dgama, viii. 39a). What he
196 arrests is the satisfaction which, being defiled, is upavkdra.
By distinguishing those states of satisfaction, dissatisfaction, and
indifference on the basis of those which have craving for their principle
component and those which have "leaving" (the desire for liberation)
for their principal component, we have the thirty-six "points of the
Master" (fdstrpada), so called because this distinction has been taught by 297
the Master.
***
The divisions of the parts of existence {bhavdnga) called sensation, and which we have just described, are still very numerous.
*#*
The other parts of existence will not be explained here.
36a. The others have been explained or will be explained later.
The consciousness and the six dyatanas have been explained in the First Chapter (i. 16,9); the samskaras and existence will be explained in Chapter Four; desire and attachment, in Chapter Five.
***
We have said (iii. 26) that Pratityasamutpada is defilement (klesa), aaion (karman) and a "substantial entity" (vastu).
36b-d. It is explained that defilement is like a seed, a Naga, a root,
298 a tree, a husk of grain.
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As a stalk, leaves, etc. , arise from a seed, so too defilement arises from defilement, action, and a real, substantial entity.
A pond where Nagas live does not dry up; in the same way the ocean of births where this Naga which is defilement remains does not dry up. The tree whose root is not cut off continues to grow even through
one cuts and re-cuts its greenery; in the same way, as long as this root, defilement, is not cut off, the realms of rebirth continue to grow.
A tree gives forth flowers and fruits at different times; in the same way it is not at one and the same time that this tree, the defilement, gives forth a defilement, action and a substantial entity.
Grain, even though intact, does not germinate when it is stripped of its husk; in the same way action must be associated with this husk which is defilement in order to bear fruit in a new existence.
37a-b. Action is like grain with its husk, grass, flower.
Action is like grain with its husk. It is like grass that dies when the fruit is ripe: in the same way, when the action has matured, it no longer matures any more. It is like a flower, the immediate cause of the arising of the fruit: in the same way it is the immediate cause of retribution.
2 37c. The substantial entity (vastu) is like food and drink. "
Food and drink are not reproduced in food and drink: they are not good except by being consumed: so too the "entity" which is retribution. A new retribution does not preceed from retribution, for, in this hypothesis, deliverance would then be impossible.
###
The series {samtana) of the skandhas, in its continual process, is only a succession of the four existences (bhava) that we have defined (iii. 10 and foil. ), namely intermediate existence (antardbhava), existence as arising (upapattibhava), existence in and of itself (purvakalabhava), and existence at death (naranabhava).
37d-38b. Among the four existences, existence as arising is always defiled, and by all the defilements of the sphere to which it belongs.
? It is always defiled, never good or neutral. When arising takes place in a certain sphere {bhumi: Kamadhatu, First Dhyana, etc. ), all the
500
defilements (klesa) of this sphere defile it. The Abhidharmikas say,
"Among the defilements, there is not a single one that does not defile the mind at rebirth (pratisamdhibandha); but rebirth takes place solely through defilements, not by the wrappings (jparyavasthanas) called svatantra [, through jealousy, egoism, anger, or hypocrisy, which are only associated with ignorance] (v. 47).
Although this state--the state of death--is bodily and mentally
501
"weak" (mandika), when a person has habitually practiced a certain
302
defilement, this defilement, thus "projected," becomes aaive at the
moment of death.
38c. The other existences are of three types.
Intermediate existence (antardbhava), existence in and of itself (purvakalabhava), and existence at death {maranabhava) can be good, bad, or neutral.
***
Are the four existences produced in all the Dhatus?
304 38c. Three in the Arupyas.
With the exception of intermediate existence. All four existences exist in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu.
***
We have finished the exposition of Pratityasamutpada. Now how do beings, once they are born, last?
305 38d. Everyone lasts through food.
A Sutra says, "A dharma has been proclaimed by the Blessed One who knows and sees, that all beings last through food"
There are four foods, food by the mouthful {kavadikara ahara),
303
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contact (sparfa), mental volition {manahsarhcetand), and consciousness m
(vijndna).
Food by the mouthful is coarse or subtle. Food by the mouthful of intermediate beings (who nourish themselves on odors, from whence their name of Gandharva, iii. 30c), the food of the gods, and the food of humans at the beginning of the cosmic age (pradthamakalpika, iii. 97c) is subtle, because this food, like oil poured out into the sand, completely penetrates into the body and does not give forth any excrement
307
(nisyandddbhdvdt). Or rather the food of subtle beings is subtle, for
example a being born from moisture (yuka, etc. ), one newly-born (bdlaka), [the embryonic being,] etc
39a-b. Food by the mouthfuls exists in Kamadhatu; it consists of three ayatanas.
Only beings free from desire with regard to this food arise in the two higher Dhatus; thus this food exists only in Kamadhatu.
It consists of odors, tastes, and tangible things. In fact, odors, tastes and tangible things are put in the mouth--that is, in pindas or small balls--and then swallowed. This twofold operation is made by the mouth and the nose which separate the morsels.
But how does one attribute the quality of food to odors, etc. , which are also found in shade (chdyd) and warm light {dtapa, i. l0a), in flames
m (jvald), and in the light [of gems, etc. ] (prabhd)?
But such odors, etc. , are not put in the mouth and swallowed.
According to the School, the definition, "Food consists of three ayatanas" refers to the generality of the cases. [The odors which are found in the shade, etc. , are not food; but, in the majority of cases, odor pertains to food].
309
But we think that, even though they are not swallowed, like the
others, since they contribute to the duration of a being, these odors are included in the category of subtle food; as for example bathing and unguents {snanabhyangavat\ see i. trans, p. 103).
*##
But why is rupdyatana, a visible thing (color and figure) not a food? In fact, one swallows it by the mouthfuls.
? 39c-d Rupayatana is not food, for it comforts neither its organ 310
Food is that which comforts the organs and the primary elements (the mahabhutas) which are the support of the organs. Now a visible thing, at the moment when it is swallowed--when this food, introduced into the mouth, is eaten--does not comfort either its organ (the eye), or the primary elements which are the support of the eye. Nor does it comfort the other organs, since it is not their object. Without doubt, as long as one sees it, it causes pleasure and satisfaction, it comforts: but, what is comfort and food in this case is not the visible thing, but the agreeable contact which has the visible thing for its object. The explanation that we formulate here is confirmed by the fact that an agreeable visible thing does not comfort those liberated beings who see it. [If a visible thing were to perform the function of food when one sees it, it would comfort persons delivered from the desire for mouthfuls of food, namely the Anagamins and Arhats, as odors, tastes, etc. comfort these same liberated beings when they partake of them. ]
40a-b. In the three Dhatus, contact, volition, and consciousness,
311
when they are impure, are food
Contact is what arises from the cooperation of the three (iii. p. 97);
mental volition is mental action (manasa karman, iv. lc); and con-
312 sciousness is the consciousness skandha.
Why are they not food when they are pure?
The Vaibhasikas say, "Food signifies that which makes existence
{bhava) grow; now if it were pure, it have the destruction of existence
for its result. " It is a doctrine conforming to that of the Sutra, that food
has for a result causing to endure (sthiti)> causing to go (yapana) "those
nor those delivered
that exist" (bhuta), of favoring (anugraha) "those desiring re-existence 515
(sambhavaisin). " Now contact, volition, and consciousness, when they are pure, do not produce any of these two results.
"Those that exist" signifies beings who have been born; but what is
314 the meaning of the expression "desiring re-existence? "
It refers to antardbbava, intermediate existence or being, which the Blessed One designated by five names:
40c-41a. Mind created (manomaya), desiring re-existence (sam-
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bhavaisin), Gandharva (an eater of odors), intermediate ex- istence (antardbhava), and arising (nirvrtti).
w
An intermediate being is called manomaya, because he is
produced by the manas alone, and because he exists without being supported by any exterior element, semen, blood, flower, etc.
He is called abhinirvrtti, because his nirvrtti or arising is with a view 317
(abhi-mukht) to arising proper (upapattibhava, existence of arising).
That abhinirvrtti signifies an intermediate being results from the Sutra
"After having realized (abhinirvartya) a painful body, he will be reborn 318
in a painful world;" and also from the Sutra that says, "Such a person
has abandoned the bonds which cause abhinirvrtti, without having 319
abandoned the bonds which cause upapatti or existence. " 318
in a painful world;" and also from the Sutra that says, "Such a person
has abandoned the bonds which cause abhinirvrtti, without having 319
abandoned the bonds which cause upapatti or existence. "
There are four cases: 1. An ascetic detached from Kamadhatu and
320
Rupadhatu, when he is an Anagamin: he has abandoned the bonds
which cause abhinirvrtti or intermediate existence, since he will no longer be reborn in the Dhatus where existence itself is preceeded by an intermediate existence; but he has not abandoned the bonds which cause upapatti, existence proper, for he will be reborn in Arupyadhatu; 2. an Anagamin destined to obtain Nirvana in an intermediate existence (an antardparinirvdyin, iii. p. 387): he is bound with the bonds of abhinirvrtti, but freed from upapatti', 3. an Arhat, who has abandoned the two types of bonds; and 4. all other persons who are not included in the preceeding categories, who have not abandoned any of the two types of bonds.
According to another explanation, the bhutas (p. 441, line 31) are the Arhats: the word sambhavaisin designates all beings who desire (satrsnd), and who are as a consequence reborn.
#**
What are the foods that fulfill these two functions of causing to last
321 and "favoring [re-existence]? "
322
According to the Vaibhasikas, the four foods perform these two
323
functions. Food by the mouthful has for its result the re-existence of
? those who are attached to it. This is proved by the Sutra. The Blessed
One said, "The four foods are the root of sickness, abcesses, and thorns.
[Sickness, abcesses, and thorns signifies the five updddnaskandhas of a
new existence]; and are the condition (pratyaya) of old age and death.
[And old age and death is the old age and death of a future existence, see
324
[It is evident that food by the mouthful causes living beings to
above, p. 404]. "
last. ]But how does mental intentional action, or volition (manahsam- 325
cetana), possess this power?
Once upon a time there was a man, who in a time of poverty desired
to go to another land. But he was exhausted by his hunger and his two sons were young. Feeling that he was going to die, he filled a sack with ashes, placed this sack on a wall, and encouraged his sons by telling them that this sack contained grain. The two children, through hope, lived a long time. But another man came and took the sack and opened it. The children saw that it was ashes, and their hope being crushed, they died
So too once upon a time some merchants travelled by ship on the open sea; tormented by hunger and thirst, they saw in the distance a mass of foam and believed that it was a river; hope gave them the force to go to that place and prolong their life; but, arriving, they found out
326 what it was, and their hopes being crushed, they died.
21
We also read in the Sarhgitiparyaya? "Large marine animals reach
firm ground, lay their eggs on the beach, bury them in the sand, and go
back to the ocean. If the mother forgets the eggs, they will perish. "
328
This edition cannot be correct, for it is impossible that the mind
of another would be food. Thus we should read, "If the eggs think of their mother, they will not perish; but if they forget their mother, they will perish. "
**#
Yet one cannot doubt that all the impure dharmas increase bhava or existence. Why did the Blessed One teach that the foods are four in number?
Because he refers to the essentials:
41. Among the foods, two have for their result the growth of the
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asraya (the body) and the dirita (the mind), and two have for their result the projection and the production of a new
329 existence.
The asraya is the body with its organs, which is the support (asraya)
of what is supported (dsrita) by it: namely the mind and its mental
states. Food by the mouthful makes the body grow, while contact makes
33
the mind grow. ? These two foods which cause that which is born to
live, and which are similar to a wet-nurse, are the major items for the duration of a being who is born.
Mental volitional action (manahsarhcetand) which is active, projects
a new existence; this new existence, thus projected, is produced
(nirvrttd) from the seed which is the consciousness "informed" through 331
action. Mental volitional action and the consciousness are thus the two foods which cause birth, which are similar to a mother, and which are the major items for the production of the existence of a being who has not yet been born.
332 Is everything which is "by the mouthful" (kavadikdra) food?
There are "mouthfuls" which are not food Four cases: 1. kavadikdra which is not food: that which, being taken in the mouth, has for its result the diminution of the organs and the destruction of the primary elements which support them; 2. food without being kavadikdra'. namely contact, mental volitional action, and the consciousness; 3. kavadikdra which is food: that which, being taken in the mouth, has for its result the growth of the organs and the increase of the primary elements; and 4. neither kavadikdra nor food: sound, etc
The same, by changing the terms, for the other foods.
##*
Is there contact, mental volitional action, and consciousness, which has for its result the growth of the organs and the increase of the elements, without this contact, etc. , being food?
Yes: those which belong to a sphere different from the sphere in
which the being in question is born, and, in all the spheres, those which
333 are pure.
? That which consumed (paribhukta) is harmful to one who has consumed it (praibhoktar) nevertheless receives the name of food. According to the Vaibhasikas, in fact, it is for two# moments that the thing consumed performs the function of food: 1. as soon as it is consumed, it dispels hunger and thirst; and 2. digested, it increases the
334 organs and the primary elements {Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 676c25).
***
This leads to another question.
How many foods are there is the different realms of rebirth, and in the different wombs?
All are in alL
How can you say that there is, in the hells, food by the mouthful?
335 The red balls of fire and molten copper are food
If this is the case, if that which is harmful is food, then the theory of the four cases [of the Samgttiparydya, note 332] is rejected, as well as the definitions of the Prakaranagrantha (7. 5; see also Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 674al, 676a26, and 779c4) which says, "What is food by the mouthful? Mouthful by reason of which there is increase of the organs, and the increase and maintainance of the primary elements," and the rest.
The doctrine of the existence of food by the mouthful in the hells is
not in contradiction with the definitions that you appeal to. These
336 definitions, in fact, are applied to food insofar as it increases. But the
objects of consummation which have for their result to diminish,
337 nevertheless possess, in the hells, the characteristics of food: they
dispel, at least for a time, hunger and thirst. Further, in the pradefika hells (iii. 59c), food by the mouthful exists as among humans. Hence food by the mouthful exists in the five realms of rebirth.
***
With respect to food by the mouthful, let us examine the Sutra: There is one who feeds one hundred non-Buddhist Rsis detached from
The World 445
? 446 Chapter Three
Kamadhatu, and there is one who feeds a single jambusandagata prthagjana: but this last gift is much more fruitful that the first. " What does the expression "jambusandagata prthagjana" mean?
[Three opinions in the Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 678a26] 1. According to 338
the first opinion,jambusanda signifyingJambudvlpa, so this signifies, 339
"All beings inhabiting Jambudvlpa who have a stomach. "
This explanation is inadmissable; for the expression "a Prthag-
jana . . . " cannot designate "all beings. . . " Were it to have such a value, we do not see why the Sutra would teach that a gift made to an infinite number of Prthagjanas is more meritorious that one made to a smaller number, to one hundred Rsis: for such would stand of itself, and there
34 would be nothing surprising about it. ?
2. According to the second opinion, the Prthagjana in question is the Bodhisattva close to Bodhi.
3. According to followers of the third opinion, the second opinion is unsustainable: in fact a gift made to such a Bodhisattva is of incalculable merit, and is of a merit superior to a gift made to one hundred kotis of Arhats. The terms of the comparison would be much too low. Thus, say the Vaibhasikas, this Prthagjana is the person who has obtained the
341 so-called nirvedhabhagiya roots of good.
In our opinion, the expression jambusandagata does not ety- mologicallysignify"possessorofthenirvedhabhagtyas\ theusagedoes not give that sense to this expression; neither the Sutra nor the Sastra uses it in this sense: the wotdjambusandagata, "seated under theJambu tree," refers to but one Bodhisattva, [as it is said, "The Bodhisattva Sarvarthasiddha, having left in order to go see Kr? igramaka, sat at the
342
foot of a jambu tree, and entered into the First Dhyana. "] The
Bodhisattva is a Prthagjana, detached from Kamadhatu: one can thus compare him with the non-Buddhist Rsis detached from Kamadhatu and say that a gift made to him is more meritorious that a gift made to Rsis.
Without doubt, a gift made to this Bodhisattva is more meritorious than a gift made to an infinite number of Rsis: and if the Sutra says that it is more meritorious than a gift made to one hundred Rsis, it is because the Sutra explains the gradation of merit by multiples of one hundred: "to feed one hundred animals, to feed one immoral person, to feed one hundred immoral persons. . . " we observe that, to proceed with these
? comparisons, the Sutra does not further speak of a jambusandagata. It does not say, "A gift made to a candidate for the results of Srotaapanna is incomparable greater than a gift made to ajambusandagata*--which it would say if jambusandagata were to signify "a possessor of the nirvedhabhagtyas"--but rather, taking up again the Rsis as the term of comparison, "A gift made to a candidate for the results of Srotaapanna is incomparably greater than a gift made to one hundred non-Buddhist Rsis.
***
We have seen what the pratityasamutpada of beings is, and how beings last. We have seen also how death results from the exhaustion of life (ayus), etc. (ii. 45a, trans, p. 269). It remains for us to say which consciousness is present at the moments of death and birth.
42a-c. Breaking, taking up again, detachment, loss of detach-
ment, death and birth are regarded as proper to the mind
343 consciousness.
It is through a single mental consciousness that the breaking and the
taking up again of the roots of good take place; the detachment either
from a Dhatu, or from a bhilmi (First DhySna, etc. ), and the loss of this
detachment; and death and birth. What is true of birth is evidently true
of the beginning of the intermediate existence: it is useless to speak of
344 it.
42d Death and birth, with the sensation of indifference.
The term cyuta is the equivalent of cyuti or death; the term udbhava is the equivalent of upapatti, arising.
The mind consciousness, at death and at birth, is associated with the sensation of indifference, upeksd, that is, with the sensation that is neither agreeable nor disagreeable. This sensation is not active; the other sensations are active and, as a consequence, an arising and a dying consciousness cannot be associated with them, for, in this hypothesis, it would itself be active.