Objection
2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated
above [1660](A[3]).
above [1660](A[3]).
Summa Theologica
Consequently man needs yet
higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These
perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God,
but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the
Divine inspiration, according to Is. 50:5: "The Lord . . . hath opened
my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back. " Even the
Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. , vii, 8)
that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there is no need to
take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner
promptings, since they are moved by a principle higher than human
reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for
acts which are higher than acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the
broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and
above the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are
Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of
"heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike kai theia}]," in respect of
which some men are called "divine. "
Reply to Objection 2: The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far
as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are
opposed to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine
instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason,
whose light flows from God.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition applies to virtue taken in its
general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as
distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we
lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is
measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from
infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to
His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the
promptings of God.
Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far
as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift,
according as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same
applies to the other virtues.
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Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for
salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing
the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's
salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary
standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the
precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to
man for salvation.
Objection 2: Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave
well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's
behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues;
and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts are
not necessary to man for salvation.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost
gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel
against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance,
piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride. " But a
sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues.
Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.
On the contrary, Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and
fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since of
wisdom it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him that
dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without
fear cannot be justified. " Therefore the other gifts that are placed
between these are also necessary for salvation.
I answer that, As stated above [1652](A[1]), the gifts are perfections
of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings
of God. Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not
sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost,
there is, in consequence, need for a gift.
Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its
natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly, with
a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated
above ([1653]Q[62], A[1]). And, though this latter perfection is
greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more
perfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his full
possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love
and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a
nature or a form or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work according to
them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly
in every nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a
nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless
it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly,
can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has the nature of light
imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows
the medical art perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is
not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive
instructions from him.
Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's
connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If,
however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special
promptings from God, this will be out of God's superabundant goodness:
hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the
acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in
matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves
him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the
theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it
receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost,
according toRom. 8:14, 17: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God,
they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and Ps. 142:10:
"Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit,
none can receive the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he
be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to
accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the
Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the
virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the
commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man
being moved by a higher principle.
Reply to Objection 2: By the theological and moral virtues, man is not
so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual
need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for
the reason already given.
Reply to Objection 3: Whether we consider human reason as perfected in
its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it
does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is
unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection.
God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by
His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind
and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given
as remedies to these defects.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not
habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as
"a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy
Ghost rest in Him, as stated in Is. 11:2,3: "He upon Whom thou shalt
see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that
baptizeth"; on which words Gregory comments as follows (Moral. ii, 27):
"The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He
dwells always in the Mediator. " Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are not habits.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according
as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above ([1654]AA[1],2).
But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like
an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is
befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.
Objection 3: Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine
inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit:
for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as
Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the gifts
of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His
disciples (Jn. 14:17): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you. "
Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His
gifts abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but
abiding habits.
I answer that, As stated above [1655](A[1]), the gifts are perfections
of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy
Ghost. Now it is evident from what has been already said (Q[56], A[4];
Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power
according as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as
it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason.
Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy
Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in
comparison with the reason, are related to the appetitive power. Now
the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are
disposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by
saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the
Holy Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts. "
Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above
[1656](A[2]). Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever
abides in holy men.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds, in the case of an instrument
which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man
is not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy
Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will.
Therefore he needs a habit.
Reply to Objection 3: Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the
manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence
the comparison fails.
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Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are
unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down
corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding,
knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing
is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual
virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to justice, viz.
piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of
fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance.
Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently.
Objection 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of
fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself.
Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us
to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by
God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological
virtues, should have been included.
Objection 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of
love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions
condivided with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so
ought the other three.
Objection 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding;
counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore,
some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear.
Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Holy Writ (Is. 11:2,3).
I answer that, As stated above [1657](A[3]), the gifts are habits
perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy
Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that
they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive
powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all
the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior
power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the principles of human
actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues;
and such powers are the reason and appetite.
Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the
apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and
judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of
truth, the speculative reason is perfected by "understanding"; the
practical reason, by "counsel. " In order to judge aright, the
speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom"; the practical reason by
"knowledge. " The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's
relations to another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching
himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers;
and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to
Prov. 15:27: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil,"
and Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid
of Thy judgments. " Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all
those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend.
Reply to Objection 1: The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in
matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such
matters, but to external things that can be made, since art is the
right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made
(Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of
the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the
principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He
moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance:
for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, to restrain
man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason,
so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man from evil
pleasures through fear of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Justice is so called from the rectitude of the
reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the
name of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to
our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is
also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore
the gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all,
is fittingly called piety.
Reply to Objection 3: The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost,
unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not
moved by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of
union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith,
hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to
the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to
these three virtues, as being derived therefrom.
Reply to Objection 4: Love, hope and joy have good for their object.
Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions
are transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On
the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to
God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from
certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its
name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from
evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does.
Reply to Objection 5: Wisdom directs both the intellect and the
affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to
wisdom as their directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the
gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear.
Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a
consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the
word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the
same Spirit. " Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of
the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to
divers men, and are not connected together in the same man.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of
the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith. " But some of
the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it
seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and
the same man.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small
account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless
if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the
strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very
weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it
hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lack
the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has these
virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action":
from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift without
another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.
On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the
following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons,
that by turns they fed one another. " Now the sons of Job, of whom he is
speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.
I answer that, The true answer to this question is easily gathered from
what has been already set down. For it has been stated [1658](A[3])
that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as
regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are
disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. 5:5: "The charity
of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to
us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as
the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that whoever has
charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one
possess without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way
as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the
knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct
the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the
Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he
mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge.
They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and
thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human
mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the
knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that
these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while
expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is
referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous
grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it is one
thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the
blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another, to
know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against the
ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper
name of knowledge. "
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is
proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by
another, as stated above ([1659]Q[65], A[1]); so Gregory wishes to
prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that
one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed
that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless
one virtue lend its support to another. " We are therefore not to
understand that one gift can be without another; but that if
understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as
temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not
remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of His
sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all
temptations. " Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according to
Is. 11:9: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy
mountain. " Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in
heaven.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated
above [1660](A[3]). But habits are of no use, where their acts are
impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for
Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the
truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . . .
fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the
inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of which are incompatible with
the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state
of glory.
Objection 3: Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the
contemplative life, e. g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the
active life, e. g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with
this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the
Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of
God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly
river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who,
proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in
those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly
virtue. "
I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to
their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may
be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for
this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable
to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in
heaven, where God will be "all in all" (1 Cor. 15:28), and man entirely
subject unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the
matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life
they have an operation about a matter, in respect of which they will
have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they
will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the
case with regard to the cardinal virtues ([1661]Q[67], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according
as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they
afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of
glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good
by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something
that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in
the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with
the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, hope passes,
and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates
the truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness,"
of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach no more every
man . . . his brother" (Jer. 31:3,4); but the enlightening of the mind
remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous,"
which is necessary in the present life; and also that "it makes the
mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of
fortitude he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in
the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands of
confidence," which remains also in the future life. With regard to
knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void
of ignorance," which refers to the present state. When, however, he
adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the
fulness of knowledge, which belongs to the future state. Of piety he
says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy. " These
words taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward
regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost heart," belongs also
to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but
fellowship of joy. Of fear he say that "it oppresses the mind, lest it
pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and
that "it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the future," which
also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer
to the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope
are here, and obtain there.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the gifts as to their
matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active
life; but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things
pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly
bliss.
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Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in
their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that
which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of
man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is written (Dt. 10:12):
"And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that
thou fear the Lord thy God? " and (Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a
master, where is My fear? " Therefore it seems that fear, which is
mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts.
Objection 2: Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is
profitable to all things. " Now a common good is preferable to
particular goods. Therefore piety, which is given the last place but
one, seems to be the most excellent gift.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel
pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry.
Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it
is set down as being below it.
Objection 4: Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while
science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than
the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than
fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the
gifts are not set down in their order of dignity.
On the contrary, Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It
seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which
Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we
read in Mat. 5:3]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz.
in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here,
with the lower gifts. "
I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways:
first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding
from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to
their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they
follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with
another; because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul's
powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above [1662](A[4]). Hence, as
the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and
among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the
active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet
so that wisdom stands before understanding, and understanding before
science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the
gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent
than piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels
fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and
fortitude temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and
counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel are
concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard
ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds
with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and
understanding are given the preference to the others, their excellence
is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are
preferred to knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to their
matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation,
so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the
Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as
though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of
generation, man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov. 16:16),
before doing good works, and which result from the other gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is
not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of
which he had said it "is profitable to little. "
Reply to Objection 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by
reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its
matter: for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty
(Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all
matters.
Reply to Objection 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason
are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in
relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason
transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on
the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive
power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because
counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while
knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel
together with fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the
preference to knowledge and piety.
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Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the
gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity:
"No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of
eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but,
without charity, they avail nothing. " But charity is a virtue.
Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more
excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for
Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the
mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude,
temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven
virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly to bestow wisdom;
against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against
fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of
heart, piety; against piety, fear. " Therefore the virtues are more
excellent than the gifts.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the
virtues cannot be used to evil purpose. " But it is possible to make
evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up
the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding,
while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it
multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it gives
confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and
yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from
the right line, may become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly
alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair. " Therefore the virtues
are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to
remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so
that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the
gifts are more excellent than the virtues.
I answer that, As was shown above ([1663]Q[58], A[3];[1664] Q[62],
A[1]), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some
intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby
man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby
reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which
perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other
hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to
be amenable to the Divine motion.
Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues,
by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as
the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which
perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues.
Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral
virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent
than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i. e. the seven gifts, "never
attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all they do be done in
faith, hope, and charity. "
But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and
moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the
gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their
Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the
other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more
exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing
moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect
than the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we
grant to be more perfect than the gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes
another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God
precedes love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the
intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The
other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's
neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this way
moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through
being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly
subordinate to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts
of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which
"dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and
understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as
they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the
perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory
means to say.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?
(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?
(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;
(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.
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Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the
virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns
the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq. ) to the gifts of the Holy
Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq. , ascribes the
beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
Objection 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the
reason and the eternal law, as stated above ([1665]Q[19], A[3];[1666]
Q[21], A[1]). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while
the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost,
as is clear from what has been said ([1667]Q[68], AA[1],3, seqq. ).
Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of
the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes
do not differ from them.
Objection 3: Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness,
justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that
are neither virtues nor gifts, e. g. poverty, mourning, and peace.
Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.
I answer that, As stated above ([1668]Q[2], A[7];[1669] Q[3], A[1]),
happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the
end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are
full of hope"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "We are saved by
hope. " Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved
towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action.
And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of
virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal
happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be
moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may
obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the
virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to
the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts
are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above
([1670]Q[68], A[8]). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes
propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas
Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples
on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them
to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that no other habits,
besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.
Reply to Objection 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of
meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these
might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts,
because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues
perfect him, as stated above ([1671]Q[68], A[2]).
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Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes
do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because
they hope for a reward, as stated above [1672](A[1]). Now the object of
hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to
come.
Objection 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to
the beatitudes, Lk. 6:25, where we read: "Woe to you that are filled;
for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn
and weep. " Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because
frequently men are not punished in this life, according to Job 21:13:
"They spend their days in wealth. " Therefore neither do the rewards of
the beatitudes refer to this life.
Objection 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the
reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant
fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps.
16:15: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall
appear.
higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These
perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God,
but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the
Divine inspiration, according to Is. 50:5: "The Lord . . . hath opened
my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back. " Even the
Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. , vii, 8)
that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there is no need to
take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner
promptings, since they are moved by a principle higher than human
reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for
acts which are higher than acts of virtue.
Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the
broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and
above the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are
Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher
(Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of
"heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike kai theia}]," in respect of
which some men are called "divine. "
Reply to Objection 2: The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far
as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are
opposed to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine
instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason,
whose light flows from God.
Reply to Objection 3: This definition applies to virtue taken in its
general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as
distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we
lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is
measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from
infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to
His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the
promptings of God.
Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far
as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift,
according as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same
applies to the other virtues.
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Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for
salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing
the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's
salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary
standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the
precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to
man for salvation.
Objection 2: Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave
well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's
behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues;
and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts are
not necessary to man for salvation.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost
gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel
against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance,
piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride. " But a
sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues.
Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.
On the contrary, Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and
fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since of
wisdom it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him that
dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without
fear cannot be justified. " Therefore the other gifts that are placed
between these are also necessary for salvation.
I answer that, As stated above [1652](A[1]), the gifts are perfections
of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings
of God. Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not
sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost,
there is, in consequence, need for a gift.
Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its
natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly, with
a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated
above ([1653]Q[62], A[1]). And, though this latter perfection is
greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more
perfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his full
possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love
and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a
nature or a form or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work according to
them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly
in every nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a
nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless
it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly,
can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has the nature of light
imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows
the medical art perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is
not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive
instructions from him.
Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's
connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If,
however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special
promptings from God, this will be out of God's superabundant goodness:
hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the
acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in
matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves
him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the
theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it
receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost,
according toRom. 8:14, 17: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God,
they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and Ps. 142:10:
"Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit,
none can receive the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he
be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to
accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the
Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the
virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the
commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man
being moved by a higher principle.
Reply to Objection 2: By the theological and moral virtues, man is not
so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual
need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for
the reason already given.
Reply to Objection 3: Whether we consider human reason as perfected in
its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it
does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is
unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection.
God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by
His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind
and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy
Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given
as remedies to these defects.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not
habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as
"a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments
(Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy
Ghost rest in Him, as stated in Is. 11:2,3: "He upon Whom thou shalt
see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that
baptizeth"; on which words Gregory comments as follows (Moral. ii, 27):
"The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He
dwells always in the Mediator. " Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are not habits.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according
as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above ([1654]AA[1],2).
But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like
an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is
befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the
gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.
Objection 3: Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine
inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit:
for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as
Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the gifts
of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His
disciples (Jn. 14:17): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you. "
Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His
gifts abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but
abiding habits.
I answer that, As stated above [1655](A[1]), the gifts are perfections
of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy
Ghost. Now it is evident from what has been already said (Q[56], A[4];
Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power
according as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as
it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason.
Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy
Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in
comparison with the reason, are related to the appetitive power. Now
the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are
disposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost
are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by
saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the
Holy Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts. "
Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above
[1656](A[2]). Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever
abides in holy men.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds, in the case of an instrument
which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man
is not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy
Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will.
Therefore he needs a habit.
Reply to Objection 3: Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the
manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence
the comparison fails.
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Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are
unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down
corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding,
knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing
is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual
virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to justice, viz.
piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of
fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance.
Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently.
Objection 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of
fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself.
Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.
Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us
to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by
God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological
virtues, should have been included.
Objection 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of
love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions
condivided with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so
ought the other three.
Objection 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding;
counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore,
some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear.
Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Holy Writ (Is. 11:2,3).
I answer that, As stated above [1657](A[3]), the gifts are habits
perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy
Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that
they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive
powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all
the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior
power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the principles of human
actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues;
and such powers are the reason and appetite.
Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the
apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and
judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of
truth, the speculative reason is perfected by "understanding"; the
practical reason, by "counsel. " In order to judge aright, the
speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom"; the practical reason by
"knowledge. " The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's
relations to another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching
himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers;
and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to
Prov. 15:27: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil,"
and Ps. 118:120: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid
of Thy judgments. " Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all
those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend.
Reply to Objection 1: The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in
matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such
matters, but to external things that can be made, since art is the
right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made
(Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of
the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the
principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He
moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance:
for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, to restrain
man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason,
so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man from evil
pleasures through fear of God.
Reply to Objection 2: Justice is so called from the rectitude of the
reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the
name of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to
our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is
also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore
the gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all,
is fittingly called piety.
Reply to Objection 3: The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost,
unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not
moved by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of
union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith,
hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to
the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to
these three virtues, as being derived therefrom.
Reply to Objection 4: Love, hope and joy have good for their object.
Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions
are transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On
the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to
God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from
certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its
name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from
evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does.
Reply to Objection 5: Wisdom directs both the intellect and the
affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to
wisdom as their directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the
gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear.
Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a
consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the
Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the
word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the
same Spirit. " Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of
the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to
divers men, and are not connected together in the same man.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of
the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith. " But some of
the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it
seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and
the same man.
Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small
account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless
if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the
strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very
weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it
hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lack
the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has these
virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action":
from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift without
another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.
On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the
following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons,
that by turns they fed one another. " Now the sons of Job, of whom he is
speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of
the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.
I answer that, The true answer to this question is easily gathered from
what has been already set down. For it has been stated [1658](A[3])
that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as
regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are
disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the
Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. 5:5: "The charity
of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to
us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as
the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the
Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that whoever has
charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one
possess without charity.
Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way
as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the
knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct
the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the
Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he
mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge.
They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and
thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human
mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the
knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that
these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity.
Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while
expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is
referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous
grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it is one
thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the
blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another, to
know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against the
ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper
name of knowledge. "
Reply to Objection 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is
proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by
another, as stated above ([1659]Q[65], A[1]); so Gregory wishes to
prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that
one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed
that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless
one virtue lend its support to another. " We are therefore not to
understand that one gift can be without another; but that if
understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as
temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.
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Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not
remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of His
sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all
temptations. " Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according to
Is. 11:9: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy
mountain. " Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in
heaven.
Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated
above [1660](A[3]). But habits are of no use, where their acts are
impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for
Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the
truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . . .
fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the
inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of which are incompatible with
the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state
of glory.
Objection 3: Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the
contemplative life, e. g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the
active life, e. g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with
this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the
Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory.
On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of
God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly
river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who,
proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in
those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly
virtue. "
I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to
their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may
be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for
this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable
to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in
heaven, where God will be "all in all" (1 Cor. 15:28), and man entirely
subject unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the
matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life
they have an operation about a matter, in respect of which they will
have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they
will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the
case with regard to the cardinal virtues ([1661]Q[67], A[1]).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according
as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they
afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of
glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good
by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something
that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in
the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with
the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, hope passes,
and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates
the truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness,"
of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach no more every
man . . . his brother" (Jer. 31:3,4); but the enlightening of the mind
remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous,"
which is necessary in the present life; and also that "it makes the
mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of
fortitude he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in
the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands of
confidence," which remains also in the future life. With regard to
knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void
of ignorance," which refers to the present state. When, however, he
adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the
fulness of knowledge, which belongs to the future state. Of piety he
says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy. " These
words taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward
regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost heart," belongs also
to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but
fellowship of joy. Of fear he say that "it oppresses the mind, lest it
pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and
that "it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the future," which
also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer
to the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope
are here, and obtain there.
Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the gifts as to their
matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active
life; but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things
pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly
bliss.
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Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in
their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that
which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of
man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is written (Dt. 10:12):
"And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that
thou fear the Lord thy God? " and (Malachi 1:6): "If . . . I be a
master, where is My fear? " Therefore it seems that fear, which is
mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts.
Objection 2: Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since
the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is
profitable to all things. " Now a common good is preferable to
particular goods. Therefore piety, which is given the last place but
one, seems to be the most excellent gift.
Objection 3: Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel
pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry.
Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it
is set down as being below it.
Objection 4: Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while
science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than
the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than
fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the
gifts are not set down in their order of dignity.
On the contrary, Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It
seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which
Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we
read in Mat. 5:3]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz.
in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here,
with the lower gifts. "
I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways:
first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding
from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to
their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they
follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with
another; because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul's
powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above [1662](A[4]). Hence, as
the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and
among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the
active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet
so that wisdom stands before understanding, and understanding before
science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the
gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent
than piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels
fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and
fortitude temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and
counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel are
concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard
ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds
with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and
understanding are given the preference to the others, their excellence
is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are
preferred to knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to their
matter.
Reply to Objection 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation,
so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the
Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as
though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of
generation, man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov. 16:16),
before doing good works, and which result from the other gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is
not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of
which he had said it "is profitable to little. "
Reply to Objection 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by
reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its
matter: for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty
(Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all
matters.
Reply to Objection 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason
are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in
relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason
transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on
the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive
power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because
counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while
knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel
together with fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the
preference to knowledge and piety.
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Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the
gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity:
"No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which
divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of
eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but,
without charity, they avail nothing. " But charity is a virtue.
Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more
excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for
Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the
mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude,
temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven
virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly to bestow wisdom;
against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against
fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of
heart, piety; against piety, fear. " Therefore the virtues are more
excellent than the gifts.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the
virtues cannot be used to evil purpose. " But it is possible to make
evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up
the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding,
while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it
multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it gives
confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and
yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from
the right line, may become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly
alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair. " Therefore the virtues
are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to
remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so
that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the
gifts are more excellent than the virtues.
I answer that, As was shown above ([1663]Q[58], A[3];[1664] Q[62],
A[1]), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some
intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby
man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby
reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which
perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other
hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to
be amenable to the Divine motion.
Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues,
by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as
the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which
perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues.
Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral
virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent
than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says
(Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i. e. the seven gifts, "never
attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all they do be done in
faith, hope, and charity. "
But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and
moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the
gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their
Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the
other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more
exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing
moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect
than the virtues.
Reply to Objection 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we
grant to be more perfect than the gifts.
Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes
another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God
precedes love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the
intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The
other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's
neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this way
moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through
being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly
subordinate to God.
Reply to Objection 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts
of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which
"dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and
understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as
they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the
perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory
means to say.
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OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four
points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?
(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?
(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;
(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.
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Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the
virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns
the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq. ) to the gifts of the Holy
Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq. , ascribes the
beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
Objection 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the
reason and the eternal law, as stated above ([1665]Q[19], A[3];[1666]
Q[21], A[1]). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while
the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost,
as is clear from what has been said ([1667]Q[68], AA[1],3, seqq. ).
Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of
the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes
do not differ from them.
Objection 3: Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness,
justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the
beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that
are neither virtues nor gifts, e. g. poverty, mourning, and peace.
Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.
I answer that, As stated above ([1668]Q[2], A[7];[1669] Q[3], A[1]),
happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the
end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are
full of hope"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): "We are saved by
hope. " Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved
towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action.
And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of
virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal
happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be
moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may
obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the
virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit.
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to
the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts
are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above
([1670]Q[68], A[8]). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes
propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas
Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples
on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them
to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that no other habits,
besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.
Reply to Objection 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of
meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these
might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts,
because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues
perfect him, as stated above ([1671]Q[68], A[2]).
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Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes
do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because
they hope for a reward, as stated above [1672](A[1]). Now the object of
hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to
come.
Objection 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to
the beatitudes, Lk. 6:25, where we read: "Woe to you that are filled;
for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn
and weep. " Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because
frequently men are not punished in this life, according to Job 21:13:
"They spend their days in wealth. " Therefore neither do the rewards of
the beatitudes refer to this life.
Objection 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the
reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant
fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps.
16:15: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall
appear.
