No More Learning

Whatever his reasons may have been, he


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357]
Constantius at Rome
67
treacherously failed to come to the relief of the besieged. When the
news reached the Court he was recalled and deprived of his command.
Eutherius, sent by Julian from Gaul, discredited the calumnies of
Marcellus, and Constantius silenced the malignant whispers of the Court;
accepting his Caesar's protestations of loyalty, he created him supreme
commander over the troops in Gaul. The actual gains won by the
military operations of the year 356 may not have been great but that
their moral effect was considerable is demonstrated by the campaign of
357 and by the spirit of the troops at the battle of Strassburg; above
all, Julian was no longer an imperial figure-head, he now begins an inde-
pendent career as general and administrator.
In the spring of 357 Constantius, wishing to celebrate with high
pomp and ceremony the twentieth year of his rule since the death of
Constantine, visited Rome for the first time (28 April—29 May). The
city filled him with awe and wonder and he caused an obelisk to be
raised in the Circus Maximus as a memorial of his stay in the capital.
But to the historian the main interest of this visit lies in the fact that
as a Christian Emperor Constantius removed from the Senate-house the
altar of Victory? To the whole-hearted Pagans this altar came to
stand for a symbol of the Holy Roman Empire as they conceived it:
it was an outward and visible sign of that bond which none might loose
between Rome's hard-won greatness as a conquering nation and her
loyalty to her historic faith. They clung to it with passionate devotion
as to a time-honoured creed in stone-a creed at once political and
religious—and thus again and again they struggled and pleaded for its
retention or its restoration. The deeper meaning of what might seem a
matter of trifling import must never be forgotten if we are to understand
the earnest petition of Symmachus or the scorn of Ambrose. The Pagan
was defending the last trench : the destruction of the altar of Victory
meant for him that he could hold the fortress no longer.
From Rome the Emperor was summoned to the Danube to take
action against the Sarmatians, Suevi and Quadi; he was unable to co-
operate with Julian in person, but despatched Barbatio, magister peditum,
to Gaul in command of 25,000 troops. Julian was to march from the
north, Barbatio was to make Augst near Basel his base of operations,
and between the two forces the barbarians were to be enclosed. The
choice of a general, however, foredoomed the plan of campaign to failure.
Barbatio, one of the principal agents in the death of Gallus, was the last
man to work in harmony with Julian. The Caesar leaving Sens concen-
trated his forces only 13,000 strong at Rheims, and as in the previous
year marched south to Elsass. Finding the pass of Zabern blocked, he
drove the barbarians before him and forced them to take refuge in the
islands of the Rhine. Barbatio had previously allowed a marauding band
of Laeti laden with booty to pass his camp and to cross the Rhine
Symm, Rel, ini. 6.
1
CH. INI.
5--2


## p. 68 (#98) ##############################################

68
The Battle of Strassburg
(357
unscathed, and later by false reports he secured the dismissal of the
tribunes Bainobaudes and the future emperor Valentinian, whom Julian
had ordered to dispute the robbers' return. He now refused to supply
the Caesar with boats ; light-armed troops, however, waded across the
Rhine to the islands and seizing the barbarians' canoes massacred the
fugitives. After this success Julian fortified the pass of Zabern and thus
closed the gate into Gaul; he settled garrisons in Elsass along the
frontier line and did all in his power to supply them with provisions, for
Barbatio withheld all the supplies which arrived from southern Gaul.
Having now secured his position, Julian received the amazing intelligence
that Barbatio had been surprised by the Germans, had lost his whole
baggage train and had retreated in confusion to Augst, where he had
gone into winter quarters. It must be confessed that this defeat of
25,000 men by a sudden barbarian foray seems almost inexplicable, unless
it be that Barbatio was determined at all costs to refuse in any way to
co-operate with the Caesar and was surprised while on the march to
Augst. Julian's position was one of great danger: the Emperor was
far distant on the Danube, the Alemanni previously at variance among
themselves, were now re-united, Gundomad, the faithful ally of Rome, had
been treacherously murdered and the followers of Vadomar had joined
their fellow-countrymen. Barbatio's defeat had raised the enemy's hopes,
while Julian was unsupported and had only some 13,000 men under his
command. It was at this critical moment that a host of Alemannic
tribesmen crossed the Rhine under the leadership of Chnodomar and
encamped, it would seem, on the left bank of the river, close to the city of
Strassburg which the Romans had apparently not yet recovered. On the
third day after the passage of the stream had begun, Julian learned of
the movement of the barbarians, and set out from Zabern on the military
road to Brumath, and thence on the highway which ran from Strassburg
to Mainz towards Weitbruch ; here after a march of six or seven hours
the army would reach the frontier fortification and from this point they
had to descend by rough and unknown paths into the plain. On sight
of the enemy despite the counsels of the Caesar, despite their long march
and the burning heat of an August day, the troops insisted on an im-
mediate attack. The Roman army was drawn up for battle, Severus on
rising ground on the left wing, Julian in command of the cavalry on the
right wing in the plain. Severus from his point of vantage discovered
an ambush and drove off the barbarians with loss, but the Alemanni in
their turn routed the Roman horse ; although Julian was successful in
staying their flight, they were too demoralised to renew the conflict.
The whole brunt of the attack was therefore borne by the Roman centre
and left wing, and it was a struggle of footmen against footmen.
length the stubborn endurance of the Roman infantry carried the day,
and the Alemanni were driven headlong backwards toward the Rhine.
Their losses were enormous—6000 left dead on the field of battle and
At


## p. 69 (#99) ##############################################

357–358]
Julian on the Rhine
69
countless others drowned : Chnodomar was at last captured, and Julian
sent the redoubtable chieftain as a prisoner to Constantius. The victory
meant the recovery of the upper Rhine and the freeing of Gaul from
barbarian incursions. There would even seem to have been an attempt
after the battle to hail Julian as Augustus, but this he immediately
repressed. The booty and captives were sent to Metz and the Caesar
himself marched to Mainz, being compelled to subdue a mutiny on the
way; the army had apparently been disappointed in its share of the
spoil
. Julian at once proceeded to cross the Rhine opposite Mainz and
to conduct a campaign on the Main. His aim would seem to have been
to strike still deeper terror into the vanquished, and to secure his
advantage in order that he might feel free to turn to the work which
awaited him in the north. Three chieftains sued for
peace after their
land had been laid waste with fire and sword, and to seal this success
Julian rebuilt a fortress which Trajan had constructed on the right bank
of the Rhine. The great difficulty which faced the Caesar was the question
of supplies, and one of the terms of the ten months' armistice granted to
the Alemanni was that they should furnish the garrison of the Muni-
mentum Trajani with provisions. It was this pressing necessity which
demanded both an assertion of the power of Rome among the peoples
dwelling about the mouths of the Meuse and Rhine, and also the re-
establishment of the regular transport of corn from Britain. During the
campaign on the Main, Severus had been sent north to reconnoitre; the
Franks now occupied a position of virtual independence in the district
south of the Meuse, and in the absence of Roman garrisons and with the
Caesar fully occupied by the operations against the Alemanni a troop of
600 Frankish warriors were devastating the country-side. They retired
before Severus and occupied two deserted fortresses. Here for 54 days
in December 357 and January 358 they were besieged by Julian who
had marched north to support the magister equitum. Hunger compelled
them at last to yield, for the relief sent by their fellow-tribesmen arrived
too late. Julian spent the winter in Paris, and in early summer ad-
vanced with great speed and secrecy, surprised the Franks in Toxandria
and forced them to acknowledge Roman supremacy. Further north the
Chamavi had been driven by the pressure of the Saxons in their rear to
cross the Rhine and to take possession of the country between that river
and the Meuse. The co-operation of Severus enabled Julian to force
them to submission, and it would appear that in consequence they re-
tired to their former homes on the Yssel. The lower Rhine was now
once more in Roman hands; the generalship of Julian had achieved what
the praefect Florentius had deemed that Roman gold could alone secure,
and the building of a fleet of 400 sea-going vessels was at once begun.
The lower Rhine
secured, Julian forthwith (July-August) returned to his
unfinished task in the south. It was imperative that the ravaged pro-
vinces of Gaul should be repeopled: their desolation and the honour of
сн. п.


## p. 70 (#100) #############################################

70
Administrative Reforms
(355–360
the Empire alike demanded that the prisoners in the hands of the
barbarians should be restored. The remorseless ravaging of his land
compelled Hortarius to yield, to surrender his Roman captives and to
furnish timber for the rebuilding of the Roman towns. The winter past,
Julian once more left Paris and with his new feet brought the corn of
Britain to the garrisons of the Rhine. Seven fortresses, from Castra
Herculis in the land of the Batavi to Bingen in the south, were recon-
structed, and then in a last campaign against the most southerly tribes
of the Alemanni, thosė chieftains who had taken a leading part in the
battle of Strassburg were forced to tender their submission. It was no
easy matter to secure the release of the Roman prisoners, but Julian
could claim to have restored 20,000 of these unfortunates to their homes.
The Caesar's work was done : Gaul was once more in peace and the
Rhine the frontier of the Empire.
When we turn to Julian's action in the civil affairs of the West, our
information is all too scanty. It is clear that he approached his task
with the passionate conviction that at all costs he would relieve the lot
of the oppressed provincials. He took part in person in the administra-
tion of justice and himself revised the judgments of provincial governors;
he refused to grant “indulgences” whereby arrears of taxation were
remitted, for he well knew that these imperial acts of grace benefited
the rich alone, for wealth when first the tribute was assessed could
purchase the privilege of delay and thus in the end enjoy the relief of
the general rebate. He resolutely opposed all extraordinary burdens,
and when Florentius persistently urged him to sign a paper imposing
additional taxation for war purposes he threw the document indignantly
to the ground and all the remonstrances of the praefect were without avail.
In Belgica the Caesar's own representatives collected the tribute and the
inhabitants were saved from the exactions alike of the agents of the praefect
and of the governor. So successful was his administration that where
previously for the land-tax alone twenty-five aurei had been exacted
seven aurei only were now demanded by the State. But reform was slow
and in Julian's character there was a strain of restless impatience: he
was intolerant of delays and of the irrational obstacles that barred the
highway of progress ; it galled him that he could not appoint as officials
and subordinates men after his own heart. Admitted that Constantius
sent him capable civil servants, yet these men who were to be the agents of
reform were themselves members of the corrupt bureaucracy which was
ruining the provinces. Indeed, might these nominees of his cousin be
withstood ? The undefined limits of his office might always render it
an open question whether the assertion of the Caesar's right were not
aggression upon imperial privilege. Julian's conscious power and burn-
ing enthusiasm felt the cruel curb of his subordination. Constantius
wished loyally to support his young relative, had given him the supreme
command in Gaul after the first trial year and was determined that he


## p. 71 (#101) #############################################

355–359]
Constantius on the Danube
71
should be supported by experienced generals, but Julian was far distant
and his enemies at Court had the Emperor's ear; for them his successes
and virtues but rendered him the more dangerous ; the eunuch gang,
says Ammianus, only worked the harder at the smithies where calumnies
were forged. At times they mocked the Caesar's vanity and decried his
conquests, at others they played upon the suspicions of Constantius:
Julian was victor to-day, why not another Victorinus—an upstart
Emperor of Gaul-to-morrow. Imperial messengers to the West were
careful to bring back ominous reports, and Julian, who knew how matters
stood and was not ignorant of his cousin's failings, may well have feared
the overmastering influence of the Emperor's advisers. Thus constantly
checked in his plans of reform alike religious and political, already, it
may be, hailed as Augustus by his soldiery and dreading the machinations
of courtiers, he began, at first perhaps in spite of himself, to long for
greater independence; in 359 he was dreaming of the time when he
should be no longer Caesar. The war in the East gave him his opportunity.
While Julian had been recovering Gaul, Constantius had been engaged
in a series of campaigns on the Danube frontier, and for this purpose
had removed his court from Milan to Sirmium. An unimportant
expedition against the Suevi in Rhaetia in 357 was followed in 358 by
lengthy operations in the plains about the Danube and the Theiss
against the Quadi and various Sarmatian tribes who had burst plundering
across the border. The barbarian territory was ravaged, and through
the Emperor's successful diplomacy one people after another submitted
and surrendered their prisoners. They were in most cases left in
possession of their lands under the supremacy of Rome, but the Limi-
gantes were forced to settle on the left instead of the right bank of
the Theiss, while the Sarmatae Liberi were given a king by Constantius
in the person of their native prince Zizais, and were themselves restored
to the district which the Limigantes had been compelled to leave. The
latter however in the following year (359), discontented with their new
homes, craved that they might be allowed to cross the Danube and settle
within the Empire. This Constantius was persuaded to permit, hoping,
thus to gain recruits for the Roman army and thereby to lighten the
burdens of the provincials. The Limigantes, once admitted upon Roman
territory, sought to avenge themselves for the losses of the previous year
by a treacherous onslaught upon the Emperor. Constantius escaped
and a general massacre of the faithless barbarians ensued. The pacifica-
tion of the northern frontier was now complete.
Meanwhile in the East hostilities with Persia had ceased on any large
scale since 351, and in 356–7 the praefect Musonianus had been carrying
on negotiations for peace (through Cassianus, military commander in
Mesopotamia) with Tampsapor a neighbouring satrap. But the moment
was inopportune. Sapor himself had at length effected an alliance with
the Chionitae and Gelani and now (spring 358) in a letter to the Emperor
CH. III.


## p. 72 (#102) #############################################

72
The Siege of Amida
(359–360
:
demanded the restoration of Mesopotamia and Armenia ; in case of
refusal he threatened military action in the following year. Constantius
proudly rejected the shameful proposal, but sent two successive embassies
to Persia in the hope of concluding an honourable peace. The effort
was fruitless. Court intrigue deprived Ursicinus, Rome's one really
capable general in the East, of the supreme command, and in spite of the
prayers of the provincials he was succeeded by Sabinianus, who in his
obscure old age was distinguished only by his wealth, inefficiency and
credulous piety. During the entire course of the war inactivity was the
one prominent feature of his generalship. On the outbreak of hostilities
in 359 the Persians adopted a new plan of campaign. A rich Syrian,
Antoninus by name, who had served on the staff of the general
commanding in Mesopotamia, was threatened by powerful enemies with
ruin. Having compiled from official sources full information alike as to
Rome's available ammunition and stores and the number of her troops he
fled with his family to the court of Sapor; here, welcomed and trusted,
he counselled immediate action : men had been withdrawn from the
East for the campaigns on the Danube, let the King no longer be con-
tent with frontier forays, let him without warning strike for the rich
province of Syria unravaged since the days of Gallienus! The deserter's
advice was adopted by the Persians. On the advance of their army,
however, the Romans, withdrawing from Charrae and the open country-side,
burned down all vegetation over the whole of northern Mesopotamia.
This devastation and the swollen stream of the Euphrates forced the
Persians to strike northward through Sophene; Sapor crossed the river
higher in its course and marched towards Amida. The city refused
to surrender, and the death of the son of Grumbates, king of the
Chionitae, provoked Sapor to abandon his attack on Syria and to press
the siege. Six legions formed the standing garrison, a force which
probably numbered some 6000 men in all. But at the time of
the Persian advance the country-folk had all assembled for the yearly
market, and when the peasantry fled for refuge within the city walls
Amida was densely overcrowded. None however dreamed of surrender ;
Ammianus, one of the besieged, has left us a vivid account of those heroic
seventy-three days. In the end the city fell (6 Oct. ) and its inhabitants
were either slain or carried into captivity. Winter was now approaching
and Sapor was forced to return to Persia with the loss of 30,000 men.
The sacrifice of Amida had saved the eastern provinces of the Roman
Empire, but the fall of the city also convinced Constantius that more
troops were needed if Rome was to withstand the enemy. Accordingly
the Emperor sent by the tribune Decentius his momentous order that
the auxiliary troops, the Aeruli Batavi Celtae and Petulantes, should
leave Gaul forthwith, and with them 300 men from each of the remaining
Gallic regiments. The demand reached Julian in Paris where he was
spending the winter (January ? 360); for him the serious feature of the


## p. 73 (#103) #############################################

360]
“ Julianus Augustus”
73
despatch was that the execution of the Emperor's command was entrusted
to Lupicinus and Gintonius', while Julian himself was ignored. The
transference of the troops was probably an imperial necessity, but this
could not justify the form of the Emperor's despatch. The unrelenting
malice of the courtiers had carried the day; Constantius seems to have
lost confidence in his Caesar. At first Julian thought to lay down his
office; then he temporised : he professed that obedience to the Emperor
would imperil the safety of the province, he raised the objection that the
barbarians had enlisted on the understanding that they should never be
called upon to serve beyond the Alps, Lupicinus was in Britain fighting
the Picts and Scots, while Florentius, to whose influence rumour ascribed the
Emperor's action, was absent in Vienne. Julian summoned him to Paris
to give his advice, but the praefect pleaded the urgency of the supervision
of the corn supply and remained where he was. While Julian played
a waiting game, a timely broadsheet was found in the camp of the
Celtae and Petulantes. The anonymous author complained that the
soldiers were being dragged none knew whither, leaving their families to
be captured by the Alemanni. The partisans of Constantius saw the
danger; should Julian still delay, they insisted, he would but justify the
Emperor's suspicions. His hand was forced; he wrote a letter to
Constantius, ordered the soldiers to leave their winter quarters and gave
permission for their families to accompany them ; Sintula, the Caesar's
tribune of the stable, at once set out for the East with a picked body
of Gentiles and Scutarii. Unwisely, as events proved, the court party
demanded that the troops should march through Paris : there, they
thought, any disaffection could be repressed. Julian met the men outside
the city and spoke them fair, their officers he invited to a banquet in the
evening. But when the guests had returned to their quarters, there
suddenly arose in the camp a passionate shout, and crowding tumultu-
ously to the palace the soldiers surrounded its walls, raising the fateful
acclamation,“Julianus Augustus. ” Without, the army clamoured, within
his room its leader wrestled with the gods until the dawn, and with the
break of a new day he was assured of Heaven's blessing. When he
came forth to face his men he might attempt to dissuade them, but he
knew that he would bow to their will. Raised upon a shield and
crowned with a standard bearer's torque, the Caesar returned to his
palace an Emperor. But now that the irrevocable step was taken, his
resolution seemed to have failed him and he remained in retirement-
perhaps for some days. The adherents of Constantius took heart and
a group of conspirators plotted against Julian's life. But the secret was
not kept, and the soldiers once more encircled the palace and would not
be contented until they had seen their Emperor alive and well. From
this moment Julian stifled his scruples and accepted accomplished fact.
After the flight of Decentius and Florentius he despatched Eutherius
i Or Sintula. Amm, xx. 4. 3.
сн. п.


## p. 74 (#104) #############################################

74
Julian and Constantius
[ 360–361
!
and his magister officiorum Pentadius as ambassadors to Constantius,
while in his letter he proposed the terms which he was prepared to make
the basis of a compromise. He would send to the East troops raised
from the dediticii and the Germans settled on the left bank of the
Rhine—to withdraw the Gallic troops would be, he professed, to
endanger the safety of the province—while Constantius should allow
him to appoint his own officials, both military and civil, save only that
the nomination of the praetorian praefect should rest with the elder
Augustus, whose superior authority Julian avowed himself willing to
acknowledge. When the news from Paris reached Caesarea, Constantius
hesitated : should he march forthwith against his rebellious Caesar and
desert the East while the Persians were threatening to renew the attack
of the previous year, or should he subordinate his personal quarrel to the
interests of the State ? Loyalty to his conception of an Emperor's duty
carried the day and he advanced to Edessa. The fact that the Persians
in this year were able to recover Singara, once more fallen into Roman
hands, and to capture and garrison Bezabdê, a fortress on the Tigris in
Zabdicene, while the Emperor remained perforce inactive, serves to show
how very earnest was his need of troops. Even the attempt to recover
Bezabdê in the autumn was unsuccessful. Meanwhile Constantius,
ignoring Julian's proposals, made several nominations to high officers in
the West, and despatched Leonas to bid the rebel lay aside the purple
with which a turbulent soldiery had invested him. The letter, when
.
read to the troops, served but to inflame their enthusiasm for their general,
and Leonas fled for his life. But Julian still hoped that an under-
standing between himself and Constantius was even now not impossible.
To save his army from inaction he led them-not towards the East, but
against the Attuarian Franks on the lower Rhine. The barbarians,
unwarned of the Roman approach, were easily defeated and peace was
granted on their submission. The campaign lasted three months, and
thence by Basel and Besançon Julian returned to winter at Vienne, for
Paris, his beloved Lutetia, lay at too great a distance from Asia.
Letters were still passing between himself and Constantius, but his task
lay clear before him: he must be forearmed alike for aggression and
defence. By a display of power he sought to wrest from his cousin
recognition and acknowledgment, while, with his troops about him, he
could at least sustain his cause and escape the shame of his brother's
fate. Recruits from the barbarian tribes swelled his forces, and large
sums of money were raised for the coming campaign. In the spring of
361 Julian by the treacherous capture and banishment of Vadomar
removed all fears of an invasion by the Alemanni, and about the month
of July set out from Basel for the East. By this step he took the
aggressive and himself finally broke off the negotiations; this was avowed
by his appointment of a praefect of Gaul in place of Nebridius, the
nominee of Constantiųs, who had refused to take the oath of allegiance
2


## p. 75 (#105) #############################################

361]
Julian marches against Constantius
75
to Julian. Germanianus temporarily performed the praefect's duties,
but retired in favour of Sallust, while Nevitta was created magister
armorum and Jovius quaestor.
As soon as he was freed from the Persian War, Constantius had
thought to hunt down his usurping Caesar and capture his prey while
Julian was still in Gaul; he had set guards about the frontiers and had
stored corn on the Lake of Constance and in the neighbourhood of the
Cottian Alps. Julian determined that he would not wait to be surrounded,
but would strike the first blow, while the greater part of the army of
Illyricum was still in Asia. He argued that present daring might
deliver Sirmium into his hands, that thereupon he could seize the
Pass of Succi, and thus be master of the road to the West. Jovius
and Jovinus were ordered to advance at full speed through North
Italy, in command, it would appear, of a squadron of cavalry. They
would thus surprise the inhabitants into submission, while fear of the
main army, which would follow more slowly, might overawe opposition.
Nevitta he commanded to make his way through Rhaetia Mediterranea,
while he himself left Basel with but a small escort and struck direct
through the Black Forest for the Danube. Here he seized the vessels
of the river fleet and at once embarked his men. Without rest or
intermission Julian continued the voyage down the river and reached
Bononia on the eleventh day. Under the cover of night, Dagalaiphus
with some picked followers was despatched to Sirmium. At dawn his
troop was demanding admission in the Emperor's name ; only when too
late was the discovery made that the Emperor was not Constantius.
The general Lucilianus, who had already begun the leisurely concentra-
tion of his men for an advance into Gaul, was rudely aroused from sleep
and hurried away to Bononia. The gates of Sirmium, the northern
capital of the Empire, were opened and the inhabitants poured forth
to greet the victor of Strassburg. Two days only did Julian spend in
the city, then marched to Succi, left Nevitta to guard the pass and retired
to Naissus, where he spent the winter awaiting the arrival of his army.
Julian's march from Gaul meant the final breach with Constantius; his
present task was to justify his usurpation to the world. Thus the
imperial pamphleteer was born. One apologia followed another, now
addressed to the senate, now to Athens as representing the historic
centre of Hellenism, now to some city whose allegiance Julian sought
to win. But he overshot the mark; the painting of the character of
Constantius men felt to be a caricature and the scandalous portraiture
unworthy of one who owed his advancement to his cousin's favours.
Meanwhile Julian strained every nerve to raise more troops for the
coming campaign. He was not yet strong enough to advance into
Thrace to meet the forces under Count Martianus, and the news from
the West forced him to realise how critical his position might become.
1 Now Kapulu-Derbend : Bulgarian, Trajanova Vrata.
CH. III,


## p. 76 (#106) #############################################

76
Death and Character of Constantius
[361
Two legions and a cohort stationed in Sirmium he did not dare to
trust and so gave the command that they should march to Gaul to
take the place of those regiments which formed part of his own army.
On the long journey the men's discontent grew to mutiny: refusing to
advance, they occupied Aquileia and were supported by the inhabitants
who had remained at heart loyal to Constantius. The danger was very
real; the insurgents might form a nucleus of disaffection in Italy and
thus imperil Julian's retreat. He gave immediate orders to Jovinus to
return and to employ in the siege of Aquileia the whole of the main
force now advancing through Italy.
In the East Constantius had marched to Edessa (spring 361), where
he awaited information as to the plans of Sapor. It was only on the
news of Julian's capture of the pass of Succi that he felt that the war in
the West could be no longer postponed. At the same time Constantius
learned of Sapor’s retreat, since the auspices forbade the passage of
the Tigris. The Roman army assembled at Hierapolis greeted the
Emperor's harangue with enthusiasm, Arbitio was despatched in advance
to bar Julian's progress through Thrace, and when Constantius had
made provision in Antioch for the government of the East he started
in person against the usurper. Fever however attacked him in Tarsus
and his illness was rendered still more serious by the violent storms of
late autumn. At Mopsucrenae, in Cilicia, he died on 3 November 361 at
the age of 44. Ammianus Marcellinus has given us a definitive sketch
of the character of Constantius. His faults are clear as day. To guard
the Emperor from treason, Diocletian had made the throne unapproach-
able, but this severance of sovereign and people drove the ruler back on
the narrow circle of his ministers.
They were at once his informants and
his advisers : their lord learned only that which they deemed it well for
him to know. The Emperor was led by his favourites ; Constantius
possessed considerable influence, writes Ammianus in bitter irony, with his
eunuch chamberlain Eusebius. The insinuations of courtiers ultimately
sowed mistrust between his Caesar Julian and himself. They played
upon the suspicious nature of the Emperor, their whispers of treason
fired him to senseless ferocity, and the services of brave men were lost
to the Empire lest their popularity should endanger the monarch's peace.
Even loyal subjects grew to doubt whether the Emperor's safety were
worth its fearful price. To maintain the extravagant pomp of his
rapacious ministers and followers, the provinces laboured under an over-
whelming weight of taxes and impositions which were exacted with
merciless severity, while the public post was ruined by the constant
journeyings of bishops from one council to another. Yet though these
dark features of the reign of Constantius are undeniable, below his
inhuman repression of those who had fallen under the suspicion of
treason lay a deep conviction of the solemnity of the trust which had
been handed down to him from father and grandfather. For Constantius


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361]
Julian the Apostate
77
а
the consciousness that he was representative by the grace of Heaven of
hereditary dynasty carried with it its obligation, and the task of main-
taining the greatness of Rome was subtly confused with the duty of
self-preservation, since a usurper's reign would never be hallowed by the
seal of a legitimate succession. With a sense of this responsibility
Constantius always sought to appoint only tried men to important
offices in the State, he consistently exalted the civil element at the
expense of the military and rigidly maintained the separation between
the two services which had been one of the leading principles of
Diocletian's reforms. Sober and temperate, he possessed that power of
.
physical endurance which was shared by so many of his house. In his
early years he served as lieutenant to his father alike in East and West
and gained a wide experience of men and cities. Now on this frontier,
now on that, he was constantly engaged in the Empire's defence; a
soldier by necessity and no born general, he was twice hailed by his men
with the title of Sarmaticus, and in the usurpations of Magnentius and of
Julian he refused to hazard the safety of the provinces and loyally
sacrificed all personal interests in face of the higher claims of his duty
to the Roman world. He was naturally cold and self-contained; he fails
to awake our affection or our enthusiasm, but we can hardly withhold
our tribute of respect. He bore his burden of Empire with high serious-
ness; men were conscious in his presence of an overmastering dignity
and of a majesty which inspired them with something akin to awe.
By the death of Constantius the Empire was happily freed from the
horrors of another civil war: Julian was clearly marked out to be his
cousin's successor, and the decision of the army did not admit of doubt;
Eusebius and the Court party were forced to abandon any idea of
putting forward another claimant to the throne. Two officers,
Theolai fus and Aligildus, bore the news to Julian; fortune had inter-
vened to favour his rash adventure, and he at once advanced through
Thrace by Philippopolis to Constantinople. Agilo was despatched to
Aquileia and at length the besieged were convinced of the Emperor's
death and thereupon their stubborn resistance came to an end. Nigrinus,
the ringleader, and two others were put to death, but soldiers and
citizens were fully pardoned. When on 11 December 361 Julian, still
but 31 years old, entered as sole Emperor his eastern capital, all eyes
were turned in wondering amazement on the youthful hero, and for the
rest of his life upon him alone was fixed the gaze of Roman historians ;
wherever Julian is not, there we are left in darkness, of the West for
example we know next to nothing. The history of Julian's reign
becomes perforce the biography of the Emperor. In that biography
three elements are all-important: Julian's passionate determination to
restore the pagan worship; his earnest desire that men should see a new
Marcus Aurelius upon the throne, and that abuses and maladministration
should hide their heads ashamed before an Emperor who was also a
а
C
CH. III.


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78
Reform
( 361-362
philosopher; and, in the last place, his tragic ambition to emulate the
achievements of Alexander the Great and by a crushing blow to assert
over Persia the pre-eminence of Rome.
Innumerable have been the explanations which men have offered for
the apostasy of Julian. They have pointed to his Arian teachers, have
suggested that Christianity was hateful to him as the religion of
Constantius whom he regarded as his father's murderer, while rationalists
have paradoxically claimed that the Emperor's reason refused to accept
the miraculous origin and the subtle theologies of the faith. It would be
truer to say that Christianity was not miraculous enough—was too
rational for the mystic and enthusiast. The religion which had as its
central object of adoration the cult of a dead man was to him human,
all too human: his vague longings after some vast imaginative conception
of the universe felt themselves cabined and confined in the creeds of
Christianity. With a Roman's pride and a Roman's loyalty to the past
as he conceived it, the upstart faith of despised Galilaean peasants
aroused at one moment his scorn, at another his pity: a Greek by
education and literary sympathies, the Christian Bible was but a faint
and distorted reflex of the masterpieces which had comforted his
solitary youth: a mystic who felt the wonder of the expanse of the
heavens, with a strain in his nature to which the ritual excesses of the
Orient appealed with irresistible fascination, it was easy for him to adopt
the speculations of Neoplatonism and to fall a victim to the thaumaturgy
of Maximus. The causes of Julian's apostasy lie deep-rooted in the
apostate's inmost being.
His first acts declared his policy: he ordered the temples to be
opened and the public sacrifices to be revived; but the Christians were
to be free to worship, for Julian had learned the lesson of the failure of
previous persecutions, and by imperial order all the Catholic bishops
banished under Constantius were permitted to return. Those privileges,
however, which the State had granted to the churches were now to be
withdrawn : lands and temples which had belonged to the older religion
were to be surrendered to their owners, the Christian clergy were no longer
to claim exemption from the common liability to taxation or from duties
owed to the municipal senates. With Julian's accession Christianity
had ceased to be the favoured religion, and it was therefore contended
that reason demanded alike restitution and equality before the law.
Meanwhile a Court was sitting at Chalcedon to try the partisans of
Constantius. Its nominal president was Sallust (probably Julian's friend
when in Gaul), but the commission was in reality controlled by Arbitio,
an unprincipled creature of Constantius. Julian may perhaps have
intended to show impartiality by such a choice, but as a result justice
was travestied, and though public opinion approved of the deaths of
Paul the notary and of Apodemius, who were principally responsible for
the excesses committed in the treason trials of the late reign, and may
а


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362–363]
Julian at Antioch
79
have welcomed the fate of the all-powerful chamberlain Eusebius, men
were horror-struck at the execution of Ursulus, who as treasurer in Gaul
had loyally supported Julian when Caesar; his unpopularity with the
troops was indeed his only crime, and the Emperor did not mend his
error by raising the weak plea that he had been kept in ignorance of the
sentence. Julian's next step was the summary dismissal of the horde of
minor officials of the palace who had served to make the Court circle
under Constantius a very hot-bed of vice and corruption. The purge
was sudden and indiscriminate; it was the act of a young man in
a hurry. The feverish ardour of the Emperor's reforming energy swept
before it alike the innocent and the guilty. Such impatience appeared
unworthy of a philosopher, and so far from awaking gratitude in his
subjects served rather to arouse discontent and alarm.
But already Julian was burning to undertake his great expedition
against Persia, and refused to listen to counsellors who suggested the
folly of aggression now that Sapor was no longer pressing the attack.
The Emperor's preparations could best be made in Antioch and here he
arrived probably in late July 363. On the way he had made a détour
to visit Pessinus and Ancyra ; the lukewarm devotion of Galatia had
discouraged him, but in Antioch where lay the sanctuary of Daphne he
looked for earnest support in his crusade for the moral regeneration of
Paganism. The Crown of the East (as Ammianus styles his native city)
welcomed the Emperor with open arms, but the enthusiasm was short-
lived. The populace gay, factious, pleasure-loving, looked for spectacles
and the pomp of a Court; Julian's heart was set on a civil and religious
reformation. He longed for amendment in law and administration,
above all for a remodelling of the old cult and the winning of converts
to the cause of the gods. He himself was to be the head of the new
state church of Paganism ; the hierarchy of the Christians was to be
adopted—the country priests subordinated to the high priest of the
province, the high priest to be responsible to the Emperor, the pontifex
maximus. A new spirit was to inspire the Pagan clergy; the priest
himself was to be no longer a mere performer of public rites, let him
take up the work of preacher, expound the deeper sense which underlay
the old mythology and be at once shepherd of souls and an ensample to
his flock in holy living. What Maximin Daza had attempted to achieve
in ruder fashion by forged acts of Pilate, Julian's writings against the
Galilaeans should effect : as Maximin had bidden cities ask what they
would of his royal bounty, did they but petition that the Christians
might be removed from their midst, so Julian was ready to assist and
favour towns which were loyal to the old faith. Maximin had created
a new priesthood recruited from men who had won distinction in
public careers: his dream had been to fashion an organisation which
might successfully withstand the Christian clergy; here too Julian was
his disciple. When pest and famine had desolated the Roman East in
a
CH. 111.


## p. 80 (#110) #############################################

80
Julian and the Christians
[363
Maximin's days, the helpfulness and liberality of Christians towards the
starving and the plague-stricken had forced men to confess that true
piety and religion had made their home with the persecuted heretics:
it was Julian's will that Paganism should boast its public charity and
that an all-embracing service of humanity should be reasserted as a
vital part of the ancient creed. If only the worshippers of the gods of
Hellas were once quickened with a spiritual enthusiasm, the lost ground
would be recovered. It was indeed to this call that Paganism could not
respond. There were men who clung to the old belief, but theirs
was no longer a victorious faith, for the fire had died upon the altar.
Resignation to Christian intolerance was bitter, but the passion which
inspires martyrs was nowhere to be found. Julian made converts—the
Christian writers mournfully testify to their numbers—but he made them
by imperial gold, by promises of advancement or fear of dismissal. They
were not the stuff of which missionaries could be fashioned. The citizens
were disappointed of their pageants, while the royal enthusiast found his
hopes to be illusions. Mutual embitterment was the natural result.
Julian was never a persecutor in the accepted meaning of that word:
it was the most constant complaint of the Christians that the Emperor
denied them the glory of martyrdom, but pagan mobs knew that the
Emperor would not be quick to punish violence inflicted on the
Galilaeans: when the Alexandrians brutally murdered their tyrannous
bishop, George of Cappadocia, they escaped with an admonition ; when
Julian wrote to his subjects of Bostra, it was to suggest that their bishop
might be hunted from the town. If Pessinus was to receive a boon from
the Emperor, his counsel was that all her inhabitants should become
worshippers of the Great Mother ; if Nisibis needed protection from
Persia, it would only be granted on condition that she changed her faith.
In the schools throughout the Empire Christians were expounding the
works of the great Greek masters; from their earliest years children were
taught to scorn the legends which to Julian were rich with spiritual
meaning. He that would teach the scriptures must believe in them,
and given the Emperor's zealous faith, it was but reasonable that he
should prohibit Christians from teaching the classic literature which
was his Bible. If Ammianus criticised the edict severely, it was because
he did not share the Emperor's belief; the historian was a tolerant
monotheist, Julian an ardent worshipper of the gods. The Emperor's
conservatism and love of sacrifice alike were stirred by the records of
the Jews. A people who in the midst of adversity had clung with
a passionate devotion to the adoration of the God of their fathers
deserved well at his hands. Christian renegades should see the glories
of a restored temple which might stand as an enduring monument of
his reign. The architect Alypius planned the work, but it was never
completed. The earth at this time was troubled by strange upheavals,
earthquakes and ocean waves, and by some such phenomenon Jerusalem


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11
363]
The Persian Expedition
81
would seem to have been visited'; perhaps during the excavations a well
of naphtha was ignited. We only know that Christians, who saw in
Julian's plan a defiance of prophecy, proclaimed a miracle, and that the
Emperor did not live to prove them mistaken.
Thus in Antioch the relations between the sovereign and his people
were growing woefully strained. Julian removed the bones of Saint
Babylas from the precinct of Daphne and soon after the temple was
burned to the ground. Suspicion fell upon the Christians and their
great church was closed. A scarcity of provisions made itself felt in the
city and Julian fixed a maximum price and brought corn from Hierapolis
and elsewhere, and sold it at reduced rates. It was bought up by the
merchants, and the efforts to coerce the senate failed. The populace
ridiculed an Emperor whose aims and character they did not understand.
The philosopher would not stoop to violence but the man in Julian
could not hold his peace. The Emperor descended from the awful
isolation which Diocletian had imposed on his successors; he challenged
the satirists to a duel of wits and published the Misopogon. It was to
sacrifice his vantage-ground. The chosen of Heaven had become the
jest of the mob, and Julian's pride could have drained no bitterer cup.
When he left the city for Persia, he had determined to fix his court, upon
his return, at Tarsus, and neither the entreaties of Libanius nor the tardy
repentance of Antioch availed to move him from his purpose.
.
Here but the briefest outline can be given of the oft-told tale of
Julian's Persian expedition. Before it criticism sinks powerless, for it is
a wonder-story and we cannot solve its riddle. The leader perished and
the rest is silence : with him was lost the secret of his hopes. Julian
left Antioch on 5 March 363 and on the 9th reached Hierapolis. Here
the army had been concentrated and four days later the Emperor
advanced at its head, crossed the Euphrates and passing through
Batnae halted at Charrae. The name must have awakened gloomy
memories and the Emperor's mind was troubled with premonitions of
disaster; men said that he had bidden his kinsman Procopius mount the
throne should he himself fall in the campaign. A troop of Persian
horse had just burst plundering across the frontier and returned laden
with booty; this event led Julian to disclose his plan of campaign.
Corn had been stored along the road towards the Tigris, in order to
create an impression that he had chosen that line for his advance; in
fact the Emperor had determined to follow the Euphrates and strike for
Ctesiphon. He would thus be supported by his fleet bearing supplies
and engines of war. Procopius and Sebastianus he entrusted with 30,000
troops--almost half his army-and directed them to march towards the
Tigris. They were for the present to act only on the defensive, shielding
the eastern provinces from invasion and guarding his own forces from
any Persian attack from the north. When he himself was once at grips
1 Cf. Vita Artemii Mart. AS. Boll. Tom. viii. p. 883, § 66.
6
C. MED. H. VOL. I. CH. III.


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82
Julian's march
[363
with Persia in the heart of the enemy's territory, Sapor would be forced
to concentrate his armies, and then, the presence of Julian's generals being
no longer necessary to protect Mesopotamia, should a favourable
opportunity offer, they were to act in concert with Arsaces, ravage
Chiliocomum, a fertile district of Media, and advance through Corduene
and Moxoene to join him in Assyria. That meeting never took place:
from whatever reason Procopius and Sebastianus never left Mesopotamia.
Julian reviewed the united forces—65,000 men—and then turned south
following the course of the Belias (Belecha) until he reached Callinicum
(Ar-Rakka) on 27 March.
Another day's march brought him to the Euphrates, and here he
met the fleet under the command of the tribune Constantianus and the
Count Lucillianus. Fifty warships, an equal number of boats designed
to form pontoon bridges, and a thousand transports-the Roman armada
seemed to an eyewitness fitly planned to match the magnificent stream
on which it floated. Another 98 miles brought the army to Diocletian's
bulwark fortress of Circesium (Karkisiya). Here the Aboras (Khabūr)
formed the frontier line; Julian harangued the troops, then crossed the
river by a bridge of boats and began his march through Persian territory.
In spite of omens and disregarding the gloomy auguries of the Etruscan
soothsayers, the Emperor set his face for Ctesiphon ; he would storm
high Heaven by violence and bend the gods to his will. From its
formation the invading army was made to appear a countless host, for
their marching column extended over some ten miles, while neither the
fleet nor the land forces were suffered to lose touch with each other.
Some of the enemy's forts capitulated, the inhabitants of Anatha being
transported to Chalcis in Syria, some were found deserted, while the
garrisons of others refusing to surrender professed themselves willing to
abide by the issue of the war. Julian was content to accept these terms
and continued his unresting advance. Historians have blamed this rash
confidence, whereby he endangered his own retreat. It is however to be
remembered that a siege in the fourth century might mean a delay of
many weeks, that the Emperor's project was clearly to dismay Persia
by the rapidity of his onset and that it would seem probable that his
plan of campaign had been from the first to return by the Tigris and
not by the Euphrates. The Persians had intended a year or two before
to leave walled cities untouched and strike for Syria, Julian in his turn
refused to waste precious time in investing the enemy's strongholds, but
would deal a blow against the capital itself. The march was attended
with many difficulties: a storm swept down upon the camp, the swollen
river burst its dams and many transports were sunk, the passage of the
Narraga was only forced by a successful attack on the Persian rear which
compelled them to evacuate their position in confusion, a mutinous and
discontented spirit was shown by the Roman troops and the Emperor
was forced to exert his personal influence and authority before discipline


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363]
Ctesiphon
83
was restored; finally the Persians raised all the sluices and, freeing the
waters, turned the country which lay before the army into a widespread
marsh. Difficulties however vanished before the resource and prompti-
tude of the Emperor, and the advance guard under Victor brought him
news that the country up to the walls of Ctesiphon was clear of the
enemy. On the fall of the strong fortress of Maiozamalcha, the fleet
followed the Naharmalcha (the great canal which united Euphrates and
Tigris), while the army kept pace with it on land. The Naharmalcha,
however, flows into the Tigris three miles below Ctesiphon, and thus the
Emperor would have been forced to propel his ships up stream in his
attack on the capital. The difficulty was overcome by clearing the dis-
used canal of Trajan, down which the fleet emerged into the Tigris
to the north of Ctesiphon. From the triangle thus formed by the
Naharmalcha, the Tigris and the canal of Trajan Julian undertook the
capture of the left bank of the river. Protected by a palisade, the
Persians offered a stubborn resistance to the Roman night attack. The
five ships first despatched were repulsed and set on fire; on the moment
“it is the signal that our men hold the bank ” cried the Emperor, and
the whole fleet dashed to their comrades' support. Julian's inspiration
won a field of battle for the Romans. Underneath a scorching sun the
armies fought until the Persians-elephants, cavalry and foot-were
fleeing pell-mell for the shelter of the city walls; their dead numbered
some 2500. Had the pursuit been pressed, Ctesiphon might perhaps
have been won that day, but plunder and booty held the victors fast.
Should the capital be besieged or the march against Sapor begun? It
would almost seem that Julian himself wavered irresolute, while precious
days were lost. Secret proposals of peace led him to underestimate the
enemy's strength, while men, playing the part of deserters, offered to lead
him through fertile districts against the main Persian army. Should
he weary his forces and damp the spirit of his men by an arduous siege,
he might not only be cut off from the reinforcements under Procopius
and Sebastianus, but might find himself caught between two fires-Sapor's
advance and the resistance of the garrison. To conclude a peace were
unworthy of one who took Alexander for his model-better with his
victorious troops to strike a final and conclusive blow, and possibly
before the encounter effect a junction with the northern army. Crews
numerous enough to propel his fleet against the stream he could not
spare, and if he were to meet Sapor, he might be drawn too far from
the river to act in concert with his ships: they must not fall into the
enemy's hands, and therefore they must be burned. The resolution was
taken and regretted too late; twelve small boats alone were rescued
from the flames. Julian's plans miscarried, for the army of the north
remained inactive, perhaps through the mutual jealousy of its com-
manders, and Arsaces withheld his support from the foe of Sapor.
The Persians burned their fields before his advance, and the rich country-
CH, DI.
6-2


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84
Death of Julian
(363
his rear.
a
side which traitorous guides had promised became a wilderness of ash
and smoke. Orders were given for a retreat to Corduene; amidst
sweltering heat, with dwindling stores, the Romans beheld to their
dismay the cloud of dust upon the horizon which heralded Sapor's
approach. At dawn the heavy-armed troops of Persia were close at
hand and only after many engagements were beaten off with loss.
After a halt of two days at Hucumbra, where a supply of provisions
was discovered, the army advanced over country which had been de-
vastated by fire, while the troops were constantly harassed by sudden
onsets. At Maranga the Persians were once more reinforced ; two of
the king's sons arrived at the head of an elephant column and squadrons
of mailed cavalry. Julian drew up his forces in semicircular forma-
tion to meet the new danger; a rapid charge disconcerted the Persian
archers, and in the hand-to-hand struggle which followed the enemy
suffered severely. Lack of provisions, however, tortured the Roman army
during the three days' truce which ensued. When the march was resumed,
Julian learned of an attack
upon
Unarmed he galloped to the
threatened point, but was recalled to the defence of the van-guard. At
the same time the elephants and cavalry had burst upon the centre, but
were already in fight when a horseman's spear grazed the Emperor's arm
and pierced his ribs. None knew whence the weapon came, though rumour
ran that a Christian fanatic had assassinated his general, while others said
that a tribesman of the Taieni had dealt the fatal blow. In vain Julian
essayed to return to the field of battle; his soldiers magnificently avenged
their Emperor, but he could not share their victory. Within his tent he
calmly reviewed the past and uncomplaining yielded his life into the keep-
ing of the eternal Godhead. “In medio cursu florentium gloriarum hunc
merui clarum e mundo digressum. " Death in mercy claimed Julian. The
impatient reformer and champion of a creed outworn might have become
the embittered persecutor. Rightly or wrongly after generations would
know him as the great apostate, but he was spared the shame of being
numbered among the tyrants. He was born out of due time and therein
lay the tragedy of his troubled existence; for long years he dared not
discover the passionate desires which lay nearest his heart, and when at
length he could give them expression, there were few or none fully to
understand or sympathize. His work died with him and soon, like a
little cloud blown by the wind, left not a trace behind.
The next day at early dawn the heads of the army and the principal
officers assembled to choose an Emperor. Partisans of Julian struggled
with followers of Constantius, the armies of the West schemed against
the nominee of the legions of the East, Christianity and Paganism each
sought its own champion. All were however prepared to sink their
differences in favour of Sallust, but when he pleaded ill-health and
advanced age, a small but tumultuous faction carried the election of
Jovian, the captain of the imperial guard. Down the long line of troops


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363]
The Shameful Peace
85
of peace.
ran the Emperor's name, and some thought from the sound half-heard
that Julian was restored to them. They were undeceived at the sight
of the meagre purple robe which hardly served to cover the vast height
and bent shoulders of their new ruler. Chosen as a whole-hearted
adherent of Christianity, Jovian was by nature genial and jocular, a
gourmand and lover of wine and women-a man of kindly disposition
and very moderate education. The army by its choice had foredoomed
itself to dishonour; its excuse, pleads Ammianus, lay in the extreme urgency
of the crisis. The Persians, learning of Julian's death and of the
incapacity of his successor, pressed hard upon the retreating Romans ;
charges of the enemy's elephants broke the ranks of the legionaries while
on the march, and when the army halted their entrenched camp was
constantly attacked. Saracen horsemen took their revenge for Julian's
refusal to give them their customary pay by joining in these unceasing
assaults. By way of Sumere, Charcha and Dara the army retired, and
then for four whole days the enemy harassed the rear-guard, always
declining an engagement when the Romans turned at bay. The troops
clamoured to be allowed to cross the Tigris : on the further bank they
would find provisions and fewer foes, but the generals feared the dangers
of the swollen stream. Another two days passed-days of gnawing
hunger and scorching heat. At last Sapor sent Surenas with proposals
The king knew that Roman forces still remained in
Mesopotamia and that new regiments could easily be raised in the
Eastern provinces: desperate men will sell their lives dearly and diplomacy
might win a less costly victory than the sword. Four days the
negotiations continued, and then when suspense had become intolerable
the Thirty Years' Peace was signed. All but one of the five satrapies
which Rome under Diocletian had wrested from Persia were to be
restored, Nisibis and Singara were to be surrendered, while the Romans
were no longer to interfere in the internal affairs of Armenia. “We
ought to have fought ten times over” cries the soldier Ammian “rather
than to have granted such terms as these ! ” But Jovian desired (by what
means it mattered not) to retain a force which should secure him
against rivals—Was not Procopius who, men said, had been marked out
by Julian as his successor, at the head of an army in Mesopotamia ?
Thus the shameful bargain was struck, and the miserable retreat
continued. To the horrible privations of the march were added Persian
treachery and the bitter hostility of the Saracen tribesmen. At
Thilsaphata the troops under Sebastianus and Procopius joined the army,
and at length Nisibis was reached, the fortress which had been Rome's
bulwark in the East since the days of Mithridates. The citizens prayed
with tears that they might be allowed single-handed to defend the
walls against the might of Persia ; but Jovian was too good a Christian
to break his faith with Sapor, and Bineses, a Persian noble, occupied the
city in the name of his master. Procopius, who had been content to
CH. III.


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86
Jovian's Edict of Toleration
[ 364
.
acknowledge Jovian, now bore the corpse of Julian to Tarsus for burial,
and then, his mission accomplished, prudently disappeared. The army
in Gaul accepted the choice of their eastern comrades, but Jovian's
success was short-lived. In the depth of winter he hurried from Antioch
towards Constantinople and with his infant son, Varronianus, assumed the
consulship at Ancyra.