Are you in this
nobleDispositionofMindsobecomingaMan
ofyour Birthj.
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
buttheImage,'tisinthisdivineSoulweoughtto^ "f behold our selves, and to contemplate the whole c<<<w*ww Deity in it, that is to lay God, and Wisdom ; ii'ourftivts we would know our selves perfectly. mil.
Alcib. This seems very probable.
Socrat. To know one'sselfisWildom ,aswe have both agreed.
Alab. 'Tistrue.
Socrat. While we don't know our selves, nor are wise wich this Wisdom ? , we can't know either our
Goods or our Evils \ for it is not possible that he who knows noc Akibiades, should know that what belongs co Alcihioies, does indeed appertain to him.
Alcib. 'Tis impossible.
Socrat. 'Tis only by knowing our selves that we
come to know that that which belongs to us does in
deedappertaintous. Andifwe knownotwhatbe l o n g s t o u s ? , n e i t h e r s h a l l w e k n o w w h a t h a s r e s e n t
ence to the things that belong to us,
Alcib. I conless. it.
Socrat. We thereforejustnowdidilltoagree,
that there are some Persons, who tho' they don't know themselves, yet know that which belongs to them, withoutknowingthethingsthatappertainto thatwhichbelongstothem. ForthesethreeKnow ledges ; to know one's self, to know that which be longstoone; andtoknowthethingsthatappertain
4tothatwhichbelongstoone, arelink'dtogether, theyaretheActionof thefameMan, andtheEffect of one and the fame Art.
Alcib. 'Tis very likely.
Socrat. Now thatMan thatknowsnotthethings thatbelongtohimself neitherwillknowthosethat belong to others.
AlciB. That's evident.
Socrat. Andifheknowsnotwhatbelongstoothets, neither will he know what belongs to the City.
Alcib. That's a certainConsequence.
Socrat. Therefore such a M a n can never be a good
States
? ? ill
7ke First Alcibiades ; or,
StatesMan;nayhecan'tbesomuchasaGoodMast ertogovern aFamily;whatdo Ifay? Hecan't somuchasgovernhimself;forheknowsnotwhat he does ? , and if he knows not what he does, 'tis impossible he (hould be free from Faults.
Alc'ib. That is impossible indeed.
Socrat. And ifhe commits Faults, does he not do
ill both in private and in publick ? Ifhe does ill, is he not Miserable ? and as he is Miserable, does he not involve those that obey him in his Misfortunes ?
ThWhi Alcib. Whocandenyit>
ta'titlaf- Socrat. Then'tisnotpossiblethathewhoisnei- fy. ther Good nor Wife,, should be Happy.
Alc'ib. No certainly.
Socrat. Then all vicious Persons are Miserable. Alc'ib. I acknowledge it.
Socrat. Then aMan can'tdeliverhimselffrom his
Misery by Riches, but by Wisdom. % Alc'ib. That's certain^
theHtfpU Socrat. Sothat,MyDearAlcibiaies^Citieshave nesofcitiesnonee? eitherofWalls, orShips,orArsenals,or
mfhl" TroopsorGrandeurtomake'emhappy;theonly v<me. thingtheyneedisVertue. Andifyouwouldma
nagetheaffairsoftheCommonwealth welljou must give your Citizens Vertue.
Alcib. This is an evident Truth.
Socrat. ButcanaMan givethatwhichhehasnot? Alcib. Howshouldhe?
Socrat. Thenyououghtfirstofalltoconsiderhow toacquireVertue;andsomusteveryManwhode- firestotakecarenotonlyofhimself, andthethings thatbelongtohim;butalso-oftheCity,andthe things that belong to that.
Alcib. This,isbeyond alldoubt.
Socrat. Therefore you ought not to consider how to acquire for your selfor your City a large extent of Empire and the absolute power of doing what youplease-,butonlyhowtoacquireWisdomand Justice.
Alcib, 1 believe what you say.
Stem*
? ? *OftheNatureofMan. 21j
Socrat. Forifyouandyour. CitygovernyourselvesWe cant wisely afnd justly,:you will please God. fffl G*L
Ale. Iam well convincedofthat. \ %m \nd'*"
Socrat. And you'll govern your selves wisely and Ju'ikt. justly,i? fasIjustnow toldyou, you beholdyourifwewould s e l v e s a l w a y s i n t h e D e i t y -y i n t h a t s p l e n d i d L i g h t , c o n d u i t o u r whichaloneiscapableof givingyoutheknowledgeselv"TMfeb of the Truth. -. - ? w, ]m^\e.
Alcib. This seems very reasonable. hold out Socrat. For while you behold your selves in \\i\sftivtsitGM
Light ^ you will see your selves. $ and will fee and
know your True Goods. ? Alctb, Without doubt. ?
Socrat. AndsoyouwillalwaysdowhatisGood.
Alcib. Most certainly. ? . -? SocIfyoualwaysdowhatisgooJ,Idareanswer? ? ,.
forit,andwarrantyou,youshallbealwayshappy. thtcertain*
Alcib. Your warrant is very good in this cafe, raempenu Socrates. ? ? ; of good
Socrat. But ifyou govern your selves unjustly,Am? KS' .
andinsteadofbeholdingtheDeity, andTrueLightThesethat youlookinto thatwhichiswithoutGodandfulll"e\M,
ofDarkness,youwilldonothingbuttheWorksofn>e D a r k n e s s , a n d s u c h a s a r e f u l l o f I m p i e t y ? , a n d i t c a n ' t t h e w o r ( s o f beotherwise,becauseyouwillnotknowyourself. Darfyef).
A l c i b . I a m o f t h e s a m e m i n d . . '. M ,.
Socrat. My dearAlcibiaies^representtoyourfelf_, '",'f aPerson- that has * a. Powertodoanythinghe^'"? p pleases,andyethasnoJudgment? ,whatistobeex-absolute ' pected from him ? and what Mischief is there that Power,
willnotbefal him> Forexample, suppose asickJjyjjjj Man has power to do whatever comes intohisHead, Wisdom. 1 h a s r i o u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n P h y s i c k -, i s i n a r a g e a g a i n s t everyBody,,sothat:noPetsondaresspeaktohim or restrainhim-,twhat willbetheeventofthis? He
will without' doubt destroy his Body, and render himselfincurable. ";;? ,'"-
* WhenWisdomiswanting, absolutePoweralwaystransports Men beyond the Limits of their Duty, and induces *em to trampfc Religion and Justice under their Feet.
Akib.
? ? a Slave.
Thebaseness ? fvict-
jijc;^ Most certainly.
Stcrat. Then Vice is a vile thing, and suitable to a Slave.
H 4
The First Alcibiades ? or,
Alcib. 'Tis very true.
Socrat. Suppose some Person in a Ship, who has not the Judgment and Skill of a Pilot, should yet have the liberty to do what he thinks fit: You your selffae what must certainly befal him and those that abandon thsmfelves to his Conduct.
Alcib They must all necessarily perish.
Theruheoj Socr. it. ThecaseisthefamewithCities,Repub-
cjnesand \\q&s and allStates; ifdestitute of Vertuetheir
Statesmn'? ? . ?
certain-whin Ruine 1S certain. : ,
Venuedoes Alcib. 'Tisimpossibleitshould. beotherwise. notreignit Socrat. Consequently,mydearAlcibiades, ifyou ''*? would be happy ; your business is not to acquire a
largeextentofEmpireforyourselforyourRepub lics but to acquire Vertue.
Alcib. Very true.
'Titmore Socrat. * And before thisVertue isacquir'd, 'tis advantage- better and more advantageous, I don't lay for a
m Persons'Child,butforaMantoobeyhim,whoisthemost toobeythanVertuous, thantocommand. . 'j
command, Alcib. Iamofthefamemind.
Soc And what isbest isalso most beautiful. Alcib. Without doubt.
Socrat. That which ismost beautiful islikewise
most becoming, and suitable.
-dkib. That's beyond dispute.
Soc. 'Tis then becoming and suitable to a vicious
Avici 's
Person
oughttobe PersontobeaSlave, forthatisbestforhim.
Alcib. So it seems. :
Ti>eNobility Socrat. And Vertue is a noble thing, and suits <</Venue. onivwithafreeMan.
* AfterSocrtttshasconfoundedthePrideofAlcibiades,hegives afinishingstroketolayhimlow, inreducinghimtopronouncethis terribleSentence against himself, that he's only worthy to be a Slave, because he has oo Vertue , since 'tis Vertue alone that makes Men free.
Alcib.
? ? O f the Nature of Mati.
i 2 J
Alcib. That can't be contested. . . , , , -
Socrat. Then this Vilenefs. ought to be avoided, which only suites with Slaves.
Alcib. Most certainly, Socrates.
S o c r a t . W e l l t h e n , m y d e a r A l c i b i a d e s ? , d o y o u n o v ?
perceive in what condition you are ?
Are you in this nobleDispositionofMindsobecomingaMan ofyour Birthj. ot; : .
. Alcib. *Ah, Socrates^ Iperceivevery weli, lam in the Condition, you speak of
Socrat. But doyouknow how todeliveryourself but ofthisCondition, which I darenotname, when IspeakofaManofyourmake>
Alcib. Y&Idb. . , . . ,,
Soc. Well,howcanyoudeliveryourself? Alcib. I(halldelivermy self,itSocrates pleases. Socrat. You don't fay well, Alcibiades. Alcib. WhatshouldIsaythen? .
letusforthefutureChangePersons;you (hallper-TMth? ? M sonateme, andsyouhthatistofay,I'llnowfmakeMt*0t*
"rny Court to you, as you have hitherto" made yours tome.
Socrat: If so m y dear Alcibiades, what is repor tedoftheStOrkmaybesaidoftheloveIhavefor
* ,Tjs upon this, without doubt, that Plutarcbbys, Alcibiades struckwiththevictoriousseasonsof Socrates,waslikeaCoeki thatafteralongfight,hangs the wing and yieldshimsclfconquer'd, and that Socrates by hisingeniousDiscourses touch'd him to the
quick,audmadehimpouroutafloudofTears. ? tTMs. Passageiscorruptedinthetext. Itshouldberead,
u(xaeroffs'imijkyiyiifjm,orei{ot)i/teimtiJkyiyrffm. TO,bt purPedagogueorSchoolmaster, asyouhavebeenmint. We feeSo crates has been constantly following Alcibiades as his Sehoo'master ; tor the future Alcibiades designs to follow Socrates in his Turn: butitwillbetolearnofhimandnottoteachhim. InGreecethey had Schoolmasters for their Children , because they went to put* lick. Schools, and there were no private Masters but for Persons of thefirstQuaUty; andtheymadeuseof'embutrarely. VUeFevre. ? aA^'Tranfhtion'twasrequisiteto,putanequivalentTerm,, be* cause the W o r d Pedagogue or Schoolmaster would not have founded
Mttidi A/c$b. Wellthen,IfayifGodpleases,andIadd,>>>>>>* j
Socrat. You should say, ifGod pleases: ,
1 Q youI
? ? Vl6
IkeFirstAlcibiades, &c.
you ? , for after it has hatch'd and nourished a little W i n g e d L o v e i n y o u r B o s o m -, T h i s l i t t l e L o v e ( h a l l take his turn to cherish and nourish that in his old Age.
A l c i b . I t s h a l l i o ? , a n d I r o m t h i s d a y I ' l l a p p l y m y
selfto Righteouineis.
Seerat. Idesireyou may through thewhole course
o f your- Life, perievere in this design * but I confess Ifearitverymuch. NotthatIdistrustyourGood Temper -, but the force of the Examples that reign in this Ciry occasion these apprehensions. I tremble for fear they should be too strong for you and me too. " -; -:'? <
* The Event prov'd chat this fear oi Senates was but too well founded. ,Alcibiudts with allhis good Temper, and wi:h hisgreac Qualities,encirelyruin'dhimself, anddid-Worldoftojithiefto ttoeAthenian". Heabamlon'dhimselftoPleasures;iitimers'dhim selfin Luxury; aid made Spoil on allhands, without any respect to Honour or D e a n y : and if he did ill in seizing, he did still worseinspending, tofurnishmatterforhisIntemperance andDe
bauches. InsteadoffollowingtheRulesofJustice, hegovern'd afteralicentiousmanner, fullofDissolution,andmix'dwithTrea- chery and Deceit 5 and gave himself up to extravagant Fits of Anger, whichoccasionedgreatMischiefs. Allwhichproceeded fromhis forsakingLyctyt,andforgettingthewiseLessonsofSocrates. AlcU bladeshisDiseasebecame incureablewhen hehad jestthisPhysician. It seiz'd him like a violent Fever, overturns his Understanding, andmat)ehimasitwererunmad. FromLycetaitdrovehimto the Assembly of the Athenians ; from that Assembly it fore'd him to Sea, from the Sea to Sicily, from thence to Lacedemonia, from Lacidevmh. to the Ptrsians, from the Persians to Samos, irom Sums to Aliens, from Athens again into the Htllefpont ; arid from thence infineitbroughthimtobeconfin'd'inaTown ofPbrygia where he liv'dobscurelyin theEmbracesofadebauch^'Woman, aud
wasatlastmiserablykill'd. '. . ",',', . ,>';,'ir;';I
THE
? ? The Argument of THE
SecondALCIBIAD ES:
P i e t y h the onlyspring of our Happiness, and 'tisPrayer alone that nourishes Piety :By this we keep up a continual Correspondence with
God, representourNecessitiestohim,anddrawdown bisFavoursuponus. SothattheEssenceofReligion consistsinPrayer. ForPrayersareproperlytheSal liesofaSoulpenetratedwith:Piety, discoveringits
MiserytoGod,inordertorequejiaRemedy. But our Pajfionsfillour Minds withso. much Darkness, that we know neither our Goods, nor our Evils, but
following our own Desires every day offersuch Peti tionstoGod,aswouldbefataltous,andwouldbe come realCursesifGodshouldbarkentous. Therefore there is nothing ofso great hnportance as Prayer ; nothing that requiresso much Prudence and Attenti
on,andyetwegoaboutnothingwithsomuchTeme
rityandNegligence. Platoherevigorouslyopposes
thisAbuse;andteaches,thatifwe wouldpraywellwe
mustlearntoknow ourGoods andEvils;thattheKnow-
ledg of this is only taught by God; and consequent
lythat 'tis God alone that can dissipate the Darkness
ofourSouls,andteachustopray. Tillthenwe
can'tsafely make any Prayers of ourselves, without being exposed to great Dangers. But are zee in
themeantimetocontinuewithoutPrayer, thoweare in continual need of the Divine Affiftance ? There would be Stupidity or Pride in this kind of Inaction. Certainly it would be more eligiblefor the Soultocon tinueinsilence,thantoaskEvils(fGod, whenshe desirestoaskGood;butGodboxgivenhersomehelp und,er this Ignorance, in inspiring even during the
Q. 2 time
"7
? ? 1%8 TheArgumentoftheSecondAlcibiades*
timeofDarkness, aPrayerwhichteachesustoaban don ourselves to him, and to request of him, thathe woulddohis6wnWillinus,andnotours. Ofallthe PrayersMen arecapableofmaking,thisisthemost a-
greeabletoGod,andthisSocrateswouldhavemen con tinuallymake. When God has once enlightenedand in-
struttedus, weshallthen ask of him what we think n e c e s s a r y -, f o r f e e i n g w e s h a l l s p e a k o n l y , b y h i s S p i r i t we stall request of him that which is truly Good; whichheisalwayswillingtogrant; andwillne-der
failtogiveit,becausehetrulylovesus. Thisjs
what Socrates designs to teach in this Dialogue, which may be termed Sacred ; since it isfull of Maxims,
very worthy of Christianity itself\ and very useful
bothforPoliticksandReligion. Aswhen Socrates fays, alltheSciencesintheWorldvoithouttheKnow ledg of that which is very good, arepernicious, in stead of being useful ; when he teaches us, that God
is not to be corrupted by Bribes, and that he does not regard the Sacrifices, and Offerings of the wicked ; but the Righteousness and holiness of those that in voke him : And when he assures us, that God isfree and has asoveraign Power to hear, or reject our Supplications ; whence itfollows, that when he hears
. them^ heshewsusanAc! ofGrace, andnotofftriff
Justice. HerearemanyotherBeautieswhichmay beeasilyremarked, becausetheyverysensiblyand ob
viouslyofferthemselves. ThisDialogueisakindof Continuationoftheprecedent. Asintheformer, AlcibiadesymwV tounderstand butlittlewithrespetl to humane Affairs ; in this he appears to be very igno*
rant in divine things ;for there issogreat a Connexi
on between "em ; that those that are ignorant os the
one, are neceffarily ignorant of the other, as Socra
tesdemonstrates,whenhestews, thattoknowGod,
to know one'sself and to know what appertains to
ourselves, and what to others, is the EffeB of one
andthefameArt. Wemayobservebytheway,at we have done before ; that this Dialogue issustained
asalltherestare,byAftion. AndthisDramdtrick Air
? ? TheArgumentoftheSecondAlcibiades. 219
Air, isthatwhichanimatesit,andisoneofitsgreat estBeauties.
All that isfarther necessary to be known, is at whattimePlatosupposesittobemade. Ifwefollow his Interpreters, they make him fall into a very ridi culouslnconveniency. ForafterhehadsaidArchela
us,King^Macedonia waxkit? d,hespeaksof^Pe
ricles as of a Person yet alive, contrary to what iscertainly known, namely, thatArchelaussurvived
Pericles, andwasnotassassinated till"Twentyyears
after his Death ; and contr-ary to what Plato himself says, inhisGorgiasand Theagest Weshallfeein
the Notes what led Plato'j Interpreters into thisM i stake. Inthemeantimeitmaybemaintained,thatSo
crates held these Discourses with Alcibiades, thefirjl year of the 93 Olympiade; for Perdiccas reigned i$
years after the death of Pericles, who died the-last
yearofthe87Olympiade. Archelaus,who-kilPd Perdiccas, reignedseven years, and then was kill'd
tfc? lajiyear of the 92 Olympiade. This naturally
leadsustothetimeofthisDialogue. Theythatmake Archelaus to have reigned 16 Tears, or Perdiccas, 23,
make Archelaussurvive Alcibiades and Socrates. This Dialogue is of thefame Charafter with the- precedent, fjuxnvriKh, that is, Sotrates here makes- Alcibiades find out the Truths which he designs to, teachhim. 'TisalsoaMora/Dialogue, as. wellas,
theformer.
aj THE
? ? *}0
?
4 THE
Second ALCIBIADES, OR
Of Prayer. >>
Socrates, Alcibiades.
Socrates. A Leibiaies,areyougoingintothisTem- J~y pietofayyourPrayers?
Jttctb. Yes Socrates, that is m y design.
S p c r a t . I n d e e d y o u s e e m v e r y t h o u g h t f u l ? , I s e e
your Eyes are fix'd on the Ground like a M a n that's thinking on some very serious Matter.
Alc'tb. What should I think on, Socrates >
Socrat. Whatshouldyouthinkon? onsomevery i m p o r t a n t t h i n g , I s u p p o s e ? , f o r I b e s e e c h y o u i n t h e
Name of God, tellme, whether when we address our Prayers to-the Gods, either in publick or pri vate, do they not grant us some things, and refuse us others ? do they not hear some Persons, and re ject others ?
Ak. That's very true.
Spcrat. Don't-youthink then, thatPrayerrequires. Tmtrrt- agreat(ieai0fPrecautionandPrudence,lestbefore q"re! tfedof'we are aware we as^ the Gods great Evils, while wlfdtm"andwe think we are requesting what is good ; and lest Frudmi. theyshouldbedispos'dtograntwhatisrequestedof
'em -,as they granted OeJipus, his Petition, who pray'd that his Children might decide their Rights by theSword. This unhappy Father, who might have pray'd to the Gods to remove from him the Mischiefs that oppiels'd him, drew new Miseries on
him-
? ? Os TVLAYEQL. 2-}i
himself by his horrible Imprecations ; for his Petiti ons were heard, and this prov'd a source of terrible Calamities to his Family, the particulars of which I need not relate to you. *
Acib. ButSocrates,youtellmeofaMadMan,
canyoubelieveanyManinhisSenseswouldhave
made such kind of Prayers > Sa. IhentobemadyouthinkisOppos'dtobeing
Wile
Alcib. Most certainly. : . >;>? >' ? ,
Soerat. Don'tyouthink, thatsomeMen'are Fools,
and others Wife ? i
Alcib. Yes.
Soerat. C o m e then, let us endeavour to k n o w and
distinguish 'em well h for you agree that there are some that are foolish, others that are wife, and o-
thers that are mad.
Alcib. I do so. ? ? ? ? '>
Soc. Are notsomePeopleinhealth,andotherssick>
Alcib. That's certain.
Soerat. These are not the same Persons.
Alcib. No certainly.
Soerat. Is there a third fort, w h o are neither sick
nor in health >
Alcib. *No. Thatcan'tbe.
Soerat. For a M a n must necessarily be in health
or sick, there is no Medium.
Alcib. So I think.
Soerat. But is it the fame thing with respect to
Wisdom and Folly in your opinion ? y
Alcib. Howdoyoulay?
Soerat. I ask you if a M a n must necessarily be either foolishorwife;oristhereacertainMedi umwhichmakesonebecomeneitherawileMannor
a Fool ?
vv,ii
? ? ? ,. :. . ;. <
* If one were dispos'd to Criticize, one might fay, there isa third state which i>thatof Convalescence, in which Men have not yetrecover'dHealth,neitherareproperlytick. Butatbottom, thisisnottrue, forone whoisrecovering isnolongerunder the Power of Sickness, but is in the way of Hc>>kh. . .
Q_ J- Alcib.
? ? %^i
The Second Alcibiades ,? or,
thtpfjp-
Alcib. f-No. There'snoMedium.
Socrat. Then'One must necessarily be one or t'other. Alcib. So I think.
Socrat. Did you not just now grant that Madness
isoppositetoWisdom?
Alcib. Yes.
Socrat. And that there is no Medium, to put a
Man intosuch? Conditionastobeneitherwifenor foolish ?
Alcib.
