Indeed, in that case, I
suppose they must themselves despair.
suppose they must themselves despair.
Hamilton - 1834 - Life on Hamilton - v1
A bigotted prince, governed by a greedy
confessor, is a character on which little dependence can be
placed. "
Holland, as a government, stands in need of all its credit
for its own uses. But from the Dutch capitalists much
might be expected, though not on the faith of the United
States, by the establishment of a system such as he is about
to propose. The prospects of internal loans to govern-
ment, both from the want of confidence, and the more ad-
vantageous terms of traffic in which individual wealth could
be employed, he rates very low.
"To surmount these obstacles," he observes,"and give
individuals ability and inclination to lend, a plan might be
devised which, by incorporating their means together, and
uniting them with those of the public, will, on the founda-
tion of that incorporation and union, erect a mass of credit
that will supply the defect of moneyed capital, and answer
all the purposes of cash. A plan which will not only ad-
vance the interest of the lenders, secure the independence
of their country, and in its progress have the most benefi-
cial influence upon its future commerce, but be a source of
national strength and wealth. I mean," he says, "the in-
stitution of a national bank. This I regard, in some shape
or other, as an expedient essential to our safety and sue-
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? HAMILTON. 357
cess, unless by a happy turn of European affairs, the war
should speedily terminate, in a manner upon which it would
be unwise to reckon. There is no other that can give to
government that extensive and systematic credit, which the
defect of our revenues makes indispensably necessary to
its operations. The longer it is delayed, the more difficult
it becomes. Our affairs grow every day more relaxed and
more involved. Public credit hastens to a more irretrievable
catastrophe. The means for executing the plan are exhaust-
ed in partial and temporary efforts. The loan now making
in Massachusetts, would have gone a great way in esta-
blishing the funds on which the bank must stand.
"I am aware of all the objections that have been made to
public banks, and that they are not without enlightened and
respectable opponents. But all that has been said against
them only tends to prove, that like all other good things,
they are subject to abuse, and when abused, become per-
nicious. The precious metals, by similar arguments, may
be proved to be injurious. It is certain that the monies
of South America have had great influence in banishing
industry from Spain, and sinking it in real wealth and im-
portance. Great power, commerce, and riches, or, in other
words, great national prosperity, may, in like manner, be
denominated evils; for they lead to insolence, an inordi-
nate ambition, a vicious luxury, licentiousness of morals,
and all those vices which corrupt a government, enslave the
state, and precipitate the ruin of a nation. But no wise
statesman will reject the good, from an apprehension of the
ill. The truth is, in human affairs there is no good, pure
and unmixed. Every advantage has two sides; and wis-
dom consists in availing ourselves of the good, and guard-
ing, as much as possible, against the bad.
"The tendency of a national bank is to increase public and
private credit. The former gives power to the state, for
the protection of its rights and interests, and the latter fa-
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? 358 THE LIFE OF
cilitates and extends the operations of commerce among in
dividuals.
"Industry is increased, commodities are multiplied, agri-
culture and manufactures nourish, and herein consist the
true wealth and prosperity of a state.
"Most commercial nations have found it necessary to in-
stitute banks; and they have proved to be the happiest en-
gines that ever were invented for advancing trade. Venice,
Genoa, Hamburgh, Holland, and England, are examples of
their utility. They owe their riches, commerce, and the
figure they have made at different periods, in a great de-
gree, to this source. Great Britain is indebted for the im-
mense efforts she has been able to make in so many illus-
trious and successful wars, essentially to that vast fabric of
credit, raised on this foundation. Tis by this alone, she
now menaces our independence. She has indeed abused
the advantage, and now stands on a precipice. Her ex-
ample should both persuade and warn us. 'Tis in repub-
lics, where banks are most easily established and supported,
and where they are least liable to abuse. Our situation
will not expose us to frequent wars, and the public will
have no temptation to overstrain its credit.
"In my opinion, we ought not to hesitate, because we have
no other resource. The long and expensive wars of King
William had drained England of its specie; its commerce
began to droop for want of a proper medium; its taxes
were unproductive, and its revenues declined. The admi-
nistration wisely had recourse to the institution of a bank,
and it retrieved the national difficulties. We are in the
same, and still greater want, of a sufficient medium. We
have little specie; the paper we have is of small value, and
rapidly declining to less. We are immersed in a war for
our existence as a nation, for our liberty and happiness as
a people. We have no revenues, nor no credit. A bank,
if practicable, is the only thing that can give us either the
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? HAMILTON. 359
one or the other. Besides these great and cardinal mo-
tives to such an institution, and the advantages we should
enjoy from it in common with other nations, our situation,
relatively to Europe and to the West Indies, would give us
some peculiar advantages.
"Nothing is more common than for men to pass from the
abuse of a good thing to the disuse of it. Some persons,
disgusted by the depreciation of the money, are chimerical
enough to imagine it would be beneficial to abolish all pa-
per, and annihilate the whole of what is now in circulation,
and depend altogether upon specie, both for commerce and
finance. The scheme is altogether visionary, and in the at-
tempt would be fatal. We have not a competent stock
of specie in this country, either to answer the purpose of
circulation in trade, or to serve as a basis for revenue.
The whole amount of what we have, I am persuaded, does
not exceed six millions of dollars, one-fifth of the circulating
medium before the war. To suppose this would be suffi-
cient for the operations of commerce, would be to suppose
that our domestic and foreign commerce were both reduced
four-fifths; a supposition that carries absurdity on the face
of it. It follows, that if our paper money were destroyed,
a great part of the transactions of traffic must be carried on
by barter; a mode inconvenient, partial, confined; destruc-
tive both of commerce and industry. With the addition of
the paper we now have, this evil exists in too great a degree. "
Having shown that if all the specie could be drawn into
the treasury annually, the consequence of such a measure,
which never was effected in any country, would be a com-
plete stagnation of business; and that a recourse to taxes
in kind, would prove wholly inefficacious, he proceeds to
observe, --
"The error of those who would explode paper money
altogether, originates in not making proper distinctions.
Our paper was, in its nature, liable to depreciation, because
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? 360 THE LIFE OF
it had no funds for its support, and was not upheld by pri-
vate credit. The emissions under the resolution of March,
1780, have partly the former advantage, but are destitute
of the latter, which is equally essential. No paper credit
can be substantial or durable, which has not funds, and
which does not unite immediately the interest and influence
of the moneyed men, in its establishment and preservation.
A credit begun on this basis will, in process of time, greatly
exceed its funds; but this requires time, and a well settled
opinion in its favour. 'Tis in a national bank alone that
WE CAN FIND THE INGREDIENTS TO CONSTITUTE A WHOLE-
SOME, SOLID, AND BENEFICIAL PAPER CREDIT. "
The length to which these extracts have extended does
not warrant the publication more at large of this elaborate
document. A mere outline of the plan, consisting of twen-
ty articles, is all that will now be given.
The capital of the bank was to consist of a stock of three
millions of dollars, divided into thirty thousand shares, to
be exempted from all taxes and impositions.
The subscription, according to the respective amounts,
to be in proportionate quantities of specie, personal, and
landed securities; the object being to secure the largest
possible amount of specie. The bank to have all legal
corporate immunities, and the stock to be protected from
attachment, making each member of the incorporation lia-
ble, by suit, to the extent of his stock.
The privilege of subscribing for one half of the capital
stock, to be reserved to the United States, to the particu-
lar states, or to foreigners, and the United States to be-
come conjointly responsible with the private proprietors,
for all the transactions of the bank, which was to be autho-
rized to issue notes, with and without interest, a part only
payable in America, the residue in Europe. The aggregate
of the notes not to exceed the amount of the bank stock;
with a power to lend at an interest not to exceed eight per
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? HAMILTON. 361
cent. , and to borrow to the amount of one half of its stock,--
to purchase estates, by principal or by annuities, -- to have
the privilege of coining, to the amount of one half of its
stock, (the quantity of alloy, &c. to be determined by con-
gress,) and to have, also, the power of discounting foreign
bills of exchange, -- to receive deposits of plate or money,
which deposits were to be exempt from taxation, -- to have
the right of contracting with the French government, for
the supply of its fleets and armies in America, and to con-
tract with congress for the supply of their armies, -- with
a condition to lend the United States, on a certain unaliena-
ble fund of one hundred and ten thousand four hundred
pounds per annum, the sum of twelve hundred thousand
pounds, at an interest of eight per cent. , payable in twenty
years, or sooner, at the option of congress, and a similar
rate to govern all future loans; for which fund the United
States, and the individual states, to be severally pledged.
The bank to become responsible for the redemption of
all the paper; the old, at forty for one, in parts of one third,
at the end of every ten years, with interest at five per
cent. ; the new, as specie, in six years, so as to fulfil the
previous engagements of congress; for which responsibili-
ty, adequate funds, payable to the bank, equal to the dis-
charge of the whole paper currency in thirty years, bear-
ing an interest of two per cent. , were to be established.
The bank notes to be received in payment of all public
custom's and taxes, at an equivalent with gold and silver,
with power to dissolve itself at pleasure, having made
effectual provision for the payment of its debts. Its stock
to be transferable. To be chartered for thirty years, and
no other bank, public or private, to be permitted during
that period. Three offices to be established, one in each
of the states of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia,
to facilitate the circulation and payment of the bank notes;
the whole to be managed by twelve general directors, eight
vol. i. 46
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? 362 THE LIFE OF
to be chosen by the private proprietors, and four by con-
gress; the minister of finance having the privilege of in-
specting all their proceedings.
A full examination of the principles of the proposed in-
stitution would exceed the proper limits of this work, but
a few desultory observations on some of the features of this
plan, may not be misplaced.
The introduction of landed security, as a part of the capi-
tal stock, is the provision which, in a merely commercial
view, might perhaps have been deemed most objectionable.
But it is to be remembered, that commercial convenience
was merely an incidental consideration. The primary ob-
ject was similar to that of the bank of England; after ab-
sorbing the previous issues, to obtain a monopoly of the cir-
culation, and by that means to secure a safe and uniform
currency.
But had the sole purpose of Colonel Hamilton been the
granting facilities to trade, it is by no. means obvious that
his plan would have been less effective.
It is true, that the country would not furnish an adequate
amount of specie, or of equivalent available personal secu-
rities to fill the stock; and that for this reason, the defici-
ency was sought to be supplied by landed security. But
this landed security, though less readily convertible than
the government debt of England, which forms the basis of
its bank, might be pledged for an amount of cash of rela-
tive value, and there would still exist the use of the lands,
and the use of the value of its representative.
That the landed security was not convertible to meet the
immediate wants of the bank, would be less objectionable,
in the minds of those who entertain the opinion, not without
strong reasons, that the capital of a bank should remain a
permanent vested fund, upon which to base a credit, not a
fund to be appropriated to its current uses.
It is possible that this provision might have diminished
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? HAMILTON. 363
the number of merely moneyed subscribers; but as this plan
was to go into operation, at a time when the prevailing dis-
trust of paper securities would dispose individuals, amidst a
choice of evils, to prefer an institution which would furnish
this additional support, to a capital of which the specie com-
ponent was the most alluring ingredient, this disadvantage
would have been more than compensated.
The power of coining money, was introduced merely to
. enable the bank to convert its plate into specie; but it was
a power which, under proper checks, might have been ex-
tended with advantage.
The privilege of contracting with the French govern-
ment, for the supply of its armies, was highly desirable
from this consideration, that the greater part of the specie
was derived from the expenditures of France, and passing
through the bank, would have increased its credit and effi-
ciency, while the great profits to be derived from the con-
tracts, would have offered large inducements to subscri-
bers.
The article which rendered the bank responsible for the
redemption of the existing paper, had in view the import-
ance of relieving the country from a fluctuating medium,
which infected all credit. The amount of the annuity to
be secured by congress to the bank, was not fixed, from
the difficulty of estimating the whole amount of the govern-
ment issues; a difficulty which was increased by this
circumstance, that this plan proposed to embrace all the
State emissions, as essential to every efficient scheme of
finance, -- a fact of high interest, in reference to the great
question of the "Assumption," which threatened an insu-
perable obstacle to the fiscal system of the present govern-
ment.
The permission to the bank to dissolve or sell at plea-
sure, was introduced to encourage men to adventure in it,
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? 364 THE LIFE OF
from a confidence, that when once engaged, the profits
would induce them to continue.
In reply to the inquiry, where funds are to be procured,
in the present impotent state of the federal government,
Colonel Hamilton says, " I answer, there are ample means,
and they must be had. Congress must deal plainly with
their constituents; they must tell them that power without
revenue, is a bubble; that unless they give them substan-
tial resources of the latter, they will not have enough of
the former either to prosecute the war, or to maintain the
union in peace; that in short, they must, in justice to the
public, and to their own honour, renounce the vain at-
tempt of carrying on the war without either, -- a perse-
verance in which can only deceive the people, and betray
their safety. They must demand an instant, positive, and
perpetual investiture of an impost on trade; a land tax
and a poll tax to be collected by their own agents. This
act to become a part of the confederation. It has ever
been my opinion, that congress ought to have complete so-
vereignty in all but the mere municipal law of each state,
and I wish to see a convention of all the states, with
full power to alter and amend, finally and irrevocably, the
present futile and senseless confederation. "
After stating the plan of the bank, "these," he says, " as
has already been observed, are only intended as outlines.
The form of administration for the bank, and all other mat-
ters, may be easily determined. If the leading principles
are once approved, we shall find good models in the differ-
ent European banks, which we can accommodate to our cir-
cumstances. Great care, in particular, should be employed
to guard against counterfeits; and, I think, methods may
be devised that will be effectual.
"I see nothing to prevent the practicability of a plan of
this kind, but a distrust of the final success of the war, which
may make men afraid to risk any considerable part of their
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? HAMILTON. 36S
fortunes in the public funds; but without being an enthu-
siast, I will venture to assert, that with such a resource as
is here proposed, the loss of our independence is impossible.
All we have to fear is, that the want of money may disband
the army, or so perplex and enfeeble our operations, as to
create in the people a general disgust and alarm, which may
make them clamour for peace on any terms. But if a judi-
cious administration of our finances, assisted by a bank,
takes place, and the ancient security of property is restored,
no convulsion is to be apprehended; our opposition will
soon assume an aspect of system and vigour, that will re-
lieve and encourage the people, and put an end to the hopes
of the enemy. 'Tis evident, they have it not in their pow-
er to subdue us by force of arms;-- in all these states they
have not more than fifteen thousand effective troops, nor is
it possible for them much to augment this number. The
East and West Indies demand reinforcements. In all the
islands they have not, at this time, above five thousand men;
a force not more than equal to the proper garrisoning of
Jamaica alone, and which, the moment they lose a maritime
superiority in those seas, will leave them much cause to fear
for their possessions. They will probably send out fifteen
hundred or two thousand men to recruit their regiments
already here, but this is the utmost they can do.
"Our allies have five thousand men at Rhode-Island,
which in the worst event that can happen, will be recruit-
ed to eight, to co-operate with us on a defensive plan. --
Should our army amount to no more than fifteen thousand
men, the combined forces, though not equal to the expulsion
of the enemy, will be equal to the purpose of compelling
them to renounce their offensive, and content themselves
with maintaining one or two capital points. This is on the
supposition, that the public have the means of putting their
troops in activity. By stopping the progress of their con-
quests, and reducing them to an unmeaning and disgrace-
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? 366 THE LIFE OF
ful defensive, we destroy the national expectation of suc-
cess, from which the ministry draw their resources. They
are in a situation, where the want of splendid successes is
ruin. They have carried taxation nearly to its extreme
boundary; they have mortgaged all their funds; they have
a large unfunded debt, besides the enormous mass which is
funded. This must necessarily create apprehensions in
their most sanguine partizans, and if these are not counter-
acted by nattering events, from time to time, they cannot
much longer continue the delusion.
Indeed, in that case, I
suppose they must themselves despair. The game we play,
is a sure game, if we play it with skill. I have calculated,
in the preceding observations, on the most disadvantageous
side; many events may turn up in the course of the summer,
to make even the present campaign decisive. "
On the twenty-sixth of May, the following reply was re-
ceived from the Superintendent of Finance.
ROBERT MORRIS TO COLONEL HAMILTON.
SIR,
It is some time since I received your performance, dated
the thirtieth April last. I have read it with that attention
which it greatly deserves, and finding many points of it to
coincide with my own opinions on the subject, it naturally
strengthened that confidence which every man ought to
possess, to a certain degree, in his own judgement. You
will very soon see the plan of a bank published, and sub-
scriptions opened for its establishment, having already met
with the approbation of congress. It only remains for indi-
viduals to do their part, and a foundation will be laid for
the anticipation of taxes and funds, by a paper credit that
cannot depreciate. The capital proposed, falls far short of
your idea, and, indeed, far short of what it ought to be; but
the capital may afterwards be increased to almost anv
amount. To propose a larger sum in the outset, and fail
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? HAMILTON. 367
in the attempt to raise it, might prove fatal; to begin with
what is clearly in our power to accomplish, and on that be-
ginning to establish the credit that will inevitably command
the future increase of capital, seems the most certain road
to success. I have thought much about interweaving a
land security with the capital of this bank, but am apprehen-
sive it would convey to the public mind an idea of paper
being circulated on that credit; and that the bank, of con-
sequence, must fail in its payments in case of any conside-
rable run on it, and we must expect that its ruin will be
attempted by external and internal foes. I have, therefore,
left that point to the future deliberations of the directors of
this bank, to whom, in due time, I shall communicate your
address. I esteem myself much your debtor for this piece,
not merely on account of the personal respect you have
been pleased to express, but also on account of your good
intentions; and for these, and the pains you have taken, I
not only think, but on all proper occasions shall say, the
public are also indebted to you.
My office is new, and I am young in the execution of it.
Communications from men of genius and abilities will always
be acceptable, and yours will ever command the attention of
Sir, your obedient, humble servant,
Robt. Morris.
Col. Alex. Hamilton, of the Artillery.
The plan referred to in the preceding letter was submit-
ted to congress on the seventeenth, adopted on the twenty-
sixth*, and published, with an address from Mr. Morris, on
the twenty-eighth of May, 1781.
* The votes on this question, give an important indication of the views of
congress, at that day, on this " constructive power. " Of the eleven states pre-
sent, eight, viz. New-Hampshire, Rhode-Island, Connecticut, New-Jersey,
Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, were in favour.
Massachusetts was against it, with one vote from Pennsylvania. Of the /our
memben from Virginia, James Madison was alone in the negative.
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? 368 THE LIFE OF
The capital was four hundred thousand dollars, in shares
of four hundred dollars each, payable in gold or silver.
Its notes were made payable on demand, and receivable
for taxes: a power was given to enlarge the capital: the
superintendent of finance was authorized to inspect the
books; and on the last day of the year, an ordinance pass-
ed, incorporating it under the name of the Bank of North
America.
Great as was the merit of Mr. Morris in the suggestion
of this plan, he acquired a still stronger title to applause for
the skill, energy, and judgement, with which it was carried
into execution.
His principal reliance for a supply of coin, was founded
upon an engagement of the Governor General of Havan-
nah to remit to the United States four hundred thousand
dollars in specie, to be repaid by annual shipments of flour,
which were to be guarantied by France, but which en-
gagement was not fulfilled.
It has been stated that the whole specie capital of this
bank, when it commenced its operations, did not exceed
forty thousand dollars; and such was the apprehension of
this small resource being exhausted, that persons were em-
ployed, during the earlier part of its existence, to follow
those who had demanded specie and obtain it from them,
at any price, so as to return it into the coffers of the bank.
This institution, nevertheless, soon obtained extensive
confidence ; ministered largely to the wants of government;
and after its utility had been fully tested in furnishing a me-
dium of exchange throughout the states, as safe and more
convenient than the precious metals; relief in the payment
of the public burthens; increased facilities to the internal
and external commerce of the country; the state of Penn-
sylvania, by which it also had been incorporated, under the
delusion of popular prejudice repealed its charter, on the
extraordinary ground of the dangerous influence of foreign
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? HAMILTON. 360
capital on the free institutions of the country; forgetting,
that without such capital, that freedom, and those institu-
tions, would probably not have been established: but the
returning good sense of the state renewed the charter the
ensuing year.
The project for a convention of the states, which Hamil-
ton first proposed in his letter to Mr. Duane, seems not to
have met with much countenance in congress; but the ex-
position which he had given of the defects of the existing
government, enforced by the embarrassments with which
that body found themselves perpetually clogged, rendered
an enlargement of the powers of the confederation a sub-
ject of frequent and anxious deliberation.
Aware of the impediments which public opinion would
interpose to the successful attainment of this great object,
Hamilton commenced, at this time, a series of numbers,
under the title of " The Continentalist. "
The earlier essays were published in July and August,
1781. They were then suspended until after the surren-
der of York Town, when they were resumed, at intervals,
and continued during a part of the succeeding year. Many
of them are lost, but a sufficient number remain to show
the design of the publication. The first part was devoted to
an examination of the defects of the existing league, and to
an exposure of the groundless jealousy of power to which he
attributed the hostility of the people to an enlargement of the
authority of the federal government. Several of the essays
onthisbranch ofthesubject. cannotbe found. The succeeding
numbers are occupied with a brief enumeration of the pow-
ers with which the government ought to be clothed. Of
these, the principal were, first, the power of regulating
trade; comprehending a right of granting bounties and
premiums, by way of encouragement; of imposing duties
of every kind, as well for revenue as regulation; of ap-
pointing all officers of the customs, and of laying embar-
vol. I. 47
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? 370 the life or
goes in extraordinary emergencies. Second, a moderate
land tax, at a specific rate, to be granted to the federal go-
vernment in perpetuity, and to be levied, (if congress think
proper,) by their own collectors. Third, a moderate capi-
tation tax. Fourth, the disposal of all unlocated land, for
the benefit of the United States. Fifth, a certain propor-
tion of the product of all the mines existing in the United
States; and sixth, the appointment of all the land and na-
val officers by congress.
Much space is allotted, to show the necessity of confer-
ring on the general government specific funds, under their
exclusive control, as a basis upon which he proposed to
build up a system of public credit, and the same reasons
are recapitulated at large, which are contained in the elabo-
rate letter to Mr. Morris; one consideration is worthy of
remark,-- notwithstanding the zeal with which the esta-
blishment of permanent funds is advocated, both in this,
and all his other financial papers, there will be observed
the most scrupulous care to introduce provisions in every
scheme of finance, of which he was the author, to operate
as a check upon the proneness of governments to incur
debts, and insure their discharge, as fast as might be con-
sistent with public convenience.
The necessity of conferring the power of regulating
trade, in its fullest sense, both by bounties and prohibitions,
is clearly and strongly stated; and the consequences of con-
flicting state tarifFs. distinctly portrayed. Butwhilethis essen-
tial attribute of national sovereignty is claimed, a similar dis-
cretion is evinced, as to the extent to which this power should
be exercised. "Easy duties on commerce" are contended
for, in order to lighten the charges on production; and
while the necessity is shown of granting to the federal go-
vernment adequate funds, the policy of its relying on a com-
pound of permanent and occasional supplies is exhibited.
"The federal government," he says, " should neither be in-
^
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? HAMILTON. 371
dependent, nor too much dependent. It should neither be
raised above responsibility or control, nor should it want
the means of maintaining its own weight, authority, digni-
ty, and credit. To this end, permanent funds are indis-
pensable; but they ought to be of such a nature, and so
moderate in their amount, as never to be inconvenient. "
The collection of the national revenues, by officers ap-
pointed by congress, is shown to be essential to the success
of the system, and is urged from the farther consideration,
that their appointment, and also that of all military officers,
of every rank, would be the means of creating, in the inte-
rior of each state, a mass of influence in favour of the fede-
ral government. "The great danger," he says, has been
shown to be, "that it will not have power enough to de-
fend itself, and preserve the union; not that it will ever be-
come formidable to the general liberty. A mere regard to
the interests of the confederacy will never be a principle
sufficiently active to curb the ambition and intrigues of dif-
ferent members. Force cannot effect it.
"A contest of arms will seldom be between the common
sovereign and a single refractory member, but between dis-
tinct combinations of the several parts against each other;
a sympathy of situations, will be apt to produce associates
to the disobedient. The application of force is always dis-
agreeable; the issue uncertain. It will be wiser to obviate
the necessity of it, by interesting such a number of indivi-
duals in each state in support of the federal government, as
will be a counterpoise to the ambition of others, and will
make it difficult for them to unite the people in opposition
to the just and necessary measures of the union. There is
something noble and magnificent in the perspective of a
great federative republic, closely linked in the pursuit of
a common interest, tranquil and prosperous at home, re-
spectable abroad; there is something proportionably dimi-
nutive and contemptible, in the prospect of a number of
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? 372 THE LIFE OF
petty states, with the appearance only of union, -- jarring,
jealous, and perverse, -- without any determined direction,
-- fluctuating and unhappy at home, weak and insignifi-
cant by their dissensions in the eyes of other nations. Hap-
py America, if those to whom thou hast entrusted the
guardianship of thy infancy, know how to provide for thy
future repose, but miserable and undone, if their negligence
or ignorance permits the spirit of discord to erect her ban-
ners on the ruins of thy tranquillity! "
Such were the sentiments of a man, whose views have
been so much, and so designedly misrepresented; whose
strong solicitude for the liberties of America, saw in the
constitutional strength of each department of government,
the only security against usurpation; who sought to con-
nect with every grant of power, its appropriate check; and
who having advised every precaution for the public safety,
which the most prudent foresight could suggest, believed
that a generous confidence on the part of the people, was
as essential to their happiness, as an honest administration
by their rulers.
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? HAMILTON. 378
CHAPTER XIV.
[1781. ]
The urgent representations made to congress by the
French minister, M. de la Luzerne, of the reluctance of
the French court to extend their aids beyond what had al-
ready been granted, -- the intimation that the state of Eu-
rope might possibly lead France to an arrangement, which,
as the best terms that could be obtained for the United
States, would be founded on the principle of uti possidetis,
and the difficulties which Colonel Laurens had encountered
in his mission, all concurred to prompt an attempt upon
New-York, which had been abandoned in the previous au-
tumn, and which the letters of La Fayette show, was now
in contemplation. General Washington, early in this year,
(but at what precise time we are unable to state,) proceed-
ed to Newport, for the purpose of concerting measures
with General Rochambeau, in which journey, it would ap-
pear, from the following note, without date, that notwith-
standing their recent difference, he was attended by Colo-
nel Hamilton, -- which is also of importance to show, that
the difference which had taken place, had produced no di-
minution of respect in the breast of the General.
DEAR HAMILTON,
I shall be obliged to you for the answer to the address,
as soon as it is convenient to you. If we do not ride to
the Point to see the fleet pass out, I am to have a confer-
ence with Count de Rochambeau, and the engineer, di-
rectly after breakfast, at which I wish you to be present.
I am, sincerely and affectionately, yours,
Geo. Washington.
Half past--, A. M.
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? 374 THE LIFE OP
This interview having taken place, Washington returned
to the army, and immediately ordered them from their quar-
ters, with directions to encamp at Peekskill, whence they
moved down the eastern banks of the Hudson, waiting the
junction of the French forces, which soon after marched.
The advance having arrived, on the sixth of July an ex-
pedition was pushed forward, under General Lincoln, in
the hope of surprising the enemy's works at King's Bridge.
After an unimportant skirmish, the detachment returned to
the main body, then at Dobbs' Ferry, a position on the Hud-
son, a little more than twenty miles from New-York, where
the American army crossed in the disastrous retreat of 1776.
Hamilton, who had proceeded to Albany, after his return
from Newport, anxious to take part in the interesting ope-
rations which were about to occur, finding his application
for a command unattended to, determined to bring the ques-
tion to a definitive issue. The following extract from a let-
ter written to Mrs. Hamilton, gives the course of this affair.
Camp, near Dobbs' Ferry, July 10th, 1781.
"The day before yesterday I arrived here, but for want
of an opportunity could not write any sooner; indeed, I
know of none now. Finding, when I came here, that no-
thing was said on the subject of a command, I wrote the
General a letter, and enclosed him my commission. This
morning Tilghman came to me in his name, pressed me to
retain my commission, with an assurance that he would en-
deavour, by all means, to give me a command, nearly such
as I could have desired in the present circumstances of the
army. Though I know you would be happy to hear I had
rejected this proposal, it is a pleasure my reputation would
not permit me to afford you. I consented to retain my
commission, and accept the command. I quarter, at present,
by a very polite and warm invitation, with General Lincoln,
and experience from the officers of both armies every mark
of esteem. "
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? HAMILTON. 375
It was at this post that Washington first received the in-
telligence that the squadron of De Grasse was approach-
ing the coast of Virginia. A council of war was held, to
which Hamilton was invited by General Washington. The
plan of a southern campaign was then discussed, and though
reluctant to relinquish the attempt on New-York, so long
entertained, it was determined, for the most cogent reasons,
to make a forced march on Lord Cornwallis.
It became of the utmost importance to conceal this pur-
pose. The idea was thrown out, that the French fleet was
expected at Shrewsbury, and that the army was to march
and join it there; and, to complete the deception, lines for
an encampment were marked out on the Jersey side, ovens
constructed, and a body of men advanced, as if to take a
position for the combined forces. At this particular crisis,
Washington felt the full value of his exertions in obtaining
secret intelligence. A communication was constantly kept
up with New-York, and it was soon ascertained that the
deception was complete. The extent of the imposition on
Sir Henry Clinton has always been a subject of surprise,
but a stratagem which was adopted by Washington, and
which fully succeeded, will serve to explain it. There was
an individual in New-Jersey, who at one time held a con-
siderable rank in the militia, and who had been employed
by Washington to gain intelligence. In this service he had
proved himself shrewd, observing, and alert; and the in-
formation he had given, at the commencement of his ca-
reer, had been of much importance. Some time prior to
this period, General Washington had discovered this man
to be a traitor, and that, under cover of serving the Ameri-
can cause, he was in fact in the pay of Sir Henry Clinton.
He determined to take advantage of this discovery, and
under the pretence of employing him to get farther advices,
Washington sent for him to head quarters, where he threw
in his way a map, prepared for the purpose, marked with
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? 3T6 THE LIFE OF
the pretended route of the army to Shrewsbury, and with
plans of the land and naval attack upon New-York. Anx-
ious to confirm his impressions by every possible means,
this same individual sought an interview with Colonel Ha-
milton, and under semblance of a zeal for the American in-
terests, inquired of him the destination of the army. Ha-
milton, confident that a disclosure by him of the actual in-
tentions of the commander-in-chief, would be the most cer-
tain means of deceiving him, as it could not be supposed
that he would communicate such an important and confi-
dential secret, at once replied, "we are going to Virginia. "
The spy, thus completely duped, hastened with his informa-
tion to the enemy, and communicated it to Sir Henry Clin-
ton, who was in vain prompted by others to suspect the real
designs of the Americans, and replied to every importunity,
that he had information of a kind, and from a source, that
could not be disputed.
The intelligence of De Grasse's approach, had been com-
municated to General Washington by the Superintendent
of Finance, who immediately on the receipt of it, proceeded
express to head quarters. The probability of Cornwallis'
capture, now became strong. But a great obstacle existed:
-- it was the utter incapacity of moving the army for want
of funds. Robert Morris, on this occasion, rendered one of
those great services to his country, which no other indivi-
dual could have performed ; -- he assumed the responsibi-
lity of moving the army. Washington, aware of the em-
barrassed finances, inquired where were his means? He
replied, that he did not himself know, but that he would find
them. He immediately returned to Philadelphia, secured
all the water craft on the Delaware, provided supplies on
the route of the army, and while Washington was collecting
a force to protect West Point, raised a large portion of the
necessary funds on his personal responsibility.
confessor, is a character on which little dependence can be
placed. "
Holland, as a government, stands in need of all its credit
for its own uses. But from the Dutch capitalists much
might be expected, though not on the faith of the United
States, by the establishment of a system such as he is about
to propose. The prospects of internal loans to govern-
ment, both from the want of confidence, and the more ad-
vantageous terms of traffic in which individual wealth could
be employed, he rates very low.
"To surmount these obstacles," he observes,"and give
individuals ability and inclination to lend, a plan might be
devised which, by incorporating their means together, and
uniting them with those of the public, will, on the founda-
tion of that incorporation and union, erect a mass of credit
that will supply the defect of moneyed capital, and answer
all the purposes of cash. A plan which will not only ad-
vance the interest of the lenders, secure the independence
of their country, and in its progress have the most benefi-
cial influence upon its future commerce, but be a source of
national strength and wealth. I mean," he says, "the in-
stitution of a national bank. This I regard, in some shape
or other, as an expedient essential to our safety and sue-
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? HAMILTON. 357
cess, unless by a happy turn of European affairs, the war
should speedily terminate, in a manner upon which it would
be unwise to reckon. There is no other that can give to
government that extensive and systematic credit, which the
defect of our revenues makes indispensably necessary to
its operations. The longer it is delayed, the more difficult
it becomes. Our affairs grow every day more relaxed and
more involved. Public credit hastens to a more irretrievable
catastrophe. The means for executing the plan are exhaust-
ed in partial and temporary efforts. The loan now making
in Massachusetts, would have gone a great way in esta-
blishing the funds on which the bank must stand.
"I am aware of all the objections that have been made to
public banks, and that they are not without enlightened and
respectable opponents. But all that has been said against
them only tends to prove, that like all other good things,
they are subject to abuse, and when abused, become per-
nicious. The precious metals, by similar arguments, may
be proved to be injurious. It is certain that the monies
of South America have had great influence in banishing
industry from Spain, and sinking it in real wealth and im-
portance. Great power, commerce, and riches, or, in other
words, great national prosperity, may, in like manner, be
denominated evils; for they lead to insolence, an inordi-
nate ambition, a vicious luxury, licentiousness of morals,
and all those vices which corrupt a government, enslave the
state, and precipitate the ruin of a nation. But no wise
statesman will reject the good, from an apprehension of the
ill. The truth is, in human affairs there is no good, pure
and unmixed. Every advantage has two sides; and wis-
dom consists in availing ourselves of the good, and guard-
ing, as much as possible, against the bad.
"The tendency of a national bank is to increase public and
private credit. The former gives power to the state, for
the protection of its rights and interests, and the latter fa-
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? 358 THE LIFE OF
cilitates and extends the operations of commerce among in
dividuals.
"Industry is increased, commodities are multiplied, agri-
culture and manufactures nourish, and herein consist the
true wealth and prosperity of a state.
"Most commercial nations have found it necessary to in-
stitute banks; and they have proved to be the happiest en-
gines that ever were invented for advancing trade. Venice,
Genoa, Hamburgh, Holland, and England, are examples of
their utility. They owe their riches, commerce, and the
figure they have made at different periods, in a great de-
gree, to this source. Great Britain is indebted for the im-
mense efforts she has been able to make in so many illus-
trious and successful wars, essentially to that vast fabric of
credit, raised on this foundation. Tis by this alone, she
now menaces our independence. She has indeed abused
the advantage, and now stands on a precipice. Her ex-
ample should both persuade and warn us. 'Tis in repub-
lics, where banks are most easily established and supported,
and where they are least liable to abuse. Our situation
will not expose us to frequent wars, and the public will
have no temptation to overstrain its credit.
"In my opinion, we ought not to hesitate, because we have
no other resource. The long and expensive wars of King
William had drained England of its specie; its commerce
began to droop for want of a proper medium; its taxes
were unproductive, and its revenues declined. The admi-
nistration wisely had recourse to the institution of a bank,
and it retrieved the national difficulties. We are in the
same, and still greater want, of a sufficient medium. We
have little specie; the paper we have is of small value, and
rapidly declining to less. We are immersed in a war for
our existence as a nation, for our liberty and happiness as
a people. We have no revenues, nor no credit. A bank,
if practicable, is the only thing that can give us either the
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? HAMILTON. 359
one or the other. Besides these great and cardinal mo-
tives to such an institution, and the advantages we should
enjoy from it in common with other nations, our situation,
relatively to Europe and to the West Indies, would give us
some peculiar advantages.
"Nothing is more common than for men to pass from the
abuse of a good thing to the disuse of it. Some persons,
disgusted by the depreciation of the money, are chimerical
enough to imagine it would be beneficial to abolish all pa-
per, and annihilate the whole of what is now in circulation,
and depend altogether upon specie, both for commerce and
finance. The scheme is altogether visionary, and in the at-
tempt would be fatal. We have not a competent stock
of specie in this country, either to answer the purpose of
circulation in trade, or to serve as a basis for revenue.
The whole amount of what we have, I am persuaded, does
not exceed six millions of dollars, one-fifth of the circulating
medium before the war. To suppose this would be suffi-
cient for the operations of commerce, would be to suppose
that our domestic and foreign commerce were both reduced
four-fifths; a supposition that carries absurdity on the face
of it. It follows, that if our paper money were destroyed,
a great part of the transactions of traffic must be carried on
by barter; a mode inconvenient, partial, confined; destruc-
tive both of commerce and industry. With the addition of
the paper we now have, this evil exists in too great a degree. "
Having shown that if all the specie could be drawn into
the treasury annually, the consequence of such a measure,
which never was effected in any country, would be a com-
plete stagnation of business; and that a recourse to taxes
in kind, would prove wholly inefficacious, he proceeds to
observe, --
"The error of those who would explode paper money
altogether, originates in not making proper distinctions.
Our paper was, in its nature, liable to depreciation, because
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? 360 THE LIFE OF
it had no funds for its support, and was not upheld by pri-
vate credit. The emissions under the resolution of March,
1780, have partly the former advantage, but are destitute
of the latter, which is equally essential. No paper credit
can be substantial or durable, which has not funds, and
which does not unite immediately the interest and influence
of the moneyed men, in its establishment and preservation.
A credit begun on this basis will, in process of time, greatly
exceed its funds; but this requires time, and a well settled
opinion in its favour. 'Tis in a national bank alone that
WE CAN FIND THE INGREDIENTS TO CONSTITUTE A WHOLE-
SOME, SOLID, AND BENEFICIAL PAPER CREDIT. "
The length to which these extracts have extended does
not warrant the publication more at large of this elaborate
document. A mere outline of the plan, consisting of twen-
ty articles, is all that will now be given.
The capital of the bank was to consist of a stock of three
millions of dollars, divided into thirty thousand shares, to
be exempted from all taxes and impositions.
The subscription, according to the respective amounts,
to be in proportionate quantities of specie, personal, and
landed securities; the object being to secure the largest
possible amount of specie. The bank to have all legal
corporate immunities, and the stock to be protected from
attachment, making each member of the incorporation lia-
ble, by suit, to the extent of his stock.
The privilege of subscribing for one half of the capital
stock, to be reserved to the United States, to the particu-
lar states, or to foreigners, and the United States to be-
come conjointly responsible with the private proprietors,
for all the transactions of the bank, which was to be autho-
rized to issue notes, with and without interest, a part only
payable in America, the residue in Europe. The aggregate
of the notes not to exceed the amount of the bank stock;
with a power to lend at an interest not to exceed eight per
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? HAMILTON. 361
cent. , and to borrow to the amount of one half of its stock,--
to purchase estates, by principal or by annuities, -- to have
the privilege of coining, to the amount of one half of its
stock, (the quantity of alloy, &c. to be determined by con-
gress,) and to have, also, the power of discounting foreign
bills of exchange, -- to receive deposits of plate or money,
which deposits were to be exempt from taxation, -- to have
the right of contracting with the French government, for
the supply of its fleets and armies in America, and to con-
tract with congress for the supply of their armies, -- with
a condition to lend the United States, on a certain unaliena-
ble fund of one hundred and ten thousand four hundred
pounds per annum, the sum of twelve hundred thousand
pounds, at an interest of eight per cent. , payable in twenty
years, or sooner, at the option of congress, and a similar
rate to govern all future loans; for which fund the United
States, and the individual states, to be severally pledged.
The bank to become responsible for the redemption of
all the paper; the old, at forty for one, in parts of one third,
at the end of every ten years, with interest at five per
cent. ; the new, as specie, in six years, so as to fulfil the
previous engagements of congress; for which responsibili-
ty, adequate funds, payable to the bank, equal to the dis-
charge of the whole paper currency in thirty years, bear-
ing an interest of two per cent. , were to be established.
The bank notes to be received in payment of all public
custom's and taxes, at an equivalent with gold and silver,
with power to dissolve itself at pleasure, having made
effectual provision for the payment of its debts. Its stock
to be transferable. To be chartered for thirty years, and
no other bank, public or private, to be permitted during
that period. Three offices to be established, one in each
of the states of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia,
to facilitate the circulation and payment of the bank notes;
the whole to be managed by twelve general directors, eight
vol. i. 46
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? 362 THE LIFE OF
to be chosen by the private proprietors, and four by con-
gress; the minister of finance having the privilege of in-
specting all their proceedings.
A full examination of the principles of the proposed in-
stitution would exceed the proper limits of this work, but
a few desultory observations on some of the features of this
plan, may not be misplaced.
The introduction of landed security, as a part of the capi-
tal stock, is the provision which, in a merely commercial
view, might perhaps have been deemed most objectionable.
But it is to be remembered, that commercial convenience
was merely an incidental consideration. The primary ob-
ject was similar to that of the bank of England; after ab-
sorbing the previous issues, to obtain a monopoly of the cir-
culation, and by that means to secure a safe and uniform
currency.
But had the sole purpose of Colonel Hamilton been the
granting facilities to trade, it is by no. means obvious that
his plan would have been less effective.
It is true, that the country would not furnish an adequate
amount of specie, or of equivalent available personal secu-
rities to fill the stock; and that for this reason, the defici-
ency was sought to be supplied by landed security. But
this landed security, though less readily convertible than
the government debt of England, which forms the basis of
its bank, might be pledged for an amount of cash of rela-
tive value, and there would still exist the use of the lands,
and the use of the value of its representative.
That the landed security was not convertible to meet the
immediate wants of the bank, would be less objectionable,
in the minds of those who entertain the opinion, not without
strong reasons, that the capital of a bank should remain a
permanent vested fund, upon which to base a credit, not a
fund to be appropriated to its current uses.
It is possible that this provision might have diminished
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? HAMILTON. 363
the number of merely moneyed subscribers; but as this plan
was to go into operation, at a time when the prevailing dis-
trust of paper securities would dispose individuals, amidst a
choice of evils, to prefer an institution which would furnish
this additional support, to a capital of which the specie com-
ponent was the most alluring ingredient, this disadvantage
would have been more than compensated.
The power of coining money, was introduced merely to
. enable the bank to convert its plate into specie; but it was
a power which, under proper checks, might have been ex-
tended with advantage.
The privilege of contracting with the French govern-
ment, for the supply of its armies, was highly desirable
from this consideration, that the greater part of the specie
was derived from the expenditures of France, and passing
through the bank, would have increased its credit and effi-
ciency, while the great profits to be derived from the con-
tracts, would have offered large inducements to subscri-
bers.
The article which rendered the bank responsible for the
redemption of the existing paper, had in view the import-
ance of relieving the country from a fluctuating medium,
which infected all credit. The amount of the annuity to
be secured by congress to the bank, was not fixed, from
the difficulty of estimating the whole amount of the govern-
ment issues; a difficulty which was increased by this
circumstance, that this plan proposed to embrace all the
State emissions, as essential to every efficient scheme of
finance, -- a fact of high interest, in reference to the great
question of the "Assumption," which threatened an insu-
perable obstacle to the fiscal system of the present govern-
ment.
The permission to the bank to dissolve or sell at plea-
sure, was introduced to encourage men to adventure in it,
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? 364 THE LIFE OF
from a confidence, that when once engaged, the profits
would induce them to continue.
In reply to the inquiry, where funds are to be procured,
in the present impotent state of the federal government,
Colonel Hamilton says, " I answer, there are ample means,
and they must be had. Congress must deal plainly with
their constituents; they must tell them that power without
revenue, is a bubble; that unless they give them substan-
tial resources of the latter, they will not have enough of
the former either to prosecute the war, or to maintain the
union in peace; that in short, they must, in justice to the
public, and to their own honour, renounce the vain at-
tempt of carrying on the war without either, -- a perse-
verance in which can only deceive the people, and betray
their safety. They must demand an instant, positive, and
perpetual investiture of an impost on trade; a land tax
and a poll tax to be collected by their own agents. This
act to become a part of the confederation. It has ever
been my opinion, that congress ought to have complete so-
vereignty in all but the mere municipal law of each state,
and I wish to see a convention of all the states, with
full power to alter and amend, finally and irrevocably, the
present futile and senseless confederation. "
After stating the plan of the bank, "these," he says, " as
has already been observed, are only intended as outlines.
The form of administration for the bank, and all other mat-
ters, may be easily determined. If the leading principles
are once approved, we shall find good models in the differ-
ent European banks, which we can accommodate to our cir-
cumstances. Great care, in particular, should be employed
to guard against counterfeits; and, I think, methods may
be devised that will be effectual.
"I see nothing to prevent the practicability of a plan of
this kind, but a distrust of the final success of the war, which
may make men afraid to risk any considerable part of their
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? HAMILTON. 36S
fortunes in the public funds; but without being an enthu-
siast, I will venture to assert, that with such a resource as
is here proposed, the loss of our independence is impossible.
All we have to fear is, that the want of money may disband
the army, or so perplex and enfeeble our operations, as to
create in the people a general disgust and alarm, which may
make them clamour for peace on any terms. But if a judi-
cious administration of our finances, assisted by a bank,
takes place, and the ancient security of property is restored,
no convulsion is to be apprehended; our opposition will
soon assume an aspect of system and vigour, that will re-
lieve and encourage the people, and put an end to the hopes
of the enemy. 'Tis evident, they have it not in their pow-
er to subdue us by force of arms;-- in all these states they
have not more than fifteen thousand effective troops, nor is
it possible for them much to augment this number. The
East and West Indies demand reinforcements. In all the
islands they have not, at this time, above five thousand men;
a force not more than equal to the proper garrisoning of
Jamaica alone, and which, the moment they lose a maritime
superiority in those seas, will leave them much cause to fear
for their possessions. They will probably send out fifteen
hundred or two thousand men to recruit their regiments
already here, but this is the utmost they can do.
"Our allies have five thousand men at Rhode-Island,
which in the worst event that can happen, will be recruit-
ed to eight, to co-operate with us on a defensive plan. --
Should our army amount to no more than fifteen thousand
men, the combined forces, though not equal to the expulsion
of the enemy, will be equal to the purpose of compelling
them to renounce their offensive, and content themselves
with maintaining one or two capital points. This is on the
supposition, that the public have the means of putting their
troops in activity. By stopping the progress of their con-
quests, and reducing them to an unmeaning and disgrace-
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? 366 THE LIFE OF
ful defensive, we destroy the national expectation of suc-
cess, from which the ministry draw their resources. They
are in a situation, where the want of splendid successes is
ruin. They have carried taxation nearly to its extreme
boundary; they have mortgaged all their funds; they have
a large unfunded debt, besides the enormous mass which is
funded. This must necessarily create apprehensions in
their most sanguine partizans, and if these are not counter-
acted by nattering events, from time to time, they cannot
much longer continue the delusion.
Indeed, in that case, I
suppose they must themselves despair. The game we play,
is a sure game, if we play it with skill. I have calculated,
in the preceding observations, on the most disadvantageous
side; many events may turn up in the course of the summer,
to make even the present campaign decisive. "
On the twenty-sixth of May, the following reply was re-
ceived from the Superintendent of Finance.
ROBERT MORRIS TO COLONEL HAMILTON.
SIR,
It is some time since I received your performance, dated
the thirtieth April last. I have read it with that attention
which it greatly deserves, and finding many points of it to
coincide with my own opinions on the subject, it naturally
strengthened that confidence which every man ought to
possess, to a certain degree, in his own judgement. You
will very soon see the plan of a bank published, and sub-
scriptions opened for its establishment, having already met
with the approbation of congress. It only remains for indi-
viduals to do their part, and a foundation will be laid for
the anticipation of taxes and funds, by a paper credit that
cannot depreciate. The capital proposed, falls far short of
your idea, and, indeed, far short of what it ought to be; but
the capital may afterwards be increased to almost anv
amount. To propose a larger sum in the outset, and fail
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? HAMILTON. 367
in the attempt to raise it, might prove fatal; to begin with
what is clearly in our power to accomplish, and on that be-
ginning to establish the credit that will inevitably command
the future increase of capital, seems the most certain road
to success. I have thought much about interweaving a
land security with the capital of this bank, but am apprehen-
sive it would convey to the public mind an idea of paper
being circulated on that credit; and that the bank, of con-
sequence, must fail in its payments in case of any conside-
rable run on it, and we must expect that its ruin will be
attempted by external and internal foes. I have, therefore,
left that point to the future deliberations of the directors of
this bank, to whom, in due time, I shall communicate your
address. I esteem myself much your debtor for this piece,
not merely on account of the personal respect you have
been pleased to express, but also on account of your good
intentions; and for these, and the pains you have taken, I
not only think, but on all proper occasions shall say, the
public are also indebted to you.
My office is new, and I am young in the execution of it.
Communications from men of genius and abilities will always
be acceptable, and yours will ever command the attention of
Sir, your obedient, humble servant,
Robt. Morris.
Col. Alex. Hamilton, of the Artillery.
The plan referred to in the preceding letter was submit-
ted to congress on the seventeenth, adopted on the twenty-
sixth*, and published, with an address from Mr. Morris, on
the twenty-eighth of May, 1781.
* The votes on this question, give an important indication of the views of
congress, at that day, on this " constructive power. " Of the eleven states pre-
sent, eight, viz. New-Hampshire, Rhode-Island, Connecticut, New-Jersey,
Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, were in favour.
Massachusetts was against it, with one vote from Pennsylvania. Of the /our
memben from Virginia, James Madison was alone in the negative.
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? 368 THE LIFE OF
The capital was four hundred thousand dollars, in shares
of four hundred dollars each, payable in gold or silver.
Its notes were made payable on demand, and receivable
for taxes: a power was given to enlarge the capital: the
superintendent of finance was authorized to inspect the
books; and on the last day of the year, an ordinance pass-
ed, incorporating it under the name of the Bank of North
America.
Great as was the merit of Mr. Morris in the suggestion
of this plan, he acquired a still stronger title to applause for
the skill, energy, and judgement, with which it was carried
into execution.
His principal reliance for a supply of coin, was founded
upon an engagement of the Governor General of Havan-
nah to remit to the United States four hundred thousand
dollars in specie, to be repaid by annual shipments of flour,
which were to be guarantied by France, but which en-
gagement was not fulfilled.
It has been stated that the whole specie capital of this
bank, when it commenced its operations, did not exceed
forty thousand dollars; and such was the apprehension of
this small resource being exhausted, that persons were em-
ployed, during the earlier part of its existence, to follow
those who had demanded specie and obtain it from them,
at any price, so as to return it into the coffers of the bank.
This institution, nevertheless, soon obtained extensive
confidence ; ministered largely to the wants of government;
and after its utility had been fully tested in furnishing a me-
dium of exchange throughout the states, as safe and more
convenient than the precious metals; relief in the payment
of the public burthens; increased facilities to the internal
and external commerce of the country; the state of Penn-
sylvania, by which it also had been incorporated, under the
delusion of popular prejudice repealed its charter, on the
extraordinary ground of the dangerous influence of foreign
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? HAMILTON. 360
capital on the free institutions of the country; forgetting,
that without such capital, that freedom, and those institu-
tions, would probably not have been established: but the
returning good sense of the state renewed the charter the
ensuing year.
The project for a convention of the states, which Hamil-
ton first proposed in his letter to Mr. Duane, seems not to
have met with much countenance in congress; but the ex-
position which he had given of the defects of the existing
government, enforced by the embarrassments with which
that body found themselves perpetually clogged, rendered
an enlargement of the powers of the confederation a sub-
ject of frequent and anxious deliberation.
Aware of the impediments which public opinion would
interpose to the successful attainment of this great object,
Hamilton commenced, at this time, a series of numbers,
under the title of " The Continentalist. "
The earlier essays were published in July and August,
1781. They were then suspended until after the surren-
der of York Town, when they were resumed, at intervals,
and continued during a part of the succeeding year. Many
of them are lost, but a sufficient number remain to show
the design of the publication. The first part was devoted to
an examination of the defects of the existing league, and to
an exposure of the groundless jealousy of power to which he
attributed the hostility of the people to an enlargement of the
authority of the federal government. Several of the essays
onthisbranch ofthesubject. cannotbe found. The succeeding
numbers are occupied with a brief enumeration of the pow-
ers with which the government ought to be clothed. Of
these, the principal were, first, the power of regulating
trade; comprehending a right of granting bounties and
premiums, by way of encouragement; of imposing duties
of every kind, as well for revenue as regulation; of ap-
pointing all officers of the customs, and of laying embar-
vol. I. 47
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? 370 the life or
goes in extraordinary emergencies. Second, a moderate
land tax, at a specific rate, to be granted to the federal go-
vernment in perpetuity, and to be levied, (if congress think
proper,) by their own collectors. Third, a moderate capi-
tation tax. Fourth, the disposal of all unlocated land, for
the benefit of the United States. Fifth, a certain propor-
tion of the product of all the mines existing in the United
States; and sixth, the appointment of all the land and na-
val officers by congress.
Much space is allotted, to show the necessity of confer-
ring on the general government specific funds, under their
exclusive control, as a basis upon which he proposed to
build up a system of public credit, and the same reasons
are recapitulated at large, which are contained in the elabo-
rate letter to Mr. Morris; one consideration is worthy of
remark,-- notwithstanding the zeal with which the esta-
blishment of permanent funds is advocated, both in this,
and all his other financial papers, there will be observed
the most scrupulous care to introduce provisions in every
scheme of finance, of which he was the author, to operate
as a check upon the proneness of governments to incur
debts, and insure their discharge, as fast as might be con-
sistent with public convenience.
The necessity of conferring the power of regulating
trade, in its fullest sense, both by bounties and prohibitions,
is clearly and strongly stated; and the consequences of con-
flicting state tarifFs. distinctly portrayed. Butwhilethis essen-
tial attribute of national sovereignty is claimed, a similar dis-
cretion is evinced, as to the extent to which this power should
be exercised. "Easy duties on commerce" are contended
for, in order to lighten the charges on production; and
while the necessity is shown of granting to the federal go-
vernment adequate funds, the policy of its relying on a com-
pound of permanent and occasional supplies is exhibited.
"The federal government," he says, " should neither be in-
^
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? HAMILTON. 371
dependent, nor too much dependent. It should neither be
raised above responsibility or control, nor should it want
the means of maintaining its own weight, authority, digni-
ty, and credit. To this end, permanent funds are indis-
pensable; but they ought to be of such a nature, and so
moderate in their amount, as never to be inconvenient. "
The collection of the national revenues, by officers ap-
pointed by congress, is shown to be essential to the success
of the system, and is urged from the farther consideration,
that their appointment, and also that of all military officers,
of every rank, would be the means of creating, in the inte-
rior of each state, a mass of influence in favour of the fede-
ral government. "The great danger," he says, has been
shown to be, "that it will not have power enough to de-
fend itself, and preserve the union; not that it will ever be-
come formidable to the general liberty. A mere regard to
the interests of the confederacy will never be a principle
sufficiently active to curb the ambition and intrigues of dif-
ferent members. Force cannot effect it.
"A contest of arms will seldom be between the common
sovereign and a single refractory member, but between dis-
tinct combinations of the several parts against each other;
a sympathy of situations, will be apt to produce associates
to the disobedient. The application of force is always dis-
agreeable; the issue uncertain. It will be wiser to obviate
the necessity of it, by interesting such a number of indivi-
duals in each state in support of the federal government, as
will be a counterpoise to the ambition of others, and will
make it difficult for them to unite the people in opposition
to the just and necessary measures of the union. There is
something noble and magnificent in the perspective of a
great federative republic, closely linked in the pursuit of
a common interest, tranquil and prosperous at home, re-
spectable abroad; there is something proportionably dimi-
nutive and contemptible, in the prospect of a number of
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? 372 THE LIFE OF
petty states, with the appearance only of union, -- jarring,
jealous, and perverse, -- without any determined direction,
-- fluctuating and unhappy at home, weak and insignifi-
cant by their dissensions in the eyes of other nations. Hap-
py America, if those to whom thou hast entrusted the
guardianship of thy infancy, know how to provide for thy
future repose, but miserable and undone, if their negligence
or ignorance permits the spirit of discord to erect her ban-
ners on the ruins of thy tranquillity! "
Such were the sentiments of a man, whose views have
been so much, and so designedly misrepresented; whose
strong solicitude for the liberties of America, saw in the
constitutional strength of each department of government,
the only security against usurpation; who sought to con-
nect with every grant of power, its appropriate check; and
who having advised every precaution for the public safety,
which the most prudent foresight could suggest, believed
that a generous confidence on the part of the people, was
as essential to their happiness, as an honest administration
by their rulers.
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? HAMILTON. 378
CHAPTER XIV.
[1781. ]
The urgent representations made to congress by the
French minister, M. de la Luzerne, of the reluctance of
the French court to extend their aids beyond what had al-
ready been granted, -- the intimation that the state of Eu-
rope might possibly lead France to an arrangement, which,
as the best terms that could be obtained for the United
States, would be founded on the principle of uti possidetis,
and the difficulties which Colonel Laurens had encountered
in his mission, all concurred to prompt an attempt upon
New-York, which had been abandoned in the previous au-
tumn, and which the letters of La Fayette show, was now
in contemplation. General Washington, early in this year,
(but at what precise time we are unable to state,) proceed-
ed to Newport, for the purpose of concerting measures
with General Rochambeau, in which journey, it would ap-
pear, from the following note, without date, that notwith-
standing their recent difference, he was attended by Colo-
nel Hamilton, -- which is also of importance to show, that
the difference which had taken place, had produced no di-
minution of respect in the breast of the General.
DEAR HAMILTON,
I shall be obliged to you for the answer to the address,
as soon as it is convenient to you. If we do not ride to
the Point to see the fleet pass out, I am to have a confer-
ence with Count de Rochambeau, and the engineer, di-
rectly after breakfast, at which I wish you to be present.
I am, sincerely and affectionately, yours,
Geo. Washington.
Half past--, A. M.
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? 374 THE LIFE OP
This interview having taken place, Washington returned
to the army, and immediately ordered them from their quar-
ters, with directions to encamp at Peekskill, whence they
moved down the eastern banks of the Hudson, waiting the
junction of the French forces, which soon after marched.
The advance having arrived, on the sixth of July an ex-
pedition was pushed forward, under General Lincoln, in
the hope of surprising the enemy's works at King's Bridge.
After an unimportant skirmish, the detachment returned to
the main body, then at Dobbs' Ferry, a position on the Hud-
son, a little more than twenty miles from New-York, where
the American army crossed in the disastrous retreat of 1776.
Hamilton, who had proceeded to Albany, after his return
from Newport, anxious to take part in the interesting ope-
rations which were about to occur, finding his application
for a command unattended to, determined to bring the ques-
tion to a definitive issue. The following extract from a let-
ter written to Mrs. Hamilton, gives the course of this affair.
Camp, near Dobbs' Ferry, July 10th, 1781.
"The day before yesterday I arrived here, but for want
of an opportunity could not write any sooner; indeed, I
know of none now. Finding, when I came here, that no-
thing was said on the subject of a command, I wrote the
General a letter, and enclosed him my commission. This
morning Tilghman came to me in his name, pressed me to
retain my commission, with an assurance that he would en-
deavour, by all means, to give me a command, nearly such
as I could have desired in the present circumstances of the
army. Though I know you would be happy to hear I had
rejected this proposal, it is a pleasure my reputation would
not permit me to afford you. I consented to retain my
commission, and accept the command. I quarter, at present,
by a very polite and warm invitation, with General Lincoln,
and experience from the officers of both armies every mark
of esteem. "
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? HAMILTON. 375
It was at this post that Washington first received the in-
telligence that the squadron of De Grasse was approach-
ing the coast of Virginia. A council of war was held, to
which Hamilton was invited by General Washington. The
plan of a southern campaign was then discussed, and though
reluctant to relinquish the attempt on New-York, so long
entertained, it was determined, for the most cogent reasons,
to make a forced march on Lord Cornwallis.
It became of the utmost importance to conceal this pur-
pose. The idea was thrown out, that the French fleet was
expected at Shrewsbury, and that the army was to march
and join it there; and, to complete the deception, lines for
an encampment were marked out on the Jersey side, ovens
constructed, and a body of men advanced, as if to take a
position for the combined forces. At this particular crisis,
Washington felt the full value of his exertions in obtaining
secret intelligence. A communication was constantly kept
up with New-York, and it was soon ascertained that the
deception was complete. The extent of the imposition on
Sir Henry Clinton has always been a subject of surprise,
but a stratagem which was adopted by Washington, and
which fully succeeded, will serve to explain it. There was
an individual in New-Jersey, who at one time held a con-
siderable rank in the militia, and who had been employed
by Washington to gain intelligence. In this service he had
proved himself shrewd, observing, and alert; and the in-
formation he had given, at the commencement of his ca-
reer, had been of much importance. Some time prior to
this period, General Washington had discovered this man
to be a traitor, and that, under cover of serving the Ameri-
can cause, he was in fact in the pay of Sir Henry Clinton.
He determined to take advantage of this discovery, and
under the pretence of employing him to get farther advices,
Washington sent for him to head quarters, where he threw
in his way a map, prepared for the purpose, marked with
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? 3T6 THE LIFE OF
the pretended route of the army to Shrewsbury, and with
plans of the land and naval attack upon New-York. Anx-
ious to confirm his impressions by every possible means,
this same individual sought an interview with Colonel Ha-
milton, and under semblance of a zeal for the American in-
terests, inquired of him the destination of the army. Ha-
milton, confident that a disclosure by him of the actual in-
tentions of the commander-in-chief, would be the most cer-
tain means of deceiving him, as it could not be supposed
that he would communicate such an important and confi-
dential secret, at once replied, "we are going to Virginia. "
The spy, thus completely duped, hastened with his informa-
tion to the enemy, and communicated it to Sir Henry Clin-
ton, who was in vain prompted by others to suspect the real
designs of the Americans, and replied to every importunity,
that he had information of a kind, and from a source, that
could not be disputed.
The intelligence of De Grasse's approach, had been com-
municated to General Washington by the Superintendent
of Finance, who immediately on the receipt of it, proceeded
express to head quarters. The probability of Cornwallis'
capture, now became strong. But a great obstacle existed:
-- it was the utter incapacity of moving the army for want
of funds. Robert Morris, on this occasion, rendered one of
those great services to his country, which no other indivi-
dual could have performed ; -- he assumed the responsibi-
lity of moving the army. Washington, aware of the em-
barrassed finances, inquired where were his means? He
replied, that he did not himself know, but that he would find
them. He immediately returned to Philadelphia, secured
all the water craft on the Delaware, provided supplies on
the route of the army, and while Washington was collecting
a force to protect West Point, raised a large portion of the
necessary funds on his personal responsibility.
