Lessing, Philosophical and
Theological
Writ- ings, trans.
Schelling-Philosophical-Investigations-into-the-Essence-of-Human-Freedom
pfung (das Centrum) erschaffen.
" The unusual use of the accusative here--in den Anfang--has been carried over to the En- glish where it is equally unusual.
The notion of change of location here seems quite intentional and suggests a birth where one is "thrown" into the beginning (although one should not confuse this with Heidegger's notion of "thrownness" or Geworfenheit).
76. This is one of the most enigmatic sections of the Philosophical Investiga- tions where the timeless and time-bound meet. Or do they? Several com- mentators (Hennigfeld, Snow) have tended to view Schelling's insistence
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on an "act which is eternal by its very nature" as somewhat fanciful, a mere fac? on de parler, and they are perhaps correct in holding such a view in so far as the act is associated with an intelligible being, a kind of being that, strictly speaking, has only a most peculiar sort of being. Yet, while it does manifestly seem wise to be cautious about the ontological intent and plausibility of Schelling's claim, it is fair to say that a founding act of the nature Schelling contemplates cannot by definition belong to time if it indeed is in a very strong sense responsible for the governing interpre- tation of, or attitude to, time that is one of the basic constituent ele- ments of a self or character, of whatever is created through this central act. And it is likely fairest to say that a self or character or life is only ex- pressed in a narrative, in a time-bound form which, to be founded as a narrative, to have a structure as a narrative, however, must also be out- side time to that particular extent. For all narratives must have begin- nings, and these beginnings to be beginnings cannot be subject to the rules or terms they create, to use discredited language, they must transcend the narratives they found; if this were not the case, there could be no narrative at all. This point is made with splendid irony by Thomas Mann in his "Prelude: Descent into Hell" with which begins The Stories of Jacob, the first novel in the great tetralogy, Joseph and His Brothers. (For a further development of Mann's opening in connection with similar issues in the context of The Ages of the World, see Wolfram Hogrebe, Pra? dikation und Genesis: Metaphysik als Fundamentalheuristik im Ausgang von Schellings "Die Weltalter" [Frankfurt a. M. : Suhrkamp Ver- lag, 1989], 7. )
Yet, Schelling does seem to be more radical than that in so far as he sug- gests that character is determined in an even more intimate and particular way, determined with reference to a very particular plot-line indeed-- Judas being the paradigm here. It is this particularity itself that might of- fend and bring into doubt Schelling's account because it tends toward a form of metaphysical speculation rather too bold for modern or postmod- ern taste. But, as Z? iz? ek has said, Schelling at his boldest, or wildest, is often also at his closest to everyday experience, and this goes for the kind of thinking he expresses here as well. For choosing a certain narrative, along with all that comes with it, through a founding act is to choose al- ways within a context, to take a position vis-a`-vis a dominating narrative, and this position by its very nature must be a particular one, one that de- fines a self and, as such, seems to reveal a character that is outside the tra- dition which imposes the dominating narrative because it would be ex- traordinarily difficult to explain the possibility of such dissent or particularization without having recourse to that outside. Now, one may hesitate to associate that outside with intelligible character or the like, but some explanatory figure is necessary, since this simple experience of dis- sent is the clearest and most immediate indication of its necessity.
But Schelling appears to stumble into further problems by noting that the free act also is a necessary one. Here again, the answer might be that
the founding act determines, that it is both an act of freedom, a declara- tion in the void, and an imposition of necessity since it dictates all subse- quent acts that flow from it. See ? Zi? zek, The Indivisible Remainder, 16-22.
77. Schelling plays on two basic meanings of the word Anstoss, which can mean either a "hindrance or an "obstacle," as we have translated it here following Gutmann, or an impetus or "motivating factor. " The relation between the two meanings seems quite clear and brings to mind Rousseau's account of the origins of a certain kind of modern eros in the second part of his Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Men. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Men, in The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. and Judith Masters (Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 142-143.
78. What does this kind of predestination mean? Again, as remarked in note 76, the sense of predestination seems to reflect the notion that, as T. S. Eliot says, "in my beginning is my end" ("East Coker"), that the constitu- tive acts by which I become myself also constitute a sort of predestina- tion, that as constitutive acts, they must be outside time, yet they dictate what time will hold.
But, as stated before, the imputation of an eternal character, that someone is bound to a particular character, whether evil or good, is very problematic, not only in itself but also in regard to the kind of theodicy Schelling may be pursuing.
Here emerges the central ambiguity, which we mentioned in terms of the translation of Wesen. Does Schelling argue that there is something akin to an essence in God and human beings or does he deny this pos- sibility? Is there a darkness that conceals a "hidden" light or does light somehow determine itself on its emergence from darkness--in other words, is genesis a genesis of something that precedes genesis or of something that becomes itself in genesis--the older way of saying this is to look at genesis as necessary emergence or as a coalescence of chance.
It seems to us that this ambiguity courses through the entire treatise and is neither openly nor tacitly resolved (and this despite Schelling's closing arguments which very explicitly rehearse one last time the no- tion that God has some kind of innate identity), and its impact on the theodicy and anthropology of the treatise is profound because it shows a fundamental indecision about the possibility of the grand structure of thought set forth in the treatise--in this sense, the latter is indeed both a primary example of idealism and its destruction (and, in this same sense, both of Heidegger's opinions expressed at different times--1936 and 1941--are correct).
79. Here Schelling emphasizes a key point, that evil is not an expression of the passions allowed to reign due to debility, but rather that evil is thoroughly imbued with mind or spirit--to posit the self is to entertain the possibility of evil hitherto "dormant" but nonetheless fundamental, a
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constitutive force in the self, and therefore "radical. " Schelling relies on Kant of course and reproves Fichte, who discusses radical evil in his System der Sittenlehre (1798) at 198-205. Fichte notes:
This is what we presuppose: man will do nothing which is not simply necessary and which, pressed onward by his nature [Wesen], he is not compelled to do. Accordingly, we presuppose an original lethargy [Tra? gheit] in reflection and, as a consequence, in action pursuant to this reflection. Accordingly, this would be a true, positive, radical evil; not just something negative as it hitherto seemed to be. Then it had to be that way as well. We must have something positive merely in order to be able to explain the nega- tive. (Fichte, Werke, IV/199)
80. The Greek means quite literally "by bastard reasoning," a combination which suggests an unanchored and wavering way of thinking that cannot tell the difference between original and copy. The term appears in the Ti- maeus at 52b3 and the crucial portion of the text is this:
So because of all these and other kindred notions, we are also not able on waking up to distinguish clearly the unsleeping and truly ex- isting nature, owing to our dream-like condition, nor to tell the truth--how that it belongs to a copy [eik ? on]--seeing that it has not for its own that for which it came into being, but fleets ever as a phan- tom [fantasma] of something else--to come into existence in some other thing, clinging to existence as best it may, on pain of being nothing at all; whereas to the aid of that which truly is [to ont ? os on] there comes the precise and true argument, that so long as one thing is one thing, and another something different, neither of the two will ever come to exist in the other so that the same thing becomes simul- taneously both one and two. (Plato, Timaeus, trans. R. G. Bury [Cam- bridge, Mass. : Harvard UP (Loeb Classical Library), 1929], 122-125)
81. Buchheim finds a reference to Jacobi's epistolic novel, cumbersomely ti- tled Edward Allwill's Collection of Letters edited by Friedrich Heinrich Ja- cobi with an Addition from Letters of His Own, and, specifically, to letter XX. See Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, trans. George di Giovanni (Montreal & Kingston: McGill- Queen's University Press, 1994), 465-472.
82. Likely a further reference to Jacobi (and perhaps Schlegel as well).
83. The German reads: "Gewissenhaftigkeit erscheint nicht eben notwendig und immer als Enthusiasmus oder als ausserordentliche Erhebung u? ber sich selbst, wozu, wenn der Du? nkel selbstbeliebiger Sittlichkeit niedergesch- lagen ist, ein anderer und noch viel schlimmerer Hochmutsgeist gerne auch
diese machen mo? chte. "
84. Buchheim indicates that the source here is Velleius Paterclus, Historia
romana II 35, 2 (Buchheim, PU 153, n282). The Cato referred to is M. Porcius Cato, called "the younger" or "Uticensis" (95-46 B. C. E. ) to dis- tinguish him from his great ancestor, M. Porcius Cato, the "Censor. " The former Cato was portrayed in antiquity as a veritable incarnation
of Republican virtue, the glory of staunch and stubborn Rome, before the advent of the empire, and this is especially evident in Lucan's dark epic, the Pharsalia, where the famous line, "victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni" ["The winning cause has pleased the gods, but that of the defeated Cato"] (I:128) helped set the tone (with its ironies perhaps less than intact) for Cato's subsequent historical reception.
The Freedom of God
85. The German reads: "Der zweite ist der Wille der Liebe, wodurch das Wort in die Natur ausgesprochen wird, und durch den Gott sich erst perso? nlich macht. " We have preserved the accusative sense of the German that im- plies the active power of the word in regard to nature.
86. King Alfonso X of Castile (1221-1284), called "el sabio," "the learned" or "wise," is portrayed in Pierre Bayle's Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) as having made daring challenges to tradition in the name of scien- tific inquiry. In particular, Alfonso was notorious both for questioning Ptolemaic astronomy and, after having engaged in extensive research on it, for making his blasphemous suggestion that had he been "of God's counsel at the Creation, many things would have been ordered better. " If one wishes to take the issue that far, Alfonso's daring questioning can be seen as an example of the kind of questioning of the architect that leads to his overthrow, a rather neat prefiguration of the principal thrust of modernity. (Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, vol. 2 [Reinier Leers: Amsterdam, 1697], 94-95; Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, 14-18)
87. 2 Sam. 22:27 reads in the Revised Standard Version: With the pure thou dost show
thyself pure,
and with the crooked thou dost show thyself perverse.
88. This citation is from Hamann's Aesthetica in nuce. Eine Rhapsodie in Kab- balistischer Prosa (Hamann, Sa? mtliche Werke, 2:208). Buchheim notes (Buchheim, PU, 158 n316) that the citation is incorrect, the text having appeared in 1762 in Crusades of a Philologist (Kreuzzu? ge des Philologen). The "chamberlain of the Alexandrian church" is probably Origen (c. 185- 254 C. E. ), the outstanding thinker of the Christian East who bears com- parison in significance and scope of thought with St. Augustine, the great difference between the two being that St. Augustine has almost always been celebrated, whereas Origen has been both celebrated and calumni- ated as devoted more to Plato than to the church (indeed, for this reason much of his thought was soundly rejected in the East at the Fifth General Council in 533 C. E. ).
89. Gynaeceum (Gr. gunaik ? on or gunaik ? onitis) denotes those inner rooms of a Greek or Roman house occupied exclusively by women.
90. The German reads: "Inwiefern die Selbstheit in ihrer Lossagung das Prinzip des Bo? sen ist, erregt der Grund allerdings das mo? gliche Prinzip des Bo? sen, aber nicht das Bo? se selber, noch zum Bo? sen. "
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? 168 | NOTES TO PAGES 66-77
91. From Huggard's translation (modified to account for Schelling's use of a Latin translation of the original text which was written in French and dif- fers in the first passage cited in the note):
(1) from section 25 (Schelling's reference to p. 139):
Hence, from the foregoing it is to be concluded that God antece- dently wills all good in itself, that he consequently wills the best as an end, what is indifferent and physical evil as a means, but that he wishes to permit moral evil only as a condition without which the best may not be obtained so that evil surely may not be admitted except in the form of a hypothetical necessity that connects it to the best. (Leibniz, Theodicy, 138)
(2) from section 230 (Schelling's reference to p. 292):
Regarding vice, it has been shown above that it is not the object of a divine decree as means, but as a condition without which--and only to that extent is it permitted. (Leibniz, Theodicy, 270)
The All-Unity of Love
92. This language is derived from Boehme. See part 5 of the Mysterium pan- sophicum included in this volume.
93. Here is a relevant excerpt from the page referred to in Philosophy and Religion:
Now, as the final goal of history is reconciliation with the fall, the latter can also be looked upon from a more positive perspective. For the first selfhood of the ideas was one flowing from the immediate activity of God. But the selfhood and absolute into which they intro- duce themselves through reconciliation is self-given, so that they exist in selfhood as truly independent ideas regardless of their abso- luteness. In this way the fall becomes the means for the complete revelation of God. In so far as God, by virtue of the eternal necessity of his nature, lends selfhood to what is seen, he gives it away itself into finitude and, so to speak, sacrifices it so that the ideas which were in him without a self-given life are called into life; it is precisely in this way that they become capable, as independently existing, to be in the absolute once again, something which happens through a completed morality. (Schelling, Sa? mmtliche Werke, VI: 63)
94. In the Revised Standard Version, the passage reads: "For he must reign, until he has put all his enemies under his feet. " This passage is from Paul's first letter to the Corinthians (15: 25).
95. Indifference is one of the fundamental terms in the so-called philosophy of identity, that is, the philosophical tendency associated with Schelling's writings between 1801 and 1804. This notion of "indifference" is often thought to be the target of Hegel's notorious comments in the "Preface" to The Phenomenology of the Spirit, the empty absolute, the "night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black" (Hegel, Phenome- nology, 9). But it should be hardly surprising that Schelling's conception
of indifference is not to be confused with the Hegelian caricature. Indif- ference is not in fact an absence of difference, a complete surrender to a pure and, thus, unknowable (at least for a finite mind) plenitude, it is not an overcoming of opposition in pure identity, as it were, but, just as it sounds, it is a point of indifference between oppositions where they are in balance, where they are indifferent the one to the other. Indifference as such is the absolute because the first indication of difference must be an indication of limitation.
It must be admitted, however, that Schelling's notion of indifference does little to explain how difference can come to be, that is, how anything can come to be--the origin remains necessarily mysterious, ever a chal- lenge to thought, and a stern reminder of the possible limits to thought.
96. The aphorisms read:
162. The difference between a divine identity and a merely finite one is that, in the former, it is not things which are opposed but need to be connected that are connected but such of which each could exist for itself but yet does not exist without another.
163. This is the mystery of eternal love, that that which would be absolute for itself, although considering it no theft to exist for itself, yet exists only in and with others. If each thing were not a whole, but rather only a part of the whole, there would be no love: there is love, however, because each thing is a whole and nonetheless does not nor can exist without another. (Schelling, Sa? mmtliche Werke, VII: 174)
97. The somewhat overwrought German of the final clause in this sentence reads: ". . . ferner dass nur Gott als Geist die absolute Identita? t beider Prin- zipien, aber nur dadurch und insofern ist, dass und inwiefern beide seiner Perso? nlichkeit unterworfen sind. "
98. This footnote has gathered a good deal of attention. White refers to it in his attempt to adduce evidence for his claim that Schelling is engaging in esotericism (107). More recently, Peter Warnek has argued that the note reflects Schelling's "own thematizing of the movement of the word to re- coil upon the way in which freedom comes to word" (Peter Warnek, "Reading Schelling and Heidegger: The Freedom of Cryptic Dialogue," in Schelling Now, 180). Warnek continues: "Schelling's word of freedom would therefore also have to be the ecstatic movement of freedom bring- ing itself to word; it would be life saying life in the movement of life itself. This is the promise of a 'system of freedom. '" Jason Wirth also makes the following comments on this note:
. . . Schelling expressed the dialogical genesis of everything in the text. The writer composes from a particular perspective and in me- dias res within an unfolding drama still always to be completed. This dialogical demand, this indebtedness to the treatise's subject, does not grant Schelling authority over it. This writing, within a fluid context in which the Wesen can somehow emerge, does not grant Schelling the capacity to render it with sharp determinations.
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170 | NOTES TO PAGES 66-77
This dialogical humility knows that this is not a dialogue between equals because there is no parity among the interlocutors. The in- terlocutors are not einerlei, not of the same kind. A model of such an asymmetrical dialogue might be something like attempting to communicate with nature. Or speaking with animals, not as crea- tures to be trained for human use, but as animals per se. A more classical precedent might be Job's dialogue with the whirlwind. It is a dialogue between bodies and their animas, between the light and its concealed, indwelling darkness. It might be thought of as a di- alogue of the fractured Wesen with itself, producing discontinuities without sublimation. (Wirth, The Conspiracy of Life, 159)
99. The German here is "Finalita? t der Ursachen" or "finality of causes. " What is likely meant by this is clarified by Gutmann who translates Finalita? t by "purposiveness," thereby suggesting that Schelling is alluding to Aristo- telian teleology and, thus, the notion of a causa finalis that is the end for the sake of which (hou eneka) something happens.
100. The Latin source appears to be Horace which Schelling freely varies. Here is the original (Odes II. i):
Motum ex Metello consule civicum bellique causas et vitia et modos
ludumque fortunae gravesque principum amicitias et arma
nondum expiatis uncta cruoribus, periculosae plenum opus aleae,
tractas et incedis per ignes suppositos cineri doloso.
[In our translation: You are treating of the civil commotion under the consulship of Metellus, the causes of war, the mistakes, its phases, the game of fortune, the dire friendships among princes and the arms stained with blood--a task full of dangerous risk--and you go forth through fires hidden beneath treacherous ashes. ]
101. The section reads:
76. Let it not be objected that such rational speculations on the mysteries of religion are forbidden. --The word 'mystery', in early Christian times, meant something quite different from what we understand by it now; and the development of revealed truths into truths of reason is absolutely necessary if they are to be of any help to the human race. When they were revealed, of course, they were not yet truths of reason; but they were revealed in order to become such truths. They were, so to speak, the result of the calculation which the mathematics teacher announces in advance, in order to give his pupils some idea of what they are working towards. If the pupils were satisfied with knowing the result in advance, they
would never learn to calculate, and would frustrate the intention with which the good master gave them a guideline to help them with their work. (G. E.
Lessing, Philosophical and Theological Writ- ings, trans. H. B. Nisbet [Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005], 236)
102. This is an allusion to Herder's philosophy of history and, more specifi- cally, to his theory about the origin and development of Christianity as outlined, for example, in his Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Mankind (Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit). In that work, Herder insists that Christianity, just as all religions, including those of the pagan cultures, must be traced back to an original religion [Urrelig- ion] and that the very idea of religion has always been a primary fact of human life. (See 9, V. "Religion Is the Oldest and Holiest Tradition of the Earth," in Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, ed. Martin Bollacher [Frankfurt a. M. : Deutscher Klas- siker Verlag, 1989], 372-379. )
103. This alludes to Goethe's famous bon mot mentioned at the end of Baader's essay "On the Assertion that There Can Be No Wicked Use of Reason. " See that essay in this volume.
104. The essay by Baader noted here is called "On the Analogy between the Drive to Know and to Procreate" (U? ber die Analogie des Erkenntnis- und des Zeugungs-Triebes). See Franz Xaver von Baader, Sa? mmtliche Werke, ed. F. Hoffmann, vol. 1 (Aalen: Scientia Verlag [Reprint], 1963), 39-48.
105. According to Buchheim, this idea was prevalent in theosophic literature and, of course, in Boehme (Buchheim, PU 167, n372-373).
106. This is likely another reference to Schlegel and his Indierbuch (see note 7 above).
SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTS
Introductory Note
1. For an extensive treatment of the relation between Schelling and Boehme, see Robert F. Brown, The Later Philosophy of Schelling: The Influ- ence of Boehme on the Works of 1809-1815 (Lewisburg: Bucknell Univer- sity Press, 1977).
2. For a broad overview of the Pantheism debate, see Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard UP, 1987).
3. In this respect, see Wirth, The Conspiracy of Life, 65-100.
Boehme
1. Jakob Bo? hme, Sa? mtliche Schriften, ed. Will-Erich Peukert, vol 4 (Stuttgart: Frohmann-Holzboog [Reprint], 1955-1960), 97-111.
Baader
1. Franz Xaver von Baader, Sa? mmtliche Werke, 33-38. 2. "Evil is not a story, it's a power. "
NOTESTOPAGES81-130 | 171
172 | NOTES TO PAGES 81-130
Lessing
1. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Werke, ed. Herbert G. Go? pfert, vol. VIII (Mu- nich: Hanser Verlag, 1979), 118-120.
Jacobi
1. The translation follows Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, U? ber die Lehre des Spi- noza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, ed. Marion Lauschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000), 23-36 and Lessing, Werke VIII, 565- 571. As to the former, we have attempted to follow as closely as possible the various forms of emphasis in the text.
2. En-Sof [Heb: "that which has no end/the infinite"] refers to the notion of a hidden or absent God, a deus absconditus, without name and form which is the ground of all beings. The term developed into a central con- cept in the Kabbalistic philosophy of the Middle Ages. (See Go? bel, "En- soph," Lessing, Werke VIII, 751 and Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism [New York: Schocken Books, 1946], 269-273. )
3. salto mortale [literally, "by means of a fatal leap," in which a person turns head over heels in the air, e. g. , somersault].
4. This term comes from section 47 of the Monadology, which reads as fol- lows: "Accordingly, God alone is the primary unity or the original simple substance, of which all the created or derivative monads are products. They originate, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of the divin- ity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the created being, to which it is essential to be limited . . . " See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadology, ed. and trans. Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburgh: Uni- versity of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 162.
5. Jacobi likely refers here to a Latin translation of Principes de la nature et de la grace fonde? s en raison.
6. Jacobi is referring to the "Confession of Augsburg" by Melanchthon, Lu- ther, and other theologians that was submitted to the emperor during the Reichstag of Augsburg in 1530. This "Confession" continued to incite fierce disputes between orthodox and reformed Lutherans thereafter. (See Go? bel, "Augsburgische Konfession," Lessing, Werke VII, 739. )
7. Jacobi's salto mortale is paired with a play on Kopf [head, intellect] here. The implication is that one must humble one's intellect before this leap, which has no use for it; a leap which, in other words, represents a subor- dination of reason to faith.
8. The text follows Jacobi, U? ber die Lehre des Spinoza, 166-167. As before, we have attempted to follow closely the various forms of emphasis in the text.
9. Jacobi is referring to Voltaire's tragedy Mahomet or Le fanatisme ou Ma- homet le Prophe`te (1743).
Herder
1. Johann Gottfried Herder, Sa? mtliche Werke, ed. B. Suphan, vol. 16 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1881-1913), 552-560.
Index
Page numbers in italics refer to the supplementary texts and the notes to them.
absolute: accession to, xiii; bond, 59; causality, 11; dualism of good and evil, 74; existence, 59; freedom, 50; and the I, 3, 10, 23; identity, 3, 27, 28, 68 (of light and darkness), 71 (of ground and existence, of good and evil), 148n32; indifference, 68, 76; in the, 168nn93, 95; knowledge, xxvii; necessity, 60, 61; personal- ity, 62; self-realization of, xii, xiii, xiv; self-revelation of, xx; sub- stance, 23; unity, 40, 49; utterly groundless, 52
actuality, 26, 62, 67, 120, 148n32; pos- sibility and, 58, 61, 145n26, 158n60; potency and, 44, 54, 70; potentiality and, 66, 75; and the re- versed god, 54
abstraction, 20, 58, 60
Adorno, Theodor W. (1903-1969),
133n16
Adams, Robert M. , 160n69 Alfonso X, King of Castile
(1221-1284), 167n87
anarchy, xxxiii, 29, 30, 62, 151n40 animal(s): becoming, 40, 100; of Buri-
dan, 48; and consciousness, 133n15; dark principle in, 40; in- stinct, 39, 40, 76; soul of, 124; sur- render to, 101; understanding of, 99; and unity, 40
animality, 39
Antoninus Pius (86-161 C. E. ), 121 Apollodorus of Athens (b. ca. 180
B. C. E. ), 143n22 Aphrodite (Venus), 143n22
Archaeus, 154n52
Arians (Arianism), 39, 157n57 Aristotle (384-322 B. C. E. ), xxxiii,
140n13, 147n32, 155n53
Arius (256-336 C. E. ), 194n57
ataxia, 38
atheism, 19, 83, 136n1
atomic swerve, 48, 159n67 Augustine of Hippo, Saint (354-430),
36-37
autonomy, xvi, xvii, xviii, xix, 142n18
Baader, Franz Xaver (1765-1841), 35, 40, 43, 75, 81-82, 158m57, 171nn103, 104, 171n1
Bayle, Pierre (1647-1706), 154n53, 155n55, 167n86
Beach, Edward, 144n26, 158n60 Beauvoir, Simone de (1908-1986),
xxii, 134n32
becoming, x, 17, 28, 51, 59, 66,
150n36, 152n45; animal, 40, 100;
real, 54, 60
Being, 17, 24, 50, 51, 70, 148n32; ab-
solute causality and, 11; of abso- lute identity, 27, 28; and becoming, 66; in God, 72; ground of, 18; in the ground, 72; human, 53; jointure of, xxv; and mechanistic laws, 120; and non-Being, 35; primal, 21, 143n24; as self, 38; and sin, 55, 56; and translation of, xxxiii, xxxiv; and what does not have, 67; and will, 21, 53, 143n24
beings in the world, xxxii, 11, 18, 20, 23, 25
174 | INDEX
Beiser, Frederick, 171n2 Bernstein, Richard, x, 131n3,
133nn14, 18
Bilfinger, Georg Bernhard
(1693-1750), 112
Blumenberg, Hans (1920-1996), xi,
132n8
Bo? ckh, Philipp August (1785-1867), 41 Boehme, Jacob (1575-1624), 81,
142n18, 147n31, 150n37, 153n50, 157n56, 159n63, 168n92, 171n105, 171n1
body, 13, 31, 67, 96, 109, 154n53; of the animal, 156n55; as appear- ance, 125; concept of, 14; eyes of, 115; internal selfhood of, 38; ma- ternal, 29; part, 18; passions of, xxiii; of previous world, 45; real- ism as, 26; root of cold in, 63; soul and, 14; transparent, 33
bond, 31, 56; of creaturely existence, 55; of forces, 31, 34, 40, 43, 54; of gravity, 30; of principles, 41, 42, 56, 59; of love, 45, 55; of personality, 75
Bowie, Andrew, 158n60 Breazeale, Daniel, 144n25
Brown, Robert F. , 133n15, 171n1 Bruno, Giordano (1548-1600), 14,
140n13
Buchheim, Thomas, xxxv, 135n4,
139n9, 140n13, 143n23, 150nn33, 38, 151n43, 153n50, 154n52, 157n56, 158n59, 166nn81, 84, 167n88, 171n105
Buridan, Jean (ca. 1300-1358), 48, 159n66, 162n71
Cassirer, Ernst (1874-1945), 132n7 categorical imperative, xvii, xxiii, 57 Cato, M. Porcius "the younger" or
"Uticensis" (95-46 B. C. E. ), 57,
166n84
causality, 11, 141n14
centrum, 33, 55, 64, 65, 88, 159n64,
163n75; basis or, 44; and beginning of the creation, 51; dark, 35; and
dark principle, 40; as essence of willing, 47; and God, 72; initial, 42; of nature, 34; of particular wills, 32; revealed, 37; of a yearning, 42
cosmourgos, 144n24 cosmotheoros, 138n6
chaos, xx, 42, 45, 128, 155n53; and
nonrational ground, 145n26, 151n40; offspring of, 65; primor- dial, 152n47; struggle against, 46
conscientiousness, 56-57 consequence: in relation to Spinozan
substance, 12, 16-18, 20, 141n14,
149n32
contingency, xxii, xxv, xxvi, 48-49,
50, 52
contraction, xx, xxi, xxii, xxviii,
xxxiii, 110, 149n32, 150n32 copula, 13, 14, 139n10
creation: accomplished, 91, 92; as
act, 60, 65; actual, 62; and connec- tion, 128; and evil, xxiv, 40, 53, 58; final purpose of, 66-67; first, 42-44, 47, 51, 52, 53, 68; and fury, 89; and God, x, 46, 149n32, 155n53; ground of, 55; hate and love in, 127; and initial ground of nature, 45; and identity, xix; hierarchy of, xxi; and King Alfonso X, 167n86; from nothingness, 40; process of, 31; rationality of, xi; ever-renewed, 11; second, 46; and struggle, xxviii; and the universe, 123; of the world, 90, 110; as yearning of the One, 59-60
creature(s), xvii, xxii, 23, 29, 34, 55, 88, 90-92, 99; and dark principle in, 43; and evil, 42; free will in, 159n67; God and, 146n27; for human use, 170n98; imperfection of, 36-37, 155n53; and nothing- ness, 40; self-will of, 32-33, 42, 47
Crocker, Lester G. , 143n20
d'Holbach, Paul-Henri Thiry (1723-1789), 142n20
darkness, 30, 37, 41, 46, 65-70, 90, 93, 156n55, 170n98; and ground, xx-xxi, 29-33, 62, 151n40, 152n47; and light, xx, 35, 42, 44, 55, 66, 113, 165n78; principle of, 44, 156n55
depths, 45, 47, 56; and ground, 30-32, 34
Derrida, Jacques (1930-2004), 161n70
Descartes, Rene? (1596-1650), 26 Desmond, William, 133n14 determinism, 49, 160nn68, 69 devil, 36, 64, 96, 97, 99
dialectic, xii, xiii, xiv, 14, 63, 64, 69, 75, 76, 84, 149n32
difference, xiv, 15, 169n95; between God and man, 150n32, 169n96; identity and, 47, 148n32; non-, 15; specific, 22
differentiation, xiv; and divine imagi- nation, 18, 149n32; of nature from God, 27; of things from God, 12; of understanding and will, 36
discord, 19, 35, 118; of principles, 41, 54, 56
disease, 18, 34-35, 38, 66 disharmony, 38. See ataxia dissonance, x, xxv, xxviii, 150n32 distemperance, 38, 157n56 Dostoevsky, F. M. (1821-1881),
152n44
drive, xiv, 43, 75, 76, 99, 101, 116,
117-119, 122-123
dualism, 24, 30, 68, 71, 74, 146n27; Kantian, xii
Eliot, T. S. (1888-1965), 165n78 emanation, 18, 25, 40, 73, 146n27 Empedocles (ca. 490-430 B. C. E. ), 10,
138n8
Empiricus, Sextus (2nd Century
C. E. ), 10, 139n8
enthusiasm, 26; conscientiousness
as, 57; excesses of, xv; for the
good, 40, 100, 158n57; virtue as, 58 Epictetus (cc. 55-135), 121
Epicurus (ca. 341-270 B. C. E. ), 48 Erasmus of Rotterdam, Desiderius
(1466-1536), 71
essence: of absolute identity and
gravity, 27, 148n32; of acting indi- vidual, 49-53, 160n70, 165n78; of the body, 154n53; conceptual pri- ority of, 29; of fury, 90; of God, xiv, xix, xxxv, 30, 60, 62; and ground, 151n41, 152n47; of human corrupt- ness, 99; of the human soul, 16, 29, 38, 41, 112; and inner necessity, 49; of intelligible being, 49-50; life-, 87; of the moral world, 14; of nature, 31, 89; and positive and negative philosophy, 144n26; of reason and knowledge, 10; revealing itself in its opposite, 41; of things-in- themselves, 22; of willing, 47; of yearning, 29
estrangement, 25, 146n27 eternity, 66, 87, 88-90, 92-93; and
eternal beginning, 51-53. See
predestination
Euclid of Alexandria (ca. 325-265
B. C. E. ), 58
existence, xi, xxxiv, 29, 43, 65, 67,
109, 116, 125, 166n80; absolute, 59; of beings, 11, 25; cause of, 145n26; creaturely, 63; and essence, xxxiv; and evil, xi, xii, 154n53; and God, xxi, xxii, xxv-xxvi, xxxv, 11, 30, 45, 55, 62, 63, 124, 139n10; and ground, xx, xxv, xxviii, xxxiii, xxxiv, 27, 44, 66, 70, 71, 84, 141n14, 147n32, 149n32, 150nn32, 34; medi- ated, 119; personal, 62, 70, 117; ra- tional, 117-118; of spirit, 122
expansion: and contraction, xx, xxviii, xxxiii, 110, 149n32; of forces, 30
evil: and the absolute, xiii; aroused in creation, 53; fundamental being of, 24, 41, 73; and chaos, 42; and cognition, xiii; as conditio sine qua non, 65; dark principle of, 53; and
INDEX | 175
176 | INDEX
evil (continued)
emanation, 25, 73; end of, 66-68; and finitude, 38; and freedom, ix, xxv, 23, 24, 52; general, 47, 53; ground of, 36, 37, 39; matter and, 25; metaphysical, xi, xxiv, 36; ori- gin of, 26, 36, 42, 63; passions and, 53; as lower degree of perfec- tion, 24; as perversion, xvii, xxii, 35, 38, 44, 54-55, 63, 64; as posi- tive force, xxiii; possibility of, 33-40, 54-58, 62, 165n79; as pri- mal ground, 44; principle of, 36, 53, 64, 65, 155n53; privative no- tion of, xi-xiv, 23-25; as produc- tive, xiii; propensity to, xvi, xviii, 47, 52; radical, x, xv-xix, xxiii, 53, 166n79; reality of, 23, 33, 39-48; and search to become a god, xxvii; self-will and, 34; solicitation to, 41; and spirit, 40, 44, 46; and system, xii, xxix; temptation to, 41; threefold distinction of, xi; and the understanding, 36; unity severable in man and, 33, 42
fatalism, 11, 20, 108, 114
feeling, 11, 12, 19, 21, 22, 29, 55, 75,
122; of having strayed from the centrum, 55; and compulsion, 59; and disease, 35; of eternal begin- ning (of each individual), 51; of freedom, 9, 11, 17, 111, 121; of honor, 121; moral, 75; philoso- phers of, 56; of reality, 125
fever, 56
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1762-1814),
3, 10, 20, 22, 29, 50, 53, 59, 136n1, 137n2, 138n6, 161n70; Doctrine of Science, 139n9; Die Grundzu? ge des gegenwa? rtigen Zeitalters, U? ber das Wesen des Gelehrten, Anweisung zum seligen Leben, 151n43; System der Sittenlehre, 166n79
finitude, 38, 40, 109, 168n93 Frank, Manfred, ix, 131n1
freedom: absolute, 50; and the ani- mal, 100; as Being-in-God, 72; as capacity for good and evil, 23; of choice, 61; concept of, 9-10, 17, 21, 23, 48, 162n71; and contin- gency, 49; disease and, 34; and the eternal, 18; within God, 145n27; and idealism, 49-53; and imma- nence, 23-25; as incompatible with system, 9, 138n7; and the "Kantian paradox," xviii; loss of in- itial, 56; and necessity, xix, xxvi, 4, 10, 50, 56, 143n23, 161n70, 163n73; and pantheism, 16-19; and per- sonality, 10; as one and all of phi- losophy, 22; problem of, ix-xxvi; and propensity to evil, xviii, 52; as rule of the intelligent principle over sensual desires, 39; as self- activity, 120; and system, 9-11, 49; as unlimited power, 11; and the will, xvi-xix, 4, 47
Fuhrmans, Horst, 138n7
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1900-2002), 161n70
Gabler, Christian (1770-1821), 137n5 God: as absolute identity, 71; and
antichrist, 97-98; as author, 142n18; and Babel, 94; as cogni- tion of spiritual light, 56; and col- ors, 92-93; and creation, 46; the devil and, 54, 96; and emanation, 40; as eternal love, 54; existence of, 3, 27, 124, 145n26, 149n32, 152n47; as expansion and contrac- tion, 110; eye of soul and, 115; freedom within, 145n27; free will of, 64, 94-95, 97; as general law, 60; and ground, xxi-xxii, 20, 27-29, 42, 45, 46, 61, 63; God begotten in, 30; hidden, 172n2; homology with human beings, xxvi, xxvii; imma- nence of things in, 11-26, 72, 139n10; inseverability (or indissol- ubility) of principles in, xxiv, 33,
41, 153n51; Kantian autonomy and, xvi-xix, 134n30; Leibniz's concept of, xiv, 154n53, 168n91; as a life, 66-68; as living unity of forces, 59; man in, 72; and matter, 41; as moral being, 60; and nature, 59; and necessity, xxi, xxvi, 61, 168n93; perfection of creation and, 61; and personality, 59, 62, 73; of the philosophers, xiii-xiv, xv, xxvii; point of view of, xiii, xv; and predestination, 52, 165n78; presci- ence of, 52; as primum passivum, 76; as principle of pure form and intelligibility, xx; and privation theory of evil, 36-37; and the pro- claimed word, 32; as real, 47; rep- resentation of, 30-32; self- revelation of, xx, 47, 58, 59, 60, 65; reversed, 54; separation of man from, 33; separation of things from, 31; sin and, 55; as spirit, 47, 59, 71, 86-88, 92, 122; theodicy and, ix-xxix, 58-66; as unity of light and darkness, 32-33; as unity of possibility and actuality, 61
Go? bel, Helmut, 172nn2, 6 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang
(1749-1832), xiii, xviii, 83, 102,
133n13, 171n103 Goeze, Johann Melchior
(1717-1786), 81, 83
golden age, 45, 159n62
Graves, Robert (1895-1985), 147n30 gravity, 125-126, 128; and light,
27-28, 30, 147n32; of the planets,
156n55
ground: ambiguity of, 152n47; as an-
archic, xxv, 29, 62; attractive force of, 46, 66; and becoming of things, 28; beginning-, 107; of the birth of spirit (second principle of dark- ness), 44; and consequence, 17-18; and the dark principle, 31-33, 44, 66; and desire, 43; di- vided, 31; and disease, 34; and ex-
istence, xx, xxv, xxviii, 27, 141n14, 147n32; and essence, 151n41; and/of evil, 36-37, 39, 44, 47, 53, 63; and the fall, 48, 55; force active in, 40; freedom as, 22, 26; and God, xxi-xxii, 20, 27, 28, 42, 45, 61, 63; and the good, 68; and gravity, 27-28, 30; and the ideal principle, 59; and the indivisible remainder, 29; of magia, 85; man as emerging from, 32; meaning of, 134n28, 145n26; of nature, 27, 34, 39, 44, 45, 70; and the non-ground, 69-70; and personality, 75; perversion of relation to existence, xxii; primal, 66; principle of evil and, 64, 65; re- alism and, 26; of selfhood, 70; self- positing and, 51; and self-will, 33-34; and sin, 55; and solicitation, 41, 63; and the understanding, 36; and unity, 45; will of, 42, 45, 47, 59, 63, 66-67; and the yearning, 30, 72
Gutmann, James, xxxiii, 142n18, 151nn39, 40, 165n77, 170n99
Hamann, Johann Georg (1730-1788), 64, 83, 152n44, 167n88
harmony, xxiv, 52, 56, 126; preestab- lished, x, xi
Hayden-Roy, Priscilla, 135n1, 151n39 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
(1770-1831), x, xii-xv, xviii, xxv, 81, 133nn13, 14, 143n24, 146n27, 163n72; Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, xiii, 133n15; Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, xii, 132n11; Phenomenology of Spirit, 133n12, 138n6, 168n95
Heraclitus (535-475 B. C. E. ), 149n32 Herder, Johann Gottfried
(1744-1803), 82, 83, 84, 171n102 Hermanni, Friedrich, 131nn2, 10,
134nn35, 37, 153n51,
Heidegger, Martin (1889-1976), ix, xi,
xxv-xxvi, xxviii, xxxii, 161n70, 163n75, 165n78; The Metaphysical
INDEX | 177
178 | INDEX
Heidegger (continued)
Foundations of Logic, 132n7, 140n13; Plato's Sophist, 153n49; The Principle of Reason, 132n9; Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, ix, xxv, 131nn1, 4, 134n36, 137nn1, 6, 162n71
Hesiod (ca. 700 B. C. E. ), 159n52 Horace, or Quintus Horatius Flaccus
(65-27 B. C. E. ), 151n42, 170n100 Horkheimer, Max (1895-1973), 133n16 Hogrebe, Wolfram, 164n76
idealism, ix, 3, 17, 20-23, 26, 49, 59; science and, 137n6; transcenden- tal, 161n70; destruction of, 165n78
identity, xix, 117, 118, 152n47; abso- lute, 27-28, 68, 69, 70, 71, 76, 147n32; as absolute indifference, 68; and difference, 47; empty, 139n10; and essence, xxxiv; of evil, 64; between God and beings, 25; between God and human beings, xxvi, 169n96; the I as, 3; innate, 165n78; law of, 13-17, 50, 140n13; of light and darkness, 32-33, 68, 70; mechanism and spirit, 4; philo- sophy of, 136n1, 168n95; of subjec- tive and objective, 144n24, 161n70
immanence: of things in God, 11-26, 72, 139n10
indifference: of existence and ground, xxii; as form of freedom, 162n71; and God, 24; and the non- ground, xxviii, 68-70, 73, 76; and philosophy of identity, 168n95; point of, 127, 129, 130
individuality, 15, 16, 21, 35, 47, 53 infinity, 62, 107, 159n67 imagination: divine, 18; as origin of
good and evil, 88-90; of peoples, 43; philosophical, xiv; and sin, 54-55; will and, 87
Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich (1743-1819), 82, 83, 100, 136n1,
138n7, 141n15, 143n21, 161n70,
166nn81, 82
Jacobs, Wilhelm G. , 132n11 Jesus Christ, 51, 68, 98, 157n57 Judas, 51, 164n76
Juvenal (1st-2nd C. E. ), 160n68
Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804), ix, x, xii, xv-xix, xxiii-xxiv, xxvii, xxxii, 4, 22, 49, 53, 58, 83, 134nn26, 30, 138n6, 140n13, 142n19, 145n26, 146n27, 161n70, 166n79; Critique of Pure Reason, 141n16, 147n29; Metaphysical Foundations of Natu- ral Science, 137n4; Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 160n68
Kepler, Johannes (1571-1630), 37, 155n53, 156n55
Kierkegaard, Soren Aabye (1813-1855), 161n70
Kru? ll, Philipp, 135n1
La Mettrie, Julien Offray de (1709-1751), 142n20
Laurence, Joseph, 131n3, 134nn24, 34
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1646-1716), x, xi-xii, xiii-xiv, xv, xxv, 14, 16-17, 26, 36, 37, 49, 60, 61, 65, 81, 107, 110-112, 132n7, 140n13, 141n15, 160n69, 172n4; Es- says on Theodicy, 154n53, 156n55, 160n69, 168n91; Opuscules et frag- ments ine? dits, 140n13
Lessing, Ephraim Gotthold (1729-1781), 74, 81, 82-83, 171n101
light: gravity and, 27-28, 30, 147n32; principle of, 33, 150n32
Lo? with, Karl (1897-1973), 133n13 logic, 14, 140n13, 157n55, 161n70; of
the enigma, 28
logos, xiv, xx; and Arianism, 157n57,
159n63; being of God, xxi Long, A. A. , 159n67
love, 55, 60, 62, 64, 65, 68, 75, 95; bond of, 45, 55; divine, 58, 67; eter- nal, 169n96; God as, 54, 61; hate and, 127-130, 138n8; human will and, 63; inner, 125; motility of, 41; as motive passion, 109; natural, 119; and the non-ground, 70; and philosophy, 76; pure, 122-123; and Pygmalion, 21, 143n22; and the spirit, 30, 34, 42, 44; of unity, 97; will of, 42, 47, 59, 70; word of, 45
Lucan, Marcus Annaeus (39-65 C. E. ), 167n84
Lucretius (ca. 99-50 B. C. E. ), 159n67 Luther, Martin (1483-1546), 51,
172n6
malum metaphysicum. See evil Mann, Thomas (1875-1955), 164n76 Marquard, Odo, 131n3, 132n11 matter, xvi, 25, 30, 33, 54, 146n28; dy-
namism of, 137n4; imperfection of, 38, 155n53; inertia of, 37; Kant's dynamic theory of, 137n4; mag- netic, 111; Platonic, 30, 41; primal, 107; and spirit, 112
Maximilian I, King of Bavaria (1756-1825), 137n3
mechanism, 4, 14, 108, 118, 119, 120, 122
Melanchthon, Philipp (1497-1560),
172n6
Melissus of Samos (ca. 5th Century B. C. E. ), 155n55
Michalson, Jr. , Gordon E. , 133nn18, 20, 134n25
modification(s), 73; desire and, 116, 118; of substance, 12, 16, 20, 26, 140n14
Moiso, Francesco, 157n56
monads, 16, 110, 172n4 monotheletes (monotheletism), 39,
157n57
morality, 56-58, 64, 168n93; and radi-
cal evil, xv
mysticism, 81, 121
Nabokov, V. V. (1899-1977), xxxi nature, 18, 21, 22, 24, 42, 64, 71, 108;
anarchy of, 30, 44; -being, 88; blind, 145n26; divine, 61, 158n57; drop-forming principium in, 126; essence of, 31; eternal, 89-90, 92; and European philosophy, 26; and evil, 43; as first (or old) Testa- ment, 72; forces of, 14; and God, 26, 27, 59, 65, 72, 87, 122; and ground, 30, 34, 37, 39, 44, 45-46, 70, 147n32; human, 53, 120, 158n57; as lying beyond absolute identity, 28; -language, 92-93, 95; law(s) of, 60, 123, 125, 127-129, 154n53, 156n55; -life, 88-89; life in, 57; magia of, 96; man and, 161n70; mastery of, xiv, xxvii; mathematics and, 132n7; mechanistic and dy- namic notions of, 20, 21, 142n20; and the moral world, 14; as older revelation, 77; personality and, 59; philosophy of, xx, 4, 10, 21, 27, 31, 84, 136n1, 137n5; science of, 43; and spirit, 4, 85-86; stirring life of the craving as, 86; and the subject, 151n43; and the turba, 91; typology in, 73; the understanding and, 30, 31; and unnature, 101; and the veil of dejection, 62-63; and will, 32, 33, 34
necessity, 11, 19, 50, 51, 164n76; ab- solute, 50, 60, 61; abstract, 60; and contingency, xxvi; of death, 48, 67; divine, xxi, xxv, 57, 168n93; empiri- cal, 49, 50; of evil, 25, 39, 146n28; and freedom, xix, xxvi, 4, 10, 50, 56, 143n23, 161n70; geometric, 43, 59; higher, 49; holy, 56, 129; hypo- thetical, 168n91; inner, 49, 50, 148n32; laws of, 163n73; logical, 58, 15n53; mechanical, 59; meta- physical, 61, 154n53; moral, 61; of sin, 48; unconscious, 58
Neiman, Susan, 133n18, 135n39, 167n86
INDEX | 179
180 | INDEX
Niethammer, Friedrich Immanuel (1766-1848), 3, 137n2
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm (1844-1900), x, 134n38, 146n27
non-ground [der Ungrund], 68-70, 73, 81, 85, 87, 88
Norman, Judith, xxxv, 131n3, 135n3, 151n39
nothingness, xi, xx, xxi, 16, 40, 69,
125
Oetinger, Friedrich Christoph (1702-1782), 157n56
omnipotence, xi, 11-12, 41, 42, 45, 146n27; of the will, 86, 87, 120, 121
opposition: being and, 66; of good and evil, 24, 25, 38, 44, 46, 58, 71; and ground, 42; indifference and, 69; to love, 65; of nature and spirit, 4; of necessity and freedom, 4; overcoming of, 77, 169n95; and self-will, 64; of sin, 55; of subject and object, 3; and unity, 14
Origen (ca. 182-251 C. E. ), 167n88 Ovid (43 B. C. E. -17 C. E. ), 143n22,
159n62
pandemonism, 25
pantheism, 11-12, 15-17, 19-23, 25,
27, 71; Pantheism debate [Pan- theismusstreit], 82-84, 143n21, 171n2; as immanence of things in God, 139n10
Paracelsus, or Philip Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim (1493-1541), 154n52
participation, 23, 67, 146n27 Paterclus, Velleius (ca. 19 B. C. E. -31
C. E. ), 166n84
Peetz, Siegbert, 138n7, 143n21 Pelikan, Jarolslav, 157n57 periphery, 33, 34, 35, 43, 47. See
centrum
personality, 4, 10, 33, 74, 75, 110; ab-
solute, 62; concept of, 38, 73, 142n18; God as, 59-60, 66, 71, 73;
and man, 62; spirit and, 66, 75 Pinkard, Terry, 134n26
Pippin, Robert, 133n19, 134n26,
161n70
Plato (427-347 B. C. E. ), 10, 14, 30, 39,
41, 142n19, 151n39, 153n49, 155n53, 167n88; Theaetetus 153n48; Timaeus, 44, 138n8, 152n45, 166n80
Plotinus (ca. 205-270 C. E. ), 25, 146n28
possibility: and actuality, 61, 158n60; bare, 144n26; concept of, 61; empty, 61; of evil, 33, 36, 40, 54, 58, 62, 169n79; of good and evil, 33, 153n51; of immediate cognition, 76-77; of salvation, 46; of several worlds, 62
potency, 28, 44, 54, 62, 63, 67, 70, 148n32
predeterminism, 160n68 predestination, 52, 165n78 principles: absolute identity of, 71;
in discord, 54, 56; existence and ground, xxii; good and evil, 54; lig- ature of, 56; light and darkness, 32-34, 40-42, 69; and personality, 75; perversion of, 35-36; severabil- ity of, 33; unity of, 40, 41, 66, 68, 70; universal, xxiii
Pygmalion, 21, 143n22 Pythagoras of Samos (582-507
B. C. E.
76. This is one of the most enigmatic sections of the Philosophical Investiga- tions where the timeless and time-bound meet. Or do they? Several com- mentators (Hennigfeld, Snow) have tended to view Schelling's insistence
NOTESTOPAGES40-58 | 163
164 | NOTES TO PAGES 40-58
on an "act which is eternal by its very nature" as somewhat fanciful, a mere fac? on de parler, and they are perhaps correct in holding such a view in so far as the act is associated with an intelligible being, a kind of being that, strictly speaking, has only a most peculiar sort of being. Yet, while it does manifestly seem wise to be cautious about the ontological intent and plausibility of Schelling's claim, it is fair to say that a founding act of the nature Schelling contemplates cannot by definition belong to time if it indeed is in a very strong sense responsible for the governing interpre- tation of, or attitude to, time that is one of the basic constituent ele- ments of a self or character, of whatever is created through this central act. And it is likely fairest to say that a self or character or life is only ex- pressed in a narrative, in a time-bound form which, to be founded as a narrative, to have a structure as a narrative, however, must also be out- side time to that particular extent. For all narratives must have begin- nings, and these beginnings to be beginnings cannot be subject to the rules or terms they create, to use discredited language, they must transcend the narratives they found; if this were not the case, there could be no narrative at all. This point is made with splendid irony by Thomas Mann in his "Prelude: Descent into Hell" with which begins The Stories of Jacob, the first novel in the great tetralogy, Joseph and His Brothers. (For a further development of Mann's opening in connection with similar issues in the context of The Ages of the World, see Wolfram Hogrebe, Pra? dikation und Genesis: Metaphysik als Fundamentalheuristik im Ausgang von Schellings "Die Weltalter" [Frankfurt a. M. : Suhrkamp Ver- lag, 1989], 7. )
Yet, Schelling does seem to be more radical than that in so far as he sug- gests that character is determined in an even more intimate and particular way, determined with reference to a very particular plot-line indeed-- Judas being the paradigm here. It is this particularity itself that might of- fend and bring into doubt Schelling's account because it tends toward a form of metaphysical speculation rather too bold for modern or postmod- ern taste. But, as Z? iz? ek has said, Schelling at his boldest, or wildest, is often also at his closest to everyday experience, and this goes for the kind of thinking he expresses here as well. For choosing a certain narrative, along with all that comes with it, through a founding act is to choose al- ways within a context, to take a position vis-a`-vis a dominating narrative, and this position by its very nature must be a particular one, one that de- fines a self and, as such, seems to reveal a character that is outside the tra- dition which imposes the dominating narrative because it would be ex- traordinarily difficult to explain the possibility of such dissent or particularization without having recourse to that outside. Now, one may hesitate to associate that outside with intelligible character or the like, but some explanatory figure is necessary, since this simple experience of dis- sent is the clearest and most immediate indication of its necessity.
But Schelling appears to stumble into further problems by noting that the free act also is a necessary one. Here again, the answer might be that
the founding act determines, that it is both an act of freedom, a declara- tion in the void, and an imposition of necessity since it dictates all subse- quent acts that flow from it. See ? Zi? zek, The Indivisible Remainder, 16-22.
77. Schelling plays on two basic meanings of the word Anstoss, which can mean either a "hindrance or an "obstacle," as we have translated it here following Gutmann, or an impetus or "motivating factor. " The relation between the two meanings seems quite clear and brings to mind Rousseau's account of the origins of a certain kind of modern eros in the second part of his Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Men. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Men, in The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. and Judith Masters (Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 142-143.
78. What does this kind of predestination mean? Again, as remarked in note 76, the sense of predestination seems to reflect the notion that, as T. S. Eliot says, "in my beginning is my end" ("East Coker"), that the constitu- tive acts by which I become myself also constitute a sort of predestina- tion, that as constitutive acts, they must be outside time, yet they dictate what time will hold.
But, as stated before, the imputation of an eternal character, that someone is bound to a particular character, whether evil or good, is very problematic, not only in itself but also in regard to the kind of theodicy Schelling may be pursuing.
Here emerges the central ambiguity, which we mentioned in terms of the translation of Wesen. Does Schelling argue that there is something akin to an essence in God and human beings or does he deny this pos- sibility? Is there a darkness that conceals a "hidden" light or does light somehow determine itself on its emergence from darkness--in other words, is genesis a genesis of something that precedes genesis or of something that becomes itself in genesis--the older way of saying this is to look at genesis as necessary emergence or as a coalescence of chance.
It seems to us that this ambiguity courses through the entire treatise and is neither openly nor tacitly resolved (and this despite Schelling's closing arguments which very explicitly rehearse one last time the no- tion that God has some kind of innate identity), and its impact on the theodicy and anthropology of the treatise is profound because it shows a fundamental indecision about the possibility of the grand structure of thought set forth in the treatise--in this sense, the latter is indeed both a primary example of idealism and its destruction (and, in this same sense, both of Heidegger's opinions expressed at different times--1936 and 1941--are correct).
79. Here Schelling emphasizes a key point, that evil is not an expression of the passions allowed to reign due to debility, but rather that evil is thoroughly imbued with mind or spirit--to posit the self is to entertain the possibility of evil hitherto "dormant" but nonetheless fundamental, a
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constitutive force in the self, and therefore "radical. " Schelling relies on Kant of course and reproves Fichte, who discusses radical evil in his System der Sittenlehre (1798) at 198-205. Fichte notes:
This is what we presuppose: man will do nothing which is not simply necessary and which, pressed onward by his nature [Wesen], he is not compelled to do. Accordingly, we presuppose an original lethargy [Tra? gheit] in reflection and, as a consequence, in action pursuant to this reflection. Accordingly, this would be a true, positive, radical evil; not just something negative as it hitherto seemed to be. Then it had to be that way as well. We must have something positive merely in order to be able to explain the nega- tive. (Fichte, Werke, IV/199)
80. The Greek means quite literally "by bastard reasoning," a combination which suggests an unanchored and wavering way of thinking that cannot tell the difference between original and copy. The term appears in the Ti- maeus at 52b3 and the crucial portion of the text is this:
So because of all these and other kindred notions, we are also not able on waking up to distinguish clearly the unsleeping and truly ex- isting nature, owing to our dream-like condition, nor to tell the truth--how that it belongs to a copy [eik ? on]--seeing that it has not for its own that for which it came into being, but fleets ever as a phan- tom [fantasma] of something else--to come into existence in some other thing, clinging to existence as best it may, on pain of being nothing at all; whereas to the aid of that which truly is [to ont ? os on] there comes the precise and true argument, that so long as one thing is one thing, and another something different, neither of the two will ever come to exist in the other so that the same thing becomes simul- taneously both one and two. (Plato, Timaeus, trans. R. G. Bury [Cam- bridge, Mass. : Harvard UP (Loeb Classical Library), 1929], 122-125)
81. Buchheim finds a reference to Jacobi's epistolic novel, cumbersomely ti- tled Edward Allwill's Collection of Letters edited by Friedrich Heinrich Ja- cobi with an Addition from Letters of His Own, and, specifically, to letter XX. See Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill, trans. George di Giovanni (Montreal & Kingston: McGill- Queen's University Press, 1994), 465-472.
82. Likely a further reference to Jacobi (and perhaps Schlegel as well).
83. The German reads: "Gewissenhaftigkeit erscheint nicht eben notwendig und immer als Enthusiasmus oder als ausserordentliche Erhebung u? ber sich selbst, wozu, wenn der Du? nkel selbstbeliebiger Sittlichkeit niedergesch- lagen ist, ein anderer und noch viel schlimmerer Hochmutsgeist gerne auch
diese machen mo? chte. "
84. Buchheim indicates that the source here is Velleius Paterclus, Historia
romana II 35, 2 (Buchheim, PU 153, n282). The Cato referred to is M. Porcius Cato, called "the younger" or "Uticensis" (95-46 B. C. E. ) to dis- tinguish him from his great ancestor, M. Porcius Cato, the "Censor. " The former Cato was portrayed in antiquity as a veritable incarnation
of Republican virtue, the glory of staunch and stubborn Rome, before the advent of the empire, and this is especially evident in Lucan's dark epic, the Pharsalia, where the famous line, "victrix causa deis placuit, sed victa Catoni" ["The winning cause has pleased the gods, but that of the defeated Cato"] (I:128) helped set the tone (with its ironies perhaps less than intact) for Cato's subsequent historical reception.
The Freedom of God
85. The German reads: "Der zweite ist der Wille der Liebe, wodurch das Wort in die Natur ausgesprochen wird, und durch den Gott sich erst perso? nlich macht. " We have preserved the accusative sense of the German that im- plies the active power of the word in regard to nature.
86. King Alfonso X of Castile (1221-1284), called "el sabio," "the learned" or "wise," is portrayed in Pierre Bayle's Dictionnaire historique et critique (1697) as having made daring challenges to tradition in the name of scien- tific inquiry. In particular, Alfonso was notorious both for questioning Ptolemaic astronomy and, after having engaged in extensive research on it, for making his blasphemous suggestion that had he been "of God's counsel at the Creation, many things would have been ordered better. " If one wishes to take the issue that far, Alfonso's daring questioning can be seen as an example of the kind of questioning of the architect that leads to his overthrow, a rather neat prefiguration of the principal thrust of modernity. (Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, vol. 2 [Reinier Leers: Amsterdam, 1697], 94-95; Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, 14-18)
87. 2 Sam. 22:27 reads in the Revised Standard Version: With the pure thou dost show
thyself pure,
and with the crooked thou dost show thyself perverse.
88. This citation is from Hamann's Aesthetica in nuce. Eine Rhapsodie in Kab- balistischer Prosa (Hamann, Sa? mtliche Werke, 2:208). Buchheim notes (Buchheim, PU, 158 n316) that the citation is incorrect, the text having appeared in 1762 in Crusades of a Philologist (Kreuzzu? ge des Philologen). The "chamberlain of the Alexandrian church" is probably Origen (c. 185- 254 C. E. ), the outstanding thinker of the Christian East who bears com- parison in significance and scope of thought with St. Augustine, the great difference between the two being that St. Augustine has almost always been celebrated, whereas Origen has been both celebrated and calumni- ated as devoted more to Plato than to the church (indeed, for this reason much of his thought was soundly rejected in the East at the Fifth General Council in 533 C. E. ).
89. Gynaeceum (Gr. gunaik ? on or gunaik ? onitis) denotes those inner rooms of a Greek or Roman house occupied exclusively by women.
90. The German reads: "Inwiefern die Selbstheit in ihrer Lossagung das Prinzip des Bo? sen ist, erregt der Grund allerdings das mo? gliche Prinzip des Bo? sen, aber nicht das Bo? se selber, noch zum Bo? sen. "
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? 168 | NOTES TO PAGES 66-77
91. From Huggard's translation (modified to account for Schelling's use of a Latin translation of the original text which was written in French and dif- fers in the first passage cited in the note):
(1) from section 25 (Schelling's reference to p. 139):
Hence, from the foregoing it is to be concluded that God antece- dently wills all good in itself, that he consequently wills the best as an end, what is indifferent and physical evil as a means, but that he wishes to permit moral evil only as a condition without which the best may not be obtained so that evil surely may not be admitted except in the form of a hypothetical necessity that connects it to the best. (Leibniz, Theodicy, 138)
(2) from section 230 (Schelling's reference to p. 292):
Regarding vice, it has been shown above that it is not the object of a divine decree as means, but as a condition without which--and only to that extent is it permitted. (Leibniz, Theodicy, 270)
The All-Unity of Love
92. This language is derived from Boehme. See part 5 of the Mysterium pan- sophicum included in this volume.
93. Here is a relevant excerpt from the page referred to in Philosophy and Religion:
Now, as the final goal of history is reconciliation with the fall, the latter can also be looked upon from a more positive perspective. For the first selfhood of the ideas was one flowing from the immediate activity of God. But the selfhood and absolute into which they intro- duce themselves through reconciliation is self-given, so that they exist in selfhood as truly independent ideas regardless of their abso- luteness. In this way the fall becomes the means for the complete revelation of God. In so far as God, by virtue of the eternal necessity of his nature, lends selfhood to what is seen, he gives it away itself into finitude and, so to speak, sacrifices it so that the ideas which were in him without a self-given life are called into life; it is precisely in this way that they become capable, as independently existing, to be in the absolute once again, something which happens through a completed morality. (Schelling, Sa? mmtliche Werke, VI: 63)
94. In the Revised Standard Version, the passage reads: "For he must reign, until he has put all his enemies under his feet. " This passage is from Paul's first letter to the Corinthians (15: 25).
95. Indifference is one of the fundamental terms in the so-called philosophy of identity, that is, the philosophical tendency associated with Schelling's writings between 1801 and 1804. This notion of "indifference" is often thought to be the target of Hegel's notorious comments in the "Preface" to The Phenomenology of the Spirit, the empty absolute, the "night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black" (Hegel, Phenome- nology, 9). But it should be hardly surprising that Schelling's conception
of indifference is not to be confused with the Hegelian caricature. Indif- ference is not in fact an absence of difference, a complete surrender to a pure and, thus, unknowable (at least for a finite mind) plenitude, it is not an overcoming of opposition in pure identity, as it were, but, just as it sounds, it is a point of indifference between oppositions where they are in balance, where they are indifferent the one to the other. Indifference as such is the absolute because the first indication of difference must be an indication of limitation.
It must be admitted, however, that Schelling's notion of indifference does little to explain how difference can come to be, that is, how anything can come to be--the origin remains necessarily mysterious, ever a chal- lenge to thought, and a stern reminder of the possible limits to thought.
96. The aphorisms read:
162. The difference between a divine identity and a merely finite one is that, in the former, it is not things which are opposed but need to be connected that are connected but such of which each could exist for itself but yet does not exist without another.
163. This is the mystery of eternal love, that that which would be absolute for itself, although considering it no theft to exist for itself, yet exists only in and with others. If each thing were not a whole, but rather only a part of the whole, there would be no love: there is love, however, because each thing is a whole and nonetheless does not nor can exist without another. (Schelling, Sa? mmtliche Werke, VII: 174)
97. The somewhat overwrought German of the final clause in this sentence reads: ". . . ferner dass nur Gott als Geist die absolute Identita? t beider Prin- zipien, aber nur dadurch und insofern ist, dass und inwiefern beide seiner Perso? nlichkeit unterworfen sind. "
98. This footnote has gathered a good deal of attention. White refers to it in his attempt to adduce evidence for his claim that Schelling is engaging in esotericism (107). More recently, Peter Warnek has argued that the note reflects Schelling's "own thematizing of the movement of the word to re- coil upon the way in which freedom comes to word" (Peter Warnek, "Reading Schelling and Heidegger: The Freedom of Cryptic Dialogue," in Schelling Now, 180). Warnek continues: "Schelling's word of freedom would therefore also have to be the ecstatic movement of freedom bring- ing itself to word; it would be life saying life in the movement of life itself. This is the promise of a 'system of freedom. '" Jason Wirth also makes the following comments on this note:
. . . Schelling expressed the dialogical genesis of everything in the text. The writer composes from a particular perspective and in me- dias res within an unfolding drama still always to be completed. This dialogical demand, this indebtedness to the treatise's subject, does not grant Schelling authority over it. This writing, within a fluid context in which the Wesen can somehow emerge, does not grant Schelling the capacity to render it with sharp determinations.
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170 | NOTES TO PAGES 66-77
This dialogical humility knows that this is not a dialogue between equals because there is no parity among the interlocutors. The in- terlocutors are not einerlei, not of the same kind. A model of such an asymmetrical dialogue might be something like attempting to communicate with nature. Or speaking with animals, not as crea- tures to be trained for human use, but as animals per se. A more classical precedent might be Job's dialogue with the whirlwind. It is a dialogue between bodies and their animas, between the light and its concealed, indwelling darkness. It might be thought of as a di- alogue of the fractured Wesen with itself, producing discontinuities without sublimation. (Wirth, The Conspiracy of Life, 159)
99. The German here is "Finalita? t der Ursachen" or "finality of causes. " What is likely meant by this is clarified by Gutmann who translates Finalita? t by "purposiveness," thereby suggesting that Schelling is alluding to Aristo- telian teleology and, thus, the notion of a causa finalis that is the end for the sake of which (hou eneka) something happens.
100. The Latin source appears to be Horace which Schelling freely varies. Here is the original (Odes II. i):
Motum ex Metello consule civicum bellique causas et vitia et modos
ludumque fortunae gravesque principum amicitias et arma
nondum expiatis uncta cruoribus, periculosae plenum opus aleae,
tractas et incedis per ignes suppositos cineri doloso.
[In our translation: You are treating of the civil commotion under the consulship of Metellus, the causes of war, the mistakes, its phases, the game of fortune, the dire friendships among princes and the arms stained with blood--a task full of dangerous risk--and you go forth through fires hidden beneath treacherous ashes. ]
101. The section reads:
76. Let it not be objected that such rational speculations on the mysteries of religion are forbidden. --The word 'mystery', in early Christian times, meant something quite different from what we understand by it now; and the development of revealed truths into truths of reason is absolutely necessary if they are to be of any help to the human race. When they were revealed, of course, they were not yet truths of reason; but they were revealed in order to become such truths. They were, so to speak, the result of the calculation which the mathematics teacher announces in advance, in order to give his pupils some idea of what they are working towards. If the pupils were satisfied with knowing the result in advance, they
would never learn to calculate, and would frustrate the intention with which the good master gave them a guideline to help them with their work. (G. E.
Lessing, Philosophical and Theological Writ- ings, trans. H. B. Nisbet [Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005], 236)
102. This is an allusion to Herder's philosophy of history and, more specifi- cally, to his theory about the origin and development of Christianity as outlined, for example, in his Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Mankind (Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit). In that work, Herder insists that Christianity, just as all religions, including those of the pagan cultures, must be traced back to an original religion [Urrelig- ion] and that the very idea of religion has always been a primary fact of human life. (See 9, V. "Religion Is the Oldest and Holiest Tradition of the Earth," in Johann Gottfried Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, ed. Martin Bollacher [Frankfurt a. M. : Deutscher Klas- siker Verlag, 1989], 372-379. )
103. This alludes to Goethe's famous bon mot mentioned at the end of Baader's essay "On the Assertion that There Can Be No Wicked Use of Reason. " See that essay in this volume.
104. The essay by Baader noted here is called "On the Analogy between the Drive to Know and to Procreate" (U? ber die Analogie des Erkenntnis- und des Zeugungs-Triebes). See Franz Xaver von Baader, Sa? mmtliche Werke, ed. F. Hoffmann, vol. 1 (Aalen: Scientia Verlag [Reprint], 1963), 39-48.
105. According to Buchheim, this idea was prevalent in theosophic literature and, of course, in Boehme (Buchheim, PU 167, n372-373).
106. This is likely another reference to Schlegel and his Indierbuch (see note 7 above).
SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTS
Introductory Note
1. For an extensive treatment of the relation between Schelling and Boehme, see Robert F. Brown, The Later Philosophy of Schelling: The Influ- ence of Boehme on the Works of 1809-1815 (Lewisburg: Bucknell Univer- sity Press, 1977).
2. For a broad overview of the Pantheism debate, see Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard UP, 1987).
3. In this respect, see Wirth, The Conspiracy of Life, 65-100.
Boehme
1. Jakob Bo? hme, Sa? mtliche Schriften, ed. Will-Erich Peukert, vol 4 (Stuttgart: Frohmann-Holzboog [Reprint], 1955-1960), 97-111.
Baader
1. Franz Xaver von Baader, Sa? mmtliche Werke, 33-38. 2. "Evil is not a story, it's a power. "
NOTESTOPAGES81-130 | 171
172 | NOTES TO PAGES 81-130
Lessing
1. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Werke, ed. Herbert G. Go? pfert, vol. VIII (Mu- nich: Hanser Verlag, 1979), 118-120.
Jacobi
1. The translation follows Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, U? ber die Lehre des Spi- noza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, ed. Marion Lauschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000), 23-36 and Lessing, Werke VIII, 565- 571. As to the former, we have attempted to follow as closely as possible the various forms of emphasis in the text.
2. En-Sof [Heb: "that which has no end/the infinite"] refers to the notion of a hidden or absent God, a deus absconditus, without name and form which is the ground of all beings. The term developed into a central con- cept in the Kabbalistic philosophy of the Middle Ages. (See Go? bel, "En- soph," Lessing, Werke VIII, 751 and Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism [New York: Schocken Books, 1946], 269-273. )
3. salto mortale [literally, "by means of a fatal leap," in which a person turns head over heels in the air, e. g. , somersault].
4. This term comes from section 47 of the Monadology, which reads as fol- lows: "Accordingly, God alone is the primary unity or the original simple substance, of which all the created or derivative monads are products. They originate, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of the divin- ity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the created being, to which it is essential to be limited . . . " See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadology, ed. and trans. Nicholas Rescher (Pittsburgh: Uni- versity of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 162.
5. Jacobi likely refers here to a Latin translation of Principes de la nature et de la grace fonde? s en raison.
6. Jacobi is referring to the "Confession of Augsburg" by Melanchthon, Lu- ther, and other theologians that was submitted to the emperor during the Reichstag of Augsburg in 1530. This "Confession" continued to incite fierce disputes between orthodox and reformed Lutherans thereafter. (See Go? bel, "Augsburgische Konfession," Lessing, Werke VII, 739. )
7. Jacobi's salto mortale is paired with a play on Kopf [head, intellect] here. The implication is that one must humble one's intellect before this leap, which has no use for it; a leap which, in other words, represents a subor- dination of reason to faith.
8. The text follows Jacobi, U? ber die Lehre des Spinoza, 166-167. As before, we have attempted to follow closely the various forms of emphasis in the text.
9. Jacobi is referring to Voltaire's tragedy Mahomet or Le fanatisme ou Ma- homet le Prophe`te (1743).
Herder
1. Johann Gottfried Herder, Sa? mtliche Werke, ed. B. Suphan, vol. 16 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1881-1913), 552-560.
Index
Page numbers in italics refer to the supplementary texts and the notes to them.
absolute: accession to, xiii; bond, 59; causality, 11; dualism of good and evil, 74; existence, 59; freedom, 50; and the I, 3, 10, 23; identity, 3, 27, 28, 68 (of light and darkness), 71 (of ground and existence, of good and evil), 148n32; indifference, 68, 76; in the, 168nn93, 95; knowledge, xxvii; necessity, 60, 61; personal- ity, 62; self-realization of, xii, xiii, xiv; self-revelation of, xx; sub- stance, 23; unity, 40, 49; utterly groundless, 52
actuality, 26, 62, 67, 120, 148n32; pos- sibility and, 58, 61, 145n26, 158n60; potency and, 44, 54, 70; potentiality and, 66, 75; and the re- versed god, 54
abstraction, 20, 58, 60
Adorno, Theodor W. (1903-1969),
133n16
Adams, Robert M. , 160n69 Alfonso X, King of Castile
(1221-1284), 167n87
anarchy, xxxiii, 29, 30, 62, 151n40 animal(s): becoming, 40, 100; of Buri-
dan, 48; and consciousness, 133n15; dark principle in, 40; in- stinct, 39, 40, 76; soul of, 124; sur- render to, 101; understanding of, 99; and unity, 40
animality, 39
Antoninus Pius (86-161 C. E. ), 121 Apollodorus of Athens (b. ca. 180
B. C. E. ), 143n22 Aphrodite (Venus), 143n22
Archaeus, 154n52
Arians (Arianism), 39, 157n57 Aristotle (384-322 B. C. E. ), xxxiii,
140n13, 147n32, 155n53
Arius (256-336 C. E. ), 194n57
ataxia, 38
atheism, 19, 83, 136n1
atomic swerve, 48, 159n67 Augustine of Hippo, Saint (354-430),
36-37
autonomy, xvi, xvii, xviii, xix, 142n18
Baader, Franz Xaver (1765-1841), 35, 40, 43, 75, 81-82, 158m57, 171nn103, 104, 171n1
Bayle, Pierre (1647-1706), 154n53, 155n55, 167n86
Beach, Edward, 144n26, 158n60 Beauvoir, Simone de (1908-1986),
xxii, 134n32
becoming, x, 17, 28, 51, 59, 66,
150n36, 152n45; animal, 40, 100;
real, 54, 60
Being, 17, 24, 50, 51, 70, 148n32; ab-
solute causality and, 11; of abso- lute identity, 27, 28; and becoming, 66; in God, 72; ground of, 18; in the ground, 72; human, 53; jointure of, xxv; and mechanistic laws, 120; and non-Being, 35; primal, 21, 143n24; as self, 38; and sin, 55, 56; and translation of, xxxiii, xxxiv; and what does not have, 67; and will, 21, 53, 143n24
beings in the world, xxxii, 11, 18, 20, 23, 25
174 | INDEX
Beiser, Frederick, 171n2 Bernstein, Richard, x, 131n3,
133nn14, 18
Bilfinger, Georg Bernhard
(1693-1750), 112
Blumenberg, Hans (1920-1996), xi,
132n8
Bo? ckh, Philipp August (1785-1867), 41 Boehme, Jacob (1575-1624), 81,
142n18, 147n31, 150n37, 153n50, 157n56, 159n63, 168n92, 171n105, 171n1
body, 13, 31, 67, 96, 109, 154n53; of the animal, 156n55; as appear- ance, 125; concept of, 14; eyes of, 115; internal selfhood of, 38; ma- ternal, 29; part, 18; passions of, xxiii; of previous world, 45; real- ism as, 26; root of cold in, 63; soul and, 14; transparent, 33
bond, 31, 56; of creaturely existence, 55; of forces, 31, 34, 40, 43, 54; of gravity, 30; of principles, 41, 42, 56, 59; of love, 45, 55; of personality, 75
Bowie, Andrew, 158n60 Breazeale, Daniel, 144n25
Brown, Robert F. , 133n15, 171n1 Bruno, Giordano (1548-1600), 14,
140n13
Buchheim, Thomas, xxxv, 135n4,
139n9, 140n13, 143n23, 150nn33, 38, 151n43, 153n50, 154n52, 157n56, 158n59, 166nn81, 84, 167n88, 171n105
Buridan, Jean (ca. 1300-1358), 48, 159n66, 162n71
Cassirer, Ernst (1874-1945), 132n7 categorical imperative, xvii, xxiii, 57 Cato, M. Porcius "the younger" or
"Uticensis" (95-46 B. C. E. ), 57,
166n84
causality, 11, 141n14
centrum, 33, 55, 64, 65, 88, 159n64,
163n75; basis or, 44; and beginning of the creation, 51; dark, 35; and
dark principle, 40; as essence of willing, 47; and God, 72; initial, 42; of nature, 34; of particular wills, 32; revealed, 37; of a yearning, 42
cosmourgos, 144n24 cosmotheoros, 138n6
chaos, xx, 42, 45, 128, 155n53; and
nonrational ground, 145n26, 151n40; offspring of, 65; primor- dial, 152n47; struggle against, 46
conscientiousness, 56-57 consequence: in relation to Spinozan
substance, 12, 16-18, 20, 141n14,
149n32
contingency, xxii, xxv, xxvi, 48-49,
50, 52
contraction, xx, xxi, xxii, xxviii,
xxxiii, 110, 149n32, 150n32 copula, 13, 14, 139n10
creation: accomplished, 91, 92; as
act, 60, 65; actual, 62; and connec- tion, 128; and evil, xxiv, 40, 53, 58; final purpose of, 66-67; first, 42-44, 47, 51, 52, 53, 68; and fury, 89; and God, x, 46, 149n32, 155n53; ground of, 55; hate and love in, 127; and initial ground of nature, 45; and identity, xix; hierarchy of, xxi; and King Alfonso X, 167n86; from nothingness, 40; process of, 31; rationality of, xi; ever-renewed, 11; second, 46; and struggle, xxviii; and the universe, 123; of the world, 90, 110; as yearning of the One, 59-60
creature(s), xvii, xxii, 23, 29, 34, 55, 88, 90-92, 99; and dark principle in, 43; and evil, 42; free will in, 159n67; God and, 146n27; for human use, 170n98; imperfection of, 36-37, 155n53; and nothing- ness, 40; self-will of, 32-33, 42, 47
Crocker, Lester G. , 143n20
d'Holbach, Paul-Henri Thiry (1723-1789), 142n20
darkness, 30, 37, 41, 46, 65-70, 90, 93, 156n55, 170n98; and ground, xx-xxi, 29-33, 62, 151n40, 152n47; and light, xx, 35, 42, 44, 55, 66, 113, 165n78; principle of, 44, 156n55
depths, 45, 47, 56; and ground, 30-32, 34
Derrida, Jacques (1930-2004), 161n70
Descartes, Rene? (1596-1650), 26 Desmond, William, 133n14 determinism, 49, 160nn68, 69 devil, 36, 64, 96, 97, 99
dialectic, xii, xiii, xiv, 14, 63, 64, 69, 75, 76, 84, 149n32
difference, xiv, 15, 169n95; between God and man, 150n32, 169n96; identity and, 47, 148n32; non-, 15; specific, 22
differentiation, xiv; and divine imagi- nation, 18, 149n32; of nature from God, 27; of things from God, 12; of understanding and will, 36
discord, 19, 35, 118; of principles, 41, 54, 56
disease, 18, 34-35, 38, 66 disharmony, 38. See ataxia dissonance, x, xxv, xxviii, 150n32 distemperance, 38, 157n56 Dostoevsky, F. M. (1821-1881),
152n44
drive, xiv, 43, 75, 76, 99, 101, 116,
117-119, 122-123
dualism, 24, 30, 68, 71, 74, 146n27; Kantian, xii
Eliot, T. S. (1888-1965), 165n78 emanation, 18, 25, 40, 73, 146n27 Empedocles (ca. 490-430 B. C. E. ), 10,
138n8
Empiricus, Sextus (2nd Century
C. E. ), 10, 139n8
enthusiasm, 26; conscientiousness
as, 57; excesses of, xv; for the
good, 40, 100, 158n57; virtue as, 58 Epictetus (cc. 55-135), 121
Epicurus (ca. 341-270 B. C. E. ), 48 Erasmus of Rotterdam, Desiderius
(1466-1536), 71
essence: of absolute identity and
gravity, 27, 148n32; of acting indi- vidual, 49-53, 160n70, 165n78; of the body, 154n53; conceptual pri- ority of, 29; of fury, 90; of God, xiv, xix, xxxv, 30, 60, 62; and ground, 151n41, 152n47; of human corrupt- ness, 99; of the human soul, 16, 29, 38, 41, 112; and inner necessity, 49; of intelligible being, 49-50; life-, 87; of the moral world, 14; of nature, 31, 89; and positive and negative philosophy, 144n26; of reason and knowledge, 10; revealing itself in its opposite, 41; of things-in- themselves, 22; of willing, 47; of yearning, 29
estrangement, 25, 146n27 eternity, 66, 87, 88-90, 92-93; and
eternal beginning, 51-53. See
predestination
Euclid of Alexandria (ca. 325-265
B. C. E. ), 58
existence, xi, xxxiv, 29, 43, 65, 67,
109, 116, 125, 166n80; absolute, 59; of beings, 11, 25; cause of, 145n26; creaturely, 63; and essence, xxxiv; and evil, xi, xii, 154n53; and God, xxi, xxii, xxv-xxvi, xxxv, 11, 30, 45, 55, 62, 63, 124, 139n10; and ground, xx, xxv, xxviii, xxxiii, xxxiv, 27, 44, 66, 70, 71, 84, 141n14, 147n32, 149n32, 150nn32, 34; medi- ated, 119; personal, 62, 70, 117; ra- tional, 117-118; of spirit, 122
expansion: and contraction, xx, xxviii, xxxiii, 110, 149n32; of forces, 30
evil: and the absolute, xiii; aroused in creation, 53; fundamental being of, 24, 41, 73; and chaos, 42; and cognition, xiii; as conditio sine qua non, 65; dark principle of, 53; and
INDEX | 175
176 | INDEX
evil (continued)
emanation, 25, 73; end of, 66-68; and finitude, 38; and freedom, ix, xxv, 23, 24, 52; general, 47, 53; ground of, 36, 37, 39; matter and, 25; metaphysical, xi, xxiv, 36; ori- gin of, 26, 36, 42, 63; passions and, 53; as lower degree of perfec- tion, 24; as perversion, xvii, xxii, 35, 38, 44, 54-55, 63, 64; as posi- tive force, xxiii; possibility of, 33-40, 54-58, 62, 165n79; as pri- mal ground, 44; principle of, 36, 53, 64, 65, 155n53; privative no- tion of, xi-xiv, 23-25; as produc- tive, xiii; propensity to, xvi, xviii, 47, 52; radical, x, xv-xix, xxiii, 53, 166n79; reality of, 23, 33, 39-48; and search to become a god, xxvii; self-will and, 34; solicitation to, 41; and spirit, 40, 44, 46; and system, xii, xxix; temptation to, 41; threefold distinction of, xi; and the understanding, 36; unity severable in man and, 33, 42
fatalism, 11, 20, 108, 114
feeling, 11, 12, 19, 21, 22, 29, 55, 75,
122; of having strayed from the centrum, 55; and compulsion, 59; and disease, 35; of eternal begin- ning (of each individual), 51; of freedom, 9, 11, 17, 111, 121; of honor, 121; moral, 75; philoso- phers of, 56; of reality, 125
fever, 56
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1762-1814),
3, 10, 20, 22, 29, 50, 53, 59, 136n1, 137n2, 138n6, 161n70; Doctrine of Science, 139n9; Die Grundzu? ge des gegenwa? rtigen Zeitalters, U? ber das Wesen des Gelehrten, Anweisung zum seligen Leben, 151n43; System der Sittenlehre, 166n79
finitude, 38, 40, 109, 168n93 Frank, Manfred, ix, 131n1
freedom: absolute, 50; and the ani- mal, 100; as Being-in-God, 72; as capacity for good and evil, 23; of choice, 61; concept of, 9-10, 17, 21, 23, 48, 162n71; and contin- gency, 49; disease and, 34; and the eternal, 18; within God, 145n27; and idealism, 49-53; and imma- nence, 23-25; as incompatible with system, 9, 138n7; and the "Kantian paradox," xviii; loss of in- itial, 56; and necessity, xix, xxvi, 4, 10, 50, 56, 143n23, 161n70, 163n73; and pantheism, 16-19; and per- sonality, 10; as one and all of phi- losophy, 22; problem of, ix-xxvi; and propensity to evil, xviii, 52; as rule of the intelligent principle over sensual desires, 39; as self- activity, 120; and system, 9-11, 49; as unlimited power, 11; and the will, xvi-xix, 4, 47
Fuhrmans, Horst, 138n7
Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1900-2002), 161n70
Gabler, Christian (1770-1821), 137n5 God: as absolute identity, 71; and
antichrist, 97-98; as author, 142n18; and Babel, 94; as cogni- tion of spiritual light, 56; and col- ors, 92-93; and creation, 46; the devil and, 54, 96; and emanation, 40; as eternal love, 54; existence of, 3, 27, 124, 145n26, 149n32, 152n47; as expansion and contrac- tion, 110; eye of soul and, 115; freedom within, 145n27; free will of, 64, 94-95, 97; as general law, 60; and ground, xxi-xxii, 20, 27-29, 42, 45, 46, 61, 63; God begotten in, 30; hidden, 172n2; homology with human beings, xxvi, xxvii; imma- nence of things in, 11-26, 72, 139n10; inseverability (or indissol- ubility) of principles in, xxiv, 33,
41, 153n51; Kantian autonomy and, xvi-xix, 134n30; Leibniz's concept of, xiv, 154n53, 168n91; as a life, 66-68; as living unity of forces, 59; man in, 72; and matter, 41; as moral being, 60; and nature, 59; and necessity, xxi, xxvi, 61, 168n93; perfection of creation and, 61; and personality, 59, 62, 73; of the philosophers, xiii-xiv, xv, xxvii; point of view of, xiii, xv; and predestination, 52, 165n78; presci- ence of, 52; as primum passivum, 76; as principle of pure form and intelligibility, xx; and privation theory of evil, 36-37; and the pro- claimed word, 32; as real, 47; rep- resentation of, 30-32; self- revelation of, xx, 47, 58, 59, 60, 65; reversed, 54; separation of man from, 33; separation of things from, 31; sin and, 55; as spirit, 47, 59, 71, 86-88, 92, 122; theodicy and, ix-xxix, 58-66; as unity of light and darkness, 32-33; as unity of possibility and actuality, 61
Go? bel, Helmut, 172nn2, 6 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang
(1749-1832), xiii, xviii, 83, 102,
133n13, 171n103 Goeze, Johann Melchior
(1717-1786), 81, 83
golden age, 45, 159n62
Graves, Robert (1895-1985), 147n30 gravity, 125-126, 128; and light,
27-28, 30, 147n32; of the planets,
156n55
ground: ambiguity of, 152n47; as an-
archic, xxv, 29, 62; attractive force of, 46, 66; and becoming of things, 28; beginning-, 107; of the birth of spirit (second principle of dark- ness), 44; and consequence, 17-18; and the dark principle, 31-33, 44, 66; and desire, 43; di- vided, 31; and disease, 34; and ex-
istence, xx, xxv, xxviii, 27, 141n14, 147n32; and essence, 151n41; and/of evil, 36-37, 39, 44, 47, 53, 63; and the fall, 48, 55; force active in, 40; freedom as, 22, 26; and God, xxi-xxii, 20, 27, 28, 42, 45, 61, 63; and the good, 68; and gravity, 27-28, 30; and the ideal principle, 59; and the indivisible remainder, 29; of magia, 85; man as emerging from, 32; meaning of, 134n28, 145n26; of nature, 27, 34, 39, 44, 45, 70; and the non-ground, 69-70; and personality, 75; perversion of relation to existence, xxii; primal, 66; principle of evil and, 64, 65; re- alism and, 26; of selfhood, 70; self- positing and, 51; and self-will, 33-34; and sin, 55; and solicitation, 41, 63; and the understanding, 36; and unity, 45; will of, 42, 45, 47, 59, 63, 66-67; and the yearning, 30, 72
Gutmann, James, xxxiii, 142n18, 151nn39, 40, 165n77, 170n99
Hamann, Johann Georg (1730-1788), 64, 83, 152n44, 167n88
harmony, xxiv, 52, 56, 126; preestab- lished, x, xi
Hayden-Roy, Priscilla, 135n1, 151n39 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
(1770-1831), x, xii-xv, xviii, xxv, 81, 133nn13, 14, 143n24, 146n27, 163n72; Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, xiii, 133n15; Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, xii, 132n11; Phenomenology of Spirit, 133n12, 138n6, 168n95
Heraclitus (535-475 B. C. E. ), 149n32 Herder, Johann Gottfried
(1744-1803), 82, 83, 84, 171n102 Hermanni, Friedrich, 131nn2, 10,
134nn35, 37, 153n51,
Heidegger, Martin (1889-1976), ix, xi,
xxv-xxvi, xxviii, xxxii, 161n70, 163n75, 165n78; The Metaphysical
INDEX | 177
178 | INDEX
Heidegger (continued)
Foundations of Logic, 132n7, 140n13; Plato's Sophist, 153n49; The Principle of Reason, 132n9; Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, ix, xxv, 131nn1, 4, 134n36, 137nn1, 6, 162n71
Hesiod (ca. 700 B. C. E. ), 159n52 Horace, or Quintus Horatius Flaccus
(65-27 B. C. E. ), 151n42, 170n100 Horkheimer, Max (1895-1973), 133n16 Hogrebe, Wolfram, 164n76
idealism, ix, 3, 17, 20-23, 26, 49, 59; science and, 137n6; transcenden- tal, 161n70; destruction of, 165n78
identity, xix, 117, 118, 152n47; abso- lute, 27-28, 68, 69, 70, 71, 76, 147n32; as absolute indifference, 68; and difference, 47; empty, 139n10; and essence, xxxiv; of evil, 64; between God and beings, 25; between God and human beings, xxvi, 169n96; the I as, 3; innate, 165n78; law of, 13-17, 50, 140n13; of light and darkness, 32-33, 68, 70; mechanism and spirit, 4; philo- sophy of, 136n1, 168n95; of subjec- tive and objective, 144n24, 161n70
immanence: of things in God, 11-26, 72, 139n10
indifference: of existence and ground, xxii; as form of freedom, 162n71; and God, 24; and the non- ground, xxviii, 68-70, 73, 76; and philosophy of identity, 168n95; point of, 127, 129, 130
individuality, 15, 16, 21, 35, 47, 53 infinity, 62, 107, 159n67 imagination: divine, 18; as origin of
good and evil, 88-90; of peoples, 43; philosophical, xiv; and sin, 54-55; will and, 87
Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich (1743-1819), 82, 83, 100, 136n1,
138n7, 141n15, 143n21, 161n70,
166nn81, 82
Jacobs, Wilhelm G. , 132n11 Jesus Christ, 51, 68, 98, 157n57 Judas, 51, 164n76
Juvenal (1st-2nd C. E. ), 160n68
Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804), ix, x, xii, xv-xix, xxiii-xxiv, xxvii, xxxii, 4, 22, 49, 53, 58, 83, 134nn26, 30, 138n6, 140n13, 142n19, 145n26, 146n27, 161n70, 166n79; Critique of Pure Reason, 141n16, 147n29; Metaphysical Foundations of Natu- ral Science, 137n4; Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 160n68
Kepler, Johannes (1571-1630), 37, 155n53, 156n55
Kierkegaard, Soren Aabye (1813-1855), 161n70
Kru? ll, Philipp, 135n1
La Mettrie, Julien Offray de (1709-1751), 142n20
Laurence, Joseph, 131n3, 134nn24, 34
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1646-1716), x, xi-xii, xiii-xiv, xv, xxv, 14, 16-17, 26, 36, 37, 49, 60, 61, 65, 81, 107, 110-112, 132n7, 140n13, 141n15, 160n69, 172n4; Es- says on Theodicy, 154n53, 156n55, 160n69, 168n91; Opuscules et frag- ments ine? dits, 140n13
Lessing, Ephraim Gotthold (1729-1781), 74, 81, 82-83, 171n101
light: gravity and, 27-28, 30, 147n32; principle of, 33, 150n32
Lo? with, Karl (1897-1973), 133n13 logic, 14, 140n13, 157n55, 161n70; of
the enigma, 28
logos, xiv, xx; and Arianism, 157n57,
159n63; being of God, xxi Long, A. A. , 159n67
love, 55, 60, 62, 64, 65, 68, 75, 95; bond of, 45, 55; divine, 58, 67; eter- nal, 169n96; God as, 54, 61; hate and, 127-130, 138n8; human will and, 63; inner, 125; motility of, 41; as motive passion, 109; natural, 119; and the non-ground, 70; and philosophy, 76; pure, 122-123; and Pygmalion, 21, 143n22; and the spirit, 30, 34, 42, 44; of unity, 97; will of, 42, 47, 59, 70; word of, 45
Lucan, Marcus Annaeus (39-65 C. E. ), 167n84
Lucretius (ca. 99-50 B. C. E. ), 159n67 Luther, Martin (1483-1546), 51,
172n6
malum metaphysicum. See evil Mann, Thomas (1875-1955), 164n76 Marquard, Odo, 131n3, 132n11 matter, xvi, 25, 30, 33, 54, 146n28; dy-
namism of, 137n4; imperfection of, 38, 155n53; inertia of, 37; Kant's dynamic theory of, 137n4; mag- netic, 111; Platonic, 30, 41; primal, 107; and spirit, 112
Maximilian I, King of Bavaria (1756-1825), 137n3
mechanism, 4, 14, 108, 118, 119, 120, 122
Melanchthon, Philipp (1497-1560),
172n6
Melissus of Samos (ca. 5th Century B. C. E. ), 155n55
Michalson, Jr. , Gordon E. , 133nn18, 20, 134n25
modification(s), 73; desire and, 116, 118; of substance, 12, 16, 20, 26, 140n14
Moiso, Francesco, 157n56
monads, 16, 110, 172n4 monotheletes (monotheletism), 39,
157n57
morality, 56-58, 64, 168n93; and radi-
cal evil, xv
mysticism, 81, 121
Nabokov, V. V. (1899-1977), xxxi nature, 18, 21, 22, 24, 42, 64, 71, 108;
anarchy of, 30, 44; -being, 88; blind, 145n26; divine, 61, 158n57; drop-forming principium in, 126; essence of, 31; eternal, 89-90, 92; and European philosophy, 26; and evil, 43; as first (or old) Testa- ment, 72; forces of, 14; and God, 26, 27, 59, 65, 72, 87, 122; and ground, 30, 34, 37, 39, 44, 45-46, 70, 147n32; human, 53, 120, 158n57; as lying beyond absolute identity, 28; -language, 92-93, 95; law(s) of, 60, 123, 125, 127-129, 154n53, 156n55; -life, 88-89; life in, 57; magia of, 96; man and, 161n70; mastery of, xiv, xxvii; mathematics and, 132n7; mechanistic and dy- namic notions of, 20, 21, 142n20; and the moral world, 14; as older revelation, 77; personality and, 59; philosophy of, xx, 4, 10, 21, 27, 31, 84, 136n1, 137n5; science of, 43; and spirit, 4, 85-86; stirring life of the craving as, 86; and the subject, 151n43; and the turba, 91; typology in, 73; the understanding and, 30, 31; and unnature, 101; and the veil of dejection, 62-63; and will, 32, 33, 34
necessity, 11, 19, 50, 51, 164n76; ab- solute, 50, 60, 61; abstract, 60; and contingency, xxvi; of death, 48, 67; divine, xxi, xxv, 57, 168n93; empiri- cal, 49, 50; of evil, 25, 39, 146n28; and freedom, xix, xxvi, 4, 10, 50, 56, 143n23, 161n70; geometric, 43, 59; higher, 49; holy, 56, 129; hypo- thetical, 168n91; inner, 49, 50, 148n32; laws of, 163n73; logical, 58, 15n53; mechanical, 59; meta- physical, 61, 154n53; moral, 61; of sin, 48; unconscious, 58
Neiman, Susan, 133n18, 135n39, 167n86
INDEX | 179
180 | INDEX
Niethammer, Friedrich Immanuel (1766-1848), 3, 137n2
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm (1844-1900), x, 134n38, 146n27
non-ground [der Ungrund], 68-70, 73, 81, 85, 87, 88
Norman, Judith, xxxv, 131n3, 135n3, 151n39
nothingness, xi, xx, xxi, 16, 40, 69,
125
Oetinger, Friedrich Christoph (1702-1782), 157n56
omnipotence, xi, 11-12, 41, 42, 45, 146n27; of the will, 86, 87, 120, 121
opposition: being and, 66; of good and evil, 24, 25, 38, 44, 46, 58, 71; and ground, 42; indifference and, 69; to love, 65; of nature and spirit, 4; of necessity and freedom, 4; overcoming of, 77, 169n95; and self-will, 64; of sin, 55; of subject and object, 3; and unity, 14
Origen (ca. 182-251 C. E. ), 167n88 Ovid (43 B. C. E. -17 C. E. ), 143n22,
159n62
pandemonism, 25
pantheism, 11-12, 15-17, 19-23, 25,
27, 71; Pantheism debate [Pan- theismusstreit], 82-84, 143n21, 171n2; as immanence of things in God, 139n10
Paracelsus, or Philip Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim (1493-1541), 154n52
participation, 23, 67, 146n27 Paterclus, Velleius (ca. 19 B. C. E. -31
C. E. ), 166n84
Peetz, Siegbert, 138n7, 143n21 Pelikan, Jarolslav, 157n57 periphery, 33, 34, 35, 43, 47. See
centrum
personality, 4, 10, 33, 74, 75, 110; ab-
solute, 62; concept of, 38, 73, 142n18; God as, 59-60, 66, 71, 73;
and man, 62; spirit and, 66, 75 Pinkard, Terry, 134n26
Pippin, Robert, 133n19, 134n26,
161n70
Plato (427-347 B. C. E. ), 10, 14, 30, 39,
41, 142n19, 151n39, 153n49, 155n53, 167n88; Theaetetus 153n48; Timaeus, 44, 138n8, 152n45, 166n80
Plotinus (ca. 205-270 C. E. ), 25, 146n28
possibility: and actuality, 61, 158n60; bare, 144n26; concept of, 61; empty, 61; of evil, 33, 36, 40, 54, 58, 62, 169n79; of good and evil, 33, 153n51; of immediate cognition, 76-77; of salvation, 46; of several worlds, 62
potency, 28, 44, 54, 62, 63, 67, 70, 148n32
predeterminism, 160n68 predestination, 52, 165n78 principles: absolute identity of, 71;
in discord, 54, 56; existence and ground, xxii; good and evil, 54; lig- ature of, 56; light and darkness, 32-34, 40-42, 69; and personality, 75; perversion of, 35-36; severabil- ity of, 33; unity of, 40, 41, 66, 68, 70; universal, xxiii
Pygmalion, 21, 143n22 Pythagoras of Samos (582-507
B. C. E.
