And in the warfare between them all arguments from the earlier periods of the history of
philosophy
have been pre sented in the most manifold combinations, but without bringing any new principles into the field.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
619
unreason of the particular will. In this way the development of the actual leads from the unreason of the primordial will (deu$ implicittit) to the self-knowledge and self-determination of reason
(dens explicitus). 1
3. Thus at last religion became for Schelling the "organon of phil
osophy," as art had been earlier. Since the process of God's self- development goes on in the revelations, with which in the human mind he beholds himself, all momenta of the divine nature must appear in the succession of ideas which man in his historical development has had of God. Hence in the Philosophy of Mythol ogy and Revelation, the work of Schelling's old age, the knowledge of God it gained from the history of all religions : in the progress from the natural religions up to Christianity and its different forms
the self-revelation of God makes its way from dark primordial will to the spirit of reason and of love. God develops or evolves in and by revealing himself to men. '
In its methodical form this principle reminds us strongly of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy, in which " the Idea comes to itself," and the happy combination and fineness of feeling with which Schelling has grouped and mastered the bulky material of the history of religions in these lectures shows itself throughout akin and equal in rank to the Hegelian treatment. But the funda mental philosophical conception is yet entirely different. Schelling terms the standpoint of this his latest teaching, metaphysical em piricism. His own earlier system and that of Hegel he now calls negative philosophy: this philosophy may indeed show that if God once reveals himself, he does it in the forms of natural and historical reality which are capable of dialectical a priori construction. But that he reveals himself and thus transmutes himself into the world, dialectic is not able to deduce. This cannot be deduced at all ; it is
only to be experienced, and experienced from the way tn which Ood reveals himself in the religious life of mankind. To understand from this process God and his self-evolution into the world is the task of positive philosophy.
Those who both immediately and later derided Schelling's Phil osophy of Mythology and Revelation as " Gnosticism " scarcely knew, perhaps, how well founded the comparison was. They had in mind only the fantastic amalgamation of mythical ideas with philosophical conceptions, and the arbitrariness of cosmogonic and theogonic constructions. The true resemblance, however, consists
• Ct. above, p. 290 f.
» Cf. Coiuuotin Frantz, Sf lulling' $ Positive Philosophis (Cotton, 1879 L).
620 Germany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL
in this, that as the Gnostics gave to the warfare of religions, in the midst of which they were standing, the significance of a history of the universe and the divine powers ruling in so now Schelling set forth the development of human ideas of God as the develop ment of God himself.
Irrationalism came to its full development in Schopenhauer by the removal of the religious element. The dark urgency or instinct directed only toward itself appears with him under the name of the will to live, as the essence of all things, as the thing-in-itseff
(cf. 41, 9). In its conception, this will, directed only towards itself, has formal resemblance to Fichte's "infinite doing," just as was the case with Schlegel's irony (cf. 42, but in both cases the real difference all the greater. The activity directed solely toward itself with Fichte the autonomy of ethical self-determina tion, with Schlegel the arbitrary play of fancy, with Schopenhauer the absolute unreason of an objectless will. Since this will only creates itself perpetually, the never satisfied, the unhappy will and since the world nothing but the self-knowledge (self-revelation —objectification) of this will, must be world of misery and suffering.
Pessimism, thus grounded metaphysically, now strengthened by Schopenhauer by means of the hedonistic estimate of life itself. All human life flows on continually between willing and attaining. But to will pain, the ache of the "not-yet-satisfied. " Hence
pain is the positive feeling, and pleasure consists only in the removal of pain. Hence pain must preponderate in the life of will under all circumstances, and actual life confirms this conclusion. Compare the pleasure of the beast that devours with the torture of the one that being devoured — and you will be able to estimate with approximate correctness the proportion of pleasure and pain in the world in general. Hence man's life always ends in the complaint, that the best lot never to be born at all.
If life suffering, then only sympathy can be the fundamental ethical feeling (cf. 41, 9). The individual will immoral increases the hurt of another, or also merely indifferent toward moral feels another's hurt as its own and seeks to alleviate it. From the standpoint of sympathy Schopenhauer gave his psychological explanation of the ethical life. But this alleviation of the hurt only palliative does not abolish the will, and with the will its unhappiness persists. " The sun burns perpetual noon. " The misery of life remains always the same;
World as Will and Idea, 56 ft II. ch. 46 P<trer(/n, IT. oh. 11
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it ;
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Chap. 2, $ 43. ] Metaphysice of the Irrational : Schopenhauer. 621
only the form in which it is represented in idea alters. The special shapes change, but the content is always the same. Hence there can be no mention of a progress in history ; intellectual perfecting alters nothing in the will which constitutes the essential nature of man. History shows only the endless sorrow of the will to live,
which with an ever-new cast of characters constantly presents the same tragi-comedy before itself. 1 On this ground the philosophy of Schopenhauer has no interest in history ; history teaches only indi
vidual facts ; there is no rational science of it.
A deliverance from the wretchedness of the will would be possible
only through the negation or denial of the will itself. But this is a mystery. For the will, the tv «<u -ray — the one and all — the only Real, is indeed in its very nature self-affirmation ; how shall it deny itself ? But the Idea of this deliverance is present in the mystical asceticism, in the mortification of self, in the contempt of life and all its goods, and in the peace of soul that belongs to an absence of wishes. This, Schopenhauer held, is the import of the Indian
religion and philosophy, which began to be known in Europe about his time. He greeted this identity of his teaching with the oldest wisdom of the human race as a welcome confirmation, and now called the world of idea the veil of Maia, and the negation of the
will to live the entrance into Nirvana. But the unreasonable will to live would not let the philosopher go. At the close of his work he intimates that what would remain after the annihilation of the will, and with that, of the world also, would be for all those who are still full of will, certainly nothing ; but consideration of the life of the saints teaches, that while the world with all its suns and milky ways is nothing to them, they have attained blessedness and
" In thy nothing I hope to find the all. "
If an absolute deliverance is accordingly impossible, — were it
ever possible, then in view of the ideality of time there could be no world whatever of the affirmation of the will, — there is yet a rela tive deliverance from sorrow in those intellectual states in which the pure willess subject of knowing is active, viz. in disinterested contemplation and disinterested thought The object for both of these states he finds not in particular phenomena, but in the eternal
1 Hence the thought of grafting the optimism of the Hegelian development system on this will-irrationallstn of Schopenhauer's after the pattern of Spel ling's Dortrine of Frtrdum waa as mistaken aa the hope of reaching speculative result* by the method of inductive natural science. And with the organic combination of the two impossibilities, even a thinker so intelligent and so deep and many-sided in bis subtle investigations as Edward con Hartmann, could have only the success of a meteor that dazzles for a brief period (Die Philo$o- pkie dt» Unbevmutrn, Berlin, 1800) [Eng. tr. The Philotophy of the Vnconaciout, by B. C. Coupland, Lond. 1884].
peace.
622 Germany: Development of Idealism. [Part VI.
Forms of the objectification of the will — the Ideas. This Platonic (and Schellingian) element, however (as is the case also with the assumption of the intelligible character), fits with extreme difficulty into Schopenhauer's metaphysical system, according to which all particularising of the will is thought as only an idea in space and time ; but it gives the philosopher opportunity to employ Schiller's principle of disinterested contemplation in the happiest manner to complete his theory of life. The will becomes free from itself
when it is able to represent to itself in thought its objectification without any ulterior purpose. The misery of the irrational World- will is mitigated by morality ; in art and science it is overcome.
PART VII.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.
M. J. Monrad, Denkrichtungen der neueren Zeit. Bonn, 1879.
A. Franck, Philosophes Modernes, Strangers el Francais. Paris, 1873.
R. Eucken, Geschichte und Kritik der Orundbegtiffe der Gegenwart. Leips
187a 2d ed. 181)2.
E. v. Hartmann, Kritische Wanderung durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart.
Leips. 1890.
W. Dilthey, Archiv fur Geschichle der Philosophie. Vol. XI. pp. 651 ff.
H. Siebert, Geschichle der neueren deulschen Philosophie seit Hegel. Got-
tingen. 1898.
Ph. Damiron, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophie en France au 19* Siecle.
Paris, 1834.
H. Taine, Les Philosophes Classiques Francais au 191 SiMe. Paris, 1867.
F. Ravaisson, La Philosophie en France au 194 Siecle. Paris, 1868.
L. Ferraz, Histoire de la Philosophie en France au 19" Siecle, 3 vols. Paris,
1880-1889.
P. Janet, Les Maitres de la Pensee Moderne. Paris, 1883.
E. l)e Roberty, La Philosophie dn Siecle. Paris, 1891.
C"h. Adam, La Philosophie en France, pr. Moitie du Ifr Siicle.
1. . Liard, Les Logiciens Anglais Contemporains. Paris, 1878.
Th. Ribot, La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine. Paris, 1870.
D. Masson, Recent English Philosophy. 3d ed. Lond. 1877.
liar. Hoffding, Einleititug in die englische Philosophie der Gegenwart.
1890.
L. Ferri, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophie en Italic au J9* Siecle.
1869.
K. Werner, Die italienische Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts. Vienna, 1884 [O. Pfleiderer, The Dnelopment of Rational Theology since Kant. Lond. and
N. Y. 1891. ]
[L. Stephen, The English Utilitarians, vols. Lond. and N. Y. 1900. ]
[J. T. Merz, History of European Thought in the 19th Century, Vol. 1896. ]
The history ofphilosophical principles closed with the develop ment of the German systems at the boundary between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. survey of the succeeding development in which we are still standing to-day has far more of literary-his torical than of properly philosophical interest. For nothing essen tially and valuably new has since appeared. The nineteenth century
far from being philosophical one in this respect perhaps, 623
Paris, 1894.
Leips. Paris,
is
a
; it is,
is
A
A
I.
ff.
3
624 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII.
to be compared with the third and second centuries b. c. or the four teenth and fifteenth a. d. To speak in Hegel's language, one might say that the Weltgeist of our time, so busy with the concrete reaJity and drawn toward the outer, is kept from turning inward and to itself, and from enjoying itself in its own peculiar home. 1 The philosophical literature of the nineteenth century is, indeed, exten sive enough, and gives a variegated play of all the colours ; the seed of Ideas, which has been wafted over to ns from the days of the flower of the intellectual life, has grown luxuriantly in all spheres of science and public life, of poetry and of art ; the germinant thoughts of history have been combined in an almost immeasurable wealth of changing combinations into many structures of personally impressive detail, but even men like Hamilton and Comte, like Rosmini and Lotze, have their ultimate significance only in the energy of thought and fineness of feeling with which they have surveyed the typical con ceptions and principles of the past, and shaped them to new life and vigour. And the general course of thought, as indicated by the problems which interest and the conceptions that are formed in our century,* moves along the lines of antitheses that have been trans mitted to us through history, and have at most been given a new form in their empirical expression.
For the decisive factor in the philosophical movement of the nineteenth century is doubtless the question as to the degree of importance which the natural-science conception of phenomena may claim for our view of the world and life as a whole. The influence which this special science had gained over philosophy and the intellectual life as a whole was checked and repressed at the begin ning of the nineteenth century, to grow again afterwards with all the greater power. The metaphysics of the seventeenth, and there fore the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, were in the main under the dominance of the thinking of natural science. The con ception of the universal conformity to law on the part of all the actual world, the search for the simplest elements and forms of occurrence and cosmic processes, the insight into the invariable necessity which lies at the basis of all change, — these determined theoretical investigation. The " natural " was thus made a general standard for measuring the value of every particular event or expe-
1 Hegel, Berliner Antrittsrede, W. , VI. , XXXV.
* To the literary-historical interest in this field, which is so hard to master on account of its multiplicity, the author has been devoting the labor of many years. The product of this he is now permitted to hope soon to present as special parts of the third (supplementary) volume of his GetchiclUe der neturen Philosophie (2d ed. Leips. 1899). In this can be carried out in detail and proved what here can only be briefly sketched.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 625
rience. The spread of this mechanical way of regarding the world was met by the German Philosophy with the fundamental thought, that all that is known in this way is but the phenomenal form and vehicle of a purposefully developing inner world, and that the true comprehension of the particular has to determine the significance that belongs to it in a purposeful connected whole of life. The historical Weltanschauung was the result of the work of thought which the System of Reason desired to trace out.
These two forces contend with each other in the intellectual life of our century.
And in the warfare between them all arguments from the earlier periods of the history of philosophy have been pre sented in the most manifold combinations, but without bringing any new principles into the field. If the victory seems gradually to incline toward the side of the principles of Demoeritus, there are two main motifs favourable to this in our decades. The first is of essentially intellectual nature, and is the same that was operative in the times of intellectual life of previous centuries: it is the simplicity and clearness to jterception or imagination
(anschauliche Einfucldteit), the certainty and definiteness of the natural-science knowledge. Formulated mathematically and always demonstrable
in ex]>erii'nee, this promises to exclude all doubt and opinions, and all trouble of interpretative thought. But far more efficient in our »lay is the evident utiliti/ of natural science. The mighty trans formation in the external relations of life, which is taking place with rapid progress before our eyes, subjects the intellect of the average man irresistibly to the control of the forms of thought to which he owes such great things, and on this account we live under the sign of Baconianism (cf. above, p. 386 f. ).
(>n the other hand, the heightened culture of our day has kept alive and vital all questions relating to the value which the social and historical life has for the individual. The more the political and social development of European humanity has entered upon the epoch when the influences of masses make themselves felt in an increasing degree, and the more pronounced the power with which the collective body asserts its influence upon the individual, even in his mental and spiritual life, the more does the individual make
his struggle against the supremacy of society, and this also finds expression in the philosophic reflections of the century. The con test between the views of the world and of life which spring respec tively from history and from natural science, has gone on most violently at the point where the question will ultimately 1*> decided, in what degree the individual owes what makes his life worth living to himself, and in what degree he is indebted to the influences of the
626 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VJL
environing whole. Universalism and individualism, as in the tune of the Renaissance, have once more clashed in violent opposition.
If we are to bring out from the philosophical literature of this century and emphasise those movements in which the above charac teristic antithesis has found its most important manifestation, we have to do primarily with the question, in what sense the psychical life can be subjected to the methods and concepts of natural science ; for it is in connection with this point that the question must first be decided of the right of these methods and concepts to absolute sov ereignty in philosophy. For this reason the question as to the task, the method, and the systematic significance of psyclwlogy has never been more vigorously contested than in the nineteenth century, and the limitation of this science to a purely empirical treatment has appeared to be the only possible way out of the difficulties. Thus psychology, as the latest among the special disciplines, has com pleted its separation from philosophy, at least as regards the funda mental principles of its problem and method.
This procedure had more general presuppositions. In reaction against the highly strained idealism of the German philosophy, a broad stream of materialistic Weltanschauung flows through the nine teenth century. This spoke out about the middle of the period, not indeed with any new reasons or information, but with all the more passionate emphasis. Since then it has been much more modest in its claims to scientific value, but is all the more effective in the garb of sceptical and positivist caution.
To the most significant ramifications of this line of thought belongs without doubt the endeavour to regard the social life, the historical development, and the relations of mental and spiritual exist ence, from the points of view of natural science. Introduced by the unfortunate name of Sociology, this tendency has sought to develop a peculiar kind of the philosophy of history, which aims to extend upon a broader basis of fact the thoughts which were suggested toward the close of the philosophy of the Enlightenment (see § 37).
But on the other hand, the historical view of the world has not failed to exercise its powerful influence upon natural science. The idea of a history of the organic world, which was postulated in the philosophy of nature, early in the century, has found a highly impressive realization in empirical investigation. The methodical principles, which had led to the philosophy of Nature, extended as if spontaneously to other fields, and in the theories of evolution the historical and the scientific views of the world seem to approximate as closely as is possible without a new philosophic idea, which shall reshape and reconstruct.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 627
From the side of the individual, finally, the suggestions which were inherent in the problem of civilization as this was treated by the eighteenth century, temporarily brought the question as to the worth of life into the centre of philosophic interest. A pessimistic temper had to be overcome in order that from these discussions the deeper and clearer question as to the nature and content of values in general should be separated and brought to clear recognition. And so it was that philosophy, though by a remarkably devious path, was enabled to return to Kant's fundamental problem of values which are universally valid.
From the philosophical literature of the nineteenth century the following main points may be emphasized : —
In Franca Ideology divided into a more physiological and a more psycho logical branch. In the line of Cabanis worked principally the Paris physicians, such as Ph. Pinel (1745-1820; Xosographic Philosophiquc, 171*), F. J. V. Brouaaala (1772-1838; Traiti de Physiologic, 1822 f. ; Traiti de VIrritation rt de In Folic, 1828), and the founder of Phrenology, Fr. Jos. Oall (1768-1828 : Rrrherrhes fur le Systeme Xerreux en general et sur celui du Verrrau en parti- rulirr. 18011, which was edited in conjunction with Spurzhelm — 'I lit- an tithesis to this, physiologically, was formed by the school of Montpellier : Barthes (17. 'U-180o ; Xouceaux Elements de la Science de V Homme, 2d ed. ,
Associated with this school were M. F. X. Bichat (1771-1802; Rcherches Phyniologiques tur la Vie et la Mori. 1800). Bertrand (17H6-1881 ; Traiti du Somnamliulinme, 1823), and Buiaaon (17(10-1806; De la Division la plut Xaturelle dt* Phinominet l'hyniologiques, 1802). Corresponding to this was the development of Ideology with Daube (Ennui d" ldtologic, lM'-'i). and especially with I'ierre Iiaromiguiere (17&rt-18:! 7 ; Leconn de Philosophic, 1816-1818) and his disciple*, Fr. Thurot (1708-1832; De V Enlendement et de la Rainon. 18:10) and J. J. Cardalilao (1700-1845; Etudes Elimtntairtt de Philonophie, 1830). — Cf. Picavet, Let Ideologues (Paris, 18»1).
A line of extrusive historical study and of deeper psychology begins with M J. Degerando (1772-1842 ; De la Generation det Connaissancet Humainet, Berlin, lew; Hittoire Comparfe det Syttimet de Philonophie, 1804) and has its head in Fr. P. Oonthier Maine de Blran (1700-1824 ; De la Decomposition
de la Pemie, 1806 ; Let Rapport* du Physique et du Moral de V Homme, printed 1831 ; Euaitur les Fondementt de la I'syrhologie, 1812 ; (Entret Philotophique*. edited bv V. Cousin, 1841 ; (Eurres Intditet, edited by E. Naville, 186"; . Voti- relltt (Eurret Inedittt, edited by A. Bertrand, 1887). The influences of the Scottish and Herman philosophy discharge into this line (represented also by
lHOd).
A. M. Ampere) through P. Prevost ( 1761 -18311). Ancillon (1700-1837), Royer-Collard (1763-1846), Jouffroy (17A6-1842), and above all, Victor Cousin (1702-1HA7; Introduction a I'Hintoire Oenerale de la Philotophie, 7th ed . 1872 ; Du Vrai, du Beau et du liien, 1845 ; complete works, Paris, 184*1 ff. ;
J. Elaux. La Philosophic de M. cf. E. Fuchs. Die I'hilot. V. C't, Berlin, 1847 ; Cousin, which was
Cousin. Palis. 1864). The numerous school, founded by
especially noted through its historical labours, is called the Spiritualistic or EHeetic School. It was the official philosophy after the July Revolution, and is in part still such. To its adherents who have been active in the historical field, where their work has been characterised by thoroughness and literary taste, belong Ph. Damiron, Jul. Simon. E. Vacherot, H. Martin, A. Chaignet, Ad.
Franck. B. Haureau, Ch. Bartholiness. E. Saisset, P. Janet, E. Caro, etc. F. HsTsIsann has risen from the school to a theoretical standpoint which is in a certain sense his own. (Morale et mttaphytique. In the Revue de Met. et de Mor. 1803)
Its principal opponents were the philosophers of the CA*rrA> party, whose tbeorv is known as Traditionalism Together with Chateaubriand (Le Genie du ChrUtianltne, 1802), Jos. da Maistte (1763-1821 ; £j#ai tur It Primelpt
628 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Pabt VII.
Qenerateur des Constitutions Politique^, 1810 ; Soiries de St. Petersbourg, 1821 ; Du Pape, 1820; cf. on him Fr. Paulhan, Paris, 1898) and J. Frayssinons (1765-1841; Defense du Christianisme, 1828), V. G. A. de Bonald (1768-1841; Theorie du Pouvoir Politique et lieligieux, 1796 ; Essai Analytique sur lex Lois Haturelles de VOrdre Social, 1800; Du Divorce, 1801; De la Philosophic Morale et Politique du 184 siecle; complete works, 16 vols. , Paris, 1816 fl. ) stands here in the foreground. The traditionalism of P. S. Ballanche is presented in a strangely fantastic fashion (1776-1847 ; Essai sur les Institutions Societies, 1817 ; La Palingenesie Sociale ; complete works, 6 vols. , Paris, 1888). In the beginning II. F. U. de Lamennais (1782-1864) also supported this line in his Essai sur VIndifference en Matiere de Religion (1817); later, having fallen out with the Church {Parole d'un Croyant, 1884), he presented in the Esquisse (Vune Philosophic (4 vols. , 1841-1846) a comprehensive system of philosophy, which had for its prototype partly the Schellingian System of Identity and partly the Italian Ontologism.
Among the philosophical supporters of Socialism (cf. L. Stein, Geschichu der socialen Bevsegung in Frankreich, Leips. 1849 11. ) the most important is CI. H. de St. Simon (1760-1825 ; Introduction aux Travaux Scientifique* du ISh siecle, 1807 ; Biorganisation de la Societe Europienne, 1814 ; Systeme In dustrie^ 1821 f. ; Nouveau Christianisme, 1825 ; (Euvres choisies, 3 vols. , 1859). Of his successors may be mentioned, Bazard (Doctrine de St. Simon, 1829), B. Enfantin (1790-1864; La Religion St. Simonienne, 1831), Pierre Leroux (1798-1871 ; Refutation de I'Eclecticisme, 1&39 ; De V Humanite, 1840), and Ph. Buchez (1796-1866 ; Essai cTun Traiti Complet de Philosophic au Point de
Vue du Catholicisms et du Progres, 1840).
Aug. Comte occupies a most interesting position apart. He was born in
Montpellier in 1798 and died alone in Paris in 1867 : Cours du Philosophic Positive (6 vols. , Paris, 1840-1842) [Eng. tr. , or rather a condensation and repro duction by H. Martineau, The Positive Philosophy of A. Comte, 2 vols. , Lond. 1863] ; Systeme de Politique Positive (Paris, 1851-1854) ; The Positive Polity and certain earlier works, trans, by various authors, 4 vols. , Lond. 187(1-1878; Catechisme Positiviste (1853) ; cf. Littr6, C. et la Philosophic Positire, Paris, 1868 ; J. S. Mill, C. and Positivism, Lond. 1805 ; J. Rig, A. C. La Philosophic. Positive Resumee, Paris, 1881 ; E. Caird, The Social Philosophy and Religion of ft, Glasgow, 1886.
In the following period Comte's position became more influential and in part controlling. E. Littre' (1801-1881 ; La Science au Point de Vue Philosophique. Paris, 1873) defended his positivism in systematic form. A freer adaptation of positivism was made by such writers as H. Taine (1828-1893 ; Philosophic de I'Art, 1866 ; De VIntelligence, 1870 ; cf. on him G. Barzellotti, Rome, 1896) and Ernest Renan (1823-1892; Questions Contemporaines, 1868; L'Avenir de la Science, 1890). Under Comte's influence, likewise, has been the develop ment of empirical psychology. Th. Ribot. editor of the Revue Philosophique, is to be regarded as the leader in this field. In addition to his historical works on English and German psychology, his investigations with regard to heredity and abnormal conditions of memory, will, personality, etc. , may be noted.
In part also Sociology stands under Comte's influence, as R. Worms, G. Tarde, E. Durkheim, and others have striven to work it out (cf. Annie Sociolo- gique, pub. since 1894). Finally, evolutionary theories belong in this connection, which have been especially carried out by J. M. Guyau (1854-1888 ; Esquisse d'une Morale, 1885 ; LHrreligion de. Vavenir, 1887 ; Vart, au point de vue sociologique, 1889) [Problemes de VEsthetique Contemporaine, 1897].
By far the most important among the present representatives of philosophy in France is Ch. Renouvier (bom 1818 ; Essais de Critique Ginirale, 2d ed. , 1875-96; Esqitisse d'une Classification Systematique des Doctrines Philoso- phiques, 1885 ; La Philosophic Analytique de VHistoire, 1896 ; La Nouvelle Monadologie, 1899). The synthesis of Kant and Comte which he has sought to effect has its literary organ in the Annee Philosophique (published since 1889).
In England the Associational Psychology continues through Thomas Brown to men like Thomas Belnham (1750-1829 ; Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 1801), John Fearn (First Lines of the Human Mind,
Philotophy of the Nineteenth Century. 629
1830), and many others; finds support here also in physiological and phreno logical theories as with G. Combe (. 1 System nf Phrenology, Kdin. 1826), Sam. Bailey (Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, 1829; The Theory of Reasoning, 1861 ; LetUrs on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 18. '>. ">)and Harriet Mar tineau {Letters on the Isiws of Man's Nature ami Development, 1861), and reaches its full development through James Mill (Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind.
unreason of the particular will. In this way the development of the actual leads from the unreason of the primordial will (deu$ implicittit) to the self-knowledge and self-determination of reason
(dens explicitus). 1
3. Thus at last religion became for Schelling the "organon of phil
osophy," as art had been earlier. Since the process of God's self- development goes on in the revelations, with which in the human mind he beholds himself, all momenta of the divine nature must appear in the succession of ideas which man in his historical development has had of God. Hence in the Philosophy of Mythol ogy and Revelation, the work of Schelling's old age, the knowledge of God it gained from the history of all religions : in the progress from the natural religions up to Christianity and its different forms
the self-revelation of God makes its way from dark primordial will to the spirit of reason and of love. God develops or evolves in and by revealing himself to men. '
In its methodical form this principle reminds us strongly of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy, in which " the Idea comes to itself," and the happy combination and fineness of feeling with which Schelling has grouped and mastered the bulky material of the history of religions in these lectures shows itself throughout akin and equal in rank to the Hegelian treatment. But the funda mental philosophical conception is yet entirely different. Schelling terms the standpoint of this his latest teaching, metaphysical em piricism. His own earlier system and that of Hegel he now calls negative philosophy: this philosophy may indeed show that if God once reveals himself, he does it in the forms of natural and historical reality which are capable of dialectical a priori construction. But that he reveals himself and thus transmutes himself into the world, dialectic is not able to deduce. This cannot be deduced at all ; it is
only to be experienced, and experienced from the way tn which Ood reveals himself in the religious life of mankind. To understand from this process God and his self-evolution into the world is the task of positive philosophy.
Those who both immediately and later derided Schelling's Phil osophy of Mythology and Revelation as " Gnosticism " scarcely knew, perhaps, how well founded the comparison was. They had in mind only the fantastic amalgamation of mythical ideas with philosophical conceptions, and the arbitrariness of cosmogonic and theogonic constructions. The true resemblance, however, consists
• Ct. above, p. 290 f.
» Cf. Coiuuotin Frantz, Sf lulling' $ Positive Philosophis (Cotton, 1879 L).
620 Germany : Development of Idealism. [Part VL
in this, that as the Gnostics gave to the warfare of religions, in the midst of which they were standing, the significance of a history of the universe and the divine powers ruling in so now Schelling set forth the development of human ideas of God as the develop ment of God himself.
Irrationalism came to its full development in Schopenhauer by the removal of the religious element. The dark urgency or instinct directed only toward itself appears with him under the name of the will to live, as the essence of all things, as the thing-in-itseff
(cf. 41, 9). In its conception, this will, directed only towards itself, has formal resemblance to Fichte's "infinite doing," just as was the case with Schlegel's irony (cf. 42, but in both cases the real difference all the greater. The activity directed solely toward itself with Fichte the autonomy of ethical self-determina tion, with Schlegel the arbitrary play of fancy, with Schopenhauer the absolute unreason of an objectless will. Since this will only creates itself perpetually, the never satisfied, the unhappy will and since the world nothing but the self-knowledge (self-revelation —objectification) of this will, must be world of misery and suffering.
Pessimism, thus grounded metaphysically, now strengthened by Schopenhauer by means of the hedonistic estimate of life itself. All human life flows on continually between willing and attaining. But to will pain, the ache of the "not-yet-satisfied. " Hence
pain is the positive feeling, and pleasure consists only in the removal of pain. Hence pain must preponderate in the life of will under all circumstances, and actual life confirms this conclusion. Compare the pleasure of the beast that devours with the torture of the one that being devoured — and you will be able to estimate with approximate correctness the proportion of pleasure and pain in the world in general. Hence man's life always ends in the complaint, that the best lot never to be born at all.
If life suffering, then only sympathy can be the fundamental ethical feeling (cf. 41, 9). The individual will immoral increases the hurt of another, or also merely indifferent toward moral feels another's hurt as its own and seeks to alleviate it. From the standpoint of sympathy Schopenhauer gave his psychological explanation of the ethical life. But this alleviation of the hurt only palliative does not abolish the will, and with the will its unhappiness persists. " The sun burns perpetual noon. " The misery of life remains always the same;
World as Will and Idea, 56 ft II. ch. 46 P<trer(/n, IT. oh. 11
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Chap. 2, $ 43. ] Metaphysice of the Irrational : Schopenhauer. 621
only the form in which it is represented in idea alters. The special shapes change, but the content is always the same. Hence there can be no mention of a progress in history ; intellectual perfecting alters nothing in the will which constitutes the essential nature of man. History shows only the endless sorrow of the will to live,
which with an ever-new cast of characters constantly presents the same tragi-comedy before itself. 1 On this ground the philosophy of Schopenhauer has no interest in history ; history teaches only indi
vidual facts ; there is no rational science of it.
A deliverance from the wretchedness of the will would be possible
only through the negation or denial of the will itself. But this is a mystery. For the will, the tv «<u -ray — the one and all — the only Real, is indeed in its very nature self-affirmation ; how shall it deny itself ? But the Idea of this deliverance is present in the mystical asceticism, in the mortification of self, in the contempt of life and all its goods, and in the peace of soul that belongs to an absence of wishes. This, Schopenhauer held, is the import of the Indian
religion and philosophy, which began to be known in Europe about his time. He greeted this identity of his teaching with the oldest wisdom of the human race as a welcome confirmation, and now called the world of idea the veil of Maia, and the negation of the
will to live the entrance into Nirvana. But the unreasonable will to live would not let the philosopher go. At the close of his work he intimates that what would remain after the annihilation of the will, and with that, of the world also, would be for all those who are still full of will, certainly nothing ; but consideration of the life of the saints teaches, that while the world with all its suns and milky ways is nothing to them, they have attained blessedness and
" In thy nothing I hope to find the all. "
If an absolute deliverance is accordingly impossible, — were it
ever possible, then in view of the ideality of time there could be no world whatever of the affirmation of the will, — there is yet a rela tive deliverance from sorrow in those intellectual states in which the pure willess subject of knowing is active, viz. in disinterested contemplation and disinterested thought The object for both of these states he finds not in particular phenomena, but in the eternal
1 Hence the thought of grafting the optimism of the Hegelian development system on this will-irrationallstn of Schopenhauer's after the pattern of Spel ling's Dortrine of Frtrdum waa as mistaken aa the hope of reaching speculative result* by the method of inductive natural science. And with the organic combination of the two impossibilities, even a thinker so intelligent and so deep and many-sided in bis subtle investigations as Edward con Hartmann, could have only the success of a meteor that dazzles for a brief period (Die Philo$o- pkie dt» Unbevmutrn, Berlin, 1800) [Eng. tr. The Philotophy of the Vnconaciout, by B. C. Coupland, Lond. 1884].
peace.
622 Germany: Development of Idealism. [Part VI.
Forms of the objectification of the will — the Ideas. This Platonic (and Schellingian) element, however (as is the case also with the assumption of the intelligible character), fits with extreme difficulty into Schopenhauer's metaphysical system, according to which all particularising of the will is thought as only an idea in space and time ; but it gives the philosopher opportunity to employ Schiller's principle of disinterested contemplation in the happiest manner to complete his theory of life. The will becomes free from itself
when it is able to represent to itself in thought its objectification without any ulterior purpose. The misery of the irrational World- will is mitigated by morality ; in art and science it is overcome.
PART VII.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.
M. J. Monrad, Denkrichtungen der neueren Zeit. Bonn, 1879.
A. Franck, Philosophes Modernes, Strangers el Francais. Paris, 1873.
R. Eucken, Geschichte und Kritik der Orundbegtiffe der Gegenwart. Leips
187a 2d ed. 181)2.
E. v. Hartmann, Kritische Wanderung durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart.
Leips. 1890.
W. Dilthey, Archiv fur Geschichle der Philosophie. Vol. XI. pp. 651 ff.
H. Siebert, Geschichle der neueren deulschen Philosophie seit Hegel. Got-
tingen. 1898.
Ph. Damiron, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophie en France au 19* Siecle.
Paris, 1834.
H. Taine, Les Philosophes Classiques Francais au 191 SiMe. Paris, 1867.
F. Ravaisson, La Philosophie en France au 194 Siecle. Paris, 1868.
L. Ferraz, Histoire de la Philosophie en France au 19" Siecle, 3 vols. Paris,
1880-1889.
P. Janet, Les Maitres de la Pensee Moderne. Paris, 1883.
E. l)e Roberty, La Philosophie dn Siecle. Paris, 1891.
C"h. Adam, La Philosophie en France, pr. Moitie du Ifr Siicle.
1. . Liard, Les Logiciens Anglais Contemporains. Paris, 1878.
Th. Ribot, La Psychologie Anglaise Contemporaine. Paris, 1870.
D. Masson, Recent English Philosophy. 3d ed. Lond. 1877.
liar. Hoffding, Einleititug in die englische Philosophie der Gegenwart.
1890.
L. Ferri, Essai sur VHistoire de la Philosophie en Italic au J9* Siecle.
1869.
K. Werner, Die italienische Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts. Vienna, 1884 [O. Pfleiderer, The Dnelopment of Rational Theology since Kant. Lond. and
N. Y. 1891. ]
[L. Stephen, The English Utilitarians, vols. Lond. and N. Y. 1900. ]
[J. T. Merz, History of European Thought in the 19th Century, Vol. 1896. ]
The history ofphilosophical principles closed with the develop ment of the German systems at the boundary between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. survey of the succeeding development in which we are still standing to-day has far more of literary-his torical than of properly philosophical interest. For nothing essen tially and valuably new has since appeared. The nineteenth century
far from being philosophical one in this respect perhaps, 623
Paris, 1894.
Leips. Paris,
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; it is,
is
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ff.
3
624 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII.
to be compared with the third and second centuries b. c. or the four teenth and fifteenth a. d. To speak in Hegel's language, one might say that the Weltgeist of our time, so busy with the concrete reaJity and drawn toward the outer, is kept from turning inward and to itself, and from enjoying itself in its own peculiar home. 1 The philosophical literature of the nineteenth century is, indeed, exten sive enough, and gives a variegated play of all the colours ; the seed of Ideas, which has been wafted over to ns from the days of the flower of the intellectual life, has grown luxuriantly in all spheres of science and public life, of poetry and of art ; the germinant thoughts of history have been combined in an almost immeasurable wealth of changing combinations into many structures of personally impressive detail, but even men like Hamilton and Comte, like Rosmini and Lotze, have their ultimate significance only in the energy of thought and fineness of feeling with which they have surveyed the typical con ceptions and principles of the past, and shaped them to new life and vigour. And the general course of thought, as indicated by the problems which interest and the conceptions that are formed in our century,* moves along the lines of antitheses that have been trans mitted to us through history, and have at most been given a new form in their empirical expression.
For the decisive factor in the philosophical movement of the nineteenth century is doubtless the question as to the degree of importance which the natural-science conception of phenomena may claim for our view of the world and life as a whole. The influence which this special science had gained over philosophy and the intellectual life as a whole was checked and repressed at the begin ning of the nineteenth century, to grow again afterwards with all the greater power. The metaphysics of the seventeenth, and there fore the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, were in the main under the dominance of the thinking of natural science. The con ception of the universal conformity to law on the part of all the actual world, the search for the simplest elements and forms of occurrence and cosmic processes, the insight into the invariable necessity which lies at the basis of all change, — these determined theoretical investigation. The " natural " was thus made a general standard for measuring the value of every particular event or expe-
1 Hegel, Berliner Antrittsrede, W. , VI. , XXXV.
* To the literary-historical interest in this field, which is so hard to master on account of its multiplicity, the author has been devoting the labor of many years. The product of this he is now permitted to hope soon to present as special parts of the third (supplementary) volume of his GetchiclUe der neturen Philosophie (2d ed. Leips. 1899). In this can be carried out in detail and proved what here can only be briefly sketched.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 625
rience. The spread of this mechanical way of regarding the world was met by the German Philosophy with the fundamental thought, that all that is known in this way is but the phenomenal form and vehicle of a purposefully developing inner world, and that the true comprehension of the particular has to determine the significance that belongs to it in a purposeful connected whole of life. The historical Weltanschauung was the result of the work of thought which the System of Reason desired to trace out.
These two forces contend with each other in the intellectual life of our century.
And in the warfare between them all arguments from the earlier periods of the history of philosophy have been pre sented in the most manifold combinations, but without bringing any new principles into the field. If the victory seems gradually to incline toward the side of the principles of Demoeritus, there are two main motifs favourable to this in our decades. The first is of essentially intellectual nature, and is the same that was operative in the times of intellectual life of previous centuries: it is the simplicity and clearness to jterception or imagination
(anschauliche Einfucldteit), the certainty and definiteness of the natural-science knowledge. Formulated mathematically and always demonstrable
in ex]>erii'nee, this promises to exclude all doubt and opinions, and all trouble of interpretative thought. But far more efficient in our »lay is the evident utiliti/ of natural science. The mighty trans formation in the external relations of life, which is taking place with rapid progress before our eyes, subjects the intellect of the average man irresistibly to the control of the forms of thought to which he owes such great things, and on this account we live under the sign of Baconianism (cf. above, p. 386 f. ).
(>n the other hand, the heightened culture of our day has kept alive and vital all questions relating to the value which the social and historical life has for the individual. The more the political and social development of European humanity has entered upon the epoch when the influences of masses make themselves felt in an increasing degree, and the more pronounced the power with which the collective body asserts its influence upon the individual, even in his mental and spiritual life, the more does the individual make
his struggle against the supremacy of society, and this also finds expression in the philosophic reflections of the century. The con test between the views of the world and of life which spring respec tively from history and from natural science, has gone on most violently at the point where the question will ultimately 1*> decided, in what degree the individual owes what makes his life worth living to himself, and in what degree he is indebted to the influences of the
626 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VJL
environing whole. Universalism and individualism, as in the tune of the Renaissance, have once more clashed in violent opposition.
If we are to bring out from the philosophical literature of this century and emphasise those movements in which the above charac teristic antithesis has found its most important manifestation, we have to do primarily with the question, in what sense the psychical life can be subjected to the methods and concepts of natural science ; for it is in connection with this point that the question must first be decided of the right of these methods and concepts to absolute sov ereignty in philosophy. For this reason the question as to the task, the method, and the systematic significance of psyclwlogy has never been more vigorously contested than in the nineteenth century, and the limitation of this science to a purely empirical treatment has appeared to be the only possible way out of the difficulties. Thus psychology, as the latest among the special disciplines, has com pleted its separation from philosophy, at least as regards the funda mental principles of its problem and method.
This procedure had more general presuppositions. In reaction against the highly strained idealism of the German philosophy, a broad stream of materialistic Weltanschauung flows through the nine teenth century. This spoke out about the middle of the period, not indeed with any new reasons or information, but with all the more passionate emphasis. Since then it has been much more modest in its claims to scientific value, but is all the more effective in the garb of sceptical and positivist caution.
To the most significant ramifications of this line of thought belongs without doubt the endeavour to regard the social life, the historical development, and the relations of mental and spiritual exist ence, from the points of view of natural science. Introduced by the unfortunate name of Sociology, this tendency has sought to develop a peculiar kind of the philosophy of history, which aims to extend upon a broader basis of fact the thoughts which were suggested toward the close of the philosophy of the Enlightenment (see § 37).
But on the other hand, the historical view of the world has not failed to exercise its powerful influence upon natural science. The idea of a history of the organic world, which was postulated in the philosophy of nature, early in the century, has found a highly impressive realization in empirical investigation. The methodical principles, which had led to the philosophy of Nature, extended as if spontaneously to other fields, and in the theories of evolution the historical and the scientific views of the world seem to approximate as closely as is possible without a new philosophic idea, which shall reshape and reconstruct.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 627
From the side of the individual, finally, the suggestions which were inherent in the problem of civilization as this was treated by the eighteenth century, temporarily brought the question as to the worth of life into the centre of philosophic interest. A pessimistic temper had to be overcome in order that from these discussions the deeper and clearer question as to the nature and content of values in general should be separated and brought to clear recognition. And so it was that philosophy, though by a remarkably devious path, was enabled to return to Kant's fundamental problem of values which are universally valid.
From the philosophical literature of the nineteenth century the following main points may be emphasized : —
In Franca Ideology divided into a more physiological and a more psycho logical branch. In the line of Cabanis worked principally the Paris physicians, such as Ph. Pinel (1745-1820; Xosographic Philosophiquc, 171*), F. J. V. Brouaaala (1772-1838; Traiti de Physiologic, 1822 f. ; Traiti de VIrritation rt de In Folic, 1828), and the founder of Phrenology, Fr. Jos. Oall (1768-1828 : Rrrherrhes fur le Systeme Xerreux en general et sur celui du Verrrau en parti- rulirr. 18011, which was edited in conjunction with Spurzhelm — 'I lit- an tithesis to this, physiologically, was formed by the school of Montpellier : Barthes (17. 'U-180o ; Xouceaux Elements de la Science de V Homme, 2d ed. ,
Associated with this school were M. F. X. Bichat (1771-1802; Rcherches Phyniologiques tur la Vie et la Mori. 1800). Bertrand (17H6-1881 ; Traiti du Somnamliulinme, 1823), and Buiaaon (17(10-1806; De la Division la plut Xaturelle dt* Phinominet l'hyniologiques, 1802). Corresponding to this was the development of Ideology with Daube (Ennui d" ldtologic, lM'-'i). and especially with I'ierre Iiaromiguiere (17&rt-18:! 7 ; Leconn de Philosophic, 1816-1818) and his disciple*, Fr. Thurot (1708-1832; De V Enlendement et de la Rainon. 18:10) and J. J. Cardalilao (1700-1845; Etudes Elimtntairtt de Philonophie, 1830). — Cf. Picavet, Let Ideologues (Paris, 18»1).
A line of extrusive historical study and of deeper psychology begins with M J. Degerando (1772-1842 ; De la Generation det Connaissancet Humainet, Berlin, lew; Hittoire Comparfe det Syttimet de Philonophie, 1804) and has its head in Fr. P. Oonthier Maine de Blran (1700-1824 ; De la Decomposition
de la Pemie, 1806 ; Let Rapport* du Physique et du Moral de V Homme, printed 1831 ; Euaitur les Fondementt de la I'syrhologie, 1812 ; (Entret Philotophique*. edited bv V. Cousin, 1841 ; (Eurres Intditet, edited by E. Naville, 186"; . Voti- relltt (Eurret Inedittt, edited by A. Bertrand, 1887). The influences of the Scottish and Herman philosophy discharge into this line (represented also by
lHOd).
A. M. Ampere) through P. Prevost ( 1761 -18311). Ancillon (1700-1837), Royer-Collard (1763-1846), Jouffroy (17A6-1842), and above all, Victor Cousin (1702-1HA7; Introduction a I'Hintoire Oenerale de la Philotophie, 7th ed . 1872 ; Du Vrai, du Beau et du liien, 1845 ; complete works, Paris, 184*1 ff. ;
J. Elaux. La Philosophic de M. cf. E. Fuchs. Die I'hilot. V. C't, Berlin, 1847 ; Cousin, which was
Cousin. Palis. 1864). The numerous school, founded by
especially noted through its historical labours, is called the Spiritualistic or EHeetic School. It was the official philosophy after the July Revolution, and is in part still such. To its adherents who have been active in the historical field, where their work has been characterised by thoroughness and literary taste, belong Ph. Damiron, Jul. Simon. E. Vacherot, H. Martin, A. Chaignet, Ad.
Franck. B. Haureau, Ch. Bartholiness. E. Saisset, P. Janet, E. Caro, etc. F. HsTsIsann has risen from the school to a theoretical standpoint which is in a certain sense his own. (Morale et mttaphytique. In the Revue de Met. et de Mor. 1803)
Its principal opponents were the philosophers of the CA*rrA> party, whose tbeorv is known as Traditionalism Together with Chateaubriand (Le Genie du ChrUtianltne, 1802), Jos. da Maistte (1763-1821 ; £j#ai tur It Primelpt
628 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Pabt VII.
Qenerateur des Constitutions Politique^, 1810 ; Soiries de St. Petersbourg, 1821 ; Du Pape, 1820; cf. on him Fr. Paulhan, Paris, 1898) and J. Frayssinons (1765-1841; Defense du Christianisme, 1828), V. G. A. de Bonald (1768-1841; Theorie du Pouvoir Politique et lieligieux, 1796 ; Essai Analytique sur lex Lois Haturelles de VOrdre Social, 1800; Du Divorce, 1801; De la Philosophic Morale et Politique du 184 siecle; complete works, 16 vols. , Paris, 1816 fl. ) stands here in the foreground. The traditionalism of P. S. Ballanche is presented in a strangely fantastic fashion (1776-1847 ; Essai sur les Institutions Societies, 1817 ; La Palingenesie Sociale ; complete works, 6 vols. , Paris, 1888). In the beginning II. F. U. de Lamennais (1782-1864) also supported this line in his Essai sur VIndifference en Matiere de Religion (1817); later, having fallen out with the Church {Parole d'un Croyant, 1884), he presented in the Esquisse (Vune Philosophic (4 vols. , 1841-1846) a comprehensive system of philosophy, which had for its prototype partly the Schellingian System of Identity and partly the Italian Ontologism.
Among the philosophical supporters of Socialism (cf. L. Stein, Geschichu der socialen Bevsegung in Frankreich, Leips. 1849 11. ) the most important is CI. H. de St. Simon (1760-1825 ; Introduction aux Travaux Scientifique* du ISh siecle, 1807 ; Biorganisation de la Societe Europienne, 1814 ; Systeme In dustrie^ 1821 f. ; Nouveau Christianisme, 1825 ; (Euvres choisies, 3 vols. , 1859). Of his successors may be mentioned, Bazard (Doctrine de St. Simon, 1829), B. Enfantin (1790-1864; La Religion St. Simonienne, 1831), Pierre Leroux (1798-1871 ; Refutation de I'Eclecticisme, 1&39 ; De V Humanite, 1840), and Ph. Buchez (1796-1866 ; Essai cTun Traiti Complet de Philosophic au Point de
Vue du Catholicisms et du Progres, 1840).
Aug. Comte occupies a most interesting position apart. He was born in
Montpellier in 1798 and died alone in Paris in 1867 : Cours du Philosophic Positive (6 vols. , Paris, 1840-1842) [Eng. tr. , or rather a condensation and repro duction by H. Martineau, The Positive Philosophy of A. Comte, 2 vols. , Lond. 1863] ; Systeme de Politique Positive (Paris, 1851-1854) ; The Positive Polity and certain earlier works, trans, by various authors, 4 vols. , Lond. 187(1-1878; Catechisme Positiviste (1853) ; cf. Littr6, C. et la Philosophic Positire, Paris, 1868 ; J. S. Mill, C. and Positivism, Lond. 1805 ; J. Rig, A. C. La Philosophic. Positive Resumee, Paris, 1881 ; E. Caird, The Social Philosophy and Religion of ft, Glasgow, 1886.
In the following period Comte's position became more influential and in part controlling. E. Littre' (1801-1881 ; La Science au Point de Vue Philosophique. Paris, 1873) defended his positivism in systematic form. A freer adaptation of positivism was made by such writers as H. Taine (1828-1893 ; Philosophic de I'Art, 1866 ; De VIntelligence, 1870 ; cf. on him G. Barzellotti, Rome, 1896) and Ernest Renan (1823-1892; Questions Contemporaines, 1868; L'Avenir de la Science, 1890). Under Comte's influence, likewise, has been the develop ment of empirical psychology. Th. Ribot. editor of the Revue Philosophique, is to be regarded as the leader in this field. In addition to his historical works on English and German psychology, his investigations with regard to heredity and abnormal conditions of memory, will, personality, etc. , may be noted.
In part also Sociology stands under Comte's influence, as R. Worms, G. Tarde, E. Durkheim, and others have striven to work it out (cf. Annie Sociolo- gique, pub. since 1894). Finally, evolutionary theories belong in this connection, which have been especially carried out by J. M. Guyau (1854-1888 ; Esquisse d'une Morale, 1885 ; LHrreligion de. Vavenir, 1887 ; Vart, au point de vue sociologique, 1889) [Problemes de VEsthetique Contemporaine, 1897].
By far the most important among the present representatives of philosophy in France is Ch. Renouvier (bom 1818 ; Essais de Critique Ginirale, 2d ed. , 1875-96; Esqitisse d'une Classification Systematique des Doctrines Philoso- phiques, 1885 ; La Philosophic Analytique de VHistoire, 1896 ; La Nouvelle Monadologie, 1899). The synthesis of Kant and Comte which he has sought to effect has its literary organ in the Annee Philosophique (published since 1889).
In England the Associational Psychology continues through Thomas Brown to men like Thomas Belnham (1750-1829 ; Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 1801), John Fearn (First Lines of the Human Mind,
Philotophy of the Nineteenth Century. 629
1830), and many others; finds support here also in physiological and phreno logical theories as with G. Combe (. 1 System nf Phrenology, Kdin. 1826), Sam. Bailey (Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, 1829; The Theory of Reasoning, 1861 ; LetUrs on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 18. '>. ">)and Harriet Mar tineau {Letters on the Isiws of Man's Nature ami Development, 1861), and reaches its full development through James Mill (Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind.
