No More Learning

Well, they saw our defeat and that encouraged them to break
existing treaties, it gave them heart, and that they hoped to have a second
Cabool affair is as clear to me as the sun now shining. . . . Now what is to be
done? That which is best for the advancement of good government and well-
being of the populatior; and we must not sacrifice all this to a minute endea-
vour, utterly hopeless, I may say impossible, to give to these tyrannical, drunken,
debauched, cheating, intriguing, contemptible Ameers, a due portion of the
plunder they have amassed from the ruined people they conquered sixty years
ago. They are fortunate robbers one and all, and though I most decidedly con-
demn the way we entered this country (just as honest, however, as that by
which the Talpoors got it from the Kalloras) I would equally condemn any
policy that allowed these rascals to go on plundering the country to supply
their debaucheries after we had raised the hopes of every respectable man
in the country. This I consider to be Lord E. 's view and in that sense I act.
If I thought Lord E. was acting on an unjust plan I would of course obey my
orders, but should deeply regret my position. But I do no such thing: the
whole injustice was committed by Lord Auckland, and such a course of in-
justice cannot be closed without hardship on someone. It is likely to fall on
the Ameers, and on a crew more deserving to bear it hardly could it alight. It
falls heaviest on Roostum, an old worn debauchee, a man drunk every day of
his life, breaking his own religious ordinances, and even the habits and customs
of his country. ?
The judgment that has held the field hitherto has been hostile;
from 1844 when a writer in the Calcutta Review said : "The real cause
a
of this chastisement of the Ameers consisted in the chastisement
which the British had received from the Afghans", till the recent
verdict in the Cambridge Modern History. But the truer view will be
more like that of Outram's great apologist: "In the light of subse-
quent history it may even be argued that Outram's policy of trust
1 Law, op. cit. pp. 68 sqq. Napier, Conquest of Scinde, 334.
2 Napier, Life. . . . of Sir C. J. Napier, II, 300


## p. 539 (#567) ############################################

THE SIKHS
539
in the Ameers would have proved less wise than Napier's policy of
vigilant coercion”: assuming for the moment that such were the
respective policies of the two men.
The conquest of Sind, however, cannot be said to be the fault of
any one man. Lord Auckland looking on the country as a portion
of the older Afghanistan treated its liberties or rather the liberties
of its conquerors—as subsidiary to the general Afghan policy, for
which again he can hardly be held altogether responsible. He left
the Sind problem in a desperate condition to his successor, but neither
of them seems to have wished to annex the country; circumstances
were too strong for both of them. As to Sir Charles Napier, who
came fresh to the country, he acted a soldier's part and acted it
extraordinarily well. He illustrated the extreme value of common-
sense and directness, and there is an element of profound, as well as
kindly, truth in his remark that "Outram is a clever fellow, but he
seems to have been so long accustomed to Indian tricks that he thinks
them of real importance". In any estimate of Napier's conduct the
instructions he received must always be remembered; and in parti-
cular those of 26 August, 1842 :
It may be convenient that you should at once be informed that, if the
Ameers or any one of them, should act hostilely or evince hostile designs
against our army, it is my fixed resolution never to forgive the breach of faith
and to exact a penalty which shall be a warning to every chief in India. 1
And yet the whole transaction has been thought to bear a colour of
injustice which may rightly be ascribed to some of its parts, and the
plea of the happiness of the people, who gained enormously by the
change, has not been held sufficient to justify what happened.
II. THE PANJAB
At the beginning of the nineteenth century Ranjit Singh, the
greatest of the Sikh rulers, had consolidated a powerful kingdom
north-west of the Satlej, and seemed likely to extend his empire as
far as the Jumna; he was aided on the one hand by the weakness of
the Afghans and on the other by the policy of the English, who
seemed disinclined at first to interfere owing to the more serious
responsibilities of their great struggle with the Marathas. Lake, it
will be einembered, and Wellesley defeated Sindhia and Holkar in a
series of great battles the result of which was to increase the import-
ance of the English in the north-west, and so to make the relations
between them and the Sikhs more vital. The Cis-Satlej chiefs fought
against the English in the battle of Delhi, and in 1805 Holkar fled to
Amritsar. Ranjit Singh was too clever to help him against Lake, and
the resulting treaty of Lahore of 1 January, 1806, kept the Marathas
out of the Panjab, secured the friendship of the English, and left the
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1843, XXXIX, 408.


## p. 540 (#568) ############################################

510
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
>
Sikhs free from English interference for the time being north of the
Satlej. This state of affairs, however, was not to last.
The Cis-Satlej states had risen to virtual independence owing to
the gradual decline of the Muhammadan power, but they were
engaged in constant strife, and the unsettled state of the country they
inhabited invited the ambition of any freebooting adventurer. A
quarrel between the chiefs of Nabha and Patiala gave Ranjit Singh
an excuse to cross the Satlej (26 July, 1806) and to capture Ludhiana
which was at once transferred to his uncle Bhag Singh of Jind. The
English, under Lord Lake, had had considerable connection with
Sirhind and it was natural that the idea of the establishment of
Ranjit Singh's power in this wild and desolate country, for such it
was then, was viewed with some concern. And when he had crossed
the river a second time in 1807, the chiefs of Sirhind became suffi-
ciently alarmed to send and ask for British protection. This was in
1808, at a time when the possibility of a French invasion of India
was much discussed, and though there was no definite answer at
once, the result was the sending in September of that year of Metcalfe
to Ranjit Singh with the purpose of arranging a treaty; at the same
time assurances of protection were given to the frightened chiefs.
For the moment it seemed likely that the negotiation would fall
through; Ranjit Singh crossed the Satlej for the third time, seized
Faridkot and Ambala, and would have taken Patiala had he not
feared English intervention. But the advance of Ochterlony with a
detachment, the adroitness of the young diplomatist who is said to
hava assured the Sikh chieftain that he could make conquests in other
directions without British interference, and it has been conjectured
the weakening of the danger from the West owing to the improved
relations between England and Mahmud II, the new sultan of Turkey,
caused Ranjit Singh to pause. On 9 February, 1809, Ochterlony
issued a warning proclamation to the effect that any further aggres-
sions south of the Satlej would be forcibly resisted; and this coupled,
as Cunningham suggests, with the fear that some of the Panjab chiefs
might also seek British protection, brought the great Sikh to terms.
He therefore signed the treaty of 25 April, 1809. This guaranteed
him against interference on the part of the English north of the
Satlej, and as to the left bank, it was stated in the second article)
that the raja would never maintain, in the territory which he occu-
pied there, more troops than were necessary for the internal duties
of that territory, nor commit or suffer any encroachments on the
possessions or rights of the chiefs in its vicinity. The transaction
was completed by a proclamation of 3 May, 1809, of which the
important articles ran as follows:
1. The country of the chiefs of Malwa and Sirhind having entered under
the British protection, they shall in future be secured from the authority and
influence of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, conformably to the terms of the treaty.
1 Aitchison, op. cit. vwa, 144.
. .


## p. 541 (#569) ############################################

RANJIT SINGH'S CONQUESTS
541
.
2. All the country of the chiefs thus taken under protection shall be
exempted from all pecuniary tribute to the British Government.
3. The chiefs shall remain in the full exercise of the same rights and
authority in their own possessions which they enjoyed before they were re-
ceived under the British protection.
4. Should a British army on purposes of general welfare, be required to
march through the country of the said chiefs, it is necessary and incumbent
that every chief shall, within his own possessions, assist and furnish, to the full
of his power, such force with supplies of grain and other necessaries which
may be demanded.
5. Should an enemy approach from any quarter, for the purpose of con-
quering this country, friendship and mutual interest require that the chiefs
join the British army with all their force, and, exerting themselves in expelling
the enemy, act under discipline and proper obedience. 1
The idea was that Ranjit Singh's Cis-Satlej conquests made before
the last campaign were to remain his, but that he was to have no
claim to allegiance from Cis-Satlej chiefs. Still, this was a very
important negotiation. On the one hand it directed Ranjit Singh's
energies elsewhere than southwards; he gave up. Faridkot and Ambala.
On the other it has been said to have moved the British frontier from
the Jumna to the Satlej. The relations of the protected chiefs among
themselves took a good deal of arranging. It was necessary to protect
the weak against the strong, when the fear of Ranjit Singh was
removed, and a proclamation had to be issued on 22 August, 1811,
to the effect that while the independence of the chiefs would be
respected nd their states duly protected, they would not be allowed
to usurp the rights of others. But it was long before all the various
claims were settled and rights established.
Ranjit Singh was thus free to devote his attention elsewhere. He
got the better of the Gurkhas from 1809 to 1811, taking the Kangra
district, and when the English war in 1814-15 with the same people
brought the English and Sikhs together in the mountains, there was
excellent reason for their remaining friends. Another similar reason
was supplied by the Afghan question. Shah Shuja had been driven
from Afghanistan in 1809-10. Ranjit Singh sought to prevent him
from getting aid from the English, in view of his own project against
Multan which he unsuccessfully endeavoured to seize in February,
1810. However, Shuja was soon carried off to Kashmir, and after
various adventures in the course of which Ranjit Singh secured the
Koh-i-nur from him, he returned to Ludhiana in 1816. Meanwhile
the Sikhs, though they secured Attock, defeating the Afghans at
Haidaru in 1813, did not manage to secure Kashmir. More important
during this period was their reduction of the northern plains and
lower hills by which they gradually strengthened themselves for
further efforts. The first of such was the capture of Multan, which
had been attempted more than once before, and which was effected
in 1818. In the same year, by taking advantage of the troubles which
followed Fath Khan's death, kanjit Singh entered Peshawar, though
1 Cunningham, History of the Sikhs (ed. 1918), p. 382. 2 Idem, p. 383.


## p. 542 (#570) ############################################

642
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
he relinquished it to the Barakzai governor Yar Muhammad Khan.
1819 saw him master of Kashmir. In 1823 he again took Peshawar,
and this time he left Yar Muhammad Khan to rule in his name. Thus
by 1824 he had added to his dominions the three Muhammadan states
of Kashmir, Multan and Peshawar. A small Sikh minority ruled
a vast kingdom almost equally divided as regards inhabitants bet-
ween Hindus and Muhammadans, the latter more numerous towards
the north-west. The older organisation of the misls or confederacies
each following a chief or group of chiefs had given place to an
organised military despotism although the phrases used by Ranjit
Singh disguised the fact. The whole strength of the state was devoted
to war. The system suited the Sikh people who were excellent
soldiers and it was not disliked by the military Muhammadans of the
Panjab whom Ranjit Singh slowly reduced to obedience. The mate-
rial at his disposal, recruits obtained by the feudal system of land
tenure, was rendered more formidable by the European methods of
discipline which he adopted; he used men who had deserted from
the British service to train his troops and soon Frenchmen and other
European officers like Allard, Court, Ventura and Avitabile joined his
service.
Sir Lepel Griffin has truly said that the conquest of the frontier
was a matter beyond the Sikh strength; it was inevitable that the
subjection of so much territory in the Himalayan region should
involve constant struggles and constant loss. The events of Ranjit
Singh's later years often made him wish that he had not had the
trouble of maintaining such expensive conquests. With the English
he became more friendly, especially as his relations with them were
in the hands of Captain Wade at Ludhiana. In the discussions as to
the districts south of the Satlej, the English gave way on some points
but secured Firozpur. But it required all Wade's skill until the end
of the Burmese War and the capture of Bharatpur to keep the Sikhs
quiet. After a troublesome religious revolt under Saiyid Ahmad
Shah Ghazi, who for a time (1830) held Peshawar, had been sup-
pressed, Ranjit Singh's position in India was very strong. It was now,
therefore, when the idea of counteracting Russian influence by the
forination of buffer states was in favour, that Lord William Bentinck
arranged the famous meeting with the Sikh ruler at Rupar on the
Satlej in October, 1831, when an assurance of friendship with the
English was given which satisfied both parties for different reasons.
Much discussion took place about Sind and about the navigation of
the Indus, Ranjit Singh agreeing that that river and the Satlej should
be open to commerce. He also gave up for the time being his designs
on Shikarpur (1832) on which he had fixed his mind.
Hence the attitude of the English in regard to Shah Shuja in these
years is easily understood. They looked upon his efforts to regain the
Afghan throne with benevolent neutrality, and left him to make his
own bargain with the Sikhs and the amirs of Sind. But the Sikhs got


## p. 543 (#571) ############################################

CAPTURE OF PESHAWAR
543
>
the advantage. The negotiations fluctuated from time to time. The
amirs feared the approach of the English, and in 1832 they offered
help if Shah Shuja would give up his claims on their country. He
agreed in case he succeeded. But he reopened the question with the
maharaja, and, finding that he was the only potentạte whom he had
to conciliate, he entered into an alliance with him in August, 1833.
This treaty was the basis of the Tripartite Treaty of 1838, and provided
that the districts beyond the Indus in possession of the Sikhs should
be formally ceded to them. The Sindians were abandoned and Shah
Shuja was allowed to proceed towards his native land by way of
Shikarpur where he defeated the Sindians, who had finally decided
to oppose him, on 9 January, 1834. He then passed on towards
Kandahar, near which city he was routed by Dost Muhammad and
his brothers: on 1 July, 1834, and later after much wandering and
various attempts to secure aid he reached Ludhiana again. Ranjit
Singh resolved to make what he could out of the affair, and accord-
ingly he sent Hari Singh, his general, and Nao Nihal Singh, his
grandson, who secured the town and citadel of Peshawar on 6 May,
1834, thus finally establishing Sikh power there. Dost Muhammad,
who had been so perplexed when Shah Shuja entered Afghanistan
that he had offered his submission to the government officials as a
dependent on Great Britain, now plucked up courage, calling himself
ghazi as well as amir, and advanced as he thought to retake Peshawar.
He still wished to secure English help, and tried to do so through his
nephew Abdul Ghiyas Khan, who was at Ludhiana. The English,
however, who had their attention still directed to the question of the
navigation of the Indus, declined to interfere. The result was that
Dost Muhammad came to the eastern end of the Khaibar and having,
on 11 May, 1835, been almost surrounded by the Sikhs, was glad to
retreat hurriedly enough with considerable loss of prestige. About
September in the same year he commenced negotiations with Persia
though still hoping for English aid. Hearing, however, that the Sikhs
had sent home some of their forces, he sent Muhammad Akbar Khan,
his son, who, though he failed to secure the Sikh position, won a
doubtful battle near Jamrud on 30 April, 1837, Hari Singh the great
Sikh leader being killed. Reinforcements, however, arriving,
Muhammad Akbar Khan had to retire without having taken either
Peshawar or Jamrud.
The defeat of the amirs of Sind by Shah Shuja frightened them
and they would probably have gladly allowed Ranjit Singh to have
taken Shikarpur if he would have protected them against further
attempts of the same kind. This did not please the English who, as
Cunningham points out were beginning to have political as well as
commercial schemes in those directions. Ranjit Singh did not really
wish to be friendly with the amirs, and kept a representative of the
exiled Kaloras in his state; he even began negotiating with Shah Shuje
once more. There was a good deal of local friction and the fortress
>


## p. 544 (#572) ############################################

544
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
of Rojhan, the stronghold of a robber tribe called Mazaris, who indecd
gave trouble to the Sikhs but could hardly be termed subjects of the
amirs, was taken by the governor of Multan in August, 1836. Soon
afterwards the Sikhs went south to Ken. As there seemed every
likelihood of further aggression, 'Lord Auckland decided to mediate,
especially as both parties were ready to declare open war.
December, 1836, Ranjit Singh yielded, though unwillingly, and agreed
to let things be on their own footing, retaining however Rojhan
and Mazari territory while he destroyed the fortress of Ken. It was
on this occasion that he asked the famous question of those who were
trying to dissuade him from peace what had become of the 200,000
spears of the Marathas.
There was then a feeling of intense hostility at this time between
the Afghans and the Sikhs. Both had considerable dread of the
English and the last thing they wished for was British interference.
Unfortunately this state of feelirig, which might otherwise have
passed naturally away, occurred at a time when the fear of the
Russians was the mainspring of Indian foreign politics. There were
also numerous French designs, and the story of Allard's diplomatic
character at the court of Lahore aroused suspicion; Wellington
afterwards (4 February, 1843) warned Lord Ellenborough of the
French connection. In such circumstances the English could please
no one. Ranjit Singh did not like to be restrained from action in
Sind and elsewhere; and Dost Muhammad would have gladly wel-
comed English aid against the Sikhs. The English chose perhaps
the worst possible way out of their difficulties.
The weakness of the scheme of the Tripartite Treaty of 1838 was
obvious. The English could not trust Shah Shuja to the Sikhs for
fear that the war of restoration should become a war of aggressioni
on their part. Ranjit Singh disliked the final passing of all hopes of
gaining Shikarpur, and although the march of a Sikh force through
the Khaibar with Shah Shuja's son was decided upon, the Sikhs not
altogether unnaturally decided to do as little as they could and to
gain the utmost advantage. At the end of 1838 Ranjit Singh met
Lord Auckland at Firozpur, where the British force was assembled,
but his health had failed. He heard of the fall of Kandahar, and died
on 27 June, 1839.
Ranjit Singh's power was personal and as he founded no perma-
nent institutions which could live apart from himself his death was
the signal for the beginning of anarchy. Cunningham, the sympathetic
historian of the Sikhs, has thus estimated his claims to greatness :
Ranjit Singh found the Punjab a waning confederacy, a prey to the factions
of its chiefs, pressed by the Afghans and the Marathas and ready to submit to
English supremacy. He consolidated the numerous petty states into a kingdom,
he wrested from Kabul the fairest of its provinces, and he gave the potent
English no cause for interference. He found the military array of his country
a mass of horsemen, brave indeed but ignorant of war as an Art, and he left it
mustering fifty thousand disciplined soldiers, fifty thousand well armed
>


## p. 545 (#573) ############################################

RANJIT SINGH'S CHARACTER
545
yeomanry and militia, and more than three hundred pieces of cannon for the
field. His rule was founded on the feelings of a people, but it involved the
joint action of the necessary principles of military order and territorial exten-
sion; and when a limit had been set to Sikh dominion, and his own commanding
genius was no more, the vital spirit of his race began to consume itself in
domestic contentions. 1
Sir Lepel Griffin admits his private vices :
"He was selfish, false and avaricious; grossly superstitious, shamelessly
and openly drunken and debauched”, and continues : “We only succeed in
establishing him as a hero, as a ruler of men, and as worthy of a pedestal in
that innermost shrine where history honours the few human beings to whom
may be indisputably assigned the palm of greatness, if we free our minds of
prejudice and, discounting conventional virtue, only regard the rare qualities
of force which raise a man supreme above his fellows. Then we shall at once
allow that, although sharing in full measure the commonplace and coarse vices
of his time and education, he yet ruled the country which his military genius
had conquered with a vigour of will and an ability which placed him in the
front rank of the statesmen of the century. " 2
Ranjit Singh when dying was said to have declared his imbecile
son Kharak Singh, his successor; but, though acknowledged in the
main, his claims were disputed by Shir Singh, a reputed child of
Ranjit Singh; while his own son, Nao Nihal Singh, a bold but vicious
youth of eighteen, wished to obtain the ascendancy. The wazir,
Dhian Singh, hated the able Resident, Wade, who supported Kharak
Singh, and Dhian Singh and Nao Nihal Singh both hated the imbecile
monarch's favourite, Chet Singh. Chet Singh was murdered on
8 October, 1839. Wade was replaced by Clerk as British agent at the
beginning of April, 1840, Wade's Sikh enemies persuading Auckland
that this step would secure easier communication between British
India and the forces in Afghanistan; Lord Auckland further imagined
that the long-cherished schemes for the opening of a valuable com-
merce with Afghanistan by way of the Indus were now about to take
shape. The only real and tangible result of these intrigues was the
increase of the power of Nao Nihal Singh who hoped by the reduction
in the strength of the rajas of Jammu, and then probably by the
destruction of Raja Dhian Singh, to make himself supreme. He was,
however, interrupted in his ambitious schemes by disputes with the
English as to the favouring by the Sikhs of Afghan rebels against
Shah Shuja and even treacherous communication with Dost Muham-
mad himself; and there was a very strong feeling on the part of men
like Macnaghten in favour of taking away of the Sikh territory, that
part of it at all events which had once been held by Afghanistan.
Kharak Singh died on 5 November, 1840, and on the same day his
more brilliant son, passing homewards from the funeral rites, was
crushed by the fall of the gateway in the Lahore fort, and so seriously
injured that he died the same night. How far his death was acci-
1 Cunningham, op. cit. p. 222.
? Griffin, Ranjit Singh, p. 95.
35


## p. 546 (#574) ############################################

546
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
dental was disputed; the rajas of Jammu had every reason to wish
for it.
The question now was as to the succession. Shir Singh was
preferred by the British agent, but he was not certainly legitimate.
After much intrigue the widow of Kharak Singh, Mai Chand Kaur,
who was supported by various Sikh chiefs, notably the Sindhianwala
family, which included men of note such as Atar and Ajit Singh
Sindhianwala, and like many other Sikh families of importance was
opposed to the rajas of Jammu, came forward and secured the reg-
ency. She was to hold it till it was seen whether Nao Nihal's widow
bore a son. Shir Singh was to be a kind of viceroy, and Dhian Singh
the wazir. This temporary arrangement was nominally in force when
Dost Muhammad surrendered, but the factions soon came to blows.
Shir Singh attacked Lahore in January, 1841, and was proclaimed
maharaja on the 18th of that month, the Sindhianwala family taking
refuge in flight. Shir Singh, however, though he might like to be king,
could not rule, and the obvious result followed that the army became
all powerful. The discussion of projects for armed intervention on
the part of the British Government, while it did not make things
easier for what authority there was in the country, enabled the Sikh
army to regard itself more and more as the representative body of
the Sikh people; its position resembled that of the Ironsides of the
seventeenth century without there being any Cromwell in control.
Another source of difficulty lay in the activity of Zorawar Singh who,
as deputy of the rajas of Jammu, after taking Skardu, seized Garo,
and seemed likely to conquer much of Chinese Tibet. When, however,
the English found him established near Almora they decided to
interfere, and ordered Garo to be restored by 10 December, 1841.
By this time the Chinese arrived and defeated the Sikhs in a wonder-
ful campaign in the mountains, one of the most awful perhaps in the
history of warfare, and peace was made in the autumn of 1842,
matters between China and the Sikhs being placed on their old foot-
ing. About the same time the English managed to prevent Gulab
Singh, the brother of Dhian Singh, from being made governor of the
Afghan province, which would have placed an enemy of the British
at Peshawar instead of the Italian Avitabile.
During the troubles connected with and following the insurrec-
tion at Kabul in November, 1841, the English were in the unpleasant
position of distrusting the Sikhs, and yet not being able to do without
their aid; this was added to the fact that the English had no decided
policy. They could claim help under the Tripartite Treaty, but the
Sikhs, as has been seen, helped but grudgingly, rather because the
authorities had little control over the army than for other reasons,
though such reasons were doubtless present. Some part, however,
they took, and it was suggested to give Jallalabad to them. But its
destruction by Pollock relieved them from taking what they really
did not want. That Ellenborough at this time viewed the prospect


## p. 547 (#575) ############################################

INTRIGUE AND MURDER
517
of a Sikh war with disfavour can be seen from his dispatch of 15
May, 1842.
In June, 1842, the murder of Mai Chand Kaur altered the state
of things at the court, but it did not relieve the difficulties of Shir
Singh, and, when the Sindhianwala chiefs came to an agreement with
the rajas of Jammu, his fate was sealed. On 15 September, 1843, he
was assassinated by Ajit Singh, who proceeded to kill his son Pertab
Singh also. But Dhian Singh also reaped the reward of his treachery,
and was murdered by his Sindhianwala allies. He left, however, a son,
Hira Singh, who, in spite of the hatred of the people for his family
and the Jammu rajas, managed to raise enough troops to kill Ajit
and Lahna Singh, the two Sindhianwalas, and to proclaim Dalip
Singh, a supposed son of Ranjit Singh by a woman afterwards
notorious enough, Rani Jindan. Hira himself took the post of wazir
much to the vexation of Suchet Singh, youngest of the Jammu rajas,
who now becomes prominent.
These struggles were intricate and not very important, the one
fact that mattered being that as they became more and more intense
they brought the army into ever greater prominence and importance.
Clerk had given way as Resident to Colonel Richmond, whose letters
have furnished the world with an account of what happened. The
maternal uncle of Dilip Singh, Jawahir Singh, having tried con-
clusions with the Jammu rajas in 1843, was cast into prison. Then
Kashmira Singh and Peshawara Singh, adopted sons of Ranjit Singh,
seized Sialkot, possibly with the connivance of Raja Suchet Singh,
who may also have procured the release of Jawahir Singh about the
same time, and who was killed while attempting an insurrection against
his nephew in March, 1844. The same fate overtook Atar Singh
Sindhianwala in the following May; he had fled to British territory
the year before and now returned, joined a religious fanatic, Bhai
Bir Singh, of some popularity, and managed to gain Kashmira Singh
to his cause. It is noteworthy that Hira Singh managed to secure the
adherence of the army by telling them that the Sindhianwalas were
relying upon English help. Kashmira Singh and Bhai Bir Singh both
shared Atar Singh's fate. This same feeling of resentment against the
English Hira Singh made use of about the same time when he preten.
ded that the English reliefs for Sind were directed against the Sikhs.
Serious grounds of dispute between the two peoples were bound
to arise. The central government of the Sikhs was no doubt a scene
of confusion and crime, but the nation was strong enough. Gilgit had
been annexed to Kashmir towards the end of 1843, and the Sikh army
was at once anxious for active service and also intensely supersti-
tious. "Our position", wrote Lord Ellenborough on 11 February, 1844,
“with respect to the Punjab. can now be viewed only in the light of
an armed truce. ”? The comparatively recent events in Afghanistan
1 Ellenborough Papers, 102.
? Law, India under Ellenborough, p. 11),


## p. 548 (#576) ############################################

848
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
and the news of a mutinous disposition in some of the Sepoy regi-
ments had lessened their respect for their powerful neighbour, whom
also they believed to be preparing to annex their territory. There
was a dispute as to a village in the Nabha state where both had
interests, and the action of the English in retaining the treasure of
Suchet Singh, which had been brought by him to Firozpur before his
death, was neither liked nor understood. Colonel Richmond too was
succeeded by Major Broadfoot as Resident on 1 November, 1844, and,
as he was suspected by the Sikhs, his appointment did not ease
matters:
When things were in rather a critical state, another revolution
took place by which Hira Singh was overthrown and slain on 21
December, 1844. With him fell his tutor, Pandit Jalla, who had acquired
much influence over him. For some time there was confusion, but
the power was secured by Jawahir Singh, the brother, and Lal Singh
the lover of Rani Jindan; Lal Singh, a Brahmin, had once been an
adherent of the Jammu rajas. They had, however, to reckon with
Gulab Singh, and sent the army against Jammu early in 1845. Gulab
saw that there was nothing for it but submission, so he parted with
vast sums of money and much territory and came to Lahore with
the army, with whom he became more or less a favourite. Jawahir
Singh became wazir on 14 May, 1845, and Gulab Singh retired to the
mountains again. In the same way Mulraj, who had succeeded to
the governorship of Multan when his father was assassinated in 1844,
anci who had shown some vigour, was forced to pay a fine and to
promise to surrender territory, when he heard that the army had
agreed to march against him. Peshawara Singh, who had taken refuge
in British territory the year before, also rebelled and was put to death
at Attock in September of this same eventful year. But Jawahir's
time was at hand. The all-powerful army distrusted him as a friend
of the English, even when he talked of making war against them.
The regimental panchayats, therefore, decided that he must die, and
he was shot on 21 September, 1845. Lal Singh now became wazir,
an unworthy ruler, but the power was not with him but with Sardar
Tej Singh, the commander-in-chief, and the panchayats of the army.
The direct causes of the Sikh war with the English are obscure.
The English seeing the confusion which followed the death of Ranjit
Singh no doubt made preparations of a defensive kind; as the event
showed they would have been very foolish if they had not done so,
though there was some point in the words of a hostile critic: "To
be prepared is one thing; to be always making preparations another”.
The Sikhs, seeing more men placed in the neighbourhood of their
frontier, at a time when they knew that their own power was weaker
than before, drew the natural but erroneous inference that the English
wanted their country. And this impression was strengthened by the
fact that they knew that some of the Sikh chiefs would gladly have


## p. 549 (#577) ############################################

OUTBREAK OF WAR
649
seen the English come. There was the object lesson of Sind before
their eyes; they had always been an aggressive people themselves,
and they could not understand that a powerful nation could be
otherwise. They remembered, long after the English had ceased to
think about such matters, projects for sending troops to Lahore and
for handing Peshawar over to the Afghans; men had talked, too, in
the days of the Afghan occupation of "macadamising" the Panjab.
The actual changes in recent years, so far as troops are concerned,
have been summarised thus :
Up to 1838 the troops on the frontier amounted to one regiment at Sabatha,
and two at Ludhiana, with six pieces of artillery, equalling in all little more
than 2500 men. Lord Auckland made the total about 8000, by increasing
Ludhiana and creating Ferozepore. Lord Ellenborough formed further new
stations at Ambala, Kasauli and Simla, and placed in all about 14,000 men and
48 field guns on the frontier. Lord Hardinge increased the aggregate force to
about 32,000 men, with 68 field guns, besides having 100,00 men with artillery
at Meerut. After 1843, however, the station of Karnal, on the Jumna, was aban-
doned, which in 1838 and preceding years may have mustered about 4000 men.
But Lord Hardinge has shown that his father deserved even greater
credit than this account, believed to be from the pen of Lawrence,
would allow. The strength on the frontier, exclusive of hill stations
which remained the same, at the departure of Lord Ellenborough
was 17,612 men and sixty-six guns : at the outbreak of war it was
40,523 men and ninety-four guns. This comprises the garrisons of
Firozpur, Ludhiana, Ambala and Meerut. 1
Cunningham thinks that the Sikhs distrusted Major Broadfoot
because of angry proceedings on his part when passing through their
territory with Shah Shuja's family in 1841, and because of the
strong line he took when British agent with regard to the relations
between the Cis-Satlej states and the British Government. In the
latter connection various small incidents occurred, trifling in them-
selves but magnified by bazaar gossip in a land where there are but
few topics of conversation. More important was undoubtedly the
fact that many of the chiefs of the Panjab had, or thought they had,
everything to gain if the army with its system of panchayats dashed
itself to pieces against the English, and among these were such men
as Lal Singh, the wazir, and Tej Singh, the commander-in-chief;
their interests or their wishes coinciding with those of the soldiers on
widely different grounds. Cunningham has mentioned, too, the story
of two Sikh villages having been sequestrated because they harboured
criminals, but, whether this is true or not, it probably had little to do
with the matter. The soldiers were determined, although their com-
mander knew that they were mistaken, and although Gulab Singh
and many others were entirely opposed to the war. The Sikh army
1 Lord Hardinge, Viscount Hardinge, pp. 74 sqq. , and Burton, Sikh Wars,
pp. 10 sqq. Cf. Rait, Lord Gough, I, 371 sqq.


## p. 550 (#578) ############################################

550
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
then, hoping to surprise the English and march to Delhi, crossed the
Satlej on 11 December, 1845, between Huriki and Kasur.
The governor-general, Sir Henry Hardinge, and the commander-
in-chief, Sir Hugh Gough, were both old and tried soldiers. They
had available forces of between 20,000 and 30,000 men and they had
to meet (the exact number is uncertain)' over 50,000 well-armed
opponents. The governor-general on 13 December issued a formal
declaration of war. He stated that the British Government had ever
been on friendly terms with that of the Panjab and had continued
to be so during the disorganised state of the government which had
followed the death of Shir Singh in spite of many unfriendly proceed-
ings on the part of the Sikh durbar. The Sikh army had now invaded
British territory without a shadow of provocation and the governor-
general must, therefore, take steps necessary to protect the British
provinces, to vindicate the authority of the British Government, and
to punish the violators of treaties and disturbers of the public peace.
He therefore declared the possessions of the maharaja on the left
bank of the Satlej confiscated and annexed to the British territories.
As there was a strong striking force of the Sikhs to contend with,
it was wisely decided to bring as many troops together as possible;
the garrison of Ludhiana was therefore transferred to Basian where
it served the admirable purpose of protecting a great grain depot of
the forces. The Sikhs took up a position within a few miles of Firozpur.
It is unnecessary to discuss the alleged treachery of Lal Singh and
Tej Singh, it suffices to follow what happened. The English under
Gough pushed forward by way of Wadni and Charak to Mudki which
they had no sooner reached than they were attacked by the Sikhs
(18 December, 1845). The enemy were, however, defeated with a
loss of seventeen guns. How men who had marched so far under
such difficult conditions, and who had but the short remnant of a
winter's day to fight in, could have done better is hard to see, but
nicre than one critic has expected it. Sale, amongst other brave men,
fell here.
The English army was now only twenty miles from Firozpur,
where was General Littler, and if his force could join that of Gough
and Hardinge, who had now placed himself as a volunteer under the
orders of the commander-in-chief, they would have about 18,000 men
with which to attack the large body of Sikhs who were encamped
round Firozshah. Gough was anxious not to wait, but the governor--
general obliged him to do so; they were joined by Littler a few hours
later on the 21st, and they attacked at four in the afternoon, both
sections of the army having been many hours under arms. This was
a very different affair from Mudki, and on the night of 21 December
"the fate of India trembled in the balance”. The enemy's camp was
indeed taken, but much remained to be done, and the two leaders
were equally resolved to fight things out to a finish in the morning.
So the nexť day the wearied troops renewed the battle; again the


## p. 551 (#579) ############################################

SOBRAON
551
governor-general and the commander-in-chief led the attack; and
finally with a magnificent bayonet charge the fight was won. But
this two days' battle had been a terrible risk; there had been some
confusion and the loss of life (Broadfoot fell amongst many less known
men) had been great; he hesitated and on 30 December requested
Gough's recall. 1
Fortunately Gough was a man of iron who never hesitated for a
moment as to what he had to do. It was far otherwise with the British
public and the cabinet which represen*ed them. It was at once
resolved that the governor-general should take the command and to
get over the technical difficulty a "Letter of Service” was sent out
to him from the queen which would enable him as a lieutenant-
gereral on the staff to command in person the troops in India.
Happily conditions had altered so much that the letter owing to
the generous spirit of Sir Henry Hardinge was never published; nor
indeed was its existence generally known till fifty years later. 2
Seventy-three guns had been taken and several thousand Sikhs
killed at Firozshah, but there was still a formidable army to reckon
with, and the British force was sadly reduced. Fresh Sikh troops
kept pouring across the Satlej, more guns were brought, and every
day became of importance especially as an attack on Ludhiana was
threatened. Under these circumstances, reinforcements having arrived
from Meerut, Sir Harry Smith was sent to Ludhiana, and, after being
joined by the troops under General Wheeler, he attacked on 28
January, 1846, a strong enemy force. The Sikhs in this neighbour-
hood, afraid of being taken on both sides by the two bodies of English
troops, had fallen back to an entrenched position at Aliwal. The
result was a brilliant victory. The Sikh position was entirely des-
troyed and over fifty guns were captured. It was valuable on its own
account, but it also vastly encouraged the main body of the British
troops who were preparing for the far more serious ordeal of an
attack on the great Sikh army posted near Sobraon Ghat on the
Satlej, a few miles from Firozpur.
In sanctioning the attack on the Sikh entrenchments on the
memorable 10 February, 1846, Hardinge made the attempt conditional
on the artillery being able to be brought into play. But it was soon
evident that the Sikh guns could not be silenced by artillery, and
Gough, so the story goes, rejoiced when the ammunition gave out and
he could "be at them with the bayonet”. This, the glory of Sobraon,
was what happened, for the infantry carried ail before them in their
onrush and proved once more what Napier has said, "with what a
strength and majesty the British soldier fights". With such a leader,
ever anxious to lead the charge himself, everything was possible, and
at his side there were men of great distinction and promise : the two
Lawrences, Havelock, Robert Napier; these amongst others. Never
1 Rait, op. cit. II, 88 sqq.
2 Lord Hardinge, op. cit. pp. 104-5.


## p. 552 (#580) ############################################

552
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
was a victory more decisive. The Sikhs fled across the river losing
at least 10,000 men and all their guns. The fighting was over at
1 o'clock on the 10th and by the 13th almost the whole British army
was across the Satlej and well on its way to Lahore. By the 18th
they were close to the city. On the 20th it was occupied and the only
question was that of terms.
There were, it has often been pointed out, at least three possible
courses open to Lord Hardinge. He might have annexed the Panjab.
But this was contrary to his own ideas, contrary to the policy of the
Company, and would have required the services of a much larger
force than he had at his disposal, even had Sir Charles Napier joined
him with 12,000 men from Sind. He might again have established a
"subsidiary alliance”, that is to say he might have kept the existing
government on foot, with troops under the Company's command but
paid for by the state, and a Resident representing the wishes of the
outside authority. This was the system which commended itself to
the Lahore durbar. It had, however, other disadvantages than that
of keeping on foot the rule of a selfish body of time-serving intriguers.
It would have introduced a divided authority in the state, and was
certain to lead to disturbance and possibly to further interference in
the future. The third plan was that which he followed. It had much
to be said for it, as all compromises have, but it did not really settle
the problem, and was open to many of the same objections as that to
which reference has just been made. Perhaps, however, as things
were it was unfortunately the only possible course open to him. It
was in the main that which was represented by the treaty concluded
at Lahore on 9 March, 1846. 1
All the territories lying to the south of the Satlej were handed
over to the British Government. The Jalandhar doab between the
Bias and the Satlej was also ceded, and, in substitution for the war
indemnity of one and a half crores of rupees, the hill countries bet-
ween the Bias and the Indus, including Kashmir and Hazara. The
Sikh army was limited to twenty-five battalions of infantry and
12,000 cavalry, and thirty-six guns in addition to those already
captured were surrendered. Two other important articles prevented
the maharaja from employing any British, European, or® Amerian
subject without the consent of the British Government, and provided
that the limits of the Lahore. territory should not be changed without
the concurrence of the British Government. Kashmir was transferred
to Gulab Singh, a man of humble beginnings indeed, for he had been
a running footman to Ranjit Singh, but of talent and address. He
knew and feared the Sikhs, he was a Rajput, and was glad to be
finally, as the reward of a life of service which included no inconsider-
able amount of cruelty and self-seeking, separated from the state to
which he owed everything, but to which it is difficult to regard him,
1 Aitchison, op. cit. VIII, 160.


## p. 553 (#581) ############################################

THE TREATIES OF LAHORE
553
in spite of Lord Hardinge's defence, as other than a traitor. What was
clear was that the Lahore state must be reduced in size, that Kashmir
was the easiest limb to lop off, and that such being the case Gulab
Singh was the only man to whom it could be well handed over.
The treaty had recognised Dalip Singh as maharaja, but the
governor-general was careful to state that the British Government
would not interfere in the internal administration of the Lahore
state. It was, however, agreed that a force sufficient to protect the
person of the maharaja and to secure the execution of the treaty
should be left in the capital until the close of the year 1846, and Henry
Lawrence was appointed as British agent. It was, however, soon
clear that this arrangement would have to be prolonged. In October
an insurrection under Shaikh Imam-ud-Din, directed against the
transfer of Kashmir to Gulab Singh, took place in that country, and
a considerable British force, assisted by 17,000 of the Sikhs who had
fought against us, was necessary to put it down. And as it was proved
at a formal court of enquiry that Lal Singh the wazir had been at
the bottom of this movement, his deposition was demanded from the
durbar and agreed to. The favourite of the rani was accordingly
deported to British territory notwithstanding her protests; and as
the remaining members of the durbar saw nothing but anarchy
ahead of them if the English retired, they asked for and obtained a
revision of the treaty. It was a distinct march in the direction of
annexation, a solution which Hardinge disliked and wished to avoid,
but of which he saw even then the possibility.
The revised treaty only modified the previous one in respect of
the extent and character of British interference. It provided for the
appointment by the governor-general of a British officer with an
efficient establishment of assistants to remain at Lahore and to have
full authority to direct and control all matters in every department
of the state. There was to be a council of regency composed of lead-
ing chiefs and sardars, acting under the control and guidance of the
British Resident. The members of this council were named, and the
consent of the governor-general, expressed through the Resident, was
necessary for any change in its composition. Such British force as
the governor-general thought to be necessary should remain in Lahore
and should occupy all forts in the Lahore territory that the British
Government deemed needful for the maintenance of the security of
the capital or the peace of the country. The Lahore state was to pay
twenty-two lakhs a year in respect of the expenses of the occupation.
An allowance was to be granted to the maharani and the new
arrangements to last till the maharaja attained the age of sixteen
years (4 September, 1854), or till such period as the governor-general
and the durbar might agree on.
This treaty marked the downfall of the rani's ascendancy (she
>
1 Idem, p. 166.


## p. 554 (#582) ############################################

554
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
was finally deported to Benares), and the beginning of the control of
the famous Resident, Henry Lawrence. He chose men whom he
knew and could trust and distributed them over the province, allow-
ing them as much freedom of action as he could. Their names are
an undying testimony to Lawrence's capacity as a ruler : John and
George Lawrence, Nicholson, Herbert Edwardes, Lake, Lumsden,
Hodson; these and others like them. But this is not the place to deal
with the details of administration. Unfortunately Henry Lawrence
sailed for England with Lord Hardinge on 18 January, 1848, and his
successor, after a brief interval, was Sir Frederick Currie, a different
type of man indeed, but it would be unjust to hold him responsible
for what followed.
For the second Sikh War must be regarded as inevitable. It was
clear that the arrangements made were temporary in their nature,
and they could only result either in the annexation of the country or
in a resumption of its independence. That the Sikh people who had
fought with determination in the war just over, and who had a long
record of successful achievements behind them, were likely to settle
down without a further struggle was not to be believed. It needed
but an event of sufficient general interest to excite a national rising,
and that event was supplied by the city of Multan, long a storm
centre.
The governor of Multan, the Diwan Mulraj, whom we have
already. noted as a man of some force and ability, was in trouble
about money matters, and probably for this reason wished to resign
his post. A successor, one Sardar Khan Singh, was appointed in his
place and two officials, Vans Agnew of the Civil Service and Lieute.
nant Anderson, on being sent to arrange the matter were murdered at
Mulraj's instigation on 20 April, 1848. Mulraj strengthened the
defences of the town and proclaimed a general revolt in the surround-
ing country; the troops of the considerable escort which had come
with the officials joined him and thus there was open warfare.
The question was, what to do. Detachments of troops were
moved against Multan as soon as the urgent message sent by Van
Agnew had been received. But when it was known that the two
British officers were dead, Lord Gough, to whom Sir Frederick Currie
had written, decided against sending large masses of troops just before
the beginning of the hot weather, and Lord Dalhousie agreed with
him. This decision, though approved by the home authorities includ-
ing the Duke of Wellington, was much criticised at the time; especially
by those who did not know what the troops available were, and the
difficulties attending large military movements during the hot weather
and the rains. But politically there was, much to be said for delay.
Lord Gough knew that the whole country was really at the back of
Mulraj. Had an expedition been hurried forward, and if it had been
successful, it would have narrowed the issue down to the punishment
of the governor of Multan, and the inevitable struggle would have


## p. 555 (#583) ############################################

THE SECOND SIKH WAR
555
been postponed. It is certain too that for such a small object as the
reduction of Multan the loss of life would have been very great. If
proof were wanted of the widespread nature of the movement it
could be supplied by the movements of Chatter Singh, father of Shir
Singh, who was busy raising a revolt in Hazara and who succeeded
in winning over Peshawar to the rebel cause. By holding out that
city as a bait he was able to draw in Dost Muhammad, who afterwards
sent troops, though to small purpose.
And Lord Gough resolved that when done the work should be
finished. He estimated for and prepared a large striking force with
all its necessary auxiliaries and transport; it was to assemble at
Firozpur in November. It is not necessary to describe the movements
which took place in the interval, especially as they have been the
subject of controversy. Edwardes and Currie made heroic but mis-
taken efforts to deal with the rising on a small scale, the results being
that Shir Singh came out into open hostility on 14 September, that
the siege of Multan had to be abandoned, and that the second Sikh
War as a national rather than a local movement, began in earnest,
as it had promised to do sooner or later in any case. The importance
of the siege of Multan has been exaggerated. It was begun again
with reinforcements in December and the fortress fell on 22 January,
1849. Lord Gough had held the sound view of Multan from the first,
but Lord Dalhousie took some time to come round to it.
On 13 October, 1848, the secretary to the government of India
wrote to the Resident at Lahore that the Governor-General in Council
considered the state of Lahore to be, to all intents and purposes,
directly at war with the British Government; and Lord Dalhousie
in a letter to the Secret Committee of 7 October, 1848, spoke of a
general Panjab war and the occupation of the country. The real
war as a whole may be said to date from 9 November when Lord
Gough crossed the Satlej, though on the 15th he rather petulantly
said he did not know whether he was at peace or at war or who it
was he was fighting for. The situation soon cleared. On the 13th
his force of over 20,000 men reached Lahore. On the 16th he crossed
the Ravi and advanced to Ramnagar. On the 22nd he drove the Sikhs
across the Chenab, and himself crossed that river, Shir Singh, who
was in command of the Sikhs, having been forced by a flanking
movement by part of the troops under General Thackwell a higher up
the river to retire on the Jhelum. Gough was anxious to wait as
long as possible so as to be strengthened by the forces before Multan,
but the fall of Attock and the consequent reinforcement of the Sikhs
on the Jhelum made it necessary for him to risk an engagement. So
he moved to Dinghi on 12 January, and found himself almost due east
of Shir Singh who was just beyond the village of Chilianwala, bet-
ween it and the river. Gough now had with him about 14,000 men
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1849, XLI, 374.
2 Wylly, Thackwell, pp. 243 sqq. , and Calcutta Review, XII, 275 sqq.
2


## p. 556 (#584) ############################################

556
CONQUEST OF SIND AND THE PANJAB
and sixty-six guns. On the 13th, after a march of four hours, he
fought and won the glorious but expensive action of Chilianwala. He
had been anxious to wait until the next day, and it was only because
the Sikhs advanced their positions somewhat, making it impossible
for the British army to encamp, that he was forced into an action
under such disadvantageous conditions. But it was a dangerous and
difficult affair, marked, too, by a certain amount of confusion and
mistake! ; marked also, however, by an amazing number of heroic
deeds on the part of individuals. The British losses were over 2000,
and the impression made both in India and in England, when it was
also heard that four guns and the colours of three regiments had been
taken by the enemy, was very great. The news of the battle inspired
the first poem of George Meredith, which well represented the general
melancholy felt.