xviii):
"In order to show the distinction between His holiness and ours, it is
declared that He shall be born holy.
"In order to show the distinction between His holiness and ours, it is
declared that He shall be born holy.
Summa Theologica
ii), nature would not, for the
purpose of the act of generation, distinguish the male and female
sexes, unless the action of the male were distinct from that of the
female. Now, in generation there are two distinct operations---that of
the agent and that of the patient. Wherefore it follows that the entire
active operation is on the part of the male, and the passive on the
part of the female. For this reason in plants, where both forces are
mingled, there is no distinction of male and female.
Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was not Christ's Father, but His
Mother, it follows that it was not given to her to exercise an active
power in His conception: whether to cooperate actively so as to be His
Father, or not to cooperate at all, as some say. whence it would follow
that this active power was bestowed on her to no purpose. We must
therefore say that in Christ's conception itself she did not cooperate
actively, but merely supplied the matter thereof. Nevertheless, before
the conception she cooperated actively in the preparation of the matter
so that it should be apt for the conception.
Reply to Objection 1: This conception had three privileges---namely,
that it was without original sin; that it was not that of a man only,
but of God and man; and that it was a virginal conception. And all
three were effected by the Holy Ghost. Therefore Damascene says, as to
the first, that the Holy Ghost "came upon the Virgin, purifying
her"---that is, preserving her from conceiving with original sin. As to
the second, he says: "And bestowing on her the power to receive," i. e.
to conceive, "the Word of God. " As to the third, he says: "And to give
birth" to Him, i. e. that she might, while remaining a virgin, bring Him
forth, not actively, but passively, just as other mothers achieve this
through the action of the male seed.
Reply to Objection 2: The generative power of the female is imperfect
compared to that of the male. And, therefore, just as in the arts the
inferior art gives a disposition to the matter to which the higher art
gives the form, as is stated Phys. ii, so also the generative power of
the female prepares the matter, which is then fashioned by the active
power of the male.
Reply to Objection 3: In order for a transformation to be natural,
there is no need for an active principle in matter, but only for a
passive principle, as stated above.
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OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF CHRIST'S CONCEPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the mode and order of Christ's conception,
concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's body was formed in the first instant of its
conception?
(2) Whether it was animated in the first instant of its conception?
(3) Whether it was assumed by the Word in the first instant of its
conception?
(4) Whether this conception was natural or miraculous?
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Whether Christ's body was formed in the first instant of its conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body was not formed in the
first instant of its conception. For it is written (Jn. 2:20):
"Six-and-forty years was this Temple in building"; on which words
Augustine comments as follows (De Trin. iv): "This number applies
manifestly to the perfection of our Lord's body. " He says, further (QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 56): "It is not without reason that the Temple, which was
a type of His body, is said to have been forty-six years in building:
so that as many years as it took to build the Temple, in so many days
was our Lord's body perfected. " Therefore Christ's body was not
perfectly formed in the first instant of its conception.
Objection 2: Further, there was need of local movement for the
formation of Christ's body in order that the purest blood of the
Virgin's body might be brought where generation might aptly take place.
Now, no body can be moved locally in an instant: since the time taken
in movement is divided according to the division of the thing moved, as
is proved Phys. vi. Therefore Christ's body was not formed in an
instant.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's body was formed of the purest blood of
the Virgin, as stated above ([4151]Q[31], A[5]). But that matter could
not be in the same instant both blood and flesh, because thus matter
would have been at the same time the subject of two forms. Therefore
the last instant in which it was blood was distinct from the first
instant in which it was flesh. But between any two instants there is an
interval of time. Therefore Christ's body was not formed in an instant,
but during a space of time.
Objection 4: Further, as the augmentative power requires a fixed time
for its act, so also does the generative power: for both are natural
powers belonging to the vegetative soul. But Christ's body took a fixed
time to grow, like the bodies of other men: for it is written (Lk.
2:52) that He "advanced in wisdom and age. " Therefore it seems for the
same reason that the formation of His body, since that, too, belongs to
the generative power, was not instantaneous, but took a fixed time,
like the bodies of other men.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii): "As soon as the angel
announced it, as soon as the Spirit came down, the Word was in the
womb, within the womb the Word was made flesh. "
I answer that, In the conception of Christ's body three points may be
considered: first, the local movement of the blood to the place of
generation; secondly, the formation of the body from that matter;
thirdly, the development whereby it was brought to perfection of
quantity. of these, the second is the conception itself; the first is a
preamble; the third, a result of the conception.
Now, the first could not be instantaneous: since this would be contrary
to the very nature of the local movement of any body whatever, the
parts of which come into a place successively. The third also requires
a succession of time: both because there is no increase without local
movement, and because increase is effected by the power of the soul
already informing the body, the operation of which power is subject to
time.
But the body's very formation, in which conception principally
consists, was instantaneous, for two reasons. First, because of the
infinite power of the agent, viz. the Holy Ghost, by whom Christ's body
was formed, as stated above ([4152]Q[32], A[1]). For the greater the
power of an agent, the more quickly can it dispose matter; and,
consequently, an agent of infinite power can dispose matter
instantaneously to its due form. Secondly, on the part of the Person of
the Son, whose body was being formed. For it was unbecoming that He
should take to Himself a body as yet unformed. While, if the conception
had been going on for any time before the perfect formation of the
body, the whole conception could not be attributed to the Son of God,
since it is not attributed to Him except by reason of the assumption of
that body. Therefore in the first instant in which the various parts of
the matter were united together in the place of generation, Christ's
body was both perfectly formed and assumed. And thus is the Son of God
said to have been conceived; nor could it be said otherwise.
Reply to Objection 1: Neither quotation from Augustine refers to
formation alone of Christ's body, but to its formation, together with a
fixed development up to the time of His birth. Wherefore in the
aforesaid number are foreshadowed the number of months during which
Christ was in the Virgin's womb.
Reply to Objection 2: This local movement is not comprised within the
conception itself, but is a preamble thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not possible to fix the last instant in
which that matter was blood: but it is possible to fix the last period
of time which continued without any interval up to the first instant in
which Christ's body was formed. And this instant was the terminus of
the time occupied by the local movement of the matter towards the place
of generation.
Reply to Objection 4: Increase is caused by the augmentative power of
that which is the subject of increase: but the formation of the body is
caused by the generative power, not of that which is generated, but of
the father generating from seed, in which the formative power derived
from the father's soul has its operation. But Christ's body was not
formed by the seed of man, as stated above ([4153]Q[31], A[5], ad 3),
but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the formation thereof
should be such as to be worthy of the Holy Ghost. But the development
of Christ's body was the effect of the augmentative power in Christ's
soul: and since this was of the same species as ours, it behooved His
body to develop in the same way as the bodies of other men, so as to
prove the reality of His human nature.
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Whether Christ's body was animated in the first instant of its conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body was not animated in the
first instant of its conception. For Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian. ):
"Christ's flesh was not of another nature than ours: nor was the
beginning of His animation different from that of other men. " But the
soul is not infused into other men at the first instant of their
conception. Therefore neither should Christ's soul have been infused
into His body in the first instant of its conception.
Objection 2: Further, the soul, like any natural form, requires
determinate quantity in its matter. But in the first instant of its
conception Christ's body was not of the same quantity as the bodies of
other men when they are animated: otherwise, if afterwards its
development had been continuous, either its birth would have occurred
sooner, or at the time of birth He would have been a bigger child than
others. The former alternative is contrary to what Augustine says (De
Trin. iv), where he proves that Christ was in the Virgin's womb for the
space of nine months: while the latter is contrary to what Pope Leo
says (Serm. iv in Epiph. ): "They found the child Jesus nowise differing
from the generality of infants. " Therefore Christ's body was not
animated in the first instant of its conception.
Objection 3: Further, whenever there is "before" and "after" there must
be several instants. But according to the Philosopher (De Gener.
Animal. ii) in the generation of a man there must needs be "before" and
"after": for he is first of all a living thing, and afterwards, an
animal, and after that, a man. Therefore the animation of Christ could
not be effected in the first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "At the very
instant that there was flesh, it was the flesh of the Word of God, it
was flesh animated with a rational and intellectual soul. "
I answer that, For the conception to be attributed to the very Son of
God, as we confess in the Creed, when we say, "who was conceived by the
Holy Ghost," we must needs say that the body itself, in being
conceived, was assumed by the Word of God. Now it has been shown above
([4154]Q[6], AA[1] ,2) that the Word of God assumed the body by means
of the soul, and the soul by means of the spirit, i. e. the intellect.
Wherefore in the first instant of its conception Christ's body must
needs have been animated by the rational soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The beginning of the infusion of the soul may be
considered in two ways. First, in regard to the disposition of the
body. And thus, the beginning of the infusion of the soul into Christ's
body was the same as in other men's bodies: for just as the soul is
infused into another man's body as soon as it is formed, so was it with
Christ. Secondly, this beginning may be considered merely in regard to
time. And thus, because Christ's body was perfectly formed in a shorter
space of time, so after a shorter space of time was it animated.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul requires due quantity in the matter into
which it is infused: but this quantity allows of a certain latitude
because it is not fixed to a certain amount. Now the quantity that a
body has when the soul is first infused into it is in proportion to the
perfect quantity to which it will attain by development: that is to
say, men of greater stature have greater bodies at the time of first
animation. But Christ at the perfect age was of becoming and middle
stature: in proportion to which was the quantity of His body at the
time when other men's bodies are animated; though it was less than
theirs at the first instant of His conception. Nevertheless that
quantity was not too small to safeguard the nature of an animated body;
since it would have sufficed for the animation of a small man's body.
Reply to Objection 3: What the Philosopher says is true in the
generation of other men, because the body is successively formed and
disposed for the soul: whence, first, as being imperfectly disposed, it
receives an imperfect soul; and afterwards, when it is perfectly
disposed, it receives a perfect soul. But Christ's body, on account of
the infinite power of the agent, was perfectly disposed
instantaneously. Wherefore, at once and in the first instant it
received a perfect form, that is, the rational soul.
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Whether Christ's flesh was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's flesh was first of all
conceived, and afterwards assumed. Because what is not cannot be
assumed. But Christ's flesh began to exist when it was conceived.
Therefore it seems that it was assumed by the Word of God after it was
conceived.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's flesh was assumed by the Word of God, by
means of the rational soul. But it received the rational soul at the
term of the conception. Therefore it was assumed at the term of the
conception. But at the term of the conception it was already conceived.
Therefore it was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed.
Objection 3: Further, in everything generated, that which is imperfect
precedes in time that which is perfect: which is made clear by the
Philosopher (Metaph. ix). But Christ's body is something generated.
Therefore it did not attain to its ultimate perfection, which consisted
in the union with the Word of God, at the first instant of its
conception; but, first of all, the flesh was conceived and afterwards
assumed.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii [*Written by
Fulgentius]): "Hold steadfastly, and doubt not for a moment that
Christ's flesh was not conceived in the Virgin's womb, before being
assumed by the Word. "
I answer that, As stated above, we may say properly that "God was made
man," but not that "man was made God": because God took to Himself that
which belongs to man---and that which belongs to man did not pre-exist,
as subsisting in itself, before being assumed by the Word. But if
Christ's flesh had been conceived before being assumed by the Word, it
would have had at some time an hypostasis other than that of the Word
of God. And this is against the very nature of the Incarnation, which
we hold to consist in this, that the Word of God was united to human
nature and to all its parts in the unity of hypostasis: nor was it
becoming that the Word of God should, by assuming human nature, destroy
a pre-existing hypostasis of human nature or of any part thereof. It is
consequently contrary to faith to assert that Christ's flesh was first
of all conceived and afterwards assumed by the Word of God.
Reply to Objection 1: If Christ's flesh had been formed or conceived,
not instantaneously, but successively, one of two things would follow:
either that what was assumed was not yet flesh, or that the flesh was
conceived before it was assumed. But since we hold that the conception
was effected instantaneously, it follows that in that flesh the
beginning and the completion of its conception were in the same
instant. So that, as Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum xviii]
says: "We say that the very Word of God was conceived in taking flesh,
and that His very flesh was conceived by the Word taking flesh. "
From the above the reply to the Second Objection is clear. For in the
same moment that this flesh began to be conceived, its conception and
animation were completed.
Reply to Objection 3: The mystery of the Incarnation is not to be
looked upon as an ascent, as it were, of a man already existing and
mounting up to the dignity of the Union: as the heretic Photinus
maintained. Rather is it to be considered as a descent, by reason of
the perfect Word of God taking unto Himself the imperfection of our
nature; according to Jn. 6:38: "I came down from heaven. "
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Whether Christ's conception was natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's conception was natural. For
Christ is called the Son of Man by reason of His conception in the
flesh. But He is a true and natural Son of Man: as also is He the true
and natural Son of God. Therefore His conception was natural.
Objection 2: Further, no creature can be the cause of a miraculous
effect. But Christ's conception is attributed to the Blessed Virgin,
who is a mere creature: for we say that the Virgin conceived Christ.
Therefore it seems that His conception was not miraculous, but natural.
Objection 3: Further, for a transformation to be natural, it is enough
that the passive principle be natural, as stated above ([4155]Q[32],
A[4]). But in Christ's conception the passive principle on the part of
His Mother was natural, as we have shown ([4156]Q[32], A[4]). Therefore
Christ's conception was natural.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach. ): "Christ does in
a superhuman way those things that pertain to man: this is shown in the
miraculous virginal conception. "
I answer that, As Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): "In this mystery thou
shalt find many things that are natural, and many that are
supernatural. " For if we consider in this conception anything connected
with the matter thereof, which was supplied by the mother, it was in
all such things natural. But if we consider it on the part of the
active power, thus it was entirely miraculous. And since judgment of a
thing should be pronounced in respect of its form rather than of its
matter: and likewise in respect of its activity rather than of its
passiveness: therefore is it that Christ's conception should be
described simply as miraculous and supernatural, although in a certain
respect it was natural.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said to be a natural Son of Man, by
reason of His having a true human nature, through which He is a Son of
Man, although He had it miraculously; thus, too, the blind man to whom
sight has been restored sees naturally by sight miraculously received.
Reply to Objection 2: The conception is attributed to the Blessed
Virgin, not as the active principle thereof, but because she supplied
the matter, and because the conception took place in her womb.
Reply to Objection 3: A natural passive principle suffices for a
transformation to be natural, when it is moved by its proper active
principle in a natural and wonted way. But this is not so in the case
in point. Therefore this conception cannot be called simply natural.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE PERFECTION OF THE CHILD CONCEIVED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the perfection of the child conceived: and
concerning this there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was sanctified by grace in the first instant of His
conception?
(2) Whether in that same instant He had the use of free-will?
(3) Whether in that same instant He could merit?
(4) Whether in that same instant He was a perfect comprehensor?
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Whether Christ was sanctified in the first instant of His conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not sanctified in the first
instant of His conception. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was
not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural: afterwards
that which is spiritual. " But sanctification by grace is something
spiritual. Therefore Christ received the grace of sanctification, not
at the very beginning of His conception, but after a space of time.
Objection 2: Further, sanctification seems to be a cleansing from sin:
according to 1 Cor. 6:1: "And such some of you were," namely, sinners,
"but you are washed, but you are sanctified. " But sin was never in
Christ. Therefore it was not becoming that He should be sanctified by
grace.
Objection 3: Further, as by the Word of God "all things were made," so
from the Word incarnate all men who are made holy receive holiness,
according to Heb. 2:11: "Both he that sanctifieth and they who are
sanctified are all of one. " But "the Word of God, by whom all things
were made, was not Himself made"; as Augustine says (De Trin. i).
Therefore Christ, by whom all are made holy, was not Himself made holy.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy which shall be
born of thee shall be called the Son of God"; and (Jn. 10:36): "Whom
the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world. "
I answer that, As stated above ([4157]Q[7], AA[9],10,12), the abundance
of grace sanctifying Christ's soul flows from the very union of the
Word, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the
Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. " For it has been
shown above ([4158]Q[33], AA[2],3) that in the first instant of
conception, Christ's body was both animated and assumed by the Word of
God. Consequently, in the first instant of His conception, Christ had
the fulness of grace sanctifying His body and His soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The order set down by the Apostle in this passage
refers to those who by advancing attain to the spiritual state. But the
mystery of the Incarnation is considered as a condescension of the
fulness of the Godhead into human nature rather than as the promotion
of human nature, already existing, as it were, to the Godhead.
Therefore in the man Christ there was perfection of spiritual life from
the very beginning.
Reply to Objection 2: To be sanctified is to be made holy. Now
something is made not only from its contrary, but also from that which
is opposite to it, either by negation or by privation: thus white is
made either from black or from not-white. We indeed from being sinners
are made holy: so that our sanctification is a cleansing from sin.
Whereas Christ, as man, was made holy, because He was not always thus
sanctified by grace: yet He was not made holy from being a sinner,
because He never sinned; but He was made holy from not-holy as man, not
indeed by privation, as though He were at some time a man and not holy;
but by negation---that is, when He was not man He had not human
sanctity. Therefore at the same time He was made man and a holy man.
For this reason the angel said (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy which shall be
born of thee. " Which words Gregory expounds as follows (Moral.
xviii):
"In order to show the distinction between His holiness and ours, it is
declared that He shall be born holy. For we, though we are made holy,
yet are not born holy, because by the mere condition of a corruptible
nature we are tied . . . But He alone is truly born holy who . . . was
not conceived by the combining of carnal union. "
Reply to Objection 3: The Father creates things through the Son, and
the whole Trinity sanctifies men through the Man Christ, but not in the
same way. For the Word of God has the same power and operation as God
the Father: hence the Father does not work through the Son as an
instrument, which is both mover and moved. Whereas the humanity of
Christ is as the instrument of the Godhead, as stated above
([4159]Q[7], A[1], ad 3;[4160] Q[8], A[1], ad 1). Therefore Christ's
humanity is both sanctified and sanctifier.
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Whether Christ as man had the use of free-will in the first instant of His
conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man had not the use of
free-will in the first instant of His conception. For a thing is,
before it acts or operates. Now the use of free-will is an operation.
Since, therefore, Christ's soul began to exist in the first instant of
His conception, as was made clear above ([4161]Q[33], A[2]), it seems
impossible that He should have the use of free-will in the first
instant of His conception.
Objection 2: Further, the use of free-will consists in choice. But
choice presupposes the deliberation of counsel: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iii) that choice is "the desire of what has been
previously the object of deliberation. " Therefore it seems impossible
that Christ should have had the use of free-will in the first instant
of His conception.
Objection 3: Further, the free-will is "a faculty of the will and
reason," as stated in the [4162]FP, Q[83], A[2], OBJ[2]: consequently
the use of free-will is an act of the will and the reason or intellect.
But the act of the intellect presupposes an act of the senses; and this
cannot exist without proper disposition of the organs---a condition
which would seem impossible in the first instant of Christ's
conception. Therefore it seems that Christ could not have the use of
free-will at the first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Trinity (Gregory:
Regist. ix, Ep. 61): "As soon as the Word entered the womb, while
retaining the reality of His Nature, He was made flesh, and a perfect
man. " But a perfect man has the use of free-will. Therefore Christ had
the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception.
I answer that, As stated above [4163](A[1]), spiritual perfection was
becoming to the human nature which Christ took, which perfection He
attained not by making progress, but by receiving it from the very
first. Now ultimate perfection does not consist in power or habit, but
in operation; wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, text. 5) that
operation is a "second act. " We must, therefore, say that in the first
instant of His conception Christ had that operation of the soul which
can be had in an instant. And such is the operation of the will and
intellect, in which the use of free-will consists. For the operation of
the intellect and will is sudden and instantaneous, much more, indeed,
than corporeal vision; inasmuch as to understand, to will, and to feel,
are not movements that may be described as "acts of an imperfect
being," which attains perfection successively, but are "the acts of an
already perfect being," as is said, De Anima iii, text. 28. We must
therefore say that Christ had the use of free-will in the first instant
of His conception.
Reply to Objection 1: Existence precedes action by nature, but not in
time; but at the same time the agent has perfect existence, and begins
to act unless it is hindered. Thus fire, as soon as it is generated,
begins to give heat and light. The action of heating, however, is not
terminated in an instant, but continues for a time; whereas the action
of giving light is perfected in an instant. And such an operation is
the use of free-will, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: As soon as counsel or deliberation is ended,
there may be choice. But those who need the deliberation of counsel, as
soon as this comes to an end are certain of what ought to be chosen:
and consequently they choose at once. From this it is clear that the
deliberation of counsel does not of necessity precede choice save for
the purpose of inquiring into what is uncertain. But Christ, in the
first instant of His conception, had the fulness of sanctifying grace,
and in like manner the fulness of known truth; according to Jn. 1:14:
"Full of grace and truth. " Wherefore, as being possessed of certainty
about all things, He could choose at once in an instant.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's intellect, in regard to His infused
knowledge, could understand without turning to phantasms, as stated
above ([4164]Q[11], A[2]). Consequently His intellect and will could
act without any action of the senses.
Nevertheless it was possible for Him, in the first instant of His
conception, to have an operation of the senses: especially as to the
sense of touch, which the infant can exercise in the womb even before
it has received the rational soul, as is said, De Gener. Animal. ii,
3,4. Wherefore, since Christ had the rational soul in the first instant
of His conception, through His body being already fashioned and endowed
with sensible organs, much more was it possible for Him to exercise the
sense of touch in that same instant.
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Whether Christ could merit in the first instant of His conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit in the first
instant of His conception. For the free-will bears the same relation to
merit as to demerit. But the devil could not sin in the first instant
of his creation, as was shown in the [4165]FP, Q[63], A[5]. Therefore
neither could Christ's soul merit in the first instant of its
creation---that is, in the first instant of Christ's conception.
Objection 2: Further, that which man has in the first instant of his
conception seems to be natural to him: for it is in this that his
natural generation is terminated. But we do not merit by what is
natural to us, as is clear from what has been said in the [4166]FS,
Q[109], A[5]; [4167]FS, Q[114], A[2]. Therefore it seems that the use
of free-will, which Christ as man had in the first instant of His
conception, was not meritorious.
Objection 3: Further, that which a man has once merited he makes, in a
way, his own: consequently it seems that he cannot merit the same thing
again: for no one merits what is already his. If, therefore, Christ
merited in the first instant of His conception, it follows that
afterwards He merited nothing. But this is evidently untrue. Therefore
Christ did not merit in the first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Paterius, Expos. Vet. et Nov. Test. super
Ex. 40] says: "Increase of merit was absolutely impossible to the soul
of Christ. " But increase of merit would have been possible had He not
merited in the first instant of His conception. Therefore Christ
merited in the first instant of His conception.
I answer that, As stated above [4168](A[1]), Christ was sanctified by
grace in the first instant of His conception. Now, sanctification is
twofold: that of adults who are sanctified in consideration of their
own act; and that of infants who are sanctified in consideration of,
not their own act of faith, but that of their parents or of the Church.
The former sanctification is more perfect than the latter: just as act
is more perfect than habit; and "that which is by itself, than that
which is by another" [*Aristotle, Phys. viii]. Since, therefore, the
sanctification of Christ was most perfect, because He was so sanctified
that He might sanctify others; consequently He was sanctified by reason
of His own movement of the free-will towards God. Which movement,
indeed, of the free-will is meritorious. Consequently, Christ did merit
in the first instant of His conception.
Reply to Objection 1: Free-will does not bear the same relation to good
as to evil: for to good it is related of itself, and naturally; whereas
to evil it is related as to a defect, and beside nature. Now, as the
Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 18): "That which is beside nature
is subsequent to that which is according to nature; because that which
is beside nature is an exception to nature. " Therefore the free-will of
a creature can be moved to good meritoriously in the first instant of
its creation, but not to evil sinfully; provided, however, its nature
be unimpaired.
Reply to Objection 2: That which man has at the first moment of his
creation, in the ordinary course of nature, is natural to him. but
nothing hinders a creature from receiving from God a gift of grace at
the very beginning of its creation. In this way did Christ's soul in
the first instant of its creation receive grace by which it could
merit. And for this reason is that grace, by way of a certain likeness,
said to be natural to this Man, as explained by Augustine (Enchiridion
xl).
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents the same thing belonging to
someone from several causes. And thus it is that Christ was able by
subsequent actions and sufferings to merit the glory of immortality,
which He also merited in the first instant of His conception: not,
indeed, so that it became thereby more due to Him than before, but so
that it was due to Him from more causes than before.
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Whether Christ was a perfect comprehensor in the first instant of His
conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not a perfect comprehensor
in the first instant of His conception. For merit precedes reward, as
fault precedes punishment. But Christ merited in the first instant of
His conception, as stated above [4169](A[3]). Since, therefore, the
state of comprehension is the principal reward, it seems that Christ
was not a comprehensor in the first instant of His conception.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 24:26): "Ought not Christ to
have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory? " But glory
belongs to the state of comprehension. Therefore Christ was not in the
state of comprehension in the first instant of His conception, when as
yet He had not suffered.
Objection 3: Further, what befits neither man nor angel seems proper to
God; and therefore is not becoming to Christ as man. But to be always
in the state of beatitude befits neither man nor angel: for if they had
been created in beatitude, they would not have sinned afterwards.
Therefore Christ, as man, was not in the state of beatitude in the
first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou
hast chosen, end taken to Thee"; which words, according to the gloss,
refer to Christ's human nature, which "was taken by the Word of God
unto the unity of Person. " But human nature was taken by the Word of
God in the first instant of His conception. Therefore, in the first
instant of His conception, Christ, as man, was in the state of
beatitude; which is to be a comprehensor.
I answer that, As appears from what was said above [4170](A[3]), it was
unbecoming that in His conception Christ should receive merely habitual
grace without the act. Now, He received grace "not by measure" (Jn.
3:34), as stated above (Q[7], A[11]). But the grace of the "wayfarer,"
being short of that of the "comprehensor," is in less measure than that
of the comprehensor. Wherefore it is manifest that in the first instant
of His conception Christ received not only as much grace as
comprehensors have, but also greater than that which they all have. And
because that grace was not without its act, it follows that He was a
comprehensor in act, seeing God in His Essence more clearly than other
creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4171]Q[19], A[3]), Christ did
not merit the glory of the soul, in respect of which He is said to have
been a comprehensor, but the glory of the body, to which He came
through His Passion.
Wherefore the reply to the Second Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 3: Since Christ was both God and man, He had, even
in His humanity, something more than other creatures---namely, that He
was in the state of beatitude from the very beginning.
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OF CHRIST'S NATIVITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After considering Christ's conception, we must treat of His nativity.
First, as to the nativity itself; secondly, as to His manifestation
after birth.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether nativity regards the nature or the person?
(2) Whether another, besides His eternal, birth should be attributed to
Christ?
(3) Whether the Blessed Virgin is His Mother in respect of His temporal
birth?
(4) Whether she ought to be called the Mother of God?
(5) Whether Christ is the Son of God the Father and of the Virgin
Mother in respect of two filiations?
(6) Of the mode of the Nativity;
(7) Of its place;
(8) Of the time of the Nativity.
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Whether nativity regards the nature rather than the person?
Objection 1: It would seem that nativity regards the nature rather than
the person. For Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum): "The
eternal Divine Nature could not be conceived and born of human nature,
except in a true human nature. " Consequently it becomes the Divine
Nature to be conceived and born by reason of the human nature. Much
more, therefore, does it regard human nature itself.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v),
"nature" is so denominated from "nativity. " But things are denominated
from one another by reason of some likeness. Therefore it seems that
nativity regards the nature rather than the person.
Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, that is born which begins to
exist by nativity. But Christ's Person did not begin to exist by His
nativity, whereas His human nature did. Therefore it seems that the
nativity properly regards the nature, and not the person.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "Nativity regards
the hypostasis, not the nature. "
I answer that, Nativity can be attributed to someone in two ways:
first, as to its subject; secondly, as to its terminus. To him that is
born it is attributed as to its subject: and this, properly speaking,
is the hypostasis, not the nature. For since to be born is to be
generated; as a thing is generated in order for it to be, so is a thing
born in order for it to be. Now, to be, properly speaking, belongs to
that which subsists; since a form that does not subsist is said to be
only inasmuch as by it something is: and whereas person or hypostasis
designates something as subsisting, nature designates form, whereby
something subsists. Consequently, nativity is attributed to the person
or hypostasis as to the proper subject of being born, but not to the
nature.
But to the nature nativity is attributed as to its terminus. For the
terminus of generation and of every nativity is the form. Now, nature
designates something as a form: wherefore nativity is said to be "the
road to nature," as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii): for the purpose
of nature is terminated in the form or nature of the species.
Reply to Objection 1: On account of the identity of nature and
hypostasis in God, nature fs sometimes put instead of person or
hypostasis. And in this sense Augustine says that the Divine Nature was
conceived and born, inasmuch as the Person of the Son was conceived and
born in the human nature.
Reply to Objection 2: No movement or change is denominated from the
subject moved, but from the terminus of the movement, whence the
subject has its species. For this reason nativity is not denominated
from the person born, but from nature, which is the terminus of
nativity.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature, properly speaking, does not begin to
exist: rather is it the person that begins to exist in some nature.
Because, as stated above, nature designates that by which something is;
whereas person designates something as having subsistent being.
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Whether a temporal nativity should be attributed to Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal nativity is not to be
attributed to Christ. For "to be born is a certain movement of a thing
that did not exist before it was born, which movement procures for it
the benefit of existence" [*Cf. Augustine, De Unit. Trin. xii]. But
Christ was from all eternity. Therefore He could not be born in time.
Objection 2: Further, what is perfect in itself needs not to be born.
But the Person of the Son of God was perfect from eternity. Therefore
He needs not to be born in time. Therefore it seems that He had no
temporal birth.
Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, nativity regards the person.
But in Christ there is only one person. Therefore in Christ there is
but one nativity.
Objection 4: Further, what is born by two nativities is born twice. But
this proposition is false; "Christ was born twice": because the
nativity whereby He was born of the Father suffers no interruption;
since it is eternal. Whereas interruption is required to warrant the
use of the adverb "twice": for a man is said to run twice whose running
is interrupted. Therefore it seems that we should not admit a double
nativity in Christ.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "We confess two
nativities in Christ: one of the Father---eternal; and one which
occurred in these latter times for our sake. "
I answer that, As stated above [4172](A[1]), nature is compared to
nativity, as the terminus to movement or change. Now, movement is
diversified according to the diversity of its termini, as the
Philosopher shows (Phys. v). But, in Christ there is a twofold nature:
one which He received of the Father from eternity, the other which He
received from His Mother in time. Therefore we must needs attribute to
Christ a twofold nativity: one by which He was born of the Father from
all eternity; one by which He was born of His Mother in time.
Reply to Objection 1: This was the argument of a certain heretic,
Felician, and is solved thus by Augustine (Contra Felic. xii). "Let us
suppose," says he, "as many maintain, that in the world there is a
universal soul, which, by its ineffable movement, so gives life to all
seed, that it is not compounded with things begotten, but bestows life
that they may be begotten. Without doubt, when this soul reaches the
womb, being intent on fashioning the passible matter to its own
purpose, it unites itself to the personality thereof, though manifestly
it is not of the same substance; and thus of the active soul and
passive matter, one man is made out of two substances. And so we
confess that the soul is born from out the womb; but not as though,
before birth, it was nothing at all in itself. Thus, then, but in a way
much more sublime, the Son of God was born as man, just as the soul is
held to be born together with the body: not as though they both made
one substance, but that from both, one person results. Yet we do not
say that the Son of God began thus to exist: lest it be thought that
His Divinity is temporal. Nor do we acknowledge the flesh of the Son of
God to have been from eternity: lest it be thought that He took, not a
true human body, but some resemblance thereof. "
Reply to Objection 2: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is thus
solved by Cyril in an epistle [*Cf. Acta Concil. Ephes. , p. 1, cap.
viii]: "We do not say that the Son of God had need, for His own sake,
of a second nativity, after that which is from the Father: for it is
foolish and a mark of ignorance to say that He who is from all
eternity, and co-eternal with the Father, needs to begin again to
exist. But because for us and for our salvation, uniting the human
nature to His Person, He became the child of a woman, for this reason
do we say that He was born in the flesh. "
Reply to Objection 3: Nativity regards the person as its subject, the
nature as its terminus. Now, it is possible for several transformations
to be in the same subject: yet must they be diversified in respect of
their termini. But we do not say this as though the eternal nativity
were a transformation or a movement, but because it is designated by
way of a transformation or movement.
Reply to Objection 4: Christ can be said to have been born twice in
respect of His two nativities. For just as he is said to run twice who
runs at two different times, so can He be said to be born twice who is
born once from eternity and once in time: because eternity and time
differ much more than two different times, although each signifies a
measure of duration.
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Whether the Blessed Virgin can be called Christ's Mother in respect of His
temporal nativity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called
Christ's Mother in respect of His temporal nativity. For, as stated
above ([4173]Q[32], A[4]), the Blessed Virgin Mary did not cooperate
actively in begetting Christ, but merely supplied the matter.
purpose of the act of generation, distinguish the male and female
sexes, unless the action of the male were distinct from that of the
female. Now, in generation there are two distinct operations---that of
the agent and that of the patient. Wherefore it follows that the entire
active operation is on the part of the male, and the passive on the
part of the female. For this reason in plants, where both forces are
mingled, there is no distinction of male and female.
Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was not Christ's Father, but His
Mother, it follows that it was not given to her to exercise an active
power in His conception: whether to cooperate actively so as to be His
Father, or not to cooperate at all, as some say. whence it would follow
that this active power was bestowed on her to no purpose. We must
therefore say that in Christ's conception itself she did not cooperate
actively, but merely supplied the matter thereof. Nevertheless, before
the conception she cooperated actively in the preparation of the matter
so that it should be apt for the conception.
Reply to Objection 1: This conception had three privileges---namely,
that it was without original sin; that it was not that of a man only,
but of God and man; and that it was a virginal conception. And all
three were effected by the Holy Ghost. Therefore Damascene says, as to
the first, that the Holy Ghost "came upon the Virgin, purifying
her"---that is, preserving her from conceiving with original sin. As to
the second, he says: "And bestowing on her the power to receive," i. e.
to conceive, "the Word of God. " As to the third, he says: "And to give
birth" to Him, i. e. that she might, while remaining a virgin, bring Him
forth, not actively, but passively, just as other mothers achieve this
through the action of the male seed.
Reply to Objection 2: The generative power of the female is imperfect
compared to that of the male. And, therefore, just as in the arts the
inferior art gives a disposition to the matter to which the higher art
gives the form, as is stated Phys. ii, so also the generative power of
the female prepares the matter, which is then fashioned by the active
power of the male.
Reply to Objection 3: In order for a transformation to be natural,
there is no need for an active principle in matter, but only for a
passive principle, as stated above.
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OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF CHRIST'S CONCEPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)
We have now to consider the mode and order of Christ's conception,
concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's body was formed in the first instant of its
conception?
(2) Whether it was animated in the first instant of its conception?
(3) Whether it was assumed by the Word in the first instant of its
conception?
(4) Whether this conception was natural or miraculous?
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Whether Christ's body was formed in the first instant of its conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body was not formed in the
first instant of its conception. For it is written (Jn. 2:20):
"Six-and-forty years was this Temple in building"; on which words
Augustine comments as follows (De Trin. iv): "This number applies
manifestly to the perfection of our Lord's body. " He says, further (QQ.
lxxxiii, qu. 56): "It is not without reason that the Temple, which was
a type of His body, is said to have been forty-six years in building:
so that as many years as it took to build the Temple, in so many days
was our Lord's body perfected. " Therefore Christ's body was not
perfectly formed in the first instant of its conception.
Objection 2: Further, there was need of local movement for the
formation of Christ's body in order that the purest blood of the
Virgin's body might be brought where generation might aptly take place.
Now, no body can be moved locally in an instant: since the time taken
in movement is divided according to the division of the thing moved, as
is proved Phys. vi. Therefore Christ's body was not formed in an
instant.
Objection 3: Further, Christ's body was formed of the purest blood of
the Virgin, as stated above ([4151]Q[31], A[5]). But that matter could
not be in the same instant both blood and flesh, because thus matter
would have been at the same time the subject of two forms. Therefore
the last instant in which it was blood was distinct from the first
instant in which it was flesh. But between any two instants there is an
interval of time. Therefore Christ's body was not formed in an instant,
but during a space of time.
Objection 4: Further, as the augmentative power requires a fixed time
for its act, so also does the generative power: for both are natural
powers belonging to the vegetative soul. But Christ's body took a fixed
time to grow, like the bodies of other men: for it is written (Lk.
2:52) that He "advanced in wisdom and age. " Therefore it seems for the
same reason that the formation of His body, since that, too, belongs to
the generative power, was not instantaneous, but took a fixed time,
like the bodies of other men.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii): "As soon as the angel
announced it, as soon as the Spirit came down, the Word was in the
womb, within the womb the Word was made flesh. "
I answer that, In the conception of Christ's body three points may be
considered: first, the local movement of the blood to the place of
generation; secondly, the formation of the body from that matter;
thirdly, the development whereby it was brought to perfection of
quantity. of these, the second is the conception itself; the first is a
preamble; the third, a result of the conception.
Now, the first could not be instantaneous: since this would be contrary
to the very nature of the local movement of any body whatever, the
parts of which come into a place successively. The third also requires
a succession of time: both because there is no increase without local
movement, and because increase is effected by the power of the soul
already informing the body, the operation of which power is subject to
time.
But the body's very formation, in which conception principally
consists, was instantaneous, for two reasons. First, because of the
infinite power of the agent, viz. the Holy Ghost, by whom Christ's body
was formed, as stated above ([4152]Q[32], A[1]). For the greater the
power of an agent, the more quickly can it dispose matter; and,
consequently, an agent of infinite power can dispose matter
instantaneously to its due form. Secondly, on the part of the Person of
the Son, whose body was being formed. For it was unbecoming that He
should take to Himself a body as yet unformed. While, if the conception
had been going on for any time before the perfect formation of the
body, the whole conception could not be attributed to the Son of God,
since it is not attributed to Him except by reason of the assumption of
that body. Therefore in the first instant in which the various parts of
the matter were united together in the place of generation, Christ's
body was both perfectly formed and assumed. And thus is the Son of God
said to have been conceived; nor could it be said otherwise.
Reply to Objection 1: Neither quotation from Augustine refers to
formation alone of Christ's body, but to its formation, together with a
fixed development up to the time of His birth. Wherefore in the
aforesaid number are foreshadowed the number of months during which
Christ was in the Virgin's womb.
Reply to Objection 2: This local movement is not comprised within the
conception itself, but is a preamble thereto.
Reply to Objection 3: It is not possible to fix the last instant in
which that matter was blood: but it is possible to fix the last period
of time which continued without any interval up to the first instant in
which Christ's body was formed. And this instant was the terminus of
the time occupied by the local movement of the matter towards the place
of generation.
Reply to Objection 4: Increase is caused by the augmentative power of
that which is the subject of increase: but the formation of the body is
caused by the generative power, not of that which is generated, but of
the father generating from seed, in which the formative power derived
from the father's soul has its operation. But Christ's body was not
formed by the seed of man, as stated above ([4153]Q[31], A[5], ad 3),
but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the formation thereof
should be such as to be worthy of the Holy Ghost. But the development
of Christ's body was the effect of the augmentative power in Christ's
soul: and since this was of the same species as ours, it behooved His
body to develop in the same way as the bodies of other men, so as to
prove the reality of His human nature.
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Whether Christ's body was animated in the first instant of its conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body was not animated in the
first instant of its conception. For Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian. ):
"Christ's flesh was not of another nature than ours: nor was the
beginning of His animation different from that of other men. " But the
soul is not infused into other men at the first instant of their
conception. Therefore neither should Christ's soul have been infused
into His body in the first instant of its conception.
Objection 2: Further, the soul, like any natural form, requires
determinate quantity in its matter. But in the first instant of its
conception Christ's body was not of the same quantity as the bodies of
other men when they are animated: otherwise, if afterwards its
development had been continuous, either its birth would have occurred
sooner, or at the time of birth He would have been a bigger child than
others. The former alternative is contrary to what Augustine says (De
Trin. iv), where he proves that Christ was in the Virgin's womb for the
space of nine months: while the latter is contrary to what Pope Leo
says (Serm. iv in Epiph. ): "They found the child Jesus nowise differing
from the generality of infants. " Therefore Christ's body was not
animated in the first instant of its conception.
Objection 3: Further, whenever there is "before" and "after" there must
be several instants. But according to the Philosopher (De Gener.
Animal. ii) in the generation of a man there must needs be "before" and
"after": for he is first of all a living thing, and afterwards, an
animal, and after that, a man. Therefore the animation of Christ could
not be effected in the first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "At the very
instant that there was flesh, it was the flesh of the Word of God, it
was flesh animated with a rational and intellectual soul. "
I answer that, For the conception to be attributed to the very Son of
God, as we confess in the Creed, when we say, "who was conceived by the
Holy Ghost," we must needs say that the body itself, in being
conceived, was assumed by the Word of God. Now it has been shown above
([4154]Q[6], AA[1] ,2) that the Word of God assumed the body by means
of the soul, and the soul by means of the spirit, i. e. the intellect.
Wherefore in the first instant of its conception Christ's body must
needs have been animated by the rational soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The beginning of the infusion of the soul may be
considered in two ways. First, in regard to the disposition of the
body. And thus, the beginning of the infusion of the soul into Christ's
body was the same as in other men's bodies: for just as the soul is
infused into another man's body as soon as it is formed, so was it with
Christ. Secondly, this beginning may be considered merely in regard to
time. And thus, because Christ's body was perfectly formed in a shorter
space of time, so after a shorter space of time was it animated.
Reply to Objection 2: The soul requires due quantity in the matter into
which it is infused: but this quantity allows of a certain latitude
because it is not fixed to a certain amount. Now the quantity that a
body has when the soul is first infused into it is in proportion to the
perfect quantity to which it will attain by development: that is to
say, men of greater stature have greater bodies at the time of first
animation. But Christ at the perfect age was of becoming and middle
stature: in proportion to which was the quantity of His body at the
time when other men's bodies are animated; though it was less than
theirs at the first instant of His conception. Nevertheless that
quantity was not too small to safeguard the nature of an animated body;
since it would have sufficed for the animation of a small man's body.
Reply to Objection 3: What the Philosopher says is true in the
generation of other men, because the body is successively formed and
disposed for the soul: whence, first, as being imperfectly disposed, it
receives an imperfect soul; and afterwards, when it is perfectly
disposed, it receives a perfect soul. But Christ's body, on account of
the infinite power of the agent, was perfectly disposed
instantaneously. Wherefore, at once and in the first instant it
received a perfect form, that is, the rational soul.
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Whether Christ's flesh was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's flesh was first of all
conceived, and afterwards assumed. Because what is not cannot be
assumed. But Christ's flesh began to exist when it was conceived.
Therefore it seems that it was assumed by the Word of God after it was
conceived.
Objection 2: Further, Christ's flesh was assumed by the Word of God, by
means of the rational soul. But it received the rational soul at the
term of the conception. Therefore it was assumed at the term of the
conception. But at the term of the conception it was already conceived.
Therefore it was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed.
Objection 3: Further, in everything generated, that which is imperfect
precedes in time that which is perfect: which is made clear by the
Philosopher (Metaph. ix). But Christ's body is something generated.
Therefore it did not attain to its ultimate perfection, which consisted
in the union with the Word of God, at the first instant of its
conception; but, first of all, the flesh was conceived and afterwards
assumed.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii [*Written by
Fulgentius]): "Hold steadfastly, and doubt not for a moment that
Christ's flesh was not conceived in the Virgin's womb, before being
assumed by the Word. "
I answer that, As stated above, we may say properly that "God was made
man," but not that "man was made God": because God took to Himself that
which belongs to man---and that which belongs to man did not pre-exist,
as subsisting in itself, before being assumed by the Word. But if
Christ's flesh had been conceived before being assumed by the Word, it
would have had at some time an hypostasis other than that of the Word
of God. And this is against the very nature of the Incarnation, which
we hold to consist in this, that the Word of God was united to human
nature and to all its parts in the unity of hypostasis: nor was it
becoming that the Word of God should, by assuming human nature, destroy
a pre-existing hypostasis of human nature or of any part thereof. It is
consequently contrary to faith to assert that Christ's flesh was first
of all conceived and afterwards assumed by the Word of God.
Reply to Objection 1: If Christ's flesh had been formed or conceived,
not instantaneously, but successively, one of two things would follow:
either that what was assumed was not yet flesh, or that the flesh was
conceived before it was assumed. But since we hold that the conception
was effected instantaneously, it follows that in that flesh the
beginning and the completion of its conception were in the same
instant. So that, as Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum xviii]
says: "We say that the very Word of God was conceived in taking flesh,
and that His very flesh was conceived by the Word taking flesh. "
From the above the reply to the Second Objection is clear. For in the
same moment that this flesh began to be conceived, its conception and
animation were completed.
Reply to Objection 3: The mystery of the Incarnation is not to be
looked upon as an ascent, as it were, of a man already existing and
mounting up to the dignity of the Union: as the heretic Photinus
maintained. Rather is it to be considered as a descent, by reason of
the perfect Word of God taking unto Himself the imperfection of our
nature; according to Jn. 6:38: "I came down from heaven. "
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Whether Christ's conception was natural?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's conception was natural. For
Christ is called the Son of Man by reason of His conception in the
flesh. But He is a true and natural Son of Man: as also is He the true
and natural Son of God. Therefore His conception was natural.
Objection 2: Further, no creature can be the cause of a miraculous
effect. But Christ's conception is attributed to the Blessed Virgin,
who is a mere creature: for we say that the Virgin conceived Christ.
Therefore it seems that His conception was not miraculous, but natural.
Objection 3: Further, for a transformation to be natural, it is enough
that the passive principle be natural, as stated above ([4155]Q[32],
A[4]). But in Christ's conception the passive principle on the part of
His Mother was natural, as we have shown ([4156]Q[32], A[4]). Therefore
Christ's conception was natural.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach. ): "Christ does in
a superhuman way those things that pertain to man: this is shown in the
miraculous virginal conception. "
I answer that, As Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): "In this mystery thou
shalt find many things that are natural, and many that are
supernatural. " For if we consider in this conception anything connected
with the matter thereof, which was supplied by the mother, it was in
all such things natural. But if we consider it on the part of the
active power, thus it was entirely miraculous. And since judgment of a
thing should be pronounced in respect of its form rather than of its
matter: and likewise in respect of its activity rather than of its
passiveness: therefore is it that Christ's conception should be
described simply as miraculous and supernatural, although in a certain
respect it was natural.
Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said to be a natural Son of Man, by
reason of His having a true human nature, through which He is a Son of
Man, although He had it miraculously; thus, too, the blind man to whom
sight has been restored sees naturally by sight miraculously received.
Reply to Objection 2: The conception is attributed to the Blessed
Virgin, not as the active principle thereof, but because she supplied
the matter, and because the conception took place in her womb.
Reply to Objection 3: A natural passive principle suffices for a
transformation to be natural, when it is moved by its proper active
principle in a natural and wonted way. But this is not so in the case
in point. Therefore this conception cannot be called simply natural.
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OF THE PERFECTION OF THE CHILD CONCEIVED (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the perfection of the child conceived: and
concerning this there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was sanctified by grace in the first instant of His
conception?
(2) Whether in that same instant He had the use of free-will?
(3) Whether in that same instant He could merit?
(4) Whether in that same instant He was a perfect comprehensor?
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Whether Christ was sanctified in the first instant of His conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not sanctified in the first
instant of His conception. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was
not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural: afterwards
that which is spiritual. " But sanctification by grace is something
spiritual. Therefore Christ received the grace of sanctification, not
at the very beginning of His conception, but after a space of time.
Objection 2: Further, sanctification seems to be a cleansing from sin:
according to 1 Cor. 6:1: "And such some of you were," namely, sinners,
"but you are washed, but you are sanctified. " But sin was never in
Christ. Therefore it was not becoming that He should be sanctified by
grace.
Objection 3: Further, as by the Word of God "all things were made," so
from the Word incarnate all men who are made holy receive holiness,
according to Heb. 2:11: "Both he that sanctifieth and they who are
sanctified are all of one. " But "the Word of God, by whom all things
were made, was not Himself made"; as Augustine says (De Trin. i).
Therefore Christ, by whom all are made holy, was not Himself made holy.
On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy which shall be
born of thee shall be called the Son of God"; and (Jn. 10:36): "Whom
the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world. "
I answer that, As stated above ([4157]Q[7], AA[9],10,12), the abundance
of grace sanctifying Christ's soul flows from the very union of the
Word, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the
Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. " For it has been
shown above ([4158]Q[33], AA[2],3) that in the first instant of
conception, Christ's body was both animated and assumed by the Word of
God. Consequently, in the first instant of His conception, Christ had
the fulness of grace sanctifying His body and His soul.
Reply to Objection 1: The order set down by the Apostle in this passage
refers to those who by advancing attain to the spiritual state. But the
mystery of the Incarnation is considered as a condescension of the
fulness of the Godhead into human nature rather than as the promotion
of human nature, already existing, as it were, to the Godhead.
Therefore in the man Christ there was perfection of spiritual life from
the very beginning.
Reply to Objection 2: To be sanctified is to be made holy. Now
something is made not only from its contrary, but also from that which
is opposite to it, either by negation or by privation: thus white is
made either from black or from not-white. We indeed from being sinners
are made holy: so that our sanctification is a cleansing from sin.
Whereas Christ, as man, was made holy, because He was not always thus
sanctified by grace: yet He was not made holy from being a sinner,
because He never sinned; but He was made holy from not-holy as man, not
indeed by privation, as though He were at some time a man and not holy;
but by negation---that is, when He was not man He had not human
sanctity. Therefore at the same time He was made man and a holy man.
For this reason the angel said (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy which shall be
born of thee. " Which words Gregory expounds as follows (Moral.
xviii):
"In order to show the distinction between His holiness and ours, it is
declared that He shall be born holy. For we, though we are made holy,
yet are not born holy, because by the mere condition of a corruptible
nature we are tied . . . But He alone is truly born holy who . . . was
not conceived by the combining of carnal union. "
Reply to Objection 3: The Father creates things through the Son, and
the whole Trinity sanctifies men through the Man Christ, but not in the
same way. For the Word of God has the same power and operation as God
the Father: hence the Father does not work through the Son as an
instrument, which is both mover and moved. Whereas the humanity of
Christ is as the instrument of the Godhead, as stated above
([4159]Q[7], A[1], ad 3;[4160] Q[8], A[1], ad 1). Therefore Christ's
humanity is both sanctified and sanctifier.
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Whether Christ as man had the use of free-will in the first instant of His
conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man had not the use of
free-will in the first instant of His conception. For a thing is,
before it acts or operates. Now the use of free-will is an operation.
Since, therefore, Christ's soul began to exist in the first instant of
His conception, as was made clear above ([4161]Q[33], A[2]), it seems
impossible that He should have the use of free-will in the first
instant of His conception.
Objection 2: Further, the use of free-will consists in choice. But
choice presupposes the deliberation of counsel: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iii) that choice is "the desire of what has been
previously the object of deliberation. " Therefore it seems impossible
that Christ should have had the use of free-will in the first instant
of His conception.
Objection 3: Further, the free-will is "a faculty of the will and
reason," as stated in the [4162]FP, Q[83], A[2], OBJ[2]: consequently
the use of free-will is an act of the will and the reason or intellect.
But the act of the intellect presupposes an act of the senses; and this
cannot exist without proper disposition of the organs---a condition
which would seem impossible in the first instant of Christ's
conception. Therefore it seems that Christ could not have the use of
free-will at the first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Trinity (Gregory:
Regist. ix, Ep. 61): "As soon as the Word entered the womb, while
retaining the reality of His Nature, He was made flesh, and a perfect
man. " But a perfect man has the use of free-will. Therefore Christ had
the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception.
I answer that, As stated above [4163](A[1]), spiritual perfection was
becoming to the human nature which Christ took, which perfection He
attained not by making progress, but by receiving it from the very
first. Now ultimate perfection does not consist in power or habit, but
in operation; wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, text. 5) that
operation is a "second act. " We must, therefore, say that in the first
instant of His conception Christ had that operation of the soul which
can be had in an instant. And such is the operation of the will and
intellect, in which the use of free-will consists. For the operation of
the intellect and will is sudden and instantaneous, much more, indeed,
than corporeal vision; inasmuch as to understand, to will, and to feel,
are not movements that may be described as "acts of an imperfect
being," which attains perfection successively, but are "the acts of an
already perfect being," as is said, De Anima iii, text. 28. We must
therefore say that Christ had the use of free-will in the first instant
of His conception.
Reply to Objection 1: Existence precedes action by nature, but not in
time; but at the same time the agent has perfect existence, and begins
to act unless it is hindered. Thus fire, as soon as it is generated,
begins to give heat and light. The action of heating, however, is not
terminated in an instant, but continues for a time; whereas the action
of giving light is perfected in an instant. And such an operation is
the use of free-will, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: As soon as counsel or deliberation is ended,
there may be choice. But those who need the deliberation of counsel, as
soon as this comes to an end are certain of what ought to be chosen:
and consequently they choose at once. From this it is clear that the
deliberation of counsel does not of necessity precede choice save for
the purpose of inquiring into what is uncertain. But Christ, in the
first instant of His conception, had the fulness of sanctifying grace,
and in like manner the fulness of known truth; according to Jn. 1:14:
"Full of grace and truth. " Wherefore, as being possessed of certainty
about all things, He could choose at once in an instant.
Reply to Objection 3: Christ's intellect, in regard to His infused
knowledge, could understand without turning to phantasms, as stated
above ([4164]Q[11], A[2]). Consequently His intellect and will could
act without any action of the senses.
Nevertheless it was possible for Him, in the first instant of His
conception, to have an operation of the senses: especially as to the
sense of touch, which the infant can exercise in the womb even before
it has received the rational soul, as is said, De Gener. Animal. ii,
3,4. Wherefore, since Christ had the rational soul in the first instant
of His conception, through His body being already fashioned and endowed
with sensible organs, much more was it possible for Him to exercise the
sense of touch in that same instant.
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Whether Christ could merit in the first instant of His conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit in the first
instant of His conception. For the free-will bears the same relation to
merit as to demerit. But the devil could not sin in the first instant
of his creation, as was shown in the [4165]FP, Q[63], A[5]. Therefore
neither could Christ's soul merit in the first instant of its
creation---that is, in the first instant of Christ's conception.
Objection 2: Further, that which man has in the first instant of his
conception seems to be natural to him: for it is in this that his
natural generation is terminated. But we do not merit by what is
natural to us, as is clear from what has been said in the [4166]FS,
Q[109], A[5]; [4167]FS, Q[114], A[2]. Therefore it seems that the use
of free-will, which Christ as man had in the first instant of His
conception, was not meritorious.
Objection 3: Further, that which a man has once merited he makes, in a
way, his own: consequently it seems that he cannot merit the same thing
again: for no one merits what is already his. If, therefore, Christ
merited in the first instant of His conception, it follows that
afterwards He merited nothing. But this is evidently untrue. Therefore
Christ did not merit in the first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Paterius, Expos. Vet. et Nov. Test. super
Ex. 40] says: "Increase of merit was absolutely impossible to the soul
of Christ. " But increase of merit would have been possible had He not
merited in the first instant of His conception. Therefore Christ
merited in the first instant of His conception.
I answer that, As stated above [4168](A[1]), Christ was sanctified by
grace in the first instant of His conception. Now, sanctification is
twofold: that of adults who are sanctified in consideration of their
own act; and that of infants who are sanctified in consideration of,
not their own act of faith, but that of their parents or of the Church.
The former sanctification is more perfect than the latter: just as act
is more perfect than habit; and "that which is by itself, than that
which is by another" [*Aristotle, Phys. viii]. Since, therefore, the
sanctification of Christ was most perfect, because He was so sanctified
that He might sanctify others; consequently He was sanctified by reason
of His own movement of the free-will towards God. Which movement,
indeed, of the free-will is meritorious. Consequently, Christ did merit
in the first instant of His conception.
Reply to Objection 1: Free-will does not bear the same relation to good
as to evil: for to good it is related of itself, and naturally; whereas
to evil it is related as to a defect, and beside nature. Now, as the
Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 18): "That which is beside nature
is subsequent to that which is according to nature; because that which
is beside nature is an exception to nature. " Therefore the free-will of
a creature can be moved to good meritoriously in the first instant of
its creation, but not to evil sinfully; provided, however, its nature
be unimpaired.
Reply to Objection 2: That which man has at the first moment of his
creation, in the ordinary course of nature, is natural to him. but
nothing hinders a creature from receiving from God a gift of grace at
the very beginning of its creation. In this way did Christ's soul in
the first instant of its creation receive grace by which it could
merit. And for this reason is that grace, by way of a certain likeness,
said to be natural to this Man, as explained by Augustine (Enchiridion
xl).
Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents the same thing belonging to
someone from several causes. And thus it is that Christ was able by
subsequent actions and sufferings to merit the glory of immortality,
which He also merited in the first instant of His conception: not,
indeed, so that it became thereby more due to Him than before, but so
that it was due to Him from more causes than before.
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Whether Christ was a perfect comprehensor in the first instant of His
conception?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not a perfect comprehensor
in the first instant of His conception. For merit precedes reward, as
fault precedes punishment. But Christ merited in the first instant of
His conception, as stated above [4169](A[3]). Since, therefore, the
state of comprehension is the principal reward, it seems that Christ
was not a comprehensor in the first instant of His conception.
Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 24:26): "Ought not Christ to
have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory? " But glory
belongs to the state of comprehension. Therefore Christ was not in the
state of comprehension in the first instant of His conception, when as
yet He had not suffered.
Objection 3: Further, what befits neither man nor angel seems proper to
God; and therefore is not becoming to Christ as man. But to be always
in the state of beatitude befits neither man nor angel: for if they had
been created in beatitude, they would not have sinned afterwards.
Therefore Christ, as man, was not in the state of beatitude in the
first instant of His conception.
On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou
hast chosen, end taken to Thee"; which words, according to the gloss,
refer to Christ's human nature, which "was taken by the Word of God
unto the unity of Person. " But human nature was taken by the Word of
God in the first instant of His conception. Therefore, in the first
instant of His conception, Christ, as man, was in the state of
beatitude; which is to be a comprehensor.
I answer that, As appears from what was said above [4170](A[3]), it was
unbecoming that in His conception Christ should receive merely habitual
grace without the act. Now, He received grace "not by measure" (Jn.
3:34), as stated above (Q[7], A[11]). But the grace of the "wayfarer,"
being short of that of the "comprehensor," is in less measure than that
of the comprehensor. Wherefore it is manifest that in the first instant
of His conception Christ received not only as much grace as
comprehensors have, but also greater than that which they all have. And
because that grace was not without its act, it follows that He was a
comprehensor in act, seeing God in His Essence more clearly than other
creatures.
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4171]Q[19], A[3]), Christ did
not merit the glory of the soul, in respect of which He is said to have
been a comprehensor, but the glory of the body, to which He came
through His Passion.
Wherefore the reply to the Second Objection is clear.
Reply to Objection 3: Since Christ was both God and man, He had, even
in His humanity, something more than other creatures---namely, that He
was in the state of beatitude from the very beginning.
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OF CHRIST'S NATIVITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)
After considering Christ's conception, we must treat of His nativity.
First, as to the nativity itself; secondly, as to His manifestation
after birth.
Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether nativity regards the nature or the person?
(2) Whether another, besides His eternal, birth should be attributed to
Christ?
(3) Whether the Blessed Virgin is His Mother in respect of His temporal
birth?
(4) Whether she ought to be called the Mother of God?
(5) Whether Christ is the Son of God the Father and of the Virgin
Mother in respect of two filiations?
(6) Of the mode of the Nativity;
(7) Of its place;
(8) Of the time of the Nativity.
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Whether nativity regards the nature rather than the person?
Objection 1: It would seem that nativity regards the nature rather than
the person. For Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum): "The
eternal Divine Nature could not be conceived and born of human nature,
except in a true human nature. " Consequently it becomes the Divine
Nature to be conceived and born by reason of the human nature. Much
more, therefore, does it regard human nature itself.
Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v),
"nature" is so denominated from "nativity. " But things are denominated
from one another by reason of some likeness. Therefore it seems that
nativity regards the nature rather than the person.
Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, that is born which begins to
exist by nativity. But Christ's Person did not begin to exist by His
nativity, whereas His human nature did. Therefore it seems that the
nativity properly regards the nature, and not the person.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "Nativity regards
the hypostasis, not the nature. "
I answer that, Nativity can be attributed to someone in two ways:
first, as to its subject; secondly, as to its terminus. To him that is
born it is attributed as to its subject: and this, properly speaking,
is the hypostasis, not the nature. For since to be born is to be
generated; as a thing is generated in order for it to be, so is a thing
born in order for it to be. Now, to be, properly speaking, belongs to
that which subsists; since a form that does not subsist is said to be
only inasmuch as by it something is: and whereas person or hypostasis
designates something as subsisting, nature designates form, whereby
something subsists. Consequently, nativity is attributed to the person
or hypostasis as to the proper subject of being born, but not to the
nature.
But to the nature nativity is attributed as to its terminus. For the
terminus of generation and of every nativity is the form. Now, nature
designates something as a form: wherefore nativity is said to be "the
road to nature," as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii): for the purpose
of nature is terminated in the form or nature of the species.
Reply to Objection 1: On account of the identity of nature and
hypostasis in God, nature fs sometimes put instead of person or
hypostasis. And in this sense Augustine says that the Divine Nature was
conceived and born, inasmuch as the Person of the Son was conceived and
born in the human nature.
Reply to Objection 2: No movement or change is denominated from the
subject moved, but from the terminus of the movement, whence the
subject has its species. For this reason nativity is not denominated
from the person born, but from nature, which is the terminus of
nativity.
Reply to Objection 3: Nature, properly speaking, does not begin to
exist: rather is it the person that begins to exist in some nature.
Because, as stated above, nature designates that by which something is;
whereas person designates something as having subsistent being.
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Whether a temporal nativity should be attributed to Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that temporal nativity is not to be
attributed to Christ. For "to be born is a certain movement of a thing
that did not exist before it was born, which movement procures for it
the benefit of existence" [*Cf. Augustine, De Unit. Trin. xii]. But
Christ was from all eternity. Therefore He could not be born in time.
Objection 2: Further, what is perfect in itself needs not to be born.
But the Person of the Son of God was perfect from eternity. Therefore
He needs not to be born in time. Therefore it seems that He had no
temporal birth.
Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, nativity regards the person.
But in Christ there is only one person. Therefore in Christ there is
but one nativity.
Objection 4: Further, what is born by two nativities is born twice. But
this proposition is false; "Christ was born twice": because the
nativity whereby He was born of the Father suffers no interruption;
since it is eternal. Whereas interruption is required to warrant the
use of the adverb "twice": for a man is said to run twice whose running
is interrupted. Therefore it seems that we should not admit a double
nativity in Christ.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "We confess two
nativities in Christ: one of the Father---eternal; and one which
occurred in these latter times for our sake. "
I answer that, As stated above [4172](A[1]), nature is compared to
nativity, as the terminus to movement or change. Now, movement is
diversified according to the diversity of its termini, as the
Philosopher shows (Phys. v). But, in Christ there is a twofold nature:
one which He received of the Father from eternity, the other which He
received from His Mother in time. Therefore we must needs attribute to
Christ a twofold nativity: one by which He was born of the Father from
all eternity; one by which He was born of His Mother in time.
Reply to Objection 1: This was the argument of a certain heretic,
Felician, and is solved thus by Augustine (Contra Felic. xii). "Let us
suppose," says he, "as many maintain, that in the world there is a
universal soul, which, by its ineffable movement, so gives life to all
seed, that it is not compounded with things begotten, but bestows life
that they may be begotten. Without doubt, when this soul reaches the
womb, being intent on fashioning the passible matter to its own
purpose, it unites itself to the personality thereof, though manifestly
it is not of the same substance; and thus of the active soul and
passive matter, one man is made out of two substances. And so we
confess that the soul is born from out the womb; but not as though,
before birth, it was nothing at all in itself. Thus, then, but in a way
much more sublime, the Son of God was born as man, just as the soul is
held to be born together with the body: not as though they both made
one substance, but that from both, one person results. Yet we do not
say that the Son of God began thus to exist: lest it be thought that
His Divinity is temporal. Nor do we acknowledge the flesh of the Son of
God to have been from eternity: lest it be thought that He took, not a
true human body, but some resemblance thereof. "
Reply to Objection 2: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is thus
solved by Cyril in an epistle [*Cf. Acta Concil. Ephes. , p. 1, cap.
viii]: "We do not say that the Son of God had need, for His own sake,
of a second nativity, after that which is from the Father: for it is
foolish and a mark of ignorance to say that He who is from all
eternity, and co-eternal with the Father, needs to begin again to
exist. But because for us and for our salvation, uniting the human
nature to His Person, He became the child of a woman, for this reason
do we say that He was born in the flesh. "
Reply to Objection 3: Nativity regards the person as its subject, the
nature as its terminus. Now, it is possible for several transformations
to be in the same subject: yet must they be diversified in respect of
their termini. But we do not say this as though the eternal nativity
were a transformation or a movement, but because it is designated by
way of a transformation or movement.
Reply to Objection 4: Christ can be said to have been born twice in
respect of His two nativities. For just as he is said to run twice who
runs at two different times, so can He be said to be born twice who is
born once from eternity and once in time: because eternity and time
differ much more than two different times, although each signifies a
measure of duration.
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Whether the Blessed Virgin can be called Christ's Mother in respect of His
temporal nativity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called
Christ's Mother in respect of His temporal nativity. For, as stated
above ([4173]Q[32], A[4]), the Blessed Virgin Mary did not cooperate
actively in begetting Christ, but merely supplied the matter.
