No More Learning

or Jan. 665. M,
q,^
518 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book it
and the Alps was, in consequence of a law brought in by the consul Strabo in 665, organized after the Italian urban constitution, so that the communities not adapted for this, more especially the townships in the Alpine valleys, were assigned to particular towns as dependent and tributary villages. These new town-communities, however, were not presented with the Roman franchise, but, by means of the legal fiction that they were Latin colonies, were invested with those rights which had hitherto belonged to the Latin towns of inferior legal position. Thus Italy at that time
ended practically at the Po, while the Transpadane country was treated as an outlying dependency. Here to the north of the Po, with the exception of Cremona, Eporedia and Aquileia, there were no burgess or Latin colonies, and even the native tribes here had been by no means dislodged as they were to the south of the Po. The abolition of the Celtic cantonal, and the introduction of the Italian urban, constitution paved the way for the Romanizing of the rich and important territory ; this was the first step in the long and momentous trans formation of the Gallic stock — which once stood contrasted with Italy, and the assaults of which Italy had rallied to repel — into comrades of their Italian masters.
Considerable as these concessions were, if we compare them with the rigid exclusiveness which the Roman burgess- body had retained for more than a hundred and fifty years, they were far from involving a capitulation with the actual insurgents ; they were on the contrary intended partly to retain the communities that were wavering and threatening to revolt, partly to draw over as many deserters as possible from the ranks of the enemy. To what extent these laws and especially the most important of them—that of Caesar —were applied, cannot be accurately stated, as we are only able to specify in general terms the extent of the insurrec tion at the time when the law was issued. The main matter
chap, vil AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
519
at any rate was that the communities hitherto Latin—not only the survivors of the old Latin confederacy, such as Tibur and Praeneste, but more especially the Latin colonies, with the exception of the few that passed over to the insurgents —were thereby admitted to Roman citizenship. Besides, the law was applied to the allied cities that remained faithful in Etruria and especially in Southern Italy, such as Nuceria and Neapolis. It was natural that individual communities, hitherto specially privileged, should hesitate as to the acceptance of the franchise; that Neapolis, for example, should scruple to give up its former treaty with Rome— which guaranteed to its citizens exemption from land-service and their Greek constitution, and perhaps domanial advantages besides—for the restricted rights of new bur
It was probably in virtue of conventions concluded on account of these scruples that this city, as well as Rhegium and perhaps other Greek communities in Italy, even after their admission to Roman citizenship retained unchanged their former communal constitution and Greek as their official language. At all events, as a consequence of these laws, the circle of Roman burgesses was extraordinarily enlarged by the merging into it of numerous and important urban communities scattered from the Sicilian Straits to the Po ; and, further, the country between the Po and the Alps was, by the bestowal of the best rights of allies, as it were invested with the legal expectancy of full citizenship.
On the strength of these concessions to the wavering second communities, the Romans resumed with fresh courage the year of the conflict against the insurgent districts. They had pulled
down as much of the existing political institutions as seemed
necessary to arrest the extension of the conflagration ; the insurrection thenceforth at least spread no farther. In
Etruria and Umbria especially, where it was just beginning, Etruria and it was subdued with singular rapidity, still more, probably, J^J^. by means of the Julian law than through the success of the Used.
gesses.
Picenum
89.
5*5 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book iv
Roman arms. In the former Latin colonies, and in the thickly-peopled region of the Po, there were opened up copious and now trustworthy sources of aid : with these, and with the resources of the burgesses themselves, they could proceed to subdue the now isolated conflagration. The two former commanders-in-chief returned to Rome, Caesar as censor elect, Marius because his conduct of the war was blamed as vacillating and slow, and the man of sixty-six was declared to be in his dotage. This objection was very probably groundless; Marius showed at least his bodily vigour by appearing daily in the circus at Rome, and even as commander-in-chief he seems to have displayed on the whole his old ability in the last campaign ; but he had not achieved the brilliant successes by which alone after his political bankruptcy he could have rehabilitated himself in public opinion, and so the celebrated champion was to his bitter vexation now, even as an officer, unceremoniously laid aside as useless. The place of Marius in the Marsian army was taken by the consul of this year, Lucius Porcius Cato, who had fought with distinction in Etruria, and that of Caesar in the Campanian army by his lieutenant, Lucius Sulla, to whom were due some of the most material successes of the previous campaign ; Gnaeus Strabo retained—now as consul — the command which he had held so successfully in the Picenian territory.
Thus began the second campaign in 665. The insur- gents opened even before winter was over, the bold attempt —recalling the grand passages of the Samnite wars — to send Marsian army of 15,000 men to Etruria with view to aid the insurrection brewing in Northern Italy. But Strabo, through whose district had to pass, intercepted and totally defeated only few got back to their far distant home. When at length the season allowed the Roman armies to assume the offensive, Cato entered the Marsian territory and advanced, successfully encountering
it ;
a
it
a
it,
a
by
chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
521
the enemy there ; but he fell in the region of the Fucine
lake during an attack on the enemy's camp, so that the exclusive superintendence of the operations in Central Italy devolved on Strabo. The latter employed himself partly
in continuing the siege of Asculum, partly in the subjugation
of the Marsian, Sabellian, and Apulian districts. To relieve
his hard-pressed native town, Iudacilius appeared before Asculum with the Picentine levy and attacked the besieg
ing army, while at the same time the garrison sallied forth
and threw itself on the Roman lines. It is said that 75,000 Romans fought on this day against 60,000 Italians. Victory remained with the Romans, but Iudacilius succeeded in throwing himself with a part of the relieving army into the
town. The siege resumed its course ; it was protracted x by
the strength of the place and the desperate defence of the inhabitants, who fought with a recollection of the terrible declaration of war within its walls. When Iudacilius at
length after a brave defence of several months saw the day
of capitulation approach, he ordered the chiefs of that section
of the citizens which was favourable to Rome to be put to
death under torture, and then died by his own hand. So and
the gates were opened, and Roman executions were sub- conquer stituted for Italian ; all officers and all the respectable
citizens were executed, the rest were driven forth to beggary,
and all their property was confiscated on account of the
state. During the siege and after the fall of Asculum
numerous Roman corps marched through the adjacent rebel
districts, and induced one after another to submit. The Subjugm. Marrucini yielded, after Servius Sulpicius had defeated them gabeiiiani
decidedly at Teate (Chieti). The praetor Gaius Cosconius
and penetrated into Apulia, took Salapia and Cannae, and
1 Leaden bullets with the name of the legion which threw them, and sometimes with curses against the "runaway slaves" —and accordingly Roman —or with the inscription ' ' hit the Picentes " or " hit Pompeius "— the former Roman, the latter Italian—are even now sometimes found, belonging to that period, in the region of Ascoli.
Asculum esieg '
>
88.
Subjuga tion of Campania as far as Nola.
Saa THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book iv
besieged Canusium. A Samnite corps under Marius Eg- natius came to the help of the unwarlike region and actually drove back the Romans, but the Roman general succeeded in defeating it at the passage of the Aufidus ; Egnatius fell, and the rest of the army had to seek shelter behind the walls of Canusium. The Romans again advanced as far as Venusia and Rubi, and became masters of all Apulia. Along the Fucine lake also and at the Majella mountains — the chief seats of the insurrection — the Romans re-established their mastery ; the Marsians succumbed to Strabo's lieu tenants, Quintus Metellus Pius and Gaius Cinna, the Vestinians and Paelignians in the following year (666) to Strabo himself; Italia the capital of the insurgents became once more the modest Paelignian country-town of Corfinium ; the remnant of the Italian senate fled to the Samnite territory.
The Roman southern army, which was now under the command of Lucius Sulla, had at the same time assumed the offensive and had penetrated into southern Campania which was occupied by the enemy. Stabiae was taken and
89. destroyed by Sulla in person (30 April 665) and Hercu- laneum by Titus- Didius, who however fell himself (1 1 June) apparently at the assault on that city. Pompeii resisted longer. The Samnite general Lucius Cluentius came up to bring relief to the town, but he was repulsed by Sulla ; and when, reinforced by bands of Celts, he renewed his attempt, he was, chiefly owing to the wavering of these untrustworthy
associates, so totally defeated that his camp was taken and he himself was cut down with the greater part of his troops on their flight towards Nola. The grateful Roman army conferred on its general the grass-wreath—the homely badge with which the usage of the camp decorated the soldier who had by his capacity saved a division of his comrades. With out pausing to undertake the siege of Nola and of the other Campanian towns still occupied by the Samnites, Sulla at
chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
513
once advanced into the interior, which was the head-quarters Sulla In of the insurrection. The speedy capture and fearful
of Aeclanum spread terror throughout the Hirpinian country ; it submitted even before the arrival of the Lucanian contingent which had set itself in motion to render help, and Sulla was able to advance unhindered as far as the territory of the Samnite confederacy. The pass, where the Samnite militia under Mutilus awaited him, was turned, the Samnite army was attacked in rear, and defeated ; the camp was lost, the general escaped wounded to Aesernia. Sulla advanced to Bovianum, the capital of the Samnite country, and compelled it to surrender by a second victory achieved beneath its walls. The advanced season alone put an end to the campaign there.
The position of affairs had undergone a most complete change. Powerful, victorious, aggressive as was the insur- rection when it began the campaign of 665, it emerged from it deeply humbled, everywhere beaten, and utterly hopeless. All northern Italy was pacified. In central Italy both coasts were wholly in the Roman power, and the Abruzzi almost entirely ; Apulia as far as Venusia, and Campania as far as Nola, were in the hands of the Romans ; and by the occupation of the Hirpinian territory the com munication was broken off between the only two regions still persevering in open resistance, the Samnite and the Lucano-Bruttian. The field of the insurrection resembled the scene of an immense conflagration dying out ; every where the eye fell on ashes and ruins and smouldering brands; here and there the flame still blazed up among the ruins, but the fire was everywhere mastered, and there was no further threatening of danger. It is to be regretted that we no longer sufficiently discern in the superficial accounts handed down to us the causes of this sudden revolution. While undoubtedly the dexterous leadership of Strabo and still more of Sulla, and especially the more
punishment
The insur-
? J Powered-
rgn whole over-
Persever-
524 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book r»
energetic concentration of the Roman forces, and their more rapid offensive contributed materially to that result,
causes may have been at work along with the military in producing the singularly rapid fall of the power of the insurgents ; the law of Silvanus and Carbo may have fulfilled its design in carrying defection and treason to the common cause into the ranks of the enemy ; and mis fortune, as has so frequently happened, may have fallen as an apple of discord among the loosely-connected insurgent communities.
political
We see only —and this fact points to an internal breaking •nee of the Up 0f Italia, that must certainly have been attended by violent convulsions —that the Samnites, perhaps under the
leadership of the Marsian Quintus Silo who had been from the first the soul of the insurrection and after the capitula tion of the Marsians had gone as a fugitive to the neigh bouring people, now assumed another organization purely confined to their own land, and, after "Italia" was vanquished, undertook to continue the struggle as " Safini " or Samnites. 1 The strong Aesernia was converted from the fortress that had curbed, into the last retreat that sheltered, Samnite freedom ; an army assembled consisting, it was said, of 30,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, and was strengthened by the manumission and incorporation of 20,000 slaves ; five generals were placed at its head, among whom Silo was the first and Mutilus next to him. With astonishment men saw the Samnite wars beginning anew after a pause of two hundred years, and the resolute nation of farmers making a fresh attempt, just as in the fifth century, after the Italian confederation was shattered, to force Rome with their own hand to recognize their country's independence. But this resolution of the bravest despair
1 The rare denarii with Safinim and G. Mutt! in Oscan characters must belong to this period ; for, as long as the designation Italia was retained by the insurgents, no single canton could, as a sovereign power, coin money with its own name.
cha? . vil AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
525
made not much change in the main result ; although the mountain-war in Samnium and Lucania might still require some time and some sacrifices, the insurrection was never theless already substantially at an end.
In the meanwhile, certainly, there had occurred a fresh Outbreak complication, for the Asiatic difficulties had rendered it im- ^^^ peratively necessary to declare war against Mithradates king war.
of Pontus, and for next year (666) to destine the one consul 88.
and a consular army to Asia Minor. Had this war broken out a year earlier, the contemporary revolt of the half of
Italy and of the most important of the provinces would have formed an immense peril to the Roman state. Now that the marvellous good fortune of Rome had once more been evinced in the rapid collapse of the Italian insurrec tion, this Asiatic war just beginning was, notwithstanding its being mixed up with the expiring Italian struggle, not of a really dangerous character; and the less so, because Mithradates in his arrogance refused the invitation of the Italians that he should afford them direct assistance. Still it was in a high degree inconvenient. The times had gone by, when they without hesitation carried on simultaneously an Italian and a transmarine war, the state-chest was already after two years of warfare utterly exhausted, and the formation of a new army in addition to that already in the field seemed scarcely practicable. But they resorted to such expedients as they could. The sale of the sites that had from ancient times 137) remained unoccupied on and near the citadel to persons desirous of building, which yielded 9000 pounds of gold (,£360,000), furnished the requisite pecuniary means. No new army was formed, but that which was under Sulla in Campania was destined to embark for Asia, as soon as the state of things in southern Italy should allow its departure which might be expected, from the progress of the army operating in the north under Strabo, to happen soon.
;
(i.
88. TUrd
526 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book tv
So the third campaign in 666 began amidst favourable
prospects for Rome. Strabo put down the last resistance rrr
which was still offered in the Abruzzi. In Apulia the successor of Cosconius, Quintus Metellus Pius, son of the conqueror of Numidia and not unlike his father in his strongly conservative views as well as in military endow ments, put an end to the resistance by the capture of Venusia, at which 3000 armed men were taken prisoners. In Samnium Silo no doubt succeeded in retaking Bovianum ; but in a battle, in which he engaged the Roman general Mamercus Aemilius, the Romans conquered, and—what was more important than the victory itself —Silo was among the 6000 dead whom the Samnites left on the field. In Campania the smaller townships, which the Samnites still occupied, were wrested from them by Sulla, and Nola was invested. The Roman general Aulus Gabinius penetrated also into Lucania and gained no small advantages ; but, after he had fallen in an attack on the enemy's camp,
, campaign.
Capture of
Fan of Silo.
Ferment in Rome.
the insurgent leader and his followers once more held almost undisturbed command over the wide and desolate Lucano-Bruttian country. He even made an attempt to seize Rhegium, which was frustrated, however, by the Sicilian governor Gaius Norbanus. Notwithstanding isolated mischances the Romans were constantly drawing nearer to the attainment of their end ; the fall of Nola, the submission of Samnium, the possibility of rendering con siderable forces available for Asia appeared no
distant, when the turn taken by affairs in the capital un expectedly gave fresh life to the well-nigh extinguished insurrection.
Rome was in a fearful ferment. The attack of Drusus upon the equestrian courts and his sudden downfall brought about by the equestrian party, followed by the two-edged Varian warfare of prosecutions, had sown the bitterest discord between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie as weL'
Lamponius
longer
chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
527
as between the moderates and the ultras. Events had com
the party of concession; what it had proposed voluntarily to bestow, men had been more than half compelled to concede; but the mode in which the
pletely justified
concession was made bore, just like the earlier refusal, the stamp of obstinate and shortsighted envy. Instead of granting equality of rights to all Italian communities, they had only expressed the inferiority in another form. They had received a great number of Italian communities into Roman citizenship, but had attached to what they thus conferred an offensive stigma, by placing the new burgesses alongside of the old on nearly the same footing as the freedmen occupied alongside of the freeborn. They had irritated rather than pacified the communities between the Po and the Alps by the concession of Latin rights. Lastly, they had withheld the franchise from a considerable, and that not the worst, portion of the Italians —the whole of the insurgent communities which had again submitted; and not only so, but, instead of legally re-establishing the former treaties annulled by the insurrection, they had at most renewed them as a matter of favour and subject to revo cation at pleasure. 1 The disability as regarded the right of
The
of ^ franchise
limitation*,
1 Licinianus (p. 15) under the year 667 says : dediticiis omnibus
87.
[«]v*7a[j] data ; qui polliciti mult[a\ milia militum vix XV
. . . cohortes miserunt; a statement in which Livy's account (Epit. 80) : Italicis populis a senatu civitas data est reappears in a somewhat more precise shape. The dediticii were according to Roman state-law those peregrini liberi (Gaius i. 13-15, 35, Ulp. xx. 14, xxii. 3) who had become subject to the Romans and had not been admitted to alliance. They not
merely retain life, liberty, and property, but may be formed into com munities with a constitution of their own. 'Air6\iocs, nullius ceriat civitatis cives (Ulp. xx. 14 ; comp. Dig. xlviii. 19, 17, 1), were only the freedmen placed by legal fiction on the same footing with the dediticii (ii qui dediticiorum numcro sunt, only by erroneous usage and rarely by the better authors called directly dediticii; Gai. i. 12, Ulp. i. 14, Paul. iv. 12, 6) as well as the kindred libtrti Latini luniani. But the dediticii nevertheless were destitute of rights as respected the Roman state, in so far as by Roman state-law every deditio was necessarily unconditional (Polyb. xxi. 1 ; comp. xx. 9, 10, xxxvi. 3) and all the privileges expressly or tacitly conceded to them were conceded only precario and therefore revocable at pleasure (Appian, Hisp. 44) ; so that the Roman state, what-
Secondary
Doiitical prosecu-
528 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book it
Toting gave the deeper offence, that it was — as the comitia were then constituted —politically absurd, and the hypo critical care of the government for the unstained purity of the electors appeared to every unprejudiced person ridicu lous ; but all these restrictions were dangerous, inasmuch as they invited every demagogue to carry his ulterior objects by taking up the more or less just demands of the new burgesses and of the Italians excluded from the franchise. While accordingly the more clear-seeing of the aristocracy cou'd not but find these partial and grudging concessions as inadequate as did the new burgesses and the excluded themselves, they further painfully felt the absence from their ranks of the numerous and excellent men whom the Varian commission of high treason had exiled, and whom it was the more difficult to recall because they had been condemned by the verdict not of the people but of the jury- courts ; for, while there was little hesitation as to cancelling a decree of the people even of a judicial character by means of a second, the cancelling of a verdict of jurymen by the people appeared to the better portion of the
ever it might immediately or afterwards decree regarding its dediticii, could never perpetrate as respected them a violation of rights. This destitution of rights only ceased on the conclusion of a treaty of alliance (Liv. xxxiv. 57). Accordingly dcditio and foedus appear in constitutional law as contrasted terms excluding each other (Liv. iv. 30, xxviii. 34 ; Cod. Theod. vii. 13, 16 and Gothofr. thereon), and of precisely the same nature is the distinction current among the jurists between the quasi- dedilicii and the quasi latini, for the Latins are just thefotderati In an eminent sense (Cic. pro Balb. 24, 54).
According to the older constitutional law there were, with the exception of the not numerous communities that were declared to have forfeited their treaties in consequence of the Hannibalic war (p. 24), no Italian dediticii: in
90-89. the Plautian law of 664-5 the description : qui foederatis civitatibus ad- scripti fuerunt (Cic. pro Arch. 4, 7) still included in substance all Italians.
87. But as the dediticii who received the franchise supplementary in 667 cannot reasonably be understood as embracing merely the Bruttii and Picentes, we may assume that all the insurgents, so far as they had laid down their arms and had not acquired the franchise under the Plautio- Papirian law, were treated as dediticii, or — which is the same thing —that their treaties cancelled as a matter of course by the insurrection (hence qui fotderati fuerunt in the passage of Cicero cited) were not legally renewed to them on their surrender.
chap, vn AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
529
aristocracy as a very dangerous precedent. Thus neither
the ultras nor the moderates were content with the issue of
the Italian crisis. But still deeper indignation swelled the Mariui. heart of the old man, who had gone forth to the Italian
war with freshened hopes and had come back from it reluctantly, with the consciousness of having rendered new services and of having received in return new and most
severe mortifications, with the bitter feeling of being no
longer dreaded but despised by his enemies, with that gnawing spirit of vengeance in his heart, which feeds on its
own poison. It was true of him also, as of the new burgesses and the excluded ; incapable and awkward as he
had shown himself to be, his popular name was still a formidable weapon in the hand of a demagogue.
With these elements of political convulsion was com-
bined the rapidly spreading decay of decorous soldierly ^T^? habits and of military discipline. The seeds, which were
sown by the enrolment of the proletariate in the army, developed themselves with alarming rapidity during the demoralizing insurrectionary war, which compelled Rome
to admit to the service every man capable of bearing arms without distinction, and which above all carried political partisanship directly into the headquarters and into the soldiers' tent. The effects soon appeared in the slackening
of all the bonds of the military hierarchy. During the
siege of Pompeii the commander of the Sullan besieging
corps the consular Aulus Postumius Albinus, was put to
death with stones and bludgeons by his soldiers, who believed themselves betrayed by their general to the enemy ; and Sulla the commander-in-chief contented him
self with exhorting the troops to efface the memory of that occurrence by their brave conduct in presence of the
enemy. The authors of that deed were the marines, from
of old the least respectable of the troops. A division of legionaries raised chiefly from the city populace soon
VOL. Ill
99
Decay of
Economic crisis.
530 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book iv
followed the example thus given. Instigated by Gaius Titius, one of the heroes of the market-place, it laid hands on the consul Cato. By an accident he escaped death on this occasion ; Titius was arrested, but was not punished. When Cato soon afterwards actually perished in a combat, his own officers, and particularly the younger Gaius Marius, were —whether justly or unjustly, cannot be ascertained — designated as the authors of his death.
To the political and military crisis thus beginning fell to be added the economic crisis—perhaps still more terrible —which set in upon the Roman capitalists in consequence of the Social war and the Asiatic troubles. The debtors, unable even to raise the interest due and yet inexorably pressed by their creditors, had on the one hand entreated from the proper judicial authority, the urban praetor Asellio, a respite to enable them to dispose of their possessions, and on the other hand had searched out once more the old obsolete laws as to usury 389) and, according to the rule established in olden times, had sued their creditors for fourfold the amount of the interest paid to them contrary to the law. Asellio lent himself to bend the actually existing law into conformity with the letter, and put into shape in the usual way the desired actions for interest whereupon the offended creditors assembled in the Forum under the leadership of the tribune of the people Lucius
Murder of Cassius, and attacked and killed the praetor in front of the
Asellio.
temple of Concord, just as in his priestly robes he was
presenting sacrifice — an outrage which was not even 89 made subject of investigation (665). On the other hand was said in the circles of the debtors, that the suffering multitude could not be relieved otherwise than by "new
account-books," that by legally cancelling the claims
all creditors against all debtors. Matters stood again exactly as they had stood during the strife of the orders once more the capitalists in league with the prejudiced
is,
it
a
a
;of ;
(i.
chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
531
aristocracy made war against, and prosecuted, the oppressed multitude and the middle party which advised a modifica tion of the rigour of the law ; once more Rome stood on the verge of that abyss into which the despairing debtor drags his creditor along with him. Only, since that time the simple civil and moral organization of a great agricultural city had been succeeded by the social antagonisms of a
of many nations, and by that demoralization in which the prince and the beggar meet; now all incon gruities had come to be on a broader, more abrupt, and fearfully grander scale. When the Social war brought all the political and social elements fermenting among the citizens into lollision with each other, it laid the foundation for a new resolution. An accident led to its outbreak.
It was the tribune of the people Publius Sulpicius Rufus The
who in 666 proposed to the burgesses to declare that every
senator, who owed more than 2000 denarii (^82), should
forfeit his seat in the senate ; to grant to the burgesses condemned by non-free jury courts liberty to return home ;
to distribute the new burgesses among all the tribes, and
likewise to allow the right of voting in all tribes to the freedmen. They were proposals which from the mouth of
such a man were at least somewhat surprising. Publius Sulptcius Sulpicius Rufus (born in 630) owed his political importance fnl0*" not so much to his noble birth, his important connections,
and his hereditary wealth, as to his remarkable oratorical talent, in which none of his contemporaries equalled him. His powerful voice, his lively gestures sometimes bordering
on theatrical display, the luxuriant copiousness of his flow
of words arrested, even if they did not convince, his hearers.
As a partisan he was from the outset on the side of the senate, and his first public appearance (659) had been the K. impeachment of Norbanus who was mortally hated by the government party (p. 478). Among the conservatives he belonged to the section of Crassus and Drusus. We do
capital
SulP1C1^"
53a THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book rt
not know what primarily gave occasion to his soliciting the 88. tribuneship of the people for 666, and on its account
renouncing his patrician nobility; but he seems to have been by no means rendered a revolutionist through the fact that he, like the whole middle party, had been persecuted as revolutionary by the conservatives, and to have by no means intended an overthrow of the constitution in the sense of Gaius Gracchus. It would rather seem that, as the only man of note belonging to the party of Crassus and Drusus who had come forth uninjured from the storm of the Varian prosecutions, he felt himself called on to complete the work . of Drusus and finally to set aside the still subsisting disabilities of the new burgesses— for which purpose he needed the tribunate. Several acts of his even during his tribuneship are mentioned, which betray the very opposite of demagogic designs. For instance, he prevented by his veto one of his colleagues from cancelling through a decree of the people the sentences of jurymen issued under the Varian law; and when the late aedile Gaius Caesar, passing over the praetorship, unconstitutionally
87. became a candidate for the consulship for 667, with the design, it was alleged, of getting the charge of the Asiatic war afterwards entrusted to him, Sulpicius opposed him more resolutely and sharply than any one else. Entirely in the spirit of Drusus, he thus demanded from himself as from others primarily and especially the maintenance of the constitution. But in fact he was as little able as was Drusus to reconcile things that were incompatible, and to carry out in strict form of law the change of the constitution which he had in view—a change judicious in itself, but never to be obtained from the great majority of the old burgesses by amicable means.
His breach with the powerful family of the Julii — among whom in particular the consular Lucius Caesar, the brother of Gaius, was very influential in the senate —and with the section of the
chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
533
aristocracy adhering to beyond doubt materially co operated and carried the irascible man through personal exasperation beyond his original design.
Yet the proposals brought in by him were of such
nature as to be by no means out of keeping with the ofthes# personal character and the previous party-position of their
author. The equalization of the new burgesses with the
old was simply partial resumption of the proposals drawn
up by Drusus in favour of the Italians and, like these, only
carried out the requirements of sound policy. The recall
of those condemned the Varian jurymen no doubt sacrificed the principle of the inviolability of such
sentence, in defence of which Sulpicius himself had just practically interposed but mainly benefited in the first instance the members of the proposer's own party, the moderate conservatives, and may be very well conceived
that so impetuous man might when first coming forward decidedly combat such measure and then, indignant at
the resistance which he encountered, propose himself.
The measure against the insolvency of senators was doubt
less called forth by the exposure of the economic condition
of the ruling families — so deeply embarrassed notwith
standing all their outward splendour —on occasion of the last financial crisis. was painful doubtless, but yet of itself conducive to the rightly understood interest of the aristocracy, as could not but be the effect of the Sulpician proposal, all individuals should withdraw from the senate who were unable speedily to meet their liabilities, and the coterie-system, which found its main support in the insolvency of many senators and their consequent dependence on their wealthy colleagues, should be checked by the removal of the notoriously venal pack of the senators. At the same time, of course, we do not mean to deny that such purification of the senate-house so abruptly and invidiously exposing the senate, as Rufus proposed, would
Tendency
a
if
if,
It
a
;
it
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534 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book n
certainly never have been proposed without his personal quarrels with the ruling coterie-heads. Lastly, the regula tion in favour of the freedmen had undoubtedly for its primary object to make its proposer master of the street ; but in itself it was neither unwarranted nor incompatible with the aristocratic constitution. Since the freedmen had begun to be drawn upon for military service, their demand for the right of voting was so far justified, as the right of voting and the obligation of service had always gone hand in hand. Moreover, looking to the nullity of the comitia, it was politically of very little moment whether one sewer more emptied itself into that slough. The difficulty which the oligarchy felt in governing with the comitia was lessened rather than increased by the unlimited admission of the freedmen, who were to a very great extent personally and financially dependent on the ruling families and, if rightly used, might quite furnish the government with a means of controlling the elections more thoroughly than before. This measure certainly, like every other political favour
shown to the proletariate, ran counter to the tendencies of the aristocracy friendly to reform ; but it was for Rufus hardly anything else than what the corn-law had been for Drusus—a means of drawing the proletariate over to his side and of breaking down with its aid the opposition against the truly beneficial reforms which he meditated. It was easy to foresee that this opposition would not be slight ; that the narrow-minded aristocracy and the narrow- minded bourgeoisie would display the same stupid jealousy after the subduing of the insurrection as they had displayed before its outbreak; that the great majority of all parties would secretly or even openly characterize the partial con cessions made at the moment of the most formidable danger as unseasonable compliances, and would passion ately resist every attempt to extend them. The example of
Drusus had shown what came of undertaking to carry
chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
535
conservative reforms solely in reliance on the majority of the senate ; it was a course quite intelligible, that his friend who shared his views should attempt to carry out kindred designs in opposition to that majority and under the forms of demagogism. Rufus accordingly gave himself no trouble to gain the senate over to his views by the bait of the jury courts. He found a better support in the freedmen and above all in the armed retinue—consisting, according to the report of his opponents, of 3000 hired men and an "opposition -senate" of 600 young men from the better class—with which he appeared in the streets and in the Forum.
His proposals accordingly met with the most decided Resbtanc* resistance from the majority of the senate, which first, to „„„. gain time, induced the consuls Lucius Cornelius Sulla and meat.
Pompeius Rufus, both declared opponents of demagogism, to enjoin extraordinary religious observances,
during which the popular assemblies were suspended.
Sulpicius replied by a violent tumult, in which among
other victims the young Quintus Pompeius, son of the one
and son-in-law of the other consul, met his death and the
lives of both consuls themselves were seriously threatened
—Sulla is said even to have escaped only by Marius
opening to him his house. They were obliged to yield;
Sulla agreed to countermand the announced solemnities,
and the Sulpician proposals now passed without further
difficulty. But this was far from determining their fate.
Though the aristocracy in the capital might own its defeat,
there was now —for the first time since the commencement
of the revolution —yet another power in Italy which could
not be overlooked, viz. the two strong and victorious armies
of the proconsul Strabo and the consul Sulla. The Position of political position of Strabo might be ambiguous, but Sulla,
although he had given way to open violence for the
moment, was on the best terms with the majority of the
Quintus
Riot*.
A
Marias nominated com mander-in- chief in Sulla's stead.
536 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book it
senate; and not only so, but he had, immediately after countermanding the solemnities, departed for Campania to join his army. To terrify the unarmed consul by bludgeon- men or the defenceless capital by the swords of the legions, amounted to the same thing in the end : Sulpicius assumed that his opponent, now when he could, would requite violence with violence and return to the capital at the head of his legions to overthrow the conservative demagogue and his laws along with him. Perhaps he was mistaken. Sulla was just as eager for the war against Mithradates as he was probably averse to the political exhalations of the capital ; considering his original spirit of indifference and his unrivalled political nonchalance, there is great proba bility that he by no means intended the coup d'etat which Sulpicius expected, and that, if he had been let alone, he would have embarked without delay with his troops for Asia so soon as he had captured Nola, with the siege of which he was still occupied.
But, be this as it might, Sulpicius, with a view to parry the presumed blow, conceived the scheme of taking the supreme command from Sulla ; and for this purpose joined with Marius, whose name was still sufficiently popular to make a proposal to transfer to him the chief command in the Asiatic war appear plausible to the multitude, and whose military position and ability might prove a support in the event of a rupture with Sulla. Sulpicius probably did not overlook the danger involved in placing that old man—not less incapable than vengeful and ambitious —at the head of the Campanian army, and as little the scandalous irregularity of entrusting an extraordinary supreme command by decree of the people to a private man ; but the very tried incapacity of Marius as a statesman gave a sort of guarantee that he would not be able seriously to endanger the constitution, and above all the personal position of Sulpicius, if he formed a correct estimate of Sulla's designs,
chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
537
was one of so imminent peril that such considerations could hardly be longer heeded. That the worn-out hero himself readily met the wishes of any one who would employ him as a condottiere, was a matter of course ; his heart had now for many years longed for the command in an Asiatic war, and not less perhaps for an opportunity of once settling accounts thoroughly with the majority of the senate. Accordingly on the proposal of Sulpicius Gaius Marius was by decree of the people invested with extra ordinary supreme, or as it was called proconsular, power, and obtained the command of the Campanian army and the superintendence of the war against Mithradates ; and two tribunes of the people were despatched to the camp at Nola, to take over the army from Sulla.
Sulla was not the man to yield to such a summons. If Sulla's any one had a vocation to the chief command in the Asiatic recaU- war, it was Sulla. He had a few years before commanded
with the greatest success in the same theatre of war; he
had contributed more than any other man to the subjuga
tion of the dangerous Italian insurrection ; as consul of the
year in which the Asiatic war broke out, he had been invested with the command in it after the customary way
and with the full consent of his colleague, who was on friendly terms with him and related to him by marriage.
It was expecting a great deal to suppose that he would, in accordance with a decree of the sovereign burgesses of Rome, give up a command undertaken in such circum
stances to an old military and political antagonist, in whose hands the army might be turned to none could tell what violent and preposterous proceedings. Sulla was neither good-natured enough to comply voluntarily with such an
order, nor dependent enough to need to do so. His army was—partly in consequence of the alterations of the military
system which originated with Marius, partly from the
moral laxity and the military strictness of its discipline in
Sulla's march OQ Rom*.
538 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book it
the hands of Sulla —little more than a body of mercenaries absolutely devoted to their leader and indifferent to political affairs. Sulla himself was a hardened, cool, and clear headed man, in whose eyes the sovereign Roman burgesses were a rabble, the hero of Aquae Sextiae a bankrupt swindler, formal legality a phrase, Rome itself a city with out a garrison and with its walls half in ruins, which could be far more easily captured than Nola.
On these views he acted. He assembled his soldiers — there were six legions, or about 35,000 men — and explained to them the summons that had arrived from Rome, not forgetting to hint that the new commander-in-chief would un doubtedly lead to Asia Minor not the army as it stood, but another formed of fresh troops. The superior officers, who still had more of the citizen than the soldier, kept aloof, and only one of them followed the general towards the capital ; but the soldiers, who in accordance with earlier experiences 42) hoped to find in Asia an easy war and
endless booty, were furious in moment the two tribunes that had come from Rome were torn in pieces, and from all sides the cry arose that the general should lead them to Rome. Without delay the consul started, and forming junction with his like-minded colleague by the way, he arrived by quick marches — little troubling himself about the deputies who hastened from Rome to meet and attempted to detain him —beneath the walls of the capital. Suddenly the Romans beheld columns of Sulla's army take their station at the bridge over the Tiber and at the Colline and Esquiline gates and then two legions in battle array, with their standards at their head, passed the sacred ring-wall within which the law had forbidden war to enter. Many worse quarrel, many an important feud had been brought to settlement within those walls, without any need
for Roman army breaking the sacred peace of the city that step was now taken, primarily for the sake of the
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chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
539
miserable question whether this or that officer was called to command in the east
The entering legions advanced as far as the height of Rome
the Esquiline ; when the missiles and stones descending in showers from the roofs made the soldiers waver and they began to give way, Sulla himself brandished a blazing torch, and with firebrands and threats of setting the houses on fire the legions cleared their way to the Esquiline market-place (not far from S. Maria Maggiore). There the force hastily collected by Marius and Sulpicius awaited them, and by its superior numbers repelled the first invading columns. But reinforcements came up from the gates ; another division of the Sullans made preparations for turning the defenders by the street of the Subura; the latter were obliged to retire. At the temple of Tellus, where the Esquiline begins to slope towards the great Forum, Marius attempted once more to make a stand ; he adjured the senate and equites and all the citizens to throw themselves across the path of the legions. But he himself had transformed them from citizens to mercenaries; his own work turned against him : they obeyed not the government, but their general. Even when the slaves were summoned to arm under the promise of freedom, not more than three of them appeared. Nothing remained for the leaders but to escape in all haste through the still unoccupied gates ; after a few hours Sulla was absolute master of Rome. That night the watchfires of the legions blazed in the great market-place of the capital.
occup
The first military intervention in civil feuds had made First
it quite evident, not only that the political struggles had r<^torat;OB reached the point at which nothing save open and direct
force proves decisive, but also that the power of the
bludgeon was of no avail against the power of the sword.
It was the conservative party which first drew the sword,
and which accordingly in due time experienced the truth of
540 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS boo* tv
the ominous words of the Gospel as to those who first have recourse to it. For the present it triumphed completely and might put the victory into formal shape at its pleasure. As a matter of course, the Sulpician laws were characterized as legally null. Their author and his most notable adher ents had fled; they were, twelve in number, proscribed by the senate for arrest and execution as enemies of their country.
Death of Publius Sulpicius was accordingly seized at Laurentum
Sulpicius.
Flight of Marius.
and put to death ; and the head of the tribune, sent to Sulla, was by his orders exposed in the Forum at the very rostra where he himself had stood but a few days before in the full vigour of youth and eloquence. The rest of the proscribed were pursued ; the assassins were on the track of even the old Gaius Marius. Although the general might have clouded the memory of his glorious days by a succes sion of pitiful proceedings, now that the deliverer of his country was running for his life, he was once more the victor of Vercellae, and with breathless suspense all Italy listened to the incidents of his marvellous flight At Ostia he had gone on board a transport with the view of sailing for Africa ; but adverse winds and want of provisions com pelled him to land at the Circeian promontory and to wander at random. With few attendants and without trusting himself under a roof, the grey-haired consular, often suffering from hunger, found his way on foot to the neigh bourhood of the Roman colony of Minturnae at the mouth of the Garigliano. There the pursuing cavalry were seen in the distance ; with great difficulty he reached the shore, and a trading-vessel lying there withdrew him from his
pursuers ; but the timid mariners soon put him ashore again and made off, while Marius stole along the beach.
His pursuers found him in the salt-marsh of Minturnae sunk to the girdle in the mud and with his head concealed amidst a quantity of reeds, and delivered him to the civic authorities of Minturnae. He was placed in prison, and
chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
541
the town-executioner, a Cimbrian slave, was sent to put him to death ; but the German trembled before the flashing eyes of his old conqueror and the axe fell from his hands, when the general with his powerful voice haughtily demanded whether he dared to kill Gaius Marius. When they learned this, the magistrates of Minturnae were ashamed that the deliverer of Rome should meet with greater reverence from slaves to whom he had brought bondage than from his fellow-citizens to whom he had brought freedom ; they loosed his fetters, gave him a vessel and money for travelling expenses, and sent him to Aenaria (Ischia). The proscribed with the exception of Sulpicius gradually met in those waters; they landed at Eryx and at what was formerly Carthage, but the Roman magistrates both in Sicily and in Africa sent them away. So they escaped to Numidia, whose desert sand-dunes gave them a place of refuge for the winter. But the king Hiempsal II. , whom they hoped to gain and who had seemed for a while willing to unite with them, had only done so to lull them into security, and now attempted to seize their persons. With great difficulty the fugitives escaped from his cavalry, and found a temporary refuge in the little island of Cercina (Kerkena) on the coast of Tunis. We know not whether Sulla thanked his fortunate star that he had been spared the odium of putting to death the victor of the Cimbrians ; at any rate it does not appear that the magistrates of Minturnae were punished.
With a view to remove existing evils and to prevent Legislation future revolutions, Sulla suggested a series of new legislative enactments. For the hard-pressed debtors nothing seems
to have been done, except that the rules as to the maximum
of interest were enforced ; l directions moreover were given
1 It is not clear, what the lex unciaria of the consuls Sulla and Rufui
in the year 666 prescribed in this respect ; but the simplest hypothesis is 88. that which regards it as a renewal of the law of 397 364), so that the 857. highest allowable rate of interest was again ^th of the capital for the year
of ten months or 10 per cent for the year of twelve months.
(i.
1*1.
54a THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book it
for the sending out of a number of colonies. The senate which had been greatly thinned by the battles and prosecu tions of the Social war was filled up by the admission of 300 new senators, who were naturally selected in the interest of the Optimates. Lastly, material changes were adopted in respect to the mode of election and the initiative of legisla tion. The old Servian arrangement for voting in the cen- turiate comitia, under which the first class, with an estate of
100,000 sesterces (^1000) or upwards, alone possessed almost half of the votes, again took the place of the arrange- ments introduced in 513 to mitigate the preponderance of the first class $<>/. ). Practically there was thus introduced for the election of consuls, praetors, and censors, census which really excluded the non-wealthy from exercising the suffrage. The legislative initiative in the case of the tribunes of the people was restricted by the rule, that every proposal had henceforth to be submitted by them in the first instance to the senate and could only come before the people in the event of the senate approving
These enactments which were called forth the Sulpician attempt at revolution from the man who then came forward as the shield and sword of the constitutional party—the consul Sulla —bear an altogether peculiar character. Sulla ventured, without consulting the burgesses or jurymen, to pronounce sentence of death on twelve of the most distin guished men, including magistrates actually office and the most famous general of his time, and publicly to defend these proscriptions violation of the venerable and sacred laws of appeal, which met with severe censure even from very conservative men, such as Quintus Scaevola. He ven tured to overthrow an arrangement as to the elections which had subsisted for century and half, and to re-establish
the electoral census which had been long obsolete and
He ventured practically to withdraw the right of legislation from its two primitive factors, the magistrates
proscribed.
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chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
543
and the comitia, and to transfer it to a board which had at no time possessed formally any other privilege in this respect than that of being asked for its advice 408). Hardly had any democrat ever exercised justice in forms so tyran nical, or disturbed and remodelled the foundations of the constitution with so reckless an audacity, as this conservative reformer. But we look at the substance instead of the form, we reach very different results. Revolutions have no where ended, and least of all in Rome, without demanding
certain number of victims, who under forms more or less borrowed from justice atone for the fault of being vanquished as though were crime. Any one who recalls the suc cession of prosecutions carried on by the victorious party after the fall of the Gracchi and Saturninus (pp. 326, 369, 475) will be inclined to yield to the victor of the Esquiline market the praise of candour and comparative moderation, in so far as, first he without ceremony accepted as war what was really such and proscribed the men who were defeated
as enemies beyond the pale of the law, and, secondly, he limited as far as possible the number of victims and allowed at least no offensive outbreak of fury against inferior persons.
similar moderation appears in the political arrangements. The innovation as respects legislation —the most important and apparently the most comprehensive—in fact only brought the letter of the constitution into harmony with its
The Roman legislation, under which any consul, praetor, or tribune could propose to the burgesses any measure at pleasure and bring to the vote without debate, had from the first been irrational and had become daily more so with the growing nullity of the comitia was only tolerated, because in practice the senate had claimed for itself the right of previous deliberation and regularly crushed any proposal, put to the vote without such previous de liberation, means of the political or religious veto
The revolution had swept away these barriers; and in
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544 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS book iv
consequence that absurd system now began fully to develop its results, and to put it in the power of any petulant knave to overthrow the state in due form of law. What was under such circumstances more natural, more necessary, more truly conservative, than now to recognize formally and expressly the legislation of the senate to which effect had been hitherto given by a circuitous process? Something similar may be said of the renewal of the electoral census. The earlier constitution was throughout based on it ; even the reform
Ml. of 5 1 3 had merely restricted the privileges of the men of wealth. But since that year there had occurred an immense financial revolution, which might well justify a raising of the electoral census. The new timocracy thus changed the letter of the constitution only to remain faithful to its spirit, while it at the same time in the mildest possible form attempted at least to check the disgraceful purchase of votes with all the evils therewith connected. Lastly, the regula tions in favour of debtors and the resumption of the schemes of colonization gave express proof that Sulla, although not
disposed to approve the impetuous proposals of Sulpicius, was yet, like Sulpicius and Drusus and all the more far- seeing aristocrats in general, favourable to material reforms in themselves ; as to which we may not overlook the circum stance, that he proposed these measures after the victory and entirely of his own free will. If we combine with such considerations the fact, that Sulla allowed the principal foundations of the Gracchan constitution to stand and
disturbed neither the equestrian courts nor the largesses of
grain, we shall find warrant for the ©pinion that the Sullan •8. arrangement of 666 substantially adhered to the status quo subsisting since the fall of Gaius Gracchus ; he merely, on
the one hand, altered as the times required the traditional rules that primarily threatened danger to the existing govern
ment, and, on the other hand, sought to remedy according to his power the existing social evils, so far as either could
chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
545
be done without touching ills that lay deeper. Emphatic contempt for constitutional formalism in connection with a vivid appreciation of the intrinsic value of existing arrange ments, clear perceptions, and praiseworthy intentions mark this legislation throughout. But it bears also a certain frivolous and superficial character ; it needed in particular a great amount of good nature to believe that the fixing a maximum of interest would remedy the confused relations of credit, and that the right of previous deliberation on the part of the senate would prove more capable of resisting future demagogism than the right of veto and religion had previously been.
In reality new clouds very soon began to overcast the New com- clear sky of the conservatives. The relations of Asia p caUoiuu assumed daily a more threatening character. The state
had already suffered the utmost injury through the delay
which the Sulpician revolution had occasioned in the departure of the army for Asia ; the embarkation could on
no account be longer postponed. Meanwhile Sulla hoped
to leave behind him guarantees against a new assault on
the oligarchy in Italy, partly in the consuls who would be
elected under the new electoral arrangement, partly and especially in the armies employed in suppressing the
remains of the Italian insurrection. In the consular
comitia, however, the choice did not fall on the candidates
set up by Sulla, but Lucius Cornelius Cinna, who belonged Cinna.
to the most determined opposition, was associated with
Gnaeus Octavius, a man certainly of strictly Optimate
views. It may be presumed that it was chiefly the
capitalist party, which by this choice retaliated on the
author of the law as to interest. Sulla accepted the unpleasant election with the declaration that he was glad
to see the burgesses making use of their constitutional
liberty of choice, and contented himself with exacting
from both consuls an oath that they would faithfully
vol. in 100
Strabo,
546 THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS TOOK IV
observe the existing constitution. Of the armies, the one on which the matter chiefly depended was that of the north, as the greater part of the Campanian army was destined to depart for Asia. Sulla got the command of the former entrusted by decree of the people to his devoted colleague Quintus Rufus, and procured the recall of the former general Gnaeus Strabo in such a manner as to spare as far as possible his feelings—the more so, because the latter belonged to the equestrian party and his passive attitude during the Sulpician troubles had occasioned no small anxiety to the aristocracy. Rufus arrived at the army and took the chief command in Strabo's stead ; but a few days afterwards he was killed by the soldiers, and Strabo returned to the command which he had hardly abdicated. He was regarded as the instigator of the murder ; it is certain that he was a man from whom such a deed might be expected, that he reaped the fruits of the crime, and that he punished the well-known originators of it only with words. The removal of Rufus and the commandership of Strabo formed a new and serious danger for Sulla ; yet he did nothing to deprive the latter of his
command. Soon afterwards, when his consulship expired, he found himself on the one hand urged by his successor Cinna to depart at length for Asia where his presence was certainly urgently needed, and on the other hand cited by one of the new tribunes before the bar of the people ; it was clear to the dullest eye, that a new attack on him and his party was in preparation, and that his opponents wished his removal. Sulla had no alternative save either to push the matter to a breach with Cinna and perhaps with Strabo and once more to march on Rome, or to leave Italian affairs to take their course and to remove to another continent. Sulla decided —whether more from patriotism or more from indifference, will never be ascertained—for the latter alternative; handed over the corps left behind
Mia for Asia.
chap, vii AND THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION
547
in Samnium to the trustworthy and experienced soldier,
Metellus Pius, who was invested in Sulla's stead with the proconsular commandership-in-chief over Lower Italy ; gave the conduct of the siege of Nola to the pro praetor Appius Claudius; and in the beginning of 667 87.