The observation
was this: "The Renaissance and the Reformation
only together constitute a whole—the aesthetic re-
birth, and the moral rebirth.
was this: "The Renaissance and the Reformation
only together constitute a whole—the aesthetic re-
birth, and the moral rebirth.
Nietzsche - v17 - Ecce Homo
Re-
finement in form, in aspiration, and in the art of
keeping silent, are its more or less obvious quali-
ties; psychology is handled with deliberate hard-
ness and cruelty,—the whole book does not con-
tain one single good-natured word. . . . All this
sort of thing refreshes a man. Who can guess
the kind of recreation that is necessary after such
an expenditure of goodness as is to be found in
Zaratkustraf From a theological standpoint—
now pay ye heed; for it is but on rare occasions
that I speak as a theologian—it was God Himself
who, at the end of His great work, coiled Himself
up in the form of a serpent at the foot of the tree
of knowledge. It was thus that He recovered from
being a God. . . . He had made everything too
beautiful. . . . The devil is simply God's moment
of idleness, on that seventh day.
"The Genealogy of Morals:
A Polemic"
The three essays which constitute this genealogy
are, as regards expression, aspiration, and the art
## p. 117 (#167) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 117
of the unexpected, perhaps the most curious
things that have ever been written. Dionysus, as
you know, is also the god of darkness. In each
case the beginning is calculated to mystify; it is
cool, scientific, even ironical, intentionally thrust
to the fore, intentionally reticent. Gradually less
calmness prevails; here and there a flash of light-
ning defines the horizon; exceedingly unpleasant
truths break upon your ears from out remote dis-
tances with a dull, rumbling sound,—until very
soon a fierce tempo is attained in which everything
presses forward at a terrible degree of tension.
At the end, in each case, amid fearful thunderclaps,
a new truth shines out between thick clouds. The
truth of the first essay is the psychology of Chris-
tianity: the birth of Christianity out of the spirit
of resentment, not, as is supposed, out of the
"Spirit,"—in all its essentials, a counter-movement,
the great insurrection against the dominion of
noble values. The second essay contains the psy-
chology of conscience: this is not, as you may be-
lieve, " the voice of God in man "; it is the instinct
of cruelty, which turns inwards once it is unable
to discharge itself outwardly. Cruelty is here ex-
posed, for the first time, as one of the oldest and
most indispensable elements in the foundation of
culture. The third essay replies to the question
as to the origin of the formidable power of the
ascetic ideal, of the priest ideal, despite the fact
that this ideal is essentially detrimental, that it is
a will to nonentity and to decadence. Reply: it
flourished not because God was active behind the
priests, as is generally believed, but because it was
## p. 117 (#168) ############################################
116
ECCE HOMO
owing to tremendous constraint, has become
accustomed to see at a great distance,—Zara-
thustra is even more far-sighted than the Tsar,—
is here forced to focus sharply that which is close
at hand, the present time, the things that lie about
him. In all the aphorisms and more particularly
in the form of this book, the reader will find the
same voluntary turning away from those instincts
which made a Zarathustra a possible feat. Re-
finement in form, in aspiration, and in the art of
keeping silent, are its more or less obvious quali-
ties; psychology is handled with deliberate hard-
ness and cruelty,—the whole book does not con-
tain one single good-natured word. . . . All this
sort of thing refreshes a man. Who can guess
the kind of recreation that is necessary after such
an expenditure of goodness as is to be found in
Zarathustra? From a theological standpoint-
now pay ye heed; for it is but on rare occasions
that I speak as a theologian-it was God Himself
who, at the end of His great work, coiled Himself
up in the form of a serpent at the foot of the tree
of knowledge. It was thus that He recovered from
being a God. . . . He had made everything too
beautiful. . . . The devil is simply God's moment
of idleness, on that seventh day.
“THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS:
A POLEMIC”
The three essays which constitute this genealogy
are, as regards expression, aspiration, and the art
## p. 117 (#169) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 117
of the unexpected, perhaps the most curious
things that have ever been written. . Dionysus, as
you know, is also the god of darkness. In each
case the beginning is calculated to mystify; it is
cool, scientific, even ironical, intentionally thrust
to the fore, intentionally reticent. Gradually less
calmness prevails; here and there a flash of light-
ning defines the horizon; exceedingly unpleasant
truths break upon your ears from out remote dis-
tances with a dull, rumbling sound,—until very
soon a fierce tempo is attained in which everything
presses forward at a terrible degree of tension.
At the end, in each case, amid fearful thunderclaps,
a new truth shines out between thick clouds. The
truth of the first essay is the psychology of Chris-
tianity: the birth of Christianity out of the spirit
of resentment, not, as is supposed, out of the
“Spirit,"—in all its essentials, a counter-movement,
the great insurrection against the dominion of
noble values. The second essay contains the psy-
chology of conscience: this is not, as you may be-
lieve, “the voice of God in man”; it is the instinct
of cruelty, which turns inwards once it is unable
to discharge itself outwardly. Cruelty is here ex-
posed, for the first time, as one of the oldest and
most indispensable elements in the foundation of
culture. The third essay replies to the question
as to the origin of the formidable power of the
ascetic ideal, of the priest ideal, despite the fact
that this ideal is essentially detrimental, that it is
a will to nonentity and to decadence. Reply : it
flourished not because God was active behind the
priests, as is generally believed, but because it was
## p. 117 (#170) ############################################
116
ECCE HOMO
owing to tremendous constraint, has become
accustomed to see at a great distance, -Zara-
thustra is even more far-sighted than the Tsar,—
is here forced to focus sharply that which is close
at hand, the present time, the things that lie about
him. In all the aphorisms and more particularly
in the form of this book, the reader will find the
same voluntary turning away from those instincts
which made a Zarathustra a possible feat. Re-
finement in form, in aspiration, and in the art of
keeping silent, are its more or less obvious quali-
ties; psychology is handled with deliberate hard-
ness and cruelty,—the whole book does not con-
tain one single good-natured word. . . . All this
sort of thing refreshes a man. Who can guess
the kind of recreation that is necessary after such
an expenditure of goodness as is to be found in
Zarathustra ? From a theological standpoint-
now pay ye heed; for it is but on rare occasions
that I speak as a theologian—it was God Himself
who, at the end of His great work, coiled Himself
up in the form of a serpent at the foot of the tree
of knowledge. It was thus that He recovered from
being a God. . . . He had made everything too
beautiful. . . . The devil is simply God's moment
of idleness, on that seventh day.
“ THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS:
A POLEMIC
g
en
The three essays which cor
are, as regards expression,
## p. 117 (#171) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 117
of the unexpected, perhaps the most curious
things that have ever been written. Dionysus, as
you know, is also the god of darkness. In each
case the beginning is calculated to mystify; it is
cool, scientific, even ironical, intentionally thrust
to the fore, intentionally reticent. Gradually less
calmness prevails; here and there a flash of light-
ning defines the horizon ; exceedingly unpleasant
truths break upon your ears from out remote dis-
tances with a dull, rumbling sound,—until very
soon a fierce tempo is attained in which everything
presses forward at a terrible degree of tension.
At the end, in each case, amid fearful thunderclaps,
a new truth shines out between thick clouds. The
truth of the first essay is the psychology of Chris-
tianity: the birth of Christianity out of the spirit
of resentment, not, as is supposed, out of the
“Spirit,”—in all its essentials, a counter-movement,
the great insurrection against the dominion of
noble values. The second essay contains the psy-
chology of conscience: this is not, as you may be-
lieve, “the voice of God in man”; it is the instinct
of cruelty, which turns inwards once it is unable
to discharge itself outwardly. Cruelty is here ex-
posed, for the first time, as one of the oldest and
most indispensable elements in the foundation of
culture. The third essay replies to the question
as to the origin of the formidable power of the
ascetic ideal, of the priest ideal, despite the fact
that this ideal is essentially detrimental, that it is
a will to nonentity and to decadence. Reply : it
flourished not because God was active behind the
priests, as is generally believed, but because it was
## p. 117 (#172) ############################################
116
ECCE HOMO
owing to tremendous constraint, has become
accustomed to see at a great distance,-Zara-
thustra is even more far-sighted than the Tsar,—
is here forced to focus sharply that which is close
at hand, the present time, the things that lie about
him. In all the aphorisms and more particularly
in the form of this book, the reader will find the
same voluntary turning away from those instincts
which made a Zarathustra a possible feat. Re-
finement in form, in aspiration, and in the art of
keeping silent, are its more or less obvious quali-
ties; psychology is handled with deliberate hard-
ness and cruelty,—the whole book does not con-
tain one single good-natured word. . . . All this
sort of thing refreshes a man. Who can guess
the kind of recreation that is necessary after such
an expenditure of goodness as is to be found in
Zarathustra? From a theological standpoint-
now pay ye heed; for it is but on rare occasions
that I speak as a theologian-it was God Himself
who, at the end of His great work, coiled Himself
up in the form of a serpent at the foot of the tree
of knowledge. It was thus that He recovered from
being a God. . . . He had made everything too
beautiful. . . . The devil is simply God's moment
of idleness, on that seventh day.
“ THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS:
A POLEMIC”
The three essays which constitute this genealogy
are, as regards expression, aspiration, and the art
## p. 117 (#173) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 117
of the unexpected, perhaps the most curious
things that have ever been written. Dionysus, as
you know, is also the god of darkness. In each
case the beginning is calculated to mystify; it is
cool, scientific, even ironical, intentionally thrust
to the fore, intentionally reticent. Gradually less
calmness prevails; here and there a flash of light-
ning defines the horizon; exceedingly unpleasant
truths break upon your ears from out remote dis-
tances with a dull, rumbling sound,—until very
soon a fierce tempo is attained in which everything
presses forward at a terrible degree of tension.
At the end, in each case, amid fearful thunderclaps,
a new truth shines out between thick clouds. The
truth of the first essay is the psychology of Chris-
tianity: the birth of Christianity out of the spirit
of resentment, not, as is supposed, out of the
“Spirit,"—in all its essentials, a counter-movement,
the great insurrection against the dominion of
noble values. The second essay contains the psy-
chology of conscience: this is not, as you may be-
lieve, “the voice of God in man”; it is the instinct
of cruelty, which turns inwards once it is unable
to discharge itself outwardly. Cruelty is here ex-
posed, for the first time, as one of the oldest and
most indispensable elements in the foundation of
culture. The third essay replies to the question
as to the origin of the formidable power of the
ascetic ideal, of the priest ideal, despite the fact
that this ideal is essentially detrimental, that it is
a will to nonentity and to decadence. Reply : it
flourished not because God was active behind the
priests, as is generally believed, but because it was
## p. 118 (#174) ############################################
Il8 ECCE HOMO
a faute de mieux—from the fact that hitherto it
has been the only ideal and has had no competitors.
"For man prefers to aspire to nonentity than not
to aspire at all. " But above all, until the time of
Zarathustra there was no such thing as a counter-
ideal. You have understood my meaning. Three
decisive overtures on the part of a psychologist
to a Transvaluation of all Values. —This book
contains the first psychology of the priest.
"The Twilight of the Idols:
How to Philosophise with the Hammer"
This work—which covers scarcely one hundred
and fifty pages, with its cheerful and fateful tone,
like a laughing demon, and the production of which
occupied so few days that I hesitate to give their
number—is altogether an exception among books:
there is no work more rich in substance, more
independent, more upsetting—more wicked. If
any one should desire to obtain a rapid sketch
of how everything, before my time, was standing
on its head, he should begin reading me in this
book. That which is called " Idols" on the title
page is simply the old truth that has been be-
lieved in hitherto. In plain English, The Twi-
light of the Idols means that the old truth is on its
last legs.
## p. 119 (#175) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 119
There is no reality, no "ideality," which has
not been touched in this book (touched! what a
cautious euphemism ! ). Not only the eternal idols,
but also the youngest—that is to say, the most
senile: modern ideas, for instance. A strong
wind blows between the trees and in all directions
fall the fruit—the truths. There is the waste of
an all-too-rich autumn in this book : you trip over
truths. You even crush some to death, there are
too many of them. Those things that you can
grasp, however, are quite unquestionable ; they are
irrevocable decrees. I alone have the criterion of
"truths" in my possession. I alone can decide.
It would seem as if a second consciousness had
grown up in me, as if the "life-will" in me had
thrown a light upon the downward path along
which it has been running throughout the ages.
The downward path—hitherto this had been called
the road to "Truth. " All obscure impulse—
"darkness and dismay "—is at an end, the "good
man" was precisely he who was least aware of the
proper way. * And, speaking in all earnestness,
no one before me knew the proper way, the way
upwards: only after my time could men once
more find hope, life-tasks, and roads mapped out
* A witty reference to Goethe's well-known passage in the
Prologue to Faust:—
"A good man, though in darkness and dismay,
May still be conscious of the proper way. "
The words are spoken by the Lord. —Tr.
## p. 120 (#176) ############################################
120 ECCE HOMO
that lead to culture—/ am the joyful harbinger of
this culture. . . . On this account alone I am also
a fatality.
Immediately after the completion of the above-
named work, and without letting even one day go
by, I tackled the formidable task of the Transvalua-
tion with a supreme feeling of pride which nothing
could equal; and, certain at each moment of my
immortality, I cut sign after sign upon tablets of
brass with the sureness of Fate. The Preface came
into being on 3rd September 1888. When, after
having written it down, I went out into the open
that morning, I was greeted by the most beautiful
day I had ever seen in the Upper Engadine—clear,
glowing with colour, and presenting all the contrasts
and all the intermediary gradations between ice and
the south. I left Sils-Maria only on the 20th of
September. I had been forced to delay my depart-
ure owing to floods, and I was very soon, and for
some days, the only visitor in this wonderful spot,
on which my gratitude bestows the gift of an im-
mortal name. After a journey that was full of incid-
ents, and not without danger to life,—as for instance
at Como, which was flooded when I reached it in
the dead of night,—I got to Turin on the afternoon
of the 21 st. Turin is the only suitable place for
me, and it shall be my home henceforward. I took
the same lodgings as I had occupied in the spring,
6111 Via Carlo Alberto, opposite the mighty Palazzo
Carignano, in which Vittorio Emanuele was born;
and I had a view of the Piazza Carlo Alberto and
## p. 121 (#177) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 121
above it across to the hills. Without hesitating, or
allowing myself to be disturbed for a single moment,
I returned to my work, only the last quarter of
which had still tobewritten. On the 30th September,
tremendous triumph; the seventh day; the leisure
of a god on the banks of the Po. * On the same
day, I wrote the Preface to The Twilight of the
Idols, the correction of the proofs of which provided
me with recreation during the month of September.
Never in my life have I experienced such an
autumn; nor had I ever imagined that such things
were possible on earth—a Claude Lorrain extended
to infinity, each day equal to the last in its wild
perfection.
"The Case of Wagner-.
A Musician's Problem"
In order to do justice to this essay a man ought
to suffer from the fate of music as from an open
wound. —From what do I suffer when I suffer from
the fate of music? From the fact that music has
lost its world-transfiguring, yea-saying character—
that it is decadent music and no longer the flute of
Dionysus. Supposing, however, that the fate of
music be as dear to man as his own life, because
joy and suffering are alike bound up with it; then
he will find this pamphlet comparatively mild and
* There is a wonderful promenade along the banks of
the Po, for which Turin is famous, and of which Nietzsche
was particularly fond. —Tr.
## p. 122 (#178) ############################################
122 ECCE HOMO
full of consideration. To be cheerful in such circum-
stances, and laugh good-naturedly with others at
one's self,—ridendo dicere severum* when the verunt
dicere would justify every sort of hardness,—is
humanity itself. Who doubts that I, old artillery-
man that I am, would be able if I liked to point
my heavy guns at Wagner ? —Everything decisive
in this question I kept to myself—I have loved
Wagner. —After all, an attack upon a more than
usually subtle " unknown person" whom another
would not have divined so easily, lies in the mean-
ing and path of my life-task. Oh, I have still quite
a number of other " unknown persons " to unmask
besides a Cagliostro of Music! Above all, I have
to direct an attack against the German people, who,
in matters of the spirit, grow every day more In-
dolent, poorer in instincts, and more honest; who,
with an appetite for which they are to be envied,
continue to diet themselves on contradictions, and
gulp down "Faith" in company with science,
Christian love together with anti-Semitism, and
the will to power (to the " Empire "), dished up with
the gospel of the humble, without showing the
slightest signs of indigestion. Fancy this absence
of party-feeling in the presence of opposites! Fancy
this gastric neutrality and "disinterestedness"!
Behold this sense of justice in the German palate,
which can grant equal rights to all,—which finds
everything tasteful! Without a shadow of a doubt
the Germans are idealists. When I was last in
Germany, I found German taste striving to grant
* The motto of The Case of Wagner. —Tr.
## p. 123 (#179) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 123
Wagner and the Trumpeter of Sdkkingen * equal
rights; while I myself witnessed the attempts of the
people of Leipzig to do honour to one of the most
genuineand most German of musicians,—using Ger-
man here in the old sense of the word,—a man who
was no mere German of the Empire, the master
Heinrich Schiitz, by founding a Liszt Society, the
object of which was to cultivate and spread artful
{listige t) Church music. Without a shadow of doubt
the Germans are idealists.
But here nothing shall stop me from being rude,
and from telling the Germans one or two unpleasant
home truths: who else would do it if I did not?
I refer to their laxity in matters historical. Not
only have the Germans entirely lost the breadth of
vision which enables one to grasp the course of cul-
ture and the values of culture; not only are they
one and all political (or Church) puppets; but they
have also actually put a ban upon this very breadth
of vision. A man must first and foremost be " Ger-
man," he must belong to " the race "; then only can
he pass judgment upon all values and lack of values
in history—then only can he establish them. . . . To
be German is in itself an argument, " Germany,
Germany above all," J is a principle; the Germans
* An opera by Nessler which was all the rage in Germany
twenty years ago. —Tr.
+ Unfortunately it is impossible to render this play on the
words in English. —Tr.
X The German National Song (Deutschland, Deutschland
titer alles). —Tn.
## p. 124 (#180) ############################################
124 ECCE HOMO
stand for the "moral order of the universe" in history;
compared with the Roman Empire, they are the up-
holders of freedom; compared with the eighteenth
century, they are the restorers of morality, of the
"Categorical Imperative. " There is such a thing
as the writing of history according to the lights of
Imperial Germany; there is, I fear, anti-Semitic
history—there is also history written with an eye
to the Court, and Herr von Treitschke is not
ashamed of himself. Quite recently an idiotic
opinion in historicis, an observation of Vischer the
Swabian aesthete, since happily deceased, made the
round of the German newspapers as a "truth" to
which every German must assent.
The observation
was this: "The Renaissance and the Reformation
only together constitute a whole—the aesthetic re-
birth, and the moral rebirth. " When I listen to
such things, I lose all patience, and I feel inclined,
I even feel it my duty, to tell the Germans, for once
in a way, all that they have on their conscience.
Every gi-eat crime against culture for the last four
centuries lies on their conscience. . . . And always
for the same reason, always owing to their bottom-
less cowardice in the face of reality, which is also
cowardice in the face of truth; always owing to the
love of falsehood which has become almost instinc-
tive in them—in short, "idealism. " It was the
Germans who caused Europe to lose the fruits, the
whole meaning of her last period of greatness—the
period of the Renaissance. At a moment when a
higher order of values, values that were noble, that
said yea to life, and that guaranteed a future, had
succeeded in triumphing over the opposite values,
## p. 125 (#181) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 125
the values of degeneration, in the very seat of
Christianity itself,—and even in the hearts of those
sitting there,—Luther, that cursed monk, not only
restored the Church, but, what was a thousand times
worse, restored Christianity, and at a time too when
it lay defeated. Christianity, the Denial of the Will
to Live, exalted to a religion! Luther was an im-
possible monk who, thanks to his own "impossi-
bility," attacked the Church, and in so doing restored
it! Catholics would be perfectly justified in cele-
brating feasts in honour of Luther, and in produc-
ing festival plays * in his honour. Luther and the
"rebirth of morality "! May all psychology go to
the devil! Without a shadow of a doubt the Ger-
mans are idealists. On two occasions when, at the
cost of enormous courage and self-control, an up-
right, unequivocal, and perfectly scientific attitude
of mind had been attained, the Germans were able
to discover back stairs leading down to the old
"ideal" again, compromises between truth and the
"ideal," and, in short, formulas for the right to reject
science and to perpetrate falsehoods. Leibniz and
Kant—these two great breaks upon the intellectual
honesty of Europe! Finally, at a moment when
there appeared on the bridge that spanned two cen-
turies of decadence, a superior force of genius and
will which was strong enough to consolidate Europe
and to convert it into a political and economic unit,
with the object of ruling the world, the Germans,
with their Wars of Independence, robbed Europe
* Ever since the year 1617 such plays have been produced
by the Protestants of Germany. —Tr.
## p. 126 (#182) ############################################
126 ECCE HOMO
of the significance—the marvellous significance, of
Napoleon's life. And in so doing they laid on their
conscience everything that followed, everything that
exists to-day,—this sickliness and want of reason
which is most opposed to culture, and which is called
Nationalism,—this nivrose nationale from which
Europe is suffering acutely; this eternal subdivision
of Europe into petty states, with politics on a muni-
cipal scale: they have robbed Europe itself of its
significance, of its reason,—and have stuffed it into
a cul-de-sac. Is there any one except me who
knows the way out of this cul-de-sac? Does any-
one except me know of an aspiration which would
be great enough to bind the people of Europe once
more together?
And after all, why should I not express my
suspicions? In my case, too, the Germans will
attempt to make a great fate give birth merely to
a mouse. Up to the present they have compro-
mised themselves with me; I doubt whether the
future will improve them. Alas! how happy I
should be to prove a false prophet in this matter!
My natural readers and listeners are already Rus-
sians, Scandinavians, and Frenchmen—will they
always be the same? In the history of knowledge,
Germans are represented only by doubtful names,
they have been able to produce only " unconscious"
swindlers (this word applies to Fichte, Schelling,
Schopenhauer, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, just as
well as to Kant or Leibniz; they were all mere
## p. 127 (#183) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 127
Schleiermachers). * The Germans must not have
the honour of seeing, the first upright intellect in
their history of intellects, that intellect in which
truth ultimately got the better of the fraud of four
thousand years, reckoned as one with the German
intellect. "German intellect" is my foul air: I
breathe with difficulty in the neighbourhood of this
psychological uncleanliness that has now become
instinctive—an uncleanliness which in every word
and expression betrays a German. They have
never undergone a seventeenth century of hard self-
examination, as the French have,—a La Roche-
foucauld, a Descartes, are a thousand times more
upright than the very first among Germans,—the
latter have not yet had any psychologists. But
psychology is almost the standard of measurement
for the cleanliness or uncleanliness of a race. . . .
For if a man is not even clean, how can he be deep?
The Germans are like women, you can scarcely ever
fathom their depths—they haven't any, and that's
the end of it. Thus they cannot even be called
shallow. That which is called " deep " in Germany,
is precisely this instinctive uncleanliness towards
one's self, of which I have just spoken : people refuse
to be clear in regard to their own natures. Might
I be allowed, perhaps, to suggest the word " Ger-
man " as an international epithet denoting this psy-
chological depravity ? —At the moment of writing,
for instance, the German Emperor is declaring it to
be his Christian duty to liberate the slaves in Africa;
* Schleiermacker literally means a weaver or maker of veils.
-Tr.
## p. 128 (#184) ############################################
128 ECCE HOMO
among us Europeans, then, this would be called
simply "German. " . . . Have the Germans ever
produced even a book that had depth? They are
lacking in the mere idea of what constitutes a book.
I have known scholars who thought that Kant was
deep. At the Court of Prussia I fear that Herr
von Treitschke is regarded as deep. And when I
happen to praise Stendhal as a deep psychologist,
I have often been compelled, in the company of
German University Professors, to spell his name
aloud.
4
And why should I not proceed to the end? I
am fond of clearing the air. It is even part of my
ambition to be considered as essentially a despiser
of Germans. I expressed my suspicions of the
German character even at the age of six-and-twenty
(see Thoughts out of Season, vol. ii. pp. 164, 165),
—to my mind the Germans are impossible. When
I try to think of the kind of man who is opposed
to me in all my instincts, my mental image takes
the form of a German. The first thing I ask my-
self when I begin analysing a man, is, whether he
has a feeling for distance in him; whether he sees
rank, gradation, and order everywhere between man
and man; whether he makes distinctions; for this
is what constitutes a gentleman. Otherwise he be-
longs hopelessly to that open-hearted, open-minded
—alas! and always very good-natured species, la
canaille! But the Germans are canaille—alas!
they are so good-natured! A man lowers himself
by frequenting the society of Germans: the German
places every one on an equal footing. With the
## p. 129 (#185) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 129
exception of my intercourse with one or two artists,
and above all with Richard Wagner, I cannot say
that I have spent one pleasant hour with Germans.
Suppose, for one moment, that the profoundest
spirit of all ages were to appear among Germans,
then one of the saviours of the Capitol would be
sure to arise and declare that his own ugly soul
was just as great. I can no longer abide this race
with which a man is always in bad company, which
has no idea of nuances—woe to me! I am a nuance
—and which has not esprit in its feet, and cannot
even walk withal! In short, the Germans have no
feet at all, they simply have legs. The Germans have
not the faintest idea of how vulgar they are—but this
in itself is the acme of vulgarity,—they are not even
ashamed of being merely Germans. They will have
their say in everything, they regard themselves as
fit to decide all questions; I even fear that they
have decided about me. My whole life is essenti-
ally a proof of this remark. In vain have I sought
among them for a sign of tact and delicacy towards
myself. Among Jews I did indeed find it, but not
among Germans. I am so constituted as to be
gentle and kindly to every one,—I have the right
not to draw distinctions,—but this does not prevent
my eyes from being open. I except no one, and
least of all my friends,—I only trust that this has
not prejudiced my reputation for humanity among
them? There are five or six things which I have
always made points of honour. Albeit, the truth
remains that for many years I have considered
almost every letter that has reached me as a piece
of cynicism. There is more cynicism in an attitude
1
## p. 130 (#186) ############################################
130 ECCE HOMO
of goodwill towards me than in any sort of hatred.
I tell every friend to his face that he has never
thought it worth his while to study any one of my
writings: from the slightest hints I gather that they
do not even know what lies hidden in my books.
And with regard even to my Zarathustra, which of
my friends would have seen more in it than a piece
of unwarrantable, though fortunately harmless, ar-
rogance? Ten years have elapsed, and no one has
yet felt it a duty to his conscience to defend my
name against the absurd silence beneath which it
has been entombed. It was a foreigner, a Dane,
who first showed sufficient keenness of instinct and
of courage to do this, and who protested indignantly
against my so-called friends. At what German
University to-day would such lectures on my philo-
sophy be possible, as those which Dr. Brandes de-
livered last spring in Copenhagen, thus proving once
more his right to the title psychologist? For my
part, these things have never caused me any pain;
that which is necessary does not offend me. Amor
fati is the core of my nature. This, however, does
not alter the fact that I love irony and even world-
historic irony. And thus, about two years before
hurling the destructive thunderbolt of the Trans-
valuation, which will send the whole of civilisation
into convulsions, I sent my Case of Wagner out
into the world. The Germans were given the chance
of blundering and immortalising their stupidity once
more on my account, and they still have just enough
time to do it in. And have they fallen in with my
plans? Admirably! my dear Germans. Allow
me to congratulate you.
## p. 131 (#187) ############################################
WHY I AM A FATALITY
I KNOW my destiny. There will come a day
when my name will recall the memory of some-
thing formidable—a crisis the like of which has
never been known on earth, the memory of the
most profound clash of consciences, and the passing
of a sentence upon all that which theretofore had
been believed, exacted, and hallowed. I am not a
man, I am dynamite. And with it all there is
nought of the founder of a religion in me. Re-
ligions are matters for the mob; after coming in
contact with a religious man, I always feel that I
must wash my hands. . . . I require no "be-
lievers," it is my opinion that I am too full of
malice to believe even in myself; I never address
myself to masses. I am horribly frightened that
one day I shall be pronounced "holy. " You will
understand why I publish this book beforehand—
it is to prevent people from wronging me. I refuse
to be a saint; I would rather be a clown. Maybe
I am a clown. And I am notwithstanding, or
rather not /^^withstanding, the mouthpiece of
truth; for nothing more blown-out with falsehood
has ever existed, than a saint. But my truth is
terrible: for hitherto lies have been called truth.
The Transvaluation of all Values, this is my formula
for mankind's greatest step towards coming to its
'3'
## p. 132 (#188) ############################################
132 ECCE HOMO
senses—a step which in me became flesh and
genius. My destiny ordained that I should be the
first decent human being, and that I should feel
myself opposed to the falsehood of millenniums. I
was the first to discover truth, and for the simple
reason that I was the first who became conscious
of falsehood as falsehood—that is to say, I smelt
it as such. My genius resides in my nostrils. I
contradict as no one has contradicted hitherto, and
am nevertheless the reverse of a negative spirit I
am the harbinger of joy, the like of which has never
existed before; I have discovered tasks of such
lofty greatness that, until my time, no one had any
idea of such things. Mankind can begin to have
fresh hopes, only now that I have lived. Thus, I
am necessarily a man of Fate. For when Truth
enters the lists against the falsehood of ages, shocks
are bound to ensue, and a spell of earthquakes,
followed by the transposition of hills and valleys,
such as the world has never yet imagined even in
its dreams. The concept " politics " then becomes
elevated entirely to the sphere of spiritual warfare.
All the mighty realms of the ancient order of
society are blown into space—for they are all based
on falsehood: there will be wars, the like of which
have never been seen on earth before. Only from
my time and after me will politics on a large scale
exist on earth.
If you should require a formula for a destiny of
this kind that has taken human form, you will find
it in my Zarathustra,
## p. 133 (#189) ############################################
WHY I AM A FATALITY 133
"And he who would be a creator in good and
evil—verily, he must first be a destroyer, and break
values into pieces.
"Thus the greatest evil belongeth unto the
greatest good: but this is the creative good. "
I am by far the most terrible man that has ever
existed; but this does not alter the fact that I shall
become the most beneficent. I know the joy of
annihilation to a degree which is commensurate
with my power to annihilate. In both cases I obey
my Dionysian nature, which knows not how to
separate the negative deed from the saying of yea.
I am the first immoralist, and in this sense I am
essentially the annihilator.
People have never asked me as they should have
done, what the name of Zarathustra precisely meant
in my mouth, in the mouth of-the first immoralist;
for that which distinguishes this Persian from all
others in the past is the very fact that he was the
exact reverse of an immoralist. Zarathustra was
the first to see in the struggle between good and
evil the essential wheel in the working of things.
The translation of morality into the realm of meta-
physics, as force, cause, end-in-itself, is his work.
But the very question suggests its own answer.
Zarathustra created this most portentous of all
errors,—morality; therefore he must be the first
to expose it. Not only because he has had longer
and greater experience of the subject than any other
thinker,—all history is indeed the experimental re-
## p. 134 (#190) ############################################
134 ECCE HOMO
futation of the theory of the so-called moral order
of things,—but because of the more important fact
that Zarathustra was the most truthful of thinkers.
In his teaching alone is truthfulness upheld as the
highest virtue—that is to say, as the reverse of the
cowardice of the " idealist" who takes to his heels
at the sight of reality. Zarathustra has more pluck
in his body than all other thinkers put together.
To tell the truth and to aim straight: that is the
first Persian virtue. Have I made myself clear?
. . . The overcoming of morality by itself, through
truthfulness, the moralist's overcoming of himself in
his opposite—in me—that is what the name Zara-
thustra means in my mouth.
In reality two negations are involved in my title
Immoralist. I first of all deny the type of man
that has hitherto been regarded as the highest—the
good, the kind, and the charitable; and I also deny
that kind of morality which has become recognised
and paramount as morality-in-itself—I speak of
the morality of decadence, or, to use a still cruder
term, Christian morality. I would agree to the
second of the two negations being regarded as the
more decisive, for, reckoned as a whole, the over-
estimation of goodness and kindness seems to me
already a consequence of decadence, a symptom of
weakness, and incompatible with any ascending and
yea-saying life. Negation and annihilation are in-
separable from a yea-saying attitude towards life.
Let me halt for a moment at the question of the
## p. 135 (#191) ############################################
WHY I AM A FATALITY 135
psychology of the good man. In order to appraise
the value of a certain type of man, the cost of his
maintenance must be calculated,—and the condi-
tions of his existence must be known. The con-
dition of the existence of the good is falsehood:
or, otherwise expressed, the refusal at any price to
see how reality is actually constituted. The refusal
to see that this reality is not so constituted as
always to be stimulating beneficent instincts, and
still less, so as to suffer at all moments the intrusion
of ignorant and good-natured hands. To consider
distress of all kinds as an objection, as something
which must be done away with, is the greatest non-
sense on earth; generally speaking, it is nonsense
of the most disastrous sort, fatal in its stupidity—
almost as mad as the will to abolish bad weather,
out of pity for the poor, so to speak. In the great
economy of the whole universe, the terrors of reality
(in the passions, in the desires, in the will to power)
are incalculably more necessary than that form of
petty happiness which is called " goodness "; it is
even needful to practise leniency in order so much
as to allow the latter a place at all, seeing that it
is based upon a falsification of the instincts. I shall
have an excellent opportunity of showing the incal-
culably calamitous consequences to the whole of
history, of the credo of optimism, this monstrous
offspring of the homines optimi. Zarathustra,* the
first who recognised that the optimist is just as
degenerate as the pessimist, though perhaps more
* Needless to say this is Nietzsche, and no longer the
Persian. —Tr.
## p. 136 (#192) ############################################
I36 ECCE HOMO
detrimental, says: "Good men never speak the
truth. False shores and false harbours were ye
taught by the good. In the lies of the good were
ye born and bred. Through the good everything
hath become false and crooked front the roots"
Fortunately the world is not built merely upon
those instincts which would secure to the good-
natured herd animal his paltry happiness. To desire
everybody to become a " good man," " a gregarious
animal,' "a blue-eyed, benevolent, beautiful soul,"
or—as Herbert Spencer wished—a creature of al-
truism, would mean robbing existence of its greatest
character, castrating man, and reducing humanity
to a sort of wretched Chinadom. And this some
have tried to do! It is precisely this that men
called morality. In this sense Zarathustra calls "the
good," now "the last men," and anon "the be-
ginning of the end "; and above all, he considers
them as the most detrimental kind of men, because
they secure their existence at the cost of Truth and
at the cost of the Future.
"The good—they cannot create; they are ever
the beginning of the end.
"They crucify him who writeth new values on
new tables; they sacrifice unto themselves the future;
they crucify the whole future of humanity!
"The good—they are ever the beginning of the
end.
"And whatever harm the slanderers of the world
may do, the harm of the good is the most calamitous
of all harm! '
## p. 137 (#193) ############################################
WHY I AM A FATALITY 137
Zarathustra, as the first psychologist of the good
man, is perforce the friend of the evil man. When
a degenerate kind of man has succeeded to the
highest rank among the human species, his position
must have been gained at the cost of the reverse
type—at the cost of the strong man who is certain
of life. When the gregarious animal stands in the
glorious rays of the purest virtue, the exceptional
man must be degraded to the rank of the evil. If
falsehood insists at all costs on claiming the word
"truth " for its own particular standpoint, the really
truthful man must be sought out among the de-
spised. Zarathustra allows of no doubt here; he
says that it was precisely the knowledge of the
good, of the "best," which inspired his absolute
horror of men. And it was out of this feeling of
repulsion that he grew the wings which allowed
him to soar into remote futures. He does not
conceal the fact that his type of man is one which
is relatively superhuman—especially as opposed to
the "good" man, and that the good and the just
would regard his superman as the devil.
"Ye higher men, on whom my gaze now falls, this
is the doubt that ye wake in my breast, and this is
my secret laughter: methinks ye would call my
Superman—the devil! So strange are ye in your
souls to all that is great, that the Superman would
be terrible in your eyes for his goodness. "
It is from this passage, and from no other, that
you must set out to understand the goal to which
Zarathustra aspires—the kind of man that he con-
## p. 138 (#194) ############################################
138 ECCE HOMO
ceives sees reality as it is; he is strong enough for
this—he is not estranged or far removed from it,
he is that reality himself, in his own nature can be
found all the terrible and questionable character of
reality: only thus can man have greatness.
But I have chosen the title of Immoralist as a
surname and as a badge of honour in yet another
sense; I am very proud to possess this name which
distinguishes me from all the rest of mankind. No
one hitherto has felt Christian morality beneath
him; to that end there were needed height, a re-
moteness of vision, and an abysmal psychological
depth, not believed to be possible hitherto. Up to
the present Christian morality has been the Circe of
all thinkers—they stood at her service. What man,
before my time, had descended into the under-
ground caverns from out of which the poisonous
fumes of this ideal—of this slandering of the world
—burst forth? What man had even dared to sup-
pose that they were underground caverns? Was
a single one of the philosophers who preceded me
a psychologist at all, and not the very reverse of a
psychologist—that is to say, a " superior swindler,"
an "Idealist"? Before my time there was no
psychology. To be the first in this new realm
may amount to a curse ; at all events, it is a fatality:
for one is also the first to despise. My danger is the
loathing of mankind.
finement in form, in aspiration, and in the art of
keeping silent, are its more or less obvious quali-
ties; psychology is handled with deliberate hard-
ness and cruelty,—the whole book does not con-
tain one single good-natured word. . . . All this
sort of thing refreshes a man. Who can guess
the kind of recreation that is necessary after such
an expenditure of goodness as is to be found in
Zaratkustraf From a theological standpoint—
now pay ye heed; for it is but on rare occasions
that I speak as a theologian—it was God Himself
who, at the end of His great work, coiled Himself
up in the form of a serpent at the foot of the tree
of knowledge. It was thus that He recovered from
being a God. . . . He had made everything too
beautiful. . . . The devil is simply God's moment
of idleness, on that seventh day.
"The Genealogy of Morals:
A Polemic"
The three essays which constitute this genealogy
are, as regards expression, aspiration, and the art
## p. 117 (#167) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 117
of the unexpected, perhaps the most curious
things that have ever been written. Dionysus, as
you know, is also the god of darkness. In each
case the beginning is calculated to mystify; it is
cool, scientific, even ironical, intentionally thrust
to the fore, intentionally reticent. Gradually less
calmness prevails; here and there a flash of light-
ning defines the horizon; exceedingly unpleasant
truths break upon your ears from out remote dis-
tances with a dull, rumbling sound,—until very
soon a fierce tempo is attained in which everything
presses forward at a terrible degree of tension.
At the end, in each case, amid fearful thunderclaps,
a new truth shines out between thick clouds. The
truth of the first essay is the psychology of Chris-
tianity: the birth of Christianity out of the spirit
of resentment, not, as is supposed, out of the
"Spirit,"—in all its essentials, a counter-movement,
the great insurrection against the dominion of
noble values. The second essay contains the psy-
chology of conscience: this is not, as you may be-
lieve, " the voice of God in man "; it is the instinct
of cruelty, which turns inwards once it is unable
to discharge itself outwardly. Cruelty is here ex-
posed, for the first time, as one of the oldest and
most indispensable elements in the foundation of
culture. The third essay replies to the question
as to the origin of the formidable power of the
ascetic ideal, of the priest ideal, despite the fact
that this ideal is essentially detrimental, that it is
a will to nonentity and to decadence. Reply: it
flourished not because God was active behind the
priests, as is generally believed, but because it was
## p. 117 (#168) ############################################
116
ECCE HOMO
owing to tremendous constraint, has become
accustomed to see at a great distance,—Zara-
thustra is even more far-sighted than the Tsar,—
is here forced to focus sharply that which is close
at hand, the present time, the things that lie about
him. In all the aphorisms and more particularly
in the form of this book, the reader will find the
same voluntary turning away from those instincts
which made a Zarathustra a possible feat. Re-
finement in form, in aspiration, and in the art of
keeping silent, are its more or less obvious quali-
ties; psychology is handled with deliberate hard-
ness and cruelty,—the whole book does not con-
tain one single good-natured word. . . . All this
sort of thing refreshes a man. Who can guess
the kind of recreation that is necessary after such
an expenditure of goodness as is to be found in
Zarathustra? From a theological standpoint-
now pay ye heed; for it is but on rare occasions
that I speak as a theologian-it was God Himself
who, at the end of His great work, coiled Himself
up in the form of a serpent at the foot of the tree
of knowledge. It was thus that He recovered from
being a God. . . . He had made everything too
beautiful. . . . The devil is simply God's moment
of idleness, on that seventh day.
“THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS:
A POLEMIC”
The three essays which constitute this genealogy
are, as regards expression, aspiration, and the art
## p. 117 (#169) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 117
of the unexpected, perhaps the most curious
things that have ever been written. . Dionysus, as
you know, is also the god of darkness. In each
case the beginning is calculated to mystify; it is
cool, scientific, even ironical, intentionally thrust
to the fore, intentionally reticent. Gradually less
calmness prevails; here and there a flash of light-
ning defines the horizon; exceedingly unpleasant
truths break upon your ears from out remote dis-
tances with a dull, rumbling sound,—until very
soon a fierce tempo is attained in which everything
presses forward at a terrible degree of tension.
At the end, in each case, amid fearful thunderclaps,
a new truth shines out between thick clouds. The
truth of the first essay is the psychology of Chris-
tianity: the birth of Christianity out of the spirit
of resentment, not, as is supposed, out of the
“Spirit,"—in all its essentials, a counter-movement,
the great insurrection against the dominion of
noble values. The second essay contains the psy-
chology of conscience: this is not, as you may be-
lieve, “the voice of God in man”; it is the instinct
of cruelty, which turns inwards once it is unable
to discharge itself outwardly. Cruelty is here ex-
posed, for the first time, as one of the oldest and
most indispensable elements in the foundation of
culture. The third essay replies to the question
as to the origin of the formidable power of the
ascetic ideal, of the priest ideal, despite the fact
that this ideal is essentially detrimental, that it is
a will to nonentity and to decadence. Reply : it
flourished not because God was active behind the
priests, as is generally believed, but because it was
## p. 117 (#170) ############################################
116
ECCE HOMO
owing to tremendous constraint, has become
accustomed to see at a great distance, -Zara-
thustra is even more far-sighted than the Tsar,—
is here forced to focus sharply that which is close
at hand, the present time, the things that lie about
him. In all the aphorisms and more particularly
in the form of this book, the reader will find the
same voluntary turning away from those instincts
which made a Zarathustra a possible feat. Re-
finement in form, in aspiration, and in the art of
keeping silent, are its more or less obvious quali-
ties; psychology is handled with deliberate hard-
ness and cruelty,—the whole book does not con-
tain one single good-natured word. . . . All this
sort of thing refreshes a man. Who can guess
the kind of recreation that is necessary after such
an expenditure of goodness as is to be found in
Zarathustra ? From a theological standpoint-
now pay ye heed; for it is but on rare occasions
that I speak as a theologian—it was God Himself
who, at the end of His great work, coiled Himself
up in the form of a serpent at the foot of the tree
of knowledge. It was thus that He recovered from
being a God. . . . He had made everything too
beautiful. . . . The devil is simply God's moment
of idleness, on that seventh day.
“ THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS:
A POLEMIC
g
en
The three essays which cor
are, as regards expression,
## p. 117 (#171) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 117
of the unexpected, perhaps the most curious
things that have ever been written. Dionysus, as
you know, is also the god of darkness. In each
case the beginning is calculated to mystify; it is
cool, scientific, even ironical, intentionally thrust
to the fore, intentionally reticent. Gradually less
calmness prevails; here and there a flash of light-
ning defines the horizon ; exceedingly unpleasant
truths break upon your ears from out remote dis-
tances with a dull, rumbling sound,—until very
soon a fierce tempo is attained in which everything
presses forward at a terrible degree of tension.
At the end, in each case, amid fearful thunderclaps,
a new truth shines out between thick clouds. The
truth of the first essay is the psychology of Chris-
tianity: the birth of Christianity out of the spirit
of resentment, not, as is supposed, out of the
“Spirit,”—in all its essentials, a counter-movement,
the great insurrection against the dominion of
noble values. The second essay contains the psy-
chology of conscience: this is not, as you may be-
lieve, “the voice of God in man”; it is the instinct
of cruelty, which turns inwards once it is unable
to discharge itself outwardly. Cruelty is here ex-
posed, for the first time, as one of the oldest and
most indispensable elements in the foundation of
culture. The third essay replies to the question
as to the origin of the formidable power of the
ascetic ideal, of the priest ideal, despite the fact
that this ideal is essentially detrimental, that it is
a will to nonentity and to decadence. Reply : it
flourished not because God was active behind the
priests, as is generally believed, but because it was
## p. 117 (#172) ############################################
116
ECCE HOMO
owing to tremendous constraint, has become
accustomed to see at a great distance,-Zara-
thustra is even more far-sighted than the Tsar,—
is here forced to focus sharply that which is close
at hand, the present time, the things that lie about
him. In all the aphorisms and more particularly
in the form of this book, the reader will find the
same voluntary turning away from those instincts
which made a Zarathustra a possible feat. Re-
finement in form, in aspiration, and in the art of
keeping silent, are its more or less obvious quali-
ties; psychology is handled with deliberate hard-
ness and cruelty,—the whole book does not con-
tain one single good-natured word. . . . All this
sort of thing refreshes a man. Who can guess
the kind of recreation that is necessary after such
an expenditure of goodness as is to be found in
Zarathustra? From a theological standpoint-
now pay ye heed; for it is but on rare occasions
that I speak as a theologian-it was God Himself
who, at the end of His great work, coiled Himself
up in the form of a serpent at the foot of the tree
of knowledge. It was thus that He recovered from
being a God. . . . He had made everything too
beautiful. . . . The devil is simply God's moment
of idleness, on that seventh day.
“ THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS:
A POLEMIC”
The three essays which constitute this genealogy
are, as regards expression, aspiration, and the art
## p. 117 (#173) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 117
of the unexpected, perhaps the most curious
things that have ever been written. Dionysus, as
you know, is also the god of darkness. In each
case the beginning is calculated to mystify; it is
cool, scientific, even ironical, intentionally thrust
to the fore, intentionally reticent. Gradually less
calmness prevails; here and there a flash of light-
ning defines the horizon; exceedingly unpleasant
truths break upon your ears from out remote dis-
tances with a dull, rumbling sound,—until very
soon a fierce tempo is attained in which everything
presses forward at a terrible degree of tension.
At the end, in each case, amid fearful thunderclaps,
a new truth shines out between thick clouds. The
truth of the first essay is the psychology of Chris-
tianity: the birth of Christianity out of the spirit
of resentment, not, as is supposed, out of the
“Spirit,"—in all its essentials, a counter-movement,
the great insurrection against the dominion of
noble values. The second essay contains the psy-
chology of conscience: this is not, as you may be-
lieve, “the voice of God in man”; it is the instinct
of cruelty, which turns inwards once it is unable
to discharge itself outwardly. Cruelty is here ex-
posed, for the first time, as one of the oldest and
most indispensable elements in the foundation of
culture. The third essay replies to the question
as to the origin of the formidable power of the
ascetic ideal, of the priest ideal, despite the fact
that this ideal is essentially detrimental, that it is
a will to nonentity and to decadence. Reply : it
flourished not because God was active behind the
priests, as is generally believed, but because it was
## p. 118 (#174) ############################################
Il8 ECCE HOMO
a faute de mieux—from the fact that hitherto it
has been the only ideal and has had no competitors.
"For man prefers to aspire to nonentity than not
to aspire at all. " But above all, until the time of
Zarathustra there was no such thing as a counter-
ideal. You have understood my meaning. Three
decisive overtures on the part of a psychologist
to a Transvaluation of all Values. —This book
contains the first psychology of the priest.
"The Twilight of the Idols:
How to Philosophise with the Hammer"
This work—which covers scarcely one hundred
and fifty pages, with its cheerful and fateful tone,
like a laughing demon, and the production of which
occupied so few days that I hesitate to give their
number—is altogether an exception among books:
there is no work more rich in substance, more
independent, more upsetting—more wicked. If
any one should desire to obtain a rapid sketch
of how everything, before my time, was standing
on its head, he should begin reading me in this
book. That which is called " Idols" on the title
page is simply the old truth that has been be-
lieved in hitherto. In plain English, The Twi-
light of the Idols means that the old truth is on its
last legs.
## p. 119 (#175) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 119
There is no reality, no "ideality," which has
not been touched in this book (touched! what a
cautious euphemism ! ). Not only the eternal idols,
but also the youngest—that is to say, the most
senile: modern ideas, for instance. A strong
wind blows between the trees and in all directions
fall the fruit—the truths. There is the waste of
an all-too-rich autumn in this book : you trip over
truths. You even crush some to death, there are
too many of them. Those things that you can
grasp, however, are quite unquestionable ; they are
irrevocable decrees. I alone have the criterion of
"truths" in my possession. I alone can decide.
It would seem as if a second consciousness had
grown up in me, as if the "life-will" in me had
thrown a light upon the downward path along
which it has been running throughout the ages.
The downward path—hitherto this had been called
the road to "Truth. " All obscure impulse—
"darkness and dismay "—is at an end, the "good
man" was precisely he who was least aware of the
proper way. * And, speaking in all earnestness,
no one before me knew the proper way, the way
upwards: only after my time could men once
more find hope, life-tasks, and roads mapped out
* A witty reference to Goethe's well-known passage in the
Prologue to Faust:—
"A good man, though in darkness and dismay,
May still be conscious of the proper way. "
The words are spoken by the Lord. —Tr.
## p. 120 (#176) ############################################
120 ECCE HOMO
that lead to culture—/ am the joyful harbinger of
this culture. . . . On this account alone I am also
a fatality.
Immediately after the completion of the above-
named work, and without letting even one day go
by, I tackled the formidable task of the Transvalua-
tion with a supreme feeling of pride which nothing
could equal; and, certain at each moment of my
immortality, I cut sign after sign upon tablets of
brass with the sureness of Fate. The Preface came
into being on 3rd September 1888. When, after
having written it down, I went out into the open
that morning, I was greeted by the most beautiful
day I had ever seen in the Upper Engadine—clear,
glowing with colour, and presenting all the contrasts
and all the intermediary gradations between ice and
the south. I left Sils-Maria only on the 20th of
September. I had been forced to delay my depart-
ure owing to floods, and I was very soon, and for
some days, the only visitor in this wonderful spot,
on which my gratitude bestows the gift of an im-
mortal name. After a journey that was full of incid-
ents, and not without danger to life,—as for instance
at Como, which was flooded when I reached it in
the dead of night,—I got to Turin on the afternoon
of the 21 st. Turin is the only suitable place for
me, and it shall be my home henceforward. I took
the same lodgings as I had occupied in the spring,
6111 Via Carlo Alberto, opposite the mighty Palazzo
Carignano, in which Vittorio Emanuele was born;
and I had a view of the Piazza Carlo Alberto and
## p. 121 (#177) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 121
above it across to the hills. Without hesitating, or
allowing myself to be disturbed for a single moment,
I returned to my work, only the last quarter of
which had still tobewritten. On the 30th September,
tremendous triumph; the seventh day; the leisure
of a god on the banks of the Po. * On the same
day, I wrote the Preface to The Twilight of the
Idols, the correction of the proofs of which provided
me with recreation during the month of September.
Never in my life have I experienced such an
autumn; nor had I ever imagined that such things
were possible on earth—a Claude Lorrain extended
to infinity, each day equal to the last in its wild
perfection.
"The Case of Wagner-.
A Musician's Problem"
In order to do justice to this essay a man ought
to suffer from the fate of music as from an open
wound. —From what do I suffer when I suffer from
the fate of music? From the fact that music has
lost its world-transfiguring, yea-saying character—
that it is decadent music and no longer the flute of
Dionysus. Supposing, however, that the fate of
music be as dear to man as his own life, because
joy and suffering are alike bound up with it; then
he will find this pamphlet comparatively mild and
* There is a wonderful promenade along the banks of
the Po, for which Turin is famous, and of which Nietzsche
was particularly fond. —Tr.
## p. 122 (#178) ############################################
122 ECCE HOMO
full of consideration. To be cheerful in such circum-
stances, and laugh good-naturedly with others at
one's self,—ridendo dicere severum* when the verunt
dicere would justify every sort of hardness,—is
humanity itself. Who doubts that I, old artillery-
man that I am, would be able if I liked to point
my heavy guns at Wagner ? —Everything decisive
in this question I kept to myself—I have loved
Wagner. —After all, an attack upon a more than
usually subtle " unknown person" whom another
would not have divined so easily, lies in the mean-
ing and path of my life-task. Oh, I have still quite
a number of other " unknown persons " to unmask
besides a Cagliostro of Music! Above all, I have
to direct an attack against the German people, who,
in matters of the spirit, grow every day more In-
dolent, poorer in instincts, and more honest; who,
with an appetite for which they are to be envied,
continue to diet themselves on contradictions, and
gulp down "Faith" in company with science,
Christian love together with anti-Semitism, and
the will to power (to the " Empire "), dished up with
the gospel of the humble, without showing the
slightest signs of indigestion. Fancy this absence
of party-feeling in the presence of opposites! Fancy
this gastric neutrality and "disinterestedness"!
Behold this sense of justice in the German palate,
which can grant equal rights to all,—which finds
everything tasteful! Without a shadow of a doubt
the Germans are idealists. When I was last in
Germany, I found German taste striving to grant
* The motto of The Case of Wagner. —Tr.
## p. 123 (#179) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 123
Wagner and the Trumpeter of Sdkkingen * equal
rights; while I myself witnessed the attempts of the
people of Leipzig to do honour to one of the most
genuineand most German of musicians,—using Ger-
man here in the old sense of the word,—a man who
was no mere German of the Empire, the master
Heinrich Schiitz, by founding a Liszt Society, the
object of which was to cultivate and spread artful
{listige t) Church music. Without a shadow of doubt
the Germans are idealists.
But here nothing shall stop me from being rude,
and from telling the Germans one or two unpleasant
home truths: who else would do it if I did not?
I refer to their laxity in matters historical. Not
only have the Germans entirely lost the breadth of
vision which enables one to grasp the course of cul-
ture and the values of culture; not only are they
one and all political (or Church) puppets; but they
have also actually put a ban upon this very breadth
of vision. A man must first and foremost be " Ger-
man," he must belong to " the race "; then only can
he pass judgment upon all values and lack of values
in history—then only can he establish them. . . . To
be German is in itself an argument, " Germany,
Germany above all," J is a principle; the Germans
* An opera by Nessler which was all the rage in Germany
twenty years ago. —Tr.
+ Unfortunately it is impossible to render this play on the
words in English. —Tr.
X The German National Song (Deutschland, Deutschland
titer alles). —Tn.
## p. 124 (#180) ############################################
124 ECCE HOMO
stand for the "moral order of the universe" in history;
compared with the Roman Empire, they are the up-
holders of freedom; compared with the eighteenth
century, they are the restorers of morality, of the
"Categorical Imperative. " There is such a thing
as the writing of history according to the lights of
Imperial Germany; there is, I fear, anti-Semitic
history—there is also history written with an eye
to the Court, and Herr von Treitschke is not
ashamed of himself. Quite recently an idiotic
opinion in historicis, an observation of Vischer the
Swabian aesthete, since happily deceased, made the
round of the German newspapers as a "truth" to
which every German must assent.
The observation
was this: "The Renaissance and the Reformation
only together constitute a whole—the aesthetic re-
birth, and the moral rebirth. " When I listen to
such things, I lose all patience, and I feel inclined,
I even feel it my duty, to tell the Germans, for once
in a way, all that they have on their conscience.
Every gi-eat crime against culture for the last four
centuries lies on their conscience. . . . And always
for the same reason, always owing to their bottom-
less cowardice in the face of reality, which is also
cowardice in the face of truth; always owing to the
love of falsehood which has become almost instinc-
tive in them—in short, "idealism. " It was the
Germans who caused Europe to lose the fruits, the
whole meaning of her last period of greatness—the
period of the Renaissance. At a moment when a
higher order of values, values that were noble, that
said yea to life, and that guaranteed a future, had
succeeded in triumphing over the opposite values,
## p. 125 (#181) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 125
the values of degeneration, in the very seat of
Christianity itself,—and even in the hearts of those
sitting there,—Luther, that cursed monk, not only
restored the Church, but, what was a thousand times
worse, restored Christianity, and at a time too when
it lay defeated. Christianity, the Denial of the Will
to Live, exalted to a religion! Luther was an im-
possible monk who, thanks to his own "impossi-
bility," attacked the Church, and in so doing restored
it! Catholics would be perfectly justified in cele-
brating feasts in honour of Luther, and in produc-
ing festival plays * in his honour. Luther and the
"rebirth of morality "! May all psychology go to
the devil! Without a shadow of a doubt the Ger-
mans are idealists. On two occasions when, at the
cost of enormous courage and self-control, an up-
right, unequivocal, and perfectly scientific attitude
of mind had been attained, the Germans were able
to discover back stairs leading down to the old
"ideal" again, compromises between truth and the
"ideal," and, in short, formulas for the right to reject
science and to perpetrate falsehoods. Leibniz and
Kant—these two great breaks upon the intellectual
honesty of Europe! Finally, at a moment when
there appeared on the bridge that spanned two cen-
turies of decadence, a superior force of genius and
will which was strong enough to consolidate Europe
and to convert it into a political and economic unit,
with the object of ruling the world, the Germans,
with their Wars of Independence, robbed Europe
* Ever since the year 1617 such plays have been produced
by the Protestants of Germany. —Tr.
## p. 126 (#182) ############################################
126 ECCE HOMO
of the significance—the marvellous significance, of
Napoleon's life. And in so doing they laid on their
conscience everything that followed, everything that
exists to-day,—this sickliness and want of reason
which is most opposed to culture, and which is called
Nationalism,—this nivrose nationale from which
Europe is suffering acutely; this eternal subdivision
of Europe into petty states, with politics on a muni-
cipal scale: they have robbed Europe itself of its
significance, of its reason,—and have stuffed it into
a cul-de-sac. Is there any one except me who
knows the way out of this cul-de-sac? Does any-
one except me know of an aspiration which would
be great enough to bind the people of Europe once
more together?
And after all, why should I not express my
suspicions? In my case, too, the Germans will
attempt to make a great fate give birth merely to
a mouse. Up to the present they have compro-
mised themselves with me; I doubt whether the
future will improve them. Alas! how happy I
should be to prove a false prophet in this matter!
My natural readers and listeners are already Rus-
sians, Scandinavians, and Frenchmen—will they
always be the same? In the history of knowledge,
Germans are represented only by doubtful names,
they have been able to produce only " unconscious"
swindlers (this word applies to Fichte, Schelling,
Schopenhauer, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, just as
well as to Kant or Leibniz; they were all mere
## p. 127 (#183) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 127
Schleiermachers). * The Germans must not have
the honour of seeing, the first upright intellect in
their history of intellects, that intellect in which
truth ultimately got the better of the fraud of four
thousand years, reckoned as one with the German
intellect. "German intellect" is my foul air: I
breathe with difficulty in the neighbourhood of this
psychological uncleanliness that has now become
instinctive—an uncleanliness which in every word
and expression betrays a German. They have
never undergone a seventeenth century of hard self-
examination, as the French have,—a La Roche-
foucauld, a Descartes, are a thousand times more
upright than the very first among Germans,—the
latter have not yet had any psychologists. But
psychology is almost the standard of measurement
for the cleanliness or uncleanliness of a race. . . .
For if a man is not even clean, how can he be deep?
The Germans are like women, you can scarcely ever
fathom their depths—they haven't any, and that's
the end of it. Thus they cannot even be called
shallow. That which is called " deep " in Germany,
is precisely this instinctive uncleanliness towards
one's self, of which I have just spoken : people refuse
to be clear in regard to their own natures. Might
I be allowed, perhaps, to suggest the word " Ger-
man " as an international epithet denoting this psy-
chological depravity ? —At the moment of writing,
for instance, the German Emperor is declaring it to
be his Christian duty to liberate the slaves in Africa;
* Schleiermacker literally means a weaver or maker of veils.
-Tr.
## p. 128 (#184) ############################################
128 ECCE HOMO
among us Europeans, then, this would be called
simply "German. " . . . Have the Germans ever
produced even a book that had depth? They are
lacking in the mere idea of what constitutes a book.
I have known scholars who thought that Kant was
deep. At the Court of Prussia I fear that Herr
von Treitschke is regarded as deep. And when I
happen to praise Stendhal as a deep psychologist,
I have often been compelled, in the company of
German University Professors, to spell his name
aloud.
4
And why should I not proceed to the end? I
am fond of clearing the air. It is even part of my
ambition to be considered as essentially a despiser
of Germans. I expressed my suspicions of the
German character even at the age of six-and-twenty
(see Thoughts out of Season, vol. ii. pp. 164, 165),
—to my mind the Germans are impossible. When
I try to think of the kind of man who is opposed
to me in all my instincts, my mental image takes
the form of a German. The first thing I ask my-
self when I begin analysing a man, is, whether he
has a feeling for distance in him; whether he sees
rank, gradation, and order everywhere between man
and man; whether he makes distinctions; for this
is what constitutes a gentleman. Otherwise he be-
longs hopelessly to that open-hearted, open-minded
—alas! and always very good-natured species, la
canaille! But the Germans are canaille—alas!
they are so good-natured! A man lowers himself
by frequenting the society of Germans: the German
places every one on an equal footing. With the
## p. 129 (#185) ############################################
WHY I WRITE SUCH EXCELLENT BOOKS 129
exception of my intercourse with one or two artists,
and above all with Richard Wagner, I cannot say
that I have spent one pleasant hour with Germans.
Suppose, for one moment, that the profoundest
spirit of all ages were to appear among Germans,
then one of the saviours of the Capitol would be
sure to arise and declare that his own ugly soul
was just as great. I can no longer abide this race
with which a man is always in bad company, which
has no idea of nuances—woe to me! I am a nuance
—and which has not esprit in its feet, and cannot
even walk withal! In short, the Germans have no
feet at all, they simply have legs. The Germans have
not the faintest idea of how vulgar they are—but this
in itself is the acme of vulgarity,—they are not even
ashamed of being merely Germans. They will have
their say in everything, they regard themselves as
fit to decide all questions; I even fear that they
have decided about me. My whole life is essenti-
ally a proof of this remark. In vain have I sought
among them for a sign of tact and delicacy towards
myself. Among Jews I did indeed find it, but not
among Germans. I am so constituted as to be
gentle and kindly to every one,—I have the right
not to draw distinctions,—but this does not prevent
my eyes from being open. I except no one, and
least of all my friends,—I only trust that this has
not prejudiced my reputation for humanity among
them? There are five or six things which I have
always made points of honour. Albeit, the truth
remains that for many years I have considered
almost every letter that has reached me as a piece
of cynicism. There is more cynicism in an attitude
1
## p. 130 (#186) ############################################
130 ECCE HOMO
of goodwill towards me than in any sort of hatred.
I tell every friend to his face that he has never
thought it worth his while to study any one of my
writings: from the slightest hints I gather that they
do not even know what lies hidden in my books.
And with regard even to my Zarathustra, which of
my friends would have seen more in it than a piece
of unwarrantable, though fortunately harmless, ar-
rogance? Ten years have elapsed, and no one has
yet felt it a duty to his conscience to defend my
name against the absurd silence beneath which it
has been entombed. It was a foreigner, a Dane,
who first showed sufficient keenness of instinct and
of courage to do this, and who protested indignantly
against my so-called friends. At what German
University to-day would such lectures on my philo-
sophy be possible, as those which Dr. Brandes de-
livered last spring in Copenhagen, thus proving once
more his right to the title psychologist? For my
part, these things have never caused me any pain;
that which is necessary does not offend me. Amor
fati is the core of my nature. This, however, does
not alter the fact that I love irony and even world-
historic irony. And thus, about two years before
hurling the destructive thunderbolt of the Trans-
valuation, which will send the whole of civilisation
into convulsions, I sent my Case of Wagner out
into the world. The Germans were given the chance
of blundering and immortalising their stupidity once
more on my account, and they still have just enough
time to do it in. And have they fallen in with my
plans? Admirably! my dear Germans. Allow
me to congratulate you.
## p. 131 (#187) ############################################
WHY I AM A FATALITY
I KNOW my destiny. There will come a day
when my name will recall the memory of some-
thing formidable—a crisis the like of which has
never been known on earth, the memory of the
most profound clash of consciences, and the passing
of a sentence upon all that which theretofore had
been believed, exacted, and hallowed. I am not a
man, I am dynamite. And with it all there is
nought of the founder of a religion in me. Re-
ligions are matters for the mob; after coming in
contact with a religious man, I always feel that I
must wash my hands. . . . I require no "be-
lievers," it is my opinion that I am too full of
malice to believe even in myself; I never address
myself to masses. I am horribly frightened that
one day I shall be pronounced "holy. " You will
understand why I publish this book beforehand—
it is to prevent people from wronging me. I refuse
to be a saint; I would rather be a clown. Maybe
I am a clown. And I am notwithstanding, or
rather not /^^withstanding, the mouthpiece of
truth; for nothing more blown-out with falsehood
has ever existed, than a saint. But my truth is
terrible: for hitherto lies have been called truth.
The Transvaluation of all Values, this is my formula
for mankind's greatest step towards coming to its
'3'
## p. 132 (#188) ############################################
132 ECCE HOMO
senses—a step which in me became flesh and
genius. My destiny ordained that I should be the
first decent human being, and that I should feel
myself opposed to the falsehood of millenniums. I
was the first to discover truth, and for the simple
reason that I was the first who became conscious
of falsehood as falsehood—that is to say, I smelt
it as such. My genius resides in my nostrils. I
contradict as no one has contradicted hitherto, and
am nevertheless the reverse of a negative spirit I
am the harbinger of joy, the like of which has never
existed before; I have discovered tasks of such
lofty greatness that, until my time, no one had any
idea of such things. Mankind can begin to have
fresh hopes, only now that I have lived. Thus, I
am necessarily a man of Fate. For when Truth
enters the lists against the falsehood of ages, shocks
are bound to ensue, and a spell of earthquakes,
followed by the transposition of hills and valleys,
such as the world has never yet imagined even in
its dreams. The concept " politics " then becomes
elevated entirely to the sphere of spiritual warfare.
All the mighty realms of the ancient order of
society are blown into space—for they are all based
on falsehood: there will be wars, the like of which
have never been seen on earth before. Only from
my time and after me will politics on a large scale
exist on earth.
If you should require a formula for a destiny of
this kind that has taken human form, you will find
it in my Zarathustra,
## p. 133 (#189) ############################################
WHY I AM A FATALITY 133
"And he who would be a creator in good and
evil—verily, he must first be a destroyer, and break
values into pieces.
"Thus the greatest evil belongeth unto the
greatest good: but this is the creative good. "
I am by far the most terrible man that has ever
existed; but this does not alter the fact that I shall
become the most beneficent. I know the joy of
annihilation to a degree which is commensurate
with my power to annihilate. In both cases I obey
my Dionysian nature, which knows not how to
separate the negative deed from the saying of yea.
I am the first immoralist, and in this sense I am
essentially the annihilator.
People have never asked me as they should have
done, what the name of Zarathustra precisely meant
in my mouth, in the mouth of-the first immoralist;
for that which distinguishes this Persian from all
others in the past is the very fact that he was the
exact reverse of an immoralist. Zarathustra was
the first to see in the struggle between good and
evil the essential wheel in the working of things.
The translation of morality into the realm of meta-
physics, as force, cause, end-in-itself, is his work.
But the very question suggests its own answer.
Zarathustra created this most portentous of all
errors,—morality; therefore he must be the first
to expose it. Not only because he has had longer
and greater experience of the subject than any other
thinker,—all history is indeed the experimental re-
## p. 134 (#190) ############################################
134 ECCE HOMO
futation of the theory of the so-called moral order
of things,—but because of the more important fact
that Zarathustra was the most truthful of thinkers.
In his teaching alone is truthfulness upheld as the
highest virtue—that is to say, as the reverse of the
cowardice of the " idealist" who takes to his heels
at the sight of reality. Zarathustra has more pluck
in his body than all other thinkers put together.
To tell the truth and to aim straight: that is the
first Persian virtue. Have I made myself clear?
. . . The overcoming of morality by itself, through
truthfulness, the moralist's overcoming of himself in
his opposite—in me—that is what the name Zara-
thustra means in my mouth.
In reality two negations are involved in my title
Immoralist. I first of all deny the type of man
that has hitherto been regarded as the highest—the
good, the kind, and the charitable; and I also deny
that kind of morality which has become recognised
and paramount as morality-in-itself—I speak of
the morality of decadence, or, to use a still cruder
term, Christian morality. I would agree to the
second of the two negations being regarded as the
more decisive, for, reckoned as a whole, the over-
estimation of goodness and kindness seems to me
already a consequence of decadence, a symptom of
weakness, and incompatible with any ascending and
yea-saying life. Negation and annihilation are in-
separable from a yea-saying attitude towards life.
Let me halt for a moment at the question of the
## p. 135 (#191) ############################################
WHY I AM A FATALITY 135
psychology of the good man. In order to appraise
the value of a certain type of man, the cost of his
maintenance must be calculated,—and the condi-
tions of his existence must be known. The con-
dition of the existence of the good is falsehood:
or, otherwise expressed, the refusal at any price to
see how reality is actually constituted. The refusal
to see that this reality is not so constituted as
always to be stimulating beneficent instincts, and
still less, so as to suffer at all moments the intrusion
of ignorant and good-natured hands. To consider
distress of all kinds as an objection, as something
which must be done away with, is the greatest non-
sense on earth; generally speaking, it is nonsense
of the most disastrous sort, fatal in its stupidity—
almost as mad as the will to abolish bad weather,
out of pity for the poor, so to speak. In the great
economy of the whole universe, the terrors of reality
(in the passions, in the desires, in the will to power)
are incalculably more necessary than that form of
petty happiness which is called " goodness "; it is
even needful to practise leniency in order so much
as to allow the latter a place at all, seeing that it
is based upon a falsification of the instincts. I shall
have an excellent opportunity of showing the incal-
culably calamitous consequences to the whole of
history, of the credo of optimism, this monstrous
offspring of the homines optimi. Zarathustra,* the
first who recognised that the optimist is just as
degenerate as the pessimist, though perhaps more
* Needless to say this is Nietzsche, and no longer the
Persian. —Tr.
## p. 136 (#192) ############################################
I36 ECCE HOMO
detrimental, says: "Good men never speak the
truth. False shores and false harbours were ye
taught by the good. In the lies of the good were
ye born and bred. Through the good everything
hath become false and crooked front the roots"
Fortunately the world is not built merely upon
those instincts which would secure to the good-
natured herd animal his paltry happiness. To desire
everybody to become a " good man," " a gregarious
animal,' "a blue-eyed, benevolent, beautiful soul,"
or—as Herbert Spencer wished—a creature of al-
truism, would mean robbing existence of its greatest
character, castrating man, and reducing humanity
to a sort of wretched Chinadom. And this some
have tried to do! It is precisely this that men
called morality. In this sense Zarathustra calls "the
good," now "the last men," and anon "the be-
ginning of the end "; and above all, he considers
them as the most detrimental kind of men, because
they secure their existence at the cost of Truth and
at the cost of the Future.
"The good—they cannot create; they are ever
the beginning of the end.
"They crucify him who writeth new values on
new tables; they sacrifice unto themselves the future;
they crucify the whole future of humanity!
"The good—they are ever the beginning of the
end.
"And whatever harm the slanderers of the world
may do, the harm of the good is the most calamitous
of all harm! '
## p. 137 (#193) ############################################
WHY I AM A FATALITY 137
Zarathustra, as the first psychologist of the good
man, is perforce the friend of the evil man. When
a degenerate kind of man has succeeded to the
highest rank among the human species, his position
must have been gained at the cost of the reverse
type—at the cost of the strong man who is certain
of life. When the gregarious animal stands in the
glorious rays of the purest virtue, the exceptional
man must be degraded to the rank of the evil. If
falsehood insists at all costs on claiming the word
"truth " for its own particular standpoint, the really
truthful man must be sought out among the de-
spised. Zarathustra allows of no doubt here; he
says that it was precisely the knowledge of the
good, of the "best," which inspired his absolute
horror of men. And it was out of this feeling of
repulsion that he grew the wings which allowed
him to soar into remote futures. He does not
conceal the fact that his type of man is one which
is relatively superhuman—especially as opposed to
the "good" man, and that the good and the just
would regard his superman as the devil.
"Ye higher men, on whom my gaze now falls, this
is the doubt that ye wake in my breast, and this is
my secret laughter: methinks ye would call my
Superman—the devil! So strange are ye in your
souls to all that is great, that the Superman would
be terrible in your eyes for his goodness. "
It is from this passage, and from no other, that
you must set out to understand the goal to which
Zarathustra aspires—the kind of man that he con-
## p. 138 (#194) ############################################
138 ECCE HOMO
ceives sees reality as it is; he is strong enough for
this—he is not estranged or far removed from it,
he is that reality himself, in his own nature can be
found all the terrible and questionable character of
reality: only thus can man have greatness.
But I have chosen the title of Immoralist as a
surname and as a badge of honour in yet another
sense; I am very proud to possess this name which
distinguishes me from all the rest of mankind. No
one hitherto has felt Christian morality beneath
him; to that end there were needed height, a re-
moteness of vision, and an abysmal psychological
depth, not believed to be possible hitherto. Up to
the present Christian morality has been the Circe of
all thinkers—they stood at her service. What man,
before my time, had descended into the under-
ground caverns from out of which the poisonous
fumes of this ideal—of this slandering of the world
—burst forth? What man had even dared to sup-
pose that they were underground caverns? Was
a single one of the philosophers who preceded me
a psychologist at all, and not the very reverse of a
psychologist—that is to say, a " superior swindler,"
an "Idealist"? Before my time there was no
psychology. To be the first in this new realm
may amount to a curse ; at all events, it is a fatality:
for one is also the first to despise. My danger is the
loathing of mankind.
