No More Learning

Objection 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less
than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those
who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater
dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have
received.

On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): "He
that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or
promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the
dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money. "

I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired
against the owner's will. For instance, if a steward were to give some
of his lord's property to a person, against his lord's will and orders,
the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our Lord,
Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered
spiritual things to be given gratis, according to Mat. 10:8, "Freely
have you received, freely give. " Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual
things in return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them.
Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying
spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced
to other punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be
clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap.
Si quis Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas].

Reply to Objection 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally,
receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the
sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the
Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, and
against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by
virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should not
busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others, namely,
that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his Order,
whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which
he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it.

Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders
simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a
benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal
transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the
law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret
he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself alone, and not
as regards others.

Reply to Objection 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one
knows to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his
command or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders
from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they
are ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a
dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive Orders
in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of
simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order without a
dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, because no one
should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an
unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law, suspended as
regards both himself and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore
no one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders from him for
any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one
ought not to give credence to another's sin, and so one ought with a
good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been
guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and the fact
be a secret, one can receive Orders from him because he is not
suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated
above (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not
only the punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of
acquiring unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot
sell it. Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives
Orders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he
deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his
order, and resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom,
but also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with
infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually
acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful
possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits,
allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits),
excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the
Church.

On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by
others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of
his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with
fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he
has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be
made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an
enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he
is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the
transaction, by paying what was promised.

Reply to Objection 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received,
must be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their
transfer, notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the
chapter of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the
losers by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the
guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire
chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of
superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church.

Reply to Objection 5: If there are any persons who have been
simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the
simony was committed with their knowledge since the holding of the
General Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A. D. 1215, held by Innocent
III], they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of
return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some
house of the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however,
this took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses
of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into
monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they wander
about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former rank,
and must be assigned a lower place.

On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their
knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting
they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.

Reply to Objection 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty
of simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is
not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to
repent of his evil intention.

Reply to Objection 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one
who has knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases
the bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all
renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive
either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the
laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to
retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater dispensation,
allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor orders; or a
full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the
same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.
__________________________________________________________________

OF PIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)

After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will
render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of inquiry
arise with regard to piety:

(1) To whom does piety extend?

(2) What does piety make one offer a person?

(3) Whether piety is a special virtue?

(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of
religion?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?

Objection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human
individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes,
properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by
the term {eusebeia}. But the worship of God does not denote relation to
man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to
certain human individuals.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): "Piety, on her day,
provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart
with works of mercy. " Now the works of mercy are to be done to all,
according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not
extend definitely to certain special persons.

Objection 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual
relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the Philosopher
states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), and on each of them is founded a kind of
friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a
gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, "Having an appearance indeed of piety [Douay:
'godliness']. " Therefore piety extends not only to one's kindred and
fellow-citizens.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by piety
that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country
and render them faithful service. "

I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways,
according to their various excellence and the various benefits received
from them. on both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely
excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government.
In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our
parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment.
Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country,
after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to
God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship
to one's parents and one's country.

The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our
kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same
parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship
given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to
all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to
these.

Reply to Objection 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the
worship due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a
particular. Hence it is written (Malach. 1:6): "If I be a father, where
is My honor? " Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine
worship.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "the term
piety is often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language
of the common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact
that God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him
than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word
'pious' to God Himself. "

Reply to Objection 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and
fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than
other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether piety provides support for our parents?

Objection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our
parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, "Honor thy
father and mother," belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the
giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide
support for one's parents.

Objection 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is
bound to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), "neither
ought the children to lay up for the parents. " Therefore piety does not
oblige them to support their parents.

Objection 3: Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also
to other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above
[3153](A[1]). But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and
fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's
parents.

On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for
hindering children from supporting their parents.

I answer that, We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to
say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that
which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's superior
through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence
and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him
to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if
he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to
his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him;
and so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service
due. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "piety gives both duty
and homage": "duty" referring to service, and "homage" to reverence or
honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), "we are said to give
homage to those whose memory or presence we honor. "

Reply to Objection 1: According to our Lord's interpretation (Mat.
15:3-6) the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe
them; and the reason for this is that support is given to one's father
because it is due to him as to one greater.

Reply to Objection 2: Since a father stands in the relation of
principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a
principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son:
and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but
for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son
to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising from some
momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay
by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the
successors of their children, but children of their parents.

Reply to Objection 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), "we offer
homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our
country"; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and
to others according to our means and their personal claims.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from
other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds
from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct
virtue from charity.

Objection 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God.
But piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ.
Dei x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.

Objection 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and
duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common
good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as a
part of justice.

I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object under a
special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in
rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of
something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing is
indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural principle of
being and government. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it
pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those who are
related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope
and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety
is a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and
country.

Reply to Objection 2: God is the principle of our being and government
in a far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence
religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety,
which pays homage to our parents and country. But things relating to
creatures are transferred to God as the summit of excellence and
causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, by way of
excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, by way of
excellence, is called "Our Father. "

Reply to Objection 3: Piety extends to our country in so far as the
latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the
good of our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal
justice has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the
sake of religion?

Objection 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents
should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Lk.
14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother,
and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life
also, he cannot be My disciple. " Hence it is said in praise of James
and John (Mat. 4:22) that they left "their nets and father, and
followed" Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites (Dt. 33:9):
"Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do not know you; and
to his brethren: I know you not; and their own children they have not
known. These have kept Thy word. " Now a man who knows not his parents
and other kinsmen, or who even hates them, must needs omit the duties
of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake
of religion.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lk. 9:59,60) that in answer to him
who said: "Suffer me first to go and bury my father," Our Lord replied:
"Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the kingdom of
God. " Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety
to bury one's father. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for
the sake of religion.

Objection 3: Further, God is called "Our Father" by excellence. Now
just as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do
we worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be
omitted for the sake of the worship of religion.

Objection 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not
break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with
those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, both
on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on
the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister without
the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of piety towards
one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion.

On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees (Mat. 15:3-6) who
taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying
one's parents the honor we owe them.

I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is
opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his
book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos. ), "good is not opposed to good. "
Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one
another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other.
Now, as stated above ([3154]FS, Q[7], A[2]; [3155]FS, Q[18], A[3]), the
act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if
it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of vice.
Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one's parents
according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that man should
tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Lk.
12:52, "the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of
kindred. "

Accordingly, if the worship of one's parents take one away from the
worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to
one's parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad
Heliod. ): "Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy
mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the
cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter. "
Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one's parents
should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God.
If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not
withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and
there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says
(Hom. xxxvii in Ev. ) that "when we find our parents to be a hindrance
in our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from
them. " For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the
service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them.
It is in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their
kindred, because they obeyed the Lord's command, and spared not the
idolaters (Ex. 32). James and John are praised for leaving their
parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to
evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another means
of livelihood, if they followed Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father
because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth. ), "Our Lord by
so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries and
other things that one anticipates under these circumstances. For after
the burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and
so forth: but chiefly, because there were others who could see to the
funeral. " Or, according to Cyril's commentary on Lk. 9, "this
disciple's request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that
he might support a yet living father in the latter's old age, until at
length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord did not grant, because
there were others, bound by the duties of kindred, to take care of
him. "

Reply to Objection 3: Whatever we give our parents out of piety is
referred by us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform
with regard to any of our neighbors are offered to God, according to
Mat. 25:40: "As long as you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you
did it to Me. " Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our
assistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided they
incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for the sake
of religion.
But if we cannot devote ourselves to their service without
sin, or if they can be supported without our assistance, it is lawful
to forego their service, so as to give more time to religion.

Reply to Objection 4: We must speak differently of one who is yet in
the world, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he
that is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support without
him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because he would be
breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of parents. Some say,
however, that even then he might abandon them, and leave them in God's
care. But this, considered aright, would be to tempt God: since, while
having human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents to danger,
in the hope of God's assistance. on the other hand, if the parents can
find means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to abandon
them and enter religion, because children are not bound to support
their parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He that
has already made his profession in religion is deemed to be already
dead to the world: wherefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting
his parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ, and
busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound,
saving his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state withal,
to make points efforts for his parents' support.
__________________________________________________________________

OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of
which will manifest the contrary vices.

Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other
virtues?

(2) What does observance offer?

(3) Of its comparison with piety.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue, distinct
from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. But
the object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety: for
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by observance that we pay
worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity. " But
worship and honor are paid also by piety to our parents, who excel in
dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct virtue from piety.

Objection 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that
are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel
in science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay
honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore
observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in
dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a
position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law,
according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute to
whom tribute is due," etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of
the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice. Therefore
observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from other
virtues.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance along
with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.

I answer that, As explained above ([3156]Q[101], AA[1],3;[3157] Q[80]),
according to the various excellences of those persons to whom something
is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of virtues in a
descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character
of principle in a particular way, which character is found in God in a
universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence
in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular
way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of
learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life:
while a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle of
government with regard to certain things: for instance, the governor of
a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of
warfare, a professor in matters of learning, and so forth. Hence it is
that all such persons are designated as "fathers," on account of their
being charged with like cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him
(4 Kings 5:13): "Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great
thing," etc.

Therefore, just as, in a manner, religion, whereby worship is given to
find piety, whereby we worship our so under piety we find observance,
whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3158]Q[101], A[3], ad 2),
religion goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although
piety properly so called is distinct from religion; and in the same way
piety can be called observance by way of excellence, although
observance properly speaking is distinct from piety.

Reply to Objection 2: By the very fact of being in a position of
dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a
certain power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he
should be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of
others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of
science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in
relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself.
Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and
honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as science,
virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity,
the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence
whatever belongs to the same virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking,
to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot
be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their
position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our
parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and
not to special justice, which is a principal virtue.

Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above
([3159]Q[58], A[6]).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are
in positions of dignity?

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay
worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according to
Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons whom we
hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the same.
Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and
honor to persons in positions of dignity.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe:
wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of
justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in
positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us.
Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and honor
to all.

Objection 3: Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity
who are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of
remuneration, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their
dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to
whom fear; honor to whom honor. " Moreover, we owe them reverence and
subjection, according to Heb. 13:17, "Obey your prelates, and be
subject to them. " Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as
paying worship and honor.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by
observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some
kind of dignity. "

I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern
subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: thus
a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a
certain excellence and power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a
person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration:
first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together with a
certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the exercise of his
government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honor,
which is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in respect of
the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting
in rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him,
according to one's faculty, for the benefits we received from him.

Reply to Objection 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also
whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations
between man and man.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3160]Q[80]), debt is twofold.
One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man
owes honor and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are
placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a
certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honor to
persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.

Reply to Objection 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in
positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is
due to them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the
exercise of their government there is due both obedience, whereby
subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes,
which are a repayment of their labor.
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Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?

Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety.
For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a
father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular
governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the
state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is
greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance
is a greater virtue than piety.

Objection 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the
common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we
ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to
expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common good.
Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in positions
of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays worship to one's
kindred.

Objection 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the
first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the virtuous
by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore
observance takes the first place after religion.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Now,
immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the first
table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers to
piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the order
of excellence.

I answer that, Something may be paid to persons in positions of dignity
in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when one serves
them in the administration of the affairs of the state. This no longer
belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays worship not only to
one's father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that which is paid
to persons in positions of dignity refers specially to their personal
usefulness or renown, and this belongs properly to observance, as
distinct from piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we
must needs take into consideration the different relations in which
other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both virtues regard.
Now it is evident that the persons of our parents and of our kindred
are more substantially akin to us than persons in positions of dignity,
since birth and education, which originate in the father, belong more
to one's substance than external government, the principle of which is
seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety
takes precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons
more akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.

Reply to Objection 1: The prince is compared to the father as a
universal to a particular power, as regards external government, but
not as regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this
way the father should be compared with the divine power from which all
things derive their being.

Reply to Objection 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are
related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to
observance, but to piety, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be
proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered
in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore,
though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of
honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a
greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received from
their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay worship and
honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are not of their
kindred.
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OF DULIA (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1)
dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto to
those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey
their commands.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?

(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?

(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are above
us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?

(4) Whether it contains several species?
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Whether honor denotes something corporal?

Objection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal.
For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be
gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is
something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated above
([3161]Q[81], A[2], ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3),
"honor is the reward of virtue. " Now, since virtue consists chiefly of
spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the reward
is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not consist of
corporal things.

Objection 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from
glory. Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor
consists of things internal and spiritual.

On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, "Honor widows
that are widows indeed," and (1 Tim. 5:17), "let the priests that rule
well be esteemed worthy of double honor" etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch. ):
"Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for remuneration. " Now both
of these pertain to spiritual things. Therefore honor consists of
corporal things.

I answer that, Honor denotes a witnessing to a person's excellence.
Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their
excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now
witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is
the searcher of hearts, the witness of one's conscience suffices.
wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere
internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges
either God's excellence or another man's excellence before God. But, as
regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs, either by
words, as when one proclaims another's excellence by word of mouth, or
by deeds, for instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by
external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like.
Accordingly honor consists of signs, external and corporal.

Reply to Objection 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the
one hand it is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one
man honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the
other hand, it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in
order that he may be held in reverence by others.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3),
honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and
corporal things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things
themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling virtue.
It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be
made known, according to Mat. 5:15, "Neither do men light a candle, and
put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all
that are in the house. " In this sense honor is said to be the reward of
virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways.
First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor
consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor.
Secondly, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a
person's excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear
witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise one that
works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even to the
best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived at the
end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).

Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our
bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his goodness becomes
clear to the knowledge of many. The word "glory" signifies this, for
"glory" is the same as {kleria}, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom.
16:27 observes that glory is "clear knowledge together with praise. "
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Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us?

Objection 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are
above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to Mat.
11:11, "He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John
the Baptist. " Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honor
him (Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to those who are above
us.

Objection 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his
virtue, as stated above [3162](A[1]; Q[63], A[3]). But sometimes those
who are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them,
as neither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in
the order of nature.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 12:10): "With honor
preventing one another," and we read (1 Pet. 2:17): "Honor all men. "
But this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are above
us. Therefore honor is not due properly to those who are above us.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that Tobias "had ten
talents of silver of that which he had been honored by the king": and
we read (Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered it
to be proclaimed in his presence: "This honor is he worthy of whom the
king hath a mind to honor. " Therefore honor is paid to those also who
are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not due
properly to those who are above us.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that "honor is due
to the best. "

I answer that, As stated above [3163](A[1]), honor is nothing but an
acknowledgment of a person's excelling goodness. Now a person's
excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor
him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in
itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is
always due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority.

For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those who
honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some
others, or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in
some respect and not simply.

Reply to Objection 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind
of honor, but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God.
Or again, he forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to
indicate the dignity of John himself, for which Christ equaled him to
the angels "according to the hope of glory of the children of God":
wherefore he refused to be honored by him as though he were superior to
him.

Reply to Objection 2: A wicked superior is honored for the excellence,
not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being God's minister, and
because the honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which
he presides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and
should be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor.

Reply to Objection 3: In every man is to be found something that makes
it possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3,
"In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves," and thus,
too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another.

Reply to Objection 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by
kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity but on
account of some excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and
Mardochaeus were honored by kings.
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Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria?

Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct from
latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, "O Lord my God, in Thee have I put my
trust," says: "Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by
creation, to Whom we owe latria. " Now the virtue directed to God as
Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as God.
Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8),
"to be loved is like being honored. " Now the charity with which we love
God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia
whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria with
which we honor God.

Objection 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an
image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the
thing represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being
made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis.
2:22,23) that "they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God
created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made
him. " Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God
is honored.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that "the homage due
to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey
their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from
latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God. "

I answer that, According to what has been stated above ([3164]Q[101],
A[3]), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there
must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is
due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is
competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has
absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly,
which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a
certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a
particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays
due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, which
pays due service to the lordship of God.