in doing this it
instrumentalizes
the suchness of things.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
) a monk who developed a view on emptiness he called 'the middle Way' or 'the middle Path'.
nagarjuna scorns the isolation of emptiness as a separate phenomenon and its articulation as a concept.
it is evident that faure's analysis does not imply that hegel was a nihil- ist, nor does it disqualify hegel's systematic philosophy as a proto-form of nihilism. if nihilism means lacking a positive and enduring foundation of the meanings, values and truths that motivate man's actions--positively formulated: stating that the basic value, meaning and truth is the 'nihil'-- then hegelian philosophy is the opposite of nihilism. however, faure's accusation stands once we acknowledge the influence of hegelianism, due to the critique it engendered and the basic concepts it provided for disil- lusioned and anti-metaphysically focused generations of scholars to come. hegel triggered ex negativo a long-lasting debate on nihilism in western thought in different registers: russian literature, modern philosophy, and postmodern politics.
in order to actualize hegel's positioning of buddhism i expose it to a more profound misunderstanding of buddhist thought. the eastern
21 morton too acknowledges that "what hegel actually produces, along with many others, is a sense of a positive nothingness that exists alongside phenomena" inspite of the fact that "he, in strictly buddhist terms, becomes guilty of the very nihilism he is berating in what he beholds" (? 6).
22 faure, Unmasking Buddhism, p. 25.
? 70 henk oosterling
reception of hegelian thought implicitly addresses his understanding of nothingness. buddhist scholars of the Kyoto school who are famous for their intercultural focus23 have explored the productive relations between buddhism and Christian thought from the other side of the divide. hegel's philosophy was already known in Japan the decades after Japan opened its borders and markets for the West in the second half of the 19th century. but it was the centenary of his death in 1931 that caused a breakthrough,24 as happened in france under the guidance of Alexander Koje`ve. 25 the most prominent philosopher who integrated hegelianism in Japanese thought was Kitaro nishida (1870-1945). this founding father of the Kyoto school stressed the relational focus of hegel's thinking and thematized an experiential nothingness. 26 nihilism was further explored by nishida's former student Keiji nishitani (1900-1990) who, after hav- ing studied in germany and having persuaded Karl lo? with to come and teach in Japan, wrote extensively on nihilism. 27 masao Abe (1915-2006) deepened the insights in the relation between emptiness and affirmation focusing on the suchness (sanskrit: tathata? ; Jap. konomama) of things. A brief survey of their ideas redirects hegel's notion of 'emptiness'.
Nishida: Pure Experience in Between of General and Particular
the maha? ya? na concept of ? Absolute nothingness? (zettai mu) is the foun- dational concept of nishida's philosophy. like hegel nishida too under- stands the 'self' in terms of a contradictory identity: it is both A & -A.
23 see: rolf elberfeld, Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945), Das Verstehen der Kulturen. Mod- erne japanische Philosophie und die Frage nach der Interkulturalita? t, Amsterdam/Atlanta: rodopi 1999, chapter 3.
24 see: gino Piovesana, Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought 1892-1996. A Survey, tokyo: Japan library 1997, p. 169.
25 Koje`ve proposed a philosophical anthropological reading of hegel's dialectical phi- losophy. his courses influenced many a hegelian critical adept: georges bataille, Jacques lacan, Jean hippolyte and Jean-Paul sartre attended his courses. After World War ii Koje`ve unfolded a futuristic vision in which Japanese consciousness and aestheticism played a crucial role in the realization of hegel's idea of man's ultimate way of living after 'the end of history'. francis fukuyama's famous book on this topic refers more to Koje`ve than to hegel.
26 see: david dilworth, (transl. ) Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, by nishida Kitaro: ? the logic of the Place of nothingness and the religious Worldview? (basho-teki ronri to shukyo-teki sekaikan), honolulu: university of hawaii Press, 1987. nishida frequently discussed his ideas with daisetz t. suzuki, the Zen scholar who would later bring Zen to the West. see: daisetz t. suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, Princeton: Princeton uP, 1970 (orig. 1938).
27 Keiji nishitani, The Self-Overcoming of NIHILISM, Albany: suny Press 1990.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 71
however, for him 'essence' that precedes the rupture between subject and object, is realized--in the twofold meaning of the word--not as a concept but as a pure experience ( junsui keiken)--a notion he picked up in the work of William James--that cannot be grasped in discursive arguments. When nishida speaks about pure experience as enlightenment, he has Zen's satori in mind. Against this background nishida, a Zen practitioner himself, defines enlightenment as ? the ultimate seeing of the bottomless nothingness of the self. ? 28
in hegelian terms, what is problematized here is the dialectical ten- sion between the general and the particular, the one and the many or the whole and its parts. these are tensionally unified in the singular. this however is not a conceptual unison, let alone a notional sublation. for nishida the one and the many coincide as absolute contradictory self- identity (zettai mujunteki jiko doitsu). the self however is not understood as the unity of consciousness: "in the depths of our selves there is nothing to be found; everywhere is ? nothingness? ; instead we find absolute ? unity? , by transcending everything related to the self. "29 no-thing or nothingness is not a concept, it is an experience of being fully related to everything and nothing in particular.
there is a metalogical problem as well. for an identity to be truly con- tradictory one has to suppose that both sides of the logical dichotomy are true, since this is what makes them contradictory. but for buddhists there is no such assertion. buddhist thought denies a permanent, self-identical entity through time. moreover, the totality of all there is is not a thing. its negation therefore is not a thing either. Just like that of its parts the 'thingness' of the whole--and by implication of emptiness as lack of this substantial whole--results from fixations of ever changing interacting forces on different scales. teleology does not direct these interactions. the contradiction is ephemeral. only 'extreme' hypostasized notions of an atomic, unchanging being or deterministic causality might produce a contradiction. instead of substantial identity--the 'i= not i' in a fichtean articulation--nishida stresses the interrelated nature between parts both within individuals and between them as parts of a whole. 30
Pure experience is the experience of what unites in difference. it is a corporeal experience of embedded relationality, superseding the
28 idem, p. 81.
29 dilworth, Last Writings, p. 110.
30 see: elberfeld, Das Verstehen der Kulturen, pp. 110/138 ff.
? 72 henk oosterling
Cartesian and Kantian dualities of mind-body and subject-object. As 'cor- poreal' realization--the thinking posture of the toe sucking 'buddha'--it can only be grasped in spatial terms. the issue in Kyoto Zen buddhist thought is not time but place. nishida refers to Plato's chora, as the form of all forms that itself in not yet formed, but that is perhaps too metaphys- ical a comparison. Place or basho must be understood beyond the duality of matter and form or the mind-body dichotomy as a physically oriented field of consciousness, a being-in or an inbetweenness. 31
nishida's logic of place (basho) focuses on form. the Japanese word for form is kata. this word also describes the repetitive practice of basis techniques in the martial arts: as a dance of stylized forms that 'flow' with- out intention from the body of the martial artist. but it too counts for tea ceremony (cha do) or flower arrangement (ikebana). it is all about finding the proper form in the proper place. for Japanese culture the stylization of form, dissolving intention in direct acting, is crucial. in this experience agency becomes 'acting intuition'. nishida's logic of place allows him to fuse momentariness and eternity, particularity and universality.
"the crux of the difference between nishida and hegel may be viewed as a distinction between process and completion. in hegel's case, the manifestation of the unfolding (. . . ) is at the same time a witness to its own necessity. (. . . ) nishida, for his part, is not interested in the dialectical unfolding as such but rather in the actual completion of the process in the place of absolute nothingness. "32 in affirming the radicalized phenomenal- ity of things the 'autonomy' of the field of consciousness is realized.
Nishitani: Emptiness as Plenitude
nishitani adds a nietzschean tone to the debate on nothingness. his book on nihilism analyzes different tendencies of nihilism in the West, mainly focusing on nietzsche's claim that nihilism eventually can become affir- mative and creative. this corresponds with an affirmative presentation of emptiness (sanskrit: sunyata; Jap. ku) that results from the insight that
31 the Japanese word for person is ningen, that literally means: being (nin) of the inbe- tween (gen). this 'relational' constituent is sublated in hegel's notion of the subject. see: h. oosterling, ? A Culture of the inter. Japanese notions of ma and basho? in: heinz Kim- merle & henk oosterling (eds. ), Sensus communis in Multi- and Intercultural perspective. On the Possibility of Common Judgements in Arts and Politics, Wu? rzburg: Ko? nigshausen & neumann 2000, pp. 61-84.
32 maren Zimmermann, " 'nishida's 'self-identity of Absolute Contradiction' and hegel": Absolute negation and dialectics", in: J. W. heisig ed. nanzan, Frontiers of Japanese Phi- losophy, nagoya: 2006, p. 195.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 73
nothingness (mu) in the final instance is a experience of fullfilment. nishi- tani too emphasizes the embeddedness of the self: it is rather a nod of relations than a substance. other Japanese scholars have enhanced this insight by pointing at a constitutive inbetweenness of Japanese culture.
'nihilism' now is focused on insubstantial connectedness. As no-thing this becomes affirmative once in a continuity of momentary conscious selves the ephemeral 'i' is acknowledged to be the fixation of the flow of unique singular moments. in hegel's system these 'absolute' positions (an sich), posing itself initially as all there is, i. e. absolute, enrich them- selves in the process of objectification (fu? r sich) and subjectivation (an und fu? r sich), a process driven by negativity. to nishitani the nothing that haunts 'unhappy consciousness' is just a relative nothingness. the abso- lute individual--to phrase it paradoxically--that arises in an absolute present experiences an affirmative emptiness as plenitude, as being ful- filled in itself and as such being fully present to the world. of course these phrases appear non-sensical in the light of everyday existence where the 'i' is psychologically evident and pragmatic urgency demands calculated anticipations all the time.
but what is at stake here is precisely the radicality of this everyday- ness, that is devoid of Hinterwelten, as nietzsche called the totalistic mind frames that Western philosophy produced time and again to ward off the unbearable lightness of being: "ironically, it was not in his nihilistic view of buddhism but in such ideas as amor fati and the dionysian as the overcoming of nihilism that nietzsche came closest to buddhism, and especially to maha? ya? na". but in the final instance the maha? ya? na point of view on emptiness "cannot be reached even by nihilism that overcomes nihilism, even though this latter may tend in that direction. "33 Adorno acknowledges this at the end of Negative Dialectics when he comes to speak about the ineffective overcomings of nietzsche's nihilism "that was meant differently yet supplied fascism with slogans (. . . ) And yet the light- ing up of an eye, indeed the feeble tail-wagging of a dog one gave a tidbit it promptly forgets, would make the ideal of nothingness evaporate. "34
33 Keiji nishitani: The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, Albany new york: suny Press 1990, p. 180.
34 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 380.
? 74 henk oosterling
Abe: The Suchness of Things
nishida's and nishitani's expositions give us a first clue for an understand- ing of nothingness in a concrete and affirmative sense. Japanese Zen bud- dhism acknowledges, notwithstanding the primacy of appearances, the experiential 'truth' of nothingness that is grasped in a radical affirmation of these appearances. the intentional subject dissolves in 'acting-intuition' that realizes the empty mind or no-mind (mu shin). this is not a unar- ticulated immediacy, but the result of 'form'al training: Zen's active sit- ting or the unmovable movement in martial arts performs the 'essence' of nothingness. but what does this say about nirvana? in his comparative study Zen and Western Thought masao Abe focuses on three problems in buddhism: the significance of nirvana for contemporary thought and life, the idea of purity in maha? ya? na buddhism and emptiness as suchness.
Abe realizes that the negative connotation of nirvana "even occurs in the buddhist world. "35 he offers six arguments for understanding nirvana 'beyond nihilism' and the last one is, in hegelian perspective, very instruc- tive: "what significance does nirvana have in regard to understanding the meaning of history? " recalling the momentariness history has no begin and no end: "eternity manifests itself in the here and now. "36 the emphasis shifts to the now and here as "the realization of nirvana. "37
As for the purity, Abe criticizes the 'third position above and outside the process' from which purity is objectified and conceptualized. Purity is not the counter-concept of impurity. it is the ground from which an objectified opposition can arise. indirectly criticizing hegelian dialectics, Abe states that purity is not the sublated enlightenment as an end, on the contrary: it is the unsaid 'ground' of our existence as a whole. 'origi- nal purity, however, is not a state which is objectively observable, but is realization . . . "38 this is the corporeal and spatial realization of emptiness in the maha? ya? na sense that was grasped by nishida through a logic of place.
nishitani's analysis of emptiness as fullness is further specified by Abe: fullness manifests itself as the suchness (sanskrit: bhuta tathata? ; Jap. : kono no mama) of things. but "everything is just as it is" implies that "every-
35 masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, William r. lafleur (ed. ) hampshire/london: macmillam Press ltd 1985, p. 205.
36 masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, p. 215. 37 idem, p. 214.
38 idem, p. 220.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 75
thing is different from everything else. And yet while everything and everyone retained their uniqueness and particularity they are free from conflict because they have no self-nature. "39 exit dialectics. this sounds a bit weird, but this insight shows perfectly how historicity and objectifica- tion are nullified in the realization of emptiness. the fullness of emptiness realizes itself once the unique suchness--the as-it-is-ness--of things is affirmed in the non-willing of an individual. in objectifying matter West- ern thought aims at manipulating it as an object that in the very act of objectification constitutes the subject. it pretends to change things pro- gressively in order to realize completion.
in doing this it instrumentalizes the suchness of things. "how can we overcome this fundamental restless- ness and return to suchness? to do so is the raison d'e^tre and essential task of religion. "40 At this point Abe reminds us of the metaphor of the snake swallowing its own tail as a symbol of eternity, of a full circle. but this image also reminds him of emptiness in as far the self tries to grasp itself, as the toe sucking buddha: "through the death of ego-self, no-self is realized". "this is because the realization of suchness is the positive aspect of the realization of emptiness. "41
in the strict sense nihilism now has to do with fullness and suchness. this is far from being the nihilist interpretation that states that the sub- ject is imprisoned in senseless nihility as to the values that regulate his behavior. Acting still has an axiological focus. even political categories as solidarity can be applied to the buddhist perspective--at least in the bud- dhism of the middle Path of nagarjuna--where enlightenment implies the salvation of all others: compassion validates actions, even after the end of history. it is the active dimension of an ontology of relations. As a radical inter-est--being in between--this action is however beyond calculation.
6. Conclusion: Avoiding the subject
of course the presentation of the Japanese hegel reception is far more complex. According to some critics, in spite of all quasi-mystical double talk Kyoto school's discourse is implicitly enacting the rupture of subjec- tivity: "nishida, by insisting on a ? contradictory identity? , has embraced the
39 idem, p. 223. 40 idem, p. 224. 41 idem, p. 226.
? 76 henk oosterling
very ? object logic? abandoned by the buddhists as well as by modern West- ern philosophers such as nietzsche, James and derrida. (. . . ) the irony is that Western figures such as nietzsche, heidegger, James and derrida have tried to develop a methodology to attain what, in effect, nishida calls a ? logic of the east? by abandoning the very categories that nishida resur- rects from more traditional Western philosophy. "42 this is an interesting observation, even more interesting once we realize that at least three of these Western thinkers were significantly influenced by eastern thought. When we also take into account that nietzsche, heidegger and derrida explicitly criticized hegel, this complex intercultural web of ideas might give us an indication of new dimensions of contemporary 'nihilism'.
While Z? iz? ek is 'tarrying with the negative' in order to reinstitute subjectivity,43 french philosophers of difference--next to derrida also michel foucault, Jean-franc? ois lyotard and gilles deleuze--revitalize nihilism from within by articulating an affirmative 'nihil' in their respec- tive oeuvres. they focus on the now here as nowhere, circumscribe the implosion of time and space in quasi-concepts as 'event' and 'singular- ity' that respectively break with the past-present-future chronology and the logic of particulars and universality. this all started by deconstruct- ing hegel's philosophical edifice, inspired by nietzsche and heidegger, in the 1960's. once sublation of contradictory forces to a higher identity is deconstructed, what is left is a field of differences and webs of relations. in deconstructing universal claims these philosophers of differences, liter- ally, a-void the subject, showing that it is a fixation within a field of forces, articulating differences and relations. they explicitly have found inspira- tion in buddhist philosophy, an inspiration that can easily be traced in their texts over the years. 44 this urged some commentators to label der- rida's deconstruction as a differential logic, comparing it with the bud- dhist logic of sunyata. 45
the most explicit affirmative presentation of the 'nihil' beyond sub- jectivity can be found in the work of philosophers that are as severely criticized by Z? iz? ek as the neo-buddhists: gilles deleuze and fe? lix guat-
42 david Putney, ? identity and the unity of experience: A critique of nishida's theory of self ? , in: Asian Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, p. 141.
43 slavoj Z? iz? ek, Tarrying with the Negative. Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology, dur- ham: duke university Press, 1993, p. 218.
44 references to Zen-texts, Japanese culture and oriental practices vary from casual remarks to more systematic elaborations. see: henk oosterling, 'scheinheiligkeit oder heiligkeit der schein. subjektkritische bescha? ftigungen mit Japan', in: Das Multiversum der Kulturen, heinz Kimmerle (ed. ) Amsterdam/Atlanta: rodopi elementa 1996, pp. 103-122.
45 robert magliola, Derrida on the Mend, indiana: Purdue university Press, 1984, p. 89.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 77
tari. deleuze's affinity with buddhism is made explicit in Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). he redefines spinoza's immanence as praxis of expres- sion in which substance is co-existential with the actual and possible expressions of its modes. 46 this 'transcendental empiricism' is further elaborated in The Logic of Sense (1969). there the Zen riddle comes to the fore as a constituent 'superficiality' that breaks with the opposition of deep and superficial: "returned to the surface, the sage discovers objects- events, all of them communicating in the void which constitutes their substance. (. . . ) the event is the identity of form and void. (. . . ) the void is the site of sense. "47 A comparison with nishida's 'pure experience' as a constituting immanence is at hand. this 'immanence' persists in deleuze's cooperation with fe? lix guattari. in What is Philosophy? (1991) they situate "thought-nature, that logic can only show, according to a famous phrase, without ever being able to grasp it in propositions or relate it to a ref- erence. then logic is silent. Paradigm for paradigm, it is then in agree- ment with a kind of Zen buddhism. "48 there is "no doubt that the orient thought, but it thought the object in itself as pure abstraction, the empty universality identical to simple particularity. "49
is there still an all encompassing whole from which all particulars are 'sensed'? in one of his lasts last texts, deleuze refers to spinoza stating that immanence is not immanence to substance--as hegel would have it--but that substance and modes are in immanence: "We will say of pure immanence that it is A life, and nothing else". life is singularized as a life, yet this is all encompassing. "it is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life". life is a transcendental field, that can only be grasped through its immanence. "A life is the imma- nence of immanence, absolute immanence (. . . ) to the degree that is goes beyond the aporias of the subject and the object that Johann fichte, in his last philosophy, presents the transcendental field as a life, no longer dependent on a being or submitted to an Act--it is an absolute immedi- ate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life. "50
46 see: gilles deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, new york: Zone books 1997 (orig. 1968).
47 gilles deleuze, The Logic of Sense, london: Continuum 2001 (orig. 1969), p. 155.
48 gilles deleuze & fe? lix guattari, What is Philosophy? , london/new york: verso 1994 (orig. 1991), p. 140.
49 deleuze & guattari, What is Philosophy? , p. 94.
50 gilles deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on A Life, new york: Zone books 2001 (orig. 1995), p. 27. my italics.
? The religions of Persia, syria and egyPT:
The TransiTion from The naTural To The sPiriTual
herman van erp
1. introduction
hegel's philosophy of determinate religion contains the development of religions as successively more adequate conceptions of god. The essence of religion develops itself logically and historically in conformity to neces- sary moments. religion acquires in this process an increasingly adequate concept of itself as a specific form of absolute knowledge. Though the idea of the absolute spirit is present from the beginning, its presentation within the immediate religions is still unformed; their level of reflection is simple and misses the depth of speculative thought. religious thinking moves anyway in the sphere of presentation and is not aimed at rational understanding or conceptual knowledge of its content, which is the task of philosophy. The general truth of the concept of god--the proof that god is and what this means--is considered by hegel as the culminat- ing point of his philosophy as such and is, as the result from that course, legitimately presumed within the philosophy of religion. in this chapter, i shall give a brief survey of hegel's conception of the most important religions of the ancient middle east, except the Jewish one. as i do not have much information about these religions from other sources, i cannot give a judgement concerning the adequacy of this hegelian conception from a more empirical point of view and i will not discuss whether his approach of these religions is correct. however, hegel's expositions are in themselves interesting enough for being a rich source for understanding and evaluating the meaning of religious representations of today.
2. The representations of natural or immediate religion
The subject of the philosophy of religion is how the idea of god develops itself both in respect to the content (in itself) as well to the form (for the religious conscience). "To educe the concept of religion and make it the object of consciousness has been the labour of spirit over thousands of years. " (l2 27, 514/412) logically, this development implies three stages:
80 herman van erp
a) the starting point of the process, i. e. , the not yet developed and there- fore abstract principle, which hegel indicates as the soil (Boden) of the religion, its substance or substantiality,1 b) the genuine process of the development, or the further determination of the principle, c) the result or the end to which the development is directed. The concept of god as spirit belongs to the starting point of the philosophy of religion. Therefore, the whole development is a process of gods manifestation. spirit mani- fests itself in concrete forms and reveals itself for another that can have an inner relationship with it: "spirit bears witness to spirit. This witness is spirit's own inner nature. "2 This process of becoming manifest for the human mind is the second stage of the development. it is the stage in which spirit is "activity of self-determining, of entering into existence, of being for an other, of bringing its moments into mutual distinction and spreading itself out. "3 in the Phenomenology of Spirit, hegel analyses the development of the human mind in relation to the absolute spirit. in his philosophy of religion, the subject of development is the idea of god him- self: god determines himself as the absolute spirit in the way he comes out of and returns to himself through the other (creation, human mind), that can not remain totally different from him. 4
The religions of the part Determinate Religion are the particular forms in which this development of the idea of god is present in a not only sub- stantive but also subjective way, theoretically and practically, in religious representations and cultus. The representation can be called the theoreti- cal or objective aspect of religion; cultus, as the elevation of the subject toward god, its practical or subjective aspect. 5 The determinate religions are determined as finite, transitory in principle, and ethnically bound as religion of peoples. The end or result of the progress is universality: the reconciliation of spirit with itself and the other, which will be achieved finally in Christianity. Therefore, Christianity, as The Consummate Reli- gion, is placed outside this second part of the philosophy of religion.
it is important to be aware that, according to hegel, not only the rep- resentation of the spirit and the philosophical concept of it pass through this process of development, but god himself as spirit too. spirit executes its own process of development, is essentially self-realization and takes
1 for instance: l1 24, 314/218; l1 27, 444/332. 2 l1 27, 413/307.
3 l1 27, 182/90.
4 l1 m, 228/138.
5 l1 24, 328/230, 336/237; l1 27, 396/291, 441/330.
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 81
particular shapes in this process. god does not remain closed within an abstract unity, but determines himself necessarily in relation to another, which is distinct from the abstract unity in the original being. The deter- minate religions differ in the way this otherness is determined and rep- resented. in the natural religions, nearly all natural entities can figure as immediate presentations of the divinity, without much distance or reflection. in this immediacy, there is no room for representations of a positive relationship between god and the other because such a relation presupposes the negativity of a distinction. it is a kind of natural panthe- ism without reflection concerning the distinct moments of the concept. (l2 27, 532-533/430)6 on a higher level of development, the religions become conscious of the distinction between nature and spirit and, later on, they develop representations of divine activity as being the origin of this distinction. Those latter representations imply some notion of god in the form of free activity, which is the essence of subjectivity. The idea that god determines himself in that distinction and that the relationship between god and the other originates from god himself is lacking within the natural religions. here, god is not yet represented as a free subject and spirit remains something merely substantial, something abstract like the principle of life, cosmic soul, of which particular entities (natural powers, animals, particular human beings) count as immediate representatives. a contingent natural shape is the sensible form in which that substantiality is immediately present. (l2 24, 379/280) The notion of god as not only a substance but as a free subject is arising in the transition from natural religion to the religions of spiritual individuality. 7
The idea of god as Trinity is the fundamental idea of Christianity, the consummate religion. differentiation within and through itself is, accord- ing to hegel, the most essential determination of spirit, as the absolute having a relation to itself through the other. Without this relationship, the absolute remains an empty abstraction, representation without specific content, or--because it cannot be without any content--its content is characterised as spiritless and dead. hegel criticizes the bent of his con- temporary philosophers to deism. a purely subjective religion of mere feeling and inner sensibility is accused for falling back into this empti- ness. (l2 27, 569/464-65) "as modern theology says that we cannot know
6 spinozism is also accused of pantheism, but is of an entirely different form. for a discussion on this point, see in particular l1 24, 343-344/244; l1 27, 370/269, and 373-377/272-74, also l2 27, 572/469 ff.
7 This name is used by hegel in the lectures of 1824.
? 82 herman van erp
god, that he does not have further determinations in himself, it knows only that he is, as an abstraction without content; and thus, god is faded away into this hollow abstractum. "8 We witness this empty entity in the abstract god Brahm of indian religion (identified by hegel with hindu reli- gion), although there it is still accompanied (though very inconsistently) by a motley collection of gods. We shall see that, for hegel, the religions of the transition are fundamentally different; liberated, that is, from a con- sciousness that is still captured in the opposition between abstraction and sensibility.
Within religious representations, divine spirit comes to appearance, reveals itself, bears witness of itself to another spirit, even if a particu- lar religion is not aware of this relationship and does not represent the divine as something essentially spiritual. natural religions are of this kind. The most undeveloped forms of natural religion are not aware of any distinction between the essential content of the concept of god or his substance and the representations, which religion makes thereof for itself. The moments of reflection and self-consciousness have not yet come to a positive form. Therefore, for this religious consciousness, the divinity does not have a necessary form, but may take any possible shape that can be found in nature--necessity being a category of conceptual thinking--, without any question about the adequacy between represen- tation and conceptual content. "even within natural religions, we will find an elevating of thought above mere natural powers, above the dominion of the natural. But this elevation is carried out inconsistently," the concept of god collapses in an amalgam of representations, a mixture of spiritual and natural powers. (l2 27, 521/418) The abstract and indeterminate char- acter of the notion of god makes it possible to take all kind of natural entities as an immediate expression of it.
3. The Transition from natural religion to higher levels
a fundamental proposition of hegel's philosophy of religion is that god can be known, that he has revealed himself. all religions are the actual proof of it in their representations of the absolute. on this point, hegel is engaged in a constant polemic against the agnosticism and subjectivism of contemporary philosophers and theologians. in the Encyclopedia, he
8 l1 24, 127/43 (translation h. e. ).
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 83
compares the opinion that god is unknowable with blaming him as envi- ous, and in the lectures of 1827 he says: "When the name of god is taken seriously, it is already the case for Plato and aristotle that god is not jeal- ous to the point of not communicating himself. "9 Thus, hegel's approach of religion is to a large extent nourished by a presumed a priori knowl- edge about the object and essence of religion. he tried to expound the metaphysical concept of religion in such a way that it could explain the development of the determinate religions in the form of both a strongly logical as well historical succession. This schema never succeeded com- pletely, but the theory that the development of religious consciousness passed over from east to West is a constant element in hegel's approach. The middle east is considered as the place where natural religion under- goes its transition to the higher forms of spiritual religion. Thus, hegel's considerations concerning particular religious representations and phe- nomena are repeatedly interwoven with comparisons that could support the differences in the level of development. Therefore, it is not possible to understand hegel's exposition of a particular religion without knowing something about the beginning and the end of the process that is deter- mining the development as he understands of it.
hegel thinks there is also a development at the level of natural reli- gions. important details in the parallel of the logical and historical devel- opment and in the ordering of these religions were changed during the successive lectures.
it is evident that faure's analysis does not imply that hegel was a nihil- ist, nor does it disqualify hegel's systematic philosophy as a proto-form of nihilism. if nihilism means lacking a positive and enduring foundation of the meanings, values and truths that motivate man's actions--positively formulated: stating that the basic value, meaning and truth is the 'nihil'-- then hegelian philosophy is the opposite of nihilism. however, faure's accusation stands once we acknowledge the influence of hegelianism, due to the critique it engendered and the basic concepts it provided for disil- lusioned and anti-metaphysically focused generations of scholars to come. hegel triggered ex negativo a long-lasting debate on nihilism in western thought in different registers: russian literature, modern philosophy, and postmodern politics.
in order to actualize hegel's positioning of buddhism i expose it to a more profound misunderstanding of buddhist thought. the eastern
21 morton too acknowledges that "what hegel actually produces, along with many others, is a sense of a positive nothingness that exists alongside phenomena" inspite of the fact that "he, in strictly buddhist terms, becomes guilty of the very nihilism he is berating in what he beholds" (? 6).
22 faure, Unmasking Buddhism, p. 25.
? 70 henk oosterling
reception of hegelian thought implicitly addresses his understanding of nothingness. buddhist scholars of the Kyoto school who are famous for their intercultural focus23 have explored the productive relations between buddhism and Christian thought from the other side of the divide. hegel's philosophy was already known in Japan the decades after Japan opened its borders and markets for the West in the second half of the 19th century. but it was the centenary of his death in 1931 that caused a breakthrough,24 as happened in france under the guidance of Alexander Koje`ve. 25 the most prominent philosopher who integrated hegelianism in Japanese thought was Kitaro nishida (1870-1945). this founding father of the Kyoto school stressed the relational focus of hegel's thinking and thematized an experiential nothingness. 26 nihilism was further explored by nishida's former student Keiji nishitani (1900-1990) who, after hav- ing studied in germany and having persuaded Karl lo? with to come and teach in Japan, wrote extensively on nihilism. 27 masao Abe (1915-2006) deepened the insights in the relation between emptiness and affirmation focusing on the suchness (sanskrit: tathata? ; Jap. konomama) of things. A brief survey of their ideas redirects hegel's notion of 'emptiness'.
Nishida: Pure Experience in Between of General and Particular
the maha? ya? na concept of ? Absolute nothingness? (zettai mu) is the foun- dational concept of nishida's philosophy. like hegel nishida too under- stands the 'self' in terms of a contradictory identity: it is both A & -A.
23 see: rolf elberfeld, Kitaro Nishida (1870-1945), Das Verstehen der Kulturen. Mod- erne japanische Philosophie und die Frage nach der Interkulturalita? t, Amsterdam/Atlanta: rodopi 1999, chapter 3.
24 see: gino Piovesana, Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought 1892-1996. A Survey, tokyo: Japan library 1997, p. 169.
25 Koje`ve proposed a philosophical anthropological reading of hegel's dialectical phi- losophy. his courses influenced many a hegelian critical adept: georges bataille, Jacques lacan, Jean hippolyte and Jean-Paul sartre attended his courses. After World War ii Koje`ve unfolded a futuristic vision in which Japanese consciousness and aestheticism played a crucial role in the realization of hegel's idea of man's ultimate way of living after 'the end of history'. francis fukuyama's famous book on this topic refers more to Koje`ve than to hegel.
26 see: david dilworth, (transl. ) Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, by nishida Kitaro: ? the logic of the Place of nothingness and the religious Worldview? (basho-teki ronri to shukyo-teki sekaikan), honolulu: university of hawaii Press, 1987. nishida frequently discussed his ideas with daisetz t. suzuki, the Zen scholar who would later bring Zen to the West. see: daisetz t. suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, Princeton: Princeton uP, 1970 (orig. 1938).
27 Keiji nishitani, The Self-Overcoming of NIHILISM, Albany: suny Press 1990.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 71
however, for him 'essence' that precedes the rupture between subject and object, is realized--in the twofold meaning of the word--not as a concept but as a pure experience ( junsui keiken)--a notion he picked up in the work of William James--that cannot be grasped in discursive arguments. When nishida speaks about pure experience as enlightenment, he has Zen's satori in mind. Against this background nishida, a Zen practitioner himself, defines enlightenment as ? the ultimate seeing of the bottomless nothingness of the self. ? 28
in hegelian terms, what is problematized here is the dialectical ten- sion between the general and the particular, the one and the many or the whole and its parts. these are tensionally unified in the singular. this however is not a conceptual unison, let alone a notional sublation. for nishida the one and the many coincide as absolute contradictory self- identity (zettai mujunteki jiko doitsu). the self however is not understood as the unity of consciousness: "in the depths of our selves there is nothing to be found; everywhere is ? nothingness? ; instead we find absolute ? unity? , by transcending everything related to the self. "29 no-thing or nothingness is not a concept, it is an experience of being fully related to everything and nothing in particular.
there is a metalogical problem as well. for an identity to be truly con- tradictory one has to suppose that both sides of the logical dichotomy are true, since this is what makes them contradictory. but for buddhists there is no such assertion. buddhist thought denies a permanent, self-identical entity through time. moreover, the totality of all there is is not a thing. its negation therefore is not a thing either. Just like that of its parts the 'thingness' of the whole--and by implication of emptiness as lack of this substantial whole--results from fixations of ever changing interacting forces on different scales. teleology does not direct these interactions. the contradiction is ephemeral. only 'extreme' hypostasized notions of an atomic, unchanging being or deterministic causality might produce a contradiction. instead of substantial identity--the 'i= not i' in a fichtean articulation--nishida stresses the interrelated nature between parts both within individuals and between them as parts of a whole. 30
Pure experience is the experience of what unites in difference. it is a corporeal experience of embedded relationality, superseding the
28 idem, p. 81.
29 dilworth, Last Writings, p. 110.
30 see: elberfeld, Das Verstehen der Kulturen, pp. 110/138 ff.
? 72 henk oosterling
Cartesian and Kantian dualities of mind-body and subject-object. As 'cor- poreal' realization--the thinking posture of the toe sucking 'buddha'--it can only be grasped in spatial terms. the issue in Kyoto Zen buddhist thought is not time but place. nishida refers to Plato's chora, as the form of all forms that itself in not yet formed, but that is perhaps too metaphys- ical a comparison. Place or basho must be understood beyond the duality of matter and form or the mind-body dichotomy as a physically oriented field of consciousness, a being-in or an inbetweenness. 31
nishida's logic of place (basho) focuses on form. the Japanese word for form is kata. this word also describes the repetitive practice of basis techniques in the martial arts: as a dance of stylized forms that 'flow' with- out intention from the body of the martial artist. but it too counts for tea ceremony (cha do) or flower arrangement (ikebana). it is all about finding the proper form in the proper place. for Japanese culture the stylization of form, dissolving intention in direct acting, is crucial. in this experience agency becomes 'acting intuition'. nishida's logic of place allows him to fuse momentariness and eternity, particularity and universality.
"the crux of the difference between nishida and hegel may be viewed as a distinction between process and completion. in hegel's case, the manifestation of the unfolding (. . . ) is at the same time a witness to its own necessity. (. . . ) nishida, for his part, is not interested in the dialectical unfolding as such but rather in the actual completion of the process in the place of absolute nothingness. "32 in affirming the radicalized phenomenal- ity of things the 'autonomy' of the field of consciousness is realized.
Nishitani: Emptiness as Plenitude
nishitani adds a nietzschean tone to the debate on nothingness. his book on nihilism analyzes different tendencies of nihilism in the West, mainly focusing on nietzsche's claim that nihilism eventually can become affir- mative and creative. this corresponds with an affirmative presentation of emptiness (sanskrit: sunyata; Jap. ku) that results from the insight that
31 the Japanese word for person is ningen, that literally means: being (nin) of the inbe- tween (gen). this 'relational' constituent is sublated in hegel's notion of the subject. see: h. oosterling, ? A Culture of the inter. Japanese notions of ma and basho? in: heinz Kim- merle & henk oosterling (eds. ), Sensus communis in Multi- and Intercultural perspective. On the Possibility of Common Judgements in Arts and Politics, Wu? rzburg: Ko? nigshausen & neumann 2000, pp. 61-84.
32 maren Zimmermann, " 'nishida's 'self-identity of Absolute Contradiction' and hegel": Absolute negation and dialectics", in: J. W. heisig ed. nanzan, Frontiers of Japanese Phi- losophy, nagoya: 2006, p. 195.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 73
nothingness (mu) in the final instance is a experience of fullfilment. nishi- tani too emphasizes the embeddedness of the self: it is rather a nod of relations than a substance. other Japanese scholars have enhanced this insight by pointing at a constitutive inbetweenness of Japanese culture.
'nihilism' now is focused on insubstantial connectedness. As no-thing this becomes affirmative once in a continuity of momentary conscious selves the ephemeral 'i' is acknowledged to be the fixation of the flow of unique singular moments. in hegel's system these 'absolute' positions (an sich), posing itself initially as all there is, i. e. absolute, enrich them- selves in the process of objectification (fu? r sich) and subjectivation (an und fu? r sich), a process driven by negativity. to nishitani the nothing that haunts 'unhappy consciousness' is just a relative nothingness. the abso- lute individual--to phrase it paradoxically--that arises in an absolute present experiences an affirmative emptiness as plenitude, as being ful- filled in itself and as such being fully present to the world. of course these phrases appear non-sensical in the light of everyday existence where the 'i' is psychologically evident and pragmatic urgency demands calculated anticipations all the time.
but what is at stake here is precisely the radicality of this everyday- ness, that is devoid of Hinterwelten, as nietzsche called the totalistic mind frames that Western philosophy produced time and again to ward off the unbearable lightness of being: "ironically, it was not in his nihilistic view of buddhism but in such ideas as amor fati and the dionysian as the overcoming of nihilism that nietzsche came closest to buddhism, and especially to maha? ya? na". but in the final instance the maha? ya? na point of view on emptiness "cannot be reached even by nihilism that overcomes nihilism, even though this latter may tend in that direction. "33 Adorno acknowledges this at the end of Negative Dialectics when he comes to speak about the ineffective overcomings of nietzsche's nihilism "that was meant differently yet supplied fascism with slogans (. . . ) And yet the light- ing up of an eye, indeed the feeble tail-wagging of a dog one gave a tidbit it promptly forgets, would make the ideal of nothingness evaporate. "34
33 Keiji nishitani: The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, Albany new york: suny Press 1990, p. 180.
34 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 380.
? 74 henk oosterling
Abe: The Suchness of Things
nishida's and nishitani's expositions give us a first clue for an understand- ing of nothingness in a concrete and affirmative sense. Japanese Zen bud- dhism acknowledges, notwithstanding the primacy of appearances, the experiential 'truth' of nothingness that is grasped in a radical affirmation of these appearances. the intentional subject dissolves in 'acting-intuition' that realizes the empty mind or no-mind (mu shin). this is not a unar- ticulated immediacy, but the result of 'form'al training: Zen's active sit- ting or the unmovable movement in martial arts performs the 'essence' of nothingness. but what does this say about nirvana? in his comparative study Zen and Western Thought masao Abe focuses on three problems in buddhism: the significance of nirvana for contemporary thought and life, the idea of purity in maha? ya? na buddhism and emptiness as suchness.
Abe realizes that the negative connotation of nirvana "even occurs in the buddhist world. "35 he offers six arguments for understanding nirvana 'beyond nihilism' and the last one is, in hegelian perspective, very instruc- tive: "what significance does nirvana have in regard to understanding the meaning of history? " recalling the momentariness history has no begin and no end: "eternity manifests itself in the here and now. "36 the emphasis shifts to the now and here as "the realization of nirvana. "37
As for the purity, Abe criticizes the 'third position above and outside the process' from which purity is objectified and conceptualized. Purity is not the counter-concept of impurity. it is the ground from which an objectified opposition can arise. indirectly criticizing hegelian dialectics, Abe states that purity is not the sublated enlightenment as an end, on the contrary: it is the unsaid 'ground' of our existence as a whole. 'origi- nal purity, however, is not a state which is objectively observable, but is realization . . . "38 this is the corporeal and spatial realization of emptiness in the maha? ya? na sense that was grasped by nishida through a logic of place.
nishitani's analysis of emptiness as fullness is further specified by Abe: fullness manifests itself as the suchness (sanskrit: bhuta tathata? ; Jap. : kono no mama) of things. but "everything is just as it is" implies that "every-
35 masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, William r. lafleur (ed. ) hampshire/london: macmillam Press ltd 1985, p. 205.
36 masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought, p. 215. 37 idem, p. 214.
38 idem, p. 220.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 75
thing is different from everything else. And yet while everything and everyone retained their uniqueness and particularity they are free from conflict because they have no self-nature. "39 exit dialectics. this sounds a bit weird, but this insight shows perfectly how historicity and objectifica- tion are nullified in the realization of emptiness. the fullness of emptiness realizes itself once the unique suchness--the as-it-is-ness--of things is affirmed in the non-willing of an individual. in objectifying matter West- ern thought aims at manipulating it as an object that in the very act of objectification constitutes the subject. it pretends to change things pro- gressively in order to realize completion.
in doing this it instrumentalizes the suchness of things. "how can we overcome this fundamental restless- ness and return to suchness? to do so is the raison d'e^tre and essential task of religion. "40 At this point Abe reminds us of the metaphor of the snake swallowing its own tail as a symbol of eternity, of a full circle. but this image also reminds him of emptiness in as far the self tries to grasp itself, as the toe sucking buddha: "through the death of ego-self, no-self is realized". "this is because the realization of suchness is the positive aspect of the realization of emptiness. "41
in the strict sense nihilism now has to do with fullness and suchness. this is far from being the nihilist interpretation that states that the sub- ject is imprisoned in senseless nihility as to the values that regulate his behavior. Acting still has an axiological focus. even political categories as solidarity can be applied to the buddhist perspective--at least in the bud- dhism of the middle Path of nagarjuna--where enlightenment implies the salvation of all others: compassion validates actions, even after the end of history. it is the active dimension of an ontology of relations. As a radical inter-est--being in between--this action is however beyond calculation.
6. Conclusion: Avoiding the subject
of course the presentation of the Japanese hegel reception is far more complex. According to some critics, in spite of all quasi-mystical double talk Kyoto school's discourse is implicitly enacting the rupture of subjec- tivity: "nishida, by insisting on a ? contradictory identity? , has embraced the
39 idem, p. 223. 40 idem, p. 224. 41 idem, p. 226.
? 76 henk oosterling
very ? object logic? abandoned by the buddhists as well as by modern West- ern philosophers such as nietzsche, James and derrida. (. . . ) the irony is that Western figures such as nietzsche, heidegger, James and derrida have tried to develop a methodology to attain what, in effect, nishida calls a ? logic of the east? by abandoning the very categories that nishida resur- rects from more traditional Western philosophy. "42 this is an interesting observation, even more interesting once we realize that at least three of these Western thinkers were significantly influenced by eastern thought. When we also take into account that nietzsche, heidegger and derrida explicitly criticized hegel, this complex intercultural web of ideas might give us an indication of new dimensions of contemporary 'nihilism'.
While Z? iz? ek is 'tarrying with the negative' in order to reinstitute subjectivity,43 french philosophers of difference--next to derrida also michel foucault, Jean-franc? ois lyotard and gilles deleuze--revitalize nihilism from within by articulating an affirmative 'nihil' in their respec- tive oeuvres. they focus on the now here as nowhere, circumscribe the implosion of time and space in quasi-concepts as 'event' and 'singular- ity' that respectively break with the past-present-future chronology and the logic of particulars and universality. this all started by deconstruct- ing hegel's philosophical edifice, inspired by nietzsche and heidegger, in the 1960's. once sublation of contradictory forces to a higher identity is deconstructed, what is left is a field of differences and webs of relations. in deconstructing universal claims these philosophers of differences, liter- ally, a-void the subject, showing that it is a fixation within a field of forces, articulating differences and relations. they explicitly have found inspira- tion in buddhist philosophy, an inspiration that can easily be traced in their texts over the years. 44 this urged some commentators to label der- rida's deconstruction as a differential logic, comparing it with the bud- dhist logic of sunyata. 45
the most explicit affirmative presentation of the 'nihil' beyond sub- jectivity can be found in the work of philosophers that are as severely criticized by Z? iz? ek as the neo-buddhists: gilles deleuze and fe? lix guat-
42 david Putney, ? identity and the unity of experience: A critique of nishida's theory of self ? , in: Asian Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, p. 141.
43 slavoj Z? iz? ek, Tarrying with the Negative. Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology, dur- ham: duke university Press, 1993, p. 218.
44 references to Zen-texts, Japanese culture and oriental practices vary from casual remarks to more systematic elaborations. see: henk oosterling, 'scheinheiligkeit oder heiligkeit der schein. subjektkritische bescha? ftigungen mit Japan', in: Das Multiversum der Kulturen, heinz Kimmerle (ed. ) Amsterdam/Atlanta: rodopi elementa 1996, pp. 103-122.
45 robert magliola, Derrida on the Mend, indiana: Purdue university Press, 1984, p. 89.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 77
tari. deleuze's affinity with buddhism is made explicit in Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). he redefines spinoza's immanence as praxis of expres- sion in which substance is co-existential with the actual and possible expressions of its modes. 46 this 'transcendental empiricism' is further elaborated in The Logic of Sense (1969). there the Zen riddle comes to the fore as a constituent 'superficiality' that breaks with the opposition of deep and superficial: "returned to the surface, the sage discovers objects- events, all of them communicating in the void which constitutes their substance. (. . . ) the event is the identity of form and void. (. . . ) the void is the site of sense. "47 A comparison with nishida's 'pure experience' as a constituting immanence is at hand. this 'immanence' persists in deleuze's cooperation with fe? lix guattari. in What is Philosophy? (1991) they situate "thought-nature, that logic can only show, according to a famous phrase, without ever being able to grasp it in propositions or relate it to a ref- erence. then logic is silent. Paradigm for paradigm, it is then in agree- ment with a kind of Zen buddhism. "48 there is "no doubt that the orient thought, but it thought the object in itself as pure abstraction, the empty universality identical to simple particularity. "49
is there still an all encompassing whole from which all particulars are 'sensed'? in one of his lasts last texts, deleuze refers to spinoza stating that immanence is not immanence to substance--as hegel would have it--but that substance and modes are in immanence: "We will say of pure immanence that it is A life, and nothing else". life is singularized as a life, yet this is all encompassing. "it is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life". life is a transcendental field, that can only be grasped through its immanence. "A life is the imma- nence of immanence, absolute immanence (. . . ) to the degree that is goes beyond the aporias of the subject and the object that Johann fichte, in his last philosophy, presents the transcendental field as a life, no longer dependent on a being or submitted to an Act--it is an absolute immedi- ate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life. "50
46 see: gilles deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, new york: Zone books 1997 (orig. 1968).
47 gilles deleuze, The Logic of Sense, london: Continuum 2001 (orig. 1969), p. 155.
48 gilles deleuze & fe? lix guattari, What is Philosophy? , london/new york: verso 1994 (orig. 1991), p. 140.
49 deleuze & guattari, What is Philosophy? , p. 94.
50 gilles deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on A Life, new york: Zone books 2001 (orig. 1995), p. 27. my italics.
? The religions of Persia, syria and egyPT:
The TransiTion from The naTural To The sPiriTual
herman van erp
1. introduction
hegel's philosophy of determinate religion contains the development of religions as successively more adequate conceptions of god. The essence of religion develops itself logically and historically in conformity to neces- sary moments. religion acquires in this process an increasingly adequate concept of itself as a specific form of absolute knowledge. Though the idea of the absolute spirit is present from the beginning, its presentation within the immediate religions is still unformed; their level of reflection is simple and misses the depth of speculative thought. religious thinking moves anyway in the sphere of presentation and is not aimed at rational understanding or conceptual knowledge of its content, which is the task of philosophy. The general truth of the concept of god--the proof that god is and what this means--is considered by hegel as the culminat- ing point of his philosophy as such and is, as the result from that course, legitimately presumed within the philosophy of religion. in this chapter, i shall give a brief survey of hegel's conception of the most important religions of the ancient middle east, except the Jewish one. as i do not have much information about these religions from other sources, i cannot give a judgement concerning the adequacy of this hegelian conception from a more empirical point of view and i will not discuss whether his approach of these religions is correct. however, hegel's expositions are in themselves interesting enough for being a rich source for understanding and evaluating the meaning of religious representations of today.
2. The representations of natural or immediate religion
The subject of the philosophy of religion is how the idea of god develops itself both in respect to the content (in itself) as well to the form (for the religious conscience). "To educe the concept of religion and make it the object of consciousness has been the labour of spirit over thousands of years. " (l2 27, 514/412) logically, this development implies three stages:
80 herman van erp
a) the starting point of the process, i. e. , the not yet developed and there- fore abstract principle, which hegel indicates as the soil (Boden) of the religion, its substance or substantiality,1 b) the genuine process of the development, or the further determination of the principle, c) the result or the end to which the development is directed. The concept of god as spirit belongs to the starting point of the philosophy of religion. Therefore, the whole development is a process of gods manifestation. spirit mani- fests itself in concrete forms and reveals itself for another that can have an inner relationship with it: "spirit bears witness to spirit. This witness is spirit's own inner nature. "2 This process of becoming manifest for the human mind is the second stage of the development. it is the stage in which spirit is "activity of self-determining, of entering into existence, of being for an other, of bringing its moments into mutual distinction and spreading itself out. "3 in the Phenomenology of Spirit, hegel analyses the development of the human mind in relation to the absolute spirit. in his philosophy of religion, the subject of development is the idea of god him- self: god determines himself as the absolute spirit in the way he comes out of and returns to himself through the other (creation, human mind), that can not remain totally different from him. 4
The religions of the part Determinate Religion are the particular forms in which this development of the idea of god is present in a not only sub- stantive but also subjective way, theoretically and practically, in religious representations and cultus. The representation can be called the theoreti- cal or objective aspect of religion; cultus, as the elevation of the subject toward god, its practical or subjective aspect. 5 The determinate religions are determined as finite, transitory in principle, and ethnically bound as religion of peoples. The end or result of the progress is universality: the reconciliation of spirit with itself and the other, which will be achieved finally in Christianity. Therefore, Christianity, as The Consummate Reli- gion, is placed outside this second part of the philosophy of religion.
it is important to be aware that, according to hegel, not only the rep- resentation of the spirit and the philosophical concept of it pass through this process of development, but god himself as spirit too. spirit executes its own process of development, is essentially self-realization and takes
1 for instance: l1 24, 314/218; l1 27, 444/332. 2 l1 27, 413/307.
3 l1 27, 182/90.
4 l1 m, 228/138.
5 l1 24, 328/230, 336/237; l1 27, 396/291, 441/330.
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 81
particular shapes in this process. god does not remain closed within an abstract unity, but determines himself necessarily in relation to another, which is distinct from the abstract unity in the original being. The deter- minate religions differ in the way this otherness is determined and rep- resented. in the natural religions, nearly all natural entities can figure as immediate presentations of the divinity, without much distance or reflection. in this immediacy, there is no room for representations of a positive relationship between god and the other because such a relation presupposes the negativity of a distinction. it is a kind of natural panthe- ism without reflection concerning the distinct moments of the concept. (l2 27, 532-533/430)6 on a higher level of development, the religions become conscious of the distinction between nature and spirit and, later on, they develop representations of divine activity as being the origin of this distinction. Those latter representations imply some notion of god in the form of free activity, which is the essence of subjectivity. The idea that god determines himself in that distinction and that the relationship between god and the other originates from god himself is lacking within the natural religions. here, god is not yet represented as a free subject and spirit remains something merely substantial, something abstract like the principle of life, cosmic soul, of which particular entities (natural powers, animals, particular human beings) count as immediate representatives. a contingent natural shape is the sensible form in which that substantiality is immediately present. (l2 24, 379/280) The notion of god as not only a substance but as a free subject is arising in the transition from natural religion to the religions of spiritual individuality. 7
The idea of god as Trinity is the fundamental idea of Christianity, the consummate religion. differentiation within and through itself is, accord- ing to hegel, the most essential determination of spirit, as the absolute having a relation to itself through the other. Without this relationship, the absolute remains an empty abstraction, representation without specific content, or--because it cannot be without any content--its content is characterised as spiritless and dead. hegel criticizes the bent of his con- temporary philosophers to deism. a purely subjective religion of mere feeling and inner sensibility is accused for falling back into this empti- ness. (l2 27, 569/464-65) "as modern theology says that we cannot know
6 spinozism is also accused of pantheism, but is of an entirely different form. for a discussion on this point, see in particular l1 24, 343-344/244; l1 27, 370/269, and 373-377/272-74, also l2 27, 572/469 ff.
7 This name is used by hegel in the lectures of 1824.
? 82 herman van erp
god, that he does not have further determinations in himself, it knows only that he is, as an abstraction without content; and thus, god is faded away into this hollow abstractum. "8 We witness this empty entity in the abstract god Brahm of indian religion (identified by hegel with hindu reli- gion), although there it is still accompanied (though very inconsistently) by a motley collection of gods. We shall see that, for hegel, the religions of the transition are fundamentally different; liberated, that is, from a con- sciousness that is still captured in the opposition between abstraction and sensibility.
Within religious representations, divine spirit comes to appearance, reveals itself, bears witness of itself to another spirit, even if a particu- lar religion is not aware of this relationship and does not represent the divine as something essentially spiritual. natural religions are of this kind. The most undeveloped forms of natural religion are not aware of any distinction between the essential content of the concept of god or his substance and the representations, which religion makes thereof for itself. The moments of reflection and self-consciousness have not yet come to a positive form. Therefore, for this religious consciousness, the divinity does not have a necessary form, but may take any possible shape that can be found in nature--necessity being a category of conceptual thinking--, without any question about the adequacy between represen- tation and conceptual content. "even within natural religions, we will find an elevating of thought above mere natural powers, above the dominion of the natural. But this elevation is carried out inconsistently," the concept of god collapses in an amalgam of representations, a mixture of spiritual and natural powers. (l2 27, 521/418) The abstract and indeterminate char- acter of the notion of god makes it possible to take all kind of natural entities as an immediate expression of it.
3. The Transition from natural religion to higher levels
a fundamental proposition of hegel's philosophy of religion is that god can be known, that he has revealed himself. all religions are the actual proof of it in their representations of the absolute. on this point, hegel is engaged in a constant polemic against the agnosticism and subjectivism of contemporary philosophers and theologians. in the Encyclopedia, he
8 l1 24, 127/43 (translation h. e. ).
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 83
compares the opinion that god is unknowable with blaming him as envi- ous, and in the lectures of 1827 he says: "When the name of god is taken seriously, it is already the case for Plato and aristotle that god is not jeal- ous to the point of not communicating himself. "9 Thus, hegel's approach of religion is to a large extent nourished by a presumed a priori knowl- edge about the object and essence of religion. he tried to expound the metaphysical concept of religion in such a way that it could explain the development of the determinate religions in the form of both a strongly logical as well historical succession. This schema never succeeded com- pletely, but the theory that the development of religious consciousness passed over from east to West is a constant element in hegel's approach. The middle east is considered as the place where natural religion under- goes its transition to the higher forms of spiritual religion. Thus, hegel's considerations concerning particular religious representations and phe- nomena are repeatedly interwoven with comparisons that could support the differences in the level of development. Therefore, it is not possible to understand hegel's exposition of a particular religion without knowing something about the beginning and the end of the process that is deter- mining the development as he understands of it.
hegel thinks there is also a development at the level of natural reli- gions. important details in the parallel of the logical and historical devel- opment and in the ordering of these religions were changed during the successive lectures.
