in its
Confucian
shape), and the former as focussing on nature rather than on a moral order.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
in the invisible world they exist without such a union, but purely as spirits.
they have some kind of a non-physical bodily existence.
the vis- ible and the invisible world, however, are not separated from each other.
they exist on the same scene.
therefore, it would be more adequate to speak of a visible and an invisible dimension of the world.
When a human being passes away, his spirit leaves his body and exists from this moment on purely as a spirit. the spirits of the deceased or more in general of the ancestors, play an important role for the now liv- ing people. the spirits can also dwell in natural things. this makes of the belief in spirits an animistic religion. indeed, animals, plants, rivers,
25 Hegel, Jenaer Systementwu? rfe i (1803/04), p. 311.
26 H. Kimmerle, 'Hegel und afrika', in: Die Dimension des Interkulturellen, amsterdam/ atlanta: Rodopi 1994, pp. 85-112, especially 109-112.
27 See for the following text: H. Kimmerle, 'the world of spirits and the respect for nature: towards a new appreciation of animism' in: The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, vol. 2, 2006, pp. 249-263. the most important sources for this article are: g. Parrinder, African Traditional Religion, london: Sheldon Press 19743 and t. fourche & H. Morlichem, Une bible noire, Brussels: Max arnold 1973.
? religion of nature 17
rocks etc. have a soul, for spirits can dwell in them. trees are preferred as dwelling places of spirits. they are bigger, stronger and older than human beings are. their tops reach high into the air so that they can easier make contact with the invisible world of spirits.
there are not only good, but also bad spirits. in the universe, in nature and in the human world harmonious relations are presupposed. that is the case as long as the good spirits prevail over the bad. Human beings or the spirits within them have the task to help maintaining the harmony by contributing to the preponderance of the good spirits. 28 When we consider, what happens presently in and between african countries (the mutual genocide of Hutu and tutsi in Rwanda, the struggles between Hema and lendu in eastern Congo or the long lasting civil war between Moslems and Christians in Sudan and nigeria), we can have heavy doubts about the maintenance of harmonic relations in the universe and in the human world. it is not easy to understand these horrible events. We do not know what really is at stake for the people concerned. it might be possible to compare these events with the terrible stories, which Hegel takes over from Cavazzi. However, also in other parts of world we find different esti- mations of the value of human life than in the West. Just think of the suicide-attacks of Moslem-fighters against their enemies in the western world and even against fellow-citizens and fellow-believers. also in the West, we have experienced horrible examples of genocides in recent times. Stories about the conduct of uS-american soldiers towards prison- ers of war in iraq or in guantanamo testify to exorbitant cruelty.
in african traditional religion the spirits in natural things and those of the ancestors exist close to the now living people, so to speak on the same scene, as i have said already. independently from them there is a Supreme Being, far away, somewhere in heaven, from where He reigns the universe. in certain parts of West africa, there is also a belief in deities, who live in between the spirits and the Supreme Being. they take care of the fertility of the land and of the women, of good weather conditions, preponderance in war situations etc. in many cases, they are responsible for the well- being of certain regions and the people who live there. the Yoruba who live in the present states of nigeria, Benin and niger believe in hundreds of deities with specific tasks. 29
28 M. B. Ramose, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Harare: Mond Books 1999.
29 Ch. Staewen, Ifa--African Gods Speak. The Oracle of the Yoruba in Nigeria, Hamburg: litVerlag 1996.
? 18 heinz kimmerle
African Philosophers About Animism and the Belief in Spirits
african philosophers have no problem with the religious beliefs of their peoples. they do not find that the belief in spirits is in opposition to a rational way of thought. according to them, spirituality and rationality are not contradictory. i could give many examples for that from the writings of odera oruka from Kenya, appiah from ghana, oluwole from nigeria, among others. 30 gyekye from ghana is critical in respect of the belief in spirits. nevertheless, he does not contest the belief in spirits as such. He is afraid that an "excessive and incessant attention to the ancestors" and what they would have done in the present situation is "an impediment to the cultivation of the innovative spirit or outlook required for making progress in the . . . transition to modernity. " instead, he pleads for an adap- tation of the " 'pristine values and attitudes' to the 'setting of the present'. " Struggling against excessive corruption, he tries to reanimate traditional values under changed conditions. traditional harmonious relations in the human communities are highly appreciated by him: mutual support for each other, especially for those who are in need or in dangerous situa- tions. also in this respect, he warns for sticking in an uncritical way to the traditional ways of thinking and acting. in a final analysis, he suggests for the relations in the human world a "moderate communitarianism. "31
Conclusions
in most of the african countries south to the Sahara, Christianity and islam are the biggest religions. in their present form, they have taken over many elements from animism. also traditional animist representa- tions and practices still exist. 'Black islam' in the countries directly under the Sahara is impregnated by the belief in spirits and the magic powers of their religious leaders. 32 Moreover, within the big number of Christian
30 H. odera oruka, Sage Philosophy. Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate in African Philosophy, leiden: Brill 1990, pp. 74-75; K. a. appiah, in My Father's House. Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, london: Methuen 1992, pp. 218-220; S. B. oluwole, Witchcraft, Rein- carnation and the God-Head, lagos: excel Publishers 1992, p. 52.
31 K. gyekye, Tradition and Modernity. Philosophical Reflections on the African Experi- ence, new York/oxford: oxford university Press 1997, pp. 257-260, 189-191 and 75-76.
32 R. l. Moreau, Africains Musulmans, Paris/abidjan: Pre? sence africaine/inades edition 1982; V. Monteil, L' Islam noir, Paris: le Seuil 1964.
? religion of nature 19
denominations, the speaking in tongues, the healing of sick people by the power of belief or exorcizing bad spirits are practices that occur daily. 33
in the West, this kind of religious representations and practices is pushed back strongly since and by enlightenment. this is also charac- teristic for the explanation of the 'religion of nature' in the context of a 'religion of spirit' in the later Hegel. the 'religion of life' and its animist connotations in an earlier period of Hegel's thought, which i have brought to the fore, cannot be related directly, and first of all not in the context of the enlightenment mentality that prevailed at that time, to the traditional animist african 'religion of life'.
However, in subcultures, in literature and figurative art and in language, the belief in spirits has never disappeared totally in the West. Derrida has recently worked out a new 'spectrology', that is a new conception of spir- its, spectres and phantoms. in his book Spectres de Marx, he determines the reality-status of spirits and spectres as the 'present absence' or the 'absent presence'. He analyses in this connection the unconscious or not as such recognizable powers in politics and economy. 34 He does not take the step to speak also of spirits in nature, as it is done in african tradi- tional thought what i propose to be taken seriously. in the realm of this discussion, the relation between the 'religion of life' in Hegel's writings of 1800-1802 to animist religious representations, as they are practised in sub-Saharan africa, becomes meaningful.
? 33 J. S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, new York: anchor 1970. 34 J. Derrida, Spectres de Marx, Paris: galile? e 1995.
Hegel on CHinese Religion sander griffioen
1. introduction
The focus of this contribution is Hegel's approach to Chinese religion. The main sources are the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Towards the end, we venture into the broader field of the intellectual history of europe's encounter with China. our aim there is to determine the sig- nificance of Hegel's contribution compared to the pioneering work of the Jesuit fathers and leibniz.
Concerning the reception history, there is one large field we will not enter. We will not deal with the Chinese reactions to Hegel. Apart from the problem of having to rely on materials that for the greatest part have not been translated, it would also be incongruent with the present contri- bution. Hegel's reception in China has only little to do with his writings on China, which, as we will see, are ill suited to impress a Chinese public. Fortunately, in this respect others have done what we will not do. espe- cially through the recent work of Martin Mu? ller much of this terrain has been covered. 1
The body of texts on China is far from large. The section in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy only counts nine pages (five of which serve as an introduction to oriental philosophy in general). The section in the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion is somewhat bigger: about thirty-five pages; a few pages on lamaism included. (l2 27, 547-579/445-475). The chapter on China in the Lectures on World History is the largest: forty- four pages in the most recent edition, offering a well-structured survey of China's ancient history. However, this is still relatively small. Throughout Hegel is dependent on secondary sources. on the whole he is content to gather materials without establishing what is reliable and what is not.
1 Martin Mu? ller, 'Chinas Hegel und Hegels China: Untersuchung zu 'Rezeption' als interpretationskonstellation am Beispiel der chinesischen Bescha? ftigung mit Hegels China-sicht', Jahrbuch fu? r Hegelforschung, Vols. 10-11/ 2004-2005 (2006). He is also the editor of an extensive bibliography: 'Die chinesischsprachige Hegel-Rezeption von 1902 bis 2000. eine Bibliographie'. Hegeliana, Vol. 16, Frankfurt am Main: 2002 (480 pp. ).
? 22 sander griffioen
Although the texts show a keen interest in the orient, there is not one aspect of Chinese thought that is dealt with exhaustively. even though these texts tell us less about China than about Hegel's philosophy, they nevertheless need to be taken seriously. it would be too easy to conclude that Hegel's account of Chinese thought represents a pure regress com- pared to the Jesuit fathers, and to leibniz, Wolff and goethe. studying the texts leads to a more nuanced conclusion. Yes, there is regress in some respects, but in others, Hegel can be said to have carved out a sui generis position in the receptionhistory, which is worth being studied.
2. orientation
Hegel's study of oriental religion and philosophy (Religion of Ancient China, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc. ) only starts in the 1820's. 2 With respect to China, his foremost source is the Jesuit Me? moirs concernant les Chi- nois (1776-1814). For his knowledge of Taoism he is mainly dependent on Abel Re? musat, Me? moire sur la vie et les opinions de Lao-Tseu (1823). 3 Until 1824, these exploits do not effect his overall classification of religions: The religion of ancient China remains subsumed under the 'nature religions', within which category it represents the rubric of 'the religion of magic'. However, from 1827 on the picture starts to change. As Jaeschke puts it, then Hegel's approach to the pre-Christian religions comes closer to a 'sequence of interpretations' than to the application of a rigid system. Although in 1827 the religion of ancient China is still classified as magical, it now represents a 'developed religion of magic'. eventually, in 1831, all links between China and nature religions are severed. 4
one peculiarity needs to be pointed out at this stage, the lack of a sharp demarcation between religion and philosophy. Where the texts show a preference for 'religion', it is because (as we will see) the category of 'phi- losophy' in a strict sense is not applicable to China and to the (broader) oriental world, since philosophy presupposes a measure of freedom unknown to the orient. This explains why Hegel in his own expositions shows preference for 'religion' as a term with a broader application than
2 Cf. Walter Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, stuttgart: Metzler 2003, p. 461.
3 see Hodgon's editorial introduction to g. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827, one Volume edition, Peter Hodgson (ed. ), Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1988, p. 43.
4 Cf. Hodgson, 'editorial introduction' in: Hegel, The Lectures of 1827, pp. 40-46, and Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, pp. 461-2.
? hegel on chinese religion 23
'philosophy'. nevertheless, there is no watertight division between religion and philosophy. The religion of Ancient China is being interpreted and assessed throughout as if it were an aspirant philosophy. Clearly, Hegel's interest is in doctrines, in thought contents, and less in religious rites and customs (although he does deal with these in the pertinent sections of the Lectures on World History). Finally, the texts also use 'philosophy' in a non-emphatic sense. This is true for general references to 'oriental phi- losophy', 'Chinese philosophy', etc. Here Hegel simply follows common designations.
3. Three stages
Hegel's survey of Chinese religion opens with what he calls 'the state reli- gion of the Chinese empire'. it comprises the religious practices and doc- trines as reconstructed on the basis of the (quite heterogeneous) materials collected in the Shujing (the Book of Annals), and includes the teachings of Confucius. only around 1827 does he gain knowledge of Taoism, mainly through Re? musat's study. He then starts to distinguish three stages in the development of Chinese thought. The first stage being the 'state religion', the second one being represented by Taoism, and the third one by Bud- dhism. With respect to the latter, there is no distinction between indian and Chinese Buddhism. in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the survey of Chinese philosophy proper closes with a section on the Yi Jing (Vorl. 6, 371-3). systematically those are at the level of the second stage, and will be included here accordingly.
laozi, whom he regards as an older contemporary of Confucius, is portrayed as a reformer of a much older Taoist 'sect'. This second stage entails a shift from a nature religion to a higher, more speculative form of thought. Thus, it is not Taoism that is classified as a religion of nature, but the state religion. normally the latter is viewed as essentially moral (esp.
in its Confucian shape), and the former as focussing on nature rather than on a moral order. The explanation is that Hegel takes Heaven (tian), the central concept of the state religion, to refer mainly to the physical order, rather than to the moral order. Whereas, on the other hand, he holds that Taoism represents a higher, purer level in the development of thinking. Hegel discovers here the beginning of speculative thought. As we will see, his interest is drawn by what he takes to be vestiges of Trinitarian thought in certain texts.
The treatment of the Yi Jing resembles the approach to Taoism. Hegel appreciates its speculative interest as to the order of the cosmos, which
24 sander griffioen
he considers as a major progress vis-a`-vis Confucius' moral teachings. However, no matter how speculative its intentions, the outcome is found wanting. Hegel thinks the hexagrams of the Yi Jing are not equipped as a medium of thought and are only able to grasp the external order of things.
it is only in the third stage, represented by Buddhism that oriental reli- gion is thought to reach its apex. Buddhist thought is praised for having developed the concept of the one substance in which all particularities and individualities submerge. Here thinking attains infinity, liberating itself from all attachment to finite life. in this respect Buddhist thought is on a par with spinoza's philosophy. (l2 27, 564/461; 573-574/470-471)
4. state Religion
let us take a closer look at each of the stages. The first stage is most exten- sively dealt with in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Although, as mentioned before, tian (Heaven) is assumed to connote primarily nature, these lectures do stress that ancient teachings are moral and social rather than anything else. This shows that China does not neatly fit Hegel's sys- tematization. 'Magic' is another category that appears strangely out of place in the present context. on first hearing, one is inclined to think it is introduced to account for the fascination China exerted on an impress- ible european public. in fact, the reason for its use is quite different: it is because tian is thought to be entirely indeterminate and therefore for its content dependent on the whims of the rulers. Just as in more primi- tive religions of magic, such as found among the inuit, magicians and conjurers (l2 27, 541/439) play an essential role in finding out the will of Heaven, China developed a system of divinations placed under the supervision of high state officials, the mandarin class. According to Hegel, this state religion lacks any form of rationality. 'The emperor is lord over the visible world of the mandarins just as he is over the invisible shen. ' (l2 27, 555/453)
The descriptions of the shen (spirits) make clear that Hegel focuses on the chthonic aspect of Chinese ancient religion, viz. the local genii (Vorl. 12, 162), at the expense of the ouranic, heavenly aspects. 5 Therefore,
5 Raguin (following the research conducted by Kristoffer schipper) has shown that official religion focused on the Dao of Heaven whereas popular religion was primarily interested in local, terrestrial spirits: cf. Yves Raguin, Lec? ons sur le taoi? sme, Taipei: institut Ricci, 1989, pp. 119-121.
? hegel on chinese religion 25
it is only logical for him to assume that the common people are not able to develop an outlook transcending their own localities and hence can- not but fall prey to all sorts of superstition once the emperor recedes. 'The Chinese are the most superstitious people of the world; they have a ceaseless fear and anxiety of everything, because everything external has a significance for them, is a power over them . . . ' (l2 27, 561/458). in a similar vein the 1831 manuscripts read: 'This power is that of the shen, and with this an enormous realm of superstition comes into play. ' (l2 27, 561/458, note 135)
5. Taoism and the Yi Jing
With respect to Taoism Hegel's attention is drawn to places in the Daode- jing (the book of The Way and the Power, attributed to laozi) that evi- dence triadic cosmological thought, esp. chapter 42: 'Tao gave birth to one, one gave birth to Two, Two gave birth to Three, Three gave birth to all the myriad things. '6 This text was one of the proof texts in Re? musat's effort to show a direct relation between China and the Bible. Whereas schelling in his Philosophy of Mythology (1857) expresses serious doubts about Re? musat's speculations, Hegel reproduces the hypothesis of a his- torical link to the biblical account of the creation of the world. 7 He con- cludes that laozi's text offers Trinitarian thought in a rudimentary form: 'Unless three determinations are recognized in god, "god" is an empty word. Right at the beginning of thinking we find the very simplest and most abstract determinations of thought . . . ' (l2 27, 559/456) However, the 1827 manuscript from which this quote is taken is quick to add: 'but one should not believe that a higher, spiritual religion has established itself in this case. ' (560/457). Hegel argues that the Dao remains abstract, and
6 in the translation of John C. H. Wu, Tao Teh Ching, Boston & london: shambhala, 2005. This cosmology has many parallels in ancient Chinese thought. An illustration which spells out the implications somewhat further is offered by the Suo Wen (a dictionary dat- ing from the 2nd C. ) in its annotation of character for 'one' ( yi): 'le Un est initial; c'est le commencement absolu; une fois la Voie (tao) e? tablie dans et par le Un, Ciel et Terre sont produits et distingue? s, les Dix mille e^tres e? voluent et s'accomplissent. ' (Dictionnaire Ricci de caracte`res chinois, Paris-Taipei: 1999, Vol. 1, p. 814).
7 Cf. Knut Walf, 'Christian Theologoumena in Western translations of the Daoists', in: Bible in Modern China, red. irene eber e. a. , Monumenta serica Xlii, sankt Augustin (Dld) [not dated], p. 128, note 21; gu? nter Wohlfahrt, Hegel und China. Philosophische Bemerkun- gen zum Chinabild Hegels mit besonderer Beru? cksichtigung des Laozi, in: Jahrbuch fu? r Hegel- forschung, 3/1997, pp. 144-5.
? 26 sander griffioen
that whatever concretization Taoism brings only accrued to the person of laozi instead of to the Tao (560/457). Hegel is referring to the cult of laozi in popular Taoism--which in fact is of later date than the Daodejing. This unhistorical interpretation finds reaffirmation in the 1831 manuscripts.
it is interesting to dwell a moment on Hegel's critique of the Yi Jing. (Vorl. 6, 371-373)8 His main point is that the sixty-four hexagrams only represent the order of the cosmos in an external and static fashion. The reason why leibniz had a much keener eye for the inner connectedness of the hexagrams9 and their ability to express transformations may well be because Hegel was led by an assumed relationship between the hexa- grams and the inflexible character of Chinese, a topic brought up in the same context (Vorl. 12, 152-153). He considers, with some justice, Chinese characters as less flexible than a phonetic system. 10 Furthermore, he holds the non-inflecting character of Chinese language responsible for a ten- dency for representations to be juxtaposed rather than connected. in his mind to miss inflection makes a language a poor medium to articulate dynamic relationships--a view for which nowadays it will be hard to find support among linguists. 11
6. Buddhism and spinozism
'The religion of Fo' (Buddhism) represents the third and final stage. in all lectures the space reserved for this stage is large (relatively speaking) compared to the previous stages. However, the reason is not that extra space is needed for a widening of the textual basis, for in this case Hegel also wholly depends on secondary sources. in fact, the basis is now nar- rower than before. Peter Hodgson in his introduction to the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion only lists certain reports by travellers and a general history of China. (De Mailla's Histoire ge? ne? rale de la Chine, Paris, 1777-1785). Apparently, on approaching the top Hegel prefers to travel light. evidently, he is not interested in the history of Buddhism's indian origins and its later career in China, Japan and Korea. His interest is rather
8 Young Kun Kim, 'Hegel's Criticism of Chinese Philosophy', in: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 28, no. 2, sinological Torque (1978), pp. 174-176.
9 see esp. Karel l. van der leeuw, Leibniz. Over de natuurlijke theologie van de Chinezen, Budel: Damon 2006, pp. 57-63; 130-136.
10 'Was die schriftsprache selbst betrifft, so ist dies herauszuheben, dass sie das gro? sste Hindernis der Befo? rderung der Wissenschaft ist. ' (Vorl. 12, 153)
11 The inflexibility of (spoken) Chinese is one of the myths debunked by John DeFrancis: The Chinese Language. Fact and Fantasy, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1984.
? hegel on chinese religion 27
to highlight what he thinks is its central concept: Substance, or rather: the notion of the one substance.
Contemporary european issues at least as much prompted the choice of this concept, as a reconstruction of the inner development of Chinese religion. The most obvious relation is with the controversies surrounding spinozism. The parallel with spinoza is present right from the outset. Just as the latter attempted to overcome Cartesian dualism by positing one substance, so Hegel places a Buddhist concept of one substance at the apex of oriental thought. Consecutively Hegel contrasts this notion with the concept of pantheism employed by the critics of spinozism. His point is that those critics have a poor understanding of the spinozist notion of the All and could learn a lot from the orient. The great achievement of the latter is to have understood the power of negation. Hegel uses the term 'idealism' as a contrast to the vulgar realism of the critics of spinozism who falsely attribute to spinoza a notion of the Divine as an Allesheit, i. e. a container in which all things of this world are dumped. To do justice to spinoza a more appropriate term than pantheism would be acosmism, since in the latter case Divine omnipotence would rightly be understood as a negation of the world. (l2 27, 574/470, note 172)
For a human being, this state of negation is the highest state: one must immerse oneself in this nothing, in the eternal tranquillity of the nothing generally, in the substantial in which all determinations cease, where there is no virtue or intelligence, where all movement annuls itself. All character- istics of both natural life and spiritual life have vanished. (l2 27, 565/462)
7. subjectivism, subjectivity and Philosophy
oriental idealism is not only contrasted to the hypostatization of finite things of which Hegel accused the opponents of spinozism, but is also pitted against Romanticist subjectivism. lecturing in 1825/26 on oriental thought Hegel uses the opportunity for a side-attack on Friedrich schlegel's subjec- tivism. The orient is praised for having discovered the self-sufficiency of pure thinking ('thought for itself '), and for having turned this into the foundation of truth. on the other hand, Romanticists indulge in a 'subjec- tive vanity' that dissolves all objectivity. The advantage of the orient is to have developed 'an intellectual substantiality' in which all 'subjective van- ity is drowned'. 12 However, as Hegel contends, the disadvantage is that the
12 'jene subjective eitelkeit darin zu ersa? ufen' Cf. Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, p. 485.
? 28 sander griffioen
orient only has a dim awareness of god as subject, and as a consequence fails to give the human person its due. (l2 27, 576/472)13 This is also why oriental thought could not evolve into a genuine philosophy.
so while opposing both objectivism and subjectivism, Hegel is at the same time concerned that objectivity and subjectivity receive their due. He also makes clear that the acknowledgment of free subjectivity is the 'to be or not to be' of philosophy. since he finds this lacking in the ori- ent, the conclusion cannot but be that we are looking here in vain for genuine philosophy. especially within the Confucian pale there is little to find. even as a moral teacher Confucius cannot measure up to Cicero. Cicero's De Officiis, Hegel suggests, is more valuable than all the works of Confucius; to which he sarcastically adds that it would have been better for the sage's reputation if these had not been translated. 14
Conclusion: Hegel's Place in the Reception History
After this survey of relevant texts, a certain disappointment is hard to avoid. The texts are not many, and nowhere witness of any mastery. inter- preters before us, of course, reached a similar conclusion. one of them, Young Kun Kim, nevertheless derives consolation by supposing that Hegel at least has left us with hard but stimulating questions: 'neverthe- less, Hegel has contributed to the study of Chinese philosophy by posing tough questions, which i am afraid, have not yet been answered. '15 Unfor- tunately, Kim does not tell us what these questions were.
is this to say that 'Hegel and China' is a subject that could just as well be passed over? This would be the case if Hegel would represent a sheer regress compared to the Jesuit fathers, leibniz, Wolff, goethe, and schelling. in fact, his position has something of a sui generis character. in order to understand his position we need to take a number of points into account.
Ex oriente lux. Hegel follows Voltaire in placing China at the beginning of history: his lectures on world history, religion and philosophy all start with China. so the Far east and no longer Asia Minor is honoured as the
13 idem, p. 484.
14 'Ciceros 'De officiis' ist vielleicht besser fu? r uns als alle Werke des Konfuzius. U? ber die U? bersetzungen urteilen die kompetenten Richter, man ha? tte fu? r Konfuzius' Ruhm besser gesorgt, ihn nicht zu u? bersetzen; es sei ganz gewo? hnliche, weitschweifige Moral. ' (Vorl. 6, 371)
15 Kim, 'Hegel's Criticism of Chinese Philosophy', p. 179.
? hegel on chinese religion 29
cradle of humanity. Herein he follows Voltaire who was the first historian to break with the older tradition of starting in one way or another with the biblical account of israel and the surrounding nations. Whereas Bossuet's Discours sur l'histoire universelle (1681) still followed the old model, Vol- taire started a revolution by letting his Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations (1756), of work of comparable ambition, open with China! 16 Hegel is a child of this revolution.
Historicism. Although the sun rises in the east, it sets in the west. With Hegel, the Western sunset is more important than the eastern sunrise. Both the east's fascination with substantiality and Western reflexivity are placed in a developmental perspective:
This oriental way of viewing things is opposed to that of the occident: just as the sun sets in the West, so it is in the West that human being descends into itself, into its own subjectivity. (l2 27, 572/469)
Therefore, in Hegel the Voltairean revolution does not give the orient a central place. With Buddhism China and india have run their historical course. The spirit then moves on to europe, leaving behind the achieve- ments of the orient as empty shells on the shores of time. For each of the participants the clock of history only strikes once. 17
Concurrence with Leibniz. only in passing is leibniz' interest in China mentioned. Yet there is congruence on an important point. leibniz' Dis- course on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716) was prompted by the criticism of an Anti-Riccian group levelled against the legacy of Ricci. The point the critics wanted to make was that Ricci and friends had been nai? ve in their attitude towards China: the so-called natural theology of the Chinese being in fact a form of pantheism, if not atheism. 18 This criti- cism is strikingly similar to the attacks on spinozism. so Hegel would have answered the anti-Riccian faction in much the same way as he answered the anti-spinozists, i. e. by arguing that the orient and spinoza developed an understanding of substantiality that as such is neither pantheistic or
16 on this revolution, see Karl loewith, Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, Chicago: 1949, Chapter 5.
17 'Die Uhr der Philosophien, die bei Hegel dieselbe wie die des Weltgeistes ist, schla? gt nicht zweimal dieselbe stunde . . . ' see ernst Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt.
When a human being passes away, his spirit leaves his body and exists from this moment on purely as a spirit. the spirits of the deceased or more in general of the ancestors, play an important role for the now liv- ing people. the spirits can also dwell in natural things. this makes of the belief in spirits an animistic religion. indeed, animals, plants, rivers,
25 Hegel, Jenaer Systementwu? rfe i (1803/04), p. 311.
26 H. Kimmerle, 'Hegel und afrika', in: Die Dimension des Interkulturellen, amsterdam/ atlanta: Rodopi 1994, pp. 85-112, especially 109-112.
27 See for the following text: H. Kimmerle, 'the world of spirits and the respect for nature: towards a new appreciation of animism' in: The Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa, vol. 2, 2006, pp. 249-263. the most important sources for this article are: g. Parrinder, African Traditional Religion, london: Sheldon Press 19743 and t. fourche & H. Morlichem, Une bible noire, Brussels: Max arnold 1973.
? religion of nature 17
rocks etc. have a soul, for spirits can dwell in them. trees are preferred as dwelling places of spirits. they are bigger, stronger and older than human beings are. their tops reach high into the air so that they can easier make contact with the invisible world of spirits.
there are not only good, but also bad spirits. in the universe, in nature and in the human world harmonious relations are presupposed. that is the case as long as the good spirits prevail over the bad. Human beings or the spirits within them have the task to help maintaining the harmony by contributing to the preponderance of the good spirits. 28 When we consider, what happens presently in and between african countries (the mutual genocide of Hutu and tutsi in Rwanda, the struggles between Hema and lendu in eastern Congo or the long lasting civil war between Moslems and Christians in Sudan and nigeria), we can have heavy doubts about the maintenance of harmonic relations in the universe and in the human world. it is not easy to understand these horrible events. We do not know what really is at stake for the people concerned. it might be possible to compare these events with the terrible stories, which Hegel takes over from Cavazzi. However, also in other parts of world we find different esti- mations of the value of human life than in the West. Just think of the suicide-attacks of Moslem-fighters against their enemies in the western world and even against fellow-citizens and fellow-believers. also in the West, we have experienced horrible examples of genocides in recent times. Stories about the conduct of uS-american soldiers towards prison- ers of war in iraq or in guantanamo testify to exorbitant cruelty.
in african traditional religion the spirits in natural things and those of the ancestors exist close to the now living people, so to speak on the same scene, as i have said already. independently from them there is a Supreme Being, far away, somewhere in heaven, from where He reigns the universe. in certain parts of West africa, there is also a belief in deities, who live in between the spirits and the Supreme Being. they take care of the fertility of the land and of the women, of good weather conditions, preponderance in war situations etc. in many cases, they are responsible for the well- being of certain regions and the people who live there. the Yoruba who live in the present states of nigeria, Benin and niger believe in hundreds of deities with specific tasks. 29
28 M. B. Ramose, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Harare: Mond Books 1999.
29 Ch. Staewen, Ifa--African Gods Speak. The Oracle of the Yoruba in Nigeria, Hamburg: litVerlag 1996.
? 18 heinz kimmerle
African Philosophers About Animism and the Belief in Spirits
african philosophers have no problem with the religious beliefs of their peoples. they do not find that the belief in spirits is in opposition to a rational way of thought. according to them, spirituality and rationality are not contradictory. i could give many examples for that from the writings of odera oruka from Kenya, appiah from ghana, oluwole from nigeria, among others. 30 gyekye from ghana is critical in respect of the belief in spirits. nevertheless, he does not contest the belief in spirits as such. He is afraid that an "excessive and incessant attention to the ancestors" and what they would have done in the present situation is "an impediment to the cultivation of the innovative spirit or outlook required for making progress in the . . . transition to modernity. " instead, he pleads for an adap- tation of the " 'pristine values and attitudes' to the 'setting of the present'. " Struggling against excessive corruption, he tries to reanimate traditional values under changed conditions. traditional harmonious relations in the human communities are highly appreciated by him: mutual support for each other, especially for those who are in need or in dangerous situa- tions. also in this respect, he warns for sticking in an uncritical way to the traditional ways of thinking and acting. in a final analysis, he suggests for the relations in the human world a "moderate communitarianism. "31
Conclusions
in most of the african countries south to the Sahara, Christianity and islam are the biggest religions. in their present form, they have taken over many elements from animism. also traditional animist representa- tions and practices still exist. 'Black islam' in the countries directly under the Sahara is impregnated by the belief in spirits and the magic powers of their religious leaders. 32 Moreover, within the big number of Christian
30 H. odera oruka, Sage Philosophy. Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate in African Philosophy, leiden: Brill 1990, pp. 74-75; K. a. appiah, in My Father's House. Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, london: Methuen 1992, pp. 218-220; S. B. oluwole, Witchcraft, Rein- carnation and the God-Head, lagos: excel Publishers 1992, p. 52.
31 K. gyekye, Tradition and Modernity. Philosophical Reflections on the African Experi- ence, new York/oxford: oxford university Press 1997, pp. 257-260, 189-191 and 75-76.
32 R. l. Moreau, Africains Musulmans, Paris/abidjan: Pre? sence africaine/inades edition 1982; V. Monteil, L' Islam noir, Paris: le Seuil 1964.
? religion of nature 19
denominations, the speaking in tongues, the healing of sick people by the power of belief or exorcizing bad spirits are practices that occur daily. 33
in the West, this kind of religious representations and practices is pushed back strongly since and by enlightenment. this is also charac- teristic for the explanation of the 'religion of nature' in the context of a 'religion of spirit' in the later Hegel. the 'religion of life' and its animist connotations in an earlier period of Hegel's thought, which i have brought to the fore, cannot be related directly, and first of all not in the context of the enlightenment mentality that prevailed at that time, to the traditional animist african 'religion of life'.
However, in subcultures, in literature and figurative art and in language, the belief in spirits has never disappeared totally in the West. Derrida has recently worked out a new 'spectrology', that is a new conception of spir- its, spectres and phantoms. in his book Spectres de Marx, he determines the reality-status of spirits and spectres as the 'present absence' or the 'absent presence'. He analyses in this connection the unconscious or not as such recognizable powers in politics and economy. 34 He does not take the step to speak also of spirits in nature, as it is done in african tradi- tional thought what i propose to be taken seriously. in the realm of this discussion, the relation between the 'religion of life' in Hegel's writings of 1800-1802 to animist religious representations, as they are practised in sub-Saharan africa, becomes meaningful.
? 33 J. S. Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, new York: anchor 1970. 34 J. Derrida, Spectres de Marx, Paris: galile? e 1995.
Hegel on CHinese Religion sander griffioen
1. introduction
The focus of this contribution is Hegel's approach to Chinese religion. The main sources are the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Towards the end, we venture into the broader field of the intellectual history of europe's encounter with China. our aim there is to determine the sig- nificance of Hegel's contribution compared to the pioneering work of the Jesuit fathers and leibniz.
Concerning the reception history, there is one large field we will not enter. We will not deal with the Chinese reactions to Hegel. Apart from the problem of having to rely on materials that for the greatest part have not been translated, it would also be incongruent with the present contri- bution. Hegel's reception in China has only little to do with his writings on China, which, as we will see, are ill suited to impress a Chinese public. Fortunately, in this respect others have done what we will not do. espe- cially through the recent work of Martin Mu? ller much of this terrain has been covered. 1
The body of texts on China is far from large. The section in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy only counts nine pages (five of which serve as an introduction to oriental philosophy in general). The section in the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion is somewhat bigger: about thirty-five pages; a few pages on lamaism included. (l2 27, 547-579/445-475). The chapter on China in the Lectures on World History is the largest: forty- four pages in the most recent edition, offering a well-structured survey of China's ancient history. However, this is still relatively small. Throughout Hegel is dependent on secondary sources. on the whole he is content to gather materials without establishing what is reliable and what is not.
1 Martin Mu? ller, 'Chinas Hegel und Hegels China: Untersuchung zu 'Rezeption' als interpretationskonstellation am Beispiel der chinesischen Bescha? ftigung mit Hegels China-sicht', Jahrbuch fu? r Hegelforschung, Vols. 10-11/ 2004-2005 (2006). He is also the editor of an extensive bibliography: 'Die chinesischsprachige Hegel-Rezeption von 1902 bis 2000. eine Bibliographie'. Hegeliana, Vol. 16, Frankfurt am Main: 2002 (480 pp. ).
? 22 sander griffioen
Although the texts show a keen interest in the orient, there is not one aspect of Chinese thought that is dealt with exhaustively. even though these texts tell us less about China than about Hegel's philosophy, they nevertheless need to be taken seriously. it would be too easy to conclude that Hegel's account of Chinese thought represents a pure regress com- pared to the Jesuit fathers, and to leibniz, Wolff and goethe. studying the texts leads to a more nuanced conclusion. Yes, there is regress in some respects, but in others, Hegel can be said to have carved out a sui generis position in the receptionhistory, which is worth being studied.
2. orientation
Hegel's study of oriental religion and philosophy (Religion of Ancient China, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc. ) only starts in the 1820's. 2 With respect to China, his foremost source is the Jesuit Me? moirs concernant les Chi- nois (1776-1814). For his knowledge of Taoism he is mainly dependent on Abel Re? musat, Me? moire sur la vie et les opinions de Lao-Tseu (1823). 3 Until 1824, these exploits do not effect his overall classification of religions: The religion of ancient China remains subsumed under the 'nature religions', within which category it represents the rubric of 'the religion of magic'. However, from 1827 on the picture starts to change. As Jaeschke puts it, then Hegel's approach to the pre-Christian religions comes closer to a 'sequence of interpretations' than to the application of a rigid system. Although in 1827 the religion of ancient China is still classified as magical, it now represents a 'developed religion of magic'. eventually, in 1831, all links between China and nature religions are severed. 4
one peculiarity needs to be pointed out at this stage, the lack of a sharp demarcation between religion and philosophy. Where the texts show a preference for 'religion', it is because (as we will see) the category of 'phi- losophy' in a strict sense is not applicable to China and to the (broader) oriental world, since philosophy presupposes a measure of freedom unknown to the orient. This explains why Hegel in his own expositions shows preference for 'religion' as a term with a broader application than
2 Cf. Walter Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, stuttgart: Metzler 2003, p. 461.
3 see Hodgon's editorial introduction to g. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827, one Volume edition, Peter Hodgson (ed. ), Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 1988, p. 43.
4 Cf. Hodgson, 'editorial introduction' in: Hegel, The Lectures of 1827, pp. 40-46, and Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, pp. 461-2.
? hegel on chinese religion 23
'philosophy'. nevertheless, there is no watertight division between religion and philosophy. The religion of Ancient China is being interpreted and assessed throughout as if it were an aspirant philosophy. Clearly, Hegel's interest is in doctrines, in thought contents, and less in religious rites and customs (although he does deal with these in the pertinent sections of the Lectures on World History). Finally, the texts also use 'philosophy' in a non-emphatic sense. This is true for general references to 'oriental phi- losophy', 'Chinese philosophy', etc. Here Hegel simply follows common designations.
3. Three stages
Hegel's survey of Chinese religion opens with what he calls 'the state reli- gion of the Chinese empire'. it comprises the religious practices and doc- trines as reconstructed on the basis of the (quite heterogeneous) materials collected in the Shujing (the Book of Annals), and includes the teachings of Confucius. only around 1827 does he gain knowledge of Taoism, mainly through Re? musat's study. He then starts to distinguish three stages in the development of Chinese thought. The first stage being the 'state religion', the second one being represented by Taoism, and the third one by Bud- dhism. With respect to the latter, there is no distinction between indian and Chinese Buddhism. in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, the survey of Chinese philosophy proper closes with a section on the Yi Jing (Vorl. 6, 371-3). systematically those are at the level of the second stage, and will be included here accordingly.
laozi, whom he regards as an older contemporary of Confucius, is portrayed as a reformer of a much older Taoist 'sect'. This second stage entails a shift from a nature religion to a higher, more speculative form of thought. Thus, it is not Taoism that is classified as a religion of nature, but the state religion. normally the latter is viewed as essentially moral (esp.
in its Confucian shape), and the former as focussing on nature rather than on a moral order. The explanation is that Hegel takes Heaven (tian), the central concept of the state religion, to refer mainly to the physical order, rather than to the moral order. Whereas, on the other hand, he holds that Taoism represents a higher, purer level in the development of thinking. Hegel discovers here the beginning of speculative thought. As we will see, his interest is drawn by what he takes to be vestiges of Trinitarian thought in certain texts.
The treatment of the Yi Jing resembles the approach to Taoism. Hegel appreciates its speculative interest as to the order of the cosmos, which
24 sander griffioen
he considers as a major progress vis-a`-vis Confucius' moral teachings. However, no matter how speculative its intentions, the outcome is found wanting. Hegel thinks the hexagrams of the Yi Jing are not equipped as a medium of thought and are only able to grasp the external order of things.
it is only in the third stage, represented by Buddhism that oriental reli- gion is thought to reach its apex. Buddhist thought is praised for having developed the concept of the one substance in which all particularities and individualities submerge. Here thinking attains infinity, liberating itself from all attachment to finite life. in this respect Buddhist thought is on a par with spinoza's philosophy. (l2 27, 564/461; 573-574/470-471)
4. state Religion
let us take a closer look at each of the stages. The first stage is most exten- sively dealt with in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Although, as mentioned before, tian (Heaven) is assumed to connote primarily nature, these lectures do stress that ancient teachings are moral and social rather than anything else. This shows that China does not neatly fit Hegel's sys- tematization. 'Magic' is another category that appears strangely out of place in the present context. on first hearing, one is inclined to think it is introduced to account for the fascination China exerted on an impress- ible european public. in fact, the reason for its use is quite different: it is because tian is thought to be entirely indeterminate and therefore for its content dependent on the whims of the rulers. Just as in more primi- tive religions of magic, such as found among the inuit, magicians and conjurers (l2 27, 541/439) play an essential role in finding out the will of Heaven, China developed a system of divinations placed under the supervision of high state officials, the mandarin class. According to Hegel, this state religion lacks any form of rationality. 'The emperor is lord over the visible world of the mandarins just as he is over the invisible shen. ' (l2 27, 555/453)
The descriptions of the shen (spirits) make clear that Hegel focuses on the chthonic aspect of Chinese ancient religion, viz. the local genii (Vorl. 12, 162), at the expense of the ouranic, heavenly aspects. 5 Therefore,
5 Raguin (following the research conducted by Kristoffer schipper) has shown that official religion focused on the Dao of Heaven whereas popular religion was primarily interested in local, terrestrial spirits: cf. Yves Raguin, Lec? ons sur le taoi? sme, Taipei: institut Ricci, 1989, pp. 119-121.
? hegel on chinese religion 25
it is only logical for him to assume that the common people are not able to develop an outlook transcending their own localities and hence can- not but fall prey to all sorts of superstition once the emperor recedes. 'The Chinese are the most superstitious people of the world; they have a ceaseless fear and anxiety of everything, because everything external has a significance for them, is a power over them . . . ' (l2 27, 561/458). in a similar vein the 1831 manuscripts read: 'This power is that of the shen, and with this an enormous realm of superstition comes into play. ' (l2 27, 561/458, note 135)
5. Taoism and the Yi Jing
With respect to Taoism Hegel's attention is drawn to places in the Daode- jing (the book of The Way and the Power, attributed to laozi) that evi- dence triadic cosmological thought, esp. chapter 42: 'Tao gave birth to one, one gave birth to Two, Two gave birth to Three, Three gave birth to all the myriad things. '6 This text was one of the proof texts in Re? musat's effort to show a direct relation between China and the Bible. Whereas schelling in his Philosophy of Mythology (1857) expresses serious doubts about Re? musat's speculations, Hegel reproduces the hypothesis of a his- torical link to the biblical account of the creation of the world. 7 He con- cludes that laozi's text offers Trinitarian thought in a rudimentary form: 'Unless three determinations are recognized in god, "god" is an empty word. Right at the beginning of thinking we find the very simplest and most abstract determinations of thought . . . ' (l2 27, 559/456) However, the 1827 manuscript from which this quote is taken is quick to add: 'but one should not believe that a higher, spiritual religion has established itself in this case. ' (560/457). Hegel argues that the Dao remains abstract, and
6 in the translation of John C. H. Wu, Tao Teh Ching, Boston & london: shambhala, 2005. This cosmology has many parallels in ancient Chinese thought. An illustration which spells out the implications somewhat further is offered by the Suo Wen (a dictionary dat- ing from the 2nd C. ) in its annotation of character for 'one' ( yi): 'le Un est initial; c'est le commencement absolu; une fois la Voie (tao) e? tablie dans et par le Un, Ciel et Terre sont produits et distingue? s, les Dix mille e^tres e? voluent et s'accomplissent. ' (Dictionnaire Ricci de caracte`res chinois, Paris-Taipei: 1999, Vol. 1, p. 814).
7 Cf. Knut Walf, 'Christian Theologoumena in Western translations of the Daoists', in: Bible in Modern China, red. irene eber e. a. , Monumenta serica Xlii, sankt Augustin (Dld) [not dated], p. 128, note 21; gu? nter Wohlfahrt, Hegel und China. Philosophische Bemerkun- gen zum Chinabild Hegels mit besonderer Beru? cksichtigung des Laozi, in: Jahrbuch fu? r Hegel- forschung, 3/1997, pp. 144-5.
? 26 sander griffioen
that whatever concretization Taoism brings only accrued to the person of laozi instead of to the Tao (560/457). Hegel is referring to the cult of laozi in popular Taoism--which in fact is of later date than the Daodejing. This unhistorical interpretation finds reaffirmation in the 1831 manuscripts.
it is interesting to dwell a moment on Hegel's critique of the Yi Jing. (Vorl. 6, 371-373)8 His main point is that the sixty-four hexagrams only represent the order of the cosmos in an external and static fashion. The reason why leibniz had a much keener eye for the inner connectedness of the hexagrams9 and their ability to express transformations may well be because Hegel was led by an assumed relationship between the hexa- grams and the inflexible character of Chinese, a topic brought up in the same context (Vorl. 12, 152-153). He considers, with some justice, Chinese characters as less flexible than a phonetic system. 10 Furthermore, he holds the non-inflecting character of Chinese language responsible for a ten- dency for representations to be juxtaposed rather than connected. in his mind to miss inflection makes a language a poor medium to articulate dynamic relationships--a view for which nowadays it will be hard to find support among linguists. 11
6. Buddhism and spinozism
'The religion of Fo' (Buddhism) represents the third and final stage. in all lectures the space reserved for this stage is large (relatively speaking) compared to the previous stages. However, the reason is not that extra space is needed for a widening of the textual basis, for in this case Hegel also wholly depends on secondary sources. in fact, the basis is now nar- rower than before. Peter Hodgson in his introduction to the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion only lists certain reports by travellers and a general history of China. (De Mailla's Histoire ge? ne? rale de la Chine, Paris, 1777-1785). Apparently, on approaching the top Hegel prefers to travel light. evidently, he is not interested in the history of Buddhism's indian origins and its later career in China, Japan and Korea. His interest is rather
8 Young Kun Kim, 'Hegel's Criticism of Chinese Philosophy', in: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 28, no. 2, sinological Torque (1978), pp. 174-176.
9 see esp. Karel l. van der leeuw, Leibniz. Over de natuurlijke theologie van de Chinezen, Budel: Damon 2006, pp. 57-63; 130-136.
10 'Was die schriftsprache selbst betrifft, so ist dies herauszuheben, dass sie das gro? sste Hindernis der Befo? rderung der Wissenschaft ist. ' (Vorl. 12, 153)
11 The inflexibility of (spoken) Chinese is one of the myths debunked by John DeFrancis: The Chinese Language. Fact and Fantasy, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1984.
? hegel on chinese religion 27
to highlight what he thinks is its central concept: Substance, or rather: the notion of the one substance.
Contemporary european issues at least as much prompted the choice of this concept, as a reconstruction of the inner development of Chinese religion. The most obvious relation is with the controversies surrounding spinozism. The parallel with spinoza is present right from the outset. Just as the latter attempted to overcome Cartesian dualism by positing one substance, so Hegel places a Buddhist concept of one substance at the apex of oriental thought. Consecutively Hegel contrasts this notion with the concept of pantheism employed by the critics of spinozism. His point is that those critics have a poor understanding of the spinozist notion of the All and could learn a lot from the orient. The great achievement of the latter is to have understood the power of negation. Hegel uses the term 'idealism' as a contrast to the vulgar realism of the critics of spinozism who falsely attribute to spinoza a notion of the Divine as an Allesheit, i. e. a container in which all things of this world are dumped. To do justice to spinoza a more appropriate term than pantheism would be acosmism, since in the latter case Divine omnipotence would rightly be understood as a negation of the world. (l2 27, 574/470, note 172)
For a human being, this state of negation is the highest state: one must immerse oneself in this nothing, in the eternal tranquillity of the nothing generally, in the substantial in which all determinations cease, where there is no virtue or intelligence, where all movement annuls itself. All character- istics of both natural life and spiritual life have vanished. (l2 27, 565/462)
7. subjectivism, subjectivity and Philosophy
oriental idealism is not only contrasted to the hypostatization of finite things of which Hegel accused the opponents of spinozism, but is also pitted against Romanticist subjectivism. lecturing in 1825/26 on oriental thought Hegel uses the opportunity for a side-attack on Friedrich schlegel's subjec- tivism. The orient is praised for having discovered the self-sufficiency of pure thinking ('thought for itself '), and for having turned this into the foundation of truth. on the other hand, Romanticists indulge in a 'subjec- tive vanity' that dissolves all objectivity. The advantage of the orient is to have developed 'an intellectual substantiality' in which all 'subjective van- ity is drowned'. 12 However, as Hegel contends, the disadvantage is that the
12 'jene subjective eitelkeit darin zu ersa? ufen' Cf. Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch, p. 485.
? 28 sander griffioen
orient only has a dim awareness of god as subject, and as a consequence fails to give the human person its due. (l2 27, 576/472)13 This is also why oriental thought could not evolve into a genuine philosophy.
so while opposing both objectivism and subjectivism, Hegel is at the same time concerned that objectivity and subjectivity receive their due. He also makes clear that the acknowledgment of free subjectivity is the 'to be or not to be' of philosophy. since he finds this lacking in the ori- ent, the conclusion cannot but be that we are looking here in vain for genuine philosophy. especially within the Confucian pale there is little to find. even as a moral teacher Confucius cannot measure up to Cicero. Cicero's De Officiis, Hegel suggests, is more valuable than all the works of Confucius; to which he sarcastically adds that it would have been better for the sage's reputation if these had not been translated. 14
Conclusion: Hegel's Place in the Reception History
After this survey of relevant texts, a certain disappointment is hard to avoid. The texts are not many, and nowhere witness of any mastery. inter- preters before us, of course, reached a similar conclusion. one of them, Young Kun Kim, nevertheless derives consolation by supposing that Hegel at least has left us with hard but stimulating questions: 'neverthe- less, Hegel has contributed to the study of Chinese philosophy by posing tough questions, which i am afraid, have not yet been answered. '15 Unfor- tunately, Kim does not tell us what these questions were.
is this to say that 'Hegel and China' is a subject that could just as well be passed over? This would be the case if Hegel would represent a sheer regress compared to the Jesuit fathers, leibniz, Wolff, goethe, and schelling. in fact, his position has something of a sui generis character. in order to understand his position we need to take a number of points into account.
Ex oriente lux. Hegel follows Voltaire in placing China at the beginning of history: his lectures on world history, religion and philosophy all start with China. so the Far east and no longer Asia Minor is honoured as the
13 idem, p. 484.
14 'Ciceros 'De officiis' ist vielleicht besser fu? r uns als alle Werke des Konfuzius. U? ber die U? bersetzungen urteilen die kompetenten Richter, man ha? tte fu? r Konfuzius' Ruhm besser gesorgt, ihn nicht zu u? bersetzen; es sei ganz gewo? hnliche, weitschweifige Moral. ' (Vorl. 6, 371)
15 Kim, 'Hegel's Criticism of Chinese Philosophy', p. 179.
? hegel on chinese religion 29
cradle of humanity. Herein he follows Voltaire who was the first historian to break with the older tradition of starting in one way or another with the biblical account of israel and the surrounding nations. Whereas Bossuet's Discours sur l'histoire universelle (1681) still followed the old model, Vol- taire started a revolution by letting his Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations (1756), of work of comparable ambition, open with China! 16 Hegel is a child of this revolution.
Historicism. Although the sun rises in the east, it sets in the west. With Hegel, the Western sunset is more important than the eastern sunrise. Both the east's fascination with substantiality and Western reflexivity are placed in a developmental perspective:
This oriental way of viewing things is opposed to that of the occident: just as the sun sets in the West, so it is in the West that human being descends into itself, into its own subjectivity. (l2 27, 572/469)
Therefore, in Hegel the Voltairean revolution does not give the orient a central place. With Buddhism China and india have run their historical course. The spirit then moves on to europe, leaving behind the achieve- ments of the orient as empty shells on the shores of time. For each of the participants the clock of history only strikes once. 17
Concurrence with Leibniz. only in passing is leibniz' interest in China mentioned. Yet there is congruence on an important point. leibniz' Dis- course on the Natural Theology of the Chinese (1716) was prompted by the criticism of an Anti-Riccian group levelled against the legacy of Ricci. The point the critics wanted to make was that Ricci and friends had been nai? ve in their attitude towards China: the so-called natural theology of the Chinese being in fact a form of pantheism, if not atheism. 18 This criti- cism is strikingly similar to the attacks on spinozism. so Hegel would have answered the anti-Riccian faction in much the same way as he answered the anti-spinozists, i. e. by arguing that the orient and spinoza developed an understanding of substantiality that as such is neither pantheistic or
16 on this revolution, see Karl loewith, Meaning in History. The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History, Chicago: 1949, Chapter 5.
17 'Die Uhr der Philosophien, die bei Hegel dieselbe wie die des Weltgeistes ist, schla? gt nicht zweimal dieselbe stunde . . . ' see ernst Bloch, Subjekt-Objekt.
