The void will have to
be filled either by the states entering into a federal relationship
with the successor Government or Goverments in British India or,
failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it
or them.
be filled either by the states entering into a federal relationship
with the successor Government or Goverments in British India or,
failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it
or them.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
The wishes of the inhabi-
tants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the
votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equiva-
lent method.
“If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that
these areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after India
is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted
into two sovereign independent states. There shall be a treaty of
separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfac-
tory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communica-
tions, customs, commerce and the like, which must necessarily
continue to be matters of common concern between the contracting
parties.
"The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights
of the minorities in the two States.
"Immediately on the acceptance of the agreement by the Con-
gress and the League the two shall decide upon a common course
of action for the attainment of independence of India.
"The League will, however, be free to remain out of any direct
## p. 673 (#713) ############################################
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA
673
action to which the Congress may resort and in which the League
may not be willing to co-operate. '
The negotiations were bound to fail under the circumstances.
There was no place for compromise between the Congress on the
one hand and the Muslim League on the other. The Congress
failed in its object of achieving the independence of the country
after coming to some settlement with the Muslim League. How-
ever, critics point out that thy negotiations between Mahatma
Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah had very unhappy results. To quote
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, "Gandhi's approach to Mr. Jinnah
on this occasion was a great political blunder. It gave a new and
added importance to Mr. Jinnah which the latter exploited to the
full. . . . . . Mr. Jinnah had lost most of the importance after he left
the Congress in the twenties. It was largely due to Gandhi's acts
of commission and omission that Mr. Jinnah regained his import-
ance in Indian political life. As a consequence of Gandhi's atti-
tude of running after him and entreating him, many of the Mus-
lims who were doubtful about Mr. Jinnah and his policy developed
a new respect for Jinnah. Moreover, it was Gandhi who first gave
currency to the title Quid-e-Azam or great leader, as applied to
Mr. Jinnah. By addressing him in his letter as a Quid-e-Azam, he
recognised him as a great leader and strengthened his position in
the eyes of the Indian Muslims. " (India Wins Freedom by Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, page 93).
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA (1945)
Although the negotiations between Mahatma Gandhi and Mr.
Jinnah failed on the basis of the Rajagopalachariar formula, efforts
were made by Bhulabhai Desai, Leader of the Congress Party in
the Central Legislative Assembly, to solve the deadlock. That
ultimately resulted in the Desai-Liaqat formula of January 1945.
The formula contained the following terms for the formation of an
Interim Government at the Centre:-
"The Congress and League agree that they will join in forming
an Interim Government at the Centre. The composition of such
Government will be on the following lines:
“(a) Equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and
the League in the Central Executive. Persons nominated need not
be members of the Central Legislature.
“(b) Representatives of minorities (in particular Scheduled
Castes and the Sikhs).
"(c) The Commander-in-Chief.
"The Government will be formed and function within the frame-
## p. 674 (#714) ############################################
674 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
work of the existing Government of India Act. It is, however, ,
understood that if the Cabinet cannot get a particular measure
passed by the Legislative Assembly, they will not enforce the same
by resort to any of the powers of the Governor-General or the Vice-
roy. This will make them sufficiently independent of the Gover-
nor-General.
“It is agreed between the Congress and the League that if such
Interim Government is formed, their first step would be to release
the Working Committee members of the Congress.
“The steps by which efforts would be made to achieve this end
are at present indicated to take the following course. On the basis of
the above understanding, some way should be found to get the
Governor-General to make a proposal or a suggestion that he desires
an Interim Government to be formed at the Centre on the agree-
ment between the Congress and the League and when the Gover-
nor-General invites Mr. Jinnah, and Mr. Desai either jointly or
separately, the above proposals would be made, desiring that they
are prepared to join in the forming of the Government.
“The next step would be to get the withdrawal of section 93 in
the Provinces and to form as soon as possible Provincial Govern-
ments on the lines of a Coalition. ”
However, in spite of the honest efforts of Desai and Liaqat Ali
Khan, no settlement could be secured between the Congress and the
Muslim League, and the deadlock continued till the surrender of
Germany on 5 May, 1945.
WAVELL PLAN (1945)
On 14 June, 1945, Lord Wavell gave a broadcast to the people
of India. On the same day, Mr. L. S. Amery, Secretary of State
for India, made a similar statement in the House of Commons. The
thoughts and sentiments in both were practically the same. The
modus operandi consisted in calling a conference of the representa-
tives chosen by the Viceroy for the purpose of obtaining from the
leaders of various parties a joint list or separate lists of worthy per-
sons in order to constitute a new Executive Council of the Governor-
General. Lord Wavell pleaded for “men of influence and ability
to be recommended by the various parties who would be prepared
to take decision and responsibility of administration of all the port-
folios including External Affairs,” except the conduct of war which
was to be under the Commander-in-Chief. There was to be an
equal number of Muslims and Hindus other than the Scheduled
Castes. The control of the Secretary of State for India and the
Governor-General was to continue. Likewise, the veto of the Vice-
## p. 675 (#715) ############################################
WAVELL PLAN
675
roy was to continue, although the same was not to be used unreason-
ably. It was to be used not in the interests of England but those
of India. The proposals were to affect only British India and not
the Indian States. To quote Wavell, “In regard to the Indian
States, while recognising that during the interim period the powers
of the Crown representative will continue, it is clear that the
National Government will have to deal with many matters which
overlap and have concern with the states, e. g. , trade, industry,
labour etc. Further the barriers between the States people and
the princes and members of the National Government and other
associates should be removed so as to help in mutual discussion, con-
sultation and consideration of common problems and their solu-
tion. " Wavell pointed out that "If the meeting is successful, I
.
hope that we shall be able to agree on the formation of the new
Executive Council at the Centre and that Provincial Ministries in
Section 93 provinces would resume office and that these would be
Coalitions. " However, “If the meeting should unfortunately fail,
we must carry on as at present until parties come together. ”
The members of the Congress Working Committee were released
from jail and high hopes were raised on all sides. Invitations were
issued to the leaders including Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah
for the proposed Conference to be held at Simla. The Conference
met on 27 June, 1945. After three days of deliberations, it was
adjourned. On 11 July, 1945, Mr. Jinnah had a short interview
extending over 15 minutes with Lord Wavell. He seems to have
made it clear that he would not agree to the inclusion of non-League
Muslims in the list of the Governor-General on the ground that the
Muslims League alone was the sole representative of the Muslims
of India. Lord Wavell was not aware of the fact that a member
of his own Executive Council was advising Mr. Jinnah to stand
firm. However, Lord Wavell did not accept the point of view of
Mr. Jinnah. Shortly after that, Mahatma Gandhi met Lord
Wavell. On 12 July, 1945, Maulana Azad, President of the Con-
gress, was invited by Lord Wavell to see him. He was merely in-
formed that Mr. Jinnah was not agreeable to the Muslim represen-
tatives in the list prepared by Lord Wavell himself. However, Lord
Wavell did not reveal the contents of the list. On 14 July, 1945,
Lord Wavell declared that the Conference had failed. In a state-
ment, he observed thus: “The Conference has. . . . . . failed. Nobody
can regret this more than I do zyself. I wish to make it clear that
the responsibility for the failure is mine. The main idea underly-
ing the Conference was mine. If it had succeeded, its success could
have been attributed to me and I cannot place the blame for its
failure upon any of the parties. ”
## p. 676 (#716) ############################################
676 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
Critics point out that the procedure followed by Lord Wavell
was not a proper one.
He should have taken the leaders of the
other parties into confidence and revealed to them the contents of
his own list of the members of the Executive Council. It is possible
that the Congress Working Committee might have agreed to accept
his list, with or without minor alterations. He should not have
allowed the Muslim League to sabotage the whole scheme. The
responsibility for the failure must be shared by the Muslim League
and the British Government. The latter ought to have acted firmly
and fearlessly.
There is a close analogy between the Cripps Mission and the
Wavell Plan. Cripps came to India in the midst of the beating of
drums and the fanfare of trumpets. He raised high hopes and
made extravagant off-the-record promises to the Congress President
and later denied the same. In the case of the Wavell Plan also,
the Viceroy definitely stated at Simla that there was no question
of his veto being eliminated. To that extent, he was frank unlike
Cripps. Moreover, when Cripps came to India and invited
Mahatma Gandhi to meet him, the Mahatma was not at all im-
pressed by his proposals. In the case of the Wavell Plan, Mahatma
Gandhi felt that the Plan was sincere in spirit and contained the
seeds of independence. When Cripps came to India, Mahatma
Gandhi did not ask for the summoning of the Congress Working
Committee to consider the proposals. However, in 1945, he asked
for the summoning of the Congress Working Committee to consider
the Wavell Plan. Cripps came to India when there was an imme-
diate danger of the Japanese invasion of India. When the threat
of invasion passed away, the Cripps Mission came to an abrupt
end. Likewise, the Wavell Plan came to light when the Labour
Party threatened the Conservaſive Party in the elections held in
July 1945. When the elections were over, the Wavell Plan also
came to an unexpected end. It is also pointed out that the Simla
Conference was due to the Russian pressure as the Cripps Mission
was due to the American pressure. In 1942, the Mission failed as
the Congress rejected the proposals. The failure of the Wavell
Plan was due to the attitude of the Muslim League. The Cripps
proposals failed virtually on the third day of the deliberations of the
Congress Working Committee which met on 29 March 1942. The
decision was not made public on account of the special request of
Cripps. In 1945 also, the Simla Conference failed on the third day
of its meeting, i. e. , 29th June, 1945.
About the Simla Conference, Shri V. P. Menon says: “The Simla
Conference afforded the last opportunity for the forces of national-
ism to fight a rearguard action to preserve the integrity of the
1
## p. 677 (#717) ############################################
LABOUR PARTY COMES TO POWER
677
country, and when the battle was lost, the waves of communalism
quickly engulfed it. Only the Hobbson's choice of partition was
left. ” (The Transfer of Power in India, p. 215).
LABOUR PARTY IN OFFICE
The Labour Party came to power on 10 July 1945 and Lord
Pethick Lawrence, an old friend of India, was appointed Secretary
of State for India. In his speech to the new Parliament, the King-
Emperor referred to the Indian affairs in these words: “In accord-
ance with the promises already made to my Indian peoples, my
Government will do their utmost to promote in conjunction with
the leaders of Indian opinion, early realisation of full self-govern-
ment in India. ” The War with Japan ended officially on the mid-
night of 14 August 1945.
Lord Wavell was summoned to London for consultations and he
reached there on 25 August 1. 945. Before his return to India, an
announcement was made from London to the effect that fresh elec-
tions would be held both for the provincial legislatures and the
central legislature in India. Lord Wavell came back to India on
18 September 1945 and made a broadcast speech on 19 September
1945. In that broadcast, Lord Wavell told the people of India
that His Majesty's Government were determined to do their utmost
to promote the early realisation of full self-government in India.
He also declared that elections to the central and provincial legisla-
tures would be held in the coming cold weather and after that the
Government hoped that ministerial responsibility would be accept-
ed by the political leaders in all the provinces. It was the intention
of His Majesty's Government to convene as soon as possible a cons-
titution-making body and for that purpose he himself would hold,
immediately after the elections, discussions with representatives of
the provincial legislative assemblies to ascertain whether the propo-
sals contained in the Declaration of 1942 were acceptable to them
or whether some alternative or modified scheme was preferable.
He also declared that discussions would also be undertaken with
the representatives of the Indian states with a view to ascertaining
in what way they would best take their part in the constitution-
making body. His Majesty's Government was also proceeding to
the consideration of the treaty which was to be concluded between
Great in and India. He also declared that after the election
he would take steps to bring into being an Executive Council which
would have the support of the main Indian political parties. He
concluded his broadcast with these words: “It is now for the Indians
to show that they have the wisdom, faith and courage to determine
## p. 678 (#718) ############################################
678 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
in what way they can best reconcile their differences and how their
country can be governed by Indians for Indians. ” A similar state-
ment was made on the same day by Mr. Attlee, the Prime Minister
of England and that statement ended with these words: “I would
ask all Indians to follow this great example and to join together in
a united effort to work out a Constitution which the majority and
minority communities will accept as a just and fair constitution in
which both the states and provinces can find their places. The
British Government will do their utmost to give every assistance
in their power and India can be assured of the sympathy of the
British people. ”
On 4 December 1945, Lord Pethick Lawrence made a statement
in the House of Lords in which he took pains to make it clear that
there was absolutely no foundation in the propaganda in certain
quarters that the British Government intended to delay matters by
adopting the device of holding discussions with the representatives
of the people of India. He also declared that His Majesty's Gov-
ernment was arranging for a Parliamentary Delegation to go to
India under the auspices of the Empire Parliamentary Association
so that the members of the British Parliament could have an oppor-
tunity to meet leading political Indian personalities so that they
could form their own views on the spot. The Secretary of State
also made it clear that the British Government would not allow the
loyalty of the administrative services and the Indian armed forces
to be interfered with.
On 10 December 1945, while addressing the annual function of
the Associated Chamber of Commerce, Lord Wavell gave an assur-
ance that the British Government and the British people honestly
and sincerely wished the Indian people to have their political free-
dom and a government or governments of their own choice. How-
ever, he made it clear that the problem was a difficult one and
there was no magic Sesame which would open the Alibaba's cave.
The problem could also not be solved through violence and disorder.
There must be some agreement between the Congress, the Muslims
and the rulers of the Indian States and the British Government so
that the objective of freedom and welfare of India could be secur-
ed. To quote him, “I do appeal most solemnly and earnestly at
this critical moment of Indian history for goodwill on the part of
all leaders. We are going through a very difficult and testing time
and it will need coolness and wisdom if we are to avoid calamity.
in so far as I can help by personal contact, I am always prepared
to do so. ”
On 19 February 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence made a momen-
tus declaration in the House of Lords in which he announced the
## p. 679 (#719) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION
679
decision of the British Government to send a special mission of Cabi-
net Ministers to resolve the constitutional deadlock in the country.
The members of the Mission were Lord Pethick Lawrence himself,
Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade and Mr. A.
V. Alexander, First Lord of Admiralty.
THE CABINET MISSION (1946)
The Mission reached Delhi on 24 March 1946. Prolonged dis-
cussions took place between the members of the Mission and the
leaders of the Congress and Muslim League. However, the main
parties could not come to any mutual understanding. The result
was that the members of the Mission had to put forward their own
formula for solving the constitutional problem. That formula was
embodied in a joint statement issued by the Cabinet Mission and
Lord Wavell on 16 May, 1946.
After pointing out the impracticability of the Pakistan scheme,
the statement of May 16 recommended that the new constitution of
India should take the following basic form:-
"(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British
India and States which should deal with the following
subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications,
and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances
required for the above subjects.
"(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature
constituted from British India and States representatives.
Any question raising a major communal issue in the
Legislature should require for its decision a majority of
the representatives present and voting of each of the two
major communities as well as a majority of all the mem-
bers present and voting.
“(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all resi-
duary powers should vest in the Provinces.
“(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than
those ceded to the Union.
“(5) Provinces should be free to form Groups with executives
and legislatures, and each Group could determine the
Provincial subjects to be taken in common.
“(6) The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should
contain a provision whereby any Province could, by a
majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a re-
consideration of the terms of the constitution after an ini-
tial period of 10 years and at 10 yearly intervals there-
after. "
## p. 680 (#720) ############################################
680 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
As regards the constitution-making machinery, it was provided
that the Legislative Assemblies of the provinces would elect the
members of that body on the basis of one representative for one
million of the population. The Sikh and Muslim legislators were
to elect the quota of their communities, determined on the popula-
tion basis. Others were to elect the representatives for the rest
of the population. The representatives from the provinces were to
divide themselves into three sections, A, B and C. Section C was
to consist of the representatives of Bengal and Assam, Section B of
the Punjab, Sind and North-West Frontier Province and Section A
of the rest of the provinces of India. "These Sections shall proceed
to settle the Provincial Constitution for the Provinces included in
each Section, and shall also decide whether any Group Constitu-
tion shall be set up for these provinces and, if so, with what provin-
cial subjects the Groups should deal. ” The representatives of the
Sections of the Indian States were then to re-assemble and settle
the Union Constitution.
TABLE OF REPRESENTATION
Section A
Province
General Muslim Total
Madras
45
4
49
Bombay
19
2
21
United Provinces
47
8
55
Bihar
31
5
36
Central Provinces
16
1
17
Orissa
9
0
9
Total
167
20
187
Section B
Province
General Muslim Sikh Total
Punjab
8 16 4 28
N. -W. Frontier Province 0
3 0
3
Sind
1
3 0
4
Total
9
22
4
35
Province
Bengal
Assam
Section C
General
27
7
Muslim
33
3
Total
60
10
Total
34
36
70
Total for British India
Maximum for States
292
93
Total
385
## p. 681 (#721) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION
681
The Provinces of India were given the power to opt out of the
Groups by a decision of their Legislature after the general elections
under the new Constitution. The Resolutions of the Union Consti-
tuent Assembly regarding major communal issues were to require
a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the
two major communities. The Chairman of the Constituent As-
sembly was to decide which resolution raised major communal
issues and was to consult the Federal Court before giving his de-
cision. A plan for the interim Government was also envisaged in
the Scheme of May 16, 1946.
The Cabinet Mission declared that the British Government could
not and would not in any circumstances transfer paramountcy to
an Indian Government. However, it was made clear that when
a new self-governing Government or Governments came into being
in British India, it would not be possible for the British Government
to carry out the obligations of paramountcy. In that case, all the
rights surrendered by the states to the paramount power were to
return to the Indian states. “Political arrangements between the
states on the one hand and the British Crown and British India on
the other will thus be brought to an end.
The void will have to
be filled either by the states entering into a federal relationship
with the successor Government or Goverments in British India or,
failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it
or them. ” This policy has been described as a “political scorched-
earth policy. ”
The great merit of the Cabinet Mission scheme was that the
Constituent Assembly was to be constituted on the democratic prin-
ciple of population strength. The principle of weightage was to be
discarded altogether. The democratic method of the decision of
issues by a simple majority was adopted in the case of communal
issues. However, safeguards were provided for the minorities.
The scheme also provided for an Indian Union of provinces and
states and rejected the idea of Pakistan completely. The Cabinet
Mission scheme was the last attempt made by British statesmen to
save India from division and disaster. Some of the anomalies of
the scheme were due to the desire of the members of the Cabinet
Mission to save Indian unity at any cost.
The scheme required
that all the members of the Constituent Assembly were to be
Indians. Neither the British Government nor non-official Europeans
in India were to be given any representation in the Constituent
Assembly. The European members of the Provincial Assemblies
were to absent themselves from voting. There was to be no inter-
ference with the work of the Constituent Assembly either by the
British Government or by its officials. Within the framework of
## p. 682 (#722) ############################################
682 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
the scheme, the Constituent Assembly was to be its own master.
As regards its demerits, while the scheme protected the rights of
the Muslim minority, the same principle was not applied to the
Sikhs in the Punjab. The proposals of the Cabinet Mission with
regard to the grouping of the provinces were not clear. Both the
Congress and the Muslim League interpreted the provisions differ-
ently. The Muslims regarded the compulsory grouping of the pro-
vinces as one of the cornerstones of the Cabinet Mission Scheme and
were not prepared to come to a compromise on that question. The
Congress stand was that the making of the groups was optional for
the provinces and the latter were free to join or not to join any
group. As a matter of fact, Mahatma Gandhi asked the people of
Assam not to join the group if they did not approve of it. To solve
this difficulty, it was suggested that the provinces might join provi-
sionally, but later on freedom might be given to them to leave it if
they so desired. The Congress suggested that the matter be refer-
red to the Federal Court of India for decision. However, the Bri-
tish Government gave its verdict in favour of the compulsory group-
ing of the provinces. The Muslim League won and the Congress
lost its point. Another defect of the scheme was the order in which
the Union and Sectional Assemblies were to meet and work and
draft their constitutions. It looked ridiculous first to form the
constitutions of the groups and the provinces and then to frame
the constitution of the Union. It was like putting the cart before
the horse. This practical difficulty would have been experienced
if the whole scheme would have been worked out in actual practice.
As regards the events after May 16, 1946, the All India Muslim
League passed a resolution on June 6, 1946, by which it accepted
the Cabinet Mission scheme in its entirety. On June 26, 1946, the
Working Committee of the Indian National Congress passed a reso-
lution by which it accepted the scheme partially. The part accept-
ed by it related to constitution-making. The view of the Working
Committee was that the grouping of the provinces was not to be
compulsory. The Congress rejected the interim
the interim Government
scheme on the ground that the clarifications given were not accept-
able. The resolution of the Working Committee was ratified by the
All India Congress Committee. The Sikhs rejected the scheme
.
completely on the ground that the compulsory grouping of the pro-
vinces as contemplated by the scheme was suicidal to their interests.
Before the members of the Cubinet Mission left India, they issued
a statement along with Lord Wavell in which they expressed their
satisfaction that the work of the making of the constitution would
proceed with the consent of the major political parties in India.
They regretted that an interim Government consisting of the vari-
## p. 683 (#723) ############################################
THE CALCUTTA KILLING
683
ous political parties could not be formed on account of certain diffi-
culties. It was hoped that after the elections to the Constituent
Assembly were over, negotiations would be started for the formation
of an interim Government consisting of the representatives of the
various political parties.
CALCUTTA KILLING (AUGUST 1946)
Mr. Jinnah who had accepted the scheme in its entirety, was
annoyed at the decision of the British Government to postpone the
formation of the interim Government. He accused Lord Wavell
of his having gone back on his promise. He was so much angry
that the Muslim League, under his leadership, passed another reso-
lution on July 29, 1946, by which it withdrew its former accept-
ance of the Cabinet Mission scheme. Mr. Jinnah was not content-
ed with this negative action. The Muslim League passed the fam-
ous Direct Action Resolution by which both the Congress and the
British Government were condemned for their breach of faith with
the Muslims. It was declared that the time had come for the Mus-
lim League to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan. The
resolution authorised the Working Committee of the Muslim League
to prepare a programme of direct action at once. August 16, 1946,
was fixed as the Direct Action Day. On that day, Hindu-Muslim
riots took place in Calcutta on an unprecedented scale. There was
a lot of blood-shed. There was an enormous loss of life and pro-
perty and the British Government did nothing to stop it. Mr.
Suhrawardy, Chief Minister of Bengal at that time, was himself in
the control room to direct and protect the rioters. On 18 August
1946, the figure of casualties mounted to 1,000 killed and 2,000
injured. As the trouble continued till 20 August 1946, the total
toll of communal carnage in Calcutta was 15,000 dead and wound-
ed. An eye-witness account is in these words: “Even small boys
and girls were killed by mobs. In one place, a three year old
child is stated to have been killed and nailed to the door. Fiendish
mobs raiding residences are said to have thrown down children
from second and third floor balconies in some places. Mobs arm-
ed with axes, daggers, lathies and other weapons raided houses
and shops, battered the doors, looted, butchered or maimed the
residents on whom they could lay hands, threw petrol and kerosene
on the building, set fire to it and went on their way to carry out
similar fiendish work elsewhere. "
The Calcutta atrocities were followed by the riots in Noakhali.
It is difficult to describe the hardships and sufferings of the Hindu
men, women and children. To quote, “The echoes of the Calcutta
## p. 684 (#724) ############################################
684 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
riots have hardly died down ere we have reports of massacres more
dire and disastrous still. Harrowing tales of murder, loot and arson
which made the Calcutta killing pale into insignificance have oc-
curred in Noakhali and Tipperah Districts. ” The indignities to
which Hindu women were subjected in Noakhali brought forth
protests from all over the country.
When all this was happening, Lord Wavell invited Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru, President of the Indian National Congress, to
form the interim Government and he took office on 2 September,
1946. To begin with, the Muslim League refused to join the
Interim Government but later on, on 13 October, 1946, it decided
to join. On 15 October, 1946, 5 members of the Muslim League
were included in the Interim Government. The introduction of
the new element destroyed the team spirit of the Executive Council
as the League members openly repudiated the idea of collective res-
ponsibility. What was worse, the League refused to join the Con-
stituent Assembly although Lord Wavell had told Pandit Jawahar-
lal Nehru before the inclusion of the Muslim League members in
the Executive Council that the League had agreed to join the
Constituent Assembly.
ATTLEE'S STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 1947
As apprehended, the Muslim League did not participate in the
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. It demanded a separate
Constituent Assembly for framing a separate constitution of its
own. On 20 February, 1947, Prime Minister Attlee made an im-
portant statement in which he declared the intention of the British
Government to quit India by a date not later than June 1948. To
quote Mr. Attlee, “This great sub-continent now containing over
four hundred million people has for the last century enjoyed peace
and security as a part of the British Commonwealth and Empire.
Continued peace and security are more than ever necessary today
if the full possibilities of economic development are to be realised
and a higher standard of life attained by the Indian people.
"His Majesty's Government are anxious to hand over their res-
ponsibilities to a Government which, resting on the sure foundation
of the support of the people, is capable of maintaining peace and
administering India with justice and efficiency. It is, therefore,
essential that all parties should sink their differences in order that
they may be ready to shoulder the great responsibility which will
come upon them next year.
“After months of hard work by the Cabinet Mission a great
measure of agreement was obtained as to the method by which
a
## p. 685 (#725) ############################################
ATTLEE'S STATEMENT
685
Constitution should be worked out. This was embodied in their
.
statement of May last. His Majesty's Government agreed to re-
commend to Parliament a constitution worked out in accordance
with the proposals made therein by a fully representative Constitu-
ent Assembly. But if it should appear that such a constitution will
not have been worked out by a full representative Assembly before
the time mentioned in paragraph 7, His Majesty's Government will
have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government
in British India should be handed over, on due date, whether as a
whole to some form of Central Governnient for British India, or in
some areas to the existing Provincial Governments or in such other
way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the
Indian people.
“Although the final transfer of authority may not take place until
June, 1948, preparatory measures must be put in hand in advance.
It is important that the efficiency of the civil administration should
be maintained and that the defence of India should be fully provid-
ed for. But inevitably, as the process of transfer proceeds, it will
become progressively more difficult to carry out to the letter all
the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. Legislation
will be introduced in due course to give effect to the final transfer
>
of power.
“In regard to the Indian States, as was explicitly stated by the
Cabinet Mission, His Majesty's Government do not intend to hand
c. ver their powers and obligations under Paramountcy to any Gov-
ernment of British India. It is not intended to bring Paramountcy,
as a system, to a conclusion earlier than the date of the final trans-
fer of power, but it is contemplated that for the intervening period
the relations of the Crown with individual States may be adjusted
by agreement.
"His Majesty's Government will negotiate agreements in regard
to matters arising out of the transfer of power with representatives
of those to whom they propose to transfer power.
“His Majesty's Government believe that British commercial and
industrial interests in India can look forward to a fair field for
their enterprise under the new conditions. The commercial con-
nection between India and the United Kingdom has been long and
will continue to be to their mutual advantage.
"His Majesty's Government cannot conclude the statement with-
out expressing on behalf of the people of this country their good-
will and good wishes towards the people of India as they go forward
to this final stage in their achievement of self-government. It will
be the wish of everyone in these Islands that, notwithstanding con-
stitutional changes, the association of the British and Indian peoples
## p. 686 (#726) ############################################
686 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
should not be brought to an end, and they will wish to continue to
do all that is in their power to further the well-being of India. ”
Mr. Attlee also announced that Lord Mountbatten was to suc-
ceed Lord Wavell as the Viceroy of India and he was to be entrust-
ed with the task of transferring into the hands of the Indians the
responsibility for the Government of British India in a manner that
would best ensure the future happiness and prosperity of India.
After the February Declaration, the Muslim League resorted to
Direct Action. There was a wear and tear campaign in favour
of Pakistan. There were very serious riots in the Punjab in which
horrible atrocities were committed on the minorities, particularly
the Sikhs. There was arson, looting, violence and murders. There
was trouble in the North-West Frontier Province. It is regrettable
that the British Government in India took no action against the
workers of the Muslim League. While on previous occasions, the
Congress workers while hoisting the national flag on the Govern-
ment buildings were shot dead, absolutely no action was taken
against Muslim women and youngmen who climbed the Secretariat
with the help of staircases and hoisted the flag of the Muslim
League. The Muslim League volunteers were surrounded, put in
trucks and left off after giving them a joy-ride for a few miles. That
certainly heartened them to do more and more.
JUNE 3 PLAN (1947)
Lord Mountbatten assumed office as Governor-General and
Viceroy of India on 24 March, 1947. The situation at that time
was explosive. Riots were taking place at that time on a large
scale. It appeared that it was not possible to maintain the unity
of India under any circumstances. Mr. Jinnah declared that the
"Muslim League will not yield an inch in its demand for Pakistan”
and he had the backing of the British bureaucracy in India in this
demand. Hectic negotiations continued between Lord Mountbat-
ten on the one hand and the Muslim League leaders and the Con-
gress Leaders on the other. Ultimately Lord Mountbatten broad-
cast on 3 June, 1947, his famous Plan which laid down the method
by which power was to be transferred from British to Indian hands.
In that Plan, it was declared that if the areas with a majority of
Muslim population desired that they should be allowed to form a
separate dominion, a new Constituent Assembly would be set up
for that purpose. However, in that case, there would be a parti-
tion of Bengal and Punjab if the representatives of their Legislative
Assemblies so desired. "The members of two parts of each Legisla-
tive Assembly sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether
## p. 687 (#727) ############################################
JUNE 3 PLAN
687
or not the provinces should be partitioned. If a simple majority
of either part decides in favour of partition, partition will take
place and arrangements would be made accordingly. ” The Legis-
lative Assembly of Sind was to make its own decision at a special
meeting. A decision by referendum was provided for in the case
of North-West Frontier Province. The Muslim majority District
of Sylhet was to decide by a referendum whether it would join East
Bengal or remain in Assam. There was to be a Boundary Com-
mission to settle the details of the boundaries in case the partition
of Bengal and Punjab was decided upon. The statement conclud-
ed thus: "His Majesty's Government propose to introduce legisla-
tion during the current session for the transfer of power this year
on a Dominion Status basis on one or two successor authorities ac-
cording to decisions taken as a result of this announcement. This
will be without prejudice to the right of the Indian Constituent
Assemblies to decide in due course whether or not the part of India
in respect of which they have authority will remain the British
Commonwealth. "
In his broadcast, Lord Mountbatten declared: “The whole Plan
may not be perfect; but like all Plans, its success will depend on
the spirit of goodwill with which it is carried out. I have always
felt that once it was decided in what way to transfer power the
transfer should take place at the earliest possible moment, but the
dilemma was that if we waited until a constitution set for All-India
was agreed, we should have to wait a long time, particularly if
partition were decided on, whereas if we handed over power before
the Constituent Assemblies had finished their work, we should leave
the country without a constitution. The solution to this dilemma
which I put forward, is that His Majesty's Government should trans-
fer power now to one or two Governments of British India each
having Dominion Status as soon as the necessary arrangements can
be made. This I hope will be within the next few months. ”
This historic pronouncement was received with mixed feelings
by the public. The Hindus and nationalists of all persuasions dep-
lored the partition of India. The Muslim League was not fully
satisfied with the "truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan. " However,
it was agreed that the June 3 Plan was the best practicable solu-
tion of the Indian problem as could be worked out under the cir-
cumstances. No wonder, the Plan was accepted both by the
Muslim League and the Congress. The Legislatures of the Punjab
and Bengal decided in favour of the partition of those provinces.
Two Boundary Commissions were appointed by the British Gov-
ernment for the Punjab and Bengal with Sir Cyril Radcliffe
Chairman of both. The referendum in North-West Frontier Pro-
as
## p. 688 (#728) ############################################
688 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
vince went in favour of Pakistan. Sylhet also decided to join
Pakistan.
INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT, 1947
In pursuance of the June 3 Plan, the Indian Independence Bill
was presented before the British Parliament on 4 July, 1947 and
the same was passed by the British Parliament on 18 July, 1947,
without any dissent. The Indian Independence Act provided for
the partition of India and the establishment of two Dominions of
India and Pakistan from the appointed day (August 15, 1947).
It also provided for the legislative supremacy of the two Dominions.
The legislatures of the two Duminions were given full power to
make laws having extra-territorial jurisdiction. The British Gov-
ernment was to have no control over the affairs of the Dominions,
provinces or any part of the Dominions after August 15, 1947.
Until a new constitution was framed for each Dominion, the Act
made the existing Constituent Assemblies the Dominion Legislatures
for the time being. The Assemblies were to exercise all the powers
which were formerly exercised by the Central Legislature in addi-
tion to its power regarding the framing of a new constitution.
Pending the framing of a new constitution, each of the Dominions
and all the provinces were to be governed in accordance with the
Government of India Act, 1935. Each Dominion was authorised
to make modifications in the Government of India Act, 1935. The
Governor-General was given the power to modify or adapt the
Government of India Act, 1935, as might be considered necessary
till March 31, 1948. After that date, it was open to the Constitu-
ent Assembly to modify or adopt the old Government of India Act,
1935. The right of the King to veto laws or to reserve laws for
his pleasure was given up. This right was given to the Governor-
General. He was given the full right to assent in the name of His
Majesty to any law of the Dominion Legislature made in the ordi-
nary legislative capacity. The Act provided for the termination
of the suzerainty of the Crown over the Indian States. All treaties,
agreements and functions exercisable by His Majesty with regard
to the states and their rulers were to lapse from August 15, 1947.
The existing arrangements between the Government of India and
the Indian states were to continue pending the detailed negotiations
between the Indian states and the new Dominions. Agreements
with the tribes of the North-West Frontier Province of India were
to be negotiated by the successor Dominion. The office of the
Secretary of State for India was to be abolished and his work was
to be taken over by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth
## p. 689 (#729) ############################################
DEMAND FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
689
Affairs. The title of Emperor of India was to be dropped from the
royal style and titles of the King of England. The Act terminated
British authority over India and set up two independent Domini-
ons, each with full authority to make its own constitution. Both
the Dominions were given full freedom. They could leave the
British Commonwealth of Nations if they so pleased.
In terms of the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, Pakis-
tan got her independence on 14 August, 1947 and India on 15
August, 1947. While Mr. M. A. Jinnah became the Governor-Gene-
ial of Pakistan, Lord Mountbatten was requested by the Govern-
ment of India to continue as the Governor-General of India.
On the night of 14 August, 1947, when the independence of
India was declared, Jawaharlal Nehru addressed the members of
the Constituent Assembly in these words: “Long years ago we made
a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem
our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially.
At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India
will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes
but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new,
when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suspended,
finds utterance. It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take
the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and
to the still larger cause of humanity. ”
DEMAND FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
The claim that the Constitution of India should be framed by
the people of India, through their chosen representatives, was first
put forward by a few advanced Indian nationalists during the first
World War when the British statesmen enunciated the famous
principle of self-determination for all nations, whether big or small.
However, after the end of the War, the Indian claim was not con-
ceded. The Preamble of the Government of India Act, 1919, speci-
fically stated thus: “And whereas the time and manner of each
advance can be determined only by Parliament upon whom res-
ponsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian
people. . . . . " In spite of this repudiation by the British Govern-
ment of India's demand for seif-determination, the demand began
to grow stronger and stronger with the lapse of time. Mahatma
Gandhi wrote thus in 1922: "Let us see clearly what Swaraj to-
gether with the British connection means. It means undoubtedly
India's ability to declare her independence if she wishes. Swaraj,
therefore, will not be a free gift of the British Parliament. It will
be a declaration of India's full expression. That it will be express-
## p. 690 (#730) ############################################
690 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
A
ed through an Act of Parliament is true. But it will be merely a
courteous ratification of the declared wish of the people of India,
even as it was in the case of the Union of South Africa. Not an
unnecessary adverb could be altered by the House of Commons.
The ratification in our case will be a treaty to which Britain will
be a party. Such Swaraj may not come this year, may not come
within our own generation. But I have contemplated nothing
less. The British Parliament when the settlement comes, will
ratify the wishes of the people of India as expressed not through the
bureaucracy but through her freely chosen representatives. '
Under the inspiration of Mrs. Annie Besant, an attempt was
made by the Liberal members of the Central Legislative Assembly
in 1922 and 1923 to call a national convention "in order to obtain
for the Commonwealth of India Dominion Status in her external
relations and Swaraj in her internal affairs. ” A National Confer-
ence was held in New Delhi in February, 1923, with a view to
make arrangements for the calling of such a convention after the
elections of 1923, but the scheme did not fructify.
In 1924, the Swarajist Party put forward the demand in the
Central Legislative Assembly for the convening of a representative
Round Table Conference or Convention for recommending a
scheme of a Constitution for India which, after it was approved by
a newly elected Indian Legislature, was to be submitted to the Bri-
tish Parliament for enactment in the form of a statute.
tants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the
votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equiva-
lent method.
“If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that
these areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after India
is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted
into two sovereign independent states. There shall be a treaty of
separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfac-
tory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communica-
tions, customs, commerce and the like, which must necessarily
continue to be matters of common concern between the contracting
parties.
"The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights
of the minorities in the two States.
"Immediately on the acceptance of the agreement by the Con-
gress and the League the two shall decide upon a common course
of action for the attainment of independence of India.
"The League will, however, be free to remain out of any direct
## p. 673 (#713) ############################################
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA
673
action to which the Congress may resort and in which the League
may not be willing to co-operate. '
The negotiations were bound to fail under the circumstances.
There was no place for compromise between the Congress on the
one hand and the Muslim League on the other. The Congress
failed in its object of achieving the independence of the country
after coming to some settlement with the Muslim League. How-
ever, critics point out that thy negotiations between Mahatma
Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah had very unhappy results. To quote
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, "Gandhi's approach to Mr. Jinnah
on this occasion was a great political blunder. It gave a new and
added importance to Mr. Jinnah which the latter exploited to the
full. . . . . . Mr. Jinnah had lost most of the importance after he left
the Congress in the twenties. It was largely due to Gandhi's acts
of commission and omission that Mr. Jinnah regained his import-
ance in Indian political life. As a consequence of Gandhi's atti-
tude of running after him and entreating him, many of the Mus-
lims who were doubtful about Mr. Jinnah and his policy developed
a new respect for Jinnah. Moreover, it was Gandhi who first gave
currency to the title Quid-e-Azam or great leader, as applied to
Mr. Jinnah. By addressing him in his letter as a Quid-e-Azam, he
recognised him as a great leader and strengthened his position in
the eyes of the Indian Muslims. " (India Wins Freedom by Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad, page 93).
DESAI-LIAQAT FORMULA (1945)
Although the negotiations between Mahatma Gandhi and Mr.
Jinnah failed on the basis of the Rajagopalachariar formula, efforts
were made by Bhulabhai Desai, Leader of the Congress Party in
the Central Legislative Assembly, to solve the deadlock. That
ultimately resulted in the Desai-Liaqat formula of January 1945.
The formula contained the following terms for the formation of an
Interim Government at the Centre:-
"The Congress and League agree that they will join in forming
an Interim Government at the Centre. The composition of such
Government will be on the following lines:
“(a) Equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and
the League in the Central Executive. Persons nominated need not
be members of the Central Legislature.
“(b) Representatives of minorities (in particular Scheduled
Castes and the Sikhs).
"(c) The Commander-in-Chief.
"The Government will be formed and function within the frame-
## p. 674 (#714) ############################################
674 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
work of the existing Government of India Act. It is, however, ,
understood that if the Cabinet cannot get a particular measure
passed by the Legislative Assembly, they will not enforce the same
by resort to any of the powers of the Governor-General or the Vice-
roy. This will make them sufficiently independent of the Gover-
nor-General.
“It is agreed between the Congress and the League that if such
Interim Government is formed, their first step would be to release
the Working Committee members of the Congress.
“The steps by which efforts would be made to achieve this end
are at present indicated to take the following course. On the basis of
the above understanding, some way should be found to get the
Governor-General to make a proposal or a suggestion that he desires
an Interim Government to be formed at the Centre on the agree-
ment between the Congress and the League and when the Gover-
nor-General invites Mr. Jinnah, and Mr. Desai either jointly or
separately, the above proposals would be made, desiring that they
are prepared to join in the forming of the Government.
“The next step would be to get the withdrawal of section 93 in
the Provinces and to form as soon as possible Provincial Govern-
ments on the lines of a Coalition. ”
However, in spite of the honest efforts of Desai and Liaqat Ali
Khan, no settlement could be secured between the Congress and the
Muslim League, and the deadlock continued till the surrender of
Germany on 5 May, 1945.
WAVELL PLAN (1945)
On 14 June, 1945, Lord Wavell gave a broadcast to the people
of India. On the same day, Mr. L. S. Amery, Secretary of State
for India, made a similar statement in the House of Commons. The
thoughts and sentiments in both were practically the same. The
modus operandi consisted in calling a conference of the representa-
tives chosen by the Viceroy for the purpose of obtaining from the
leaders of various parties a joint list or separate lists of worthy per-
sons in order to constitute a new Executive Council of the Governor-
General. Lord Wavell pleaded for “men of influence and ability
to be recommended by the various parties who would be prepared
to take decision and responsibility of administration of all the port-
folios including External Affairs,” except the conduct of war which
was to be under the Commander-in-Chief. There was to be an
equal number of Muslims and Hindus other than the Scheduled
Castes. The control of the Secretary of State for India and the
Governor-General was to continue. Likewise, the veto of the Vice-
## p. 675 (#715) ############################################
WAVELL PLAN
675
roy was to continue, although the same was not to be used unreason-
ably. It was to be used not in the interests of England but those
of India. The proposals were to affect only British India and not
the Indian States. To quote Wavell, “In regard to the Indian
States, while recognising that during the interim period the powers
of the Crown representative will continue, it is clear that the
National Government will have to deal with many matters which
overlap and have concern with the states, e. g. , trade, industry,
labour etc. Further the barriers between the States people and
the princes and members of the National Government and other
associates should be removed so as to help in mutual discussion, con-
sultation and consideration of common problems and their solu-
tion. " Wavell pointed out that "If the meeting is successful, I
.
hope that we shall be able to agree on the formation of the new
Executive Council at the Centre and that Provincial Ministries in
Section 93 provinces would resume office and that these would be
Coalitions. " However, “If the meeting should unfortunately fail,
we must carry on as at present until parties come together. ”
The members of the Congress Working Committee were released
from jail and high hopes were raised on all sides. Invitations were
issued to the leaders including Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah
for the proposed Conference to be held at Simla. The Conference
met on 27 June, 1945. After three days of deliberations, it was
adjourned. On 11 July, 1945, Mr. Jinnah had a short interview
extending over 15 minutes with Lord Wavell. He seems to have
made it clear that he would not agree to the inclusion of non-League
Muslims in the list of the Governor-General on the ground that the
Muslims League alone was the sole representative of the Muslims
of India. Lord Wavell was not aware of the fact that a member
of his own Executive Council was advising Mr. Jinnah to stand
firm. However, Lord Wavell did not accept the point of view of
Mr. Jinnah. Shortly after that, Mahatma Gandhi met Lord
Wavell. On 12 July, 1945, Maulana Azad, President of the Con-
gress, was invited by Lord Wavell to see him. He was merely in-
formed that Mr. Jinnah was not agreeable to the Muslim represen-
tatives in the list prepared by Lord Wavell himself. However, Lord
Wavell did not reveal the contents of the list. On 14 July, 1945,
Lord Wavell declared that the Conference had failed. In a state-
ment, he observed thus: “The Conference has. . . . . . failed. Nobody
can regret this more than I do zyself. I wish to make it clear that
the responsibility for the failure is mine. The main idea underly-
ing the Conference was mine. If it had succeeded, its success could
have been attributed to me and I cannot place the blame for its
failure upon any of the parties. ”
## p. 676 (#716) ############################################
676 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
Critics point out that the procedure followed by Lord Wavell
was not a proper one.
He should have taken the leaders of the
other parties into confidence and revealed to them the contents of
his own list of the members of the Executive Council. It is possible
that the Congress Working Committee might have agreed to accept
his list, with or without minor alterations. He should not have
allowed the Muslim League to sabotage the whole scheme. The
responsibility for the failure must be shared by the Muslim League
and the British Government. The latter ought to have acted firmly
and fearlessly.
There is a close analogy between the Cripps Mission and the
Wavell Plan. Cripps came to India in the midst of the beating of
drums and the fanfare of trumpets. He raised high hopes and
made extravagant off-the-record promises to the Congress President
and later denied the same. In the case of the Wavell Plan also,
the Viceroy definitely stated at Simla that there was no question
of his veto being eliminated. To that extent, he was frank unlike
Cripps. Moreover, when Cripps came to India and invited
Mahatma Gandhi to meet him, the Mahatma was not at all im-
pressed by his proposals. In the case of the Wavell Plan, Mahatma
Gandhi felt that the Plan was sincere in spirit and contained the
seeds of independence. When Cripps came to India, Mahatma
Gandhi did not ask for the summoning of the Congress Working
Committee to consider the proposals. However, in 1945, he asked
for the summoning of the Congress Working Committee to consider
the Wavell Plan. Cripps came to India when there was an imme-
diate danger of the Japanese invasion of India. When the threat
of invasion passed away, the Cripps Mission came to an abrupt
end. Likewise, the Wavell Plan came to light when the Labour
Party threatened the Conservaſive Party in the elections held in
July 1945. When the elections were over, the Wavell Plan also
came to an unexpected end. It is also pointed out that the Simla
Conference was due to the Russian pressure as the Cripps Mission
was due to the American pressure. In 1942, the Mission failed as
the Congress rejected the proposals. The failure of the Wavell
Plan was due to the attitude of the Muslim League. The Cripps
proposals failed virtually on the third day of the deliberations of the
Congress Working Committee which met on 29 March 1942. The
decision was not made public on account of the special request of
Cripps. In 1945 also, the Simla Conference failed on the third day
of its meeting, i. e. , 29th June, 1945.
About the Simla Conference, Shri V. P. Menon says: “The Simla
Conference afforded the last opportunity for the forces of national-
ism to fight a rearguard action to preserve the integrity of the
1
## p. 677 (#717) ############################################
LABOUR PARTY COMES TO POWER
677
country, and when the battle was lost, the waves of communalism
quickly engulfed it. Only the Hobbson's choice of partition was
left. ” (The Transfer of Power in India, p. 215).
LABOUR PARTY IN OFFICE
The Labour Party came to power on 10 July 1945 and Lord
Pethick Lawrence, an old friend of India, was appointed Secretary
of State for India. In his speech to the new Parliament, the King-
Emperor referred to the Indian affairs in these words: “In accord-
ance with the promises already made to my Indian peoples, my
Government will do their utmost to promote in conjunction with
the leaders of Indian opinion, early realisation of full self-govern-
ment in India. ” The War with Japan ended officially on the mid-
night of 14 August 1945.
Lord Wavell was summoned to London for consultations and he
reached there on 25 August 1. 945. Before his return to India, an
announcement was made from London to the effect that fresh elec-
tions would be held both for the provincial legislatures and the
central legislature in India. Lord Wavell came back to India on
18 September 1945 and made a broadcast speech on 19 September
1945. In that broadcast, Lord Wavell told the people of India
that His Majesty's Government were determined to do their utmost
to promote the early realisation of full self-government in India.
He also declared that elections to the central and provincial legisla-
tures would be held in the coming cold weather and after that the
Government hoped that ministerial responsibility would be accept-
ed by the political leaders in all the provinces. It was the intention
of His Majesty's Government to convene as soon as possible a cons-
titution-making body and for that purpose he himself would hold,
immediately after the elections, discussions with representatives of
the provincial legislative assemblies to ascertain whether the propo-
sals contained in the Declaration of 1942 were acceptable to them
or whether some alternative or modified scheme was preferable.
He also declared that discussions would also be undertaken with
the representatives of the Indian states with a view to ascertaining
in what way they would best take their part in the constitution-
making body. His Majesty's Government was also proceeding to
the consideration of the treaty which was to be concluded between
Great in and India. He also declared that after the election
he would take steps to bring into being an Executive Council which
would have the support of the main Indian political parties. He
concluded his broadcast with these words: “It is now for the Indians
to show that they have the wisdom, faith and courage to determine
## p. 678 (#718) ############################################
678 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
in what way they can best reconcile their differences and how their
country can be governed by Indians for Indians. ” A similar state-
ment was made on the same day by Mr. Attlee, the Prime Minister
of England and that statement ended with these words: “I would
ask all Indians to follow this great example and to join together in
a united effort to work out a Constitution which the majority and
minority communities will accept as a just and fair constitution in
which both the states and provinces can find their places. The
British Government will do their utmost to give every assistance
in their power and India can be assured of the sympathy of the
British people. ”
On 4 December 1945, Lord Pethick Lawrence made a statement
in the House of Lords in which he took pains to make it clear that
there was absolutely no foundation in the propaganda in certain
quarters that the British Government intended to delay matters by
adopting the device of holding discussions with the representatives
of the people of India. He also declared that His Majesty's Gov-
ernment was arranging for a Parliamentary Delegation to go to
India under the auspices of the Empire Parliamentary Association
so that the members of the British Parliament could have an oppor-
tunity to meet leading political Indian personalities so that they
could form their own views on the spot. The Secretary of State
also made it clear that the British Government would not allow the
loyalty of the administrative services and the Indian armed forces
to be interfered with.
On 10 December 1945, while addressing the annual function of
the Associated Chamber of Commerce, Lord Wavell gave an assur-
ance that the British Government and the British people honestly
and sincerely wished the Indian people to have their political free-
dom and a government or governments of their own choice. How-
ever, he made it clear that the problem was a difficult one and
there was no magic Sesame which would open the Alibaba's cave.
The problem could also not be solved through violence and disorder.
There must be some agreement between the Congress, the Muslims
and the rulers of the Indian States and the British Government so
that the objective of freedom and welfare of India could be secur-
ed. To quote him, “I do appeal most solemnly and earnestly at
this critical moment of Indian history for goodwill on the part of
all leaders. We are going through a very difficult and testing time
and it will need coolness and wisdom if we are to avoid calamity.
in so far as I can help by personal contact, I am always prepared
to do so. ”
On 19 February 1946, Lord Pethick Lawrence made a momen-
tus declaration in the House of Lords in which he announced the
## p. 679 (#719) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION
679
decision of the British Government to send a special mission of Cabi-
net Ministers to resolve the constitutional deadlock in the country.
The members of the Mission were Lord Pethick Lawrence himself,
Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade and Mr. A.
V. Alexander, First Lord of Admiralty.
THE CABINET MISSION (1946)
The Mission reached Delhi on 24 March 1946. Prolonged dis-
cussions took place between the members of the Mission and the
leaders of the Congress and Muslim League. However, the main
parties could not come to any mutual understanding. The result
was that the members of the Mission had to put forward their own
formula for solving the constitutional problem. That formula was
embodied in a joint statement issued by the Cabinet Mission and
Lord Wavell on 16 May, 1946.
After pointing out the impracticability of the Pakistan scheme,
the statement of May 16 recommended that the new constitution of
India should take the following basic form:-
"(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British
India and States which should deal with the following
subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications,
and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances
required for the above subjects.
"(2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature
constituted from British India and States representatives.
Any question raising a major communal issue in the
Legislature should require for its decision a majority of
the representatives present and voting of each of the two
major communities as well as a majority of all the mem-
bers present and voting.
“(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all resi-
duary powers should vest in the Provinces.
“(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than
those ceded to the Union.
“(5) Provinces should be free to form Groups with executives
and legislatures, and each Group could determine the
Provincial subjects to be taken in common.
“(6) The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should
contain a provision whereby any Province could, by a
majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for a re-
consideration of the terms of the constitution after an ini-
tial period of 10 years and at 10 yearly intervals there-
after. "
## p. 680 (#720) ############################################
680 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
As regards the constitution-making machinery, it was provided
that the Legislative Assemblies of the provinces would elect the
members of that body on the basis of one representative for one
million of the population. The Sikh and Muslim legislators were
to elect the quota of their communities, determined on the popula-
tion basis. Others were to elect the representatives for the rest
of the population. The representatives from the provinces were to
divide themselves into three sections, A, B and C. Section C was
to consist of the representatives of Bengal and Assam, Section B of
the Punjab, Sind and North-West Frontier Province and Section A
of the rest of the provinces of India. "These Sections shall proceed
to settle the Provincial Constitution for the Provinces included in
each Section, and shall also decide whether any Group Constitu-
tion shall be set up for these provinces and, if so, with what provin-
cial subjects the Groups should deal. ” The representatives of the
Sections of the Indian States were then to re-assemble and settle
the Union Constitution.
TABLE OF REPRESENTATION
Section A
Province
General Muslim Total
Madras
45
4
49
Bombay
19
2
21
United Provinces
47
8
55
Bihar
31
5
36
Central Provinces
16
1
17
Orissa
9
0
9
Total
167
20
187
Section B
Province
General Muslim Sikh Total
Punjab
8 16 4 28
N. -W. Frontier Province 0
3 0
3
Sind
1
3 0
4
Total
9
22
4
35
Province
Bengal
Assam
Section C
General
27
7
Muslim
33
3
Total
60
10
Total
34
36
70
Total for British India
Maximum for States
292
93
Total
385
## p. 681 (#721) ############################################
THE CABINET MISSION
681
The Provinces of India were given the power to opt out of the
Groups by a decision of their Legislature after the general elections
under the new Constitution. The Resolutions of the Union Consti-
tuent Assembly regarding major communal issues were to require
a majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the
two major communities. The Chairman of the Constituent As-
sembly was to decide which resolution raised major communal
issues and was to consult the Federal Court before giving his de-
cision. A plan for the interim Government was also envisaged in
the Scheme of May 16, 1946.
The Cabinet Mission declared that the British Government could
not and would not in any circumstances transfer paramountcy to
an Indian Government. However, it was made clear that when
a new self-governing Government or Governments came into being
in British India, it would not be possible for the British Government
to carry out the obligations of paramountcy. In that case, all the
rights surrendered by the states to the paramount power were to
return to the Indian states. “Political arrangements between the
states on the one hand and the British Crown and British India on
the other will thus be brought to an end.
The void will have to
be filled either by the states entering into a federal relationship
with the successor Government or Goverments in British India or,
failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it
or them. ” This policy has been described as a “political scorched-
earth policy. ”
The great merit of the Cabinet Mission scheme was that the
Constituent Assembly was to be constituted on the democratic prin-
ciple of population strength. The principle of weightage was to be
discarded altogether. The democratic method of the decision of
issues by a simple majority was adopted in the case of communal
issues. However, safeguards were provided for the minorities.
The scheme also provided for an Indian Union of provinces and
states and rejected the idea of Pakistan completely. The Cabinet
Mission scheme was the last attempt made by British statesmen to
save India from division and disaster. Some of the anomalies of
the scheme were due to the desire of the members of the Cabinet
Mission to save Indian unity at any cost.
The scheme required
that all the members of the Constituent Assembly were to be
Indians. Neither the British Government nor non-official Europeans
in India were to be given any representation in the Constituent
Assembly. The European members of the Provincial Assemblies
were to absent themselves from voting. There was to be no inter-
ference with the work of the Constituent Assembly either by the
British Government or by its officials. Within the framework of
## p. 682 (#722) ############################################
682 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
the scheme, the Constituent Assembly was to be its own master.
As regards its demerits, while the scheme protected the rights of
the Muslim minority, the same principle was not applied to the
Sikhs in the Punjab. The proposals of the Cabinet Mission with
regard to the grouping of the provinces were not clear. Both the
Congress and the Muslim League interpreted the provisions differ-
ently. The Muslims regarded the compulsory grouping of the pro-
vinces as one of the cornerstones of the Cabinet Mission Scheme and
were not prepared to come to a compromise on that question. The
Congress stand was that the making of the groups was optional for
the provinces and the latter were free to join or not to join any
group. As a matter of fact, Mahatma Gandhi asked the people of
Assam not to join the group if they did not approve of it. To solve
this difficulty, it was suggested that the provinces might join provi-
sionally, but later on freedom might be given to them to leave it if
they so desired. The Congress suggested that the matter be refer-
red to the Federal Court of India for decision. However, the Bri-
tish Government gave its verdict in favour of the compulsory group-
ing of the provinces. The Muslim League won and the Congress
lost its point. Another defect of the scheme was the order in which
the Union and Sectional Assemblies were to meet and work and
draft their constitutions. It looked ridiculous first to form the
constitutions of the groups and the provinces and then to frame
the constitution of the Union. It was like putting the cart before
the horse. This practical difficulty would have been experienced
if the whole scheme would have been worked out in actual practice.
As regards the events after May 16, 1946, the All India Muslim
League passed a resolution on June 6, 1946, by which it accepted
the Cabinet Mission scheme in its entirety. On June 26, 1946, the
Working Committee of the Indian National Congress passed a reso-
lution by which it accepted the scheme partially. The part accept-
ed by it related to constitution-making. The view of the Working
Committee was that the grouping of the provinces was not to be
compulsory. The Congress rejected the interim
the interim Government
scheme on the ground that the clarifications given were not accept-
able. The resolution of the Working Committee was ratified by the
All India Congress Committee. The Sikhs rejected the scheme
.
completely on the ground that the compulsory grouping of the pro-
vinces as contemplated by the scheme was suicidal to their interests.
Before the members of the Cubinet Mission left India, they issued
a statement along with Lord Wavell in which they expressed their
satisfaction that the work of the making of the constitution would
proceed with the consent of the major political parties in India.
They regretted that an interim Government consisting of the vari-
## p. 683 (#723) ############################################
THE CALCUTTA KILLING
683
ous political parties could not be formed on account of certain diffi-
culties. It was hoped that after the elections to the Constituent
Assembly were over, negotiations would be started for the formation
of an interim Government consisting of the representatives of the
various political parties.
CALCUTTA KILLING (AUGUST 1946)
Mr. Jinnah who had accepted the scheme in its entirety, was
annoyed at the decision of the British Government to postpone the
formation of the interim Government. He accused Lord Wavell
of his having gone back on his promise. He was so much angry
that the Muslim League, under his leadership, passed another reso-
lution on July 29, 1946, by which it withdrew its former accept-
ance of the Cabinet Mission scheme. Mr. Jinnah was not content-
ed with this negative action. The Muslim League passed the fam-
ous Direct Action Resolution by which both the Congress and the
British Government were condemned for their breach of faith with
the Muslims. It was declared that the time had come for the Mus-
lim League to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan. The
resolution authorised the Working Committee of the Muslim League
to prepare a programme of direct action at once. August 16, 1946,
was fixed as the Direct Action Day. On that day, Hindu-Muslim
riots took place in Calcutta on an unprecedented scale. There was
a lot of blood-shed. There was an enormous loss of life and pro-
perty and the British Government did nothing to stop it. Mr.
Suhrawardy, Chief Minister of Bengal at that time, was himself in
the control room to direct and protect the rioters. On 18 August
1946, the figure of casualties mounted to 1,000 killed and 2,000
injured. As the trouble continued till 20 August 1946, the total
toll of communal carnage in Calcutta was 15,000 dead and wound-
ed. An eye-witness account is in these words: “Even small boys
and girls were killed by mobs. In one place, a three year old
child is stated to have been killed and nailed to the door. Fiendish
mobs raiding residences are said to have thrown down children
from second and third floor balconies in some places. Mobs arm-
ed with axes, daggers, lathies and other weapons raided houses
and shops, battered the doors, looted, butchered or maimed the
residents on whom they could lay hands, threw petrol and kerosene
on the building, set fire to it and went on their way to carry out
similar fiendish work elsewhere. "
The Calcutta atrocities were followed by the riots in Noakhali.
It is difficult to describe the hardships and sufferings of the Hindu
men, women and children. To quote, “The echoes of the Calcutta
## p. 684 (#724) ############################################
684 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
riots have hardly died down ere we have reports of massacres more
dire and disastrous still. Harrowing tales of murder, loot and arson
which made the Calcutta killing pale into insignificance have oc-
curred in Noakhali and Tipperah Districts. ” The indignities to
which Hindu women were subjected in Noakhali brought forth
protests from all over the country.
When all this was happening, Lord Wavell invited Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru, President of the Indian National Congress, to
form the interim Government and he took office on 2 September,
1946. To begin with, the Muslim League refused to join the
Interim Government but later on, on 13 October, 1946, it decided
to join. On 15 October, 1946, 5 members of the Muslim League
were included in the Interim Government. The introduction of
the new element destroyed the team spirit of the Executive Council
as the League members openly repudiated the idea of collective res-
ponsibility. What was worse, the League refused to join the Con-
stituent Assembly although Lord Wavell had told Pandit Jawahar-
lal Nehru before the inclusion of the Muslim League members in
the Executive Council that the League had agreed to join the
Constituent Assembly.
ATTLEE'S STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 1947
As apprehended, the Muslim League did not participate in the
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. It demanded a separate
Constituent Assembly for framing a separate constitution of its
own. On 20 February, 1947, Prime Minister Attlee made an im-
portant statement in which he declared the intention of the British
Government to quit India by a date not later than June 1948. To
quote Mr. Attlee, “This great sub-continent now containing over
four hundred million people has for the last century enjoyed peace
and security as a part of the British Commonwealth and Empire.
Continued peace and security are more than ever necessary today
if the full possibilities of economic development are to be realised
and a higher standard of life attained by the Indian people.
"His Majesty's Government are anxious to hand over their res-
ponsibilities to a Government which, resting on the sure foundation
of the support of the people, is capable of maintaining peace and
administering India with justice and efficiency. It is, therefore,
essential that all parties should sink their differences in order that
they may be ready to shoulder the great responsibility which will
come upon them next year.
“After months of hard work by the Cabinet Mission a great
measure of agreement was obtained as to the method by which
a
## p. 685 (#725) ############################################
ATTLEE'S STATEMENT
685
Constitution should be worked out. This was embodied in their
.
statement of May last. His Majesty's Government agreed to re-
commend to Parliament a constitution worked out in accordance
with the proposals made therein by a fully representative Constitu-
ent Assembly. But if it should appear that such a constitution will
not have been worked out by a full representative Assembly before
the time mentioned in paragraph 7, His Majesty's Government will
have to consider to whom the powers of the Central Government
in British India should be handed over, on due date, whether as a
whole to some form of Central Governnient for British India, or in
some areas to the existing Provincial Governments or in such other
way as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests of the
Indian people.
“Although the final transfer of authority may not take place until
June, 1948, preparatory measures must be put in hand in advance.
It is important that the efficiency of the civil administration should
be maintained and that the defence of India should be fully provid-
ed for. But inevitably, as the process of transfer proceeds, it will
become progressively more difficult to carry out to the letter all
the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. Legislation
will be introduced in due course to give effect to the final transfer
>
of power.
“In regard to the Indian States, as was explicitly stated by the
Cabinet Mission, His Majesty's Government do not intend to hand
c. ver their powers and obligations under Paramountcy to any Gov-
ernment of British India. It is not intended to bring Paramountcy,
as a system, to a conclusion earlier than the date of the final trans-
fer of power, but it is contemplated that for the intervening period
the relations of the Crown with individual States may be adjusted
by agreement.
"His Majesty's Government will negotiate agreements in regard
to matters arising out of the transfer of power with representatives
of those to whom they propose to transfer power.
“His Majesty's Government believe that British commercial and
industrial interests in India can look forward to a fair field for
their enterprise under the new conditions. The commercial con-
nection between India and the United Kingdom has been long and
will continue to be to their mutual advantage.
"His Majesty's Government cannot conclude the statement with-
out expressing on behalf of the people of this country their good-
will and good wishes towards the people of India as they go forward
to this final stage in their achievement of self-government. It will
be the wish of everyone in these Islands that, notwithstanding con-
stitutional changes, the association of the British and Indian peoples
## p. 686 (#726) ############################################
686 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
should not be brought to an end, and they will wish to continue to
do all that is in their power to further the well-being of India. ”
Mr. Attlee also announced that Lord Mountbatten was to suc-
ceed Lord Wavell as the Viceroy of India and he was to be entrust-
ed with the task of transferring into the hands of the Indians the
responsibility for the Government of British India in a manner that
would best ensure the future happiness and prosperity of India.
After the February Declaration, the Muslim League resorted to
Direct Action. There was a wear and tear campaign in favour
of Pakistan. There were very serious riots in the Punjab in which
horrible atrocities were committed on the minorities, particularly
the Sikhs. There was arson, looting, violence and murders. There
was trouble in the North-West Frontier Province. It is regrettable
that the British Government in India took no action against the
workers of the Muslim League. While on previous occasions, the
Congress workers while hoisting the national flag on the Govern-
ment buildings were shot dead, absolutely no action was taken
against Muslim women and youngmen who climbed the Secretariat
with the help of staircases and hoisted the flag of the Muslim
League. The Muslim League volunteers were surrounded, put in
trucks and left off after giving them a joy-ride for a few miles. That
certainly heartened them to do more and more.
JUNE 3 PLAN (1947)
Lord Mountbatten assumed office as Governor-General and
Viceroy of India on 24 March, 1947. The situation at that time
was explosive. Riots were taking place at that time on a large
scale. It appeared that it was not possible to maintain the unity
of India under any circumstances. Mr. Jinnah declared that the
"Muslim League will not yield an inch in its demand for Pakistan”
and he had the backing of the British bureaucracy in India in this
demand. Hectic negotiations continued between Lord Mountbat-
ten on the one hand and the Muslim League leaders and the Con-
gress Leaders on the other. Ultimately Lord Mountbatten broad-
cast on 3 June, 1947, his famous Plan which laid down the method
by which power was to be transferred from British to Indian hands.
In that Plan, it was declared that if the areas with a majority of
Muslim population desired that they should be allowed to form a
separate dominion, a new Constituent Assembly would be set up
for that purpose. However, in that case, there would be a parti-
tion of Bengal and Punjab if the representatives of their Legislative
Assemblies so desired. "The members of two parts of each Legisla-
tive Assembly sitting separately will be empowered to vote whether
## p. 687 (#727) ############################################
JUNE 3 PLAN
687
or not the provinces should be partitioned. If a simple majority
of either part decides in favour of partition, partition will take
place and arrangements would be made accordingly. ” The Legis-
lative Assembly of Sind was to make its own decision at a special
meeting. A decision by referendum was provided for in the case
of North-West Frontier Province. The Muslim majority District
of Sylhet was to decide by a referendum whether it would join East
Bengal or remain in Assam. There was to be a Boundary Com-
mission to settle the details of the boundaries in case the partition
of Bengal and Punjab was decided upon. The statement conclud-
ed thus: "His Majesty's Government propose to introduce legisla-
tion during the current session for the transfer of power this year
on a Dominion Status basis on one or two successor authorities ac-
cording to decisions taken as a result of this announcement. This
will be without prejudice to the right of the Indian Constituent
Assemblies to decide in due course whether or not the part of India
in respect of which they have authority will remain the British
Commonwealth. "
In his broadcast, Lord Mountbatten declared: “The whole Plan
may not be perfect; but like all Plans, its success will depend on
the spirit of goodwill with which it is carried out. I have always
felt that once it was decided in what way to transfer power the
transfer should take place at the earliest possible moment, but the
dilemma was that if we waited until a constitution set for All-India
was agreed, we should have to wait a long time, particularly if
partition were decided on, whereas if we handed over power before
the Constituent Assemblies had finished their work, we should leave
the country without a constitution. The solution to this dilemma
which I put forward, is that His Majesty's Government should trans-
fer power now to one or two Governments of British India each
having Dominion Status as soon as the necessary arrangements can
be made. This I hope will be within the next few months. ”
This historic pronouncement was received with mixed feelings
by the public. The Hindus and nationalists of all persuasions dep-
lored the partition of India. The Muslim League was not fully
satisfied with the "truncated and moth-eaten Pakistan. " However,
it was agreed that the June 3 Plan was the best practicable solu-
tion of the Indian problem as could be worked out under the cir-
cumstances. No wonder, the Plan was accepted both by the
Muslim League and the Congress. The Legislatures of the Punjab
and Bengal decided in favour of the partition of those provinces.
Two Boundary Commissions were appointed by the British Gov-
ernment for the Punjab and Bengal with Sir Cyril Radcliffe
Chairman of both. The referendum in North-West Frontier Pro-
as
## p. 688 (#728) ############################################
688 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
vince went in favour of Pakistan. Sylhet also decided to join
Pakistan.
INDIAN INDEPENDENCE ACT, 1947
In pursuance of the June 3 Plan, the Indian Independence Bill
was presented before the British Parliament on 4 July, 1947 and
the same was passed by the British Parliament on 18 July, 1947,
without any dissent. The Indian Independence Act provided for
the partition of India and the establishment of two Dominions of
India and Pakistan from the appointed day (August 15, 1947).
It also provided for the legislative supremacy of the two Dominions.
The legislatures of the two Duminions were given full power to
make laws having extra-territorial jurisdiction. The British Gov-
ernment was to have no control over the affairs of the Dominions,
provinces or any part of the Dominions after August 15, 1947.
Until a new constitution was framed for each Dominion, the Act
made the existing Constituent Assemblies the Dominion Legislatures
for the time being. The Assemblies were to exercise all the powers
which were formerly exercised by the Central Legislature in addi-
tion to its power regarding the framing of a new constitution.
Pending the framing of a new constitution, each of the Dominions
and all the provinces were to be governed in accordance with the
Government of India Act, 1935. Each Dominion was authorised
to make modifications in the Government of India Act, 1935. The
Governor-General was given the power to modify or adapt the
Government of India Act, 1935, as might be considered necessary
till March 31, 1948. After that date, it was open to the Constitu-
ent Assembly to modify or adopt the old Government of India Act,
1935. The right of the King to veto laws or to reserve laws for
his pleasure was given up. This right was given to the Governor-
General. He was given the full right to assent in the name of His
Majesty to any law of the Dominion Legislature made in the ordi-
nary legislative capacity. The Act provided for the termination
of the suzerainty of the Crown over the Indian States. All treaties,
agreements and functions exercisable by His Majesty with regard
to the states and their rulers were to lapse from August 15, 1947.
The existing arrangements between the Government of India and
the Indian states were to continue pending the detailed negotiations
between the Indian states and the new Dominions. Agreements
with the tribes of the North-West Frontier Province of India were
to be negotiated by the successor Dominion. The office of the
Secretary of State for India was to be abolished and his work was
to be taken over by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth
## p. 689 (#729) ############################################
DEMAND FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
689
Affairs. The title of Emperor of India was to be dropped from the
royal style and titles of the King of England. The Act terminated
British authority over India and set up two independent Domini-
ons, each with full authority to make its own constitution. Both
the Dominions were given full freedom. They could leave the
British Commonwealth of Nations if they so pleased.
In terms of the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, Pakis-
tan got her independence on 14 August, 1947 and India on 15
August, 1947. While Mr. M. A. Jinnah became the Governor-Gene-
ial of Pakistan, Lord Mountbatten was requested by the Govern-
ment of India to continue as the Governor-General of India.
On the night of 14 August, 1947, when the independence of
India was declared, Jawaharlal Nehru addressed the members of
the Constituent Assembly in these words: “Long years ago we made
a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem
our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially.
At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India
will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes
but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new,
when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suspended,
finds utterance. It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take
the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and
to the still larger cause of humanity. ”
DEMAND FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
The claim that the Constitution of India should be framed by
the people of India, through their chosen representatives, was first
put forward by a few advanced Indian nationalists during the first
World War when the British statesmen enunciated the famous
principle of self-determination for all nations, whether big or small.
However, after the end of the War, the Indian claim was not con-
ceded. The Preamble of the Government of India Act, 1919, speci-
fically stated thus: “And whereas the time and manner of each
advance can be determined only by Parliament upon whom res-
ponsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian
people. . . . . " In spite of this repudiation by the British Govern-
ment of India's demand for seif-determination, the demand began
to grow stronger and stronger with the lapse of time. Mahatma
Gandhi wrote thus in 1922: "Let us see clearly what Swaraj to-
gether with the British connection means. It means undoubtedly
India's ability to declare her independence if she wishes. Swaraj,
therefore, will not be a free gift of the British Parliament. It will
be a declaration of India's full expression. That it will be express-
## p. 690 (#730) ############################################
690 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES FROM 1919 TO 1969
A
ed through an Act of Parliament is true. But it will be merely a
courteous ratification of the declared wish of the people of India,
even as it was in the case of the Union of South Africa. Not an
unnecessary adverb could be altered by the House of Commons.
The ratification in our case will be a treaty to which Britain will
be a party. Such Swaraj may not come this year, may not come
within our own generation. But I have contemplated nothing
less. The British Parliament when the settlement comes, will
ratify the wishes of the people of India as expressed not through the
bureaucracy but through her freely chosen representatives. '
Under the inspiration of Mrs. Annie Besant, an attempt was
made by the Liberal members of the Central Legislative Assembly
in 1922 and 1923 to call a national convention "in order to obtain
for the Commonwealth of India Dominion Status in her external
relations and Swaraj in her internal affairs. ” A National Confer-
ence was held in New Delhi in February, 1923, with a view to
make arrangements for the calling of such a convention after the
elections of 1923, but the scheme did not fructify.
In 1924, the Swarajist Party put forward the demand in the
Central Legislative Assembly for the convening of a representative
Round Table Conference or Convention for recommending a
scheme of a Constitution for India which, after it was approved by
a newly elected Indian Legislature, was to be submitted to the Bri-
tish Parliament for enactment in the form of a statute.
