No More Learning

Kant endeavours to demonstrate that this
sentiment is the necessary condition of our
moral being; the truth which precedes all
those, the knowledge of which is acquired
by life. Can it be denied that conscience
has more dignity, when we believe it to be
an innate power, than when we consider it
in the light of a faculty acquired, like all
others, by experience and habit? And it is
in this point, especially, that the ideal me-
taphysics exert a great influence over the
moral conduct of man: they attribute the
same primitive force to the notion of duty as
to that of space and time; and, considering
them both as inherent in our nature, they
admit no more doubt of one than of the
other.
All our esteem for ourselves and for others
ought to be founded on the relations which
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? 204 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
exist between our actions and the law of duty;
this law depends, in no case, on the desire
of happiness; on the contrary, it is often
summoned to combat that desire. Kant goes
still farther; he affirms, that the first effect
of the power of virtue is to cause a noble
pain by the sacrifices which it demands.
The destination of man upon this earth is
not happiness, but. the advance towards
moral perfection. It is in vain that, by a
childish play of words, this improvement is
called happiness; we clearly feel the dif-
ference between enjoyments and sacrifices;
arid if language was to adopt the same terms
for such discordant ideas, our natural judg-
ment would reject the deception.
It has been often said, that human nature
had a tendency towards happiness: this is
its involuntary iastinct; but the instinct of
reflection is virtue. By giving man very little
influence over his own happiness, and means
of improvement without number, the in-
tention of the Creator was surely not to
make the object of our lives an almost unat-
tainable end. Devote all your powers to
the attainment of happiness; control your
character, if you can, to such a degree as
not to feel those wandering desires, which,
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? OP THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALS. 205
nothing can satisfy; and, in spite of all these
wise arrangements of self-love, you will be
afflicted with disorders, you will be ruined,
you will be imprisoned, and all the edifice
of your selfish cares will be overturned.
It may be replied to this--" I will be so
"circumspect, that I will not have any ene-
"mies. " Let it be so; you will not have
to reproach yourself with any acts of gene-
rous imprudence; but sometimes we have
seen the least courageous among the perse-
cuted. "I will manage my fortune so well,
44 that I will preserve it. "--I believe it;--but
there are universal disasters, which do not
spare even those- whose principle has been
never to expose themselves for others; and
illness, and accidents of every kind, dispose
of our condition in spite of ourselves. How
then should happiness be the end of our
moral liberty in this short life; happiness,
which chance, suffering, old age, and death,
put out of our power? The case is not the
same with moral improvement; every day,
every hour, every minute, may contribute
to it; all fortunate and unfortunate events
equally assist it; and this work depends en-
tirely on ourselves, whatever may be our
situation upon earth. . .
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? 206 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
The moral system of Kant and Fichte i9
very analogous to that of the Stoics; but the
Stoics allowed more to the ascendency of
natural qualities; the Roman pride is disco-
verable in their manner of estimating man-
kind. The disciples of Kant believe in the
necessary and continual action of the mil
against evil inclinations. They tolerate no
exceptions in our obedience to duty, and re-
ject all excuses which can act as motives to
such exceptions.
The theory of Kant concerning veracity is
an example of this; he rightly considers it as
the basis of all morality. When the Son of
God called himself the Logos, or the Word,
perhaps he wished to do honour to that ad-
mirable faculty in language of revealing
what we think. Kant has carried his respect
for truth so far, as not to permit a violation
of it, evert if a villain came and demanded,
whether yow friend, whom he pursued,
was hidden. in your house. He pretends,.
that we ought never to allow ourselves, in
any partieulas instance, to do that which
would be inadmissible as a general law ; but,
on this occasion, he forgets that we may
make a general law of not sacrificing truth,
excepting to another virtue; for, as soon as
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? OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALS. 207
personal interest is removed from a question,
we need not fear sophisms, and conscience
pronounces with equity upon all things.
The theory of Kant in morals is severe*
and sometimes dry; for it excludes sensibi-
lity. He regards it as a reflex act of sensa-
tion, and as certain to lead to passiotra in
which there is always a mixture of selfish-
ness; it is on this account that he does flot
admit sensibility for a. guide, and that he
places morals under the safeguard of un-
changeable principles. There is nothing more
severe than this doctrine; but there is a severity
which softens us, even when it treats the im-
pulses of the heart as objects of suspicion, ami
endeavours to banish them all: however ri-
gorous a moralist may be, when he addresses
our conscience* he is sure to touch us. He
who sajs to man--Find every thing in your-
self--always raises up in the soul some noble
object, which is connected with that very
sensibility whose sacrifice it demands. In
studying the philosophy of Kant, we must
distinguish sentiment from sensibility; he
admits the former as the judge of philoso-
phical truth; he considers the latter as pro-
perly subject to the conscience. Sentiment
and conscience are terms employed almost
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? 208 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
as synonymes in his writings; but sensibility
approaches much nearer to the sphere of
emotions, and consequently to that of the
passions, which they originate.
We cannot grow weary of admiring those
writings of Kant, in which the supreme law
of duty is held up as sacred: what genuine
warmth, what animated eloquence, upon a
subject, where the only ordinary endeavour
is restraint! We feel penetrated with a
profound respect for the austerity of an aged
philosopher, constantly submitted to the in-
visible power of virtue, which has no em-
pire but that of conscience, no arms but those
of remorse; no treasures to distribute but
the inward enjoyments of the soul; the hope
of which cannot be offered as a motive for
their attainment, because they are incom-
prehensible until they are experienced.
Among the German philosophers, some
men of virtue, not inferior to Kant, and
who approach nearer to religion in their in-
clinations, have attributed the origin of the
moral law to religious sentiment. This
sentiment cannot be of the nature of those
which may grow into passions. Seneca has
depicted its calmness and profundity, by
saying, "In the bosom of the virtuous man I
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? t)f THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALS. 209
xt know not what God, but a God has ha-
"bitation. "
Kant pretended, that it was to impair the
disinterested purity of morals, to present
the perspective of a future life, as the end
of our actions: man3' German writers have
completely refuted him on this point. In
effect, the immortality of heaven has no
relation to the rewards and punishments, of
which we form an idea on this earth. The
sentiment which makes Us aspire to immor-
tality is as disinterested as that which makes
us find our happiness in devoting ourselves
to the happiness of others; for the first
offering to religious felicity is the sacrifice of
self; and it is thus necessarily removed from
every species of selfishness. Whatever we
may attempt, we must return to the ac-
knowledgment, that religion is the true
foundation of morality; it is that sensible
and real object within us, which can alone
divert our attention from external objects.
If piety did not excite sublime emotions, who
would sacrifice even sensual pleasures, how-
ever vulgar they might be, to the cold dignity
of reason? We must begin the internal
history of man with religion, or with sensa-
tion; for there is nothing animated besides.
VOL. III. p
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? 810 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
The moral system, founded upon personal in-
terest, would be as evident as a mathematical
truth, were it not for its exercising more
control over the passions which overturn all
calculations: nothing but a sentiment can
triumph over a sentiment; the violence of
nature can only be conquered by its exalta-
tion. Reasoning, in such a case, is like the
schoolmaster in Fontaine; nobody listens to
him, and all the world is crying out for help.
Jacobi, as 1 shall show in the analysis of
his works, has opposed the arguments which
Kant uses, in order to avoid the admission
of religious sentiment as the basis of mora-
lity. He believes, on the contrary, that the
Divinity reveals himself to every man in
particular, as he revealed himself to the
human race, when prayers and works have
prepared the heart to comprehend liim.
Another philosopher asserts, that immorta-
lity already commences upon this earth, for
him who desires and feels in himself the
taste for eternal things: another affirms,
that nature forces man to understand the
will of God; and that there is in the uni-
verse a groaning and imprisoned voice,
which invites us to deliver the world and
ourselves, by combating the principle of evil,
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? OF -THE PRINCIPLE OF MORALS. 211
under all its fatal appearances. These dif-
ferent systems are influenced by the imagina-
tion of each writer, and are adopted by those
who sympathize with him; but the general
direction of these opinions is ever the same:
to free the soul from the influence of external
objects; to place the empire of ourselves
within us; and to make duty the law of this
empire, and its hope another life,
Without doubt, the true Christians have
taught the same doctrine at all periods; but
what distinguishes the new German school,
is their uniting to all these sentiments,
which they suppose to be equally inherited
by the simple and ignorant, the highest
philosophy and the most precise species of
knowledge. The aera of pride had arrived,
in which we were told, that reason and the
sciences destroyed all the prospects of ima-
gination, all the terrors of conscience, every
belief of the heart; and we blushed for the
half of our nature which was declared weak
and almost foolish. But men have made their
appearance, who, by dint of thinking, have
found out the theory of all natural impres-
sions; and, far from wishing to stifle them,
they have discovered to us the noble source
from which they spring. The German mo-
p2
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? 212 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
ralists have raised up sentiment and enthu-
siasm from the contempt of a tyrannical
species of reason, which counted as gain
only what is destroyed, and placed man and
nature on the bed of Procrustes, that every
part of them might be cut off, which the
philosophy of materialism could not under-
stand.
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? OF SCIENTIFIC MORALITY. 213
CHAPTER XV.
Of scientific Morality.
Since the taste for the exact sciences has
taken hold of men's minds, they have wished
to prove every thing by demonstration ; and
the calculation of probabilities allowing them
to reduce even what is uncertain to rules,
they have flattered themselves that they
could resolve mathematically all the difficul-
ties offered by the nicest questions; and ex-
tend the dominion of algebra over the uni-
verse. Some philosophers, in Germany, have
also pretended to give to morality the ad-
vantages of a science rigorously proved in its
principles as well as in its consequences, and
not admitting either of objection or exception,
if the first basis of it be adopted. Kant
and Fichte have attempted this metaphysical
labour, and Schleiermacher, the translator
of Plato, and the author of several religious
treatises, of which we shall speak in the
next section, has published a very deep book,
on the examination of different systems of
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? 214 **hil6sophy and morals.
morality considered as a science. He wished
to find out one, all the reasoning^ of which
should be perfectly linked together, in which
the principle should involve all the conse-
quences, and every consequence reproduce
the principle; but* at present, it does not
appear that this object is attainable.
The ancients also were desirous of making
a science of morality, but they included in
that science laws and government: in fact,
it is impossible to determine beforehand all
the duties of life, when we do not know
what may be required by the laws and man*
ners of the country in whidh we are placed;
it is in this point of view that Plato has
imagined his republic. Man altogether is,
in that work, considered in relation to re-
ligion, to politics* and to morality; but> as
that republic could not exist, one cannot
conceive how, in the midst of the abuses of
human society, a code of morality, such as
that would be, could supply the habitual
interpretation of conscience. Philosophers
aim at the Scientific form in all things; one
should say, they flatter themselves that
they shall thus chain down the future, and
Withdraw themselves entirely from the yoke
of circumstances: but what free* us from
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? OF SCIENTIFIC MOBALITY. 215
them, is, the soul; the sincerity of our in-
ward love of virtue. The science of morality
can no more teach us to be honest men, in all
the magnificence of that expression, than
geometry to draw, or literary rules to invent.
Kant, who had admitted the necessity of
sentiment in metaphysical truths, was will-
ing to dispense with it in morality, and he
was never able to establish incontestably
more than this one great fact of the human
heart, that morality has duty, and not in-
terest, for its basis; but to understand duty,
conscience and religion must be our teachers.
Kant, in separating religion from the motives
of morality, could only see in conscience a
judge, and not a divine voice, and therefore
he has been incessantly presenting to that
judge points of difficulty; the solutions of
them which he has given, and which he
thought evident, have been attacked in a
thousand ways; for it is by sentiment alone
that we ever arrive at unanimity of opinion
amongst men.
Some German philosophers, perceiving
the impossibility of reducing into law all the
affections of which our nature is composed,
and of making a science, as it were, of all
the emotions of the heart, have contented
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? 216 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
themselves with affirming, that morality con-
sists in a feeling of harmony within ourselves-
Undoubtedly, when we feel no remorse,.
it is probable we are not criminal; and even
when we may have committed what are
faults according to the opinions of others,
if we have done our duty according to our
own opinion, we are not guilty; but we
must nevertheless be cautious in relying
on this self-satisfaclion, which ought, it
should seem, to be the best proof of virtue.
There are men who have brought themselves
to take their own pride for conscience;
fanaticism, in others, is a disinterested me-
dium, which justifies every thing in their
eyes; and in some characters, the habit of
committing crimes gives a kind of strength,
which frees them from repentance, at least
as long as they are untouched by misfor-
tune. *
It does not follow from this impossibility
of discovering a science in morality, or any
universal signs, by which to know whether
its precepts are observed, that there are not
some positive duties which may serve as our
guides; but as there are in the destiny of
man both necessity and liberty, so, in his.
conduct, there ought to be inspiration and,
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? OV SCIENTIFIC MORALITY. 217
method.
Nothing that belongs to virtue can
be either altogether arbitrary, or altogether
fixed: thus, it is one of the miracles of reli-
gion, that it unites, in the same degree, the
exultation of love and submission to the law;
thus the heart of man is at once satisfied and
directed.
I shall not here give an account of all the
systems of scientific morality which have
been published in Germany; there are some
of them so refined, that, although treating of
our own nature, one does not know on what
to rest for the conception of them. The
French philosophers have rendered morality
singularly dry, by referring every thing to
self-interest. Some German metaphysicians
have arrived at the same result, by never-
theless building all their doctrines on sacri-
fices. Neither systems of materialism, nor
those of abstraction, can give a complete
idea of virtue.
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? 218 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
CHAPTER XVI.
Jacobi.
It vrould be difficult in any country to meet
with a man of letters of a more distinguished
nature than Jacobi: with every advantage of
person and fortune, he devoted himself, from
his youth, during forty years, to meditation.
Philosophy is ordinarily a consolation or an
asylum; but he who makes choice of it when
circumstances concur to promise him great
success in the world, is the more worthy of
respect. Led by his character to acknow-
ledge the power of sentiment, Jacobi bu-
sied himself with abstract ideas, principally
to show their insufficiency. His writings on
metaphysics are much esteemed in Germany;
yet it is chiefly as a great moralist that his
reputation is universal.
He was the first who attacked morality
founded on interest; and, by assigning as
the principle of his own system, religious
sentiment considered philosophically, he has
created a doctrine distinct from that of Kant,
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? JACOBI.
219
who refers every thing to the inflexible law
of duty, and from that of the new metaphy-
sicians, who aim, as I have just said, at
applying the strictness of science to the
theory of virtue.
Schiller, in an epigram against Kant's
system of morality, says, " I take pleasure
"in serving my friends; it is agreeable to
"me to perform my duty; that makes me
"uneasy, for then I am not virtuous/' This
pleasantry carries with it a deep sense; for,
although happiness ought never to be our
object in fulfilling our duty, yet the inward
satisfaction which it affords us is precisely
what may be called the beatitude of virtue.
This word Beatitude has lost something of
its dignity: it must, however, be recurred to,
for it is necessary to express that kind of
impression which makes us sacrifice hap-
piness, or at least pleasure, to a gentler and
a purer state of mind.
In fact, if sentiment does not second mo-
rality, how would the latter make itself
respected? How could reason and will be
united together, if not by sentiment, when the
will has to control the passions? A German
philosopher has said, that " there is no yhilo-
M sophy but the Christian religion;" and
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? 220 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
certainly he did not so express himself to ex-
clude philosophy, but because he was con-
vinced that the highest and the deepest ideas
led to the discovery of the singular agree-
ment between that religion and the nature of
man. Between these two classes of* moralists,
that which with Kant, and others still more
abstracted, refers all the actions of morality
to immutable precepts, and that which with
Jacobi declares, that every thing is to be left
to the decision of sentiment, Christianity
seems to show the wonderful point, at which
the positive law has not excluded the inspi-
ration of the heart, nor that inspiration the
positive law.
Jacobi, who has so much reason to confide
in the purity of his conscience, was wrong to
lay down as a principle that we should yield
entirely to whatever the motions of our mind
may suggest. The dryness of some intolerant
writers, who admit no modification or in-
dulgence in the application of some precepts,
has driven Jacobi into the contrary excess.
When the French moralists are severe,
they are so to a degree, which destroys in-
dividual character in man; it is the spirit of
the nation to love authority in every thing.
The German philosophers, and Jacobi above
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? JACOBI. 1 1 221
all, respect what constitutes the particular
existence of every being, and judge of actions
by their source, that is to say, according to
the good or bad impulse which causfes them.
There are a thousand ways of being a very
bad man, without offending against any re-
ceived law, as a detestable tragedy may be
written, without any neglect of theatrical
rules and effect. When the soul has no na-
tural spring, it seeks to know what ought to
be said, and what ought to be done, ih every
circumstance, that it may be acquitted
towards itself, and towards others, by sub-
mitting to what is ordained. The law, how-
ever, in morality, as in poetry, can only
teach what ought not to be done; but, in
all things, what is good and sublime, is only
revealed to us by the divinity of our heart.
Public utility, as I have explained it in the
preceding chapter, might lead us to be im-
moral by morality. In the relations of pri-
vate life, on the contrary, it may sometimes
happen, that a conduct which is perfect ac-
cording to worldly estimation, may proceed
from a bad principle; that is to say, may
belong to something dry, malicious, and un-
charitable. Natural passions and superior
talents are displeasing to those men who are
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? 222 PHILOSOPHY AtfP HOEALS.
too easily dignified with the name of severe:
they avail themselves of their morality, which
they say comes from God, as an enemy
would take the sword of a father to destroy
bis children.
At the same time Jacobi's aversion to
the inflexible rigour of law, leads him too far
in freeing himself from it. "Yes," says he,
"I would be a liar like the dying Desde-
"njiona*; I would deceive like Orestes,
"when he wished to die instead of Pylades;
<* 1 would be an assassin like Timoleon; per-
"jured like Epaminondas and John de Witt;
"J (Could resolve to commit suicide like
"Cato; or sacrilege like David; for I have
"an assurance within me, that in pardoning
"these things, which are crimes according
"to the letter, man exercises the sovereign
M right which the majesty of his nature con-
"fers upon him;. fixes the seal of his dignity,
"the seal of his divine nature, to the pardon
"which be grants.
"If you would establish a system universal
"and strictly scientific, you must submit
"conscience to that system which has pe-
* Desdemona, in order to save her husband from the dis-
grace and danger of the crime he has jm%t committed, declares,
at she it dying, that the has killed herself.
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? JACOBI.
283
"trified life: that conscience must become
"deaf, dumb, and insensible; even the
"smallest remains of its root (that is, of the
"human heart) must be torn up. Yes, as
"truly as your metaphysical forms fill the
"place of Apollo and the Muses, it is only
"by imposing silence on your heart that you
"will be able implicitly to conform to laws
"without exception, and that you will adopt
"the hard and servile obedience which tbey
"demand: thus conscience will only serve
"to teach you, like a professor in his chair,
"the truth that is without you; and this
"inward light will soon be no more than a
"finger-post set up on the highway to direct
"travellers on their journey. "
Jacobi is so well guided by his own sen-
timents, that perhaps be has not sufficiently
reflected on the consequences of this morality
to ordinary men; for what answer could be
given to those who should pretend, in depart-
ing from duty, that they obey the sugges-
tions of their conscience? Undoubtedly,
we may discover that they are hypocrites
who speak thus; but we have furnished
them with an argument which will serve
to justify them, whatever they may do;
and it is a gieat tiling for men to have
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? 224 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
phrases to repeat in favour of their conduct!
they make use of them at first to deceive
others, and end with deceiving themselves.
Will it be said that this independent doc-
trine can only suit characters which are truly
virtuous? There ought to be no privileges
even for Virtue; for from the moment she
desires them, it is probable she ceases to
deserve them. A sublime equality reigns in
the empire of duty, and something passes at
the bottom of the human heart which gives
to every man, when he sincerely desires it,
the means of performing all that enthusiasm
inspires, without transgressing the limits of
the Christian law, which is also the work of
an holy enthusiasm.
The doctrine of Kant may in effect be
considered as too dry, because it does not
attribute sufficient influence to religion; but
it is not surprising that he should have been
inclined not to make sentiment the base of
his morality, at a time when there was so
widely diffused, and especially in Gerniany,
an affectation of sensibility, which necessarily
weakened the spring of minds and characters.
A genius like Kant's should have for its
object, to give a new dye to the mind.
The German moralists of the new school,
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? jacobi. 225
so pure in their sentiments, to whatever ab-
stract systems they abandon themselves, may
be divided into three classes: those who, like
Kant and Fichte, have aimed at giving to
the law of duty a scientific theory, and an
inflexible application; those, at the head of
whom Jacobi is to be placed, who take reli-
gious sentiment and natural conscience for
their guides; and those who, making revela-
tion the basis of their belief, endeavour to
unite sentiment and duty, and seek to bind
them together by a philosophical interpreta-
tion. These three classes of moralists equally
attack morality founded on self-interest. --
That morality has now scarcely any partisans
in Germany; evil actions may be done there,
but at least the theory of what is right is left
untouched,
VOL. IH.
Q
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? 226 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
CHAPTER XVII.
Of Woldemar.
The romance of Woldemar is the work of
the same philosopher, Jacobi, of whom I
have spoken in the last chapter. This work
contains philosophical discussions, in which
the svstems of morality professed by the
French writers are warmly attacked, and the
doctrine of Jacobi is explained in it with ad-
mirable eloquence. In that respect Wolde-
mar is a very fine book; but as a novel I
neither like the conduct nor the end of it.
The author, who, as a philosopher, refers all
human destiny to sentiment, describes in his
work, as it appears to me, sensibility differ-
ently from what it is in fact. An exagge-
rated delicacy, or rather a whimsical manner
of considering the human heart, may interest
in theory, but not when it is put in action, and
thus attempted to be made something real.
Woldemar feels a warm friendship for a
person who will not marry him, although
she partakes of his feeling: he marries a
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? WOLDEMAR. 227
woman he does not love, because he thinks
he has found in her a submissive and gentle
character, which is proper for marriage.
Scarcely has he married her, when he is on
the point of giving himself up to the love
he feels for the other. She, who would not
be united to him, still loves him, but she
revolts at the idea that it is possible for
him to love her; and yet she desires to live
near him, to take care of his children, to
treat his wife as her sister, and only to know
the affections of nature by the sj'tnpathy of
friendship. It is thus that a piece of Goethe,
much boasted of, Stella, finishes with a reso-
lution taken by two women, bound by sacred
ties to the same man, to live with him in
good understanding with each other. Such .
inventions only succeed in Germany, because
in that country there is frequently more
imagination than sensibility. Southern souls
would understand nothing of this heroism
of sentiment; passion is devoted, but jealous;
and that pretended delicacy, which sacri-
fices love to friendship, without the injunc-
tions of duty, is nothing but an affected
coldness.
All this generosity at the expense of love
is merely an artificial system. We must not
q2
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? 228 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
admit toleration, or rivality, into a sentiment
which is then only sublime, when, like ma-
ternal and filial tenderness, it is exclusive
and all-powerful. We ought not, by our
own choice, to place ourselves in a situation
where morals and sensibility are not of one
accord; for what is involuntary is so beau-
tiful, that it is alarming to be condemned to
give orders to ourselves in all our actions,
and to live as if we were our own victims.
It is, assuredly, neither from hypocrisy,
nor from dryness of character, that a writer
of real and excellent genius has imagined, in
the novel of Woldemar, situations in which
every personage sacrifices sentiment by means
of sentiment, and anxiously seeks a reason
for not loving what he loves. But Jacobi,
who had felt from his youth a lively inclina-
tion towards every species of enthusiasm, has
here sought out for a romantic mysterious-
ness in the attachments of the heart, which
i9 very ingeniously described, but is quite
foreign to nature. .
It seems to mc that Jacobi understands
religion better than love, for he is too de-
sirous of confounding them. It is not true
that love, like rejigion, can find all its.
happiness in the renunciation of happiness
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? WOLD EM A R. . 229
itself. We change the idea that we ought
to entertain of virtue, when we make it con-
sist in a sort of exalted feeling which has no
object, and in sacrifices for which there is
no necessity. All the characters in Jacobi's
novel are continually tilting with their gene-
rosity against their love :--not only is this
unlike what happens in life, but it has no
moral beauty when virtue does not require
it; for strong and passionate feelings honour
human nature; and religion is so impressive
as it is, precisely because it can triumph
over such feelings. Would it have been
necessary for God himself to condescend to
address the human heart, if there were only
found in that heart some cold and grace-
ful affections which it would be so easy to
renounce?
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? 230 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Of a romantic Bias in the Affections of the
Heart.
The English philosophers have founded vir-
tue, as we have said, upon feeling, or rather
upon the moral sense; but this system has
no connexion with the sentimental morality
of which we are here talking: this morality
(the name and idea of which hardly exist
out of Germany) has nothing philosophical
about it; it only makes a duty of sensibility,
and leads to the contempt of those who are
deficient in that quality.
Doubtless, the power of feeling love is
very closely connected with morality and
religion: it is possible then that our repug-
nance to cold and hard minds is a sublime
sort of instinct--an instinct which apprizes
us, that such beings, even when their con-
duct is estimable, act mechanically, or by
calculation; and that it is impossible for any
sympathy to exist between us and them. In
Germany, where it is attempted to reduce all
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