No More Learning

Reply to Objection 1: Such absence of form in the angels can be
understood either by comparison with their formation in glory; and so
the absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or
else it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and so
it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as
Augustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things (Gen.
ad lit. i, 15).

Reply to Objection 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of
the subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to
be inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the
movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace can
fail to make use of it, and can sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Although in the order of nature grace comes
midway between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in
created nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory is
the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace stands
not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as the
principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting for grace to be
given straightway with nature.
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Whether an angel merits his beatitude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude.
For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the
angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous
action was not meritorious for him.

Objection 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But
it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not
thereby merit beatitude.

Objection 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he
did so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not
before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before whereby
to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he would be
meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower
angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher, and the
distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is not
admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude.

On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the "measure of the
angel" in that heavenly Jerusalem is "the measure of a man. " Therefore
the same is the case with the angel.

I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because
existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude,
however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now
everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation
leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is
not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing
art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when
such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it;
wherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing. Now it is evident
from what has gone before ([546]AA[1],2; [547]Q[12], AA[4],5), ultimate
beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It remains,
then, that both man and angel merited their beatitude.

And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit,
there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude: as
also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had
glory.

But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then
have to be said that he had beatitude without merit, even as we have
grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which
conveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be said, as
some others have maintained, that the angels merit beatitude by their
present ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite contrary,
again, to the notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a means
to an end; while what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking,
be moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce what he
already enjoys. Or else it will have to be said that one and the same
act of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is meritorious;
and so far as it attains the end, is the fruition of beatitude. Even
this view will not stand, because free-will is not the sufficient cause
of merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as coming
from free-will, except in so far as it is informed by grace; but it
cannot at the same time be informed by imperfect grace, which is the
principle of meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of
enjoying. Hence it does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy
beatitude, and at the same time to merit it.

Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was
admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.

Reply to Objection 1: The angel's difficulty of working righteously
does not come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers; but
from the fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity.

Reply to Objection 2: An angel did not merit beatitude by natural
movement towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of
grace.

The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.
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Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude
instantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man to
do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after one
act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel.

Objection 2: Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant,
from the very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin to
be moved in the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of
a body could be instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it
would have movement in the first instant of its generation.
Consequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will, he
merited it in the first instant of his creation; and so, if their
beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the
first instant.

Objection 3: Further, there must be many intervals between things which
are far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far remote
from their natural condition: while merit comes midway between.
Therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in
order to reach beatitude.

On the contrary, Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for
beatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints.
Now the soul separated from the body, if it has merit deserving
beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be some
obstacle. Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in his
first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since
there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by
only one meritorious act.

I answer that, The angel was beatified instantly after the first act of
charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is because
grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature; as every
perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection, according
to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its
natural perfection not by passing from one stage to another; but to
have it at once naturally, as was shown above [548](A[1]; [549]Q[58],
AA[3],4). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to natural
perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence instantly after
merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel
and man alike can be from merely one act; because man merits beatitude
by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an angel was
beatified straightway after one act of charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Man was not intended to secure his ultimate
perfection at once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to
man than to the angel for securing beatitude.

Reply to Objection 2: The angel is above the time of corporeal things;
hence the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken
except as reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which
merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of
beatitude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect grace,
and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, it remains for
different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel merited
beatitude, and in another was beatified.

Reply to Objection 3: It is of the nature of an angel instantly to
attain the perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one
meritorious act is required; which act can so far be called an interval
as through it the angel is brought to beatitude.
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Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their
natural gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and
glory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is
bestowed of God's absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace depends
on God's will, and not on the degree of their natural gifts.

Objection 2: Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with
grace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace. But
grace does not come "of works," as is said Rom. 11:6. Therefore much
less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural
gifts.

Objection 3: Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or
grace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree of
his natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel.

On the contrary, Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences (Sent.
ii, D, 3) that "those angels who were created with more subtle natures
and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed with
greater gifts of grace. "

I answer that, It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and
perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the
degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from
two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of His
wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as the
angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude, so
likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the
various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the
builder chisels the stones for building a house, from the fact that he
prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is
clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the
house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of
grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature.

Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is
not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the one
thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man, in
whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or
thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is
nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy.
So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher nature,
were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same thing
happens in men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed according to
the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it appears that
the angels who had the greater natural powers, had the more grace and
glory.

Reply to Objection 1: As grace comes of God's will alone, so likewise
does the nature of the angel: and as God's will ordained nature for
grace, so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various
degrees of grace.

Reply to Objection 2: The acts of the rational creature are from the
creature itself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it
seems rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than
according to works.

Reply to Objection 3: Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the
angels, who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another
way in men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on
account of the end; while numerical difference is because of the
matter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or
impede the movement of his intellective nature; but not in the angels.
Consequently the argument is not the same for both.
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Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not
remain in the beatified angels. For it is said (1 Cor. 13:10): "When
that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done
away. " But natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with
beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural
knowledge and love cease.

Objection 2: Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But
the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels.
Therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love
to remain.

Objection 3: Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts,
as the same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points.
But the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified
knowledge and love; for, as is said Ethic. i, 8, happiness consists not
in habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge
and love in the angels.

On the contrary, So long as a nature endures, its operation remains.
But beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its perfection.
Therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and love.

I answer that, Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For as
principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations
themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to
second; because beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must
ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved
in beatitude: and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved in
the act of beatitude.

Reply to Objection 1: The advent of a perfection removes the opposite
imperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the
perfection of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the
power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken
away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In
the same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to
the perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing hinders us from
knowing a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at the
one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative one. In
like manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this appertains
to his knowledge of glory; and at the same time he can know God by his
own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.

Reply to Objection 2: All things which make up beatitude are sufficient
of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the
natural gifts; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the
uncreated beatitude.

Reply to Objection 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty
at the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural
knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory.
Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from
existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.
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Whether a beatified angel can sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as was
said above [550](A[7]), beatitude does not do away with nature. But it
is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a
beatified angel can sin.

Objection 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as
the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the
angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is
inclined towards good and evil.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to
be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not lessened
in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that "there is in the
holy angels that nature which cannot sin. " Therefore the holy angels
cannot sin.

I answer that, The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is,
because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence.
Now, God's essence is the very essence of goodness. Consequently the
angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same way as anyone
else not seeing God is to the common form of goodness. Now it is
impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming
at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as
such. Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as
aiming towards God. Now whoever wills or acts in this manner cannot
sin. Consequently the beatified angel cannot sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Created good, considered in itself, can fail. But
from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union of
beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason already
alleged.

Reply to Objection 2: The rational powers are referred to opposites in
the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the
things whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred to
opposites. For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known
principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good,
formally as good; because the will is naturally ordained to good as to
its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is referred to
opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have no
tendency to opposites with regard to God Himself, Whom they see to be
the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards
God, which ever alternative they choose, that is not sinful.

Reply to Objection 3: Free-will in its choice of means to an end is
disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident
that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to
different conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to
proceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the
principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the perfection
of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite
things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the
defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the
order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of
will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can
sin.
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Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in
beatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is perfect
charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can merit. Now,
as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases. Therefore the
beatified angels can progress in beatitude.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that "God
makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same
thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations";
since "they are all [*Vulg. : 'Are they not all . . . ? '] ministering
spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of
salvation" (Heb. 1:14). This would not be for their profit were they
not to merit thereby, nor to advance to beatitude. It remains, then,
that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance in beatitude.

Objection 3: Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying
the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not in
the highest degree of beatitude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher,
it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them; which is
not admissible.

On the contrary, Merit and progress belong to this present condition of
life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beatitude, they
are already in possession of beatitude. Consequently the beatified
angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude.

I answer that, In every movement the mover's intention is centered upon
one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable subject;
because intention looks to the end, to which infinite progress is
repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature cannot of its
own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in the vision of God,
as is clear from what has gone before ([551]Q[12], A[4]), that it needs
to be moved by God towards its beatitude. Therefore there must be some
one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to
its last end.

Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist
precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all
the blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of
vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of Him
Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the rational
creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it should be
led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which is
comprehension, for this belongs to God only; as is evident from what
was said above ([552]Q[12], A[7]; [553]Q[14], A[3]). But since infinite
efficacy is required for comprehending God, while the creature's
efficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite being is
in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pass that
the rational creature understands God more or less clearly according to
infinite degrees.
And as beatitude consists in vision, so the degree of
vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision.

Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its
beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought even to a
determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is once
secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.

Reply to Objection 1: Merit belongs to a subject which is moving
towards its end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end,
not merely passively, but also by working actively. If the end is
within the power of the rational creature, then its action is said to
procure the end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the
end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another, then the
action will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the
ultimate term is not said to be moved, but to have been moved.
Consequently, to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life;
whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward.
Even as in acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is
productive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is
both perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect charity
has no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the
reward.

Reply to Objection 2: A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First
of all, as being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beatitude is
useful. Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall for
a house. In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the
beatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; for
to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what is
perfect, considered as perfect.

Reply to Objection 3: Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in
the highest degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the
highest degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the
joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of such
as are saved by their ministrations, according to Lk. 15:10: "There is
[Vulg. 'shall be'] joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing
penance. " Such joy belongs to their accidental reward, which can be
increased unto judgment day. Hence some writers say that they can merit
as to their accidental reward. But it is better to say that the Blessed
can in no wise merit without being at the same time a wayfarer and a
comprehensor; like Christ, Who alone was such. For the Blessed acquire
such joy from the virtue of their beatitude, rather than merit it.
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THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN (NINE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of all
with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as to the evil of
punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for
consideration:

(1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?

(2) What kind of sins can be in them?

(3) What did the angel seek in sinning?

(4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are
any of them naturally evil?

(5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in
the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will?

(6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his
creation and fall?

(7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the
angels?

(8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning?

(9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?
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Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the
angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in
potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19),
because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the
angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms.
Therefore there can be no evil in them.

Objection 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies.
But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies.
Therefore neither can there by in the angels.

Objection 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But
it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love
towards God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in
loving God they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.

Objection 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently
good. Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a
true good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at
least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it
truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good.
Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.

On the contrary, It is said (Job 4:18): "In His angels He found
wickedness. "

I answer that, An angel or any other rational creature considered in
his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to
sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the
condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing
else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have;
whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the
rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of
rectitude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he
could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but if the rightness
of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving may be right
or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God's act, because
it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will has
rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the Divine
will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every desire of a
subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior; for
instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of his commanding
officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas
there can be sin in the will of every creature; considering the
condition of its nature.

Reply to Objection 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural
existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as
regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this
respect there can be evil in them.

Reply to Objection 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural
operation. Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their
nature; so neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural
action. But besides their natural action there is the action of
free-will in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.

Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the
movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural
being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural
beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away by
sinning.

Reply to Objection 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of
free-will. First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by
choosing adultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of
ignorance or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as
good. The adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an
inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the
inclination of passion or of habit; even though he does not err in his
universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect. In
this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there are no
passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest
from what has been said above ([554]Q[59], A[4]); nor, again, could any
habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin
comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not
according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces
sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated,
but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to pray,
without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin does
not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of the
things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned, by
seeking his own good, from his own free-will, insubordinately to the
rule of the Divine will.
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Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels
besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any
kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even
in the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.

Objection 2: Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are
sloth, avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the
spirit, just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can
there be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.

Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices
spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is
granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and envy
in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other vices in
them.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil "is
not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort; yet he
is proud and envious. "

I answer that, Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all by
actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are in
the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all
sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in the demons which
can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be
affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by such as
are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is affected
except with regard to something which is in some way suited to its
nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good of the
spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the superior be
not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride---not to be subject to a
superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first sin of the
angel can be none other than pride.

Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them,
since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on
its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines
over the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his neighbor's
good to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good could not be
deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked angel, except
inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which would cease to be
singular because of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin of
pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel, whereby he
grieved over man's good, and also over the Divine excellence, according
as against the devil's will God makes use of man for the Divine glory.

Reply to Objection 1: The demons do not delight in the obscenities of
the sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal
pleasures: it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all
sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man's good.

Reply to Objection 2: Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is
the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of
human life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these
demons are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal
pleasures. Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them.
But if every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed
avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in
the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence;
consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth is
a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual
exercises because they weary the body; which does not apply to the
demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual
sins which can be found in demons; yet so that envy is not to be taken
for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another.

Reply to Objection 3: Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are
comprised all other sins derived from them.
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Whether the devil desired to be as God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God.
For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under desire;
because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether
sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such
desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall under
apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the finite
equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an
angel could not desire to be as God.

Objection 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without
sin. But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature
naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by
equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin.

Objection 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of
wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being
the equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only
things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation.
Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.

On the contrary, It is said, in the person of the devil (Is. 14:13,14),
"I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most High. " And
Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being "inflated with
pride, he wished to be called God. "

I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God.
But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; secondly,
by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way; because
by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible: and there was no
habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his
mind, so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in
some particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And even supposing
it were possible, it would be against the natural desire; because there
exists in everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature;
which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature.
Consequently, no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of
a higher nature; just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were
it to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the
imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think that, because a
man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can
increase without the destruction of the subject, he can also seek a
higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to
exist. Now it is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not
merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel,
another. Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to
desire equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with
God.

To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In
one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened
unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he
commits no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper order,
that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he
to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and
not of God's power. In another way one may desire to be like unto God
in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were to desire
to create heaven and earth, which is proper to God; in which desire
there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as
God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to no one
else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own 'not-being'; since
no creature can exist except by holding its existence under God. But he
desired resemblance with God in this respect---by desiring, as his last
end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his
own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude,
which is attained by God's grace. Or, if he desired as his last end
that likeness of God which is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it
by the power of his own nature; and not from Divine assistance
according to God's ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who
says [*De casu diaboli, iv. ] that "he sought that to which he would
have come had he stood fast. " These two views in a manner coincide;
because according to both, he sought to have final beatitude of his own
power, whereas this is proper to God alone.

Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of
another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have
dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto
God.

From this we have the answer to all the objections.
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Whether any demons are naturally wicked?

Objection 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For
Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There is a
class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the
souls of the dead. " But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some
demons are naturally wicked.

Objection 2: Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But
some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Wis. 12:10): "Their
malice is natural. " Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked.

Objection 3: Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions
by nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally
rapacious; yet they are God's creatures. Therefore, although the demons
are God's creatures, they may be naturally wicked.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the demons are not
naturally wicked. "

I answer that, Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a
particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it comes
from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to its
principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil connected
with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes
other things: but with the universal good no evil can be connected. If,
then, there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some
particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil; not as evil, but
accidentally, as connected with some good. But if anything of its
nature be inclined to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot
be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature
is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend and which
is the object of the will. Hence, since the demons are intellectual
substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any
evil whatsoever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the
demons are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not
naturally so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held
that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are
animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined
towards some particular good, with which evil may be connected. In this
way, then, it can have a natural inclination to evil; yet only
accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good.

Reply to Objection 2: The malice of some men can be called natural,
either because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the
natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some
inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or
lustful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their
sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain
evils are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural
inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit.
Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to
him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes
(De Div. Nom. iv).
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Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first
instant of his creation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of
his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of
the devil (Jn. 8:44): "He was a murderer from the beginning. "

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the
lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of
time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad lit.
ii, 8), the "heaven," which is said to have been created in the
beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed:
and when it is said that God said: "Be light made: and light was made,"
we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning to the
Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light was
made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light was made,
it was made distinct from "darkness," whereby the angels who sinned are
denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation some of the
angels were made blessed, and some sinned.

Objection 3: Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual
nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of
Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could
sin in the first instant of their creation.

Objection 4: Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the
corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in
the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards in
the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have
his operation in the first instant of his creation.