No More Learning

Even Heraclitus did an injustice to the senses.
The latter lie neither as the Eleatics believed them
to lie, nor as he believed them to lie,—they do not
lie at all. The interpretations we give to their evi-
dence is what first introduces falsehood into it; for
instance the lie of unity, the lie of matter, of sub-
stance and of permanence. Reason is the cause of
our falsifying the evidence of the senses. In so far
as the senses show us a state of Becoming, of tran-
siency, and of change, they do not lie. But in de-
claring that Being was an empty illusion, Heraclitus
will remain eternally right. The “apparent” world
is the only world: the “true world” is no more than
a false adjunct thereto.


## p. 19 (#39) ##############################################

"REASON” IN PHILOSOPHY
19
3
And what delicate instruments of observation we
have in our senses! This human nose, for instance,
of which no philosopher has yet spoken with rever-
ence and gratitude, is, for the present, the most finely
adjusted instrument at our disposal : it is able to
register even such slight changes of movement as
the spectroscope would be unable to record. Our
scientific triumphs at the present day extend pre-
cisely so far as we have accepted the evidence of
our senses,—as we have sharpened and armed them,
and learned to follow them up to the end. What
remains is abortive and not yet science—that is to
say, metaphysics, theology, psychology, epistem-
ology, or formal science, or a doctrine of symbols,
like logic and its applied form mathematics. In all
these things reality does not come into consideration
at all, even as a problem ; just as little as does the
question concerning the general value of such a
convention of symbols as logic.
»
4
The other idiosyncrasy of philosophers is no less
dangerous; it consists in confusing the last and the
first things. They place that which makes its appear-
ance last-unfortunately! for it ought not to appear
at all. ! —the “highest concept,” that is to say, the
most general, the emptiest, the last cloudy streak of
evaporating reality, at the beginning as the begin-
ning. This again is only their manner of expressing
their veneration : the highest thing must not have
grown out of the lowest, it must not have grown at
all. . . . Moral: everything of the first rank must be


## p. 20 (#40) ##############################################

20
THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
causa sui. To have been derived from something
else, is as good as an objection, it sets the value of a
thing in question. All superior values are of the first
rank, all the highest concepts—that of Being, of the
Absolute, of Goodness, of Truth, and of Perfection;
all these things cannot have been evolved, they must
therefore be causa sui. All these things cannot how-
ever be unlike one another, they cannot be opposed
to one another. Thus they attain to their stupend-
ous concept “God. ” The last, most attenuated and
emptiest thing is postulated as the first thing, as the
absolute cause, as ens realissimum. Fancy humanity
having to take the brain diseases of morbid cobweb-
spinners seriously! —And it has paid dearly for
having done so.
5
-Against this let us set the different manner in
which we (-you observe that I am courteous enough
to say “we”) conceive the problem of the error and
deceptiveness of things. Formerly people regarded
change and evolution in general as the proof of
appearance, as a sign of the fact that something
must be there that leads us astray. To-day, on the
other hand, we realise that precisely as far as the
rational bias forces us to postulate unity, identity,
permanence, substance, cause, materiality and being,
we are in a measure involved in error, driven
necessarily to error; however certain we may feel,
as the result of a strict examination of the matter,
that the error lies here. It is just the same here as
with the motion of the sun: In its case it was our
eyes that were wrong; in the matter of the concepts
above mentioned it is our language itself that pleads


## p. 21 (#41) ##############################################

“REASON” IN PHILOSOPHY
21
most constantly in their favour.
In its origin
language belongs to an age of the most rudimentary
forms of psychology: if we try to conceive of the
first conditions of the metaphysics of language, i. e. ,
in plain English, of reason, we immediately find
ourselves in the midst of a system of fetichism.
For here, the doer and his deed are seen in all cir-
cumstances, will is believed in as a cause in general ;
the ego is taken for granted, the ego as Being, and
as substance, and the faith in the ego as substance
is projected into all things—in this way, alone, the
concept "thing” is created. Being is thought into
and insinuated into everything as cause ; from the
concept “ego,” alone, can the concept“ Being” pro-
ceed. At the beginning stands the tremendously
fatal error of supposing the will to be something
that actuates,-a faculty. Now we know that it
is only a word. * Very much later, in a world a
thousand times more enlightened, the assurance, the
subjective certitude, in the handling of the categories
of reason came into the minds of philosophers as a
surprise. They concluded that these categories could
not be derived from experience,-on the contrary,
the whole of experience rather contradicts them.
Whence do they come therefore ? In India, as in
Greece, the same mistake was made: “we must
already once have lived in a higher world (/instead
of in a much lower one, which would have been the
truth! ), we must have been divine, for we possess
Nietzsche here refers to the concept “free will ” of the
Christians; this does not mean that there is no such thing
as will—that is to say a powerful determining force from
within. -TR.
"


## p. 22 (#42) ##############################################

22
THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
reason! ”. . . Nothing indeed has exercised a more
simple power of persuasion hitherto than the error
of Being, as it was formulated by the Eleatics for
instance: in its favour are every word and every
sentence that we utter ! -Even the opponents of
the Eleatics succumbed to the seductive powers
of their concept of Being. Among others there
was Democritus in his discovery of the atom.
Reason” in language ! -oh what a deceptive old
witch it has been! I fear we shall never be rid of
God, so long as we still believe in grammar.
6
People will feel grateful to me if I condense a
point of view, which is at once so important and so
new, into four theses : by this means I shall facilitate
comprehension, and shall likewise challenge con-
tradiction.
Proposition One. The reasons upon which the
apparent nature of “this” world have been based,
rather tend to prove its reality,—any other kind of
reality defies demonstration.
Proposition Two. The characteristics with which
man has endowed the “true Being” of things, are
the characteristics of non-Being, of nonentity. The
“true world” has been erected upon a contradiction
of the real world; and it is indeed an apparent world,
seeing that it is merely a moralo-optical delusion.
Proposition Three. There is no sense in spinning
yarns about another world, provided, of course, that
we do not possess a mighty instinct which urges us
to slander, belittle, and cast suspicion upon this life :
in this case we should be avenging ourselves on


## p. 23 (#43) ##############################################

"REASON” IN PHILOSOPHY
23
this life with the phantasmagoria of “another,” of a
“ better” life.
Proposition Four. To divide the world into a
"true" and an “apparent” world, whether after the
manner of Christianity or of Kant (after all a
Christian in disguise), is only a sign of decadence,
-a symptom of degenerating life. The fact that
the artist esteems the appearance of a thing higher
than reality, is no objection to this statement. For
“appearance" signifies once more reality here, but
in a selected, strengthened and corrected form. The
tragic artist is no pessimist,—he says Yea to every-
thing questionable and terrible, he is Dionysian.
-


## p. 24 (#44) ##############################################

HOW THE “TRUE WORLD” ULTI-
MATELY BECAME A FABLE
-
THE HISTORY OF AN ERROR
1. THE true world, attainable to the sage, the pious
man and the man of virtue,-he lives in it, he is it.
(The most ancient form of the idea was
relatively clever, simple, convincing. It was
a paraphrase of the proposition “I, Plato, am
the truth. ")
2. The true world which is unattainable for the
moment, is promised to the sage, to the pious man
and to the man of virtue (“to the sinner who
repents”).
(Progress of the idea : it becomes more
subtle, more insidious, more evasive,--it be-
comes a woman, it becomes Christian. )
3. The true world is unattainable, it cannot be
proved, it cannot promise anything; but even as a
thought, alone, it is a comfort, an obligation, a com-
mand.
(At bottom this is still the old sun; but
seen through mist and scepticism : the idea
has become sublime, pale, northern, Königs-
bergian. *)
* Kant was a native of Königsberg and lived there all his
life. Did Nietzsche know that Kant was simply a Scotch
Puritan, whose family had settled in Germany?
24


## p. 25 (#45) ##############################################

HOW THE “TRUE WORLD" BECAME A FABLE 25
4. The true world—is it unattainable? At all
events it is unattained. And as unattained it is
also unknown. Consequently it no longer comforts,
nor saves, nor constrains: what could something
unknown constrain us to?
(The grey of dawn. Reason stretches itself
and yawns for the first time. The cock-crow
of positivism. )
5. The “true world” -an idea that no longer
serves any purpose, that no longer constrains one to
anything,—a useless idea that has become quite
superfluous, consequently an exploded idea: let us
abolish it!
(Bright daylight; breakfast; the return
of common sense and of cheerfulness; Plato
blushes for shame and all free-spirits kick
up a shindy. )
6. We have suppressed the true world: what
world survives? the apparent world perhaps ?
Certainly not! In abolishing the true world we have
also abolished the world of appearance !
(Noon; the moment of the shortest
shadows; the end of the longest error; man-
kind's zenith; Incipit Zarathustra. )


## p. 26 (#46) ##############################################

MORALITY AS THE ENEMY OF
NATURE
I
-
THERE is a time when all passions are simply fatal
in their action, when they wreck their victims with
the weight of their folly,—and there is a later period,
a very much later period, when they marry with the
a
,
spirit, when they “spiritualise” themselves. For-
merly, owing to the stupidity inherent in passion, men
waged war against passion itself: men pledged them-
selves to annihilate it,-all ancient moral-mongers
were unanimous on this point, “il faut tuer les
,
passions. ” The most famous formula for this stands
in the New Testament, in that Sermon on the Mount,
where, let it be said incidentally, things are by no
means regarded from a height. It is said there, for
instance, with an application to sexuality: “if thy eye
offend thee, pluck it out”: fortunately no Christian
acts in obedience to this precept. To annihilate
the passions and desires, simply on account of their
stupidity, and to obviate the unpleasant conse-
quences of their stupidity, seems to us to-day merely
an aggravated form of stupidity. We no longer
admire those dentists who extract teeth simply in
order that they may not ache again. On the other
.
hand, it will be admitted with some reason, that on
the soil from which Christianity grew, the idea of
26


## p. 27 (#47) ##############################################

MORALITY AS THE ENEMY OF NATURE 27
3)
C
the “spiritualisation of passion” could not possibly
have been conceived. The early Church, as every-
one knows, certainly did wage war against the “in-
telligent,” in favour of the “poor in spirit. ” In these
circumstances how could the passions be combated
intelligently? The Church combats passion by means
of excision of all kinds : its practice, its“ remedy," is
castration. It never inquires “how can a desire be
spiritualised, beautified, deified ? ”—In all ages it has
laid the weight of discipline in the process of extir-
pation (the extirpation of sensuality, pride, lust of
dominion, lust of property, and revenge). —But to
attack the passions at their roots, means attacking
life itself at its source: the method of the Church is
hostile to life.
2
The same means, castration and extirpation, are
instinctively chosen for waging war against a passion,
by those who are too weak of will, too degenerate, to
impose some sort of moderation upon it; by those
natures who, to speak in metaphor (and without
metaphor), need la Trappe, or some kind of ultima-
tum of war, a gulf set between themselves and a
passion. Only degenerates find radical methods
indispensable: weakness of will, or more strictly
speaking, the inability not to react to a stimulus, is
in itself simply another form of degeneracy. Radi-
cal and mortal hostility to sensuality, remains a
suspicious symptom: it justifies one in being sus-
picious of the general state of one who goes to such
extremes. Moreover, that hostility and hatred
reach their height only when such natures no longer
possess enough strength of character to adopt the


## p. 28 (#48) ##############################################

28
THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
radical remedy, to renounce their inner “Satan. "
Look at the whole history of the priests, the philo-
sophers, and the artists as well: the most poisonous
diatribes against the senses have not been said by
the impotent, nor by the ascetics; but by those im-
possible ascetics, by those who found it necessary
to be ascetics.
3
The spiritualisation of sensuality is called love :
it is a great triumph over Christianity. Another
triumph is our spiritualisation of hostility. It con-
sists in the fact that we are beginning to realise very
profoundly the value of having enemies : in short
that with them we are forced to do and to conclude
precisely the reverse of what we previously did and
concluded. In all ages the Church wished to anni-
hilate its enemies : we, the immoralists and Anti-
christs, see our advantage in the survival of the
Church. Even in political life, hostility has now be-
come more spiritual,—much more cautious, much
more thoughtful, and much more moderate. Almost
every party sees its self-preservative interests in pre-
venting the Opposition from going to pieces; and
the same applies to politics on a grand scale. A
new creation, more particularly, like the new Empire,
has more need of enemies than friends : only as a
contrast does it begin to feel necessary, only as a
contrast does it become necessary. And we behave
in precisely the same way to the winner enemy”:
in this quarter too we have spiritualised enmity, in
this quarter too we have understood its value. А
man is productive only in so far as he is rich in
contrasted instincts ; he can remain young only on


## p. 29 (#49) ##############################################

MORALITY AS THE ENEMY OF NATURE
29
-
a
condition that his soul does not begin to take things
easy and to yearn for peace. Nothing has grown
more alien to us than that old desire—the "peace of
the soul,” which is the aim of Christianity. Nothing
could make us less envious than the moral cow and
the plump happiness of a clean conscience. The
man who has renounced war has renounced a grand
life. In many cases, of course,“ peace of the soul”
is merely a misunderstanding,—it is something very
different which has failed to find a more honest name
for itself. Without either circumlocution or prejudice
I will suggest a few cases. “Peace of the soul”
may for instance be the sweet effulgence of rich
animality in the realm of morality (or religion). Or
the first presage of weariness, the first shadow that
evening, every kind of evening, is wont to cast. Or
a sign that the air is moist, and that winds are blow-
ing up from the south. Or unconscious gratitude for
a good digestion (sometimes called “brotherly love").
Or the serenity of the convalescent, on whose lips all
things have a new taste, and who bides his time. Or
the condition which follows upon a thorough grati-
fication of our strongest passion, the well-being of
unaccustomed satiety. Or the senility of our will,
of our desires, and of our vices. Or laziness, coaxed
by vanity into togging itself out in a moral garb.
Or the ending of a state of long suspense and of
agonising uncertainty, by a state of certainty, of even
terrible certainty. Or the expression or ripeness and
mastery in the midst of a task, of a creative work,
of a production, of a thing willed, the calm breathing
that denotes that "freedom of will” has been attained.


## p. 30 (#50) ##############################################

30
THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
Who knows ? -maybe The Twilight of the Idols
is only a sort of “peace of the soul. ”
-
-
4
I will formulate a principle. All naturalism in
morality—that is to say, every sound morality is
ruled by a life instinct,—any one of the laws of life
is fulfilled by the definite canon “thou shalt,” “ thou
shalt not,” and any sort of obstacle or hostile element
in the road of life is thus cleared away. Conversely,
the morality which is antagonistic to nature—that
is to say, almost every morality that has been taught,
honoured and preached hitherto, is directed precisely
against the life-instincts,—it is a condemnation, now
secret, now blatant and impudent, of these very
instincts. Inasmuch as it says “God sees into the
heart of man,” it says Nay to the profoundest and
most superior desires of life and takes God as the
enemy of life.
The saint in whom God is well
pleased, is the ideal eunuch. Life terminates where
the “Kingdom of God” begins.
»
5
Admitting that you have understood the villainy
of such a mutiny against life as that which has be-
come almost sacrosanct in Christian morality, you
have fortunately understood something besides; and
that is the futility, the fictitiousness, the absurdity
and the falseness of such a mutiny. For the con-
demnation of life by a living creature is after all but
the symptom of a definite kind of life: the question
as to whether the condemnation is justified or the
reverse is not even raised. In order even to approach
✔ the problem of the value of life, a man would need


## p. 31 (#51) ##############################################

MORALITY AS THE ENEMY OF NATURE 31
to be placed outside life, and moreover know it as
well as one, as many, as all in fact, who have lived
it. These are reasons enough to prove to us that
this problem is an inaccessible one to us. When we
speak of values, we speak under the inspiration, and
through the optics of life: life itself urges us to
determine values : life itself values through us when
we determine values. From which it follows that
even that morality which is antagonistic to life, and
which conceives God as the opposite and the con-
demnation of life, is only a valuation of life-of
what life? of what kind of life? But I have already
answered this question : it is the valuation of declin-
ing, of enfeebled, of exhausted and of condemned
life. Morality, as it has been understood hitherto
-as it was finally formulated by Schopenhauer in
the words “The Denial of the Will to Life,” is the
instinct of degeneration itself, which converts itself
into an imperative: it says: “Perish ! ” It is the
death sentence of men who are already doomed.
6
a
Let us at last consider how exceedingly simple it
is on our part to say : “Man should be thus and
thus ! ” Reality shows us a marvellous wealth of
types, and a luxuriant variety of forms and changes :
and yet the first wretch of a moral loafer that comes
along cries “No! Man should be different! " He
even knows what man should be like, does this sancti-
monious prig: he draws his own face on the wall and
declares : 'ecce homo ! ” But even when the moralist
addresses himself only to the individual and says
“thus and thus shouldst thou be! ” he still makes


## p. 32 (#52) ##############################################

32
THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
an ass of himself. The individual in his past and
future is a piece of fate, one law the more, one neces-
sity the more for all that is to come and is to be.
To say to him “change thyself,” is tantamount to
saying that everything should change, even back-
wards as well. Truly these have been consistent
moralists, they wished man to be different, i. e. , virtu-
ous; they wished him to be after their own image,
that is to say sanctimonious humbugs. And to this
end they denied the world! No slight form of in-
sanity! No modest form of immodesty! Morality,
in so far it condemns per se, and not out of any
aim, consideration or motive of life, is a specific
error, for which no one should feel any mercy, a de-
generate idiosyncrasy, that has done an unutterable
amount of harm. We others, we immoralists, on the
contrary, have opened our hearts wide to all kinds
of comprehension, understanding and approbation. *
We do not deny readily, we glory in saying yea to
things. Our
eyes have opened ever wider and wider
to that economy which still employs and knows how
to use to its own advantage all that which the sacred
craziness of priests and the morbid reason in priests,
rejects; to that economy in the law of life which
draws its own advantage even out of the repulsive
race of bigots, the priests and the virtuous,—what
advantage? —But we ourselves, we immoralists, are
the reply to this question.
* Cf. Spinoza, who says in the Tractatus politicus (1677),
Chap. I, § 4: “Sedulo curavi, humanas actiones non ridere,
non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere” (“I have carefully
endeavoured not to deride, or deplore, or detest human ac-
tions, but to understand them. ”). - TR.


## p. 33 (#53) ##############################################

THE FOUR GREAT ERRORS
I
))
The error of the confusion of cause and effect. -
There is no more dangerous error than to confound
the effect with the cause : I call this error the in-
trinsic perversion of reason.
Nevertheless this error
is one of the most ancient and most recent habits of
mankind. In one part of the world it has even been
canonised; and it bears the name of “Religion”
and “Morality. ” Every postulate formulated by
religion and morality contains it. Priests and the
promulgators of moral laws are the promoters of this
perversion of reason. —Let me give you an example.
Everybody knows the book of the famous Cornaro,
in which he recommends his slender diet as the recipe
for a long, happy and also virtuous life. Few books
have been so widely read, and to this day many
thousand copies of it are still printed annually in
England. I do not doubt that there is scarcely a
single book (the Bible of course excepted) that has
worked more mischief, shortened more lives, than
this well-meant curiosity. The reason of this is the
confusion of effect and cause. This worthy Italian
saw the cause of his long life in his diet : whereas
the prerequisites of long life, which are exceptional
slowness of molecular change, and a low rate of ex-
penditure in energy, were the cause of his meagre
3
33


## p. 34 (#54) ##############################################

34
THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
diet. He was not at liberty to eat a small or a great
amount. His frugality was not the result of free
choice, he would have been ill had he eaten more.
He who does not happen to be a carp, however, is
not only wise to eat well, but is also compelled to
do so. A scholar of the present day, with his rapid
consumption of nervous energy, would soon go to
the dogs on Cornaro's diet. Crede experto.
2
.
The most general principle lying at the root of
every religion and morality, is this: “Do this and
that and avoid this and that—and thou wilt be
happy. Otherwise-” Every morality and every
religion is this Imperative-I call it the great ori-
ginal sin of reason,-immortal unreason. In my
mouth this principle is converted into its opposite-
first example of my“ Transvaluation of all Values”:
a well-constituted man, a man who is one of
“Nature's lucky strokes," must perform certain
actions and instinctively fear other actions; he intro-
duces the element of order, of which he is the physi-
ological manifestation, into his relations with men
and things. In a formula : his virtue is the conse-
quence of his good constitution. Longevity and
plentiful offspring are not the reward of virtue, virtue
itself is on the contrary that retardation of the meta-
bolic process which, among other things, results in
a long life and in plentiful offspring, in short in
Cornarism. The Church and morality say: “A race,
a people perish through vice and luxury. " My re-
instated reason says: when a people are going to


## p. 35 (#55) ##############################################

THE FOUR GREAT ERRORS
35
the dogs, when they are degenerating physiologi-
cally, vice and luxury (that is to say, the need of ever
stronger and more frequent stimuli such as all ex-
hausted natures are acquainted with) are bound to
result. Such and such a young man grows pale and
withered prematurely. His friends say this or that
illness is the cause of it. I say: the fact that he be-
came ill, the fact that he did not resist illness, was
in itself already the outcome of impoverished life, of
hereditary exhaustion. The newspaper reader says:
such and such a party by committing such an error
will meet its death. My superior politics say: a
party that can make such mistakes, is in its last
agony-it no longer possesses any certainty of in-
stinct. Every mistake is in every sense the sequel
to degeneration of the instincts, to disintegration
of the will. This is almost the definition of evil,
Everything valuable is instinct-and consequently
easy, necessary, free. Exertion is an objection,
the god is characteristically different from the hero
(in my language: light feet are the first attribute
of divinity).
3
The error of false causality. In all ages men have
believed that they knew what a cause was: but
whence did we derive this knowledge, or more ac-
curately, this faith in the fact that we know? Out
of the realm of the famous “inner facts of conscious-
ness,” not one of which has yet proved itself to be
a fact. We believed ourselves to be causes even in
the action of the will; we thought that in this matter
at least we caught causality red-handed. No one


## p. 36 (#56) ##############################################

36
THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
-
doubted that all the antecedentia of an action were to
be sought in consciousness, and could be discovered
there — as “motive" -- if only they were sought.
Otherwise we should not be free to perform them,
we should not have been responsible for them. Fin-
ally who would have questioned that a thought is
caused ? that the ego causes the thought? Of these
three “facts of inner consciousness” by means of
which causality seemed to be guaranteed, the first
and most convincing is that of the will as cause; the
conception of consciousness (“spirit") as a cause,
and subsequently that of the ego (the “subject")
as a cause, were merely born afterwards, once the
causality of the will stood established as "given,” as
a fact of experience. Meanwhile we have come to
our senses. To-day we no longer believe a word
of all this. The “inner world” is full of phantoms
and will-o'-the-wisps : the will is one of these. The
will no longer actuates, consequently it no longer
explains anything—all it does is to accompany
processes; it may even be absent. The so-called
“motive" is another error. It is merely a ripple on
the surface of consciousness, a side issue of the action,
which is much more likely to conceal than to reveal
the antecedentia of the latter. And as for the ego! It
has become legendary, fictional, a play upon words:
it has ceased utterly and completely from thinking,
feeling, and willing! What is the result of it all ?
There are no such things as spiritual causes. The
whole of popular experience on this subject went
to the devil! That is the result of it all. For we
had blissfully abused that experience, we had built
the world upon it as a world of causes, as a world


## p. 37 (#57) ##############################################

THE FOUR GREAT ERRORS
37
of will, as a world of spirit. The most antiquated
and most traditional psychology has been at work
here, it has done nothing else: all phenomena were
deeds in the light of this psychology, and all deeds
were the result of will; according to it the world was
a complex mechanism of agents, an agent (a “sub-
ject") lay at the root of all things. Man projected
his three "inner facts of consciousness,” the will, the
spirit, and the ego in which he believed most firmly,
outside himself. He first deduced the concepi Be-
ing out of the concept Ego, he supposed "things” to
exist as he did himself, according to his notion oí
the ego as cause. Was it to be wondered at that
later on he always found in things only that which
he had laid in them? —The thing itself, I repeat, the
I
concept thing was merely a reflex of the belief in
the ego as cause. And even your atom, my dear
good Mechanists and Physicists, what an amount
of error, of rudimentary psychology still adheres to
it! -Not to speak of the “thing-in-itself," of the
horrendum pudendum of the metaphysicians! The
error of spirit regarded as a cause, confounded with
reality! And made the measure of reality! And
called God!
-
4
The Error of imaginary Causes. Starting out
from dreamland, we find that to any definite sensa-
tion, like that produced by a distant cannon shot
for instance, we are wont to ascribe a cause after the
fact (very often quite a little romance in which the
dreamer himself is, of course, the hero). Meanwhile
the sensation becomes protracted like a sort of con-


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38
THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
tinuous echo, until, as it were, the instinct of causality
allows it to come to the front rank, no longer however
as a chance occurrence, but as a thing which has
some meaning. The cannon shot presents itself in
a causal manner, by means of an apparent reversal
in the order of time. That which occurs last, the
motivation, is experienced first, often with a hundred
details which flash past like lightning, and the
shot is the result. What has happened? The ideas
suggested by a particular state of our senses, are mis-
interpreted as the cause of that state. As a matter
of fact we proceed in precisely the same manner
when we are awake. The greater number of our
general sensations—every kind of obstacle, pressure,
tension, explosion in the interplay of the organs, and
more particularly the condition of the nervus sym-
pathicus-stimulate our instinct of causality: we will
have a reason which will account for our feeling thus
or thus,- for feeling ill or well. We are never satis-
fied by merely ascertaining the fact that we feel thus
or thus : we admit this fact-we become conscious
of it-only when we have attributed it to some kind
of motivation. Memory, which, in such circum-
stances unconsciously becomes active, adduces for-
mer conditions of a like kind, together with the causal
interpretations with which they are associated,-but
not their real cause. The belief that the ideas, the
accompanying processes of consciousness, have been
the causes, is certainly produced by the agency of
memory. And in this way we become accustomed
to a particular interpretation of causes which, truth
to tell, actually hinders and even utterly prevents
the investigation of the proper cause.


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THE FOUR GREAT ERRORS
39
C
5
The Psychological Explanation of the above Fact.
To trace something unfamiliar back to something
familiar, is at once a relief, a comfort and a satisfac-
tion, while it also produces a feeling of power. The
unfamiliar involves danger, anxiety and care,—the
fundamental instinct is to get rid of these painful
circumstances. First principle: any explanation is
better than none at all. Since, at bottom, it is only
a question of shaking one's self free from certain
oppressive ideas, the means employed to this end
are not selected with overmuch punctiliousness :
the first idea by means of which the unfamiliar is
revealed as familiar, produces a feeling of such com-
fort that it is “held to be true. ” The proof of happi-
ness (“ of power") as the criterion of truth. The
instinct of causality is therefore conditioned and
stimulated by the feeling of fear. Whenever possible,
the question "why? " should not only educe the cause
as cause, but rather a certain kind of cause-a com-
forting, liberating and reassuring cause.
The first
result of this need is that something known or already
experienced, and recorded in the memory, is posited
as the cause. The new factor, that which has not
been experienced and which isunfamiliar, is excluded
from the sphere of causes. Not only do we try to
find a certain kind of explanation as the cause, but
those kinds of explanations are selected and preferred
which dissipate most rapidly the sensation of strange-
ness, novelty and unfamiliarity,-in fact the most
ordinary explanations. And the result is that a
certain manner of postulating causes tends to pre-
dominate ever more and more, becomes concentrated


## p. 40 (#60) ##############################################

40
THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
1
into a system, and finally reigns supreme, to the
complete exclusion of all other causes and explana-
tions. The banker thinks immediately of business,
the Christian of "sin," and the girl of her love affair.
6
The whole Domain of Morality and Religion may
be classified under the Rubric“ Imaginary Causes. ”
The "explanation" of general unpleasant sensa-
tions. These sensations are dependent upon certain
creatures who are hostile to us (evil spirits : the most
famous example of this—the mistaking of hysterical
women for witches). These sensations are depen-
dent
upon
actions which are reprehensible (the feel-
ing of “sin,” “ sinfulness" is a manner of accounting
for a certain physiological disorder—people always
find reasons for being dissatisfied with themselves).
These sensations depend upon punishment, upon
compensation for something which we ought not to
have done, which we ought not to have been (this idea
was generalised in a more impudent form by Schopen-
hauer, into that principle in which morality appears
in its real colours,—that is to say, as a veritable
poisoner and slanderer of life: “all great suffering,
whether mental or physical, reveals what we deserve:
for it could not visit us if we did not deserve it,"
“ The World as Will and Idea,” vol. 2, p. 666).
These sensations are the outcome of ill-considered
actions, having evil consequences, (the passions,
the senses, postulated as causes, as guilty. By means
of other calamities distressing physiological condi-
tions are interpreted as “merited”). —The “explana-
tion" of pleasant sensations. These sensations are
9)
-
1


## p. 41 (#61) ##############################################

THE FOUR GREAT ERRORS
41
»
dependent upon a trust in God. They may depend
upon our consciousness of having done one or two
good actions (a so-called “good conscience” is a
physiological condition, which may be the outcome
of good digestion). They may depend upon the
happy issue of certain undertakings (-an ingenuous
mistake: the happy issue of an undertaking certainly
does not give a hypochondriac or a Pascal any
general sensation of pleasure). They may depend
upon faith, love and hope,--the Christian virtues.
As a matter of fact all these pretended explanations
are but the results of certain states, and as it were
translations of feelings of pleasure and pain into a
false dialect: a man is in a condition of hopefulness
because the dominant physiological sensation of his
being is again one of strength and wealth ; he trusts
in God because the feeling of abundance and power
gives him a peaceful state of mind. Morality and
religion are completely and utterly parts of the psy-
chology of error: in every particular case cause and
effect are confounded; as truth is confounded with
the effect of that which is believed to be true; or a
certain state of consciousness is confounded with the
chain of causes which brought it about.
7
The Error of Free-Will. At present we no longer
have any mercy upon the concept “free-will”: we
know only too well what it is—the most egregious
theological trick that has ever existed for the purpose
of making mankind "responsible” in a theological
manner,—that is to say, to make mankind dependent
upon theologians. I will now explain to you only


## p. 42 (#62) ##############################################

42
THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
the psychology of the whole process of inculcating
the sense of responsibility. Wherever men try to
trace responsibility home to anyone, it is the instinct
of punishment and of the desire to judge which is
active. Becoming is robbed of its innocence when
any particular condition of things is traced to a
will, to intentions and to responsible actions. The
doctrine of the will was invented principally for the
purpose of punishment,—that is to say, with the
intention of tracing guilt. The whole of ancient
psychology, or the psychology of the will, is the
outcome of the fact that its originators, who were
the priests at the head of ancient communities,
wanted to create for themselves a right to administer
punishments-or the right for God to do so. Men
were thought of as "free" in order that they might
be judged and punished-in order that they might
be held guilty: consequently every action had to be
regarded as voluntary, and the origin of every action
had to be imagined as lying in consciousness(-in this
way the most fundamentally fraudulent character of
psychology was established as the very principle of
psychology itself). Now that we have entered upon
the opposite movement, now that we immoralists are
trying with all our power to eliminate the concepts of
guilt and punishment from the world once more, and
to cleanse psychology, history, nature and all social
institutions and customs of all signs of those two
concepts, we recognise no more radical opponents
than the theologians, who with their notion of “a
moral order of things,” still continue to pollute the
innocence of Becoming with punishment and guilt.
Christianity is the metaphysics of the hangman.


## p. 43 (#63) ##############################################

THE FOUR GREAT ERRORS
43
Studyn
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What then, alone, can our teaching be? —That
no one gives man his qualities, neither God, society
his parents, his ancestors, nor himself (this non-
sensical idea which is at last refuted here, was
taught as “intelligible freedom” by Kant, and per-
haps even as early as Plato himself). No one is
responsible for the fact that he exists at all, that he
is constituted as he is, and that he happens to be in
certain circumstances and in a particular environ-
ment. The fatality of his being cannot be divorced Cars
from the fatality of all that which has been and will
be. This is not the result of an individual intention,
of a will, of an aim, there is no attempt at attaining
to any “ideal man," or "ideal happiness” or “ideal
morality” with him,-it is absurd to wish him to
be careering towards some sort of purpose. We in-
vented the concept“purpose"; in reality purpose is
altogether lacking. One is necessary, one is a piece
of fate, one belongs to the whole,
one is in the whole,
- there is nothing that could judge, measure, com-
pare, and condemn our existence, for that would
mean judging, measuting, comparing and condemn-
ing the whole. But there is nothing outside the whole!
The fact that no one shall any longer be made re-
sponsible, that the nature of existence may not be
traced to a causa prima, that the world is an entity
neither as a sensorium nor as a spirit-this alone is
the great deliverance,—thus alone is the innocence
of Becoming restored. . . . The concept “God” has
.
been the greatest objection to existence hitherto. . . .
We deny God, we deny responsibility in God : thus
alone do we save the world. -
خوری ورگ


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THE “IMPROVERS” OF MANKIND
I
You are aware of my demand upon philosophers,
that they should take up a stand Beyond Good and
Evil,—that they should have the illusion of the moral
judgment beneath them. This demand is the result
of a point of view which I was the first to formulate:
that there are no such things as moral facts. Moral
judgment has this in common with the religious one,
that it believes in realities which are not real. Mor-
ality is only an interpretation of certain phenomena:
or, more strictly speaking, a misinterpretation of
them. Moral judgment, like the religious one, be-
longs to a stage of ignorance in which even the con-
cept of reality, the distinction between real and im-
agined things, is still lacking : so that truth, at such
a stage, is applied to a host of things which to-day
we call “imaginary. ” That is why the moral judg-
ment must never be taken quite literally: as such
it is sheer nonsense. As a sign code, however, it is
invaluable: to him at least who knows, it reveals the
most valuable facts concerning cultures and inner
conditions, which did not know enough to "under-
stand” themselves. Morality is merely a sign-
language, simply symptomatology: one must already
know what it is all about in order to turn it to any
use.


## p. 45 (#65) ##############################################

THE “IMPROVERS” OF MANKIND
45
2
Let me give you one example, quite provisionally.
In all ages there have been people who wished to
“improve" mankind : this above all is what was
called morality. But the most different tendencies
are concealed beneath the same word. Both the
taming of the beast man, and the rearing of a par-
ticular type of man, have been called “improve-
ment”: these zoological termini, alone, represent
real things—real things of which the typical “im-
prover,” the priest, naturally knows nothing, and
will know nothing. To call the taming of an animal
“improving” it, sounds to our ears almost like a
joke. He who knows what goes on in menageries,
doubts very much whether an animal is improved
in such places. It is certainly weakened, it is made
less dangerous, and by means of the depressing in-
fluence of fear, pain, wounds, and hunger, it is con-
verted into a sick animal. And the same holds good
of the tamed man whom the priest has “improved. ”
In the early years of the Middle Ages, during which
the Church was most distinctly and above all a
menagerie, the most beautiful examples of the
“ blond beast” were hunted down in all directions,
-the noble Germans, for instance, were “improved. ”
But what did this “improved ” German, who had
been lured to the monastery look like after the pro-
cess? He looked like a caricature of man, like an
abortion : he had become a “sinner,” he was caged
up, he had been imprisoned behind a host of appal-
ling notions. He now lay there, sick, wretched,
malevolent even toward himself: full of hate for the


## p. 46 (#66) ##############################################

46
THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
instincts of life, full of suspicion in regard to all that
is still strong and happy. In short a “Christian. ”
In physiological terms: in a fight with an animal,
the only way of making it weak may be to make it
sick. The Church undersood this : it ruined man,
it made him weak,but it laid claim to having
improved ”him.
3
Now let us consider the other case which is called
morality, the case of the rearing of a particular race
and species. The most magnificent example of this
is offered by Indian morality, and is sanctioned
religiously as the “ Law of Manu. ” In this book the
task is set of rearing no less than four races at once:
a priestly race, a warrior race, a merchant and agri-
cultural race, and finally a race of servants—the
Sudras. It is quite obvious that we are no longer
in a circus watching tamers of wild animals in this
book. To have conceived even the plan of such a
breeding scheme, presupposes the "existence of a
man who is a hundred times milder and more reason-
able than the mere lion-tamer. One breathes more
freely, after stepping out of the Christian atmosphere
of hospitals and prisons, into this more salubrious,
loftier and more spacious world. What a wretched
thing the New Testament is beside Manu, what an
evil odour hangs around it! —But even this organisa-
tion found it necessary to be terrible, not this time
in a struggle with the animal-man, but with his
opposite, the non-caste man, the hotch-potch man,
the Chandala. Andonce again it had no other means
of making him weak and harmless, than by making
him sick,-it was the struggle with the greatest
a


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THE “IMPROVERS” OF MANKIND
47
“number. ” Nothing perhaps is more offensive to
our feelings than these measures of security on the
part of Indian morality. The third edict, for in-
stance (Avadana-Sastra I. ), which treats “of impure
vegetables,” ordains that the only nourishment that
the Chandala should be allowed must consist of
garlic and onions, as the holy scriptures forbid their
being given corn or grain-bearing fruit, water and
fire. The same edict declares that the water which
they need must be drawn neither out of rivers, wells
or ponds, but only out of the ditches leading to
swamps and out of the holes left by the footprints
of animals. They are likewise forbidden to wash
either their linen or themselves, since the water which
is graciously granted to them must only be used for
quenching their thirst. Finally Sudra women are for-
bidden to assist Chandala women at their confine-
ments, while Chandala women are also forbidden to
assist each other at such times. The results of sani-
tary regulations of this kind could not fail to make
themselves felt; deadly epidemics and the most
ghastly venereal diseases soon appeared, and in coni-
sequence of these again “the Law of the Knife,”-
that is to say circumcision, was prescribed for male
children and the removal of the small labia from the
females. Manu himself says: “the Chandala are
the fruit of adultery, incest, and crime (this is the
necessary consequence of the idea of breeding).
Their clothes shall consist only of the rags torn from
corpses, their vessels shall be the fragments of broken
pottery, their ornaments shall be made of old iron,
and their religion shall be the worship of evil spirits;
without rest they shall wander from place to place.


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THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS
They are forbidden to write from left to right or to
use their right hand in writing: the use of the right
hand and writing from left to right are reserved to
people of virtue, to people of race. ”
4
These regulations are instructive enough: we
can see in them the absolutely pure and primeval
humanity of the Aryans,—we learn that the notion
"pure blood,” is the reverse of harmless. On the
other hand it becomes clear among which people the
hatred, the Chandala hatred of this humanity has
been immortalised, among which people it has be-
come religion and genius. From this point of view
the gospels are documents of the highest value; and
the Book of Enoch is still more so. Christianity
as sprung from Jewish roots and comprehensible
only as grown upon this soil, represents the counter-
movement against that morality of breeding, of race
and of privilege :-it is essentially an anti-Aryan
religion: Christianity is the transvaluation of all
Aryan values, the triumph of Chandala values,
the proclaimed gospel of the poor and of the low,
the general insurrection of all the down-trodden, the
wretched, the bungled and the botched, against the
"race,"—the immortal revenge of the Chandala as
the religion of love.
5
The morality of breeding and the morality of
taming, in the means which they adopt in order to
prevail, are quite worthy of each other: we may lay
down as a leading principle that in order to create
morality a man must have the absolute will to im-


## p. 49 (#69) ##############################################

THE “IMPROVERS” OF MANKIND
49
"
morality. This is the great and strange problem
with which I have so long been occupied : the
psychology of the “Improvers” of mankind. A
small, and at bottom perfectly insignificant fact,
known as the “pia fraus,” first gave me access to
this problem : the pia fraus, the heirloom of all
philosophers and priests who “improve ” mankind.
Neither Manu, nor Plato, nor Confucius, nor the
teachers of Judaism and Christianity, have ever
doubted their right to falsehood. They have never
doubted their right to quite a number of other things
To express oneself in a formula, one might say :-
all means which have been used heretofore with the
object of making man moral, were through and
through immoral.