If you say that arising itself pre-exists, how can you
attribute
the efficacy of a thing to that same thing?
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-3-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991-PDF-Search-Engine
If past and future things do not exist, there would be consciousness without an object; thus there is no conciousness without an object.
25d. And because the past bears a result.
4. If the past does not exist, how can good and bad action give forth a result? In fact, at the moment when the result is produced, the retributive cause (ii. 54c-d) is past.
Therefore, because of the proofs from Scripture and reasoning quoted above, the Vaibhasikas affirm the existence of both the past and the future.
***
The masters who call themselves Sarvastivadins, "belivers in the existence of all," maintain that the past and the future exist.
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25c-d. He who affirms the existence of the dhannas of the three time periods is held to be a Sarvastivadin.
The masters who affirms the existence of all things, past,
present and future, are Sarvastivadins. Those who affirm the
existence of the present and a part of the past, namely the
existence of action which has not given forth its result; and the
non-existence of the future and a part of the past, namely the
non-existence of action which has given forth its result, are
regarded as Vibhajyavadins; [they do not belong to the Sarvasti-
93 vadin School. ]
***
How many systems are there in this School? [How many ways are there of understanding the doctrine of the existence of all (sarvastivada)? which is the best? ]
25d. There are four types of Sarvastivadins accordingly as
they teach a difference in existence {bhava), a difference in
characteristic, a difference in condition, and mutual
94 difference.
1. The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defends bhavanyathatva, that is, he affirms that the three time periods, past, present, and future, are differenciated by their non-identity of existence (bhdva).
When a dharma goes from one time period to another its nature is not modified, but its existence is. A gold vase which one breaks is an example which shows the difference of figure: its figure (samsthdna, i. l0a) is modified, but not its color. An example which shows difference in qualities: milk becomes whey; its taste, force, and digestibility change, but not its color. In the same way, when a future dharma passes from the future into the present, its
? future existence is abandoned, and its present existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same. When it passes from the present into the past, its present existence is abandoned, and its past existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same.
2. The Bhadanta Ghosaka defends laksandnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference in their characteris- tics.
A dharma goes through the time periods. When it is past, it is endowed with past characteristics (laksana),b\xt it is not deprived of its present and future characteristics; when it is future, it is endowed with its future characteristics, but it is not deprived of its present and past characteristics; and when it is present, it is endowed with its present characteristics, but it is not deprived of
95
one woman is not detached with respect to other women.
3. The Bhadanta Vasumitra defends avasthdnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference of condition (avastha). A dharma, going through the time periods, having taken up a certain condition, becomes different through the difference of its condition, not through a difference in its substance. Example: a token placed on the square of ones, is called one; placed on the square of tens, ten; and placed on the square of hundreds, one hundred.
4. The Bhadanta Buddhadeva defends anyonyathdtva, that is, the time periods are established through their mutual relation- ships.
A dharma, going throughout the time periods, takes different names through different relationships, that is, it is called past, future, or present, through a relationship with what preceeds and
with what follows. For example, the same woman is both a
96
its past and future characteristics.
Example: a man attached to
daughter and a mother.
***
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It is in this manner that these four masters maintain the
98 existence of all.
The first, professing "transformation" (parindma) may be 98
refuted along with the Samkhyas.
In the thesis of the second master, the time periods, past, present, and future, are confounded, since the three characteristics are found everywhere. The example moreover is lacking any similarity to the problem, for, within the man in question, there is active lust with respect to one woman, but there is only the "possession of lust" (ii. 36) with respect to other women.
In the thesis of the fourth master, the three time periods exist at the same time: a past dharma, for example, is past in relation to that whch preceeds it, future in relation to that which follows, and present in relation to what preceeds and what follows.
26a. The third is the best.
Consequently the best system is that of Vasumitra,
26b. The three time periods are proven by reason of their activity,
According to which the time periods and the conditions are established through the operation of the activity of a dharma: when a dharma does not accomplish its operation, it is future; when it is accomplishing it, it is present; and when its operation has come to an end, it is past.
*##
[The Sautrantikas criticize:] If the past and the future exist as things, they are present: why are they thus qualified as past and future?
? It is action not yet completed, in the act of being completed, or already completed, which determine the time period of a dharma. "
Good enough. But what action would you assign to a tatsabhdga eye? The action of an eye is to see, and a tatsabhdga eye does not now see (i. 42). Would you say that its action is to project and to give forth a result (phaladdnaparigraha, ii. 59)? But then if giving forth a result is an "action," then sabhdgahetu causes, etc. (ii. 59c) give forth their result when they are past, and so one arrives at the conclusion that they accomplish their action in the past and so would be as a consequence in the present. Or if an action, in order to be complete, calls for a projection and a giving forth of a result, these past causes would be at least semi-present. Thus the time periods are confounded.
27a. What is opposed [to the activity of a dharma? ]
But, if it always exists, why doesn't a dharma always exercise its activity? What obstacle causes it to sometimes produce and sometimes not to produce its action? One cannot say that its inaction results from the non-presence of certain causes, since these causes also always exist.
27a. How can activity be past, etc. ?
And how can activity itself be past, etc. ? Would you imagine a second activity of activity? That would be absurd. But if the activity, in and of itself (svarilpasattdpeksaya), is past, etc. , why not admit that the same holds for the dharma! And who says that the time periods depend on past activity, etc. ? Would you say that activity is neither past, present, nor future, but that, nevertheless, it exists? Then, being unconditioned (asamskrta), it is eternal (nitya), and how can you then say that a dharma is future when it does not exercise its activity, or past when it not longer exercises it?
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These objections would hold, [answer the Sarvastivadins,] if 100
activity were other than the dharma itself.
27b. But it is not other than the dharma.
Thus this error does not exist. Therefore
27b. The time periods are no longer justified.
If activity is the same as the dharma, and if the dharma always exist, its activity would also always exist. Why and how does one say that sometimes it is past, sometimes future? The distinction of the time periods is not justified.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:]How is it not justified? In fact a conditioned dharma which has not arisen is called future; that which, having arisen, is not destroyed, is called present; and that which is destroyed is called past.
[The Sautrantikas answer:] If, in the past and future, a dharma exists with the same nature {tenaivatmana) as when it is present,
27b-c. Existing in the same manner, how can it be non-ari- sen or destroyed?
If the unique self-nature of a dharma continues to exist, how can this dharma be non-arisen or destroyed? What is it that it is lacking now, through the absence of which it is qualified as non-arisen? What is it that it is lacking later, through the absence of which it is qualified as destroyed? Consequently, if one does not admit that the dharma exists after having been non-existent and no longer exists after having existed, the three time periods cannot
101 be established or proved to exist.
#*#
? [It is useful to examine the reasoning of the Sarvastivadins. ]
1. The argument that, possessing the characteristics of conditioned things (arising, etc. , ii. 452), conditioned things are not eternal even though they exist both in the past and in the future, is pure verbiage, for, if it always exists, a dharma is not susceptible either of arising or of perishing. "A dharma is eternal, and it is not eternal:" to speak in this manner is to contradict oneself through one's own words.
This is what the stanza explains when it says, "Self nature
always exists, but this does not mean that being is eternal, nor that
being is different from its self nature: this is clearly stated by the
102 Lord. "
2. With regard to the argument that the Blessed One taught the
existence of the past and the future since he said "Past action
103
exists, and future results exist", we would also say that the past
exists, and that the future exists. Past is that which was existent; future is that which, given its cause, will exist: it is in this sense that we say that the past and the future exists. But they do not exist as substantial entities (dravyatas) as does the present.
[The Sarvastivadins protest:] Who says that they exist like the present?
If they don't exist like the present, how do they exist?
The Sarvastivadins answer: They exist with the nature of the past and the future.
But, if they now. exist, how can one attribute the nature of past
and future to them? In fact, the Blessed One, in a text quoted by the
Sarvastivadins, had the intention of condemning the view that
negates cause and effect (iv. 79, v. 7). He said "the past exists" in
the sense of "the past was;" he said "the future exists" in the sense
104
of "the future will be. " The word "is" (asti) is a nipdta, in the
same sense as the expressions, "There is (asti) previous non-exist- ence of the lamp," "there is later non-existence of the lamp," and again, "This lamp is extinguished, but it was not extinguished by
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me. " It is in this same way that the text says "the past exists, and the future exists. " To understand otherwise, being in the past, the past would not now be the past.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] We see that the Blessed One,
105
addressing the Lagudasikhlyaka ascetics, expressed himself in
this way, "Past action, which has been destroyed, which has perished, and which has ceased, does exist. " According to the proposed explanation, the sense would be, "This action was. " Now can we suppose that the ascetics would not admit that past action has already passed away?
[The Sautrantikas reply:]When the Blessed One says that past action exists, he had in view its power of giving forth a result, a power which was placed in the series of the agent through action which has now passed away. To understand otherwise, that is, if past action actually exists now in and of itself, how can it be considered as past?
Of the rest, Scripture contains a formal declaration. The
Blessed One said in the Paramarthasunyatasutra, "The eye, Oh
Bhiksus, arising, does not come from any place; perishing, it does
not remain in any place. In this way, Oh Bhik? us, the eye exists
after having been non-existent and, after having existed, disap-
106
pears. " If a future eye existed, the Blessed One would not have
said that the eye exists only after having been non-existent.
[The Sarvastivadins would perhaps say:] The expression, "It exists after having been non-existent" signifies "after having been non-existent in the present" (yartamane'dhvany abhutva), that is, "after having been non-existent as present" {vartamanabhavena abhutva).
This is inadmissible, for the time periods do not differ from the eye.
Does this mean that one should understand this as, "After having been non-existent in its own nature (svalaksanatas)? " But this is to explicitely acknowledge that a future eye does not now
? exist.
3. As for the argument that "the past and the future exist, since the consciousness arises by reason of two things," should one understand that since the mental consciousness arises by reason of a mental organ and past, present, or future dharmas, these dharmas are a necessary condition for the mental consciousness to arise to the same extent as is the mental organ, that is, in the quality of "generating condition" (janakapratyaya)} Or are they solely "conditions in a quality of object" {alambanamatra, ii. 62c)? Evidently future dharmas, which will be produced after thousands of years or which will never be produced, are not the generating causes of a present mental consciousness. Evidently Nirvana, which is contradictory to all arising, cannot be a generating cause. It is enough that the dharmas are a condition for the arising of a consciousness in their qualtiy of being an object: let us admit that it is thus for future and past dharmas.
[The Sarvastivadins ask:] If the past and future dharmas do not exist, how can they be the objects of consciousness?
They exist in the manner in which they are taken as objects.
And in what manner are they taken as objects?
[They are taken as objects with the mark of the past and the
107
future, as having existed or as coming into existence. ] In fact, a
person who remembers a past visible object of a past sensation, does not see "this is;" but he remembers "this was;" the man who foresees the future does not see the future as existing, but he foresees it as coming into existence (bhavisyat). . .
Another point. Memory (which is a certain mental conscious- ness) grasps a visible thing that has been seen, a sensation that has been felt, that is, a visible object and a sensation in a present state of being. If a dharma which one remembers is, in fact, the one grasped by the memory, it is presently manifested; if it is not one that one grasps through the memory, then the memory conscious- ness certainly has a non-existent object.
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Would one say that past and future visible objects exist without being present, because past or future visible objects are nothing other than atoms (paramdnu) in a state of dispersion (viprakirna)? But we would say: (1) when the consciousness takes as its object, through memory or prevision, a past or future visible object, it does not take it as an object in a state of dispersion, but on the contrary, as an assembled collection {sarhcita) of atoms; (2) if a past or future visible object is the visible object of the present with this small difference that the atoms are dispersed, then the atoms are thus eternal; there is never either production (utpdda) nor destruction of them; there is only association and dispersion of the atoms. To maintain such a thesis is to adopt the doctrine of the Ajlvikas and to reject the Sutras of the Sugata: 'The eye, Oh Bhiksus, arising, does not come from any place . . . ;" (3) the argument does not hold for sensation and other "non-solid" (amurta) dharmas: not being combinations of atoms {aparamanu- samcita), we do not see how they can be, in the past or in the future, atoms in a state of dispersion. In fact, moreover, one remembers the sensation as it was experienced when it was present; one foresees it as it will be experienced when it will be present. If, past and future, it is such that one grasps it through memory or prevision, it would be eternal. Thus the mental consciousness termed "memory" has a non-existent object, namely a sensation that does not now presently exist.
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] If that which does not absolutely exist can be the object of consciousness, then a thirteenth dyatana (i. 14) could be the object of consciousness.
[The author answers:] Then what is, according to you, the object of a consciousness which says, "There is no thirteenth ayatana! "
It is its name, "thirteenth ayatana. "
? Then this object is only a name; the thing designated, the object, does not exist. Furthermore, what will be the presently existing object upon which the consciousness of the previous non-existence of sound bears?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] The object of this consciousness is the sound itself [and not its non-existence. ]
Then, anyone who is in quest of the non-existence of sound should make a noise!
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] No, for the sound of which there is previous non-existence, exists in a future state, and it is this sound in its future state which is the object of the previously non-existent consciousness.
But if future sound, of which there is previous non-existence, exists in fact, how can there be the idea that it does not now exist?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] It does not presently exist {varta- mdno nasti)\ from whence there is the idea, "it does not now exist. "
You do not have the right to speak in this manner, for it is the same dharma which is past, present, and future. Or, if there is a difference between future and present sound, and the idea "it does not now exist" bears on this difference, then you recognize that the distinctive characteristic of the present exists after not having existed. We will therefore have to prove that existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhdva) can be an object of consciousness.
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] If a non-existent thing can be an object of consciousness, how could the Bodhisattva in his last existence say, "It is impossible that I know, that I see that which does not exist in this world? "
The meaning of this text is clear: "I am not like other prideful (dbhimdnika, v. 10a) ascetics who attribute to themselves a
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108
non-existent illumination':
which is. " Moreover, to admit your thesis, the object of any idea (buddhi) would be real: if all that one thinks is real, there is no longer any place for doubt or examination (vimarsa); there would be no difference between the Bodhisattva and others.
Let us add moreover that ideas certainly have existent and
non-existent things for their object, for the Blessed One explicitly
said, "From the moment when I said to him, 'Come, Oh BhiksusP
(iv. 26c), my Sravaka is instructed from evening until morning: he
will know that which is as is (sacca satto jnasyati) and that which is
not as not, that which is not the highest (sa-uttara) as not the
highest, and that which is the highest (anuttara=Nirvdna) as the 10
Consequently the reason that the Sarvastivadins gave in favor of the existence of the past and the future, that is, "because the object of the consciousness is existent" does not hold.
4. The Sarvastivadins also deduce an argument from the result of action. But the Sautrantikas do not admit that a result arises directly from a past action. A result arises from a special state of the series (cittasarhtdnavifesdt), a state which proceeds from the action, as one shall see at the end of this work wherein we refute the doctrine of the Vatsiputriyas (dtmavddapratisedha, see iv. 85a).
But the masters who affirm the real existence {dravyatas) of the past and the future should also admit the eternity of the result: what efficacy {sdmarthya) can they attribute to the action? An efficacy with regard to production (utpdda)? An efficacy with regard to the action of making something present (vartamdmka- rana)?
a. This is to admit that arising exists after having been non-existent (abhutvd bhavati).
If you say that arising itself pre-exists, how can you attribute the efficacy of a thing to that same thing? You cannot but join the School of the Varsaganyas, "That which is, solely is; that which is not, solely is not; that which
110 is not, does not arise; and that which is, is not destroyed. "
highest. " (iv. l27d) 9
as for me, I only see as existing that
? b. What should we understand by "the action of making something present? "
Will this be the fact of drawing something to another place? We see three difficulties in this: (1) the result will thus be eternal; (2) how could the result, when it is non-material (aruupin), be achieved? ; and (3) movement would exist after having been non-existent.
Would this be the fact of modifying the unique or self nature of a pre-existent result (svabhavavisesana)? But is there not, in this thesis, the appearance of a modification previously non-existent?
*##
Consequently, the sarvastivada, "the doctrine of the existence of all," of the Sarvastivadins who affirm the real existence of the past and the future, is not good within Buddhism. It is not in this sense that one should understand sarvastivada. Good sarvastivada consists in affirming the existence of "all" by understanding the word "all" as Scripture understands it. How do the Sutras affirm that all exists? "When one says, 'all exists/ Oh Brahmins, this
111 refers to the twelve ayatanas: these are equivalent terms. "
Or rather, the "all" that exists is the three time periods. And it has been said how they exist: "That which has previously been, is the past. . . " (see above, p. 813).
But if the past and future do not exist, how can one be bound (samyukta) by a past or future klesa to a thing (vastu) which is past or future?
One is bound by a past klesa by reason of the existence, in the series, of an anusaya which has arisen from a past klesa; one is bound by a future klesa by reason of the existence of an anusaya which is the cause of the future anusaya of a klesa which has had or will have this thing for its object.
The Vaibhasikas say: "The past and the future truly exist. As
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regards that which cannot be explained, one should know that
27d. The nature of things is indeed profound;
112 certainly, it cannot be proven through reasoning. "
113 [Thus one need not deny the past and the future].
One can say that that which arises perishes: for example a visible. One can say that that which arises differes from that which perishes: in fact, that which arises is the future; that which perishes is the present. Time also arises, for that which is arising is
114
embraced within time, it has time for its nature; and a dharma
arises from time, by reason of the multiplicity of the moments of
115 future time.
We have thus finished with the problem presented to us by the theory of the anusayas.
***
116
When a person abandons an object through the disappear-
ance of the possession that he had of this object, is there for him "disconnection" from this object through the cutting off of the possession of the defilements which bears on this object? And inversely, when there is disconnection, is there abandoning?
When there is disconnection from an object, there is always an abandoning of this object; but one can have abandoning without disconnection.
28. When that which is to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering is abandoned, the ascetic remains in connection
? ^
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with it from the fact of the other universal defilements; when the first category is abandoned, he remains in connection with it from the fact of the other defilements
117 which have it as their object.
Let us suppose a person enters on to the path of the Seeing of Truths; the Seeing of Suffering has arisen in him, but not yet the
118
Seeing of Arising. He has abandoned the things (vastu) which
are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, but he is not yet disjoined from these things by this: for he continues to be bound to
119
these first things
whose abandoning depends on the Seeing of Arising and which are relative to these first things.
In the Path of Meditation wherein one sucessively expells nine categories (strong-strong, etc. ) of defilements, when the first category is abandoned and not the others, these other categories of defilements, which bear upon the first category, continue to bind. (vi. 33)
###
How many anusayas attach themselves (anuserate) to each object?
We would never finish were we to examine this problem in detail. The Vaibhasikas (in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 449al6) give a summary exposition of this.
In general one can say that there are sixteen types of dharmas, objects to which the anusayas attach themselves: for each sphere there are five categories (categories to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. ); plus the pure dharmas. The conscious- nesses are of the same sixteen types.
When we know which dharmas are the objects of which consciousness, we are then able to calculate how many anusayas
through the universal defilements (v. 12)
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attach themselves to these dharmas.
29. Abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and
Arising, abandoned through Meditation, the dharmas in
Kamadhatu are the sphere of three consciousnesses of this
sphere, of one consciousness of Rupadhatu and the pure
120 consciousness.
In all, these dharmas are the object of five consciousnesses. The three consciousnesses of Kamadhatu are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, through the Seeing of Arising, and through Meditation {abhydsa = bhdvand). One consciousness of Rupadhatu is abandoned through Meditation.
30a-b. The same three categories of dharmas in Rupadhatu
are the object of three consciousnesses of Rupadhatu, three
of Kamadhatu, one of Arupyadhatu and the pure con-
121 sciousness.
The three consciousnesses of Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu are the same as above: they are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and its Arsing, and through Meditation. Consciousness in Arupyadhatu is abandoned through Meditation. In all, these dharmas are the objects of eight consciousnesses.
30c-d. The same categories of dharmas in Arupyadhatu are the objects of three consciousnesses of the three spheres and pure conscousness.
The same three consciousnesses. In all, these dharmas are the object of ten consciousnesses.
31a-b. The dharmas abandoned through the Seeing of
? Extinction and the Path are all the objects of the same consciousnesses with the addition of the consciousness of their own category.
(a)The dharmas of Kamadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction are objects of the five consciousnesses as above, plus the consciousness abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction: in all six consciousnesses.
(b)The dharmas of Kamadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of the Path are objects of the five consciousnesses as above, plus the consciousness abandoned through Seeing the Path: in all six consciousnesses.
(c)The dharmas of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu are abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path: they are the objects, respectively, of nine and eleven consciousnesses.
31c-d. The pure dharmas are the object of the last three consciousnesses of the three spheres and of pure conscious- ness.
They are the objects of ten consciousnesses, the conscious- nesses of the three spheres abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path, through Meditation, and the pure consciousness.
Here are two summarizing slokas: "The dharmas of the three spheres abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering and through Meditation, are, in the order of the spheres, the domain of five, of eight, of ten consciousnesses. " "To the abandoning through Seeing the Extinction of Suffering and the Path, add the mind of their class. The pure dharmas are the object of ten consciousnesses. "
Such are the sixteen types of dharmas, objects of sixteen types of consciousness. We shall now examine what anusaya attaches
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itself to what dharma.
A complete analysis would take us too far afield; we will
content ourselves with studying a typical case.
1. Let us choose, among the objects of attachment, agreeable sensation, and let us see how many anusayas attach themselves to it.
Agreeable sensation is of seven types: (1) belonging to Kamadhatu, to be abandoned through Meditation; (2-6) belonging to Rupadhatu, of five categories; and (7) pure.
When it is pure, the anusayas do not attach themselves to it, as we have shown.
When they belong to Kamadhatu, the anusayas abandoned through Meditation and all the universal anusayas attach them- selves to it.
When they belong to Rupadhatu, all the universal anusayas attach themselves to it.
2. How many anusayas attach themselves to the consciousness which has agreeable sensation for its object?
The consciousness which has agreeable sensation for its object is of twelve types: (1-4) belong to Kamadhatu, for categories of consciousness (excepting the consciousness abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering); (5-9) belong to Rupadhatu, five categories; (10-11) belong to Arupyadhatu, the consciousness abandoned through Seeing the Path and the one abandoned through Meditation; and (12) the pure consciousness.
Attaching themselves to it are, according to their types: 1. four categories of Meditation; anusaya of the sphere of Kamadhatu; 2. the anusayas of the sphere of Rupadhatu which have conditioned things for their object; 3. two categories of anusayas of the sphere of Arupyadhatu; and 4. the universal anusayas (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 452c20).
3. How many anusayas attach themselves to the consciousness
? which has for its object the consciousness having an agreeable sensation for its object?
The consciousness which has an agreeable sensation for its object, and which is of twelve types, is itself the object of a consciousness which can be of fourteen types, namely the twelve aforementioned types with the addition (13-14) of the conscious- nesses of the sphere of Arupyadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Seeing of the Arising of Suffering.
Attaching themselves to this consciousness are, according to their types, the anusayas described above in the first two spheres, plus four categories in Arupyadhatu (by excluding the anusaya abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering).
The other dharmas (the twenty-two indriyas, i. 48c-d, etc. ) will 122
be examined on the basis of this example.
***
The mind is termed sanusaya, "havinganusaya" from the fact of the anusayas. Should we think that, necessarily, the anusayas
125
nourish themselves, and lodge in (anuserate) the sanusaya
mind?
Those which lodge in it are the non-abandoned anusayas, whose object is not abandoned (v. 61c-d), and which are associated with the mind in question.
Those which do not lodge in it are the abandoned anusayas which are associated with the mind in question.
32a-b. The defiled mind is sanusaya in two ways; the non-defiled mind solely from the fact of the anusayas which
124 lodge therein.
The defiled mind is sanusaya from the fact of the anusayas
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which lodge therein: the anusayas with which it is associated, whose object is not abandoned, which takes an object; and (2) from the fact of the anuiayas which are not therein: the abandoned anuiayas and that to which it is associated: for this mind continues to have them as companions.
The non-defiled mind is sanusaya from the fact of the anusayas which lodge therein: the non-abandoned anusayas which are associated with the mind.
##*
In what order are the ten anusayas produced (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 245b28 and following)?
Any one can arise after any one: there is thus no rule which applies to all of them. Nevertheless, for the order of their production:
32c. From moha9 there is doubt.
At first, bound by ignorance (moha=avidya)> a person is in confusion with respect to the Truths: he does not take pleasure in the Truth of Suffering; he does not admit it.
From this state of confusion, there arises doubt; he undertands the two thesis; he doubts whether suffering is true, or if non-suffering is true.
32d. From whence false views;
From doubt there arises false views: by reason of false teaching and false reflection, he comes to the judgement "This is not suffering. "
32e. From whence a belief in a self;
? From false view there arises the view of personality; for, not recognizing the skandhas as suffering, he considers these skandhas as constituting a "self. "
33a. From whence a belief in the extremes;
From whence there is the view of the two extremes, for a person, believing in a self, becomes attached to the idea of the eternity or the annihilation of the self.
33b. From whence the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices;
From this there is an esteeming of morality and practices considered to be a means of purification.
33c. From whence the esteeming of bad views;
From this, there is an esteeming of that which is inferior, the esteeming of what he considers as a means of purification.
33d. From whence lust and pride relative to one's own views;
From this there is attachment to one's own views, and pride and pleasure in these views.
33e. And hatred with respect to another:
From this there is dislike: for, quite full of his own views, he detests the views of others which are contrary to his own.
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According to other masters, there is hatred for one's own opinions when . one changes them; for lust and the other anusayas which are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths are those which have for their object the person himself and his own views.
33f. Such is the order.
This is the order of the arising of the ten klesas, ***
How many causes give rise to the klesas?
34. Klesas [with complete causes] arise from the non-aban- doning of the anusaya, from the presence of their object,
125
For example, lust arises (1) when the anus aya of lust is non-abandoned--not-completely-known {aparijnata)--its opposi- tion not having arisen (v. 64); (2) when the dharmas which provoke the manifestation of lust, namely visible things, etc. , are found in the field of experience {abhasagata~visayarupata-apanna)\ and (3) when there is erroneous judgment.
T h e anus ay a is cause; t h e dharmas a r e its object; and incorrect judgment is its immediate preparation: three distinct forces.
The same holds for the other klesas
34a. With complete causes.
This is the case for the klesas which proceed from all causes. For, according to the School, a klesa can arise through the mere force of its object; as in the case of the Arhat who is subject to
and from erroneous judgment.
? falling away (vi. 58b).
In a Sutra, the Blessed One said that the ninety-eight anusayas, with the ten wrappings of attachment (the paryavasthanas), are made up of three cankerous influences (dsravas), the cankerous influence of objects of pleasure (kdmasrava), the cankerous influence of existence (bhavdsrava), and the cankerous influence of ignorance (avidydsrava); four floods (oghas), the flood of the objects of pleasure (kdmaugha), the flood of existence (bha- vaugha), the flood of views (drstyogha), and the flood of ignorance (avidhaugha); four yokes (yogas), the yoke of the objects of pleasure (kdmayoga), the yoke of existence (bhavayoga), the yoke of views (drstiyoga), and the yoke of ignorance (avidydyoga); and four clingings (updddnas), clinging to the objects of pleasure (kdmopdddna), the clinging to views (drsfyupdddna), the clinging to morality and ascetic practices (stlavratopadana), and the clinging to a belief in a self (atmavddopdddna).
***
What is the definition of the cankerous influences (dsravas)?
35a. In Kamadhatu, the defilements, with the exception of ignorance, but with the wrappings of attachment, consti- tute dsravas;
The klesas of Kamadhatu, with the exception of the five ignorances, plus the ten wrappings (patyavasthdnas, v. 47) make up forty-one things: this is the cankerous influence of the objects of pleasure.
35b. In Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu, only the anus ayas themselves constitute the cankerous influence of existen-
126 ce.
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But there are, in the two higher spheres, two wrappings,
127 namely torpor and dissipation (ii. 26a-c, v. 47). The Prakarana
says, "What is the cankerous influence of existence? With the exception of ignorance, it is the other connections (samyojanas), bonds (bandhanas), anusayas, upaklesas and wrappings (paryavas- thanas) of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu. "
The Vaibhasikas of KaSmlr say that the wrappings of attach- ment are not mentioned as forming part of the cankerous influence of existence because, in the two higher spheres, they are
128 not independent.
##*
Why are the anusayas of the two higher spheres placed together in order to make one single cankerous influence of existence?
36a-b. They are morally neutral, proceed inwards, and belong to the stage of absorption: this is why they are put together.
They both present the threefold common characteristics of being morally neutral, of being turned inward (that is, of not depending on objects), and of belonging to the spheres of absorption: they are thus united into a single cankerous influence.
And again they are called the cankerous influence of existence for the same reason that one distinguishes the cankerous influence of existence (v. 2).
From the above, it results that the avidyds, "the ignorances," of the three spheres,--in all fifteen things,--(v. 4) constitute the cankerous influence of ignorance.
Why do the ignorances constitute a separate cankerous influence?
? 36c d. Ignorance is the root: it is thus said to constitute a
129 separate cankerous influence.
In the manner in which the cankerous influences are explained,
37a-b. So too for the floods and the yokes. But views constitute a separate flood and a separate yoke by reason of their acuteness.
The "floods" and the "yokes" are explained in the same manner. The cankerous influence of the objects of sensual pleasure (kdma-ogha) without views, is both the flood of the objects of sensual pleasure and the yoke of the objects of sensual pleasure; so too the cankerous influence of existence, without views, is both the flood of existence and the yoke of existence.
130
According to the School,
tic of sharpness that views constitute a separate flood and a separate yoke.
[Why are they not a separate cankerous influence? ]
37c-d. They are not a separate cankerous influence, because, without companions, they are not favorable to installation.
[We shall explain below, v. 40, the etymology of the word dsrava or cankerous influence. ]The dsravas are so called because they seat themselves (asayantUy dsravandm nirvacanam). Isolated (asahdya) views are not favorable to installation (dsana), being acute. Thus one does not make a separate place among the dsravas or cankerous influences for them; they figure in the category of the cankerous influences, but are not mixed with the other anusayas.
Therefore we have:
a. The flood of the objects of sensual pleasure is made up of five
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it is by reason of their characteris-
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lusts, five hatreds, five egotisms, four doubts, and ten wrappings: in all twenty-nine things.
25d. And because the past bears a result.
4. If the past does not exist, how can good and bad action give forth a result? In fact, at the moment when the result is produced, the retributive cause (ii. 54c-d) is past.
Therefore, because of the proofs from Scripture and reasoning quoted above, the Vaibhasikas affirm the existence of both the past and the future.
***
The masters who call themselves Sarvastivadins, "belivers in the existence of all," maintain that the past and the future exist.
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25c-d. He who affirms the existence of the dhannas of the three time periods is held to be a Sarvastivadin.
The masters who affirms the existence of all things, past,
present and future, are Sarvastivadins. Those who affirm the
existence of the present and a part of the past, namely the
existence of action which has not given forth its result; and the
non-existence of the future and a part of the past, namely the
non-existence of action which has given forth its result, are
regarded as Vibhajyavadins; [they do not belong to the Sarvasti-
93 vadin School. ]
***
How many systems are there in this School? [How many ways are there of understanding the doctrine of the existence of all (sarvastivada)? which is the best? ]
25d. There are four types of Sarvastivadins accordingly as
they teach a difference in existence {bhava), a difference in
characteristic, a difference in condition, and mutual
94 difference.
1. The Bhadanta Dharmatrata defends bhavanyathatva, that is, he affirms that the three time periods, past, present, and future, are differenciated by their non-identity of existence (bhdva).
When a dharma goes from one time period to another its nature is not modified, but its existence is. A gold vase which one breaks is an example which shows the difference of figure: its figure (samsthdna, i. l0a) is modified, but not its color. An example which shows difference in qualities: milk becomes whey; its taste, force, and digestibility change, but not its color. In the same way, when a future dharma passes from the future into the present, its
? future existence is abandoned, and its present existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same. When it passes from the present into the past, its present existence is abandoned, and its past existence is acquired, but its nature remains the same.
2. The Bhadanta Ghosaka defends laksandnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference in their characteris- tics.
A dharma goes through the time periods. When it is past, it is endowed with past characteristics (laksana),b\xt it is not deprived of its present and future characteristics; when it is future, it is endowed with its future characteristics, but it is not deprived of its present and past characteristics; and when it is present, it is endowed with its present characteristics, but it is not deprived of
95
one woman is not detached with respect to other women.
3. The Bhadanta Vasumitra defends avasthdnyathdtva, that is, the time periods differ through the difference of condition (avastha). A dharma, going through the time periods, having taken up a certain condition, becomes different through the difference of its condition, not through a difference in its substance. Example: a token placed on the square of ones, is called one; placed on the square of tens, ten; and placed on the square of hundreds, one hundred.
4. The Bhadanta Buddhadeva defends anyonyathdtva, that is, the time periods are established through their mutual relation- ships.
A dharma, going throughout the time periods, takes different names through different relationships, that is, it is called past, future, or present, through a relationship with what preceeds and
with what follows. For example, the same woman is both a
96
its past and future characteristics.
Example: a man attached to
daughter and a mother.
***
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It is in this manner that these four masters maintain the
98 existence of all.
The first, professing "transformation" (parindma) may be 98
refuted along with the Samkhyas.
In the thesis of the second master, the time periods, past, present, and future, are confounded, since the three characteristics are found everywhere. The example moreover is lacking any similarity to the problem, for, within the man in question, there is active lust with respect to one woman, but there is only the "possession of lust" (ii. 36) with respect to other women.
In the thesis of the fourth master, the three time periods exist at the same time: a past dharma, for example, is past in relation to that whch preceeds it, future in relation to that which follows, and present in relation to what preceeds and what follows.
26a. The third is the best.
Consequently the best system is that of Vasumitra,
26b. The three time periods are proven by reason of their activity,
According to which the time periods and the conditions are established through the operation of the activity of a dharma: when a dharma does not accomplish its operation, it is future; when it is accomplishing it, it is present; and when its operation has come to an end, it is past.
*##
[The Sautrantikas criticize:] If the past and the future exist as things, they are present: why are they thus qualified as past and future?
? It is action not yet completed, in the act of being completed, or already completed, which determine the time period of a dharma. "
Good enough. But what action would you assign to a tatsabhdga eye? The action of an eye is to see, and a tatsabhdga eye does not now see (i. 42). Would you say that its action is to project and to give forth a result (phaladdnaparigraha, ii. 59)? But then if giving forth a result is an "action," then sabhdgahetu causes, etc. (ii. 59c) give forth their result when they are past, and so one arrives at the conclusion that they accomplish their action in the past and so would be as a consequence in the present. Or if an action, in order to be complete, calls for a projection and a giving forth of a result, these past causes would be at least semi-present. Thus the time periods are confounded.
27a. What is opposed [to the activity of a dharma? ]
But, if it always exists, why doesn't a dharma always exercise its activity? What obstacle causes it to sometimes produce and sometimes not to produce its action? One cannot say that its inaction results from the non-presence of certain causes, since these causes also always exist.
27a. How can activity be past, etc. ?
And how can activity itself be past, etc. ? Would you imagine a second activity of activity? That would be absurd. But if the activity, in and of itself (svarilpasattdpeksaya), is past, etc. , why not admit that the same holds for the dharma! And who says that the time periods depend on past activity, etc. ? Would you say that activity is neither past, present, nor future, but that, nevertheless, it exists? Then, being unconditioned (asamskrta), it is eternal (nitya), and how can you then say that a dharma is future when it does not exercise its activity, or past when it not longer exercises it?
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These objections would hold, [answer the Sarvastivadins,] if 100
activity were other than the dharma itself.
27b. But it is not other than the dharma.
Thus this error does not exist. Therefore
27b. The time periods are no longer justified.
If activity is the same as the dharma, and if the dharma always exist, its activity would also always exist. Why and how does one say that sometimes it is past, sometimes future? The distinction of the time periods is not justified.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:]How is it not justified? In fact a conditioned dharma which has not arisen is called future; that which, having arisen, is not destroyed, is called present; and that which is destroyed is called past.
[The Sautrantikas answer:] If, in the past and future, a dharma exists with the same nature {tenaivatmana) as when it is present,
27b-c. Existing in the same manner, how can it be non-ari- sen or destroyed?
If the unique self-nature of a dharma continues to exist, how can this dharma be non-arisen or destroyed? What is it that it is lacking now, through the absence of which it is qualified as non-arisen? What is it that it is lacking later, through the absence of which it is qualified as destroyed? Consequently, if one does not admit that the dharma exists after having been non-existent and no longer exists after having existed, the three time periods cannot
101 be established or proved to exist.
#*#
? [It is useful to examine the reasoning of the Sarvastivadins. ]
1. The argument that, possessing the characteristics of conditioned things (arising, etc. , ii. 452), conditioned things are not eternal even though they exist both in the past and in the future, is pure verbiage, for, if it always exists, a dharma is not susceptible either of arising or of perishing. "A dharma is eternal, and it is not eternal:" to speak in this manner is to contradict oneself through one's own words.
This is what the stanza explains when it says, "Self nature
always exists, but this does not mean that being is eternal, nor that
being is different from its self nature: this is clearly stated by the
102 Lord. "
2. With regard to the argument that the Blessed One taught the
existence of the past and the future since he said "Past action
103
exists, and future results exist", we would also say that the past
exists, and that the future exists. Past is that which was existent; future is that which, given its cause, will exist: it is in this sense that we say that the past and the future exists. But they do not exist as substantial entities (dravyatas) as does the present.
[The Sarvastivadins protest:] Who says that they exist like the present?
If they don't exist like the present, how do they exist?
The Sarvastivadins answer: They exist with the nature of the past and the future.
But, if they now. exist, how can one attribute the nature of past
and future to them? In fact, the Blessed One, in a text quoted by the
Sarvastivadins, had the intention of condemning the view that
negates cause and effect (iv. 79, v. 7). He said "the past exists" in
the sense of "the past was;" he said "the future exists" in the sense
104
of "the future will be. " The word "is" (asti) is a nipdta, in the
same sense as the expressions, "There is (asti) previous non-exist- ence of the lamp," "there is later non-existence of the lamp," and again, "This lamp is extinguished, but it was not extinguished by
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me. " It is in this same way that the text says "the past exists, and the future exists. " To understand otherwise, being in the past, the past would not now be the past.
[The Sarvastivadins answer:] We see that the Blessed One,
105
addressing the Lagudasikhlyaka ascetics, expressed himself in
this way, "Past action, which has been destroyed, which has perished, and which has ceased, does exist. " According to the proposed explanation, the sense would be, "This action was. " Now can we suppose that the ascetics would not admit that past action has already passed away?
[The Sautrantikas reply:]When the Blessed One says that past action exists, he had in view its power of giving forth a result, a power which was placed in the series of the agent through action which has now passed away. To understand otherwise, that is, if past action actually exists now in and of itself, how can it be considered as past?
Of the rest, Scripture contains a formal declaration. The
Blessed One said in the Paramarthasunyatasutra, "The eye, Oh
Bhiksus, arising, does not come from any place; perishing, it does
not remain in any place. In this way, Oh Bhik? us, the eye exists
after having been non-existent and, after having existed, disap-
106
pears. " If a future eye existed, the Blessed One would not have
said that the eye exists only after having been non-existent.
[The Sarvastivadins would perhaps say:] The expression, "It exists after having been non-existent" signifies "after having been non-existent in the present" (yartamane'dhvany abhutva), that is, "after having been non-existent as present" {vartamanabhavena abhutva).
This is inadmissible, for the time periods do not differ from the eye.
Does this mean that one should understand this as, "After having been non-existent in its own nature (svalaksanatas)? " But this is to explicitely acknowledge that a future eye does not now
? exist.
3. As for the argument that "the past and the future exist, since the consciousness arises by reason of two things," should one understand that since the mental consciousness arises by reason of a mental organ and past, present, or future dharmas, these dharmas are a necessary condition for the mental consciousness to arise to the same extent as is the mental organ, that is, in the quality of "generating condition" (janakapratyaya)} Or are they solely "conditions in a quality of object" {alambanamatra, ii. 62c)? Evidently future dharmas, which will be produced after thousands of years or which will never be produced, are not the generating causes of a present mental consciousness. Evidently Nirvana, which is contradictory to all arising, cannot be a generating cause. It is enough that the dharmas are a condition for the arising of a consciousness in their qualtiy of being an object: let us admit that it is thus for future and past dharmas.
[The Sarvastivadins ask:] If the past and future dharmas do not exist, how can they be the objects of consciousness?
They exist in the manner in which they are taken as objects.
And in what manner are they taken as objects?
[They are taken as objects with the mark of the past and the
107
future, as having existed or as coming into existence. ] In fact, a
person who remembers a past visible object of a past sensation, does not see "this is;" but he remembers "this was;" the man who foresees the future does not see the future as existing, but he foresees it as coming into existence (bhavisyat). . .
Another point. Memory (which is a certain mental conscious- ness) grasps a visible thing that has been seen, a sensation that has been felt, that is, a visible object and a sensation in a present state of being. If a dharma which one remembers is, in fact, the one grasped by the memory, it is presently manifested; if it is not one that one grasps through the memory, then the memory conscious- ness certainly has a non-existent object.
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Would one say that past and future visible objects exist without being present, because past or future visible objects are nothing other than atoms (paramdnu) in a state of dispersion (viprakirna)? But we would say: (1) when the consciousness takes as its object, through memory or prevision, a past or future visible object, it does not take it as an object in a state of dispersion, but on the contrary, as an assembled collection {sarhcita) of atoms; (2) if a past or future visible object is the visible object of the present with this small difference that the atoms are dispersed, then the atoms are thus eternal; there is never either production (utpdda) nor destruction of them; there is only association and dispersion of the atoms. To maintain such a thesis is to adopt the doctrine of the Ajlvikas and to reject the Sutras of the Sugata: 'The eye, Oh Bhiksus, arising, does not come from any place . . . ;" (3) the argument does not hold for sensation and other "non-solid" (amurta) dharmas: not being combinations of atoms {aparamanu- samcita), we do not see how they can be, in the past or in the future, atoms in a state of dispersion. In fact, moreover, one remembers the sensation as it was experienced when it was present; one foresees it as it will be experienced when it will be present. If, past and future, it is such that one grasps it through memory or prevision, it would be eternal. Thus the mental consciousness termed "memory" has a non-existent object, namely a sensation that does not now presently exist.
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] If that which does not absolutely exist can be the object of consciousness, then a thirteenth dyatana (i. 14) could be the object of consciousness.
[The author answers:] Then what is, according to you, the object of a consciousness which says, "There is no thirteenth ayatana! "
It is its name, "thirteenth ayatana. "
? Then this object is only a name; the thing designated, the object, does not exist. Furthermore, what will be the presently existing object upon which the consciousness of the previous non-existence of sound bears?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] The object of this consciousness is the sound itself [and not its non-existence. ]
Then, anyone who is in quest of the non-existence of sound should make a noise!
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] No, for the sound of which there is previous non-existence, exists in a future state, and it is this sound in its future state which is the object of the previously non-existent consciousness.
But if future sound, of which there is previous non-existence, exists in fact, how can there be the idea that it does not now exist?
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] It does not presently exist {varta- mdno nasti)\ from whence there is the idea, "it does not now exist. "
You do not have the right to speak in this manner, for it is the same dharma which is past, present, and future. Or, if there is a difference between future and present sound, and the idea "it does not now exist" bears on this difference, then you recognize that the distinctive characteristic of the present exists after not having existed. We will therefore have to prove that existence (bhava) and non-existence (abhdva) can be an object of consciousness.
***
[The Vaibhasikas say:] If a non-existent thing can be an object of consciousness, how could the Bodhisattva in his last existence say, "It is impossible that I know, that I see that which does not exist in this world? "
The meaning of this text is clear: "I am not like other prideful (dbhimdnika, v. 10a) ascetics who attribute to themselves a
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108
non-existent illumination':
which is. " Moreover, to admit your thesis, the object of any idea (buddhi) would be real: if all that one thinks is real, there is no longer any place for doubt or examination (vimarsa); there would be no difference between the Bodhisattva and others.
Let us add moreover that ideas certainly have existent and
non-existent things for their object, for the Blessed One explicitly
said, "From the moment when I said to him, 'Come, Oh BhiksusP
(iv. 26c), my Sravaka is instructed from evening until morning: he
will know that which is as is (sacca satto jnasyati) and that which is
not as not, that which is not the highest (sa-uttara) as not the
highest, and that which is the highest (anuttara=Nirvdna) as the 10
Consequently the reason that the Sarvastivadins gave in favor of the existence of the past and the future, that is, "because the object of the consciousness is existent" does not hold.
4. The Sarvastivadins also deduce an argument from the result of action. But the Sautrantikas do not admit that a result arises directly from a past action. A result arises from a special state of the series (cittasarhtdnavifesdt), a state which proceeds from the action, as one shall see at the end of this work wherein we refute the doctrine of the Vatsiputriyas (dtmavddapratisedha, see iv. 85a).
But the masters who affirm the real existence {dravyatas) of the past and the future should also admit the eternity of the result: what efficacy {sdmarthya) can they attribute to the action? An efficacy with regard to production (utpdda)? An efficacy with regard to the action of making something present (vartamdmka- rana)?
a. This is to admit that arising exists after having been non-existent (abhutvd bhavati).
If you say that arising itself pre-exists, how can you attribute the efficacy of a thing to that same thing? You cannot but join the School of the Varsaganyas, "That which is, solely is; that which is not, solely is not; that which
110 is not, does not arise; and that which is, is not destroyed. "
highest. " (iv. l27d) 9
as for me, I only see as existing that
? b. What should we understand by "the action of making something present? "
Will this be the fact of drawing something to another place? We see three difficulties in this: (1) the result will thus be eternal; (2) how could the result, when it is non-material (aruupin), be achieved? ; and (3) movement would exist after having been non-existent.
Would this be the fact of modifying the unique or self nature of a pre-existent result (svabhavavisesana)? But is there not, in this thesis, the appearance of a modification previously non-existent?
*##
Consequently, the sarvastivada, "the doctrine of the existence of all," of the Sarvastivadins who affirm the real existence of the past and the future, is not good within Buddhism. It is not in this sense that one should understand sarvastivada. Good sarvastivada consists in affirming the existence of "all" by understanding the word "all" as Scripture understands it. How do the Sutras affirm that all exists? "When one says, 'all exists/ Oh Brahmins, this
111 refers to the twelve ayatanas: these are equivalent terms. "
Or rather, the "all" that exists is the three time periods. And it has been said how they exist: "That which has previously been, is the past. . . " (see above, p. 813).
But if the past and future do not exist, how can one be bound (samyukta) by a past or future klesa to a thing (vastu) which is past or future?
One is bound by a past klesa by reason of the existence, in the series, of an anusaya which has arisen from a past klesa; one is bound by a future klesa by reason of the existence of an anusaya which is the cause of the future anusaya of a klesa which has had or will have this thing for its object.
The Vaibhasikas say: "The past and the future truly exist. As
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regards that which cannot be explained, one should know that
27d. The nature of things is indeed profound;
112 certainly, it cannot be proven through reasoning. "
113 [Thus one need not deny the past and the future].
One can say that that which arises perishes: for example a visible. One can say that that which arises differes from that which perishes: in fact, that which arises is the future; that which perishes is the present. Time also arises, for that which is arising is
114
embraced within time, it has time for its nature; and a dharma
arises from time, by reason of the multiplicity of the moments of
115 future time.
We have thus finished with the problem presented to us by the theory of the anusayas.
***
116
When a person abandons an object through the disappear-
ance of the possession that he had of this object, is there for him "disconnection" from this object through the cutting off of the possession of the defilements which bears on this object? And inversely, when there is disconnection, is there abandoning?
When there is disconnection from an object, there is always an abandoning of this object; but one can have abandoning without disconnection.
28. When that which is to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering is abandoned, the ascetic remains in connection
? ^
The Latent Defilements 821
with it from the fact of the other universal defilements; when the first category is abandoned, he remains in connection with it from the fact of the other defilements
117 which have it as their object.
Let us suppose a person enters on to the path of the Seeing of Truths; the Seeing of Suffering has arisen in him, but not yet the
118
Seeing of Arising. He has abandoned the things (vastu) which
are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, but he is not yet disjoined from these things by this: for he continues to be bound to
119
these first things
whose abandoning depends on the Seeing of Arising and which are relative to these first things.
In the Path of Meditation wherein one sucessively expells nine categories (strong-strong, etc. ) of defilements, when the first category is abandoned and not the others, these other categories of defilements, which bear upon the first category, continue to bind. (vi. 33)
###
How many anusayas attach themselves (anuserate) to each object?
We would never finish were we to examine this problem in detail. The Vaibhasikas (in Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 449al6) give a summary exposition of this.
In general one can say that there are sixteen types of dharmas, objects to which the anusayas attach themselves: for each sphere there are five categories (categories to be abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, etc. ); plus the pure dharmas. The conscious- nesses are of the same sixteen types.
When we know which dharmas are the objects of which consciousness, we are then able to calculate how many anusayas
through the universal defilements (v. 12)
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attach themselves to these dharmas.
29. Abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and
Arising, abandoned through Meditation, the dharmas in
Kamadhatu are the sphere of three consciousnesses of this
sphere, of one consciousness of Rupadhatu and the pure
120 consciousness.
In all, these dharmas are the object of five consciousnesses. The three consciousnesses of Kamadhatu are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering, through the Seeing of Arising, and through Meditation {abhydsa = bhdvand). One consciousness of Rupadhatu is abandoned through Meditation.
30a-b. The same three categories of dharmas in Rupadhatu
are the object of three consciousnesses of Rupadhatu, three
of Kamadhatu, one of Arupyadhatu and the pure con-
121 sciousness.
The three consciousnesses of Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu are the same as above: they are abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and its Arsing, and through Meditation. Consciousness in Arupyadhatu is abandoned through Meditation. In all, these dharmas are the objects of eight consciousnesses.
30c-d. The same categories of dharmas in Arupyadhatu are the objects of three consciousnesses of the three spheres and pure conscousness.
The same three consciousnesses. In all, these dharmas are the object of ten consciousnesses.
31a-b. The dharmas abandoned through the Seeing of
? Extinction and the Path are all the objects of the same consciousnesses with the addition of the consciousness of their own category.
(a)The dharmas of Kamadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction are objects of the five consciousnesses as above, plus the consciousness abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction: in all six consciousnesses.
(b)The dharmas of Kamadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of the Path are objects of the five consciousnesses as above, plus the consciousness abandoned through Seeing the Path: in all six consciousnesses.
(c)The dharmas of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu are abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path: they are the objects, respectively, of nine and eleven consciousnesses.
31c-d. The pure dharmas are the object of the last three consciousnesses of the three spheres and of pure conscious- ness.
They are the objects of ten consciousnesses, the conscious- nesses of the three spheres abandoned through the Seeing of Extinction and the Path, through Meditation, and the pure consciousness.
Here are two summarizing slokas: "The dharmas of the three spheres abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Arising of Suffering and through Meditation, are, in the order of the spheres, the domain of five, of eight, of ten consciousnesses. " "To the abandoning through Seeing the Extinction of Suffering and the Path, add the mind of their class. The pure dharmas are the object of ten consciousnesses. "
Such are the sixteen types of dharmas, objects of sixteen types of consciousness. We shall now examine what anusaya attaches
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itself to what dharma.
A complete analysis would take us too far afield; we will
content ourselves with studying a typical case.
1. Let us choose, among the objects of attachment, agreeable sensation, and let us see how many anusayas attach themselves to it.
Agreeable sensation is of seven types: (1) belonging to Kamadhatu, to be abandoned through Meditation; (2-6) belonging to Rupadhatu, of five categories; and (7) pure.
When it is pure, the anusayas do not attach themselves to it, as we have shown.
When they belong to Kamadhatu, the anusayas abandoned through Meditation and all the universal anusayas attach them- selves to it.
When they belong to Rupadhatu, all the universal anusayas attach themselves to it.
2. How many anusayas attach themselves to the consciousness which has agreeable sensation for its object?
The consciousness which has agreeable sensation for its object is of twelve types: (1-4) belong to Kamadhatu, for categories of consciousness (excepting the consciousness abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering); (5-9) belong to Rupadhatu, five categories; (10-11) belong to Arupyadhatu, the consciousness abandoned through Seeing the Path and the one abandoned through Meditation; and (12) the pure consciousness.
Attaching themselves to it are, according to their types: 1. four categories of Meditation; anusaya of the sphere of Kamadhatu; 2. the anusayas of the sphere of Rupadhatu which have conditioned things for their object; 3. two categories of anusayas of the sphere of Arupyadhatu; and 4. the universal anusayas (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 452c20).
3. How many anusayas attach themselves to the consciousness
? which has for its object the consciousness having an agreeable sensation for its object?
The consciousness which has an agreeable sensation for its object, and which is of twelve types, is itself the object of a consciousness which can be of fourteen types, namely the twelve aforementioned types with the addition (13-14) of the conscious- nesses of the sphere of Arupyadhatu abandoned through the Seeing of Suffering and the Seeing of the Arising of Suffering.
Attaching themselves to this consciousness are, according to their types, the anusayas described above in the first two spheres, plus four categories in Arupyadhatu (by excluding the anusaya abandoned through the Seeing of the Extinction of Suffering).
The other dharmas (the twenty-two indriyas, i. 48c-d, etc. ) will 122
be examined on the basis of this example.
***
The mind is termed sanusaya, "havinganusaya" from the fact of the anusayas. Should we think that, necessarily, the anusayas
125
nourish themselves, and lodge in (anuserate) the sanusaya
mind?
Those which lodge in it are the non-abandoned anusayas, whose object is not abandoned (v. 61c-d), and which are associated with the mind in question.
Those which do not lodge in it are the abandoned anusayas which are associated with the mind in question.
32a-b. The defiled mind is sanusaya in two ways; the non-defiled mind solely from the fact of the anusayas which
124 lodge therein.
The defiled mind is sanusaya from the fact of the anusayas
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which lodge therein: the anusayas with which it is associated, whose object is not abandoned, which takes an object; and (2) from the fact of the anuiayas which are not therein: the abandoned anuiayas and that to which it is associated: for this mind continues to have them as companions.
The non-defiled mind is sanusaya from the fact of the anusayas which lodge therein: the non-abandoned anusayas which are associated with the mind.
##*
In what order are the ten anusayas produced (Vibhdsd, TD 27, p. 245b28 and following)?
Any one can arise after any one: there is thus no rule which applies to all of them. Nevertheless, for the order of their production:
32c. From moha9 there is doubt.
At first, bound by ignorance (moha=avidya)> a person is in confusion with respect to the Truths: he does not take pleasure in the Truth of Suffering; he does not admit it.
From this state of confusion, there arises doubt; he undertands the two thesis; he doubts whether suffering is true, or if non-suffering is true.
32d. From whence false views;
From doubt there arises false views: by reason of false teaching and false reflection, he comes to the judgement "This is not suffering. "
32e. From whence a belief in a self;
? From false view there arises the view of personality; for, not recognizing the skandhas as suffering, he considers these skandhas as constituting a "self. "
33a. From whence a belief in the extremes;
From whence there is the view of the two extremes, for a person, believing in a self, becomes attached to the idea of the eternity or the annihilation of the self.
33b. From whence the esteeming of morality and ascetic practices;
From this there is an esteeming of morality and practices considered to be a means of purification.
33c. From whence the esteeming of bad views;
From this, there is an esteeming of that which is inferior, the esteeming of what he considers as a means of purification.
33d. From whence lust and pride relative to one's own views;
From this there is attachment to one's own views, and pride and pleasure in these views.
33e. And hatred with respect to another:
From this there is dislike: for, quite full of his own views, he detests the views of others which are contrary to his own.
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According to other masters, there is hatred for one's own opinions when . one changes them; for lust and the other anusayas which are abandoned through the Seeing of the Truths are those which have for their object the person himself and his own views.
33f. Such is the order.
This is the order of the arising of the ten klesas, ***
How many causes give rise to the klesas?
34. Klesas [with complete causes] arise from the non-aban- doning of the anusaya, from the presence of their object,
125
For example, lust arises (1) when the anus aya of lust is non-abandoned--not-completely-known {aparijnata)--its opposi- tion not having arisen (v. 64); (2) when the dharmas which provoke the manifestation of lust, namely visible things, etc. , are found in the field of experience {abhasagata~visayarupata-apanna)\ and (3) when there is erroneous judgment.
T h e anus ay a is cause; t h e dharmas a r e its object; and incorrect judgment is its immediate preparation: three distinct forces.
The same holds for the other klesas
34a. With complete causes.
This is the case for the klesas which proceed from all causes. For, according to the School, a klesa can arise through the mere force of its object; as in the case of the Arhat who is subject to
and from erroneous judgment.
? falling away (vi. 58b).
In a Sutra, the Blessed One said that the ninety-eight anusayas, with the ten wrappings of attachment (the paryavasthanas), are made up of three cankerous influences (dsravas), the cankerous influence of objects of pleasure (kdmasrava), the cankerous influence of existence (bhavdsrava), and the cankerous influence of ignorance (avidydsrava); four floods (oghas), the flood of the objects of pleasure (kdmaugha), the flood of existence (bha- vaugha), the flood of views (drstyogha), and the flood of ignorance (avidhaugha); four yokes (yogas), the yoke of the objects of pleasure (kdmayoga), the yoke of existence (bhavayoga), the yoke of views (drstiyoga), and the yoke of ignorance (avidydyoga); and four clingings (updddnas), clinging to the objects of pleasure (kdmopdddna), the clinging to views (drsfyupdddna), the clinging to morality and ascetic practices (stlavratopadana), and the clinging to a belief in a self (atmavddopdddna).
***
What is the definition of the cankerous influences (dsravas)?
35a. In Kamadhatu, the defilements, with the exception of ignorance, but with the wrappings of attachment, consti- tute dsravas;
The klesas of Kamadhatu, with the exception of the five ignorances, plus the ten wrappings (patyavasthdnas, v. 47) make up forty-one things: this is the cankerous influence of the objects of pleasure.
35b. In Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu, only the anus ayas themselves constitute the cankerous influence of existen-
126 ce.
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But there are, in the two higher spheres, two wrappings,
127 namely torpor and dissipation (ii. 26a-c, v. 47). The Prakarana
says, "What is the cankerous influence of existence? With the exception of ignorance, it is the other connections (samyojanas), bonds (bandhanas), anusayas, upaklesas and wrappings (paryavas- thanas) of Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu. "
The Vaibhasikas of KaSmlr say that the wrappings of attach- ment are not mentioned as forming part of the cankerous influence of existence because, in the two higher spheres, they are
128 not independent.
##*
Why are the anusayas of the two higher spheres placed together in order to make one single cankerous influence of existence?
36a-b. They are morally neutral, proceed inwards, and belong to the stage of absorption: this is why they are put together.
They both present the threefold common characteristics of being morally neutral, of being turned inward (that is, of not depending on objects), and of belonging to the spheres of absorption: they are thus united into a single cankerous influence.
And again they are called the cankerous influence of existence for the same reason that one distinguishes the cankerous influence of existence (v. 2).
From the above, it results that the avidyds, "the ignorances," of the three spheres,--in all fifteen things,--(v. 4) constitute the cankerous influence of ignorance.
Why do the ignorances constitute a separate cankerous influence?
? 36c d. Ignorance is the root: it is thus said to constitute a
129 separate cankerous influence.
In the manner in which the cankerous influences are explained,
37a-b. So too for the floods and the yokes. But views constitute a separate flood and a separate yoke by reason of their acuteness.
The "floods" and the "yokes" are explained in the same manner. The cankerous influence of the objects of sensual pleasure (kdma-ogha) without views, is both the flood of the objects of sensual pleasure and the yoke of the objects of sensual pleasure; so too the cankerous influence of existence, without views, is both the flood of existence and the yoke of existence.
130
According to the School,
tic of sharpness that views constitute a separate flood and a separate yoke.
[Why are they not a separate cankerous influence? ]
37c-d. They are not a separate cankerous influence, because, without companions, they are not favorable to installation.
[We shall explain below, v. 40, the etymology of the word dsrava or cankerous influence. ]The dsravas are so called because they seat themselves (asayantUy dsravandm nirvacanam). Isolated (asahdya) views are not favorable to installation (dsana), being acute. Thus one does not make a separate place among the dsravas or cankerous influences for them; they figure in the category of the cankerous influences, but are not mixed with the other anusayas.
Therefore we have:
a. The flood of the objects of sensual pleasure is made up of five
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it is by reason of their characteris-
? 832 Chapter Five
lusts, five hatreds, five egotisms, four doubts, and ten wrappings: in all twenty-nine things.
