Jacques derrida, who was very much influenced by levinas,
elaborated
on him at this point.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
Because of its mystical foundations, the law is indeterminate and open towards any future applications.
The gospel actually confirms this when it refers to the law as the shadow of a justice to come: "The law is only a shadow of the good things that are coming, not the realities themselves.
for this reason it can never, by the same sac- rifices be repeated endlessly year after year, make perfect those who draw near to worship.
" (Hebr.
10; 1).
To automatically subsume particular cases under general rules is to violate their singularity.
it is to violate 'life', as Hegel would call it.
However, it is just because of their indeterminateness, that we need to reinterpret legal categories to conform to the case.
Just as we have to reinterpret the case to conform to legal categories.
in either case however, we need to refer to the law.
Because without any law the decision threatens to become unrestrained power and violence.
6. Tables Turned: Kierkegaard's alternative Christian Reading
The deadening force of spiritless legalism and slavish servility threatens every faith. it is not the exclusive 'privilege' of Jewish faith (or any other). in Paul, it is by means of a law that these inauthentic restrictions and determinations are abolished and negated. "everything is permissible for me" (1 Cor. 6; 12). Certainly a Christian is a servant to his neighbour, but without sacrificing his freedom, without which their can be no love. This also means that a Christian is in principle not bound by the opinions, the traditions and values of others (the objective spirit). "for why should my freedom be judged by another's conscience? " (1 Cor. 10; 29)
Those who will not live by the law shall die by the law. When Paul-- 'Paul the Jew'--says that one must live, not after the letter but after the spirit of the law, and that the righteous shall live through faith (that this is actual freedom and sovereignty) this is essentially an elaboration of a sentence in Habakuk 2; 4. in galatians, he tells us that this is something 'we' Jews already know. in Habakuk it is still without the help of Jesus (the mediator) that one is supposed to live by the law through faith alone
hegel's philosophy of judaism 149
(because we are all sinners and remain to be dependent on the mercy of god). The fulfilling of the law through faith is already an important theme in the Torah although at other places it merely stresses the command- ments. Within letters of Paul there is, to be sure, also much 'commanding Torah'. in addition, according to Paul it is in fact a law (the law of Christ) that delivers us from the law: "Carry each other's burdens, and in this way you will fulfil the law of Christ. " (gal. 6; 2) it is the 'good law', the 'law of love' that promises to fulfil the law (the entire law). The commandment of love liberates us from working under the curse of the law (works without faith) and commands us to open up to the love of god that mercifully does its work through us, his servants and instruments.
i will linger just a little longer on the relationship of law and love because Hegel's philosophy of Judaism very much concentrates on this subject; and there is--to my opinion--an important lesson to be learned here. in Kierkegaard's lutheran reading of Christianity, we find fur- ther reason to question the strong and hateful opposition to the divine command:
on the whole, it is unbelievable what confusion has entered the sphere of religion since the time when 'thou shalt' was abolished as the sole regulative aspect of man's relationship to god. This 'thou shalt' must be present in any determination of the religious. 33
although law and love are not the same and cannot be reconciled in an easy way, there is at least one important similarity in that love itself is the most important divine command; it is itself a kind of law. it is the law of the gospel; it is a law as law; an 'abstract law' as Hegel would have it:
But when the Pharisees heard that he had silenced the sadducees, they gath- ered together. and one of them, a lawyer [it. T. s. ] asked him a question to test him. "Teacher, which is the great commandment in the law? " and he said to him, "you shall love the lord your god with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the great and first command- ment. and a second is like it: you shall love your neighbor as yourself. on these two commandments depend all the law and the Prophets. " (matt. 22; 34-40)
The law as law initiates the teleological suspension of the ethical. it is in fact a law that repeats the old law in leviticus: "love your neighbour as
33 soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto death. A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening, H. Hong / e. Hong (eds. ), New Jersey: Princeton university Press 1980, p. 115. (sKs 11, 226)
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yourself. i am the lord. " (lev. 19; 18) in 'Kierkegaard' it is stressed that only love as law is the excess, the transcendence through which justice takes place. god is love. With god everything is possible (matt. 19; 26). everything, not only 'the real', the necessary or 'the possible', but also the impossible that transgresses the all too human, natural, the probable and actual. everything is possible for him who believes (mark 9; 23). for love realizes the impossible: forgiveness, love for god above all, and love for ones neighbour. Necessity's despair (this 'sickness unto death', as Kierkeg- aard names it) is to lack possibility. The 'abstract' law of love does not (in effect) destroy the law, but it perfects the law. Hegel's denunciation of the law-as-law, of the law of love, fails to appreciate this transcendent, typically Jewish import. His philosophical revocation of the law leads to the accommodation, the naturalization and neutralization of love. it leads to what is nothing more than a mere 'idea' of love; to the idea of love as recognition. Christian love however, is not simply continuous with nature and humanity. What presents itself as love, in form of human love, friend- ship and patriotism, is generally nothing more than a sublime form of egoism. seen closely, this love is merely self-love, erotic love or prefatory love, love for a preferred object (preferred only because it satisfies my needs), while the law-as-law reminds me that i must love my neighbour (every other without any restriction). love is a law and a duty. The com- mandment 'wrenches open' the lock of self-love. and only as law is love eternally secure and safe against the self-love, jealousy and hatred that reside within worldly love and recognition. 34
love is no friend of the community. love seeks congregation in the Kingdom of god (in heaven). even the church here on earth is not (not as a community) an appropriate object of love. The church is the mystical body of Christ, the 'community' of free and separate believers (who might not even know of the existence of their fellow travellers). Communal life is not so much the purpose of being, as it is merely an instrument for the single individual to inform his neighbour about god. The law of love sets each one apart with his conscience in relation to his personal god. The law itself sets him apart (coram Deo), to the 'detriment' of his involvement
34 "only when it is a duty to love, only then is love eternally secured against every change, eternally made free in blessed independence. " soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, H. Hong and e. Hong (eds. ), Princeton New york: Princeton uP 1995, p. 29. (sKs 9, 36) Cf. franz Rosenzweig, The star of Redemption, transl. W. W. Hallo, Notre dame london: university of Notre dame Press 1985, p. 214: "The love for god is to express itself in love for one's neighbor. it is for this reason that love of neighbor can and must be commanded. "
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in the merely general bonum commune. But this relation is not degrading, and it does not deny his freedom. on the contrary! only when one has become a Christian in becoming a person in a personal relationship to god, only thus, by way of 'the truth as an encounter' (cf. martin Buber), can one expect to be able to relate--in love--to one's neighbour. "eter- nity scatters the crowd by giving each an infinite weight, by making him heavy, as an individual. for what in eternity is the highest blessing, is also the deepest seriousness. What there, is the most blessed comfort, is also the most appalling responsibility. "35
only thus, alone before god, alone with his conscience, free and subject to no-one, is he a fully responsible servant to his neighbour. only thus can he be expected to be ready and 'open' to this absurd, teleological suspen- sion of the ethical (the immanent and 'relative') in which finally, Justice is to be found. Kierkegaard refers to the Jew, to abraham, the father of israel, as the father this faith. it is this faith in the divine command that makes us free and sovereign:
[The] self acquires a new quality or qualification in the fact that it is the self directly in the sight of god. This self is no longer the merely human self but is what i would call, hoping not to be misunderstood, the theological self, the self directly in the sight of god. and what an infinite reality this self acquires by being before god! a herdsman who (if this were possible) is a self only in the sight of cows is a very low self, and so also is a ruler who is a self in the sight of slaves--for in both cases the scale or measure is lacking. The child, who hitherto has had only the parents to measure himself by, becomes a self when he is a man by getting the state as a measure. 36
By getting this strange god and his divine command as a measure, an infi- nite accent falls upon the self. evans repeats after Kierkegaard: "a respect and reverence for transcendent divine commands in fact fosters a genuine autonomy; an individual who hears the call of god is an individual who may break with established social norms for the sake of the good. "37 god
35 soren Kierkegaard, Purity of heart is to will one thing, Radford: Wilder Publication 2008, p. 104.
36 Kierkegaard, Sickness unto death, p. 79. (sKs 11, 193)
37 C. stephen evans, Kierkegaard's ethic of love. Divine commands & moral obligations, oxford: oxford uP 2006, p. 304. in line with Kierkegaard, recent literature focused on this more positive interpretation of the divine command: Robert adams, 'divine commands and the social nature of obligation' in m. Beaty, C. fisher en m. Nelson (eds. ) Christian Theism and moral philosophy, macon: mercer uP 1998); 'Religious ethics in a pluralistic society', in: g. outka en J. P. Reeder (eds. ) Prospect for a Common Morality, Princeton: Princeton uP 1993. Philip Quin, 'The divine command ethics in Kierkegaard's Works of love', in: J. Jordan en d. Howard-snyder (eds. ), Faith, Freedom and Rationality, lanham:
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is not a ruthless Tiran who eliminates freedom: "but a ruler who extends to his subjects the dignity of becoming what we might call his partners. "38 Without the royal law, 'the good law', this thorn in the flesh, individual freedom remains nothing but an empty concept, and giving love withers away in desiring Eros, in humanism, 'reconciliation' and in the economy of the self.
Conclusion
as we have seen, the dialectical configuration of Hegel's speculations pre- cludes him from interpreting Jewish faith and religion in its own right. one possible objection to this critical evaluation of Hegel's account of Judaism remains to be discussed. Various scholars are of the opinion that his evaluation changed during the years, and that he did not sustain his clearly anti-semitic ideas characteristic of the early work. in the Philoso- phy of Right (1821), in a famous footnote to ? 270, Hegel speaks out for Jewish emancipation. The exclusion, he says, of Jews from civic life was the 'highest folly', and the emancipatory measures of 1812 (the Jews were given citizenship rights) were in fact 'wise and honourable'. many com- mentators have argued that this clearly shows how Hegel's perspective on Judaism had changed during the years from a negative to a positive approach. His state, it is thought, is indeed a state of reconciliation, and it is genuinely pluralistic and inclusive, fully recognizing the humanity of the Jews. "Hegel's state, as an articulated unity and totality, would affirm and preserve difference in its difference. "39
However, his straightforward aversion to Judaism and his support of civil equality are not necessarily inconsistent with each other. other explanations are possible and plausible. Hegel's praise of the emancipa- tion edict was less purely principled than Williams implies, and it was not simply a generous, non-reciprocal gift (with nothing in return), as has been shown recently by (among others) yovel and markell. 40 it was an
Rowman and littlefield 1996); 'Kierkegaard's Christian ethics', in: a. Hannay and g. marino (eds. ), The Cambridge companion to Kierkegaard, Cambridge: Cambridge uP 1998.
38 evans, Kierkegaard's ethic of love, p. 129.
39 Robert Williams, Hegel's Ethics of Recognition, Berkeley: uCP 1993, p. 333.
40 for a further account of the continuity between Hegel's early and mature positions,
see: yirmiyahu yovel, Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche and the Jews, university Park: Pennsyl- vania state uP 1998; yovel, 'Hegels Begriff der Religion und die Religion der erhabenheit', Theologie und Philosophie 51, no. 4 (1976): pp. 512-537; Patchen markell, Bound by Recogni- tion, Princeton: Princeton university Press 2003, pp. 123-151.
? hegel's philosophy of judaism 153
active effort to reshape Jewish identity, by making it more useful to the state, and by making it more in conformity to german culture. By granting Jews citizenship rights, the Jewish identity ('this state within a state') was to be weakened and dissolved, because their assimilation was a condition to the realization of the harmony and unity of the state:
far from being a simple 'release' or 'freigabe' that affirms Jews as coequal others in their difference, Jewish emancipation (both in history and for Hegel) was part of the process of nation- and state building in Prussia and other german lands; and even when it liberated Jews from some restric- tions, it also subjected them to novel forms of subordination precisely in order to secure the sovereign self-image of germans--albeit indirectly, by facilitating identification with a supposedly sovereign state. 41
as we have seen, Hegel's harsh judgment on Jewish faith comes down to his rejection of one of its most prominent characteristics: the divine com- mand. Judaism is a religion based upon obedience to authority, rather than upon ethics. This (supposedly) slave-like submission is exempli- fied by abraham, but also by the story of Job, whose self-renunciation in dust and ashes reflects the typically Jewish acknowledgment of the absolute sovereignty of the 'hidden god'. This theological spirit accounts for the spirit of parochialism and separatism that Hegel (systematically) attributes to Judaism, and that he regarded as a potential threat to the holiness and sovereignty of the state. as we have seen, Hegel's analysis certainly underwent some transformation, yet the modifications should not be overestimated. "Hegel's view of the limitations of Jewish theology was not substantially altered, nor was his view of its ultimate anachro- nism and the necessity of its supersession. "42
But what is the purpose of this critique, this re-evaluation of the Jew- ish pathos? Why should this 'Jewish Wisdom', this 'abstract universality' (l2 27, 683/575), be of any concern, not just to the any 'shareholder in the system' (Kierkegaard), but also to the more scrupulous and honest Hegel scholar? We are no abraham, isaac or sarah. Why would Job's self- renunciation have anything to do with modern ethics? of course, most of us will never have quite the same mystical experience of gods presence in the way abraham experienced it. However, a special revelation like the one he had does not seem to be the only way to experience the divine
41 markell, Bound by Recognition, p. 127. Cf. e. Benbassa and J. C. attias, Le Juif et l'autre, Paris: editions du Relie? 2002, pp. 110-135.
42 idem, p. 140.
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command and to appreciate its meaning. sometimes it is a text from the Bible that suddenly speaks to us. suddenly this text appears to be urgently relevant for the special circumstances in which we stand and feel obliged to act. in openness to the situation at hand, and in relation to the eternal perspective, we suddenly seem to 'see' what it is that we have to do; as if god himself whispered it to us by means of a divine command.
The relevancy of the divine commandment can also be seen in rela- tion to the epiphany of god in the command that is represented by the face of the other. This ethical dimension has been thematized in the philosophy of emmanuel levinas. one encounters the other face-to- face, that is, in the encounter with the face of the other: the widow, the orphan or the stranger (cf. lev. 18; 19, Jes. 2; 17, Jer. 7; 6, deutr. 27; 19). "it is always starting from the face, from the responsibility for the other, that justice appears. "43 Prior to the ontology of the subject, and prior to any conceptual and totalitarian onto-theology of god, the ethical relation, the primary experience of the encounter with the face installs in us an infinite responsibility.
Jacques derrida, who was very much influenced by levinas, elaborated on him at this point. 'every other is wholly other':
if god is completely other, the figure or name of the wholly other, then every other (one) is every (bit) other. Tout autre est tout autre. This formula disturbs Kierkegaard's discourse on one level while at the same time rein- forcing its most extreme ramifications. it implies that god, as the wholly other, is to be found everywhere there is something of the wholly other. and since each of us, everyone else, each other is infinitely other in its abso- lute singularity, inaccessible, solitary, transcendent, non-manifest, originally non-present to my ego [. . . ], then what can be said about abraham's relation to god can be said of my relation to every other (one) as every (bit) other, in particular my relation to my neighbour or my loved ones who are as inac- cessible to me, as secret and transcendent as yahweh. 44
of course, we are no abraham, isaac or sarah--who seem to have been directly in touch with their lord. We do however relate to their inspira- tion. even if we do not have faith in god as they had, even if he is absent to us and 'dead', god, the wholly-other never ceases to inspire ethics and philosophy. The day-to-day experience of the appeal of the face seems to
43 emmanuel levinas, Entre nous. On thinking-of-the-Other, transl. m. B. smith and B. Harshav, New york: Columbia university Press 1998, pp. 104, 107.
44 Jacques derrida, 'donner la mort' in: L'etique du don, Jacques Derrida et la pense? e du don, Paris: me? tailie? -Transition 1992, pp. 76-77; The gift of death, transl. david Wills, london / Chicago: university of Chicago Press 1995, pp. 77-78.
? hegel's philosophy of judaism 155
command us in this selfsame way. "What the knights of good conscience don't realize is that 'the sacrifice of isaac' illustrates [. . . ] the most com- mon and everyday experience of responsibility. "45 like the other, the other is infinitely other; its asymmetry forbids any reduction (negation) to sameness, and so it prohibits any ethics of recognition. The other is no other-self (an alter-ego or an extended self ) whose autonomous and totalitarian economy neatly accommodates and relativises the command as being merely a 'grammatical form'; an all too austere form, that as such is entirely irrelevant and totally unacceptable for modern, rational ethics. 46 We can only be expected to be able to love and serve (that is: to be truly sovereign in love and forgiveness), when we thus experience the other's commanding appeal to us.
? 45 derrida, ? donner la mort', p. 66; The gift of death, p. 67.
46 Cf. James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy, 2e ed. , New york: mcgraw Hill 1993, pp. 9-14; 44-50.
Hegel and tHe Roman Religion:
tHe Religion of expediency and puRposiveness
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1. introduction
already in the title of the chapter in which he deals with the Roman reli- gion, Hegel indicates that he considers this religion as a religion of 'expe- diency,' (Zweckma? ? igkeit) or--in the introductory remarks--as a religion of 'purposiveness. '1 as will be become clear in this contribution, Hegel actually in doing so captured the essence of the Roman religion quite well, this being acknowledged by subsequent modern Roman religious scholar- ship. 2 Hegel devotes the entire first section of his treatment of the Roman religion to this concept of purposiveness. gods are reduced to means, whereby the purposes for which the gods are served fall entirely within the human sphere. in Roman religion, the principle Do ut des prevails.
intertwined with this notion of expediency and purposiveness, Hegel treats the Roman religion as the religion in which the two previously discussed determinate religions, the greek and the Jewish religion, are united. Roman religion "comprised the religion of beauty and the religion of sublimity. " (l2 27, 687/579) in this unification, that obviously did not succeed very well, the ground is prepared for the christian religion: the
1 the term Zweckma? ? igkeit is translated both as 'expediency' and 'purposiveness. ' When used as a title for his treatment of Roman religion, it is translated by Hodgson as 'expedi- ency,' but in the textual exposition it is more commonly referred to as 'purposiveness' (and zweckma? ? ich as 'purposive'), thus preserving the affinity with 'purpose' (Zweck). literally, Zweckma? ? igkeit means 'conformity to an end or purpose. ' Hegel's use of the term is directly influenced by Kant's discussion of extrinsic purposiveness and natural teleology in The Cri- tique of Judgement, trans. J. c. meredith (oxford: oxford university press 2007), ? ? 63, 66, 79-86. since, in the context of Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion, Zweckma? ? igkeit refers to extrinsic rather than intrinsic purposiveness, 'expediency' is an appropriate trans- lation for it (cf. Hodgson in an editorial footnote in l2 m, 190; footnote 229).
2 Reinhard leuze, Die au? erchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel, go? ttingen: vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1975, p. 228 mentions g. mensching, Die Religion, Erscheinungsformen, Struk- turtypen und Lebensgesetze, stuttgart: schwab 1959, pp. 23-25, K. latte, Ro? mische Reli- gionsgeschichte, mu? nchen: Beck 19672, p. 47. all these authors refer positively to Hegel's characterization of the Roman religion as one of Zweckerfu? llung, that is: as a fulfilment of an aim.
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consummate (or revelatory, revealed, absolute) religion, in Hegel's view. this second major characteristic of the Roman religion as the breeding ground of christianity appears here, in that it produced a "monstrous mis- ery and a universal sorrow, a sorrow that prepared the birth pangs of the religion of truth. "3 in Hegel's view, the Roman religion as such served a higher purpose: a function that has to do with the world-historical role the Roman religion has played as the context in which christianity came to birth. 'purposiveness' gains therefore a much deeper meaning, that is: not only is purposiveness a central characteristic of the creed and the codes of Roman religion in which Do ut des prevails, but the Roman reli- gion as such served a higher meaning, a higher purpose: that of being the deliverer of the religion of true freedom and reconciliation between man and god.
in this contribution, an analysis will be made of the textual material that has come to us. Because Hegel never published a treatise--but undoubt- edly planned to, until his sudden death in november 1831--we can only construct his views from the text of Hegel's original (unpublished) manu- script of 1821, which served as the basis for his lectures, and from the transcriptions of the several lectures Hegel delivered on the philosophy of religion in the years 1824, 1827 and 1831. 4 although Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion remained relatively constant through the period in which Hegel lectured on the subject than that of any other religion, its exact rela- tion and function with regard to the previous determinate religions (espe- cially the greek and the Jewish) differed significantly. How this should be interpreted and understood, is our first task to be undertaken (2). next, an analysis is made of the content of Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion in these lectures (3). finally, a conclusion is reached in which the results of this inquiry into Hegel's view of the Roman religion are briefly summarized, in light of a reflection on the meaning of Hegel's perceptions for our present age (4).
3 l2 27, 699/591, footnote 544, which indicates that this text stems from the transcripts of Hegel's lecture of 1831, the last he was to give on the philosophy of religion. in this contribution, i will pay attention to the problem of the discrepancies between the several versions of Hegel's lectures; they have no serious consequences for Hegel's treatment-- and our understanding of it--of the Roman religion.
4 see for an extensive treatment of this problem: peter c. Hodgson, 'editorial introduc- tion', in: Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827, one-volume edition, ed. by peter c. Hodgson, oxford: clarendon press, 2006, pp. 7 ff.
? hegel and the roman religion 159
2. the formal treatment of the Roman Religion in the texts of 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831
The Manuscript of 1821
in part ii of the Manuscript of 1821, titled: Determinate Religion, Hegel describes the ways in which the concept of religion (as it was treated in part i, the Concept of Religion) is to be "grasped in its determinate aspects," that is: how these aspects constitute the "forms of consciousness of the absolute idea. "5 in fact, this part ii can be read as a phenomenology of religion, of how the concept actually took shape in concrete, historical religions. two sets of categorical principles were applied by Hegel to order these determinate religions, one internal and analytical, and one exter- nal. the internal set identifies three moments of religion: aspects that can be discerned in every historical religion under scrutiny. these are 1) the abstract or metaphysical concept of divinity, 2) the ways in which the divine is known representationally in concrete texts and symbols of the religion concerned and 3) the practical relationship in which communion with the divinity is established: the cultus of this religion. this division is applied more or less consequently in Hegel's treatment of all determinate religions; the passages on the Roman religion are also arranged in this threefold, internal classification: the first part bears the title The Concept of Purposiveness, the second part The Configuration of Gods and finally the third part The Cultus.
the external set, on the other side, arranges the whole part of the Deter- minate Religion into a triad corresponding to the fundamental moments of logic, these being: being, essence, and concept. 6 However, in the case of the determinate religions, these categories are applied in the mode of determinateness and finitude. these two are the key in which the moments of logic are tuned. the result is that the logical triad is oper- ated in the following way: 1) pre-reflective immediacy or undifferentiated substance (the oriental religions of nature), 2) differentiation in the form of particularity (the Jewish religion) and necessity (greek religion),7 and
5 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', p. 17.
6 this according to the structure of Hegel's Kleine Logik (the 'smaller logic', laid down in Hegel's Enzyklopa? die der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, Berlin 1831). see more on these fundamental notions the next paragraph, where we will discuss this Hegelian logic more extensively.
7 the title of this second part of the Determinate religion in the Manuscript however is The Religion of Sublimity and Beauty, but the themes of particularity and necessity are treated extensively in it.
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finally 3) external purposiveness (Roman religion). in contrast to Hegel's treatment of the oriental religions of nature, to which Hegel actually did pay not very much attention, his treatment of the Roman religion is quite extensive. under the title of The Religion of Expediency or Understanding, this religion is represented as the apotheosis of finitude, and thus pre- pares the transition from all the finite religions to the christian religion. 8
The Lectures of 1824
part ii of the 1824 lectures is rearranged and has gained a considerable volume, both in scope and content in comparison to the Manuscript. the most obvious structural difference is that Determinate religion is divided into two rather than three main sections. Jewish, greek, and Roman reli- gion are all included now in the second main part, which bears the title The Religions of Spiritual Individuality (leaving Immediate Religion, or Nature Religion under the practically same heading as he did previously), distin- guished according to the diverse ways in which divine purpose actualises itself in relation to finite spirit: as particular (Jewish), plural (greek) and universal (Roman). determinate religion no longer consists of an inner triad, as in: the nature religions, finite spirit, and external purposiveness, but now forms the first two parts of a much larger triad: nature religions, the religions of spiritual individuality, and consummate religion that cul- minates in christianity. 9 interesting to note is that this culmination does not take the shape of a progressive advancement, since finite religion ends in total decay, degeneration and death. the Roman religion is, in this scheme, exactly this ultimate, finite religion par excellence.
at the same time, however, Hegel altered the internal set of categori- cal principles significantly. Hegel drops entirely the analytical scheme of 'abstract concept', 'concrete representation' and 'community / cultus'-- obviously for the reason that it did not work out very well for the christian religion. He altered the inner triad that he used in the Manuscript into genuinely trinitarian moments, which can be identified as three elements of the self-development of the idea of god: a) the idea of god in and for itself (in the immanent trinity: symbolized by the figure 'father'), b) rep- resentation and appearance (creation, fall, and reconciliation, the work of the 'son'), c) the communion of faith among the believers (its origin, subsistence, and worldly actualization, which is the work of the 'spirit').
8 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', p. 17. 9 idem, p. 20.
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as far as the Roman religion is concerned, the internal structure of the chapter dealing with it assumed its definitive form, returning in all subse- quent lectures: a) The Concept of Necessity and External Purpose, b) The Configuration of the Gods, and c) The Cultus. However, Hegel's treatment of the actual content of the Roman religion did not change very much, as was the case with the greek religion. 10
The Lectures of 1827
Remarkably, a threefold distinction among the several forms of the Deter- minate Religion reminiscent of the Manuscript seemed to return in the lectures of 1827. However, the basis of the division is not any longer the logical categories of being, essence and concept, but rather the interplay of nature and spirit. Hegel was obviously unable to provide a convinc- ing justification for this logic-inspired categorization, and resorted to a structure in which the Roman religion gained once again a moment of its own. the three stages that Hegel now presents in these 1827 lectures are: 1) religion as the unity of the spiritual and the natural (Immediate or Nature Religion), 2) the elevation of the spiritual above the natural (The religion of the Greeks and the Jews),11 and 3) the religion in which purposiveness is not yet spiritual (The Religion of Expediency: Roman Religion). this last religion can also be labelled the religion of fate or destiny, because it is devoid of any spirit whatsoever. 12 this aspect is reminiscent of the title under which the Roman religion was treated in the Manuscript, that is: The Religion of Expediency and Understanding.
The Lectures of 1831
many more innovations occurred in part ii, due to the fact that Hegel was obviously not satisfied with his treatment of the Determinate Religion. the threefold division of the Manuscript and and the lectures of 1827 was retained, although no longer based either on the dialectic of being, essence and concept or on the interplay between nature and spirit. Rather the operative triad is based on a new paradigm, that of immediacy, rupture, and reconciliation. these categories are less based on typically
10 idem, p. 21.
11 actually, the title as a whole is: The Elevation of the Spiritual above the Natural: the Religion of the Greeks and the Jews. note that the sequence of the treatment of the Jewish and the greek religion is reversed.
12 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', p. 23.
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logic concepts, but rather descriptive of the general life of the concept and of the dialectic of consciousness--a dialectic that is taken into the divine life as it unfolds phenomenologically in the apparition of deter- minate religions and becomes genuinely trinitarian only in the christian religion. first, as natural religion, there exists a relationship of immediacy between consciousness and its object. in fact, according to Hegel, this is only the case in magic, which is not yet properly religious. Religion only emerges with the inward cleavage or rupture of consciousness, so that consciousness is aware of the gulf between its own transitory being and that of god as absolute power. the third stage entails the overcoming of this cleavage by way of a reconciliation of consciousness and its object in a higher, more mediated level. moreover, it is on this level that freedom becomes actual for the first time.
in this phase, the subject knows himself to be free in relation to the divine object. 13 this is the religion of freedom proper or greek religion. However, since the subject has not yet passed through the infinite antith- esis between good and evil, and since the gods are not yet infinite spirit, the reconciliation that is tried here, is not complete. nor is it completed by Roman religion, which results instead in infinite unhappiness, anguish and servitude--indeed the birth pangs of the religion of true freedom and true reconciliation. interesting to note is that the Roman religion is included under the category of 'freedom'--which is a definitely more benevolent characterisation than earlier ones: as a religion of the under- standing, of finitude, ending in total decay, degeneration, death, fate and destiny, devoid of spirit. 14
With regard to the Roman religion, our conclusion so far should be that only the formal place and role of the Roman religion as a transi- tional religion between all other determinate religions and christianity has remained constant. in all texts, Roman religion is the last and ultimate representative of the determinate religion as such.
13 a more precursory, transitional phase occurs as one in which, in reaction against the confusion of the natural and the spiritual in the previous, unmediated phase, subjectivity seeks to establish itself in its unity and universality. Hegel here discusses the religion of the good (persian and Jewish), the religion of anguish (phoenician), and the religion of ferment (egyptian).
14 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', pp. 24, 25.
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3. an analysis of the content of Hegel's treatment of the Roman Religion in the texts of 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831
Introduction
as already has been said, Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion in all texts is quite steady, with the exception of the Manuscript of 1821, which is much more elaborated. the subsequent texts are much briefer, and only highlight the main points discussed in the Manuscript. in fact, Hegel's interpretation of the Roman religion remained more constant through the eleven-year period of his lectures than that of any other religion. Hegel was thoroughly familiar with Roman authors and draws a great deal on them. among the secondary sources, he relied mostly on Karl philipp moritz's Anthousia; oder, Roms Alterthu? mer (part i 1791, part ii 1796),15 although he was in fundamental disagreement with it. Hegel worked out his own vision in great detail in the Manuscript, and in the subsequent lectures simply summarized the essential aspects. 16 therefore, we will concentrate ourselves on the Manuscript first, as well as on the other sub- sequent lectures.
The Manuscript of 1821
Hegel devoted some fourteen sheets on the Roman religion in the manu- script, which is nearly half the number used for the whole of part iii on the christian religion. He seemed to have been preoccupied in 1821 with the decadence of the Roman religion and empire, to which he compared his own age in rather apocalyptical tones at the end of his lectures. 17 more importantly was, however, that he was working out for the first time his own interpretation of this religion, especially of the fundamental differ- ences between greek and Roman religion. Hegel opposed the commonly held view that the two were essentially similar. in fact, his most important secondary source, moritz's Anthousia, in which this view was condensed, was used by Hegel as his primary target. Hegel used the detailed informa- tion on the Roman gods and festivals provided by moritz to refute moritz. finally, Hegel took a great deal of effort to understand the transition from
15 yvonne pauly (ed. ), Sa? mtliche Werke; kritische und kommentierte Ausgabe, tu? bingen: niemeyer 2005.
16 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', loc. cit.
17 Reference to these apocalyptical tones is made in l3 m, 159-160/95-96.
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the Roman to the christian religion, and in what way it closes the cycle of the finite religions.
the transition from greek (and Jewish) religion to Roman religion, with which Hegel's analysis starts, represents for Hegel the transition from essence to concept, and more specifically, from necessity to pur- pose. necessity, according to Hegel, has no inner purpose, but only the formal requirement that there be some content, outcome or activity.
6. Tables Turned: Kierkegaard's alternative Christian Reading
The deadening force of spiritless legalism and slavish servility threatens every faith. it is not the exclusive 'privilege' of Jewish faith (or any other). in Paul, it is by means of a law that these inauthentic restrictions and determinations are abolished and negated. "everything is permissible for me" (1 Cor. 6; 12). Certainly a Christian is a servant to his neighbour, but without sacrificing his freedom, without which their can be no love. This also means that a Christian is in principle not bound by the opinions, the traditions and values of others (the objective spirit). "for why should my freedom be judged by another's conscience? " (1 Cor. 10; 29)
Those who will not live by the law shall die by the law. When Paul-- 'Paul the Jew'--says that one must live, not after the letter but after the spirit of the law, and that the righteous shall live through faith (that this is actual freedom and sovereignty) this is essentially an elaboration of a sentence in Habakuk 2; 4. in galatians, he tells us that this is something 'we' Jews already know. in Habakuk it is still without the help of Jesus (the mediator) that one is supposed to live by the law through faith alone
hegel's philosophy of judaism 149
(because we are all sinners and remain to be dependent on the mercy of god). The fulfilling of the law through faith is already an important theme in the Torah although at other places it merely stresses the command- ments. Within letters of Paul there is, to be sure, also much 'commanding Torah'. in addition, according to Paul it is in fact a law (the law of Christ) that delivers us from the law: "Carry each other's burdens, and in this way you will fulfil the law of Christ. " (gal. 6; 2) it is the 'good law', the 'law of love' that promises to fulfil the law (the entire law). The commandment of love liberates us from working under the curse of the law (works without faith) and commands us to open up to the love of god that mercifully does its work through us, his servants and instruments.
i will linger just a little longer on the relationship of law and love because Hegel's philosophy of Judaism very much concentrates on this subject; and there is--to my opinion--an important lesson to be learned here. in Kierkegaard's lutheran reading of Christianity, we find fur- ther reason to question the strong and hateful opposition to the divine command:
on the whole, it is unbelievable what confusion has entered the sphere of religion since the time when 'thou shalt' was abolished as the sole regulative aspect of man's relationship to god. This 'thou shalt' must be present in any determination of the religious. 33
although law and love are not the same and cannot be reconciled in an easy way, there is at least one important similarity in that love itself is the most important divine command; it is itself a kind of law. it is the law of the gospel; it is a law as law; an 'abstract law' as Hegel would have it:
But when the Pharisees heard that he had silenced the sadducees, they gath- ered together. and one of them, a lawyer [it. T. s. ] asked him a question to test him. "Teacher, which is the great commandment in the law? " and he said to him, "you shall love the lord your god with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the great and first command- ment. and a second is like it: you shall love your neighbor as yourself. on these two commandments depend all the law and the Prophets. " (matt. 22; 34-40)
The law as law initiates the teleological suspension of the ethical. it is in fact a law that repeats the old law in leviticus: "love your neighbour as
33 soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto death. A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening, H. Hong / e. Hong (eds. ), New Jersey: Princeton university Press 1980, p. 115. (sKs 11, 226)
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yourself. i am the lord. " (lev. 19; 18) in 'Kierkegaard' it is stressed that only love as law is the excess, the transcendence through which justice takes place. god is love. With god everything is possible (matt. 19; 26). everything, not only 'the real', the necessary or 'the possible', but also the impossible that transgresses the all too human, natural, the probable and actual. everything is possible for him who believes (mark 9; 23). for love realizes the impossible: forgiveness, love for god above all, and love for ones neighbour. Necessity's despair (this 'sickness unto death', as Kierkeg- aard names it) is to lack possibility. The 'abstract' law of love does not (in effect) destroy the law, but it perfects the law. Hegel's denunciation of the law-as-law, of the law of love, fails to appreciate this transcendent, typically Jewish import. His philosophical revocation of the law leads to the accommodation, the naturalization and neutralization of love. it leads to what is nothing more than a mere 'idea' of love; to the idea of love as recognition. Christian love however, is not simply continuous with nature and humanity. What presents itself as love, in form of human love, friend- ship and patriotism, is generally nothing more than a sublime form of egoism. seen closely, this love is merely self-love, erotic love or prefatory love, love for a preferred object (preferred only because it satisfies my needs), while the law-as-law reminds me that i must love my neighbour (every other without any restriction). love is a law and a duty. The com- mandment 'wrenches open' the lock of self-love. and only as law is love eternally secure and safe against the self-love, jealousy and hatred that reside within worldly love and recognition. 34
love is no friend of the community. love seeks congregation in the Kingdom of god (in heaven). even the church here on earth is not (not as a community) an appropriate object of love. The church is the mystical body of Christ, the 'community' of free and separate believers (who might not even know of the existence of their fellow travellers). Communal life is not so much the purpose of being, as it is merely an instrument for the single individual to inform his neighbour about god. The law of love sets each one apart with his conscience in relation to his personal god. The law itself sets him apart (coram Deo), to the 'detriment' of his involvement
34 "only when it is a duty to love, only then is love eternally secured against every change, eternally made free in blessed independence. " soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, H. Hong and e. Hong (eds. ), Princeton New york: Princeton uP 1995, p. 29. (sKs 9, 36) Cf. franz Rosenzweig, The star of Redemption, transl. W. W. Hallo, Notre dame london: university of Notre dame Press 1985, p. 214: "The love for god is to express itself in love for one's neighbor. it is for this reason that love of neighbor can and must be commanded. "
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in the merely general bonum commune. But this relation is not degrading, and it does not deny his freedom. on the contrary! only when one has become a Christian in becoming a person in a personal relationship to god, only thus, by way of 'the truth as an encounter' (cf. martin Buber), can one expect to be able to relate--in love--to one's neighbour. "eter- nity scatters the crowd by giving each an infinite weight, by making him heavy, as an individual. for what in eternity is the highest blessing, is also the deepest seriousness. What there, is the most blessed comfort, is also the most appalling responsibility. "35
only thus, alone before god, alone with his conscience, free and subject to no-one, is he a fully responsible servant to his neighbour. only thus can he be expected to be ready and 'open' to this absurd, teleological suspen- sion of the ethical (the immanent and 'relative') in which finally, Justice is to be found. Kierkegaard refers to the Jew, to abraham, the father of israel, as the father this faith. it is this faith in the divine command that makes us free and sovereign:
[The] self acquires a new quality or qualification in the fact that it is the self directly in the sight of god. This self is no longer the merely human self but is what i would call, hoping not to be misunderstood, the theological self, the self directly in the sight of god. and what an infinite reality this self acquires by being before god! a herdsman who (if this were possible) is a self only in the sight of cows is a very low self, and so also is a ruler who is a self in the sight of slaves--for in both cases the scale or measure is lacking. The child, who hitherto has had only the parents to measure himself by, becomes a self when he is a man by getting the state as a measure. 36
By getting this strange god and his divine command as a measure, an infi- nite accent falls upon the self. evans repeats after Kierkegaard: "a respect and reverence for transcendent divine commands in fact fosters a genuine autonomy; an individual who hears the call of god is an individual who may break with established social norms for the sake of the good. "37 god
35 soren Kierkegaard, Purity of heart is to will one thing, Radford: Wilder Publication 2008, p. 104.
36 Kierkegaard, Sickness unto death, p. 79. (sKs 11, 193)
37 C. stephen evans, Kierkegaard's ethic of love. Divine commands & moral obligations, oxford: oxford uP 2006, p. 304. in line with Kierkegaard, recent literature focused on this more positive interpretation of the divine command: Robert adams, 'divine commands and the social nature of obligation' in m. Beaty, C. fisher en m. Nelson (eds. ) Christian Theism and moral philosophy, macon: mercer uP 1998); 'Religious ethics in a pluralistic society', in: g. outka en J. P. Reeder (eds. ) Prospect for a Common Morality, Princeton: Princeton uP 1993. Philip Quin, 'The divine command ethics in Kierkegaard's Works of love', in: J. Jordan en d. Howard-snyder (eds. ), Faith, Freedom and Rationality, lanham:
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is not a ruthless Tiran who eliminates freedom: "but a ruler who extends to his subjects the dignity of becoming what we might call his partners. "38 Without the royal law, 'the good law', this thorn in the flesh, individual freedom remains nothing but an empty concept, and giving love withers away in desiring Eros, in humanism, 'reconciliation' and in the economy of the self.
Conclusion
as we have seen, the dialectical configuration of Hegel's speculations pre- cludes him from interpreting Jewish faith and religion in its own right. one possible objection to this critical evaluation of Hegel's account of Judaism remains to be discussed. Various scholars are of the opinion that his evaluation changed during the years, and that he did not sustain his clearly anti-semitic ideas characteristic of the early work. in the Philoso- phy of Right (1821), in a famous footnote to ? 270, Hegel speaks out for Jewish emancipation. The exclusion, he says, of Jews from civic life was the 'highest folly', and the emancipatory measures of 1812 (the Jews were given citizenship rights) were in fact 'wise and honourable'. many com- mentators have argued that this clearly shows how Hegel's perspective on Judaism had changed during the years from a negative to a positive approach. His state, it is thought, is indeed a state of reconciliation, and it is genuinely pluralistic and inclusive, fully recognizing the humanity of the Jews. "Hegel's state, as an articulated unity and totality, would affirm and preserve difference in its difference. "39
However, his straightforward aversion to Judaism and his support of civil equality are not necessarily inconsistent with each other. other explanations are possible and plausible. Hegel's praise of the emancipa- tion edict was less purely principled than Williams implies, and it was not simply a generous, non-reciprocal gift (with nothing in return), as has been shown recently by (among others) yovel and markell. 40 it was an
Rowman and littlefield 1996); 'Kierkegaard's Christian ethics', in: a. Hannay and g. marino (eds. ), The Cambridge companion to Kierkegaard, Cambridge: Cambridge uP 1998.
38 evans, Kierkegaard's ethic of love, p. 129.
39 Robert Williams, Hegel's Ethics of Recognition, Berkeley: uCP 1993, p. 333.
40 for a further account of the continuity between Hegel's early and mature positions,
see: yirmiyahu yovel, Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche and the Jews, university Park: Pennsyl- vania state uP 1998; yovel, 'Hegels Begriff der Religion und die Religion der erhabenheit', Theologie und Philosophie 51, no. 4 (1976): pp. 512-537; Patchen markell, Bound by Recogni- tion, Princeton: Princeton university Press 2003, pp. 123-151.
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active effort to reshape Jewish identity, by making it more useful to the state, and by making it more in conformity to german culture. By granting Jews citizenship rights, the Jewish identity ('this state within a state') was to be weakened and dissolved, because their assimilation was a condition to the realization of the harmony and unity of the state:
far from being a simple 'release' or 'freigabe' that affirms Jews as coequal others in their difference, Jewish emancipation (both in history and for Hegel) was part of the process of nation- and state building in Prussia and other german lands; and even when it liberated Jews from some restric- tions, it also subjected them to novel forms of subordination precisely in order to secure the sovereign self-image of germans--albeit indirectly, by facilitating identification with a supposedly sovereign state. 41
as we have seen, Hegel's harsh judgment on Jewish faith comes down to his rejection of one of its most prominent characteristics: the divine com- mand. Judaism is a religion based upon obedience to authority, rather than upon ethics. This (supposedly) slave-like submission is exempli- fied by abraham, but also by the story of Job, whose self-renunciation in dust and ashes reflects the typically Jewish acknowledgment of the absolute sovereignty of the 'hidden god'. This theological spirit accounts for the spirit of parochialism and separatism that Hegel (systematically) attributes to Judaism, and that he regarded as a potential threat to the holiness and sovereignty of the state. as we have seen, Hegel's analysis certainly underwent some transformation, yet the modifications should not be overestimated. "Hegel's view of the limitations of Jewish theology was not substantially altered, nor was his view of its ultimate anachro- nism and the necessity of its supersession. "42
But what is the purpose of this critique, this re-evaluation of the Jew- ish pathos? Why should this 'Jewish Wisdom', this 'abstract universality' (l2 27, 683/575), be of any concern, not just to the any 'shareholder in the system' (Kierkegaard), but also to the more scrupulous and honest Hegel scholar? We are no abraham, isaac or sarah. Why would Job's self- renunciation have anything to do with modern ethics? of course, most of us will never have quite the same mystical experience of gods presence in the way abraham experienced it. However, a special revelation like the one he had does not seem to be the only way to experience the divine
41 markell, Bound by Recognition, p. 127. Cf. e. Benbassa and J. C. attias, Le Juif et l'autre, Paris: editions du Relie? 2002, pp. 110-135.
42 idem, p. 140.
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command and to appreciate its meaning. sometimes it is a text from the Bible that suddenly speaks to us. suddenly this text appears to be urgently relevant for the special circumstances in which we stand and feel obliged to act. in openness to the situation at hand, and in relation to the eternal perspective, we suddenly seem to 'see' what it is that we have to do; as if god himself whispered it to us by means of a divine command.
The relevancy of the divine commandment can also be seen in rela- tion to the epiphany of god in the command that is represented by the face of the other. This ethical dimension has been thematized in the philosophy of emmanuel levinas. one encounters the other face-to- face, that is, in the encounter with the face of the other: the widow, the orphan or the stranger (cf. lev. 18; 19, Jes. 2; 17, Jer. 7; 6, deutr. 27; 19). "it is always starting from the face, from the responsibility for the other, that justice appears. "43 Prior to the ontology of the subject, and prior to any conceptual and totalitarian onto-theology of god, the ethical relation, the primary experience of the encounter with the face installs in us an infinite responsibility.
Jacques derrida, who was very much influenced by levinas, elaborated on him at this point. 'every other is wholly other':
if god is completely other, the figure or name of the wholly other, then every other (one) is every (bit) other. Tout autre est tout autre. This formula disturbs Kierkegaard's discourse on one level while at the same time rein- forcing its most extreme ramifications. it implies that god, as the wholly other, is to be found everywhere there is something of the wholly other. and since each of us, everyone else, each other is infinitely other in its abso- lute singularity, inaccessible, solitary, transcendent, non-manifest, originally non-present to my ego [. . . ], then what can be said about abraham's relation to god can be said of my relation to every other (one) as every (bit) other, in particular my relation to my neighbour or my loved ones who are as inac- cessible to me, as secret and transcendent as yahweh. 44
of course, we are no abraham, isaac or sarah--who seem to have been directly in touch with their lord. We do however relate to their inspira- tion. even if we do not have faith in god as they had, even if he is absent to us and 'dead', god, the wholly-other never ceases to inspire ethics and philosophy. The day-to-day experience of the appeal of the face seems to
43 emmanuel levinas, Entre nous. On thinking-of-the-Other, transl. m. B. smith and B. Harshav, New york: Columbia university Press 1998, pp. 104, 107.
44 Jacques derrida, 'donner la mort' in: L'etique du don, Jacques Derrida et la pense? e du don, Paris: me? tailie? -Transition 1992, pp. 76-77; The gift of death, transl. david Wills, london / Chicago: university of Chicago Press 1995, pp. 77-78.
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command us in this selfsame way. "What the knights of good conscience don't realize is that 'the sacrifice of isaac' illustrates [. . . ] the most com- mon and everyday experience of responsibility. "45 like the other, the other is infinitely other; its asymmetry forbids any reduction (negation) to sameness, and so it prohibits any ethics of recognition. The other is no other-self (an alter-ego or an extended self ) whose autonomous and totalitarian economy neatly accommodates and relativises the command as being merely a 'grammatical form'; an all too austere form, that as such is entirely irrelevant and totally unacceptable for modern, rational ethics. 46 We can only be expected to be able to love and serve (that is: to be truly sovereign in love and forgiveness), when we thus experience the other's commanding appeal to us.
? 45 derrida, ? donner la mort', p. 66; The gift of death, p. 67.
46 Cf. James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy, 2e ed. , New york: mcgraw Hill 1993, pp. 9-14; 44-50.
Hegel and tHe Roman Religion:
tHe Religion of expediency and puRposiveness
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1. introduction
already in the title of the chapter in which he deals with the Roman reli- gion, Hegel indicates that he considers this religion as a religion of 'expe- diency,' (Zweckma? ? igkeit) or--in the introductory remarks--as a religion of 'purposiveness. '1 as will be become clear in this contribution, Hegel actually in doing so captured the essence of the Roman religion quite well, this being acknowledged by subsequent modern Roman religious scholar- ship. 2 Hegel devotes the entire first section of his treatment of the Roman religion to this concept of purposiveness. gods are reduced to means, whereby the purposes for which the gods are served fall entirely within the human sphere. in Roman religion, the principle Do ut des prevails.
intertwined with this notion of expediency and purposiveness, Hegel treats the Roman religion as the religion in which the two previously discussed determinate religions, the greek and the Jewish religion, are united. Roman religion "comprised the religion of beauty and the religion of sublimity. " (l2 27, 687/579) in this unification, that obviously did not succeed very well, the ground is prepared for the christian religion: the
1 the term Zweckma? ? igkeit is translated both as 'expediency' and 'purposiveness. ' When used as a title for his treatment of Roman religion, it is translated by Hodgson as 'expedi- ency,' but in the textual exposition it is more commonly referred to as 'purposiveness' (and zweckma? ? ich as 'purposive'), thus preserving the affinity with 'purpose' (Zweck). literally, Zweckma? ? igkeit means 'conformity to an end or purpose. ' Hegel's use of the term is directly influenced by Kant's discussion of extrinsic purposiveness and natural teleology in The Cri- tique of Judgement, trans. J. c. meredith (oxford: oxford university press 2007), ? ? 63, 66, 79-86. since, in the context of Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion, Zweckma? ? igkeit refers to extrinsic rather than intrinsic purposiveness, 'expediency' is an appropriate trans- lation for it (cf. Hodgson in an editorial footnote in l2 m, 190; footnote 229).
2 Reinhard leuze, Die au? erchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel, go? ttingen: vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1975, p. 228 mentions g. mensching, Die Religion, Erscheinungsformen, Struk- turtypen und Lebensgesetze, stuttgart: schwab 1959, pp. 23-25, K. latte, Ro? mische Reli- gionsgeschichte, mu? nchen: Beck 19672, p. 47. all these authors refer positively to Hegel's characterization of the Roman religion as one of Zweckerfu? llung, that is: as a fulfilment of an aim.
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consummate (or revelatory, revealed, absolute) religion, in Hegel's view. this second major characteristic of the Roman religion as the breeding ground of christianity appears here, in that it produced a "monstrous mis- ery and a universal sorrow, a sorrow that prepared the birth pangs of the religion of truth. "3 in Hegel's view, the Roman religion as such served a higher purpose: a function that has to do with the world-historical role the Roman religion has played as the context in which christianity came to birth. 'purposiveness' gains therefore a much deeper meaning, that is: not only is purposiveness a central characteristic of the creed and the codes of Roman religion in which Do ut des prevails, but the Roman reli- gion as such served a higher meaning, a higher purpose: that of being the deliverer of the religion of true freedom and reconciliation between man and god.
in this contribution, an analysis will be made of the textual material that has come to us. Because Hegel never published a treatise--but undoubt- edly planned to, until his sudden death in november 1831--we can only construct his views from the text of Hegel's original (unpublished) manu- script of 1821, which served as the basis for his lectures, and from the transcriptions of the several lectures Hegel delivered on the philosophy of religion in the years 1824, 1827 and 1831. 4 although Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion remained relatively constant through the period in which Hegel lectured on the subject than that of any other religion, its exact rela- tion and function with regard to the previous determinate religions (espe- cially the greek and the Jewish) differed significantly. How this should be interpreted and understood, is our first task to be undertaken (2). next, an analysis is made of the content of Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion in these lectures (3). finally, a conclusion is reached in which the results of this inquiry into Hegel's view of the Roman religion are briefly summarized, in light of a reflection on the meaning of Hegel's perceptions for our present age (4).
3 l2 27, 699/591, footnote 544, which indicates that this text stems from the transcripts of Hegel's lecture of 1831, the last he was to give on the philosophy of religion. in this contribution, i will pay attention to the problem of the discrepancies between the several versions of Hegel's lectures; they have no serious consequences for Hegel's treatment-- and our understanding of it--of the Roman religion.
4 see for an extensive treatment of this problem: peter c. Hodgson, 'editorial introduc- tion', in: Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. The Lectures of 1827, one-volume edition, ed. by peter c. Hodgson, oxford: clarendon press, 2006, pp. 7 ff.
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2. the formal treatment of the Roman Religion in the texts of 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831
The Manuscript of 1821
in part ii of the Manuscript of 1821, titled: Determinate Religion, Hegel describes the ways in which the concept of religion (as it was treated in part i, the Concept of Religion) is to be "grasped in its determinate aspects," that is: how these aspects constitute the "forms of consciousness of the absolute idea. "5 in fact, this part ii can be read as a phenomenology of religion, of how the concept actually took shape in concrete, historical religions. two sets of categorical principles were applied by Hegel to order these determinate religions, one internal and analytical, and one exter- nal. the internal set identifies three moments of religion: aspects that can be discerned in every historical religion under scrutiny. these are 1) the abstract or metaphysical concept of divinity, 2) the ways in which the divine is known representationally in concrete texts and symbols of the religion concerned and 3) the practical relationship in which communion with the divinity is established: the cultus of this religion. this division is applied more or less consequently in Hegel's treatment of all determinate religions; the passages on the Roman religion are also arranged in this threefold, internal classification: the first part bears the title The Concept of Purposiveness, the second part The Configuration of Gods and finally the third part The Cultus.
the external set, on the other side, arranges the whole part of the Deter- minate Religion into a triad corresponding to the fundamental moments of logic, these being: being, essence, and concept. 6 However, in the case of the determinate religions, these categories are applied in the mode of determinateness and finitude. these two are the key in which the moments of logic are tuned. the result is that the logical triad is oper- ated in the following way: 1) pre-reflective immediacy or undifferentiated substance (the oriental religions of nature), 2) differentiation in the form of particularity (the Jewish religion) and necessity (greek religion),7 and
5 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', p. 17.
6 this according to the structure of Hegel's Kleine Logik (the 'smaller logic', laid down in Hegel's Enzyklopa? die der Philosophischen Wissenschaften, Berlin 1831). see more on these fundamental notions the next paragraph, where we will discuss this Hegelian logic more extensively.
7 the title of this second part of the Determinate religion in the Manuscript however is The Religion of Sublimity and Beauty, but the themes of particularity and necessity are treated extensively in it.
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finally 3) external purposiveness (Roman religion). in contrast to Hegel's treatment of the oriental religions of nature, to which Hegel actually did pay not very much attention, his treatment of the Roman religion is quite extensive. under the title of The Religion of Expediency or Understanding, this religion is represented as the apotheosis of finitude, and thus pre- pares the transition from all the finite religions to the christian religion. 8
The Lectures of 1824
part ii of the 1824 lectures is rearranged and has gained a considerable volume, both in scope and content in comparison to the Manuscript. the most obvious structural difference is that Determinate religion is divided into two rather than three main sections. Jewish, greek, and Roman reli- gion are all included now in the second main part, which bears the title The Religions of Spiritual Individuality (leaving Immediate Religion, or Nature Religion under the practically same heading as he did previously), distin- guished according to the diverse ways in which divine purpose actualises itself in relation to finite spirit: as particular (Jewish), plural (greek) and universal (Roman). determinate religion no longer consists of an inner triad, as in: the nature religions, finite spirit, and external purposiveness, but now forms the first two parts of a much larger triad: nature religions, the religions of spiritual individuality, and consummate religion that cul- minates in christianity. 9 interesting to note is that this culmination does not take the shape of a progressive advancement, since finite religion ends in total decay, degeneration and death. the Roman religion is, in this scheme, exactly this ultimate, finite religion par excellence.
at the same time, however, Hegel altered the internal set of categori- cal principles significantly. Hegel drops entirely the analytical scheme of 'abstract concept', 'concrete representation' and 'community / cultus'-- obviously for the reason that it did not work out very well for the christian religion. He altered the inner triad that he used in the Manuscript into genuinely trinitarian moments, which can be identified as three elements of the self-development of the idea of god: a) the idea of god in and for itself (in the immanent trinity: symbolized by the figure 'father'), b) rep- resentation and appearance (creation, fall, and reconciliation, the work of the 'son'), c) the communion of faith among the believers (its origin, subsistence, and worldly actualization, which is the work of the 'spirit').
8 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', p. 17. 9 idem, p. 20.
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as far as the Roman religion is concerned, the internal structure of the chapter dealing with it assumed its definitive form, returning in all subse- quent lectures: a) The Concept of Necessity and External Purpose, b) The Configuration of the Gods, and c) The Cultus. However, Hegel's treatment of the actual content of the Roman religion did not change very much, as was the case with the greek religion. 10
The Lectures of 1827
Remarkably, a threefold distinction among the several forms of the Deter- minate Religion reminiscent of the Manuscript seemed to return in the lectures of 1827. However, the basis of the division is not any longer the logical categories of being, essence and concept, but rather the interplay of nature and spirit. Hegel was obviously unable to provide a convinc- ing justification for this logic-inspired categorization, and resorted to a structure in which the Roman religion gained once again a moment of its own. the three stages that Hegel now presents in these 1827 lectures are: 1) religion as the unity of the spiritual and the natural (Immediate or Nature Religion), 2) the elevation of the spiritual above the natural (The religion of the Greeks and the Jews),11 and 3) the religion in which purposiveness is not yet spiritual (The Religion of Expediency: Roman Religion). this last religion can also be labelled the religion of fate or destiny, because it is devoid of any spirit whatsoever. 12 this aspect is reminiscent of the title under which the Roman religion was treated in the Manuscript, that is: The Religion of Expediency and Understanding.
The Lectures of 1831
many more innovations occurred in part ii, due to the fact that Hegel was obviously not satisfied with his treatment of the Determinate Religion. the threefold division of the Manuscript and and the lectures of 1827 was retained, although no longer based either on the dialectic of being, essence and concept or on the interplay between nature and spirit. Rather the operative triad is based on a new paradigm, that of immediacy, rupture, and reconciliation. these categories are less based on typically
10 idem, p. 21.
11 actually, the title as a whole is: The Elevation of the Spiritual above the Natural: the Religion of the Greeks and the Jews. note that the sequence of the treatment of the Jewish and the greek religion is reversed.
12 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', p. 23.
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logic concepts, but rather descriptive of the general life of the concept and of the dialectic of consciousness--a dialectic that is taken into the divine life as it unfolds phenomenologically in the apparition of deter- minate religions and becomes genuinely trinitarian only in the christian religion. first, as natural religion, there exists a relationship of immediacy between consciousness and its object. in fact, according to Hegel, this is only the case in magic, which is not yet properly religious. Religion only emerges with the inward cleavage or rupture of consciousness, so that consciousness is aware of the gulf between its own transitory being and that of god as absolute power. the third stage entails the overcoming of this cleavage by way of a reconciliation of consciousness and its object in a higher, more mediated level. moreover, it is on this level that freedom becomes actual for the first time.
in this phase, the subject knows himself to be free in relation to the divine object. 13 this is the religion of freedom proper or greek religion. However, since the subject has not yet passed through the infinite antith- esis between good and evil, and since the gods are not yet infinite spirit, the reconciliation that is tried here, is not complete. nor is it completed by Roman religion, which results instead in infinite unhappiness, anguish and servitude--indeed the birth pangs of the religion of true freedom and true reconciliation. interesting to note is that the Roman religion is included under the category of 'freedom'--which is a definitely more benevolent characterisation than earlier ones: as a religion of the under- standing, of finitude, ending in total decay, degeneration, death, fate and destiny, devoid of spirit. 14
With regard to the Roman religion, our conclusion so far should be that only the formal place and role of the Roman religion as a transi- tional religion between all other determinate religions and christianity has remained constant. in all texts, Roman religion is the last and ultimate representative of the determinate religion as such.
13 a more precursory, transitional phase occurs as one in which, in reaction against the confusion of the natural and the spiritual in the previous, unmediated phase, subjectivity seeks to establish itself in its unity and universality. Hegel here discusses the religion of the good (persian and Jewish), the religion of anguish (phoenician), and the religion of ferment (egyptian).
14 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', pp. 24, 25.
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3. an analysis of the content of Hegel's treatment of the Roman Religion in the texts of 1821, 1824, 1827 and 1831
Introduction
as already has been said, Hegel's treatment of the Roman religion in all texts is quite steady, with the exception of the Manuscript of 1821, which is much more elaborated. the subsequent texts are much briefer, and only highlight the main points discussed in the Manuscript. in fact, Hegel's interpretation of the Roman religion remained more constant through the eleven-year period of his lectures than that of any other religion. Hegel was thoroughly familiar with Roman authors and draws a great deal on them. among the secondary sources, he relied mostly on Karl philipp moritz's Anthousia; oder, Roms Alterthu? mer (part i 1791, part ii 1796),15 although he was in fundamental disagreement with it. Hegel worked out his own vision in great detail in the Manuscript, and in the subsequent lectures simply summarized the essential aspects. 16 therefore, we will concentrate ourselves on the Manuscript first, as well as on the other sub- sequent lectures.
The Manuscript of 1821
Hegel devoted some fourteen sheets on the Roman religion in the manu- script, which is nearly half the number used for the whole of part iii on the christian religion. He seemed to have been preoccupied in 1821 with the decadence of the Roman religion and empire, to which he compared his own age in rather apocalyptical tones at the end of his lectures. 17 more importantly was, however, that he was working out for the first time his own interpretation of this religion, especially of the fundamental differ- ences between greek and Roman religion. Hegel opposed the commonly held view that the two were essentially similar. in fact, his most important secondary source, moritz's Anthousia, in which this view was condensed, was used by Hegel as his primary target. Hegel used the detailed informa- tion on the Roman gods and festivals provided by moritz to refute moritz. finally, Hegel took a great deal of effort to understand the transition from
15 yvonne pauly (ed. ), Sa? mtliche Werke; kritische und kommentierte Ausgabe, tu? bingen: niemeyer 2005.
16 Hodgson, 'editorial introduction', loc. cit.
17 Reference to these apocalyptical tones is made in l3 m, 159-160/95-96.
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the Roman to the christian religion, and in what way it closes the cycle of the finite religions.
the transition from greek (and Jewish) religion to Roman religion, with which Hegel's analysis starts, represents for Hegel the transition from essence to concept, and more specifically, from necessity to pur- pose. necessity, according to Hegel, has no inner purpose, but only the formal requirement that there be some content, outcome or activity.
