That being said it is now of primal
importance
to take this into account.
Hegel Was Right_nodrm
?
?
?
?
46
Hegel was right
cancelled. Thinking is what is universal in and by itself. Living on such grounds is the highest humility. Humility means to make aside every distinction, every peculiarity, and to submerge oneself into the universal. (EGP 282)
"Philosophy is not something particular as an artwork" (GP II 23).
Into that position of universality, not of originality, this present book steps forward. For that reason, even though I think like this, even though this is my system, this book presents itself as an interpretation of another philosopher who, on his part, incorporates Plato and Aris- totle and all the history of Philosophy. I prove thereby that I actually believe that truth is knowable to the human mind, for I make clear that it has certainly been known before.
The only way to interpret Hegel is to give more weight to demonstra- tions than to interpretations; otherwise, one does not make Philosophy but literary criticism. Hence our title is Hegel was right. There are certain questions, especially those which are naturally linked with the sub- sequent development of sciences after Hegel's death, in which Hegel only outlined the path which demonstrations ought to follow; the present book cannot leave that only as an outline, which means I will not ex- pose how Hegel thinks without engaging my own views. The only way to do this is to rely only on what is demonstrative, that is to say, on what is truly philosophical.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? chapter ii
Why the subject?
? ? What we will put forward on chapter three in regard to the on- tical consistence of the subject is not only the key to Hegel's philosophy, as he repeatedly warns, but the key to all Phi- losophy and all sciences, and it is the most important discovery that the human mind has ever made in all history.
However, there is a certain school of thought which obstinately re- fuses to take the subject into account, and which even says that science should forbid itself from making any consideration on it. Our present chapter examines this resistance and demonstrates that, far from being scientific, this resistance is scientifically untenable because, once we do away with the subject, it becomes impossible to provide scientific con- cepts with any meaning at all. If we do away with the subject, sciences do not know what they are speaking of. Our present chapter also dis- pels one of the most widespread and inveterate prejudices there are: the belief in the empirical origin of concepts.
1. Something about modem phySicS
We must first say that our century has not contributed with any single wonder to this parade of obstinacies which deny the subject. In fact,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 48 Hegel was right
in order to avoid it, those positions claim to rely only on the physi- cal manifestations and therefore reduce all realities --even the psychic and biological ones-- to physical processes, in the hope that this sys- tematic and "objective" approach will scare away the subject once and for all. But Physics itself has proven these hopes barren by reinserting the observing subject into the picture, and this is not something trivial but the absolutely decisive factor that determines the characteristics of any observed objects or phenomena: both relativity and quantum physics make all objective data to depend on the subject. Here we see the subject reappearing where they never expected him to be.
One can barely restrain the laughs by reading Taylor and Wheeler when they say: "The word 'observer' is a shorthand way of speaking about the whole collection of recording clocks associated with one inertial frame of reference. " (1966, 19).
They fill up every inch of the universe with watches and rods whose masses and fields would distort even the most robust and delicate physi- cal phenomenon, leaving it unrecognizable and unobservable --which was the only thing at stake. Watches and rods without masses and fields are a physical impossibility; consequently, the unperturbed phe- nomena of which Taylor and Wheeler speak are not effectively observable and hence inexistent to modern physics. Taylor and Wheeler have not yet come to understand that, according to the theory of relativity and to quantum physics, any speculation about phenomena that is not re- ally observable falls outside the realm of the physical sciences.
The acknowledged physic C. F. von Weizsa? cker sums up very well the present state of affairs of his discipline: "An object is an object for subjects in the world. This would be made even clearer if the concept of object could be reduced to decidable alternatives. " (Bastin 1971, 253)
Avoiding the subject is thus reduced to a simple wishful thinking that lacks any kind of scientificity.
Leon Brillouin provides a more extended analysis of the situation, but the quote here presented is worthwhile examining; I display it here for the best interest of my readers who are not as well acquainted with modern physics:
I become very suspicious whenever I hear the word 'given'. There is only one occasion when it has a definite meaning; this is in the statement of a problem given by an examiner to some helpless students. In this situation the velocity is supposed to be exactly the given velocity, with no possible error or
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 49
discussion. But in real life, this never happens. If I observe an unknown mov- ing object in the sky, nobody can give me its velocity. Whether it be a star or a flying saucer, I have to measure the velocity by some experimental device. I can use optical signals, which would be reflected from the unknown object, to measure the delays, the Doppler shifts, etc. From these measurements, I can compute the velocity, but I should always be aware of the fact that these very experiments always perturb the motion. The velocity after observation is not the same as before observation. Every experiment requires some coupling between the observer and the observed object,. . . (1970, 4).
The photons with which I have to bomb the object to make it visible exert force upon it and modify its state. And I cannot talk of an unper- turbed object because "unperturbed" means 'not observed', something which does not exist to Physics.
To modern physics there are no objects without a subject. If someone believed that by relying on Physics one would put the subject away, his disappointment could not be greater.
As we will later see, what Hegel has to say in order to make the study of the subject scientifically unavoidable is ten thousand times deeper than the entire contribution of Physics in our century. It is not a matter of chance that Physics has finally consented to be more reflexive than the physics of Newton. However, it is timely to point out that the negation of the Newtonian absolute movement and space, a negation which is the point of departure of the theory of relativity, was already implicit in Hegel: "In the empty space there is no movement, for there is only movement in relation to a different place. " (NH 126).
According to Newton and his master and namesake Burrow, although there is no other object towards which the studied object approaches or from which it goes away, the said object would be moving, for its movement is absolute. It takes place in the absolute space which is the sensorium Dei. In other words, although it does not approach to or go away from any other thing, God would see that object moving.
The idea according to which the absolute space is the sensorium Dei goes back to Henry More, and in a certain way, to Pierre Gassendi. But we must take into account that in times of Newton everybody believed that movement was something absolute. And they still think the same thing, all those who have neglected relativity in order to remain attached to the myths of common-sense. Since the times of classic physics, Hegel disproved that belief with the mere analysis of the idea of movement:
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 50 Hegel was right
"Ultimately, it is absolutely clear that movement as such only has meaning and existence in a system of many bodies, and by the way, many bodies which stand in reciprocal relation according to different determinations" (EPW 269A).
For the same reason, Hegel rejects the first law of Newton: "a recti- linear infinite movement is a void mental monster; because movement is always towards something" (GP II 193).
Moreover, Hegel holds that the physics of his times would have avoided those phantasmagorias if they had taken the time to read well Aristotle: "Aristotle shows that the void suppresses movement [. . . ] In movement the body --as distinct-- is a positive relation, not towards nothing. " (GP II 185).
And a little before that point in his book, he says: "Aristotle deals then with the void space, an ancient question for which Physics still cannot find a solution. They could do that if they read Aristotle, but for them thought and Aristotle are things which have absolutely no existence in the world. "
Already with his commentary on Zeno, Hegel had explained the relativity principle of movement: "And this is also true: that movement is definitively relative. " (GP I 315).
In order to reject the notions of absolute space and time as unsci- entific, Hegel did not have to wait until Michelson's experiment: he only needed to realize that those were mere abstractions. Evidently, an abstraction cannot pretend to have the same status of reality: "The word absolute has often no other meaning the word abstract; thus, abso- lute space and absolute time are no other thing that abstract space and abstract time" (EPW 115A).
We have displayed these quotations in order to show that the link between modern physics and Hegel's philosophy is not fortuitous. Our author already knew how unscientific and ungrounded it is in Physics to project as real something not observable.
2. a baSic principLe
Before venturing into the refutation of the different ways out that have been invented to avoid the study of the subject, we beg the reader to consider the following reflection as fundamental, for even though it is obvious in itself, it has been neglected during the last centuries.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 51
If a word does not have an empirical meaning, the origin of the con- cept in question cannot be sensation, and hence it is necessary to look in the subject itself both for the origin and the meaning of it.
For all what follows in this book, the above reflection is essential.
It cannot be stated that the origin of such a concept is sensation, for the simple reason that the origin would have to be an empirical data, but precisely no empirical data corresponds here to the concept.
For example, the concept of 'point', in which definition enters the idea of unextendedness, could have not been caused evidently by any sensible data or by imagination, for every empirical data is extended and every image of fantasy is extended as well; consequently, the ori- gin and the meaning itself of the concept 'point' should be looked for in the subject.
On the other hand, all sciences use at least some concepts whose meaning is not empirical. The science that raises fewer doubts in this regard is Physics, but apart from the example I just mentioned, we already saw that Margenau listed only some of the few concepts which are not empirical: mass, energy, charge, force, wavelength, strength, potential, probability, amplitude, crystal, magnetic field, atom, photon, electron, meson. (1978, 98)
The following text of Hegel deals with Mathematics, but it mentions several terms employed by Physics as well:
Other mathematical determinations such as infinite, relations, infinitesimal, factors, potencies, etcetera, have their true concept in Philosophy itself; and it is wrong to believe that Philosophy should extract and take them borrowed from Mathematics, where they are accepted without concept and often without any meaning at all; these concepts must wait until Philoso- phy gives them their sense and justification. (EPW 259A)
It seems evident to me that none of these terms have an empirical origin.
Einstein, the most acclaimed physic of our century, goes far beyond Margenau. His forceful statement should not be so zealously hidden away from the public by the apologists of the empirical sciences:
And let us say this in regard of the historical development. Hume clearly understood that certain concepts, for instance, that of causality, cannot be ex- tracted from the material of experience by logical methods. Kant, convinced
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 52
Hegel was right
of the indispensable character of certain concepts, considered them --just as they are selected-- as necessary premises of any kind of thought and dis- tinguished them from concepts of empirical origin. But I am convinced that such differentiation is mistaken and does not approach the problem in a natural way. From a logical point of view, all concepts, even the closer ones to experience, are free constructions, just as the concept of causality, which was the starting point of the dispute. (Schilpp, I 1969, 12).
According to Einstein, not only some concepts of Physics but every single concept lacks an empirical origin.
3. what everyone underStandS?
That being said it is now of primal importance to take this into account. More often than not, one believes to 'know' the meaning of a certain word, because one thinks that the meaning is a determined empirical data which is easily observable. But in the cases that the word being considered does not have an empirical meaning, it would be unjusti- fied to suppose, without further investigation, that 'we know what it means'. It is by no means true that we already 'understand' its meaning; we may be imagining something, but that image is not the meaning in question, for imagination can only contain combinations of empirical impressions and accumulate the data provided by the senses; however, if the concept does not have an empirical meaning, no empirical im- pression or combination of them could provide it. Let us go back to the above mentioned example. There are some people who believe they know what the meaning of the word 'point' is; but what they imagine is a speck, not a point; if it were unextended, as it should be to be a point, they could not imagine it. As a matter of fact, they do not know what the word point means; they do not have the concept.
We must look for the meaning and for the concept in the knowing subject.
Let us put another example. In the context of discussion of modern pluridimensional, non- Euclidean spaces, a great number of mathema- ticians and physics do easily away with the problem by saying that space is a group of points. However, since they do not know what a point is, this so-called definition lacks any kind of meaning. The situa- tion gets even worse if they try to define point, for they will irremediably
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 53
say that it is an unextended part of space. They define point in terms of space, and they define space in terms of point. The circularity of this argument is manifest. We do not gain any knowledge by means of this procedure, and clearly, one will notice that these people do not know what they are speaking of.
Here is where what we were discussing occurs: they ease themselves by believing that the meaning of the word space is a certain empiri- cal data that is easily verifiable. An opponent would probably answer to this objection something like 'you are not going to deny that I am looking at the space between my body and the wall in front of me'.
Of course, I will deny this. What this person is seeing is the wall in front of him. Space as such is not observable; it is not an empirical data. Since it is not an empirical data and they do not know how to pro- vide it with meaning by other means, they do not know what they are
speaking about.
One brief digression: if modern physics boasts their rejection of
non-observable entities, one wonders why they keep speaking of spaces, let alone pluridimensional ones. The only justifiable criterion would be the 'necessary factor to explain observable data'. But we will see in our fifth chapter what the Science of Logic has to say about those explicative intended factors.
It is the right time to do away with a false way out. Scientists will admit that many concepts do not have an empirical meaning, and yet they say that they are inferred from empirical data. I do not deny here the logical legitimacy of the inference in question; but it is obvious that, in order to infer certain concepts, we must first need to know what they mean. Precisely, in this case, the meaning does not coincide with any empirical data, for it is necessary to infer it since the meaning is not an object of empirical experience; if it was an empirical data, we would not have the need to infer it. In some of the premises of the inference process, one of these concepts --which are not derived from empirical experience-- appears suddenly: How is it possible to handle it if we do not know what it means? What it seemed to be a way out only makes more acute the need to look in the knowing subject for the origin and the meaning of concepts.
We do not need here to stop for long in order to examine another way out which is identical to the previous one. According to this po- sition, there are some things that are not empirical in themselves but only in their effects. God and the soul also have sensible effects, but that
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 54 Hegel was right
is not enough to know what those terms mean. The question is not about their empirical effects: what is here discussed is if the entity itself to which its causality certain effects are attributed is empirical or not. Although we do not put into question the legitimacy of such attribu- tion, it is impossible to know which entity they are speaking of as long as we do not know the meaning of the word they designate it with. Moreover, to judge if the said entity can be the cause of such effects, we need to understand beforehand the word that designates it. The fact that the said entity could have or not such effects does not make us know what the meaning of the word in question is.
Now, he firstly hinted and then explicitly said that, more often than not, the men of the street or the scientist do not know what they are speaking of; they do not have the concept; they do not understand what they are saying. It sounds severe, but it should not offend any- body because this is not any kind of truth: it is a truth that it is urgent to straighten out despite its harshness. "To know what one says is much more unusual as what one thinks, and one is very unjust by calling severe the reproach of not knowing what one says" (BS 249); "ordinarily, one calls concepts that which is nothing more than a reverie" (WL II 281).
Given that everybody is able to use a certain term not only in private but in a conversation or in a discussion with others, they think that be- cause of that they understand it and that they have its corresponding meaning, when in fact they only have an image product of their fan- tasy. For instance, as we have previously demonstrated, it seems that common people do not have the concept of 'point'; however, it is obvi- ous that we can all use the word point very skillfully. The same happens with the word space, whose meaning is ignored even by physics.
Let us put an entirely different example: the word 'work'. We all commonly use it without any mayor trouble. Nevertheless, I dare not only all workers but economists and labor lawyers as well, to define 'work'. I have not yet found anyone who has the concept of it. Everybody supposes that they understand this word, but some imagine a certain manual activity (v. g. , a man digging a whole with a shovel) and others imagine a still man performing a certain intellectual activity. The most common thing to happen is that each person imagines something re- lated to their own trade or profession.
One only needs a handful of insisting questions to dispel any at- tempt to define work. Is effort, for instance, something essential for an
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 55
activity to be called work? On the one hand, if one answers affirma- tively, then the really skillful expert who enjoys his own professional efficacy and performs his job without fatigue would not be actually working despite the fact that his productivity is superior to that of the majority; on the other hand, if one answers negatively, the millionaire swimmer, who is in his own private pool trying to beat the crawl Olym- pic records, would be working, --which is an utterly absurd premise.
Does work, in order to be that, need to produce something? We come across here with the physiocrat theses which posit that nature is the only one that produces more than what it plants, and that work only modifies and does not produce things. According to Physics, nothing in fact is ever produced, because the existing matter in the universe does not increase nor decrease. And even leaving this aside, it is obvi- ous that the work of fishermen does not produce anything; they only collect fish from the sea. The same goes for miners and harvesters. Should one person argue that by working one produces exchange value and not something material, that person would confirm in the first place that the majority of people do not know what work is, for evidently, almost the largest part of humankind does not know what exchange value is, and the few who say they do, frequently do not know it. In the second place, it would turn out that a group of workers, who produced a great stock of merchandize which did not find demand in the market and ended up rotting out, would have not worked at all.
Does it lie in the essence of work to modify an object or a material substance? To accept this would be to rule out intellectual work, and that would confirm that one does not have the general concept of work, which was the only thing at stake here. In the second place, and this carries even stronger consequences, the distinction between work and consumption would disappear, for consumption also modifies things. And in the third place, since the fishers, the miners and the harvesters do not modify but only transport matter, it would turn out that the activity they perform is not work. And it would be ridiculous to say that the only thing that matters is the changing of the place in question, for then the thief would be performing a job, with the same right to social remuneration as the workers in the fabrics. In addition, the dis- tinction between work and rest would disappear, for he who goes out to take a walk changes the place where his clothes are in.
The result is here the same as in regard to space and point: he who believes to comprehend and know the meaning of a certain word by
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 56 Hegel was right
using it skillfully deceives himself. What he has is an image "for ordi- nary life does not have concepts but only imaginations" (WL II 357). And this image is not the meaning of the word in question, because it is too particular and because other people have a completely different image in their heads when they use the same word.
From this follows that the resource employed sometimes by scien- tists in order to elude the obligation of defining a term is completely mistaken. It is an appeal that is based on what 'everybody understands for. . . '. But it is false that everybody understands. This resource does not lead to the concept nor does it make the scientist in question know what he is talking about.
There would also be a more immediate objection: if everybody un- derstands it, then why don't they say it?
Before examining the next escapist resource it is convenient to state that recent experimental psychology confirms entirely Hegel's observa- tion in the sense that no one should be offended when told that he does not understand and even lacks the concept in question. Let us quote textually the acclaimed author of the treatise Concept Learning, psycholo- gist Earl B. Hunt, although his terminology is not the same as Hegel's:
Conceptual classification may be contrasted with another type of classi- fying behavior called discrimination learning. In discrimination learning, objects are classified on the basis of directly perceived properties such as physical size or shape. The usual explanation for discrimination learning is that the sensory features of any stimulus are matched to what is already remembered of these features, and that the learner ? s response becomes associated with them. The response thus classifies the stimulus. In discrimi- nation learning, subjective representations of immediate and past stimuli seem directly to indicate concrete, physical features (in contrast to the more abstract nature of concept formation). (EB 22, 897, 2).
While human beings popularly are called abstract thinkers, many of the classifications people make clearly seem to be concrete discriminations. Indeed, people may use the same term either in a discriminative or con- ceptual way. A child uses the term policeman in discriminating a man in distinctive uniform, while a lawyer may have a concept of a civil servant charged with enforcing criminal codes. (EB 22, 898, 1)
In this example, the professional studies of the lawyer would have lead to the acquisition of the concept, while the child, a typical example
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 57
of what Hegel calls 'ordinary life', proceeds by means of this association of empirical features called imagination: but the child and the lawyer em- ploy the same word and use it skillfully. It becomes obvious that using a word skillfully does not imply by any means that we have the belong- ing concept and that we understand. Let us repeat this with Hegel: "To know what one says is much rarer than what is thought" (BS 249).
What Hunt has summarized for us is the result of a large series of experiments. Nevertheless, it is evident that animals also learn how to discriminate and yet they do not have concepts. If we distinguish between science and technique, between knowledge and skills, it be- comes obvious that mere empirical discrimination is enough for ani- mals to possess a series of techniques which in many cases are more refined than ours. As we will later see, the technical success boasted by our empirical sciences does not demonstrate by any means that these disciplines understand.
4. Leaving termS undefined?
It is likely that the writers of treatises who leave some terms undefined refer to what "everybody understands". It is likely because, if they were not referring to this, their readers and hearers would have their mind in blank after reading or hearing those terms, they would not have any- thing to hold on to, and they would not know how to cling on to the signals they receive. Although the scientist does not make his reference explicit, his audience notices the reference to what 'everybody under- stands'. However, since they do not have the concept, the words are not actually referring to anything.
Mario Bunge claims that undefined terms "are not therefore obscure or undeterminate, since they are specified by a number of formulas" (1973, 9).
But this is clearly untenable, for the signs in a formula are even more undetermined when no one points out, by other means, what does each sign stands for, and thus the entire problem reappears out of the blue. By saying what do each sign stand for, we would not employ again undefined terms, unless we want to incur in another manifest, vicious circle. Mario Bunge himself later recognizes that: "But mathematical form alone won't tell us anything about the physical meaning of the formula". (1973, 30)
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Hegel was right
cancelled. Thinking is what is universal in and by itself. Living on such grounds is the highest humility. Humility means to make aside every distinction, every peculiarity, and to submerge oneself into the universal. (EGP 282)
"Philosophy is not something particular as an artwork" (GP II 23).
Into that position of universality, not of originality, this present book steps forward. For that reason, even though I think like this, even though this is my system, this book presents itself as an interpretation of another philosopher who, on his part, incorporates Plato and Aris- totle and all the history of Philosophy. I prove thereby that I actually believe that truth is knowable to the human mind, for I make clear that it has certainly been known before.
The only way to interpret Hegel is to give more weight to demonstra- tions than to interpretations; otherwise, one does not make Philosophy but literary criticism. Hence our title is Hegel was right. There are certain questions, especially those which are naturally linked with the sub- sequent development of sciences after Hegel's death, in which Hegel only outlined the path which demonstrations ought to follow; the present book cannot leave that only as an outline, which means I will not ex- pose how Hegel thinks without engaging my own views. The only way to do this is to rely only on what is demonstrative, that is to say, on what is truly philosophical.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? chapter ii
Why the subject?
? ? What we will put forward on chapter three in regard to the on- tical consistence of the subject is not only the key to Hegel's philosophy, as he repeatedly warns, but the key to all Phi- losophy and all sciences, and it is the most important discovery that the human mind has ever made in all history.
However, there is a certain school of thought which obstinately re- fuses to take the subject into account, and which even says that science should forbid itself from making any consideration on it. Our present chapter examines this resistance and demonstrates that, far from being scientific, this resistance is scientifically untenable because, once we do away with the subject, it becomes impossible to provide scientific con- cepts with any meaning at all. If we do away with the subject, sciences do not know what they are speaking of. Our present chapter also dis- pels one of the most widespread and inveterate prejudices there are: the belief in the empirical origin of concepts.
1. Something about modem phySicS
We must first say that our century has not contributed with any single wonder to this parade of obstinacies which deny the subject. In fact,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 48 Hegel was right
in order to avoid it, those positions claim to rely only on the physi- cal manifestations and therefore reduce all realities --even the psychic and biological ones-- to physical processes, in the hope that this sys- tematic and "objective" approach will scare away the subject once and for all. But Physics itself has proven these hopes barren by reinserting the observing subject into the picture, and this is not something trivial but the absolutely decisive factor that determines the characteristics of any observed objects or phenomena: both relativity and quantum physics make all objective data to depend on the subject. Here we see the subject reappearing where they never expected him to be.
One can barely restrain the laughs by reading Taylor and Wheeler when they say: "The word 'observer' is a shorthand way of speaking about the whole collection of recording clocks associated with one inertial frame of reference. " (1966, 19).
They fill up every inch of the universe with watches and rods whose masses and fields would distort even the most robust and delicate physi- cal phenomenon, leaving it unrecognizable and unobservable --which was the only thing at stake. Watches and rods without masses and fields are a physical impossibility; consequently, the unperturbed phe- nomena of which Taylor and Wheeler speak are not effectively observable and hence inexistent to modern physics. Taylor and Wheeler have not yet come to understand that, according to the theory of relativity and to quantum physics, any speculation about phenomena that is not re- ally observable falls outside the realm of the physical sciences.
The acknowledged physic C. F. von Weizsa? cker sums up very well the present state of affairs of his discipline: "An object is an object for subjects in the world. This would be made even clearer if the concept of object could be reduced to decidable alternatives. " (Bastin 1971, 253)
Avoiding the subject is thus reduced to a simple wishful thinking that lacks any kind of scientificity.
Leon Brillouin provides a more extended analysis of the situation, but the quote here presented is worthwhile examining; I display it here for the best interest of my readers who are not as well acquainted with modern physics:
I become very suspicious whenever I hear the word 'given'. There is only one occasion when it has a definite meaning; this is in the statement of a problem given by an examiner to some helpless students. In this situation the velocity is supposed to be exactly the given velocity, with no possible error or
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Why the subject? 49
discussion. But in real life, this never happens. If I observe an unknown mov- ing object in the sky, nobody can give me its velocity. Whether it be a star or a flying saucer, I have to measure the velocity by some experimental device. I can use optical signals, which would be reflected from the unknown object, to measure the delays, the Doppler shifts, etc. From these measurements, I can compute the velocity, but I should always be aware of the fact that these very experiments always perturb the motion. The velocity after observation is not the same as before observation. Every experiment requires some coupling between the observer and the observed object,. . . (1970, 4).
The photons with which I have to bomb the object to make it visible exert force upon it and modify its state. And I cannot talk of an unper- turbed object because "unperturbed" means 'not observed', something which does not exist to Physics.
To modern physics there are no objects without a subject. If someone believed that by relying on Physics one would put the subject away, his disappointment could not be greater.
As we will later see, what Hegel has to say in order to make the study of the subject scientifically unavoidable is ten thousand times deeper than the entire contribution of Physics in our century. It is not a matter of chance that Physics has finally consented to be more reflexive than the physics of Newton. However, it is timely to point out that the negation of the Newtonian absolute movement and space, a negation which is the point of departure of the theory of relativity, was already implicit in Hegel: "In the empty space there is no movement, for there is only movement in relation to a different place. " (NH 126).
According to Newton and his master and namesake Burrow, although there is no other object towards which the studied object approaches or from which it goes away, the said object would be moving, for its movement is absolute. It takes place in the absolute space which is the sensorium Dei. In other words, although it does not approach to or go away from any other thing, God would see that object moving.
The idea according to which the absolute space is the sensorium Dei goes back to Henry More, and in a certain way, to Pierre Gassendi. But we must take into account that in times of Newton everybody believed that movement was something absolute. And they still think the same thing, all those who have neglected relativity in order to remain attached to the myths of common-sense. Since the times of classic physics, Hegel disproved that belief with the mere analysis of the idea of movement:
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 50 Hegel was right
"Ultimately, it is absolutely clear that movement as such only has meaning and existence in a system of many bodies, and by the way, many bodies which stand in reciprocal relation according to different determinations" (EPW 269A).
For the same reason, Hegel rejects the first law of Newton: "a recti- linear infinite movement is a void mental monster; because movement is always towards something" (GP II 193).
Moreover, Hegel holds that the physics of his times would have avoided those phantasmagorias if they had taken the time to read well Aristotle: "Aristotle shows that the void suppresses movement [. . . ] In movement the body --as distinct-- is a positive relation, not towards nothing. " (GP II 185).
And a little before that point in his book, he says: "Aristotle deals then with the void space, an ancient question for which Physics still cannot find a solution. They could do that if they read Aristotle, but for them thought and Aristotle are things which have absolutely no existence in the world. "
Already with his commentary on Zeno, Hegel had explained the relativity principle of movement: "And this is also true: that movement is definitively relative. " (GP I 315).
In order to reject the notions of absolute space and time as unsci- entific, Hegel did not have to wait until Michelson's experiment: he only needed to realize that those were mere abstractions. Evidently, an abstraction cannot pretend to have the same status of reality: "The word absolute has often no other meaning the word abstract; thus, abso- lute space and absolute time are no other thing that abstract space and abstract time" (EPW 115A).
We have displayed these quotations in order to show that the link between modern physics and Hegel's philosophy is not fortuitous. Our author already knew how unscientific and ungrounded it is in Physics to project as real something not observable.
2. a baSic principLe
Before venturing into the refutation of the different ways out that have been invented to avoid the study of the subject, we beg the reader to consider the following reflection as fundamental, for even though it is obvious in itself, it has been neglected during the last centuries.
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If a word does not have an empirical meaning, the origin of the con- cept in question cannot be sensation, and hence it is necessary to look in the subject itself both for the origin and the meaning of it.
For all what follows in this book, the above reflection is essential.
It cannot be stated that the origin of such a concept is sensation, for the simple reason that the origin would have to be an empirical data, but precisely no empirical data corresponds here to the concept.
For example, the concept of 'point', in which definition enters the idea of unextendedness, could have not been caused evidently by any sensible data or by imagination, for every empirical data is extended and every image of fantasy is extended as well; consequently, the ori- gin and the meaning itself of the concept 'point' should be looked for in the subject.
On the other hand, all sciences use at least some concepts whose meaning is not empirical. The science that raises fewer doubts in this regard is Physics, but apart from the example I just mentioned, we already saw that Margenau listed only some of the few concepts which are not empirical: mass, energy, charge, force, wavelength, strength, potential, probability, amplitude, crystal, magnetic field, atom, photon, electron, meson. (1978, 98)
The following text of Hegel deals with Mathematics, but it mentions several terms employed by Physics as well:
Other mathematical determinations such as infinite, relations, infinitesimal, factors, potencies, etcetera, have their true concept in Philosophy itself; and it is wrong to believe that Philosophy should extract and take them borrowed from Mathematics, where they are accepted without concept and often without any meaning at all; these concepts must wait until Philoso- phy gives them their sense and justification. (EPW 259A)
It seems evident to me that none of these terms have an empirical origin.
Einstein, the most acclaimed physic of our century, goes far beyond Margenau. His forceful statement should not be so zealously hidden away from the public by the apologists of the empirical sciences:
And let us say this in regard of the historical development. Hume clearly understood that certain concepts, for instance, that of causality, cannot be ex- tracted from the material of experience by logical methods. Kant, convinced
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Hegel was right
of the indispensable character of certain concepts, considered them --just as they are selected-- as necessary premises of any kind of thought and dis- tinguished them from concepts of empirical origin. But I am convinced that such differentiation is mistaken and does not approach the problem in a natural way. From a logical point of view, all concepts, even the closer ones to experience, are free constructions, just as the concept of causality, which was the starting point of the dispute. (Schilpp, I 1969, 12).
According to Einstein, not only some concepts of Physics but every single concept lacks an empirical origin.
3. what everyone underStandS?
That being said it is now of primal importance to take this into account. More often than not, one believes to 'know' the meaning of a certain word, because one thinks that the meaning is a determined empirical data which is easily observable. But in the cases that the word being considered does not have an empirical meaning, it would be unjusti- fied to suppose, without further investigation, that 'we know what it means'. It is by no means true that we already 'understand' its meaning; we may be imagining something, but that image is not the meaning in question, for imagination can only contain combinations of empirical impressions and accumulate the data provided by the senses; however, if the concept does not have an empirical meaning, no empirical im- pression or combination of them could provide it. Let us go back to the above mentioned example. There are some people who believe they know what the meaning of the word 'point' is; but what they imagine is a speck, not a point; if it were unextended, as it should be to be a point, they could not imagine it. As a matter of fact, they do not know what the word point means; they do not have the concept.
We must look for the meaning and for the concept in the knowing subject.
Let us put another example. In the context of discussion of modern pluridimensional, non- Euclidean spaces, a great number of mathema- ticians and physics do easily away with the problem by saying that space is a group of points. However, since they do not know what a point is, this so-called definition lacks any kind of meaning. The situa- tion gets even worse if they try to define point, for they will irremediably
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say that it is an unextended part of space. They define point in terms of space, and they define space in terms of point. The circularity of this argument is manifest. We do not gain any knowledge by means of this procedure, and clearly, one will notice that these people do not know what they are speaking of.
Here is where what we were discussing occurs: they ease themselves by believing that the meaning of the word space is a certain empiri- cal data that is easily verifiable. An opponent would probably answer to this objection something like 'you are not going to deny that I am looking at the space between my body and the wall in front of me'.
Of course, I will deny this. What this person is seeing is the wall in front of him. Space as such is not observable; it is not an empirical data. Since it is not an empirical data and they do not know how to pro- vide it with meaning by other means, they do not know what they are
speaking about.
One brief digression: if modern physics boasts their rejection of
non-observable entities, one wonders why they keep speaking of spaces, let alone pluridimensional ones. The only justifiable criterion would be the 'necessary factor to explain observable data'. But we will see in our fifth chapter what the Science of Logic has to say about those explicative intended factors.
It is the right time to do away with a false way out. Scientists will admit that many concepts do not have an empirical meaning, and yet they say that they are inferred from empirical data. I do not deny here the logical legitimacy of the inference in question; but it is obvious that, in order to infer certain concepts, we must first need to know what they mean. Precisely, in this case, the meaning does not coincide with any empirical data, for it is necessary to infer it since the meaning is not an object of empirical experience; if it was an empirical data, we would not have the need to infer it. In some of the premises of the inference process, one of these concepts --which are not derived from empirical experience-- appears suddenly: How is it possible to handle it if we do not know what it means? What it seemed to be a way out only makes more acute the need to look in the knowing subject for the origin and the meaning of concepts.
We do not need here to stop for long in order to examine another way out which is identical to the previous one. According to this po- sition, there are some things that are not empirical in themselves but only in their effects. God and the soul also have sensible effects, but that
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is not enough to know what those terms mean. The question is not about their empirical effects: what is here discussed is if the entity itself to which its causality certain effects are attributed is empirical or not. Although we do not put into question the legitimacy of such attribu- tion, it is impossible to know which entity they are speaking of as long as we do not know the meaning of the word they designate it with. Moreover, to judge if the said entity can be the cause of such effects, we need to understand beforehand the word that designates it. The fact that the said entity could have or not such effects does not make us know what the meaning of the word in question is.
Now, he firstly hinted and then explicitly said that, more often than not, the men of the street or the scientist do not know what they are speaking of; they do not have the concept; they do not understand what they are saying. It sounds severe, but it should not offend any- body because this is not any kind of truth: it is a truth that it is urgent to straighten out despite its harshness. "To know what one says is much more unusual as what one thinks, and one is very unjust by calling severe the reproach of not knowing what one says" (BS 249); "ordinarily, one calls concepts that which is nothing more than a reverie" (WL II 281).
Given that everybody is able to use a certain term not only in private but in a conversation or in a discussion with others, they think that be- cause of that they understand it and that they have its corresponding meaning, when in fact they only have an image product of their fan- tasy. For instance, as we have previously demonstrated, it seems that common people do not have the concept of 'point'; however, it is obvi- ous that we can all use the word point very skillfully. The same happens with the word space, whose meaning is ignored even by physics.
Let us put an entirely different example: the word 'work'. We all commonly use it without any mayor trouble. Nevertheless, I dare not only all workers but economists and labor lawyers as well, to define 'work'. I have not yet found anyone who has the concept of it. Everybody supposes that they understand this word, but some imagine a certain manual activity (v. g. , a man digging a whole with a shovel) and others imagine a still man performing a certain intellectual activity. The most common thing to happen is that each person imagines something re- lated to their own trade or profession.
One only needs a handful of insisting questions to dispel any at- tempt to define work. Is effort, for instance, something essential for an
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activity to be called work? On the one hand, if one answers affirma- tively, then the really skillful expert who enjoys his own professional efficacy and performs his job without fatigue would not be actually working despite the fact that his productivity is superior to that of the majority; on the other hand, if one answers negatively, the millionaire swimmer, who is in his own private pool trying to beat the crawl Olym- pic records, would be working, --which is an utterly absurd premise.
Does work, in order to be that, need to produce something? We come across here with the physiocrat theses which posit that nature is the only one that produces more than what it plants, and that work only modifies and does not produce things. According to Physics, nothing in fact is ever produced, because the existing matter in the universe does not increase nor decrease. And even leaving this aside, it is obvi- ous that the work of fishermen does not produce anything; they only collect fish from the sea. The same goes for miners and harvesters. Should one person argue that by working one produces exchange value and not something material, that person would confirm in the first place that the majority of people do not know what work is, for evidently, almost the largest part of humankind does not know what exchange value is, and the few who say they do, frequently do not know it. In the second place, it would turn out that a group of workers, who produced a great stock of merchandize which did not find demand in the market and ended up rotting out, would have not worked at all.
Does it lie in the essence of work to modify an object or a material substance? To accept this would be to rule out intellectual work, and that would confirm that one does not have the general concept of work, which was the only thing at stake here. In the second place, and this carries even stronger consequences, the distinction between work and consumption would disappear, for consumption also modifies things. And in the third place, since the fishers, the miners and the harvesters do not modify but only transport matter, it would turn out that the activity they perform is not work. And it would be ridiculous to say that the only thing that matters is the changing of the place in question, for then the thief would be performing a job, with the same right to social remuneration as the workers in the fabrics. In addition, the dis- tinction between work and rest would disappear, for he who goes out to take a walk changes the place where his clothes are in.
The result is here the same as in regard to space and point: he who believes to comprehend and know the meaning of a certain word by
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 56 Hegel was right
using it skillfully deceives himself. What he has is an image "for ordi- nary life does not have concepts but only imaginations" (WL II 357). And this image is not the meaning of the word in question, because it is too particular and because other people have a completely different image in their heads when they use the same word.
From this follows that the resource employed sometimes by scien- tists in order to elude the obligation of defining a term is completely mistaken. It is an appeal that is based on what 'everybody understands for. . . '. But it is false that everybody understands. This resource does not lead to the concept nor does it make the scientist in question know what he is talking about.
There would also be a more immediate objection: if everybody un- derstands it, then why don't they say it?
Before examining the next escapist resource it is convenient to state that recent experimental psychology confirms entirely Hegel's observa- tion in the sense that no one should be offended when told that he does not understand and even lacks the concept in question. Let us quote textually the acclaimed author of the treatise Concept Learning, psycholo- gist Earl B. Hunt, although his terminology is not the same as Hegel's:
Conceptual classification may be contrasted with another type of classi- fying behavior called discrimination learning. In discrimination learning, objects are classified on the basis of directly perceived properties such as physical size or shape. The usual explanation for discrimination learning is that the sensory features of any stimulus are matched to what is already remembered of these features, and that the learner ? s response becomes associated with them. The response thus classifies the stimulus. In discrimi- nation learning, subjective representations of immediate and past stimuli seem directly to indicate concrete, physical features (in contrast to the more abstract nature of concept formation). (EB 22, 897, 2).
While human beings popularly are called abstract thinkers, many of the classifications people make clearly seem to be concrete discriminations. Indeed, people may use the same term either in a discriminative or con- ceptual way. A child uses the term policeman in discriminating a man in distinctive uniform, while a lawyer may have a concept of a civil servant charged with enforcing criminal codes. (EB 22, 898, 1)
In this example, the professional studies of the lawyer would have lead to the acquisition of the concept, while the child, a typical example
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of what Hegel calls 'ordinary life', proceeds by means of this association of empirical features called imagination: but the child and the lawyer em- ploy the same word and use it skillfully. It becomes obvious that using a word skillfully does not imply by any means that we have the belong- ing concept and that we understand. Let us repeat this with Hegel: "To know what one says is much rarer than what is thought" (BS 249).
What Hunt has summarized for us is the result of a large series of experiments. Nevertheless, it is evident that animals also learn how to discriminate and yet they do not have concepts. If we distinguish between science and technique, between knowledge and skills, it be- comes obvious that mere empirical discrimination is enough for ani- mals to possess a series of techniques which in many cases are more refined than ours. As we will later see, the technical success boasted by our empirical sciences does not demonstrate by any means that these disciplines understand.
4. Leaving termS undefined?
It is likely that the writers of treatises who leave some terms undefined refer to what "everybody understands". It is likely because, if they were not referring to this, their readers and hearers would have their mind in blank after reading or hearing those terms, they would not have any- thing to hold on to, and they would not know how to cling on to the signals they receive. Although the scientist does not make his reference explicit, his audience notices the reference to what 'everybody under- stands'. However, since they do not have the concept, the words are not actually referring to anything.
Mario Bunge claims that undefined terms "are not therefore obscure or undeterminate, since they are specified by a number of formulas" (1973, 9).
But this is clearly untenable, for the signs in a formula are even more undetermined when no one points out, by other means, what does each sign stands for, and thus the entire problem reappears out of the blue. By saying what do each sign stand for, we would not employ again undefined terms, unless we want to incur in another manifest, vicious circle. Mario Bunge himself later recognizes that: "But mathematical form alone won't tell us anything about the physical meaning of the formula". (1973, 30)
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