No More Learning

This fifth point encapsulates each of the preceding four. Power is exercised (first proposition) in the very interplay of force and resistance; this interplay is present in all social interactions (second proposition); force and resistance are manifest even in micro-interactions between individuals as well as states (third proposition); and while each person may choose to apply force or resist, the ultimate outcome of the relation cannot be controlled by one party (power is intentional and nonsubjec- tive - fourth proposition).
On the role of resistance in constituting power, Foucault's position will not change. In a 1984 interview, for example, Foucault reiterates that "in the relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of resistance, for if there were no possibility of resistance - of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, of strategies that reverse the situation - there would be no relations of power" (1994: 12). He adds that "there
24
FOU CAULT'S THEORY O F POWER
cannot be relations of power unless the subjects are free . . . [I]f there are relations of power throughout every social field it is because there is freedom everywhere" (ibid. : 12) .
Let us stop for a moment and recall where we are in the discussion. We began this section with a long quotation, in which Foucault identi- fied four principal aspects of power. 8 Our discussion so far has focused on explicating only the first of these, that power consists of multiple force relations. (We have covered a good deal of ground along the way. Indeed, we have implicitly addressed the other three aspects of power. )
The second aspect that Foucault identifies here is that these force relations are processes, not static, and are constantly being transformed. These transformations take the form of ceaseless struggles and con- frontations - between the original force and its accompanying resist- ance - and sometimes strengthen the power relations, but sometimes weaken or reverse it. These processes also produce a number of interre- lationships and systems, as various power relations reinforce or under- mine each other (third aspect). Here Foucault introduces a distinction between tactics and strategy: tactics are the local rationalities of power in particular cases; strategies, on the other hand, are the larger systemic or global patterns of power. And (fourth aspect) these strategies are built out of combinations and concatenations of those local tactics.
[T]he rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed . . . tactics which, becoming connected to one another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding their base of support and their condition elsewhere, end by forming comprehensive systems. (1990a: 95)
These comprehensive systems, or strategies, constitute "institutional crystallizations" out of the interaction and combination of locally fluid power relations, and become recognizable terminal forms like the state and the other types he enumerated.
The movement of Foucault's analysis here is from the micro-level to the macro, from the molecular to the everyday - from (1) specific, individual force relations through (2) their processes of transforma- tion and (3) the networks or systems that their interplay produces, to (4) their larger, strategic manifestations in the state, the law and other hegemonies, such as ownership of the means of production. In the end-forms that Foucault identifies here, we should recognize the three traditions of analysis that Foucault earlier criticized as partial and inade- quate(liberalism,psychoanalysis,Marxism). Eventhougheachofthese
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MICHEL FOU CAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
strategies may be one-dimensional, the networks of power taken in sum are multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to only one strategic mode, "juridico-discursive" or otherwise. Foucault's point is that while they may have adequately described some particular strategy (or termi- nal form) of power, each approach fails to grasp the fundamental form or operation of power at the molecular level. But as Foucault reminds us again, analysis of power must begin not with these end-forms, but with "the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power" (ibid. : 93). Observing power in its local and peripheral effects provides a new viewpoint from which to begin a study of power, and will thus entail a new methodo- logical approach: the theory of power that we have just outlined.
An ongoing project
To review, we have unpacked a dozen or so dense pages at the heart of La Valonte de Savoir. What we have discussed provides only a basic framework: a set of theoretical presuppositions that constitutes the heart of Foucault's theory of power. There are important elements of this theory that we have not discussed, and many aspects of Foucault's analysis of power would continue to evolve over the next decade, as Foucault's ongoing self-critique continued. This basic framework, how- ever, is consistent throughout the theory's subsequent development and elaboration.
Notes
1. Special thanks to David Cylkowski, Stacy Klingler and Dianna Taylor for their very thoughtful responses to earlier versions of this essay.
2. The French original is at Foucault (1976: 120): "en se dormant une autre theorie du pouvoir".
3. These are not necessarily the same relationships.
4. Lynch ( 1 9 9 8 ) gives a fuller discussion of Foucault's view of the omnipresence
of power.
5. For more on this shift, see Lynch (2009).
6. Wemustbecarefulnottomaketoomuchoftheanalogytophysics;Idonot
think, for example, that Foucault means that analysis of social relations should be reduced to equations of force relations. Given this caution, however, we can note certain implications of the analogy.
7. In this passage, Foucault is making an observation about Henri de Boulainvil- liers' eighteenth-century history of France. But his point here, in fact, speaks to Foucault's own methodology.
8. On page 19, above.
26
TWO
Disciplinary power
Marcelo Hoffman
Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe Prison, pub- lished in 1975, contains his most famous and elaborate exposition of disciplinary power. A bird's-eye view of his preceding and succeed- ing analyses reveals, however, that this concept arose in overlapping stages and served a variety of purposes. From roughly 1973 to 1976, in analyses of punishment, proto-psychiatry, criminology and race war, Foucault attempted to articulate disciplinary power in contradistinction to sovereign power. From about 1976 to 1979, he used disciplinary power as a springboard for delineating modalities of power concerned with population, namely, biopolitics, security and governmentality. Finally, in the early 19 8 0 s disciplinary power figured more as an implicit background to his analyses of subjectivity in Greco-Roman antiquity and early Christianity. The long shadow cast by this concept renders it absolutely crucial to understanding the trajectory of Foucault's thought.
Using a composite account of disciplinary power drawn from Foucault's seminal presentation in Discipline and Punish as well as his College de France course for the academic year 1973-74, Psychiatric Power, I will provide an overview of disciplinary power and then exem- plify the exercise of this power through Frederick Winslow Taylor's The Principles ofScientific Management, published in 1911. Taylor's Principles, which influenced American and European industrialists as well as Lenin and Antonio Gramsci, enriches our understanding of disciplinary power in two ways. First, the presentation of scientific management at the core of Principles reflects nothing short of a full- fledged disciplinary programme. Indeed, it is hard to read a page of Principles without noticing that Taylor suffuses his presentation with
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MICHEL FOU CAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
a thoroughly disciplinary aspiration. Second, Taylor's Principles high- lights the limitations to the exercise of disciplinary power by attesting that disciplinary practices bound up with the application of scientific management are deeply contested. Taylor thus de-naturalizes this form of power even as he seeks to extend its reach not only within factories, but also within "all social activities", including the management of homes, farms, businesses, churches, charities, universities and govern- mental agencies (F. W Taylor 1967: 8).
Subjected individuals
The concept of disciplinary power concerns individuals. As Foucault notes with reference to what he takes to be the ideal exercise of this power, "We are never dealing with a mass, with a group, or even, to tell the truth, with a multiplicity: we are only ever dealing with individuals" (2006a: 75, emphasis added). However, in opposition to political theories which take the individual as a given for the purpose of constructing sovereignty, as in the notable case of Thomas Hobbes's version of the social contract, Foucault sets about showing that the individual first and foremost amounts to a construction of disciplinary power. The individual is an effect of this form of power rather than the raw material upon which it impinges. Foucault writes, "Discipline 'makes' individuals; it is the specific techniques of a power that regards individuals as objects and as instruments of its exercise" (1979 : 170). As a first approximation, we can therefore say that disciplinary power produces individuals as its objects, objectives and instruments.
Disciplinary power yields such effects by targeting bodies. The tar- geting of bodies may not seem terribly unique, especially in light of Foucault's sweeping assertion that "what is essential in all power is that ultimately its point of application is always the body" (2006a: 14, emphasis added). It seems even less singular in light of his sugges- tion that pastoral power treats the body as an object of care (2007: 126-8) and that even sovereign power sets its sights on the body as an object of violence or honour (2006a: 44-5). However, what dis- tinguishes disciplinary power from these other modalities of power is its endeavour to meticulously, exhaustively and continuously control the activities of bodies so as to constitute them as bearers of a highly particular relationship between utility and docility, whereby increases in utility correspond to increases in docility and vice versa. In Foucault's words, disciplinary power strives to make the body "more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely" (1979: 138). This increase
28
DIS CIPLINARY POWER
entails the augmentation of the skills and aptitudes of bodies without at the same time allowing these skills and aptitudes to serve as a source of resistance to disciplinary power. This form of power thereby attempts to resolve the problem of the resistances aroused from its own incessant investments in the body. Disciplinary power controls the body to effec- tuate this result through the production not only of an individual but also of individuality, the amalgam of qualities that render an individual distinct from others (Arendt 1985: 454). This individuality consists of cellular, organic, genetic and combinatory traits. Let us now outline the production of these traits.
Foucault insists that disciplinary power creates a cellular form of individuality by ordering individuals in space. He calls this ordering "the art of distributions". Cellular individuality rests on the division of individuals from others. The art of distributions produces this individu- ality by first of all enclosing a space different from all others through the use of walls or gates, as in the case of barracks and factories (Foucault 1979: 141-3). It partitions this space into individual cells in order to break up collective activities that deter from the goal of utility, such as desertion or vagabondage. The art of distributions also codes a space with specific functions to make it as useful as possible (ibid. : 143-5). As an example of this coding, Foucault refers to the production of printed fabrics at the Oberkampf manufactory atJouy. The workshops at the manufactory were divided into operations "for the printers, the handlers, the colourists, the women who touched up the design, the engravers, the dyers" (ibid. : 145 ) . Each worker occupied a space defined by his or her specific function within the overall production process. Lastly, the art of distributions creates a cellular individuality by ascrib- ing the unit of rank to individuals. As an example of rank, Foucault discusses the seating of pupils in a classroom according to their age, grade and behaviour (ibid. : 146-7).
Within this enclosed space, disciplinary power produces an organic individuality by exerting a control over bodily activities. This individu- ality is "organic" in so far as it lends itself to disciplinary practices all on its own, as if spontaneously and naturally (ibid. : 155--6). The control of bodily activities realizes this organic individuality first of all through a temporal enclosure afforded by the use of timetables, which prevent idleness by partitioning activities into minutes and seconds (ibid. : 15 0- 51) . The control of activities also breaks down movements of the body into an ever-greater number of acts and indexes these acts to temporal imperatives. Foucault identifies the prescription of the duration and length of the steps of marching soldiers as an example of this temporal elaboration of the act (ibid. : 151-2). The control of activities further
? ? ? 29
MICHEL FOU CAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
implies a relationship between the general position of the body and its gestures. In this regard, Foucault mentions the example of the upright posture of pupils and the correct positioning of their elbows, chins, hands, legs, fingers and stomachs as the conditions for good handwrit- ing (ibid. ). The control of activities goes even further, correlating the gestures of the body to the parts of the object used by it, as in the case of manifold gestures employed by a soldier to manipulate the barrel, butt, trigger-guard, notch, moulding, lock, screw and hammer of a rifle (ibid. : 15 3 ) . Finally, rather than merely preventing idleness, the control of activities forges an organic individuality by exhaustively using time.
With the activities of the body controlled, disciplinary power pro- ceeds to constitute a genetic form of individuality by subjecting the body to the demand for a perpetual progress towards an optimal end. Foucaultdubsthisdemandthe"organizationofgeneses". Drawingfrom the example of the military, he submits that perpetual progress towards an end yields a genetic individuality in the following ways : first, through the division of time into distinct segments, such as periods of practice and training; second, through the organization of these segments into a plan proceeding from the simplest elements, such as the positioning of the fingers in military exercise; third, through the ascription of an end to these segments in the form of an exam; and, finally, through the production of a series that assigns exercises to each individual according to rank (ibid. : 157-9).
Finally, disciplinary power establishes a combinatory form of indi- viduality characterized by articulations with other bodies to obtain a level of efficiency greater than that realized by the mere sum of the activities of these bodies (ibid. : 167). Foucault calls this process the composition of forces. This composition gives rise to a combinatory individuality by first treating individual bodies as mobile elements to be connected to other individual bodies as well as the totality of bodies; second, by coordinating the time of each of these bodies to maximize the extraction of their forces and to combine them with others for the optimal results; and, lastly, by commands that may be transmitted through signs and that therefore need not be verbalized, much less explained (ibid. : 164-7).
We now know how disciplinary power works and what it produces. It works by distributing individuals, controlling activities, organizing geneses and composing forces, and these functions correspond to the production ofcellular, organic, genetic and combinatory individualities, respectively. Yet, at the risk of drawing too fine a distinction, Foucault goes further in his analysis to impart a sharp sense of how disciplinary power gets going and keepsgoing. He attributes the success of this power
30
DISCIPL I N ARY POWER
to several basic techniques: hierarchical observation, normalizing judge- ment and the examination.
If architecture figures within the art of distributions as a means of ordering multiplicities into cellular individuals, it plays the role within hierarchical observation of rendering individuals visible with the overall effect of structuring their behaviour. In making individuals seeable, architecture serves, as Foucault writes, "to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them" (ibid. : 172). Still, he suggests that outside of any ideal schema, architecture alone falls short of making visibility constant. What makes this visibility perpetual is the implementation of a hierarchical network within the group of individuals who occupy a particular architectural space. Foucault offers many examples of these networks. While we will not dwell on them here (we have an opportunity to gauge their presence in Taylor's Prin- ciples), it is instructive to mention briefly one particularly rich example. Foucault suggests that surveillance operated in the asylum in the early nineteenth century not only through a doctor but also through super- visors who reported on patients, and servants who feigned servitude to patients while gathering and transmitting information about them to the doctor (2006a: 4-6). This example clearly demonstrates the communication of the gaze from the top to the bottom, its manifestly "hierarchical" character. Yet, Foucault is keen to remind us that the gaze may operate in a more multi-directional manner to the point of bearing on the supervisors themselves.
Although surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally; this network "holds" the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from one another: supervisors, perpetually supervised. (1979: 176-7)
Such a dense network of vigilant and multi-directional gazes no doubt causes disciplinary power to appear ubiquitous, but the sheer simplicity of its mechanism also makes it seem rather inconspicuous (ibid. : 177).
In a disciplinary world, however, it is not enough to see bodies so as to yield from them specific effects. One must be able to judge them as well. This modality of power therefore depends on normalizing judgement for its continued exercise. Foucault indicates that this form of judgement consists of features that make it look quite different from judgement in, for example, criminal courts. These features are summed
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M I CHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
up in terms of the following forms of punishment: first, even minute departures from correct behaviour are punished; second, failure to adhere to rules established on the basis of regularities observed over time is punished; third, exercise is used specifically as a corrective punishment; fourth, gratification is used in addition to punishment for the purposes of establishing a hierarchy of good and bad subjects; and, finally, rank understood as the place occupied in this hierarchy is used as a form punishment or reward (ibid. : 177-8 3 ) . What ultimately stands out here for Foucault is the concept of the norm. Disciplinary power judges according to the norm. By "norm", however, it should be obvious that Foucault has in mind something other than a strictly legal concept. He depicts the norm as a standard of behaviour that allows for the measurement of forms of behaviour as "normal" or "abnormal". In his words, "the norm introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual differences". The norm thus establishes the figure of the "normal" as a "principle of coercion" for the figure of the "abnormal" (ibid. : 184).
The examination combines the techniques of hierarchical observa- tion and normalizing judgement in "a normalizing gaze" to lend further sustenance to the exercise of disciplinary power (ibid. ). This gaze, as Foucault points out in a splendidly economical formula, "manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectifi- cation of those who are subjected" (ibid. : 184-5). Put differently, the examination binds the exercise of disciplinary power to the formation of a disciplinary knowledge. It does so in several ways. First of all, the examination facilitates the exercise of disciplinary power by objectifying subjects through observation. As Foucault posits, "Disciplinary power manifests its potency, essentially, by arranging objects. The examination is, as it were, the ceremony of this objectification" (ibid. : 187). In this regard, he mentions the first military review of Louis XIV as a form of examination yielding the objectification of subjects. This review subjected 18,000 soldiers to the gaze of a barely visible sovereign who commanded their exercises (ibid. : 188). Second, the examination con- stitutes individuality through an administrative form of writing that leaves behind a dense layer of documents, as in the examples of medical records and student records. This writing makes it possible to describe individuals as objects and track their development, or lack thereof, as well as to monitor through comparison phenomena within the larger aggregate of population (ibid. : 189-91). Finally, the accumulation of documents through the examination forges the individual as a case defined in terms of a status bound up with all of the "measurements", "gaps" and '"marks"' characteristic of disciplinary power (ibid. : 192).
32
DISCIPLINARY POWER
In historical terms, Foucault sketches the shift from a society (prior to the sixteenth century) in which disciplinary power played a marginal but critical and innovative role from within the confines of religious communities to a society (beginning in the eighteenth century) in which it played a preponderant role from a myriad of institutions. In this sketch, disciplinary power spread initially through several "points of support" (2006a: 66) with religious underpinnings, such as the educa- tion of youth inspired by the ascetic ideal embraced by the Brethren of the Common Life with its focus on progressive stages of education, rules of seclusion, submission to a guide and military organization; coloniza- tion as practised by the Jesuits in the Guarani republic of Paraguay with its emphasis on the full employment of time, permanent supervision and the cellular constitution of families; and, lastly, the confinement of marginal elements of the population under the management of religious orders. From these peripheral positions, disciplinary power began to cover more spheres of society without any religious backing, appearing in the army by the end of the seventeenth century and working class by the eighteenth century (ibid. : 66-71).
Foucault maintains that this formidable extension of disciplinary power across the surface of society reflected a deeper ensemble oftrans- formations. First, disciplinary power began to function as a technique more for the constitution of useful individuals than for the prevention of desertion, idleness, theft and other problems. Second, disciplinary mechanisms began to extend beyond their institutional parameters to yield lateral effects. In this regard, Foucault mentions the quite fascinat- ing example of schools using information gathered from students to monitor parental behaviour. Lastly, disciplinary power began to bear on society as a whole through the organization of a police apparatus concerned with intricacies of individual behaviour (1979: 210-16).
These transformations were bound up in their turn with broad his- torical processes in economic, juridical and scientific domains. The gen- eralization of disciplinary power took place against the background of the eighteenth-century problem of indexing the rapid growth in popula- tion to the rapid growth in production apparatuses (ibid. : 218-20). It attempted to resolve this problem by offering a means of administering the growth in the number of human beings and making them useful. The generalization of disciplinary power also entailed consequences for the juridical system, introducing asymmetries that vitiated the egalitar- ian juridical framework forged in the eighteenth century. As Foucault explains, disciplinary power established relationships of constraint between individuals rather than relationships of contractual obligation, and it defined individuals hierarchically rather than universally. The
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MICHEL FOU CAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
play of such asymmetries within the time and space proper to the exer- cise of disciplinary power effectively suspended the law (ibid. : 222-3 ) . Lastly, the generalization o f disciplinary power implied a tightening of relations between power and knowledge to the point of their mutual constitution by the eighteenth century. The objectification of individuals became the means for their subjection and the subjection of individu- als became the means for their objectification (ibid. : 224). Through the diffusion of psychology and psychiatry, the examination became incarnated in "tests, interviews, interrogations and consultations" that reproduced mutually constitutive power-knowledge relations within disciplinary institutions (ibid. : 226-7).
Foucault finds the "formula" for the generalization of the exercise of disciplinary power in Jeremy Bentham's architectural plan for the model prison, Panopticon, published in 1791 (Foucault 2006a: 41). Foucault relates that Bentham depicts the Panopticon as an annular building with an internal periphery consisting of cells containing iron grate doors opening to the interior and windows opening to the exte- rior as well as a multi-floored central tower containing wide windows with blinds and partitions. Foucault considers this building the per- fect expression of disciplinary power for a host of reasons.
First, with each of the cells designed to be occupied by only one inmate at a time the building produces individualizing effects at its periphery. Second, venetian blinds and partitions on the tower conceal whether anyone actually occupies it, guaranteeing anonymity at the centre. Third, the artificial light from the central tower as well as the natural light entering through the cell windows assure the visibility of inmates in the cells. Finally, this visibility allows for the perpetual writing about inmates and, consequently, the constitution of an administrative knowledge about them (ibid. : 75-8 ) .
These features render the Panopticon a magnificent machine not only for subjection but also for self? subjection. By inducing in inmates an awareness of their own constant visibility, the Panopticon compels them to structure their own behaviour in accordance with its power mechanism (Foucault 1979: 201). Notably missing from this ideal process is any reliance on violence or ostentatious displays of force. Remarkably, the play of visibility facilitated by spatial arrangements and lighting suffices to make inmates the very conduits of the power mechanism embodied in the Panopticon.
Though Bentham conceived of the Panopticon as an ideal prison for the resolution of the vexing problem of pauperism (Polanyi 2001: 111-13), Foucault does not tire of reminding us that Bentham con- sidered it applicable to a broad array of settings besides the prison. As
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DISCIPLINARY POWER
Foucault explains on Bentham's behalf, "Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behavior must be imposed, the panoptic schema may be used" (1979: 205). Moreover, lest we think that the Panopticon simply remained a product of Bentham's imagination, Foucault points out that, "In the 183 0s, the Panopticon became the architectural program of most prison projects" (ibid. : 249) and that institutions apart from the prison adopted its architectural dispositions for a wide variety of purposes. As an exam- ple of this adoption, Foucault details all of the Panoptic features of the architecture of the asylum in the early nineteenth century, demonstrat- ing that the panoptic architecture of the asylum building was construed as the very cure to madness (2006a: 102-7). This cross-institutional takeover of Panoptic architectural dispositions intensified the spread of disciplinary power.
For all of the reasons elaborated above, namely, the diffusion of disciplinary power from one institution to another as well as its various transformations into an ever more productive and pervasive modal- ity of power culminating in the extension of Panoptic architectural features, Foucault finds warrant in speaking somewhat grandiosely about the advent of a "disciplinary society". Yet his employment of this expression is not without qualification. Foucault clearly wants us to take away from the phrase "disciplinary society" an understanding of a society in which disciplinary power is pervasive enough to inter- act with and alter other modalities of power rather than one in which it simply effaces these other modalities (1979: 216). Such complex articulations derive precisely from the incompleteness of the exercise of disciplinary power even in the context of a "disciplinary society". This incompleteness will become abundantly evident as we turn to Taylor's Principles.
Taylor's Principles as a disciplinary programme
At its core, scientific management as propounded by Taylor in his Prin- ciples attempts to increase the efficiency of workers by divesting them of any roles in planning and controlling their own work, and by placing these roles squarely in the hands of the management. Scientific manage- ment is manifestly disciplinary in this overall goal of increasing effi- ciency. However, Taylor devotes the bulk of his Principles to illustrating the efficacy and superiority of scientific management with reference to concrete examples drawn from a range of industrial activities, and it is within the inglorious intricacies of these examples that his espousal of
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MICHEL FOU C A ULT: KEY CONCEPTS
a disciplinary perspective becomes altogether striking. Let us turn to a couple of his most pertinent illustrations.
Taylor's first illustration comes from his experience of attempting to increase the amount of pig iron loaded at the Bethlehem Steel Company from 12. 5 tons to 47 tons per worker per day. Taylor recounts that he sought this nearly fourfold increase from workers without at the same time provoking their resistance. In his words, "It was further our duty to see that this work was done without bringing on a strike among men" (F. W Taylor 1967: 43). Taylor addresses here the disciplinary problem of maximizing the utility as well as docility of individual bodies. He goes on to explain that he set about resolving this problem by, first of all, selecting out of the 75 workers at Bethlehem Steel four workers capable of loading 47 tons of pig iron per day. This selection took place on the basis of the deployment of a veritable myriad of disciplinary practices, which Taylor describes in the following passage:
In dealing with workmen under this type of management, it is an inflexible rule to talk to and deal with only one man at a time, since each workman has his own special abilities and limitations, and since we are not dealing with men in masses, but are trying to develop each individual man to his highest state of efficiency and prosperity. Our first step was therefore to find a proper work- man to begin with. We therefore carefully watched and studied these 75 men for three or four days, at the end of which time we had picked out four men who appeared to be physically able to handle pig iron at the rate of 47 tons per day. A careful study was then made of each of these men. We looked up their history as far back as practicable and thorough inquiries were made as to the character, habits and the ambition of each of them. Finally we selected one from among the four as the most likely man to start with. (Ibid. )
One of the most obvious disciplinary effects in this passage is indi- vidualization. Taylor informs us of the importance of having treated workers individually rather than collectively, thereby reminding us of Foucault's discussion of the constitution of a "cellular" individuality. However, he proceeds to indicate that the individualizing effects sought in the selection process rested on the observation of the mass of work- ers, and that this observation and the knowledge obtained from it facili- tated a judgement about the most able-bodied workers. Lastly, Taylor tells us that he made the selection of the most able-bodied worker at Bethlehem Steel on the basis of an enquiry into the identities of the
36
DIS CIPLINARY POWER
four most able-bodied workers. Individualization, observation and the constitution of an administrative identity on the basis of knowledge obtained through observation all figure centrally in Taylor's account of the selection of the appropriate worker to load 47 tons of pig iron per day.
This worker turned out to be "a little Pennsylvania Dutchman" dubbed Schmidt (ibid. ). Taylor explains that his team selected Schmidt as the first worker to try out the increase in pig iron loading because it had learned through its enquiries that Schmidt placed an unusually high premium on his earnings. It was on the basis on this knowledge about Schmidt that Taylor's team approached him, first to entice him with the monetary incentive of a pay of $1. 85 rather than standard $1. 15 a day and then to inform him that the increase in pay would presuppose a strict obedience (ibid. : 44-5). 'Taylor relates that Schmidt was told the following in particular:
Well, if you are a high-priced man, you will do exactly as this man tells you to-morrow, from morning 'til night. When he tells you to pick up a pig and walk, you pick it up and you walk, and when he tells you to sit down and rest, you sit down. You do that right straight through the day. And what's more, no back talk. Now a high-priced man does just what he's told to do, and no back talk. Do you understand that? When this man tells you to walk, you walk; when he tells you to sit down, you sit down, and you don't talk back at him. (Ibid. : 45-6)
As in the case of the previous passage, several disciplinary practices leap out at us from this excerpt of "rough talk" to Schmidt (ibid. : 46). The first o f these practices i s the exhaustive regularity o f the movements of the body. The person in charge of Schmidt would command him not only how to work but also when and how to rest so as to work all the more efficiently. Moreover, this person would insist that Schmidt follow his orders without any "back talk", once again illustrating the discipli- nary relationship between increased utility and increased obedience. In this instance, we are further reminded of Foucault's contention that commands in the exercise of disciplinary power need not be premised on any explanation. They need only "trigger off the required behavior andthatisenough" (1979: 166).
We learn from Taylor's narrative that Schmidt accepted the condi- tions spelled out in the passage above and succeeded in loading 47 tons of pig iron per day under the meticulous control of the aforementioned person from Bethlehem Steel. Presumably, Schmidt could have used
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MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
his demonstrated skill in loading so much pig iron to extract conces- sions from management at Bethlehem Steel. However, Taylor adds that under the continued presence of an overseer Schmidt "practically never failed to work at this pace and do the task that was set him during the three years that the writer was at Bethlehem" (1967: 47). He thus leaves us with the distinct impression that the application of scientific management succeeded in yielding Schmidt as a docile as well as useful individual.
Another illustration that reveals the disciplinary character of scien- tific management derives from Taylor's account of efforts to increase the output of shovellers at Bethlehem Steel. Unlike the example above, Taylor in this instance discloses the process used to determine the appro- priate load for the maximum daily output of shovellers, explaining that experimentation with and the observation of several of the best shovellers led to the discovery of 21 pounds as the appropriate load
(ibid. : 65). On the basis of this knowledge, Bethlehem Steel set up an intricate instructions and record-keeping procedure. Taylor recalls the emphasis on individualization in this procedure, stressing that this emphasis was reflected in a system of writing detailing not only what each worker should do on a given day and how he should do it but also whether he had worked enough to earn his $1. 85 on the previous day, presumably by loading his 21 pounds per shovel. This system of writing used a norm - work equivalent to $1. 85 a day or 21 pounds per shovel - to distinguish normal from abnormal workers, with the former denoted by the receipt of white slips and the latter denoted by the receipt of yellow slips. According to Taylor, the consequences of this distinction were perfectly clear. Workers in receipt of yellow slips were faced with the choice of working in adherence to the norm and, consequently, normalizing themselves, or being demoted to a type of work corresponding to their comparatively low levels of productivity. We have in his discussion of the consequences of the distribution of these slips a fairly clear and vivid illustration of normalizing judgement.
Taylor draws the following lesson from the experience of individual- ized instructions and record keeping at Bethlehem Steel:
If the workman fails to do his task, some competent teacher should be sent to show him exactly how his work can best be done, to guide, help, and encourage him, and, at the same time, to study his possibilities as a workman. So that, under the plan which individualizes each workman, instead of brutally discharging the man or lowering his wages for failing to make good at once, he is given the time and the help required to make him proficient at
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DIS C IPL I N ARY POWER
his present job, or he is shifted to another class of work for which he is either mentally or physically better suited. (Ibid. : 69-70)
This prescription is most obviously disciplinary in its preference for first training abnormal workers on an individual basis rather than simply discharging them. Training in this instance also facilitates an intimate examination of the aptitudes of these workers with the effect of allow- ing for the production of additional knowledge about them.
Taylor identifies the point of support for such prescriptions as a ramified structure consisting as it did at Bethlehem Steel of superintend-? ants and clerks planning the fine details of work, preparing instruction slips and managing records, subtended by teachers working intimately with workers to make sure that they carry out the tasks spelled out in the instruction slips as well as tool-room men preparing standard- ized implements for the execution of these tasks (ibid. ). This structure nicely illustrates the network of gazes facilitating the play of hierarchi- cal observation.
Taylor's exposition of scientific management abounds with such examples of disciplinary power but it also de-naturalizes this modal- ity of power by demonstrating that disciplinary practices bound up with the application of scientific management have yet to take root, and that they are subject to great contestation (at the risk of belabour- ing the obvious, it is worth keeping in mind that if these disciplinary practices had taken root, Taylor would not have needed to compose Principles). Indeed, Taylor paints his vision of scientifically managed labour-processes on a canvas of sceptical employers as well as a mass of recalcitrant, if not openly hostile, workers. Against the disciplinary demand for maximized utility, we find in Taylor's narrative workers who threaten to strike, workers who intimidate managers and workers who damage machinery (ibid. : 49-52). Taylor is acutely aware of the prospect of inciting warfare within the interstices of the labour process. For this reason, he warns prospective practitioners against the hasty application of his principles of scientific management and insists that only a prolonged period of habituation will result in the successful application of these principles (ibid. : 128-35). To paraphrase Foucault, we could therefore say that the not so distant "roar of battle" (Foucault 1979: 308) resounds throughout Taylor's theory, suggesting that only an ensemble of deeply contested practices sustain the exercise of a dis- ciplinary power that strives to appear natural and spontaneous in the very bodies of individuals.
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TH REE
Biopower
Chloe Taylor
French philosopher Michel Foucault is perhaps best known as a theorist of power. Foucault analysed several different types of power, includ- ing sovereign power, disciplinary power and the subject of the current chapter: biopower. In what follows, I will first provide an overview of biopower as Foucault conceives of it. This overview will distinguish biopower from sovereign and disciplinary power, identify and discuss distinctive characteristics of biopower and provide examples which illustrate these characteristics. The final section of the chapter under- takes an extended example of a particular occurrence of biopower within modern and contemporary Western societies.
Powers of life and death:from sovereign power to biopower
In The History ofSexuality: An Introduction (1990a) and in his 1975- 76 College de France course, Society Must Be Defended (2003) Foucault describes biopower as a power which takes hold of human life. In both these works Foucault traces the shift from classical, juridico-legal or sovereign power to two typically modern forms of power, discipline and biopower, as a shift from a right of death to a power over life: "in the classical theory of sovereignty, the right of life and death was one of sovereignty's basic attributes . . . The right of sovereignty was the right to take life or let live. And then this new right is established: the right to make live and to let die" (2003: 240-41). Sovereign power is a power which deduces. It is the right to take away not only life but wealth, services, labour and products. Its only power over life is to
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MICHEL FOU CAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
seize that life, to end, impoverish or enslave it; what it does not seize it leaves alone. Sovereign power's right over life is merely the right of subtraction, not of regulation or control. As Foucault writes:
The sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring. The right which was formulated as the "power of life and death" was in reality the right to take life or let live. Its symbol, after all, was the sword. (1990a: 136, emphasis added)
The seventeenth-century theorist of sovereign power Thomas Hob- bes illustrates Foucault's points, writing:
For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, wherein there be Rules enough set down, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing impossible : ) it followeth necessar- ily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. (19 8 6 : 264)
Hobbes notes in particular that it would be ludicrous for a sovereign to attempt to regulate the corporeal dimensions of a subject's existence, and hence no covenant with the sovereign could be concerned with these aspects of a subject's life. Hobbes argues that so far as "corporall Liberty" is concerned, subjects of any commonwealth are free: "For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy" (ibid. ). The freedom of subjects, for Hobbes, consists of those aspects of life with respect to which there are no covenants with the sovereign. For Hobbes, it would be absurd to imagine certain mundane aspects of life, such as liberty over one's body and private life, being the subject of such covenants. Hobbes simply cannot imagine these being of interest to the king or to the commonwealth, or mechanisms of power which might function at this level. He elaborates:
The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath praetermit- ted: such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves
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BIOPOWER
think fit: & the like. " Hobbes adds that "Lawes are of no power . . . Without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. (Ibid. )
And he assumes that concerns such as dwelling, diet and childcare could never warrant the wielding of a sword or the exercise of law. Sovereign power is, then, for Hobbes as for Foucault, a juridico-legal power to kill which leaves the daily life of the body alone, and its symbol is the sword or the threat of death. In those realms where one would not wield a sword or the force of law, one is free or escapes from power. In particular, Hobbes thinks that our bodies are free, or that we have "corporall Liberty" unless the sovereign has us literally in chains.
In contrast to sovereign power which could "take life or let live", biopower is the power "to foster life or disallow it to the point of death" (Foucault 1990a: 138, emphasis added). Foucault writes,
Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself: it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body. (Ibid. : 142-3)
Hobbes deems corporeal aspects of life such as dwelling (abode), desires (what we want to purchase and consume), the care of the body (diet), and childcare and education to be outside of the interests of the sovereign and hence free. Yet for Foucault these aspects become some of the privileged loci of the mechanisms of biopower, indicating a transformation of power which Hobbes would have deemed "a thing impossible". 1 Biopower is able to access the body because it functions through norms rather than laws, because it is internalized by subjects rather than exercised from above through acts or threats of violence, and because it is dispersed throughout society rather than located in a single individual or government body. While the sovereign power which Hobbes describes could only seize life or kill, Foucault writes of "a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power", in which "deduction" would be replaced by a power "working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and order- ing them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them" (ibid. : 136).
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MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
Two levels of biopower: discipline and regulation
In his 1977-78 College de France course, Security, Territory, Popula- tion, Foucault takes the example of a prohibition such as "do not steal" or "do not murder" in order to illustrate the differences between sover- eign power, discipline and biopower in a simple way (Foucault 2007). Under sovereign power, which predominated up until the end of the seventeenth century when Hobbes was writing, an individual who trans- gressed these prohibitions against theft and murder would be subjected to the law and punished solely on the basis of his crime; he might, for instance, be executed, exiled or fined. Under disciplinary power, which emerged in the eighteenth century, the criminal will still be subjected to the law or punished, however it will no longer be a mere matter of his crime. Rather, power will now be at least as interested in the thief 's or murderer's character. It will want to know the conditions, both material and psychological, under which the individual committed his crime. This information will be deemed important in order to anticipate and intervene in the likelihood that the criminal will reoffend. In order to predict and control the individual's chance of recidivating, the crimi- nal needs to be subjected to psychological examinations, surveillance and rehabilitative practices unknown under sovereign power. For this reason, the punishment is less likely to put an end to the criminal's life, and more likely to control his life through tactics such as prison, psychiatric treatment, parole and probation. Finally, under biopower, which emerged later in the eighteenth century, the focus and target of power becomes the numbers of thefts and murders occurring in the population. Power now takes an interest in whether crime rates are rising or falling, in which demographic groups particular crimes are predominant, and how crime rates can be optimally controlled or regu- lated. While many of the same tactics will be employed under biopower as under disciplinary power, the focus will now be on the population rather than the individual.
If at times Foucault describes discipline and biopower as two distinct (although intersecting and overlapping) forms of power,2 at other times he includes discipline within biopower, or describes discipline as one of the two levels at which biopower works. Biopower is a power over bios or life, and lives may be managed on both an individual and a group basis. While at one level disciplinary institutions such as schools, workshops, prisons and psychiatric hospitals target individual bodies as they deviate from norms, at another level the state is concerned with knowing and administrating the norms of the population as a whole and thus with understanding and regulating "the problems of
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BIOPOWER
birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration" (Foucault 1990a: 140). Disciplinary power works primarily through institutions, while biopower works primarily through the state, however the state is also involved in many institutions, such as the prison. In The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Foucault writes of biopower:
this power over life evolved in two basic forms; these two forms were not antithetical, however; they constituted rather two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations. One of these poles - the first to be formed, it seems - centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the opti- mization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the paral- lel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines: an anatomo-politics ofthe human body. The second, formed some- what later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological proc- esses: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory controls: a bio-politics of thepopulation. (Ibid. : 139, emphasis added)
Discipline may be seen as biopower as it targets the individual body, therefore, while another level of biopower targets the species-body. Foucault will describe these two levels as "the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed" (ibid. ). These two levels of power are necessarily intertwined, since bodies make up popu- lations and populations are made up of individual bodies. In Society Must Be Defended, Foucault insists that a biopolitics of the population:
does not exclude disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques. This new technique does not simply do away with the disciplinary technique, because it exists at a different level, on a different scale, and because it has a different bearing area, and makes use of very different instruments. (2003 : 242)
One way of conceptualizing the p oint of this passage is to say that dis- cipline is the micro-technology and biopolitics is the macro-technology
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Table 3. 1 Two levels of biopower Aim
Institutions The state
Schools, armies, prisons, asylums, hospitals, workshops
Tactics
Studies and practices
of demographers, sociologists, economists; interventions in the birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, migration
Studies and practices
of criminologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, educators; apprenticeship, tests, education, training
MICHEL FOU CAULT:
KEY CON CEPTS
? ? ? ? Regulatory power (biopolitics)
Disciplinary power (anatomo- politics)
Populations, species,
race
Individuals, bodies
Knowledge/ power and control of the population
Knowledge/ power and subjugation of bodies
? of the same power over life. Table 3. 1 schematizes the distinctions between these two levels of biopower.
Administering life: from the census to sexuality
Biopower administers life rather than threatening to take it away. In order to administer life, it is important for the state to obtain forecasts and statistical estimates concerning such demographic factors as fertil- ity, natality, immigration, dwelling and mortality rates (Foucault 1990a: 25). For this reason, an important moment in the history of biopower is the development of the modern census. While inventories of heads of households, property and men who could serve in the military were taken in ancient Rome, China, Palestine, Babylonia, Persia and Egypt, they were almost unknown throughout the Middle Ages (an exception being the Domesday Book of William the Conqueror), and differed from the modern census in that they did not attempt to gather infor- mation about the entirety of the population, but only about specific types of individuals: those who could be taxed, drafted or forced to work. The idea of enumerating the entirety of a population was only introduced in Western countries at the end of the seventeenth century and became increasingly detailed in the centuries that followed. Soon, the census secured data on dates and places of birth, marital status and occupations. Modern states recognized the necessity of understanding the characteristics, structures and trends of their populations in order to manage them or to compensate for what they could not control.
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BIOPOWER
One subject of biopolitical concern is the age of a population, "together with a whole series of related economic and political prob- lems" (Foucault 2003 : 243 ). The state is concerned with demographic forecasts which foresee a "sapp[ing of] the population's strength, [a] shorten[ing of] the working week, wasted energy, and cost money [. . . ] (ibid. : 244 ).