No More Learning

Its objectivity, its Kleistian quality has often been remarked upon, and readers who measure up to Kafka have recognized the contradiction between that objectivity and events that become remote through the imaginary character of so sober a pre- sentation. However, this contrast becomes productive not only because the quasi- realistic description brings the impossible menacingly close. At the same time this critique of the realistic lineaments of Kafka's form, a critique that to socially com- mitted ears seems all too artistic, has its social aspect. Kafka is made acceptable by many of these realistic lineaments as an ideal of order, possibly of a simple life and modest activity in one's assigned station, an ideal that is itself a mask of social repression. The linguistic habitus of "the world is as it is" is the medium through which the social spell becomes aesthetic appearance. Kafka wisely guards against naming it, as if otherwise the spell would be broken whose insurmount- able omnipresence defines the arena of Kafka's work and which, as its apriori, cannot become thematic. His language is the instrument of that configuration of positivism and myth that has only now become obvious socially. Reified con-
sciousness, which presupposes and confirms the inevitability and immutableness of what exists, is-as the heritage of the ancient spell -the new form of the myth of the ever-same. Kafka's epic style is, in its archaism, mimesis of reification.
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Whereas his work must renounce any claim to transcending myth, it makes the social web of delusion knowable in myth through the how, through language. In his writing, absurdity is as self-evident as it has actually become in society. Those products are socially mute that do their duty by regurgitating tel queI whatever so- cial material they treat and count this metabolic exchange with second nature as the glory of art as social reflection . The artistic subject i s inherently social, not pri- vate. In no case does it become social through forced collectivization or the choice of subject matter. In the age of repressive collectivization, art has the power to resist the compact majority - a resistance that has become a criterion of the work and its social truth - in the lonely and exposed producer of art, while at the same time this does not exclude collective forms of production such as the composers' workshop that Schoenberg envisioned. By constantly admitting into the produc- tion of his work an element of negativity toward his own immediacy, the artist unconsciously obeys a social universal: In every successfully realized correction, watching over the artist's shoulder is a collective subject that has yet to be real- ized. The categories of artistic objectivity are unitary with social emancipation when the object, on the basis of its own impulse, liberates itself from social con- vention and controls. Yet artworks cannot be satisfied with vague and abstract universality such as that of classicism. Rather, they are predicated on fissuredness and thus on the concrete historical situation. Their social truth depends on their opening themselves to this content. The content becomes their subject, to which they mold themselves, to the same extent that their law of form does not ob- scure the fissure but rather, in demanding that it be shaped, makes it its own con- cern . - However profound and still largely obscure the part of science has been in the development of artistic forces of production , and however deeply , precisely through methods learned from science, society reaches into art, just so little is artistic production scientific, even when it is a work of integral constructivism. In art, all scientific discoveries lose their literal character: This is evident in the mod- ification of optical-perspectival laws in painting and in the natural overtone rela- tions in music. When art, intimidated by technique, tries to conserve its miniature terrain by proclaiming its transformation into science, it misconceives the status of the sciences in empirical reality. On the other hand, the aesthetic principle is not to be played out as sacrosanct-as would suit irrationalism-in opposition to the sciences. Art is not an arbitrary cultural complement to science but, rather, stands in critical tension to it. When, for instance , the cultural and human sciences are rightly accused of a lack of spirit, this is almost always at the same time a lack of aesthetic discernment. It is not without reason that the certified sciences de- mand furiously to be left in peace whenever art, whatever they attribute to it, inter- venes in their sphere; that someone can write is cause for suspicion on scientific grounds. Crudeness of thinking is the incapacity to differentiate within a topic, and differentiation is an aesthetic category as much as one of understanding. Sci- ence and art are not to be fused, but the categories that are valid in each are not
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absolutely different. Conformist consciousness prefers the opposite, partly be- cause it is incapable of distinguishing the two and partly because it refuses the insight that identical forces are active in nonidentical spheres. The same holds true with regard to morality . Brutality toward things is potentially brutality toward people. The raw-the subjective nucleus of evil-is a priori negated by art, from which the ideal of being fully formed is indispensable: This, and not the pro- nouncement of moral theses or the striving after moral effects, is art's participa- tion in the moral and makes it part of a more humanly worthy society .
Social struggles and the relations of classes are imprinted in the structure of art- works; by contrast, the political positions deliberately adopted by artworks are epiphenomena and usually impinge on the elaboration of works and thus, ulti- mately, on their social truth content. Political opinions count for little. It is possi- ble to argue over how much Attic tragedy , including those by Euripides , took part in the violent social conflicts of the epoch; however, the basic tendency of tragic form, in contrast to its mythical subjects, the dissolution of the spell of fate and the birth of subjectivity, bears witness as much to social emancipation from feudal- familial ties as, in the collision between mythical law and subjectivity, to the antagonism between fateful domination and a humanity awakening to maturity. That this antagonism, as well as the historicophilosophical tendency, became an apriori of form rather than being treated simply as thematic material, endowed tragedy with its social substantiality: Society appears in it all the more authenti- cally the less it is the intended object. Real partisanship, which is the virtue of art- works no less than of men and women , resides in the depths , where the social an- tinomies become the dialectic of forms: By leading them to language through the synthesis of the work, artists do their part socially; even Lukacs in his last years found himself compelled toward such considerations. Figuration, which articu- lates the wordless and mute contradictions, thereby has the lineaments of a praxis that is not simply flight from real praxis; figuration fulfills the concept of art itself as a comportment. It is a form of praxis and need not apologize that it does not act directly, which it could not do even if it wanted to; the political effect even of so-called committed art is highly uncertain. The social standpoint of artists may serve to interfere with conformist consciousness, but in the actual development of works they become insignificant. That he expressed abominable views when Voltaire died says nothing about the truth content of Mozart' s works . At the actual time when artworks appear there is certainly no abstracting from their intention; whoever would attempt an assessment of Brecht exclusively on the basis of the artistic merit of his works would fail him no less than one who judges his meaning according to his theses. The immanence of society in the artwork is the essential social relation of art, not the immanence of art in society. Because the social content of art is not located externally to its prjncipium individuationis but rather inheres in individuation, which is itself a social reality, art's social character is concealed and can only be grasped by its interpretation .
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Yet even in artworks that are to their very core ideological, truth content can as- sert itself. Ideology, socially necessary semblance, is by this same necessity also the distorted image of the true. A threshold that divides the social consciousness of aesthetics from the philistine is that aesthetics reflects the social critique of the ideological in artworks, rather than mechanically reiterating it. Stifter provides a model of the truth content of an oeuvre that is undoubtedly ideological in its inten- tions . Not only the conservative-restorative choice of thematic material and the fabula docet are ideological, but so is the objectivistic deportment of the form, which suggests a micrologically tender world, a meaningfully correct life that lends itself to narration. This is why Stifter became the idol of a retrospectively noble bourgeoisie. Yet the layers of his work that once provided him with his half- esoteric popularity have with time peeled away and vanished. This, however, is not the last word on Stifter, for the reconciling, conciliatory aspects, especially in his last works , are exaggerated. Here objectivity hardens into a mask and the life evoked becomes a defensive ritual. Shimmering through the eccentricity of the average is the secret and denied suffering of the alienated subject and an unrecon- ciled life. The light that falls over his mature prose is drained and bleak, as if it were allergic to the happiness of color; it i s , as it were , reduced to a pencil sketch by the exclusion of everything unruly and disturbing to a social reality that was as incompatible with the mentality of the poet as with the epic apriori that he took from Goethe and clung to. What transpires, in opposition to the wiII of his prose, through the discrepancy between its form and the already capitalist society de- volves upon its expression; ideological exaggeration endows his work mediately with its nonideological truth content, with its superiority over all consoling, assid- uously pastoral literature , and it won for it that authentic quality that Nietzsche ad- mired. Stifter is the paradigm ofhow little poetic intention, even that meaning that is directly embodied or represented in an artwork, approximates its objective con- tent; in his work the content is truly the negation of the meaning, yet this content would not exist if the meaning were not intended by the work and then canceled and transformed by the work's own complexion. Affirmation becomes the cipher of despair and the purest negativity of content contains, as in Stifter, a grain of affirmation. The iridescence that emanates from artworks, which today taboo all affirmation, is the appearance of the affirmative ineffabile, the emergence of the nonexisting as if it did exist. Its claim to existence flickers out in aesthetic sem- blance; yet what does not exist, by appearing, is promised. The constellation of the existing and nonexisting is the utopic figure of art. Although it is compelled toward absolute negativity, it is precisely by virtue of this negativity that it is not absolutely negative. By no means do artworks primarily develop this inwardly antinomial affirmative element as a result of their external attitude to what exists, that is, to society; rather, it develops immanently in them and immerses them in twilight. No beauty today can evade the question whether it is actually beautiful and not instead surreptitiously acquired by static affirmation. The antipathy to-
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ward applied arts i s , indirectly , the bad conscience of art as a whole, which makes itself felt at the sound of every musical chord and at the sight of every color. There is no need for social criticism of art to investigate this externally: It emerges from the inner-aesthetic formations themselves. The heightened sensitivity of the aes- thetic sensorium converges asymptotically with the socially motivated irritability toward art . - In art, ideology and truth cannot be neatly distinguished from each other. Art cannot have one without the other, and this reciprocity in tum is an en- ticement toward the ideological misuse of art as much as it is an enticement toward summarily finishing it off. It is only a step from the utopia of the self-likeness of artworks to the stink of the heavenly roses that art scatters here below as do the women in Schiller's tirade. The more brazenly society is transformed into a total- ity in which it assigns everything, including art, to its place, the more completely does art polarize into ideology and protest; and this polarization is hardly to art's advantage. Absolute protest constrains it and carries over to its own raison d'etre; ideology thins out to an impoverished and authoritarian copy of reality .
In the culture resurrected after the catastrophe, art-regardless of its content and substance [Inhalt and Gehalt]-has even taken on an ideological aspect by its mere existence. In its disproportion to the horror that has transpired and threatens , i t i s condemned to cynicism; even where i t directly faces the horror, i t diverts at- tention from it. Its objectivation implies insensitivity to reality. This degrades art to an accomplice of the barbarism to which it succumbs no less when it renounces objectivation and directly plays along , even when this takes the form of polemical commitment. Every artwork today, the radical ones included, has its conservative aspect; its existence helps to secure the spheres of spirit and culture, whose real powerlessness and complicity with the principle of disaster becomes plainly evi- dent. But this conservative element- which, contrary to the trend toward social integration, is stronger in advanced works than in the more moderate ones-does not simply deserve oblivion. Only insofar as spirit, in its most advanced form, sur- vives and perseveres is any opposition to the total domination of the social totality possible . A humanity to which progressive spirit fails to bequeath what humanity is poised to liquidate would disappear in a barbarism that a reasonable social order should prevent. Art, even as something tolerated in the administered world, em- bodies what does not allow itself to be managed and what total management sup- presses. Greece's new tyrants knew why they banned Beckett's plays, in which there is not a single political word. Asociality becomes the social legitimation of art. For the sake of reconciliation, authentic works must blot out every trace of reconciliation in memory. All the same, the unity that even dissociative works do not escape is not without a trace of the old reconciliation. Artworks are, a priori, socially culpable, and each one that deserves its name seeks to expiate this guilt. Their possibility of surviving requires that their straining toward synthesis de- velop in the form of their irreconcilability. Without the synthesis, which confronts reality as the autonomous artwork, there would be nothing external to reality's
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spell; the principle of the isolation of spirit, which casts a spell around itself, is also the principle thatbreaks through the spell by making it determinate.
That the nominalistic tendency of art toward the destruction of all preestablished categories of order has social implications is evident in the enemies of modem art, right up to Emil Staiger. Their sympathy for what they call a Leitbild, a guiding principle, is precisely their sympathy for social, particularly sexual, repression. The bond between a socially reactionary posture and hatred for the artistically modem , which the analysis of the obedient character makes apparent, is documented by new and old fascist propaganda, and it is also confirmed by empirical social re- search. 2 The rage against the purported destruction of sacrosanct cultural goods, which for that reason alone can no longer be experienced as such, serves to mask the real destructive wishes of the indignant. For the ruling consciousness, any con- sciousness that would have the world other than it is always seems chaotic because it deviates from a petrified reality. Inevitably those who rail loudest against the an- archy of modem art, which for the most part hardly exists, convince themselves of what they presume to be the nature of their enemy on the basis of crude errors at the simplest level ofinformation; indeed, there is no responding to them, because what they have decided in advance to reject they are not willing to experience in the first place . In this the division of labor incontestably bears part of the blame . The non- specialist will no more understand the most recent developments in nuclear physics than the lay person will straightaway grasp extremely complex new music or paint-
ing. Whereas, however, the incomprehensibility of physics is accepted on the assumption that in principle its rationality can be followed and its theorems under- stood by anyone, modem art's incomprehensibility is branded as schizoid arbi- trariness, even though the aesthetically incomprehensible gives way to experience no less than does the scientifically obscure . If art is capable of realizing its humane universality at all, then it is exclusively by means of the rigorous division of labor: Anything else is false consciousness. Works of quality, those that are fully formed in themselves, are objectively less chaotic than innumerable works that have or- derly facades somehow slapped on while underneath their own structure crumbles. Few are disturbed by this . Deep down and contrary to its better judgment, the bour- geois character tends to cling to what is inferior; it is fundamental to ideology that it is never fully believed and that it advances from self-disdain to self-destruction. The semi-educated consciousness insists on the "I like that," laughing with cynical embarrassment at the fact that cultural trash is expressly made to dupe the con- sumer: As a leisure-time occupation , art should be cozy and discretionary; people put up with the deception because they sense secretly that the principle of their own sane realism is the fraud ofequal exchange. It is within this false and at the same time art-alien consciousness that the fictional element of art, its illusoriness, devel- ops in bourgeois society: Mundus vult decipi is the categorical imperative of artis- tic consumption. This taints all supposedly na'ive artistic experience, and to this extent it is not naIve. The dominant consciousness is objectively led to this dank
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attitude because the administered must renounce the possibility of maturity, in- cluding aesthetic maturity, that is postulated by the order that they cling to as their own and at any price. The critical concept of society, which inheres in authentic artworks without needing to be added to them, is incompatible with what society must think of itself if it is to continue as it is; the ruling consciousness cannot free itself from its own ideology without endangering society's self-preservation. This confers social relevance on apparently derivative aesthetic controversies.
That society "appears" in artworks with polemical truth as well as ideologically , is conducive to historicophilosophical mystification. Speculation all too easily falls prey to the idea of a harmony between society and artworks that has been preestablished by the world spirit. But theory must not capitulate to that relation- ship. The process that transpires in artworks and is brought to a standstill in them, i s to be conceived as the same social process in which the artworks are embedded; according to Leibniz's formulation, they represent this process windowlessly. The elements of an artwork acquire their configuration as a whole in obedience to im- manent laws that are related to those of the society external to it. Social forces of production, as well as relations of production, return in artworks as mere forms divested of their facticity because artistic labor is social labor; moreover, they are always the product of this labor. In artworks , the forces of production are not in- themselves different from social productive forces except by their constitutive absenting from real society. Scarcely anything is done or produced in artworks that does not have its model, however latently, in social production. The binding force of artworks, beyond the jurisdiction of their immanence, originates in this affinity. If artworks are in fact absolute commodities in that they are a social prod- uct that has rejected every semblance of existing for society , a semblance to which commodities otherwise urgently cling, the determining relation of production, the commodity form, enters the artwork equally with the social force of production and the antagonism between the two. The absolute commodity would be free of the ideology inherent in the commodity form, which pretends to exist for-another, whereas ironically it is something merely for-itself: It exists for those who hold power. This reversal of ideology into truth is a reversal of aesthetic content, and not immediately a reversal of the attitude of art to society . Even the absolute com- modity remains salable and has become a "natural monopoly. " That artworks are offered for sale at the market-just as pots and statuettes once were - is not their misuse but rather the simple consequence of their participation in the relations of production. Thoroughly nonideological art is indeed probably completely impos- sible. Its mere antithesis to empirical reality does not suffice to make it so; Sartre3 rightly accented that the principle of l 'art pour l 'art, which has prevailed in France since Baudelaire, just as in Germany the aesthetic ideal of art prevailed as an in- stitution of moral reform, was taken up by the bourgeoisie as a means for the neutralization of art with the same willingness with which in Germany art was appropriated as a costumed ally of social control and order. What is ideological in
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the principle of I'art pour I'art does not have its locus in the energetic antithesis of art to the empirical world but rather in the abstractness and facile character of this antithesis. The idea of beauty advocated by I'artpour I'art, at least as it has devel- oped since Baudelaire , was not to be classical formalism, yet it did indeed exclude all content [/nhalt] as disruptive that did not, before undergoing the law of form and thus precisely anti-artistically, submit to a dogmatic canon of beauty: It is in this spirit that George in a letter excoriates Hofmannsthal for having allowed the painter in the Death of Titian to die of the plague . 4 L 'art pour l 'art' s concept of beauty becomes at once strangely empty and imprisoned by thematic material, a sort of lugendstil arrangement as revealed in Ibsen's formulaic descriptions of vine leaves entwined in locks of hair and of dying in beauty . Beauty , powerless to define itself and only able to gain its definition by way of its other, a sort of aerial root, becomes entangled in the fate of artificial ornamentation. This idea of beauty is limited because it sets itself up as directly antithetical to a society rejected as ugly rather than, as Baudelaire and Rimbaud did, extracting this antithesis from the content [Inhalt]-from the imagery of Paris, in Baudelaire's instance-and putting it to the test: Only in this fashion could sheer distance become the inter- vention of determinate negation. It is precisely the autarchy of neoromantic and symbolist beauty , its timidity vis-a-vis those social elements in which form exclu- sively becomes form, that accounts for its rapid transformation into something so easily consumable. This beauty deceives about the commodity world by setting it aside; this qualifies it as a commodity . Their latent commodity form has inner- artistically condemned the works of l 'art pour [ 'art to kitsch, as which they are today ridiculed. In Rimbaud it would be possible to show that bitterly sarcastic opposition to society cohabits uncritically with a submissiveness comparable to Rilke's rapture over cabaret songs and the fragrance of an old chest; ultimately it was affirmation that triumphed, and the principle of l'art pour l'art was not to be saved. It is for this reason that socially the situation of art is today aporetic. If art cedes its autonomy, it delivers itself over to the machinations of the status quo; if art remains strictly for-itself, it nonetheless submits to integration as one harm- less domain among others. The social totality appears in this aporia, swallowing whole whatever occurs. That works renounce communication is a necessary yet by no means sufficient condition of their unideological essence. The central crite- rion is the force of expression, through the tension of which artworks become elo- quent with wordless gesture. In expression they reveal themselves as the wounds of society; expression is the social ferment of their autonomous form. The princi- pal witness for this is Picasso's Guemica that, strictly incompatible with pre- scribed realism, precisely by means of inhumane construction , achieves a level of expression that sharpens it to social protest beyond all contemplative misunder- standing. The socially critical zones of artworks are those where it hurts; where in their expression, historically determined, the untruth of the social situation comes to light. It is actually this against which the rage at art reacts.
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Artworks are able to appropriate their heterogeneous element, their entwinement with society, because they are themselves always at the same time something social. Nevertheless, art's autonomy, wrested painfully from society as well as so- cially derived in itself, has the potential of reversing into heteronomy; everything new is weaker than the accumulated ever-same , and it is ready to regress back into it. The We encapsuled in the objectivation of works is not radically other than the external We, however frequently it is the residue of a real We that is past. That is why collective appeal is not simply the original sin of artworks; rather, something in their law of form implies it. It is not out of obsession with politics that great Greek philosophy accorded aesthetic effect so much more weight than its objec- tive tenor would imply . Ever since art has come within the purview of theoretical reflection, the latter has been tempted-by raising itself above art-to sink be- neath art and surrender it to power relations. What is today called situating a work involves exiting from the aesthetic sphere; the cheap sovereignty that assigns art its social position, after dismissing its immanence of form as a vain and naIve self- delusion, tends to treat the work as if it were nothing but what its social function condemns it to. The good and bad marks Plato distributed to art according to whether or not it conformed to the military virtues of the community he confused with utopia, his totalitarian rancor against real or spitefully invented decadence, even his aversion to the lies of poets, which are after all nothing but art's sem- blance character, which Plato hoped to summon to the support of the status quo- all this taints the concept of art in the same moment in which it was first con- sciously reflected upon . The purging of the affects in Aristotle' s Poetics no longer makes equally frank admission of its devotion to ruling interests, yet it supports them all the same in that his ideal of sublimation entrusts art with the task of pro- viding aesthetic semblance as a substitute satisfaction for the bodily satisfaction of the targeted public ' s instincts and needs: Catharsis is a purging action directed against the affects and an ally of repression. Aristotelian catharsis is part of a super- annuated mythology of art and inadequate to the actual effects of art. In return, artworks have realized in themselves, by spiritualization, what the Greeks pro- jected on their external effect: They are, in the process they carry out between the law ofform and their material content, their own catharsis. Sublimation, even aesthetic sublimation , incontestably participates in civilatory progress and even in inner-artistic progress itself, but it also has its ideological side: Art, as a surrogate satisfaction, by virtue of the fact that it is spurious , robs sublimation of the dignity for which the whole of classicism made propaganda, a classicism that survived for more than two thousand years under the protection of Aristotle's authority. The doctrine of catharsis imputes to art the principle that ultimately the culture indus- try appropriates and administers. The index of its untruth is the well-founded doubt whether the salutary Aristotelian effect ever occurred; substitute satisfac- tion may well have spawned repressed instincts . - Even the category of the new, which in the artwork represents what has yet to exist and that whereby the work
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transcends the given, bears the scar of the ever-same underneath the constantly new. Consciousness, fettered to this day , has not gained mastery over the new, not even in the image: Consciousness dreams ofthe new but is not able to dream the new itself. If the emancipation of art was possible only through the appropriation of the commodity character, through which art gained the semblance of its being- in-itself, then in the course of that development the commodity character was dropped from the artworks; Jugendstilplayed no small role in this, with its ideol- ogy of the reintroduction of art into life as well as with the sensations of Wilde, d'Annunzio, and Maeterlinck, who served as preludes to the culture industry. Pro- gressive subjective differentiation, the heightening and expansion of the sphere of aesthetic stimuli, made these stimuli manipulable; they were able to be produced for the cultural marketplace. The attunement of art to the most fleeting individual reactions was bound up with the reification of these reactions; art's growing simi- larity to subjective physical existence distanced it-as far as the majority of artis- tic production was concerned-from its objectivity and at the same time com- mended it to the public; to this extent the watchword I 'art pour I 'art was the mask of its opposite. What is true in the uproar over decadence is that subjective differ- entiation has an aspect of ego-weakness, an aspect shared with the mentality of the culture industry'S customers and something the culture industry knew how to exploit. Kitsch is not, as those believers in erudite culture would like to imagine, the mere refuse of art, originating in disloyal accommodation to the enemy; rather, it lurks in art, awaiting ever recurring opportunities to spring forth. Although kitsch escapes, implike, from even a historical definition, one of its most tena- cious characteristics is the prevarication of feelings, fictional feelings in which no one is actually participating, and thus the neutralization of these feelings. Kitsch parodies catharsis. Ambitious art, however, produces the same fiction of feelings; indeed, this was essential to it: The documentation of actually existing feelings, the recapitulation of psychical raw material, is foreign to it. It is in vain to try to draw the boundaries abstractly between aesthetic fiction and kitsch's emotional plunder. It is a poison admixed to all art; excising it is today one of art's despair- ing efforts. The vulgar is related in a complementary fashion to the manufactured and bartered-off feeling, and indeed vulgarity is an aspect of every salable feeling. It is as hard to say what is vulgar in artworks as to answer Erwin Ratz's question5 how it is that art, whose a priori gesrure protests against vulgarity, is yet capable of being integrated with the vulgar. Only in a mutilated fashion does the vulgar represent the plebeian that is held at a distance by the so-called high arts . When art has allowed itself, without condescension, to be inspired by a plebeian element, art has gained in an authentic weightiness that is the opposite of the vulgar. Art becomes vulgar through condescension: when, especially by means of humor, it appeals to deformed consciousness and confirms it. It suits domination if what it has made out of the masses and what it drills into them can be chalked up to their own guilty desires. Art respects the masses by presenting itself to them as what
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they could be rather than by adapting itself to them in their degraded condition. Socially, the vulgar in art is the subjective identification with objectively repro- duced humiliation. In place of what is withheld from them, the masses reactively , resentfully, enjoy what i s produced b y renunciation and usurps the place o f what has been renounced. It is ideology that low art, entertainment, is socially legiti- mate and self-evident; it is solely that condition that expresses the omnipresence of repression. The model of aesthetic vulgarity is the child in the advertisement, taking a bite of chocolate with eyes half-closed, as if it were a sin. The repressed returns in the vulgar, bearing the marks of repression; it is the subjective expres- sion ofthe failure ofthat sublimation that art praises so overzealously as catharsis and for which it gives itself credit because it senses how little sublimation, like all culture, has actually turned out to date. In the age of total administration, culture no longer needs to humiliate the barbarians it has created; it suffices that by its rit- uals it strengthens the barbarism that has subjectively been sedimenting over cen- turies. That art stands as a reminder of what does not exist, prompts rage; this rage is transferred to the image of that otherness and befouls it. The archetypes of the vulgar that the art of the emancipatory bourgeoisie held in check, sometimes inge- niously-in its clowns, servants, and Papagenos-are the grinning advertisement beauties whose praise of toothpaste brands unites the billboards of all lands; those who know they are being cheated by so much feminine splendor blacken out the all too brilliant teeth of these archetypes and in total innocence make the truth visi- ble above the gleam of culture. This, at least, is perceived by the vulgar. Because aesthetic vulgarity undialectically imitates the invariants of social degradation, it has no history; its eternal return is celebrated by graffiti. No subject matter is ever to be taboo and excluded from art as vulgar; vulgarity is a relation to the material and to those to whom the appeal is made . The expansion of the vulgar to the total- ity has meanwhile swallowed up what once laid claim to the noble and sublime: This is one of the reasons for the liquidation of the tragic. It succumbed in the denouement of the second act of Budapest operettas. Today , everything that goes under the name of "light" art is to be rejected; that also applies, however, to what is noble, the abstract antithesis to reification and at the same time its booty. Ever since Baudelaire, the noble has been associated with political reaction, as if democracy as such, the quantitative category of masses, and not the perpetuation of oppression were the source of the vulgar. Fidelity to the noble in art should be maintained, just as the noble should reflect its own culpability, its complicity with privilege. Its refuge remains exclusively the unflinching power of resistance in the act of forrning. The noble becomes spurious and itself vulgar when it extols itself, for to this day there has not been anything noble . Contradiction gnaws at the noble ever since Holderlin's verse that nothing sacred is any longer fit for use,6 the same contradiction that an adolescent might have sensed who read a socialist journal with political sympathy and at the same time was put off by the language and mentality and the ideological undercurrent of a culture for all. What that paper in
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fact promoted , of course , was not the potential of a freed people but rather people as the complement of class society , the statically conceived universal of voters who must be reckoned with.
The counterconcept to aesthetic comportment is, quite simply, the concept of the philistine, which often overlaps with the vulgar yet remains distinct from it by its indifference or hatred, whereas vulgarity greedily smacks its lips . Socially impli- cated in the guilt ofthose who lay claim to aesthetic nobility, the philistine's dis- dain grants intellectual labor an immediately higher rank than manual labor. That art benefits from certain advantages becomes, for art's self-consciousness and for those who react aesthetically, something better in-itself. This ideological element in art stands in need of permanent self-correction.
Art is capable of this because, as the negation of practical life, it is itself praxis, and indeed not simply on the basis of its genesis and the fact that, like every artifact, it is the result of activity. Just as its content is dynamic in itself and does not remain self-identical, in the course of their history the objectivated artworks themselves once again become practical comportments and tum toward reality. In this, art and theory are allied. Art recapitulates praxis in itself, modified and in a sense neutralized, and by doing so it takes up positions toward reality . Beethoven's symphonic language , which in its most secret chemistry is the bourgeois process of production as well as the ex- pression of capitalism's perennial disaster, at the same time becomes afait social by its gesture of tragic affirmation: Things are as they must and should be and are therefore good. At the same time, this music belongs to the revolutionary process of bourgeois emancipation, just as it anticipates its apologetics. The more deeply artworks are deciphered, the less their antithesis to praxis remains absolute; they themselves are something other than their origin, their fundament, that is, this very antithesis to praxis, and they unfold the mediation of this antithesis. They are less than praxis and more: less, because, as was codified once and for all in Tolstoy'S Kreutzer Sonata, they recoil before what must be done, perhaps even thwart it, although they are less capable of this than is suggested by Tolstoy'S renegade asceticism. Their truth content cannot be separated from the concept of humanity. Through every mediation , through all negativity, they are images of a transformed humanity and are unable to come to rest in themselves by any ab-
straction from this transformation. Art, however, is more than praxis because by its aversion to praxis it simultaneously denounces the naror w untruth of the prac- tical world. Immediate praxis wants to know nothing of this as long as the practi- cal organization of the world has yet to succeed. The critique exercised a priori by art is that of action as a cryptogram of domination. According to its sheer form, praxis tends toward that which, in terms of its own logic, it should abolish; vio- lence is immanent to it and is maintained in its sublimations, whereas artworks, even the most aggressive, stand for nonviolence. They are a constant indictment of the workaday bustle and the practical individual, back of which is concealed the barbaric appetite of the species , which is not human as long as it permits itself
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to be ruled by this appetite and is fused with domination. The dialectical relation of art to praxis is that of its social effect. That artworks intervene politically is doubtful; when it does happen, most often it is peripheral to the work; if they strive for it, they usually succumb to their own terms . Their true social effect is an extremely indirect participation in spirit that by way of subterranean processes contributes to social transformation and is concentrated in artworks; they only achieve such participation through their objectivation. The effect of artworks is not that they present a latent praxis that corresponds to a manifest one, for their autonomy has moved far beyond such immediacy; rather, their effect is that of recollection, which they evoke by their existence. If the historical genesis of art- works refers back to causal contexts, these do not disappear tracelessly in them; the process enacted internally by each and every artwork works back on society as the model of a possible praxis in which something on the order of a collective sub- ject is constituted. However little the external effect matters in art, and however important its form is, its intrinsic form nevertheless has an effect. Therefore the critical analysis of the effect of artworks has a great deal to say about what art- works, in their character as things, have sealed up in themselves; this could be demonstrated in the ideological effect of Wagner's music. It is not social reflec- tion on artworks and their inner chemistry that is false but rather the subordination of artworks to abstract social correlations determined from above that are indiffer- ent to the tension between the historical causal nexus and the content of the work . Just how far artworks intervene on a practical level is incidentally determined not only by them but far more importantly by the social moment. Beaumarchais's comedies were certainly not politically committed i n the style o f Brecht or Sartre , yet they in fact had a certain political effect because their tangible content [Inhalt] harmonized with a social movement that relished finding itself flattered in them. Because it is second-hand, the social effect ofart is obviously paradoxical; what is attributed to its spontaneity in fact depends on the general social tendency. Conversely, Brecht's work, which, beginning with SaintJoan o/the Stockyards, wanted to provoke social change, was probably socially powerless, and the astute Brecht by no means deceived himself on this score. Its effect is captured by the English expression of preaching to the saved. His theater of alienation intended to motivate the viewer to think. Brecht's postulate of a thinking comportment converges, strangely enough, with the objective discernment that autonomous art- works presuppose in the viewer, listener, or reader as being adequate to them. His didactic style , however, is intolerant of the ambiguity in which thought originates: It is authoritarian. This may have been Brecht's response to the ineffectuality of his didactic plays: As a virtuoso of manipulative technique, he wanted to coerce the desired effect just as he once planned to organize his rise to fame . Neverthe- less, it is not least of all due to Brecht that the artwork gained self-consciousness of itself as an element of political praxis and thus acquired a force opposed to its ideological blindness. Brecht's cult ofpracticality became an aesthetic constituent
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of his works and it is not to be eliminated from what in his work stands at a remove from the realm of causal contexts, namely their truth content. The acute reason today for the social inefficacy of artworks - those that do not surrender to crude propaganda - is that in order to resist the all-powerful system of communi- cation they must rid themselves of any communicative means that would perhaps make them accessible to the pUblic. Artworks exercise a practical effect, if they do so at all, not by haranguing but by the scarcely apprehensible transformation of consciousness; in any case, agitative effects dissipate rapidly, presumably because even artworks of that type are perceived under the general category of irrational- ity: Their principle, of which they cannot rid themselves, stalls the immediate practical impulse. Aesthetic cultivation leads away from the preaesthetic contam- ination of art and reality. The distance acquired, which is its result, not only re- veals the objective character of the artwork. It also affects the SUbjective comport- ment, in that it severs primitive identifications and puts the recipient qua empirical psychological person out of action, which benefits his relation to the work. Sub- jectively, art requires self-exteriorization; this is what was meant by Brecht's cri- tique ofempathic aesthetics. This exteriorization is, however, practical insofar as it determines the person who experiences art and steps out of himself as a ? roov 1tOA. t'tlKOV, just as art itself is objectively praxis as the cultivation of conscious- ness; but it only becomes this by renouncing persuasion. Whoever takes up an ob- jective stance vis-a-vis the artwork will hardly allow himself to become enthused by it in the fashion prescribed by the idea of a direct appeal . This would be incom- patible with the comprehending attitude appropriate to the cognitive character of artworks. By the affront to reigning needs, by the inherent tendency of art to cast different lights on the familiar, artworks correspond to the objective need for a transformation of consciousness that could become a transformation of reality. The moment they hope to achieve the effect under whose absence they suffer by adapting to existing needs they deprive people of precisely that which-to take the jargon of needs seriously and tum it against itself-they could "offer" them. Aesthetic needs are fairly vague and unarticulated; the practices of the culture in- dustry have not changed this as much as they would like the world to believe and, indeed, as much as many like to claim. That culture failed implies that there actu- ally are no subjective cultural needs independent of supply and the mechanisms of distribution. The need for art is itself largely ideological: Life would be possible without art, too, not only objectively but also with regard to the psychological econ- omy of consumers who in modified circumstances are easily moved to changing their taste , in that their taste follows the line of least resistance. In a society that has disaccustomed men and women from thinking beyond themselves, whatever sur- passes the mere reproduction of their life and those things they have been drilled to believe they cannot get along without, is superfluous. What is true in the most recent rebellion against art is that - in the face of the absurdly incessant scarcity , the expanding and self-reproducing barbarism, the ever present threat of total
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catastrophe - phenomena that are not preoccupied with the maintenance of life take on a ridiculous aspect. Whereas artists can afford to be indifferent to a cultural mechanism that in any case swallows up everything and excludes nothing , not even what is relatively good, this mechanism nevertheless tinges everything that thrives within it with something of its objective indifference. What Marx was still able to presuppose, to some degree innocently, as cultural needs in the concept of a soci- ety ' s general level of achievement , has its dialectic in the fact that in the meantime one does culture a greater honor by forgoing it and not taking part in its festivals than by agreeing to be force-fed. Aesthetic motifs are no less critical of cultural needs than are empirically real ones. Artworks want to break up the eternal ex- change of need and satisfaction, instead of doing injustice to unfulfilled needs by supplying them with substitute satisfactions. Every aesthetic and sociological the- ory of need makes use of what bears the characteristically old-fashioned name of lived aesthetic experience. 7 Its insufficiency is evident in the constitution of lived artistic experiences themselves , if such exist. The supposition of lived artistic ex- periences is based on the assumption of an equivalence between the content of experience -put crudely, the emotional expression of works - and the subjective experience of the recipient. A listener is, in other words, to become excited when the music seems to do so, whereas to the extent that one understands anything, one should become emotionally all the more disinterested the pushier the work's ges- ticulations become . Science could hardly think up anything more alien to art than those experiments that presume to measure aesthetic effect and aesthetic experi- ence by recording the heartbeat. The fount ofany such equivalence remains murky. What purportedly is to be lived or relived in the work- according to popular as- sumption, the feelings ofthe author-is itselfonly a partial element in works and certainly not the decisive one. Works are not depositions of impulses-in any case such depositions are always much disliked by listeners and least likely to be empathically "reexperienced"; they are, rather, radically modified by the autono- mous nexus of the artwork. The interplay of the constructive and the mimetically expressive elements in art is simply suppressed or distorted by the theory of lived experience: The equivalence it posits is not an equivalence at all; rather, one par- ticular aspect is abstracted. This aspect, again removed from the aesthetic nexus of the work and translated back into the empirical world, for a second time be- comes an other of what in any case it is in the work . The shock aroused by impor- tant works is not employed to trigger personal, otherwise repressed emotions. Rather , this shock i s the moment i n which recipients forget themselves and disap- pear into the work; it is the moment of being shaken. The recipients lose their footing; the possibility of truth, embodied in the aesthetic image, becomes tangi- ble. This immediacy, in the fullest sense, of relation to artworks is a function of mediation , of penetrating and encompassing experience [Eifahrung) ; it takes shape in the fraction of an instant, and for this the whole of consciousness is re- quired, not isolated stimuli and responses. The experience of art as that of its truth
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or untruth is more than subjective experience: It is the irruption of objectivity into subjective consciousness. The experience is mediated through subjectivity precisely at the point where the subjective reaction is most intense. In Beethoven many situations are scenes a jaire, perhaps even with the flaw of being staged. The entrance ofthe reprise in the Ninth Symphony, which is the result ofthe sym- phonic process, celebrates its original introduction. It resonates like an overwhelm- ing "Thus it is. " The shudder is a response, colored by fear of the overwhelming; by its affirmation the music at the same time speaks the truth about untruth. Non- judging, artworks point - as with their finger - to their content without its thereby becoming discursive. The spontaneous reaction of the recipient is mimesis of the immediacy of this gesture. In it, however, artworks are not exhausted. The position that this musical passage, once integrated, achieves by its gesture is sub- ject to critique: It poses the question whether the power of being thus-and-not- otherwise - at the epiphany of which such moments in art are aimed - is the index of its truth . Full comprehending experience [Eifahrung] , which terminates in judgment on the nonjudging work, demands a decision and, by extension, the con- cept. The lived experience [Erlebnis] is exclusively an element of such compre- hending experience and faulty because it is subject to persuasion. Works such as the Ninth Symphony exercise a mesmerizing effect: The force they achieve through their structure becomes the force of their effect. In the development of music after Beethoven the suggestive force of works , initially borrowed from so- ciety, has been shunted back to society and become agitative and ideological. Shudder, radically opposed to the conventional idea of experience [Erlebnis], pro- vides no particular satisfaction for the I; it bears no similarity to desire. Rather, it is a memento of the liquidation of the I, which, shaken , perceives its own limited- ness and finitude . This experience [Eifahrung] is contrary to the weakening of the I that the culture industry manipulates. For the culture industry the idea of the shudder is idle nonsense; this is probably the innermost motivation for the deaes- theticization of art. To catch even the slightest glimpse beyond the prison that it itself is, the I requires not distraction but rather the utmost tension; that preserves the shudder, an involuntary comportment, incidentally, from becoming regres- sion. In his Aesthetic ojthe Sublime Kant faithfully presented the power of the subject as the precondition of the sublime. True, the annihilation of the I in the face of art is to be taken no more literally than is art. Because, however, what are called aesthetic experiences [Erlebnisse] are as such psychologically real, it
would be impossible to understand them if they were simply part and parcel of the illusoriness of art. Experiences are not "as if. " The disappearance of the I in the moment of the shudder is not real; but delirium, which has a similar aspect, is nevertheless incompatible with artistic experience. For a few moments the I be- comes aware , in real terms , of the possibility of letting self-preservation fall away , though it does not actually succeed in realizing this possibility . It is not the aes- thetic shudder that is semblance but rather its attitude to objectivity: In its imme-
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diacy the shudder feels the potential as if it were actual. The I is seized by the unmetaphorical, semblance-shattering consciousness: that it itself is not ultimate, but semblance . For the subject, this transforms art into what it is in-itself, the his- torical voice of repressed nature, ultimately critical of the principle of the I, that internal agent of repression. This subjective experience [Eifahrung] directed against the I is an element of the objective truth of art. Whoever experiences [erlebt] artworks by referring them to himself, does not experience them; what passses for experience [Erlebnis] is a palmed-off cultural surrogate . Even of this surrogate one's conceptions are simplifications. The products of the culture indus- try, more shallow and standardized than any of its fans can ever be, may simulta- neously impede the identification that is their goal. The question as to what the culture industry inflicts on men and women is probably all too naIve: Its effect is much more diffuse than the form of the question suggests . The empty time filled with emptiness does not even produce false consciousness but is an exertion that leaves things just as they are .
The element of objective praxis inherent in art is transformed into subjective intention when, as a result of society's objective tendency and of the critical reflection of art, art's antithesis to society becomes irreconcilable. The accepted term for this subjective intention is commitment. Commitment is a higher level of reflection than tendency; it is not simply out to correct unpleasant situations, al- though the committed all too easily sympathize with the idea of solving problems by means of "appropriate measures. "8 Commitment aims at the transformation of the preconditions of situations, not at merely making recommendations; to this extent it inclines toward the aesthetic category of essence. The polemical self- consciousness of art presupposes its spiritualization; the more sensitized art be- comes toward that sensual immediacy with which it was formerly equated, the more critical its posture becomes toward raw reality , which - an extension of the rank growth of first nature-reproduces itself socially in ever expanded form. It is not only formally that the critically reflexive tendency toward spiritualization sharp- ens the relation of art to its subject matter. Hegel's break from sensualist aesthet- ics was of a part both with the spiritualization of the artwork and with the accen- tuation of its subject matter. Through spiritualization the artwork is transformed, in itself, into what was once blindly attested to be its effect on other spirits. - The concept of commitment is not to be taken too literally. If it is made the yard- stick of censorship, it recapitulates in its attitude toward artworks that element of dominating supervision to which they stood opposed prior to all supervisable commitment. This does not amount, however, to jettisoning categories such as that of a program or its crude progeny according to the whim of an aesthetics of taste. What they register becomes their legitimate subject matter in a phase in which they are motivated by the longing and the will that the world be other than it is. But this gives them no dispensation from the law of form; even spiritual con- tent [Inhalt] remains material and is consumed by the artworks, even when their
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self-consciousness insists that this subject matter is essence. Brecht taught noth- ing that could not have been understood apart from his didactic plays, indeed, that could not have been understood more concisely through theory , or that was not al- ready well known to his audience: That the rich are better off than the poor; that the way of the world is unjust; that repression persists within formal equality; that objective evil transforms private goodness into its own opposite; that-admit- tedly a dubious wisdom - goodness requires the masks of evil. But the sententious vehemence with which he translates these hardly dew-fresh insights into scenic gestures lends his works their tone; the didacticism led him to his dramaturgical innovations , which overthrew the moribund theater of philosophy and intrigue. In his plays, theses took on an entirely different function from the one their content [Inhalt] intended. They became constitutive; they made the drama anti-illusory and contributed to the collapse of the unitary nexus of meaning. It is this, not com- mitment, that defines their quality, yet their quality is inseparable from the com- mitment in that it becomes their mimetic element. Brecht's commitment does for the work what it gravitates toward on its own: It undermines it. As often occurs, in commitment, something that is sealed up in art becomes external by means of growing control and practicability. Artworks became for-themselves what they previously were in-themselves. The immanence of artworks, their apparently a priori distance from the empirical, would not exist without the prospect of a world transformed by self-conscious praxis. In Romeo and Juliet Shakespeare was not promoting love without familial guardianship ; but without the longing for a situa- tion in which love would no longer be mutilated and condemned by patriarchal or any other powers , the presence of the two lost in one another would not have the sweetness-the wordless, imageless utopia-over which, to this day, the cen- turies have been powerless; the taboo that prohibits knowledge of any positive utopia also reigns over artworks. Praxis is not the effect of works; rather, it is encapsuled in their truth content. This is why commitment is able to become an aesthetic force of production . In general , the bleating against tendentious art and against commitment is equally subaltern. The ideological concern to keep culture pure obeys the wish that in the fetishized culture, and thus actually, everything remains as it was. Such indignation has much in common with the opposing posi- tion's indignation that has been standardized in the phrase about the obsolete ivory tower from which, in an age zealously proclaimed an age of mass communi- cation, art must issue. The common denominator is the message; although Brecht's good taste steered him away from the word, the idea was not foreign to the posi- tivist in him. The two positions are intensely self-contradictory . Don Quixote may have served a particular and irrelevant program, that of abolishing the chivalric romance, which had been dragged along from feudal times into the bourgeois age. This modest program served as the vehicle by which the novel became an exem- plary artwork. The antagonism of literary genres in which Cervantes's work orig- inated was transformed, in his hands, into an antagonism of historical eras of,
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ultimately, metaphysical dimension: the authentic expression of the crisis of im- manent meaning in the demystified world. Works such as Werther, which have no programam tic aspect, contributed significantly to the emancipation of bourgeois consciousness in Germany. Goethe, by giving shape to the collision of society with the feelings of an individual who, finding himself alone and unloved, is driven to suicide , protested powerfully against a hardened petty bourgeoisie with- out even naming it. However, what the two basic censorial positions of bourgeois consciousness hold in common-that the artwork must not want to change the world and that it must be there for all - is a plaidoyer for the status quo; the for- mer defends the domestic peace of artworks with the world and the latter remains vigilant that the sanctioned forms of public consciousness be maintained. Today, hermetic and committed art converge in the refusal of the status quo. Interference is prohibited by reified consciousness because it reifies the already reified art- work; for reified consciousness the work's objectivation in opposition to society appears as its social neutralization. That side of artworks that faces outward is falsified as their essence without any regard to the process of their formation or, ultimately, their truth content. No artwork, however, can be socially true that is not also true in-itself; conversely , social false consciousness is equally incapable of becoming aesthetically authentic. Social and immanent aspects of artworks do not coincide, but neither do they diverge so completely as the fetishism of culture and praxis would like to believe. That whereby the truth content of artworks points beyond their aesthetic complexion, which it does only by virtue of that aesthetic complexion, assures it its social significance. This duality is not a stipu- lation that rules abstractly over the sphere of art. It is art's vital element and lodged within each and every work. Art becomes something social through its in-itself, and it becomes in-itself by means of the social force of production effec- tive in it. The dialectic of the social and of the in-itself of the artwork is the dialec- tic of its own constitution to the extent that it tolerates nothing interior that does not externalize itself, nothing external that is not the bearer of the inward, the truth content.
The dual nature of artworks as autonomous structures and social phenomena results in oscillating criteria: Autonomous works provoke the verdict of social in- difference and ultimately of being criminally reactionary; conversely, works that make socially univocal discursive judgments thereby negate art as well as them- selves. Immanent critique can possibly break through this rigid alternative. Stefan George certainly merited the reproach of being socially reactionary long before he propounded the maxims of his secret Germany, just as the poor-peoples' poetry ofthe late 1880s and 1890s, Amo Holz's, for instance, deserves to be criti- cized as being crudely unaesthetic. 9 Both types, however, should be confronted with their own concept. George's self-staged aristocratic posturings contradict the self-evident superiority that they postulate and thereby fail artistically; the verse "And- that we lack not a bouquet of myrrh" 10 is laughable, as is the verse on the
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Roman emperor who, after having his brother murdered, gently gathers up the purple train of his toga) l The brutality of George's social attitude, the result of failed identification, appears in his poetry in the violent acts of language that mar the purity of the self-sufficient work after which George aspired. In programmatic aestheticism, false social consciousness becomes the shrill tone that gives it the lie. Without ignoring the difference in quality between George, who was a great poet in spite of everything, and the mediocre naturalists , they have in common the fact that the social and critical content of their plays and poems is almost always superficial. It lags far behind what was already fully elaborated by social theory, in which they were scarcely interested. Arno Holz's parody ofpolitical hypocrisy, Social Aristocrats, suffices to prove this. Because artistically they overwhelmed society with verbiage, they felt duty bound to a vulgar idealism, as for instance in the image of the worker who dreams of something higher, whatever it may be, and who through the fate of his class origin is prevented from achieving it. The question of the provenance of his solidly bourgeois ideal of upward mobility is ignored. Naturalism's innovations-the renunciation of traditional categories of form, the distilling of the self-contained plots and even, as at points in Zola, the abandonment of the continuity of empirical time-are more advanced than its concept. The ruthless, effectively aconceptual presentation of empirical detail in Savage Paris destroyed the familiar surface coherence of the novel in a fashion not unlike that of its later monadic-associative form. As a result, naturalism re- gressed except when it took the most extreme risks. Carrying out intentions con- tradicts its principle. Yet naturalist plays abound in passages whose intention is plain: People are to speak plainly, yet in following the author's stage directions they speak as no one would ever speak. In the realist theater it is already inconsis- tent that even before they open their mouths people know so precisely what it is they are going to say. Perhaps it would be impossible to organize a realistic play ac- cording to its conception without its becoming , a contre coeur, dadaistic; through its unavoidable minimum of stylization, however, realism admits its impossibility and virtually abolishes itself. Taken in hand by the culture industry , it has become mass deception. The spiritedly unanimous rejection of Sudermannl2 may be be- cause his box office successes let out of the bag what the most talented naturalists hid: the manipulated, fictive aspect of every gesture that lays claim to being be- yond fiction when, instead, fiction envelops every word spoken on stage, however it resists and defends itself. These products, a priori cultural goods, are easily coaxed to become a nalve and affirmative image of culture . Even aesthetically there are not two types of truth. How the contradictory desiderata can reciprocally inter- penetrate without being averaged out as a mediocre compromise between a pur- portedly good form and an appropriate social content [lnhalt] can be learned from Beckett's dramatic art. Its associative logic, in which one sentence draws after it the next sentence or the reply , just as in music a theme motivates its continuation or its contrast, scorns all imitation of its empirical appearance. The result is that,
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hooded, the empirically essential is incorporated according to its exact historical importance and integrated into the play character of the work . The latter expresses the objective condition both of consciousness and of the reality that shapes it. The negativity of the subject as the true form of objectivity can only be presented in radically subjective form, not by recourse to a purportedly higher reality. The gri- macing clowns, childish and bloody, into which Beckett's subject is decomposed, are that subject' s historical truth; socialist realism is, by comparison , simply childish. In Godot the relation of domination and servitude , along with its senile lunatic form, is thematic in a phase in which control over others' labor continues, even though humanity no longer needs it for its self-preservation. This motif, truly one of the essential laws ofcontemporary society, is taken further in Endgame. In both works Beckett' s technique hurls it to the periphery: Hegel ' s chapter is trans- formed into anecdotes with sociocritical no less than dramaturgical function. In Endgame the tellurian partial catastrophe, the bloodiest of Beckett's clown jokes, is presupposed both thematically and formally in that it has obliterated art's con- stituent, its genesis. Art emigrates to a standpoint that is no longer a standpoint at all because there are no longer standpoints from which the catastrophe could be named or formed , a word that seems ridiculous in this context. Endgame is neither a play about the atom bomb nor is it contentless; the determinate negation of its content [Inhalt] becomes its formal principle and the negation of content alto- gether. Beckett's oeuvre gives the frightful answer to art that, by its starting point, by its distance from any praxis, art in the face of mortal threat becomes ideology through the harmlessness of its mere form, regardless of its content. This explains the influx of the comic into emphatic works. It has a social aspect. In that their ef- fectively blindfolded movement originates exclusively in themselves, their move- ment becomes a walking in place and declares itself as such, just as the unrelenting seriousness ofthe work declares itself as frivolous, as play. Art can only be recon- ciled with its existence by exposing its own semblance, its internal emptiness. Its most binding criterion today is that in terms of its own complexion, unreconciled with all realistic deception, it no longer tolerates anything harmless. In all art that is still possible , social critique must be raised to the level of form, to the point that it wipes out all manifestly social content [Inhalt].
With the continuing organization of all cultural spheres the desire grows to assign art its place in society theoretically and indeed practically; this is the aim of innu- merable round table conferences and symposia. Once art has been recognized as a social fact, the sociological definition of its context considers itself superior to it and disposes over it. Often the assumption is that the objectivity of value-free positivistic knowledge is superior to supposedly subjective aesthetic standpoints. Such endeavors themselves call for social criticism. They tacitly seek the primacy of administration , of the administered world even over what refuses to be grasped by total socialization or at any rate struggles against it. The sovereignty of the topographical eye that localizes phenomena in order to scrutinize their function
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and right to exist is sheer usurpation. It ignores the dialectic of aesthetic quality and functional society. A priori, in conformist fashion, the accent falls, if not on art's ideological effect, then at least on the consumability of art, while dismissing all that in which today social reflection would have its object: This is decided in advance, in conformist fashion. Because the expansion of technical administrative procedures is fused with the scientific apparatus of investigation, it appeals to those sorts of intellectuals who indeed sense something of the new social necessi- ties but nothing of the necessities of art. Their mentality is that of an imaginary sociological lecture on culture whose title should be: "The Function of Television for the Adaptation of Europe to the Developing Countries.