In the following period Comte's position became more
influential
and in part controlling.
Windelband - History of Philosophy
Merz, History of European Thought in the 19th Century, Vol.
1896.
]
The history ofphilosophical principles closed with the develop ment of the German systems at the boundary between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. survey of the succeeding development in which we are still standing to-day has far more of literary-his torical than of properly philosophical interest. For nothing essen tially and valuably new has since appeared. The nineteenth century
far from being philosophical one in this respect perhaps, 623
Paris, 1894.
Leips. Paris,
is
a
; it is,
is
A
A
I.
ff.
3
624 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII.
to be compared with the third and second centuries b. c. or the four teenth and fifteenth a. d. To speak in Hegel's language, one might say that the Weltgeist of our time, so busy with the concrete reaJity and drawn toward the outer, is kept from turning inward and to itself, and from enjoying itself in its own peculiar home. 1 The philosophical literature of the nineteenth century is, indeed, exten sive enough, and gives a variegated play of all the colours ; the seed of Ideas, which has been wafted over to ns from the days of the flower of the intellectual life, has grown luxuriantly in all spheres of science and public life, of poetry and of art ; the germinant thoughts of history have been combined in an almost immeasurable wealth of changing combinations into many structures of personally impressive detail, but even men like Hamilton and Comte, like Rosmini and Lotze, have their ultimate significance only in the energy of thought and fineness of feeling with which they have surveyed the typical con ceptions and principles of the past, and shaped them to new life and vigour. And the general course of thought, as indicated by the problems which interest and the conceptions that are formed in our century,* moves along the lines of antitheses that have been trans mitted to us through history, and have at most been given a new form in their empirical expression.
For the decisive factor in the philosophical movement of the nineteenth century is doubtless the question as to the degree of importance which the natural-science conception of phenomena may claim for our view of the world and life as a whole. The influence which this special science had gained over philosophy and the intellectual life as a whole was checked and repressed at the begin ning of the nineteenth century, to grow again afterwards with all the greater power. The metaphysics of the seventeenth, and there fore the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, were in the main under the dominance of the thinking of natural science. The con ception of the universal conformity to law on the part of all the actual world, the search for the simplest elements and forms of occurrence and cosmic processes, the insight into the invariable necessity which lies at the basis of all change, — these determined theoretical investigation. The " natural " was thus made a general standard for measuring the value of every particular event or expe-
1 Hegel, Berliner Antrittsrede, W. , VI. , XXXV.
* To the literary-historical interest in this field, which is so hard to master on account of its multiplicity, the author has been devoting the labor of many years. The product of this he is now permitted to hope soon to present as special parts of the third (supplementary) volume of his GetchiclUe der neturen Philosophie (2d ed. Leips. 1899). In this can be carried out in detail and proved what here can only be briefly sketched.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 625
rience. The spread of this mechanical way of regarding the world was met by the German Philosophy with the fundamental thought, that all that is known in this way is but the phenomenal form and vehicle of a purposefully developing inner world, and that the true comprehension of the particular has to determine the significance that belongs to it in a purposeful connected whole of life. The historical Weltanschauung was the result of the work of thought which the System of Reason desired to trace out.
These two forces contend with each other in the intellectual life of our century. And in the warfare between them all arguments from the earlier periods of the history of philosophy have been pre sented in the most manifold combinations, but without bringing any new principles into the field. If the victory seems gradually to incline toward the side of the principles of Demoeritus, there are two main motifs favourable to this in our decades. The first is of essentially intellectual nature, and is the same that was operative in the times of intellectual life of previous centuries: it is the simplicity and clearness to jterception or imagination
(anschauliche Einfucldteit), the certainty and definiteness of the natural-science knowledge. Formulated mathematically and always demonstrable
in ex]>erii'nee, this promises to exclude all doubt and opinions, and all trouble of interpretative thought. But far more efficient in our »lay is the evident utiliti/ of natural science. The mighty trans formation in the external relations of life, which is taking place with rapid progress before our eyes, subjects the intellect of the average man irresistibly to the control of the forms of thought to which he owes such great things, and on this account we live under the sign of Baconianism (cf. above, p. 386 f. ).
(>n the other hand, the heightened culture of our day has kept alive and vital all questions relating to the value which the social and historical life has for the individual. The more the political and social development of European humanity has entered upon the epoch when the influences of masses make themselves felt in an increasing degree, and the more pronounced the power with which the collective body asserts its influence upon the individual, even in his mental and spiritual life, the more does the individual make
his struggle against the supremacy of society, and this also finds expression in the philosophic reflections of the century. The con test between the views of the world and of life which spring respec tively from history and from natural science, has gone on most violently at the point where the question will ultimately 1*> decided, in what degree the individual owes what makes his life worth living to himself, and in what degree he is indebted to the influences of the
626 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VJL
environing whole. Universalism and individualism, as in the tune of the Renaissance, have once more clashed in violent opposition.
If we are to bring out from the philosophical literature of this century and emphasise those movements in which the above charac teristic antithesis has found its most important manifestation, we have to do primarily with the question, in what sense the psychical life can be subjected to the methods and concepts of natural science ; for it is in connection with this point that the question must first be decided of the right of these methods and concepts to absolute sov ereignty in philosophy. For this reason the question as to the task, the method, and the systematic significance of psyclwlogy has never been more vigorously contested than in the nineteenth century, and the limitation of this science to a purely empirical treatment has appeared to be the only possible way out of the difficulties. Thus psychology, as the latest among the special disciplines, has com pleted its separation from philosophy, at least as regards the funda mental principles of its problem and method.
This procedure had more general presuppositions. In reaction against the highly strained idealism of the German philosophy, a broad stream of materialistic Weltanschauung flows through the nine teenth century. This spoke out about the middle of the period, not indeed with any new reasons or information, but with all the more passionate emphasis. Since then it has been much more modest in its claims to scientific value, but is all the more effective in the garb of sceptical and positivist caution.
To the most significant ramifications of this line of thought belongs without doubt the endeavour to regard the social life, the historical development, and the relations of mental and spiritual exist ence, from the points of view of natural science. Introduced by the unfortunate name of Sociology, this tendency has sought to develop a peculiar kind of the philosophy of history, which aims to extend upon a broader basis of fact the thoughts which were suggested toward the close of the philosophy of the Enlightenment (see § 37).
But on the other hand, the historical view of the world has not failed to exercise its powerful influence upon natural science. The idea of a history of the organic world, which was postulated in the philosophy of nature, early in the century, has found a highly impressive realization in empirical investigation. The methodical principles, which had led to the philosophy of Nature, extended as if spontaneously to other fields, and in the theories of evolution the historical and the scientific views of the world seem to approximate as closely as is possible without a new philosophic idea, which shall reshape and reconstruct.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 627
From the side of the individual, finally, the suggestions which were inherent in the problem of civilization as this was treated by the eighteenth century, temporarily brought the question as to the worth of life into the centre of philosophic interest. A pessimistic temper had to be overcome in order that from these discussions the deeper and clearer question as to the nature and content of values in general should be separated and brought to clear recognition. And so it was that philosophy, though by a remarkably devious path, was enabled to return to Kant's fundamental problem of values which are universally valid.
From the philosophical literature of the nineteenth century the following main points may be emphasized : —
In Franca Ideology divided into a more physiological and a more psycho logical branch. In the line of Cabanis worked principally the Paris physicians, such as Ph. Pinel (1745-1820; Xosographic Philosophiquc, 171*), F. J. V. Brouaaala (1772-1838; Traiti de Physiologic, 1822 f. ; Traiti de VIrritation rt de In Folic, 1828), and the founder of Phrenology, Fr. Jos. Oall (1768-1828 : Rrrherrhes fur le Systeme Xerreux en general et sur celui du Verrrau en parti- rulirr. 18011, which was edited in conjunction with Spurzhelm — 'I lit- an tithesis to this, physiologically, was formed by the school of Montpellier : Barthes (17. 'U-180o ; Xouceaux Elements de la Science de V Homme, 2d ed. ,
Associated with this school were M. F. X. Bichat (1771-1802; Rcherches Phyniologiques tur la Vie et la Mori. 1800). Bertrand (17H6-1881 ; Traiti du Somnamliulinme, 1823), and Buiaaon (17(10-1806; De la Division la plut Xaturelle dt* Phinominet l'hyniologiques, 1802). Corresponding to this was the development of Ideology with Daube (Ennui d" ldtologic, lM'-'i). and especially with I'ierre Iiaromiguiere (17&rt-18:! 7 ; Leconn de Philosophic, 1816-1818) and his disciple*, Fr. Thurot (1708-1832; De V Enlendement et de la Rainon. 18:10) and J. J. Cardalilao (1700-1845; Etudes Elimtntairtt de Philonophie, 1830). — Cf. Picavet, Let Ideologues (Paris, 18»1).
A line of extrusive historical study and of deeper psychology begins with M J. Degerando (1772-1842 ; De la Generation det Connaissancet Humainet, Berlin, lew; Hittoire Comparfe det Syttimet de Philonophie, 1804) and has its head in Fr. P. Oonthier Maine de Blran (1700-1824 ; De la Decomposition
de la Pemie, 1806 ; Let Rapport* du Physique et du Moral de V Homme, printed 1831 ; Euaitur les Fondementt de la I'syrhologie, 1812 ; (Entret Philotophique*. edited bv V. Cousin, 1841 ; (Eurres Intditet, edited by E. Naville, 186"; . Voti- relltt (Eurret Inedittt, edited by A. Bertrand, 1887). The influences of the Scottish and Herman philosophy discharge into this line (represented also by
lHOd).
A. M. Ampere) through P. Prevost ( 1761 -18311). Ancillon (1700-1837), Royer-Collard (1763-1846), Jouffroy (17A6-1842), and above all, Victor Cousin (1702-1HA7; Introduction a I'Hintoire Oenerale de la Philotophie, 7th ed . 1872 ; Du Vrai, du Beau et du liien, 1845 ; complete works, Paris, 184*1 ff. ;
J. Elaux. La Philosophic de M. cf. E. Fuchs. Die I'hilot. V. C't, Berlin, 1847 ; Cousin, which was
Cousin. Palis. 1864). The numerous school, founded by
especially noted through its historical labours, is called the Spiritualistic or EHeetic School. It was the official philosophy after the July Revolution, and is in part still such. To its adherents who have been active in the historical field, where their work has been characterised by thoroughness and literary taste, belong Ph. Damiron, Jul. Simon. E. Vacherot, H. Martin, A. Chaignet, Ad.
Franck. B. Haureau, Ch. Bartholiness. E. Saisset, P. Janet, E. Caro, etc. F. HsTsIsann has risen from the school to a theoretical standpoint which is in a certain sense his own. (Morale et mttaphytique. In the Revue de Met. et de Mor. 1803)
Its principal opponents were the philosophers of the CA*rrA> party, whose tbeorv is known as Traditionalism Together with Chateaubriand (Le Genie du ChrUtianltne, 1802), Jos. da Maistte (1763-1821 ; £j#ai tur It Primelpt
628 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Pabt VII.
Qenerateur des Constitutions Politique^, 1810 ; Soiries de St. Petersbourg, 1821 ; Du Pape, 1820; cf. on him Fr. Paulhan, Paris, 1898) and J. Frayssinons (1765-1841; Defense du Christianisme, 1828), V. G. A. de Bonald (1768-1841; Theorie du Pouvoir Politique et lieligieux, 1796 ; Essai Analytique sur lex Lois Haturelles de VOrdre Social, 1800; Du Divorce, 1801; De la Philosophic Morale et Politique du 184 siecle; complete works, 16 vols. , Paris, 1816 fl. ) stands here in the foreground. The traditionalism of P. S. Ballanche is presented in a strangely fantastic fashion (1776-1847 ; Essai sur les Institutions Societies, 1817 ; La Palingenesie Sociale ; complete works, 6 vols. , Paris, 1888). In the beginning II. F. U. de Lamennais (1782-1864) also supported this line in his Essai sur VIndifference en Matiere de Religion (1817); later, having fallen out with the Church {Parole d'un Croyant, 1884), he presented in the Esquisse (Vune Philosophic (4 vols. , 1841-1846) a comprehensive system of philosophy, which had for its prototype partly the Schellingian System of Identity and partly the Italian Ontologism.
Among the philosophical supporters of Socialism (cf. L. Stein, Geschichu der socialen Bevsegung in Frankreich, Leips. 1849 11. ) the most important is CI. H. de St. Simon (1760-1825 ; Introduction aux Travaux Scientifique* du ISh siecle, 1807 ; Biorganisation de la Societe Europienne, 1814 ; Systeme In dustrie^ 1821 f. ; Nouveau Christianisme, 1825 ; (Euvres choisies, 3 vols. , 1859). Of his successors may be mentioned, Bazard (Doctrine de St. Simon, 1829), B. Enfantin (1790-1864; La Religion St. Simonienne, 1831), Pierre Leroux (1798-1871 ; Refutation de I'Eclecticisme, 1&39 ; De V Humanite, 1840), and Ph. Buchez (1796-1866 ; Essai cTun Traiti Complet de Philosophic au Point de
Vue du Catholicisms et du Progres, 1840).
Aug. Comte occupies a most interesting position apart. He was born in
Montpellier in 1798 and died alone in Paris in 1867 : Cours du Philosophic Positive (6 vols. , Paris, 1840-1842) [Eng. tr. , or rather a condensation and repro duction by H. Martineau, The Positive Philosophy of A. Comte, 2 vols. , Lond. 1863] ; Systeme de Politique Positive (Paris, 1851-1854) ; The Positive Polity and certain earlier works, trans, by various authors, 4 vols. , Lond. 187(1-1878; Catechisme Positiviste (1853) ; cf. Littr6, C. et la Philosophic Positire, Paris, 1868 ; J. S. Mill, C. and Positivism, Lond. 1805 ; J. Rig, A. C. La Philosophic. Positive Resumee, Paris, 1881 ; E. Caird, The Social Philosophy and Religion of ft, Glasgow, 1886.
In the following period Comte's position became more influential and in part controlling. E. Littre' (1801-1881 ; La Science au Point de Vue Philosophique. Paris, 1873) defended his positivism in systematic form. A freer adaptation of positivism was made by such writers as H. Taine (1828-1893 ; Philosophic de I'Art, 1866 ; De VIntelligence, 1870 ; cf. on him G. Barzellotti, Rome, 1896) and Ernest Renan (1823-1892; Questions Contemporaines, 1868; L'Avenir de la Science, 1890). Under Comte's influence, likewise, has been the develop ment of empirical psychology. Th. Ribot. editor of the Revue Philosophique, is to be regarded as the leader in this field. In addition to his historical works on English and German psychology, his investigations with regard to heredity and abnormal conditions of memory, will, personality, etc. , may be noted.
In part also Sociology stands under Comte's influence, as R. Worms, G. Tarde, E. Durkheim, and others have striven to work it out (cf. Annie Sociolo- gique, pub. since 1894). Finally, evolutionary theories belong in this connection, which have been especially carried out by J. M. Guyau (1854-1888 ; Esquisse d'une Morale, 1885 ; LHrreligion de. Vavenir, 1887 ; Vart, au point de vue sociologique, 1889) [Problemes de VEsthetique Contemporaine, 1897].
By far the most important among the present representatives of philosophy in France is Ch. Renouvier (bom 1818 ; Essais de Critique Ginirale, 2d ed. , 1875-96; Esqitisse d'une Classification Systematique des Doctrines Philoso- phiques, 1885 ; La Philosophic Analytique de VHistoire, 1896 ; La Nouvelle Monadologie, 1899). The synthesis of Kant and Comte which he has sought to effect has its literary organ in the Annee Philosophique (published since 1889).
In England the Associational Psychology continues through Thomas Brown to men like Thomas Belnham (1750-1829 ; Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 1801), John Fearn (First Lines of the Human Mind,
Philotophy of the Nineteenth Century. 629
1830), and many others; finds support here also in physiological and phreno logical theories as with G. Combe (. 1 System nf Phrenology, Kdin. 1826), Sam. Bailey (Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, 1829; The Theory of Reasoning, 1861 ; LetUrs on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 18. '>. ">)and Harriet Mar tineau {Letters on the Isiws of Man's Nature ami Development, 1861), and reaches its full development through James Mill (Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. 1829), and his son. J. Stuart M1U (1806-1873 ; System of Ijigir Hatiorinatite and Indurlire, 1843; Principles of Political Economy, 1848; On Liberty, 18611; Utilitarianism, 1803 ; Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, 1805; Autobiography, 1873; Posthumously, Essays on Heliijion, 1874 ; Collected Dissertations and Discussions, N. Y. , 1882 ; Useful ed. of Ethical Writings by Douglas, Kdin. 1897. Cf. H. Taine, Le Posit irisme Anglais, Paris, 1804 [Kng. tr. by Haye ; Courtney, Life of M„ and Meta physics of J. S. M. ; Bain, J. S. M. 1882], Douglas, J. S. M. , A Study of his Phitos. , kdin. 1806). Closely connected with this line of thought stands Alex. Bam ( The Senses and the Intellect, I860, 3d ed. 1808 ; Mental ami Moral Science, 1808, 3d ed. 1872, Pt. II, 1872; The Emotions and the Will, 1869, 3d
ed. 1875 ; Mind and Body, 3d ed. 1874.
The related Utilitarianism is represented by T. Cogan ( Philosophical Treatise
vn the Passion*, 1802; Ethical Questions, 1817), John Austin (17H0-1869 ; The Philosophy of Positive Law, 1832), G. Cornwall Lewis (A Treatise on the Methixls of Obsecration and Reasoning in Politics, 1852). [As representatives
of Utilitarianism, in addition to Mill, and Bain, op. cit. above, H. Sidgwiclc. Methyls of Ethics, Lond. 1874, 0th ed. 1901, and T. Fowler, Principles of Montis, Lond. lHMti f. , should also be mentioned.
Scottish Philosophy, after Dugald Stewart and James Mackintosh
I*. ! 2 ; Dissertation on the Itogress of Ethical Philosophy, 1830), had at first unimportant supporters like Abercromble (1781-1840 ; In'/nir;/ concerning the Intellectual Powers. 18:10 ; Philosophy of the Moral Feelings, 1833) and
Chalmers (1780-1847), and was especially as academical instruction brought into affiliation with the eclecticism of Cousin by Henry Calderwood (Philoso phy of the Infinite, 1864), S. Morell (An Historical and Critical I'iew of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the 10th Century, 1846), also H. Wedg
wood (On the Development ofthe Understanding, 1848).
The horizons of English thought were widened by acquaintance with the
German literature, to which Sam. Tayl. Coleridge (1772-1*14), W. Words worth (1770-1850), and especially Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881; Past and Present, 1843 [the articles on various German thinkers and the Sartor Resartus belong here also]) contributed. In philosophy this influence made itself felt
primarily through Kant, whose theory of cognition influenced J. Herschel (On the Study of Natural Philosophy, 1831), and especially W. Whewell (Phi losophy of the Inductive Sciences, 1840).
In intelligent reaction against this influence, Scottish philosophy experienced a valuable re-shaping at the hands of Sir William Hamilton (1788-1866 ; Dis- mssioHs tm Philosophy and Literature, 1852 ; On Truth and Error, 1856 ; Lec tures on Metaphysics and Logic, 1869 ; Editions of ReiiFs and Stewart's Works ; cf. J. Veitch. S. W. H. , The Man and his Philosophy, Edin. and Lond. 1883
[Memoir in 2 vols. , 1869. bv same author]). In his school Agnosticism proper, •u|*pnrted principally by H. L. Mansel (1820-1871 ; Metaphysics or the Phi- lovphy of Consciousness, 1860), is separated from a tendency inclining toward •tImmIc metaphysics : J. Veitch, K. Lowndes (Introduction to the Philosophy "f Primary Beliefs, IHit5). Leechman. McCosb. and others.
Following a suggestion from one aspect of Hamilton's thought, a movement an*ie which sought to develop formal logic as a calculus of symbols. To this movement belong G. Boole (The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, 1847 ; An
Analysis of the Isites of Thought, 1854) ; De Morgan (Ftirmal Logic, 1847) ; Th. Spencer Baynes (An Essay on the Veir Analytic of Logical Forms, 1850) ;
J. Venn f Symbolic Logic, 1881 ; Logic of Chance, 1870 ; Principles of Logic, 1889) [C. 8. Peirce, Algebra nf Lome, 1807 ; Ladd and Mitchell, in Studies in Logic,
W. Stanley JeTons ( Pure I^oi/ic, 1804 ; Principles nf Science, 1874) ;
•d. by Pelrce. Boston. '18*31. Compare on this A. Rlehl ( Vierieljohrttthr. /. writs. Philos. 1877) and L. Liard (Le* LogtcUns Anglais Contcmporain*, 1878). The combined influence of Kant and the later German theism impressed lbs
(1764-
630 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part V. 'I.
philosopher of religion, James Martineau (who is also the most prominent recent representative of intuitionist ethics [Type* of Ethical Theory, 1885 ; A Study of Religion, 1888 ; Seat of Authority in Rel. , 189U]; cf. A. W. Jackson. J. M. , Boston, 1900), and likewise F. W. Newman (The Soul, etc. , 1849 ; The ism, 1858), A. C. Fraser and others. Since Hutchinson Stirling (The Secret of Hegel, 1865 ; What is Thought f 1000) German idealism in its whole develop ment and in its metaphysical aspect, particularly in the Hegelian form, has called forth a vigorous idealistic movement, of which the leading representative was the late Thomas Hill Green (18:50-1882), Professor at Oxford. [His Introd. to Hume was followed by criticisms on Lewes and Spencer and (posthumously j by the Prolegomena to Ethics, 1883, and complete works (except the Proleg. ), 3 vols. , Lond. and N. Y. 1885, 1886, 1888; cf. W. H. Fairbrother, The Phi losophy of T. II. (? . , Lond. 1896. ] In sympathy with this idealistic and more or less Hegelian interpretation of Kantian principles are F. H. Bradley (Logic, Lond. 1883 ; Ethical Studies, 1876; Appearance and Reality, 189:)), H. Boaan qttet (Logic, 2 vols. , 1888 ; Hist, of ^Esthetics, 1892 ; Fhilos. of the State, 1899,
Religion, ; E. Caird 1880)
J. Caird to the Philosophy etc. ) ; Phil, (Introduction
of
of Kant, 2 vols. , 1889 ; Essays, 2 vols. , 1892 ; Evolution of Religion.
( Critical
1893); Seth and Haldane (Essays in Phil. Criticism, 1883) ;
(Social Philosophy, 1890). Cf. A. Seth, Hegelianism and Personality, 1887, and the review of this in Mind, by D. G. Ritchie.
These movements above noted stand under the principle of Evolution; the same principle became authoritative for the investigation of organic nature through Charles Darwin (Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. 1859; Descent of Man, 1871; The Expression of the Emotions, 1872). The same principle was formulated in more general terms and made the basis of » comprehensive System of Synthetic Philosophy by Herbert Spencer
J. Mackenzie
(bom 1820), First Principles, 1862, 6th ed. 1901; Principles of Psychology, 1855, 5th ed.
1890; Principles of Biology, 1864-1867, 4th ed. 1888; Principles of Sociology, 1876-1896 ; Principles of Ethics, 1879-1893. Cf. on him O. Gaupp, Stuttgart, 1897 [T. H. Green, in Works ; F. H. Collins, Epitome of the Synthetic Philoso phy, 1889. ] Huxley, Wallace, Tyndall, G. H. Lewes (Problems of Life and Mind, 3d ed. 1874), belong in the main to this tendency.
[Other works in evolutionary ethics are, L. Stephen, The Science of Ethics, Ix>nd.
The history ofphilosophical principles closed with the develop ment of the German systems at the boundary between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. survey of the succeeding development in which we are still standing to-day has far more of literary-his torical than of properly philosophical interest. For nothing essen tially and valuably new has since appeared. The nineteenth century
far from being philosophical one in this respect perhaps, 623
Paris, 1894.
Leips. Paris,
is
a
; it is,
is
A
A
I.
ff.
3
624 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VII.
to be compared with the third and second centuries b. c. or the four teenth and fifteenth a. d. To speak in Hegel's language, one might say that the Weltgeist of our time, so busy with the concrete reaJity and drawn toward the outer, is kept from turning inward and to itself, and from enjoying itself in its own peculiar home. 1 The philosophical literature of the nineteenth century is, indeed, exten sive enough, and gives a variegated play of all the colours ; the seed of Ideas, which has been wafted over to ns from the days of the flower of the intellectual life, has grown luxuriantly in all spheres of science and public life, of poetry and of art ; the germinant thoughts of history have been combined in an almost immeasurable wealth of changing combinations into many structures of personally impressive detail, but even men like Hamilton and Comte, like Rosmini and Lotze, have their ultimate significance only in the energy of thought and fineness of feeling with which they have surveyed the typical con ceptions and principles of the past, and shaped them to new life and vigour. And the general course of thought, as indicated by the problems which interest and the conceptions that are formed in our century,* moves along the lines of antitheses that have been trans mitted to us through history, and have at most been given a new form in their empirical expression.
For the decisive factor in the philosophical movement of the nineteenth century is doubtless the question as to the degree of importance which the natural-science conception of phenomena may claim for our view of the world and life as a whole. The influence which this special science had gained over philosophy and the intellectual life as a whole was checked and repressed at the begin ning of the nineteenth century, to grow again afterwards with all the greater power. The metaphysics of the seventeenth, and there fore the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, were in the main under the dominance of the thinking of natural science. The con ception of the universal conformity to law on the part of all the actual world, the search for the simplest elements and forms of occurrence and cosmic processes, the insight into the invariable necessity which lies at the basis of all change, — these determined theoretical investigation. The " natural " was thus made a general standard for measuring the value of every particular event or expe-
1 Hegel, Berliner Antrittsrede, W. , VI. , XXXV.
* To the literary-historical interest in this field, which is so hard to master on account of its multiplicity, the author has been devoting the labor of many years. The product of this he is now permitted to hope soon to present as special parts of the third (supplementary) volume of his GetchiclUe der neturen Philosophie (2d ed. Leips. 1899). In this can be carried out in detail and proved what here can only be briefly sketched.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 625
rience. The spread of this mechanical way of regarding the world was met by the German Philosophy with the fundamental thought, that all that is known in this way is but the phenomenal form and vehicle of a purposefully developing inner world, and that the true comprehension of the particular has to determine the significance that belongs to it in a purposeful connected whole of life. The historical Weltanschauung was the result of the work of thought which the System of Reason desired to trace out.
These two forces contend with each other in the intellectual life of our century. And in the warfare between them all arguments from the earlier periods of the history of philosophy have been pre sented in the most manifold combinations, but without bringing any new principles into the field. If the victory seems gradually to incline toward the side of the principles of Demoeritus, there are two main motifs favourable to this in our decades. The first is of essentially intellectual nature, and is the same that was operative in the times of intellectual life of previous centuries: it is the simplicity and clearness to jterception or imagination
(anschauliche Einfucldteit), the certainty and definiteness of the natural-science knowledge. Formulated mathematically and always demonstrable
in ex]>erii'nee, this promises to exclude all doubt and opinions, and all trouble of interpretative thought. But far more efficient in our »lay is the evident utiliti/ of natural science. The mighty trans formation in the external relations of life, which is taking place with rapid progress before our eyes, subjects the intellect of the average man irresistibly to the control of the forms of thought to which he owes such great things, and on this account we live under the sign of Baconianism (cf. above, p. 386 f. ).
(>n the other hand, the heightened culture of our day has kept alive and vital all questions relating to the value which the social and historical life has for the individual. The more the political and social development of European humanity has entered upon the epoch when the influences of masses make themselves felt in an increasing degree, and the more pronounced the power with which the collective body asserts its influence upon the individual, even in his mental and spiritual life, the more does the individual make
his struggle against the supremacy of society, and this also finds expression in the philosophic reflections of the century. The con test between the views of the world and of life which spring respec tively from history and from natural science, has gone on most violently at the point where the question will ultimately 1*> decided, in what degree the individual owes what makes his life worth living to himself, and in what degree he is indebted to the influences of the
626 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part VJL
environing whole. Universalism and individualism, as in the tune of the Renaissance, have once more clashed in violent opposition.
If we are to bring out from the philosophical literature of this century and emphasise those movements in which the above charac teristic antithesis has found its most important manifestation, we have to do primarily with the question, in what sense the psychical life can be subjected to the methods and concepts of natural science ; for it is in connection with this point that the question must first be decided of the right of these methods and concepts to absolute sov ereignty in philosophy. For this reason the question as to the task, the method, and the systematic significance of psyclwlogy has never been more vigorously contested than in the nineteenth century, and the limitation of this science to a purely empirical treatment has appeared to be the only possible way out of the difficulties. Thus psychology, as the latest among the special disciplines, has com pleted its separation from philosophy, at least as regards the funda mental principles of its problem and method.
This procedure had more general presuppositions. In reaction against the highly strained idealism of the German philosophy, a broad stream of materialistic Weltanschauung flows through the nine teenth century. This spoke out about the middle of the period, not indeed with any new reasons or information, but with all the more passionate emphasis. Since then it has been much more modest in its claims to scientific value, but is all the more effective in the garb of sceptical and positivist caution.
To the most significant ramifications of this line of thought belongs without doubt the endeavour to regard the social life, the historical development, and the relations of mental and spiritual exist ence, from the points of view of natural science. Introduced by the unfortunate name of Sociology, this tendency has sought to develop a peculiar kind of the philosophy of history, which aims to extend upon a broader basis of fact the thoughts which were suggested toward the close of the philosophy of the Enlightenment (see § 37).
But on the other hand, the historical view of the world has not failed to exercise its powerful influence upon natural science. The idea of a history of the organic world, which was postulated in the philosophy of nature, early in the century, has found a highly impressive realization in empirical investigation. The methodical principles, which had led to the philosophy of Nature, extended as if spontaneously to other fields, and in the theories of evolution the historical and the scientific views of the world seem to approximate as closely as is possible without a new philosophic idea, which shall reshape and reconstruct.
Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. 627
From the side of the individual, finally, the suggestions which were inherent in the problem of civilization as this was treated by the eighteenth century, temporarily brought the question as to the worth of life into the centre of philosophic interest. A pessimistic temper had to be overcome in order that from these discussions the deeper and clearer question as to the nature and content of values in general should be separated and brought to clear recognition. And so it was that philosophy, though by a remarkably devious path, was enabled to return to Kant's fundamental problem of values which are universally valid.
From the philosophical literature of the nineteenth century the following main points may be emphasized : —
In Franca Ideology divided into a more physiological and a more psycho logical branch. In the line of Cabanis worked principally the Paris physicians, such as Ph. Pinel (1745-1820; Xosographic Philosophiquc, 171*), F. J. V. Brouaaala (1772-1838; Traiti de Physiologic, 1822 f. ; Traiti de VIrritation rt de In Folic, 1828), and the founder of Phrenology, Fr. Jos. Oall (1768-1828 : Rrrherrhes fur le Systeme Xerreux en general et sur celui du Verrrau en parti- rulirr. 18011, which was edited in conjunction with Spurzhelm — 'I lit- an tithesis to this, physiologically, was formed by the school of Montpellier : Barthes (17. 'U-180o ; Xouceaux Elements de la Science de V Homme, 2d ed. ,
Associated with this school were M. F. X. Bichat (1771-1802; Rcherches Phyniologiques tur la Vie et la Mori. 1800). Bertrand (17H6-1881 ; Traiti du Somnamliulinme, 1823), and Buiaaon (17(10-1806; De la Division la plut Xaturelle dt* Phinominet l'hyniologiques, 1802). Corresponding to this was the development of Ideology with Daube (Ennui d" ldtologic, lM'-'i). and especially with I'ierre Iiaromiguiere (17&rt-18:! 7 ; Leconn de Philosophic, 1816-1818) and his disciple*, Fr. Thurot (1708-1832; De V Enlendement et de la Rainon. 18:10) and J. J. Cardalilao (1700-1845; Etudes Elimtntairtt de Philonophie, 1830). — Cf. Picavet, Let Ideologues (Paris, 18»1).
A line of extrusive historical study and of deeper psychology begins with M J. Degerando (1772-1842 ; De la Generation det Connaissancet Humainet, Berlin, lew; Hittoire Comparfe det Syttimet de Philonophie, 1804) and has its head in Fr. P. Oonthier Maine de Blran (1700-1824 ; De la Decomposition
de la Pemie, 1806 ; Let Rapport* du Physique et du Moral de V Homme, printed 1831 ; Euaitur les Fondementt de la I'syrhologie, 1812 ; (Entret Philotophique*. edited bv V. Cousin, 1841 ; (Eurres Intditet, edited by E. Naville, 186"; . Voti- relltt (Eurret Inedittt, edited by A. Bertrand, 1887). The influences of the Scottish and Herman philosophy discharge into this line (represented also by
lHOd).
A. M. Ampere) through P. Prevost ( 1761 -18311). Ancillon (1700-1837), Royer-Collard (1763-1846), Jouffroy (17A6-1842), and above all, Victor Cousin (1702-1HA7; Introduction a I'Hintoire Oenerale de la Philotophie, 7th ed . 1872 ; Du Vrai, du Beau et du liien, 1845 ; complete works, Paris, 184*1 ff. ;
J. Elaux. La Philosophic de M. cf. E. Fuchs. Die I'hilot. V. C't, Berlin, 1847 ; Cousin, which was
Cousin. Palis. 1864). The numerous school, founded by
especially noted through its historical labours, is called the Spiritualistic or EHeetic School. It was the official philosophy after the July Revolution, and is in part still such. To its adherents who have been active in the historical field, where their work has been characterised by thoroughness and literary taste, belong Ph. Damiron, Jul. Simon. E. Vacherot, H. Martin, A. Chaignet, Ad.
Franck. B. Haureau, Ch. Bartholiness. E. Saisset, P. Janet, E. Caro, etc. F. HsTsIsann has risen from the school to a theoretical standpoint which is in a certain sense his own. (Morale et mttaphytique. In the Revue de Met. et de Mor. 1803)
Its principal opponents were the philosophers of the CA*rrA> party, whose tbeorv is known as Traditionalism Together with Chateaubriand (Le Genie du ChrUtianltne, 1802), Jos. da Maistte (1763-1821 ; £j#ai tur It Primelpt
628 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Pabt VII.
Qenerateur des Constitutions Politique^, 1810 ; Soiries de St. Petersbourg, 1821 ; Du Pape, 1820; cf. on him Fr. Paulhan, Paris, 1898) and J. Frayssinons (1765-1841; Defense du Christianisme, 1828), V. G. A. de Bonald (1768-1841; Theorie du Pouvoir Politique et lieligieux, 1796 ; Essai Analytique sur lex Lois Haturelles de VOrdre Social, 1800; Du Divorce, 1801; De la Philosophic Morale et Politique du 184 siecle; complete works, 16 vols. , Paris, 1816 fl. ) stands here in the foreground. The traditionalism of P. S. Ballanche is presented in a strangely fantastic fashion (1776-1847 ; Essai sur les Institutions Societies, 1817 ; La Palingenesie Sociale ; complete works, 6 vols. , Paris, 1888). In the beginning II. F. U. de Lamennais (1782-1864) also supported this line in his Essai sur VIndifference en Matiere de Religion (1817); later, having fallen out with the Church {Parole d'un Croyant, 1884), he presented in the Esquisse (Vune Philosophic (4 vols. , 1841-1846) a comprehensive system of philosophy, which had for its prototype partly the Schellingian System of Identity and partly the Italian Ontologism.
Among the philosophical supporters of Socialism (cf. L. Stein, Geschichu der socialen Bevsegung in Frankreich, Leips. 1849 11. ) the most important is CI. H. de St. Simon (1760-1825 ; Introduction aux Travaux Scientifique* du ISh siecle, 1807 ; Biorganisation de la Societe Europienne, 1814 ; Systeme In dustrie^ 1821 f. ; Nouveau Christianisme, 1825 ; (Euvres choisies, 3 vols. , 1859). Of his successors may be mentioned, Bazard (Doctrine de St. Simon, 1829), B. Enfantin (1790-1864; La Religion St. Simonienne, 1831), Pierre Leroux (1798-1871 ; Refutation de I'Eclecticisme, 1&39 ; De V Humanite, 1840), and Ph. Buchez (1796-1866 ; Essai cTun Traiti Complet de Philosophic au Point de
Vue du Catholicisms et du Progres, 1840).
Aug. Comte occupies a most interesting position apart. He was born in
Montpellier in 1798 and died alone in Paris in 1867 : Cours du Philosophic Positive (6 vols. , Paris, 1840-1842) [Eng. tr. , or rather a condensation and repro duction by H. Martineau, The Positive Philosophy of A. Comte, 2 vols. , Lond. 1863] ; Systeme de Politique Positive (Paris, 1851-1854) ; The Positive Polity and certain earlier works, trans, by various authors, 4 vols. , Lond. 187(1-1878; Catechisme Positiviste (1853) ; cf. Littr6, C. et la Philosophic Positire, Paris, 1868 ; J. S. Mill, C. and Positivism, Lond. 1805 ; J. Rig, A. C. La Philosophic. Positive Resumee, Paris, 1881 ; E. Caird, The Social Philosophy and Religion of ft, Glasgow, 1886.
In the following period Comte's position became more influential and in part controlling. E. Littre' (1801-1881 ; La Science au Point de Vue Philosophique. Paris, 1873) defended his positivism in systematic form. A freer adaptation of positivism was made by such writers as H. Taine (1828-1893 ; Philosophic de I'Art, 1866 ; De VIntelligence, 1870 ; cf. on him G. Barzellotti, Rome, 1896) and Ernest Renan (1823-1892; Questions Contemporaines, 1868; L'Avenir de la Science, 1890). Under Comte's influence, likewise, has been the develop ment of empirical psychology. Th. Ribot. editor of the Revue Philosophique, is to be regarded as the leader in this field. In addition to his historical works on English and German psychology, his investigations with regard to heredity and abnormal conditions of memory, will, personality, etc. , may be noted.
In part also Sociology stands under Comte's influence, as R. Worms, G. Tarde, E. Durkheim, and others have striven to work it out (cf. Annie Sociolo- gique, pub. since 1894). Finally, evolutionary theories belong in this connection, which have been especially carried out by J. M. Guyau (1854-1888 ; Esquisse d'une Morale, 1885 ; LHrreligion de. Vavenir, 1887 ; Vart, au point de vue sociologique, 1889) [Problemes de VEsthetique Contemporaine, 1897].
By far the most important among the present representatives of philosophy in France is Ch. Renouvier (bom 1818 ; Essais de Critique Ginirale, 2d ed. , 1875-96; Esqitisse d'une Classification Systematique des Doctrines Philoso- phiques, 1885 ; La Philosophic Analytique de VHistoire, 1896 ; La Nouvelle Monadologie, 1899). The synthesis of Kant and Comte which he has sought to effect has its literary organ in the Annee Philosophique (published since 1889).
In England the Associational Psychology continues through Thomas Brown to men like Thomas Belnham (1750-1829 ; Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 1801), John Fearn (First Lines of the Human Mind,
Philotophy of the Nineteenth Century. 629
1830), and many others; finds support here also in physiological and phreno logical theories as with G. Combe (. 1 System nf Phrenology, Kdin. 1826), Sam. Bailey (Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, 1829; The Theory of Reasoning, 1861 ; LetUrs on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 18. '>. ">)and Harriet Mar tineau {Letters on the Isiws of Man's Nature ami Development, 1861), and reaches its full development through James Mill (Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. 1829), and his son. J. Stuart M1U (1806-1873 ; System of Ijigir Hatiorinatite and Indurlire, 1843; Principles of Political Economy, 1848; On Liberty, 18611; Utilitarianism, 1803 ; Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, 1805; Autobiography, 1873; Posthumously, Essays on Heliijion, 1874 ; Collected Dissertations and Discussions, N. Y. , 1882 ; Useful ed. of Ethical Writings by Douglas, Kdin. 1897. Cf. H. Taine, Le Posit irisme Anglais, Paris, 1804 [Kng. tr. by Haye ; Courtney, Life of M„ and Meta physics of J. S. M. ; Bain, J. S. M. 1882], Douglas, J. S. M. , A Study of his Phitos. , kdin. 1806). Closely connected with this line of thought stands Alex. Bam ( The Senses and the Intellect, I860, 3d ed. 1808 ; Mental ami Moral Science, 1808, 3d ed. 1872, Pt. II, 1872; The Emotions and the Will, 1869, 3d
ed. 1875 ; Mind and Body, 3d ed. 1874.
The related Utilitarianism is represented by T. Cogan ( Philosophical Treatise
vn the Passion*, 1802; Ethical Questions, 1817), John Austin (17H0-1869 ; The Philosophy of Positive Law, 1832), G. Cornwall Lewis (A Treatise on the Methixls of Obsecration and Reasoning in Politics, 1852). [As representatives
of Utilitarianism, in addition to Mill, and Bain, op. cit. above, H. Sidgwiclc. Methyls of Ethics, Lond. 1874, 0th ed. 1901, and T. Fowler, Principles of Montis, Lond. lHMti f. , should also be mentioned.
Scottish Philosophy, after Dugald Stewart and James Mackintosh
I*. ! 2 ; Dissertation on the Itogress of Ethical Philosophy, 1830), had at first unimportant supporters like Abercromble (1781-1840 ; In'/nir;/ concerning the Intellectual Powers. 18:10 ; Philosophy of the Moral Feelings, 1833) and
Chalmers (1780-1847), and was especially as academical instruction brought into affiliation with the eclecticism of Cousin by Henry Calderwood (Philoso phy of the Infinite, 1864), S. Morell (An Historical and Critical I'iew of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the 10th Century, 1846), also H. Wedg
wood (On the Development ofthe Understanding, 1848).
The horizons of English thought were widened by acquaintance with the
German literature, to which Sam. Tayl. Coleridge (1772-1*14), W. Words worth (1770-1850), and especially Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881; Past and Present, 1843 [the articles on various German thinkers and the Sartor Resartus belong here also]) contributed. In philosophy this influence made itself felt
primarily through Kant, whose theory of cognition influenced J. Herschel (On the Study of Natural Philosophy, 1831), and especially W. Whewell (Phi losophy of the Inductive Sciences, 1840).
In intelligent reaction against this influence, Scottish philosophy experienced a valuable re-shaping at the hands of Sir William Hamilton (1788-1866 ; Dis- mssioHs tm Philosophy and Literature, 1852 ; On Truth and Error, 1856 ; Lec tures on Metaphysics and Logic, 1869 ; Editions of ReiiFs and Stewart's Works ; cf. J. Veitch. S. W. H. , The Man and his Philosophy, Edin. and Lond. 1883
[Memoir in 2 vols. , 1869. bv same author]). In his school Agnosticism proper, •u|*pnrted principally by H. L. Mansel (1820-1871 ; Metaphysics or the Phi- lovphy of Consciousness, 1860), is separated from a tendency inclining toward •tImmIc metaphysics : J. Veitch, K. Lowndes (Introduction to the Philosophy "f Primary Beliefs, IHit5). Leechman. McCosb. and others.
Following a suggestion from one aspect of Hamilton's thought, a movement an*ie which sought to develop formal logic as a calculus of symbols. To this movement belong G. Boole (The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, 1847 ; An
Analysis of the Isites of Thought, 1854) ; De Morgan (Ftirmal Logic, 1847) ; Th. Spencer Baynes (An Essay on the Veir Analytic of Logical Forms, 1850) ;
J. Venn f Symbolic Logic, 1881 ; Logic of Chance, 1870 ; Principles of Logic, 1889) [C. 8. Peirce, Algebra nf Lome, 1807 ; Ladd and Mitchell, in Studies in Logic,
W. Stanley JeTons ( Pure I^oi/ic, 1804 ; Principles nf Science, 1874) ;
•d. by Pelrce. Boston. '18*31. Compare on this A. Rlehl ( Vierieljohrttthr. /. writs. Philos. 1877) and L. Liard (Le* LogtcUns Anglais Contcmporain*, 1878). The combined influence of Kant and the later German theism impressed lbs
(1764-
630 Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century. [Part V. 'I.
philosopher of religion, James Martineau (who is also the most prominent recent representative of intuitionist ethics [Type* of Ethical Theory, 1885 ; A Study of Religion, 1888 ; Seat of Authority in Rel. , 189U]; cf. A. W. Jackson. J. M. , Boston, 1900), and likewise F. W. Newman (The Soul, etc. , 1849 ; The ism, 1858), A. C. Fraser and others. Since Hutchinson Stirling (The Secret of Hegel, 1865 ; What is Thought f 1000) German idealism in its whole develop ment and in its metaphysical aspect, particularly in the Hegelian form, has called forth a vigorous idealistic movement, of which the leading representative was the late Thomas Hill Green (18:50-1882), Professor at Oxford. [His Introd. to Hume was followed by criticisms on Lewes and Spencer and (posthumously j by the Prolegomena to Ethics, 1883, and complete works (except the Proleg. ), 3 vols. , Lond. and N. Y. 1885, 1886, 1888; cf. W. H. Fairbrother, The Phi losophy of T. II. (? . , Lond. 1896. ] In sympathy with this idealistic and more or less Hegelian interpretation of Kantian principles are F. H. Bradley (Logic, Lond. 1883 ; Ethical Studies, 1876; Appearance and Reality, 189:)), H. Boaan qttet (Logic, 2 vols. , 1888 ; Hist, of ^Esthetics, 1892 ; Fhilos. of the State, 1899,
Religion, ; E. Caird 1880)
J. Caird to the Philosophy etc. ) ; Phil, (Introduction
of
of Kant, 2 vols. , 1889 ; Essays, 2 vols. , 1892 ; Evolution of Religion.
( Critical
1893); Seth and Haldane (Essays in Phil. Criticism, 1883) ;
(Social Philosophy, 1890). Cf. A. Seth, Hegelianism and Personality, 1887, and the review of this in Mind, by D. G. Ritchie.
These movements above noted stand under the principle of Evolution; the same principle became authoritative for the investigation of organic nature through Charles Darwin (Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. 1859; Descent of Man, 1871; The Expression of the Emotions, 1872). The same principle was formulated in more general terms and made the basis of » comprehensive System of Synthetic Philosophy by Herbert Spencer
J. Mackenzie
(bom 1820), First Principles, 1862, 6th ed. 1901; Principles of Psychology, 1855, 5th ed.
1890; Principles of Biology, 1864-1867, 4th ed. 1888; Principles of Sociology, 1876-1896 ; Principles of Ethics, 1879-1893. Cf. on him O. Gaupp, Stuttgart, 1897 [T. H. Green, in Works ; F. H. Collins, Epitome of the Synthetic Philoso phy, 1889. ] Huxley, Wallace, Tyndall, G. H. Lewes (Problems of Life and Mind, 3d ed. 1874), belong in the main to this tendency.
[Other works in evolutionary ethics are, L. Stephen, The Science of Ethics, Ix>nd.
