The subjected classes had slowly raised
themselves
to a level
with the Arabs.
with the Arabs.
Cambridge Medieval History - v2 - Rise of the Saracens and Foundation of the Western Empire
The nepotism of Othman increased the opposition, and it
finally found expression in open revolt. These fanatical partisans were
of opinion that Othman was the man against whom the real holy war
should be waged. The Kufa men were first to rebel against the
governor nominated by Othman (655); with unaccountable weakness
Othman immediately abandoned his representative. The Egyptians were
the most energetic in their protest, and started for Medina in April 655
to the number of about 500. The disquiet which was simmering on all
sides was secretly fomented by the disappointed Companions in Medina;
they were the real plotters who made use of the discontent of the
provincials. When after long discussion the Egyptians besieged Othman
in his own house these Companions looked on inactively, or at the most
excused themselves by a few pretended manoeuvres, but in fact they were
not displeased when the rebels stormed the house and slew the defence-
less old Caliph whilst at prayer (17 June 655).
From this time onward fate took its own course. Among the Medina
companions Ali was now doubtless the nearest claimant to the Caliphate,
and some even went so far as to render him homage. On the other hand,
would he not certainly appear to all the Umayyads, and especially to the
powerful governor of Syria, as the murderer of Othman? Mu'awiya was
firmly established in Syria, and was in a position to venture, under this pre-
text—to him probably more than a pretext—to dispute the Caliphate
even with the son-in-law of the prophet. The Umayyads moreover were
not the only enemies that Ali had to contend with. His former allies,
Zubair and Talha, who were at least as much to blame as he, roused the
people against him, and this was done even more determinedly by the
prophet's widow 'A'isha, who had always been opposed to him. They
were supported by the Basra tribes, whilst Ali sought support with the
Kufa people. Near Basra the quarrel came to a decision, in the so-
called Camel battle, which takes its name from the fact that 'A'isha, in
accordance with old Arabian custom, was present at the battle in *
camel-palanquin, as a sacred sign of war. Ali conquered and 'A'isha's
part was played out. Talha and Zubair were killed in the fight (9 Dec.
656). Ali was thus master of 'Irak, and Kufa became his residence.
Hereupon Arabia ceased to be the centre of the empire, and Medina
sank to the status of a provincial town, in which piety and easy-going
elegance had the necessary quiet for development. The history of
Nearer Asia however again resolved itself, as it did before Islam, into the
opposition between 'Irak and Syria. The two halves of the empire
armed themselves for the fight for supremacy, Muslims against Muslims.
At first the better discipline of the Syrians and their higher culture
## p. 357 (#389) ############################################
656-658] Ali and Mu'awiya 357
carried the day. The recollection however of the brief political
splendour of 'Irak formed the basis for a movement which was
destined to gain strength, which a century later swept away the rule of
the Umayyads. Once more was the capital of the latest Asiatic world-
power transferred to Babylon.
After the Camel battle Ali's position was thoroughly favourable, as
Mu'awiya could not take any energetic steps against him so long as Egypt
remained on Ali's side. Mu'awiya's main attention was therefore fixed on
Egypt; and in this view he was aided and abetted by 'Amr, the first
conqueror of Egypt, who had allied himself with Mu'awiya in the hope
of attaining through him the governorship of Egypt. For that reason
he rendered Mu'awiya most important services in the war against Ali,
and as Ali at this juncture advanced against Mu'awiya a battle extending
over several days ensued, after long delay, at Siffln on the Syrian border,
not far distant from Rakka (26-27 July 657). Ali's victory appeared
certain, when 'Amr conceived the idea of fastening copies of the Koran
to the points of the lances and calling on the holy book for a decision.
This trick succeeded, and much against his will Ali was forced to yield
to the pressure of the pious members of his army. A court of arbitra-
tion was thereupon agreed on. Mu'awiya's confidential representative was
of course 'Amr, whilst Ali had forced upon him in a like capacity Musa
al-Ash'ari, a man by no means thoroughly devoted to him. They had
scarcely parted when those same pious members of his army altered
their views, and now blamed Ali for having placed men, instead of God
and the sword, as judges over him. Several thousand men separated
from Ali and entered into a separate camp at Harura, whence they
were called Hariirites or secessionists, Kharijites. They resisted Ali by
force, and he was compelled to cut down most of them at Nahrawan
(7 July 658). Later on they split into innumerable small sects and
still gave much trouble to Ali and the Umayyads. The sense of
independence and the robber-knight ideas of the ancient Arabians lived
still in them, but under a religious cloak. Offshoots from these people,
the so-called Ibadites, exist even to-day in South Arabia and in East and
North Africa.
The information we have as to the result of the court of arbitration
is untrustworthy. In any case the clever 'Amr outwitted his coadjudicator
by persuading him also to deal with Ali and Mu'awiya as being on the
same footing, whilst of course Ali was the only one who had a Caliphate
to lose. Ali appears actually to have been divested of this dignity by
decree of the arbitration, but this decision did not induce him to abdicate.
This arbitration court was held at Adhruh in the year 658. Even more
painful for Ali than this failure was the loss of Egypt, which 'Amr
shortly afterwards reconquered for himself, and administered until his
death more as a viceroy than a governor. No definite decision was brought
about between Ali and Mu'awiya, as their forces were about equally
## p. 358 (#390) ############################################
358 Mu'awiya Caliph [66O-680
balanced. It was not until July 660 that Mu'Swiya caused himself to be
proclaimed Caliph at Jerusalem. Six months later Ali succumbed to the
dagger of an assassin (24 Jan. 661). Mu'awiya had to thank this
circumstance for his victory, for Ali's son and successor Hasan came to
terms with him in return for an allowance. Herewith began the
rule of the Umayyads, and Damascus became the capital of the empire.
This has been rightly termed the Arabian Empire, for it was founded
on a national basis, in marked contrast to the subsequent State of the
Abbasids, for which Islam served as a foundation. The first Caliphs
had striven after a theocracy, but, as all the members of the theocracy
were Arabs, an Arabian national empire was created. For a time the
migration of the tribes had more weight than religion. We see this
most clearly by the fact that no longer the pious companions, but the old
Arabian aristocracy, no longer Ansar and Muhajirun, but the Arabian
tribes of Syria and 'Irak, determined the destinies of the empire. The
great expansion however was only able to hold back religion for a time.
Religion soon served fo give authority to the government in power, but
at the same time provided a special motive for all kinds of opposition.
That is shewn by the domestic policy of the Umayyad State; in the first
place to force the discipline of the State on the ruling class, %je. , the
Arabs, without which no successful combined social life was possible, and
in the second place it was necessary to regulate their relations with the
non-Arabian subordinate class.
The fight for the supremacy in the State, which appeared to the 'Irak
after the days of Ali as the rule of the hated Syrians, formed the life-
task of all the great Caliphs of the house of Umayya. Mu'awiya had still
most of all the manners of an old Arabian prince; he appeared to the
Romaic element simply as the 7rpo>Tocrv/i/3ouXos of his governors,
<rvfi/3ov\oi. In Syria they had been accustomed to such things since the
days of the Ghassanids, and to that may be ascribed the better discipline
of the Syrian Arabs, who in all respects stood on a higher plane of
culture than those of 'Irak. Mu'awiya was a clever prince, and ruled by
wisdom over the tribes, whose naturally selfish rivalries supported the
structure of his State like the opposing spans of an arch. His rule was
so patriarchal, and his advisers had so much voice in the matter, that
some have thought to have found traces of parliamentary government
under Mu'awiya. Nevertheless Mu'awiya knew quite well how to carry
his point for the State, i. e. , for himself, though he avoided the
absolutist forms and the pomp of later Caliphs. The nepotism d
Othman was quite foreign to his rule; although his relatives did not
fare badly under him he nevertheless looked afte*- th° pricijjj^ ■pf Strtj
in preference to them. /He had a brilliant talent for winning important
\ men. On the same principles as the Caliph in Damascus, the Thakifite:
Ziyad, whom he had adopted as a brother, ruled as an independent viceroy
1 I. e. of the tribe of Thaklf- See p. 325.
## p. 359 (#391) ############################################
680-683] Murder of Husain at Karbala 369
over the eastern half of the kingdom. Mu'awiya's aspirations in state
policy were finally to found a dynasty. He proclaimed his son Yazid
as his successor, although this act was opposed not only to the ancient
common law based on usage but also to the mode of election of the
theocracy.
On Mu'awiya's death (18 April 680) Yazid was accordingly recognised
in the West and partially also in 'Irak. At once a double opposition
began to foment; that of the Ali party in 'Irak, which had already
begun to revive under Mu'awiya,and the theocratic opposition of the Hijaz.
Thejaidjeayour to transfer the central government once more, respectively
to 'Irak and to the Hijaz, probably underlay the opposition in both
cases. As regards 'Irak that theory is a certainty, for the families of
Kufa and Basra had not forgotten that in Ali's time they had been the
masters of the empire. Now however Ali's Shl'a (party) was thrust into
the background by the Syrians. They looked back to Ali, and their
ardent desire was a restoration of that golden period for Kufa. Their
enthusiasm for Ali and his kin is therefore nothing more than a
glorification of their own special province, of the one and only 'Irak Caliph.
This brilliant period they hoped after the death of the great Mu'awiya
to recover for themselves by selecting Husain, the second son of Ali.
Husain complied with the solicitations of the Kufa people. These how-
ever, unsteady and undisciplined as ever, shrank from rebellion and failed
him at the last moment. Husain and those remaining faithful to him
were cut down at Karbala (10 Oct. 680). Ali's son had thereby, like
others before him, fallen as a martyr to the cause of Shi'ism. Political
aspirations slowly assumed a religious tinge. The death of the prophet's
grandson in the cause of the Kufa people, their remorse on that account,
their faded hopes, their hatred of the Syrians, and, last but not least,
heterodox currents which now began to shew themselves, prepared the
way for the great Shiite insurrection a few years later under Mukhtar. Ali
is now no longer simply the companion and son-in-law of the prophet,
but has become the heir of his prophetic spirit, which then lives on in his
sons. The Ali dynasty—so at least say the legitimists—are the only true
priestly Imams, the only legal Caliphs. The struggle for the house of
the prophet, for the Banu Hashim, becomes more and more the watch-
word of the opposition party, who, after their political overthrow in 'Irak,
removed their sphere of operation to Persia. There however this
Arabian legitimism united with Iranian claims, and, in the fight for the
Banu Hashim, the Persians were arrayed against the Arabs. With
this war-cry the Abbasids conquered.
Although Husain's expedition to Karbala had ended in a fiasco, the
Umayyads were not destined to get off so lightly against the opposition
of the Medina people, an opposition of the old elective theocracy against
the new Syrian dynasty. Their opposition candidate was 'Abdallah, son
of that Zubair who had fallen in the fight against Ali. Yazid was
CH. XI.
## p. 360 (#392) ############################################
360 Civil War [683-685
compelled to undertake a campaign against the holy cities, which earned
for him the hate of later generations. The matter was however not so
bad as it has been represented, and was moreover a political necessity.
His military commander broke up the resistance of the Medina party in
the battle on the Harra (26 Aug. 683), subsequently besieging the
opposition Caliph in Mecca. Just at this time Yazld died (11 Nov. 683),
and now the succession became a difficult question. Ibn az-Zubair had the
best chance of being universally recognised, as Yazid's youthful son and
successor, Mu'awiya II, a man of no authority, died only a few months
after his father. In Syria too large groups of the people, especially the
-V members of the Kais race, sided with the Zubair party, whilst the Kalb
9 race, who had been long resident in Syria, and with whom Mu'awiya had
become related by marriage, allied themselves unreservedly with the
Umayyads. The Kalb knew only too well that the Umayyad rule
meant the supremacy of Syria. And now the question arose, which
branch of the family should rule. Practical necessities and traditional
claims led to the Umayyad party finally selecting on the principle of
seniority a man already known to us, Marwan ibn al-Hakam, to be
Caliph. The decisive battle against the Zubair faction took place at
Marj Rahit in the beginning of 684. The Umayyads were victorious,
and Marwan was proclaimed Caliph in Syria.
The Umayyads had however to pay dearly for this victory, for it
destroyed the fundamental principles of the Arabian Empire. Hate once
generated at Marj Rahit, the blood-feud there arising was so bitter
that even the ever-growing religious spirit of Islam was unable to make
headway against it. The Arabs had previously been divided into
numerous factions warring against each other, but now the battle of
Marj Rahit created that ineradicable race hatred between the Kais and
Kalb tribes, which spread to other older racial opponents. The Kais
were distributed throughout the entire kingdom; the opposition towards
them drove their opponents into the ranks of the Kalb. The political
parties became genealogical branches according to the theory of the
Arabs, which regarded all political relationship from an ethnical stand-
point. And now for the first time, not in the remote past, arose that
opposition between the Northern and Southern Arabians which per-
meated public life, and which only in part coincided with actual racial
descent. Here it was the Kais, there the Kalb, and under these party
cries the Arabs tore at each other henceforward throughout the whole
empire, and this purely political and particularist tribal feud undermined
the rule of the Arabs at least as much as their religious political
opposition to the authority of the State, for it was just the authority of
the State itself which was thereby ruined; the governors could no
longer permanently hold aloof from the parties, and finally the Caliphs
themselves were unable to do so. But for the time being the actual
zenith of the dynasty followed these disorders.
## p. 361 (#393) ############################################
685-705] Organisation of the Arabian Empire 361
Marwan quickly succeeded in conquering Egypt, and then died,
leaving a difficult inheritance to his son 'Abd-al-Malik (685-705).
Complications with the Byzantines, who had incited the Mardaites, an
unconquered mountain tribe in the Amanus, against him, rendered it
impossible for him during his first years of office to take energetic steps
in 'Irak. The Zubair faction represented by Zubair's brother Mus'ab
ruled there nominally. Apart from these however the Shiites had
now attained to eminence and had organised a great insurrection under
Mukhtar. They defeated an army sent out by 'Abd-al-Malik, but were
then themselves defeated by the Zubairite Mus'ab. The latter was
hindered in his fight against 'Abd-al-Malik by the Kharijites, who
offered opposition to any and every form of state government and had
developed into an actual scourge. In the decisive battle against 'Abd-
al-Malik on the Tigris (690) Mus'ab accordingly succumbed to the
military and diplomatic superiority of the Syrian Caliph. The opposi-
tion Caliph still maintained his resistance in Mecca. 'Abd-al-Malik
despatched against him one of his best men, Hajjaj, who managed
in 692 to put an end both to the Caliphate and to the life of the
Zubairite.
This Hajjaj became later 'Abd-al-Malik's Ziyad, or almost un-
restricted viceroy, of the eastern half of the empire. He exercised the
authority of the State in a very energetic manner, and his reward is
to be shamefully misrepresented in the historical account given of
him by the tradition of 'Irak, created by those who had been afFected
by his energetic methods. Hajjaj was also a Thakifite. He carried
out in 'Irak what 'Abd-al-Malik endeavoured to do in Syria, namely,
the consolidation of the empire. The constitutional principles of the
dominions of Islam were, according to tradition, formulated by Omar,
but the extent to which tradition ascribes these to him is impossible, for
the ten years of his reign, occupied as they were with enormous military
expeditions, did not leave him the necessary time and quiet. For this
reason later investigators consider that the chief merit must be attributed
to Mu'awiya. Probably however the honours must be divided between
Omar, Mu'awiya and 'Abd-al-Malik, jiossibly including Hisham. Omar
made the Arabs supreme over the taxpaying subjected peoples, and
avoided particularism by the introduction of the state treasury. Mu'awiya
placed the Arabian Empire on a dynastic basis and disciplined the tribes
by introducing the political in place of the religious state authority.
'Abd-al-Malik however was the first to create the actual Arabian
administration, and this was followed under Hisham by the abolition of
the agrarian political prerogative of the Arabs, to be discussed later.
This process in the economic life was followed under the Abbasids by
its extension to politics.
The Arabs were not so foolish as many modern conquerors, who first
destroy the administrative organisation which they find in newly conquered
## p. 362 (#394) ############################################
362 Economic reasons for spread of Islam
foreign countries, and then suddenly stand face to face with insuper-
able difficulties. In accordance with their fundamental political point
of view they left all such matters as they found them, contenting them-
selves with the punctual payment by the local authorities of the stipulated
tribute. How this was collected was a matter of small moment to them.
Only the supreme heads of the more important administrative depart-
ments were Arabs. All the middle and lower administrative positions
were filled by natives as late as the eighth century, and even later.
This complicated system was not interfered with until the reign of 'Abd-
al-Malik and his successor Walid, and then not in the sense of im-
mediately making it Arabian, though it was placed on a bilingual basis
by the introduction of Arabic. Arab-Greek documents of this period,
from Egypt, have been preserved to us in profusion. But in other
matters also the result of the more settled conditions was seen in the
changes made by 'Abd-al-Malik. He is regarded as the founder of the
Arabian coinage; true, he accepted here the already existing systems,
that is, for the Byzantine districts he renewed the old gold coinage,
and for the Persian territories the old silver coinage was adopted.
The principal point however seems to be that under this ruler it
was first recognised that Omar's fiscal system was untenable, and that
both in principle and in form it must cease. Hitherto the Muslims
had remained exempt from taxation and the subjected peoples had pro-
vided the necessary revenue. At the outset they had forgotten that
through the extension of Islam as a religion the number of taxpayers
would of necessity become smaller and smaller, so that thereby religion
would sap the foundations of the Arabian State. With the foundation
of the military camps, which soon grew into large towns, the natives had
on the spot a much better source of income than in the country, where
the peasants had to pay their quota of tribute. Thus an exodus from
the country began, and at the same time the number of converts to
Islam increased. As the new believers ceased to be subject to taxes, the.
result of this process on the state treasury may easily be imagined. At
the same time it became thus evident that the form of Omars regula-
tions was unsuitable, for this exodus from the country simply necessitated
an individual treatment of the districts liable to pay duty, and these
conditions compelled the Arabs to concern themselves with details. But
in doing so the Arabian upper class was of necessity deeply concerned
with the construction of the whole system of government. This process
commences under 'Abd-al-Malik. His representative Hajjaj sought
to avoid the evil consequences for the treasury by including the newly
converted believers as liable to taxation, thus deviating from Omar's
system.
The increasing settlement of Arabs in the fertile country, which had
been liable to tribute whilst in the possession of non-Muslims, had the
same result as the change of religion in the subjected peoples. Omar II
## p. 363 (#395) ############################################
705-744] Later Umayyad Caliphs 363
sought to obviate this by forbidding the sale of such country. It was
not however till later, and probably by degrees, that it was decided,
principally under the Caliph Hisham, to alter the principle of taxation,
though the alteration is much obscured by tradition. The tribute,
which was principally drawn from the ground tax, was converted into a
ground tax pure and simple, and was levied irrespective of creed on all
property owners; the tribute intended to demonstrate the dominion of
the Arabs was resolved into an individual poll-tax of the old sort, which
was only payable by non-Muslims and ceased in the event of conversion.
This state of affairs is regarded by tradition as Omar's work, but it is
the result of gradual development extending over a century. This very
energetic manner in which the Arabs applied themselves to the adminis-
tration commenced with 'Abd-al-Malik and found its termination under
the Abbasids.
Under 'Abd-al-Malik and his viceroys, his brother 'Abd-al-'AzIz
in Egypt and Hajjaj in 'Irak, an executive authority was founded,
which, although occasionally shaken by serious revolts, was nevertheless
strong, so that his successor Walid (705-715) was again able to consider
the question of an extension of the boundaries. Under his rule the
Arabian Empire attained its greatest expansion; Spain was conquered,
and the Arabs penetrated into the Punjab and far into Central Asia,
right to the borders of China. These incursions however do not fall
within the range of our present observation. Under 'Abd-al-Malik and
Walid the empire, and above all Syria, stands on the pinnacle of
prosperity; the most stately buildings were erected, such as the Omar
Mosque in Jerusalem, and the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. Poetry
flourished at the brilliant Syrian court, and, guided by Christian learning,
Arabian science begins to make its appearance.
Now however the traces of impending collapse begin to appear.
It was only with difficulty that Hajjaj suppressed a powerful military
. revolt. The supremacy of the State could only be maintained in 'Irak
with the assistance of Syrian troops. In the eastern provinces the Kais
and Kalb wage constant warfare with each other, and the reign of the
later Umayyads is occupied in a struggle with these permanently
mutinous eastern districts. Most of the later Umayyads enjoyed but
a brief reign, Sulaiman 715-717, Omar II till 720, Yazid II till 724.
Hisham, 724-743, who grappled seriously with the problem of agrarian
policy, and secured once again in Khalid al-Kasri a viceroy for the
East after the style of Ziyad and Hajjaj, was the only one capable
of restoring once more a certain amount of quiet.
Thereupon however followed the irretrievable decline of the Umayyad
State. The political opposition of Kais and Kalb converted the Caliph
into the puppet of inter-tribal feuds; Umayyads fought against Umay-
yads. The rulers succeeded each other in rapid succession. History
records four Umayyad Caliphs in the period of 743 to 744. It would
CH. XI.
## p. 364 (#396) ############################################
364 The Abbasids [744-750
occupy too much space here to trace all these disturbances. When
Marwan II, the last of the Umayyads, a man by no means personally
incapable, ascended the throne in the year 744^ the game was already
lost. Particularism had won the day. The general fight between all
parties was however essentially a fight against Syria and the Umayyads.
In this cause the new combination, which made its first efforts in the
far east, in Khorasan, attained success. In no other place were the
Arabs so intermingled with the subject peoples as here, and here too the
religious opposition against the Umayyads was taken up more vigorously
than anywhere else. It has already been indicated above that the ShPa
was destined to prevail in Persia. In their fight for the family of the
prophet, the Abbasids, under their general Abu Muslim, were victorious,
and then, supported by the Persian element, they conquered first the
eastern Arabs and subsequently the Syrians. In the year 750 the
Umayyad rule was at an end.
The victory of the Abbasids was a victory of the Persians over the
Arabs.
The subjected classes had slowly raised themselves to a level
with the Arabs. When Christians and Persians first accepted Islam it
was not possible to include them in the theocracy in any other way than
by attaching them as clients (Mawali) to the Arabian tribal system.
They were the better educated and the more highly cultivated of the
two races. In the numerous revolts they fought on the side of the
Arabs. The contrast between the Arabs and the Mawali had its cause
in the constitution of the State as founded by Omar. The more the
Mawali increased in importance and the more they permeated the
Arabian tribes, so the universalistic, i. e. , the democratic tendency of
Islam was bound in corresponding degree to force its way into wider
circles. On the other hand the continuous fights of the Arabian tribes
against the authority of the State and against each otljer led to a
dissolution of the political and ethnical conditions under which Islam
had caused the preponderance oFthe Arabian element. Thus grew more
and more a tendency to level Arabs and non-Arabs. Both became
merged in the term Muslim which even to this day represents for many
peoples their nationality. The Persians were much more religious than
the Arabs, and they accepted the political ideal of the ShJ'a, which was
tinged with religion, more than actually religious. This religious move-
ment then swept away the dominion of the Umayyads, and thereby the
international empire of the Abbasids took the place of the national
Arabian Empire. The Arabian class disappeared and was superseded
by a mixed "official aristocracy, based no longer on religious merit and
noble descent, but on authority delegated by the ruling prince. Thus
arose out of'the patriarchal kingdom of the Umayyads the absolutist
rule of the Abbasids and therewith Persian civilisation made ife
entrance into Islam. The ancient East had conquered.
## p. 365 (#397) ############################################
366
CHAPTER XII.
THE EXPANSION OF THE SARACENS (continued).
AFRICA AND EUROPE.
We are dividing the history of the expansion of the Saracens into
an Asiatic-Egyptian and an African-European order of development.
This division is founded not on outward, but on internal reasons. Even
at the present time Islam in Northern Africa presents an appearance
quite different from the Islam of Asia and Egypt. The reason for this
must be sought in the totally different composition of the population.
The Aramaic element of Nearer Asia and Coptic Egypt offered much less
resistance to the Arabian nationality and the Arabian language than did
the Persian element in Mid-Asia. The Berbers or Moors of Northern
Africa take up a middle position between these two; they certainly
accepted Islam and Arabian culture, but they remodelled them, and
preserved their own nationality in their customs and to a large extent
also in their language. Moreover, an encroachment of Islam into Europe
in so significant a form as that experienced in the Middle Ages would
have been scarcely conceivable without the great masses of the Berbers,
who were always on the move. Later too the Saracens of Southern
Europe continually appear in political relations with Africa. The
history of Islam in Europe, is therefore indissolubly connected with its
history in Northern Africa, whilst on the other hand it is in reality
merely associated with the history of the Eastern Caliphate by a certain
community of culture and religion.
The commixture of Arabs and Berbers, which gave the impress to
the whole of the Islam of the West, was a slow process. Centuries
passed, but in the end Islam has attained what Phoenicians and
Romans strove for in vain. These two great colonising nations
always settled principally in the towns on the coast, and doubtless
assimilated the Berbers crowding round them; in spite however of all
the settlements of colonists by Rome, the flat country and especially
the hinterland remained in Berber hands. As Mommsen says, the
Phoenicians and Romans have been swept away, but the Berbers
have remained, like the palm trees and the desert sand. With the
## p. 366 (#398) ############################################
366 Occupation of Alexandria [640-6«
destruction of the Roman power the influence of the widespread organ-
isation of the Berber tribes grew and the Byzantine restoration under
Justinian was limited by the growth of the Berber element. The
exarchs had continually to deal with insurrections of the Berbers, and
were probably scarcely able to exercise authority outside the limits of
the ever decreasing number of towns held by garrisons which commanded
respect. It is therefore clear from the beginning that it was not the
Byzantines who made the occupation of Northern Africa difficult for the
Arabians, but the Berbers, who in their time of need made common
cause with their former tyrants against the new intruder. The Arabs
had much trouble to make it clear to the Berbers at the point of the
sword that their real interest lay with Islam and not against it. As
soon as they had once realised this fact they accepted the Arabs for their
leaders and flooded Southern Europe, while in Africa the nascent civilisa-
tion of Islam effected an entrance, though it received a Berber national
colouring.
The continued occupation of Alexandria called for a screening of
the flank by occupying also the adjoining territory of Barka1. Barka
was the leading community of the ancient Pentapolis. The rich towns
of this group at once experienced the consequence of the occupation of
Egypt when the Arabians appeared before them. It has been already
mentioned that the Arabs through 'Amr made peace with Barka im-
mediately after the occupation of Alexandria. That took place as earlv
as the autumn of the year 642 and the winter thereupon following,
under the leadership of 'Ukba ibn Nafi', of whom more is yet to be said.
The Pentapolis belonged thenceforward permanently to the Empire of
Islam, although retaining in the first instance administrative inde-
pendence. Bordering on Barka was the ancient Proconsular Africa,
the eastern half of which, lying between the Greater and the Lesser
Syrtis, was clearly distinguished by the Arabs under the title of Tripolis,
from the northern half, with the capital Carthage, this latter territory
being termed by them simply Africa (Ifrlklya). After the occupation
of Barka various raids took place even under 'Amr (642-643), these
extending throughout the whole territory of Tripolis, while individual
detachments went southward into the desert. There can be little doubt
that even at that time 'Ukba pushed forward as far as Fezzan (Zawlla)
and another Amir of the name of Busr penetrated to the Oasis of Jufra
(Waddan). This latter incident took place while 'Amr was besieging
Tripolis, which he finally occupied at least temporarily. At the Nafusa
mountains 'Amr turned back, as the Caliph was averse to pushing forward
any further. In spite of these successes there was for the time being no
question of any permanent settlement of the Arabs westward of Barka.
'Ukba may have undertaken some small isolated expeditions with Barka
1 The following exposition is based on a critical re-examination of the sources of
the works of Caudel and Wellhausen.
## p. 367 (#399) ############################################
643-664] Attacks on Byzantine Africa 367
as a base, but the main fighting forces of Egypt were concentrated round
Alexandria, which once more had temporarily fallen into the hands of
the Byzantines.
Only after Alexandria had been reconquered and 'Abdallah ibn Sa'd
had become governor of Egypt was a new expedition to the west on a
larger scale undertaken under his guidance, probably as early as the end of
647. The Byzantine state authority was now in complete dissolution.
The Patricius Gregory of Carthage had revolted the year before, probably
because, after the second fall of Alexandria, he considered himself safe
from any energetic steps on the part of the Greeks. Nevertheless
Carthage itself does not appear to have given him its adhesion, and he
based his rule in fact on the Berbers, for which reason he took up his
residence in the interior, in the ancient Sufetula, the present Sbeitla.
To how small an extent he must have been master of the situation is
proved by the fact that he did not even take the field against 'Abdallah.
The latter, with separated detachments, plundered the territory of
Tripolis, without being able to take the town itself; one Arab division
in fact appears at that time to have penetrated to Ghadames. When
'Abdallah arrived at the site of the subsequent Kairawan he turned and
marched on Sbeitla, where he annihilated Gregory's army. The fate of
the Patricius himself is uncertain; probably he fell in battle. This
battle is also named after 'Akuba, a place lying somewhat further to the
north. But here again no consolidation of the Arabian rule resulted.
A counter attack on the part of the still unconquered towns was to be
feared, and 'Abdallah therefore allowed himself to be persuaded to retire
on payment of an enormous sum of money, stated to have been 800 talents.
The whole expedition lasted somewhat more than a year (647-648).
Hereupon the confusion following on the assassination of the Caliph
Othman brought the expansion for the time being to a standstill.
When however Mu'awiya had asserted his authority and his faithful ally
'Amr had again become master in Egypt, the expeditions towards the
west were renewed, and in these 'Amr's nephew, the 'Ukba ibn Nafi' above
mentioned, appears to have been the moving spirit, operating from Barka
as a base. Along with him a number of other leaders are mentioned,
who undertook small excursions against various Berber tribes and against
such towns as the ancient Lepta (660-663). All details are dubious; of
the subsequent period too our knowledge is but scanty. Probably after
the death of 'Amr Africa was entrusted, at all events temporarily, as
a separate province to Mu'awiya ibn Hudaij, the head of Mu'awiya's
Egyptian party in his fight against Othman; this man was sent out
directly by the Caliph with a considerable army against the united
Byzantines and Berbers, and defeated them. The fortress of Jalula was
taken by him. Mu'awiya's expedition was in conjunction with a diversion
of the fleet against Sicily, of which more remains to be said. This event
may be dated with tolerable accuracy as having occurred in the year 664.
## p. 368 (#400) ############################################
368 Policy of Hindr [670-682
Shortly afterwards 'Ukba ibn Nafi' appears to have become the suc-
cessor of Ibn Hudaij. After a brilliant raid through the chain of oases
on the northern fringe of the Sahara, where he renewed the Arabian
dominion, he undertook in the year 670 an expedition against the
so-called Proconsular Africa, where he founded, as an Arabian camp and
strategical point of support, on the same lines as Basra and Kufa,
Kairawan, which became later so famous. Shortly afterwards, at most
in a few years, he was recalled.
Under Ibn Hudaij and 'Ukba Africa had grown into a province
independent of Egypt; now it was once more attached to Egypt. The
new governor-general Maslama ibn Mukhallad sent his freedman Dinar
Abu-1-Muhajir as 'Ukba's successor. By him 'Ukba was put in chains;
Maslama plainly disapproved 'Ukba's policy. He had good reason
for his disagreement, for 'Ukba was the type of the arbitrary, reckless
leader of the Arabian horsemen; proud as he was, he knew no such
thing as compromise, and in his view the Arabs were to conquer by the
sword and not by diplomacy; he punished all renegades without mercy.
Many Berbers had indeed accepted Islam as long as a contingent of
Arabian troops was in their neighbourhood, only to secede as soon as
the latter had withdrawn. 'Ukba treated with impolitic haughtiness the
proud leaders of the Berbers who allied themselves with him. His
much-renowned raids were displays of bravado without lasting success,
but they were in accordance with the taste of Arabian circles and as
later on he met his death on one of these expeditions in the far west,
his fame was still further enhanced by the martyr's crown. Thus even
at the present day Sidi 'Ukba is a popular saint in Northern Africa.
Tested by the judgment of history his less-known successor Dinar was a
much greater man, for it was he who first vigorously opposed the
Byzantines and at the same time he was the pioneer in paving the way
to an understanding with the Berbers.
After having proved his superior strength, Dinar appears to have won
over the Berbers, especially their leader Kusaila, by conciliatory tactics.
With their assistance he proceeded against the Byzantines of Carthage.
Though he could not yet take the town he occupied other neighbouring
portions of their territory. Thereupon he undertook an advance far to
the westward, right away to Tlemcen, which he could do without risk
owing to his relations with the Berbers.
In the meantime 'Ukba had succeeded in obtaining once more from
the Caliph Yazld the supreme command in Northern Africa (681-682).
He took revenge on Dinar by leading him around in chains on all his
expeditions. He again formed the main Muslim camp at Kairawan,
whence Dinar had removed it, and he approached the Berbers once
again with true Arabian haughtiness—in short, in all matters he acted
on lines diametrically opposed to those of his predecessor. The result
proves the correctness of Dinar's policy, for the powerful Kusaila incited
## p. 369 (#401) ############################################
682-697] Saracen disasters in Africa 369
the Berbers against 'Ukba and fled on the earliest opportunity from his
camp. 'Ukba therefore proceeded westwards under much less favourable
conditions than Dinar, and though he advanced beyond Tlemcen to
Tangier and appears after crossing the Atlas to have even penetrated
right to the Atlantic Ocean, yet on the return journey both he and his
prisoner Dinar were cut down by mutinous Berbers. They could not
have been surprised if he had not fancied the whole of the west already
conquered, and therefore divided up his army into small detachments.
Or it may be that he was no longer able to keep together the troops,
who were laden with booty. And thus at Tahudha, not far from Biskra,
he suffered the martyr's death (683). This was the signal for a
general rising of the Berbers and the renewal of their co-operation with
the Byzantines. The Arabs were compelled to relinquish Africa, and
Zubair ibn Kais, the commandant of Kairawan, led the troops back.
Kusaila was enabled to wander unpunished with his bands throughout
all Africa. Thus at the time of the death of the Caliph Yazid the
whole of Africa beyond Barka was again lost. This fact further con-
firms our judgment of the vastly too much celebrated 'Ukba.
'Abd-al-Malik attempted as early as 688-689, if we may believe the
unanimous opinion of the Arabs, to restore the Caliph's authority in
Africa. He did not wait, as might have been expected, until after the
conclusion of the civil war against the opposition Caliph, 'Abdallah ibn
Zubair. This new expedition however, commanded by the same Zubair,
did not proceed against the Byzantines, but against Kusaila, for in
all these wars the Byzantine towns managed in a masterly way to make
use of the Berbers as a bulwark. First of all Kairawan which had
drifted under Berber rule was freed, and then a further advance was
made against the Mons Aurasius, Kusaila's base. Kusaila was defeated
in a bloody battle and fell, whilst Zubair's troops penetrated as far as
Sicca Veneria, the present Kef, and it may be even further. The energy
of the Arabs was however then exhausted. On the return march a fate
similar to 'Ukba's overtook Zubair, and from similar causes. The
Byzantines had in fact taken advantage of his absence to attack Barka.
Zubair with a few faithful followers was cut down by them.
Kairawan however remained in the hands of the Arabs and now
began from this point outwards the work of the real pacificator, Hassan ibn
an-Nu'man, though we do not quite know when the arrangement of the
conditions was placed in his hands. As the first Syrian Amir on African
soil he thoroughly understood how to combine severe discipline with
astute diplomacy. In all material points he adopted Dinar's policy.
Like Dinar he recognised in the first instance the Byzantines as his
main enemy. As soon as the arrival of the auxiliary troops sent by
the Caliph permitted him to do so, he advanced against the still
unvanquished Carthage, and conquered it in the summer of 697.
Following this up he defeated the united Byzantines and Berbers at
C. UED. H. VOL. II. C'H. XII. 24
## p. 370 (#402) ############################################
370 Pacification of Africa [698-703
Satfura, to the north-east of Tunis, but without being able to prevent
them from again concentrating at Bizerta. In the autumn of the same
year certainly the Arabs lost Carthage again to the Patricius Johannes,
but his powerful fleet was dispersed in the summer of 698 by a still
greater Arabian fleet, and thus the fate of the town was sealed. From
this time onward the Arabs were supreme at sea, so that it is by no
means the land troops only of Hassan which decided the final fate of
Northern Africa. In his policy towards the Berbers he was at first not
fortunate. A holy prophetess, the so-called Kahina, had roused the
Berber tribes to a united advance and had thus become the successor of
Kusaila. On the banks of the little river Nini, not far distant from
Bagai, on one of the spurs of Mons Aurasius, she defeated Hassan's
army, which was driven back as far as Tripolis. But in the long run
the Kahina was not able to maintain her position, and the clever
diplomacy of Hassan appears also to have won over several tribes and
leaders from her circle. Thus Hassan's final victory over the Kahina a
few years later at Gafes becomes at the same time the commencement
of a fraternisation with the Berbers. It is extremely difficult to fix the
chronological sequence of the fights against the Kahina in regard to
the expeditions against Carthage. If they are placed between the two
conquests of Carthage, as has been done, then the whole chronological
structure falls to pieces; it is therefore the simplest to assume the date
of Hassan's defeat as occurring only after the final fall of Carthage and
to date his victory as about 703. For in the end it was not the land
army but the fleet which rendered possible the occupation and retention
of the Byzantine coast towns. The peace with the Berbers however
led them into the camp of the Arabs and thus too the final fate of such
Byzantine towns as might still be holding out was sealed. And now,
with Islam as their watchword, heads of certain of the Berber tribes,
appointed by the Arabs, advanced against the tribes of the west, who
JAj^mained independent. The prospect of booty and land united the
formeren&nSJ68' wno were moreover so similar to each other in their
whole style oflrVrh2£r; *ne moment now approaches when Africa becomes
too confined for this rieV" wave of population, which the influx of Islam
has brought to flood level. . 3^ latinised and hellenised population of
the towns appears to a large Vxtent to have migrated to Spain and
Sicily, for in a remarkably shorT time Latin civilisation disappeared
from Northern Africa. ',
The Arabs onlv conquered Northern\Africa after they had relinquished
their first policy of plunder for that of as^ermanent occupation. The
commencement of the new policy was 'Ukba'fe foundation of Kairawan.
By that step however in the first place only fthe starting-place for the
raids was changed. Dinar was the first seriously ua consider the question
of not merely plundering the open country but on taking the fortified
towns; and in this design his Berber policy was to support him, These
## p. 371 (#403) ############################################
708-7ii] Invasion of Spain 371
plans however could only be carried out when more troops became
available for Africa after the restoration of unity in the empire by
'Abd-al-Malik, further when the fleet began also to co-operate, and when
simultaneously a clever diplomatist effected the execution of Dinar's
plans in regard to the Berbers in more extended style. This man
however was Hassan ibn an-Nu'man.
'His policy was continued by Musa ibn Nusair, who is regarded in
history as the actual pacificator of Northern Africa and the conqueror
of Spain. Musa appears to have assumed office in the year 708, though
tradition on the point is rather shaky. The first years of his govern-
ment were occupied with the subjection of the western Berbers, the
latter years being devoted to the conquest of Spain, in which work his
freedman and military commander Tarik had paved the way for him.
The conquest of Spain must be ascribed less to the craving of the
Arabs for expansion than to the fact that the newly-subjected tribes
of Moors, whom the prospect of booty had lured to the banner of Islam,
had to be kept employed. At the seat of the Caliphate these far-
reaching enterprises were followed with a certain amount of misgiving.
There certainly was little time available to intervene, for events
followed one after the other in precipitate haste, and the frail kingdom
of the Goths fell into the hands of the conquerors like a ripe fruit by a
windfall. The actual cause is obscure. History tells of disputes in
regard to the succession, and that the last king of the Goths, Roderick,
who succumbed to the Arabs, was a usurper (cf. Chap. vi). Tradition
tells of a certain Count Julian, the Christian ruler of Ceuta, whose
daughter had been violated by Roderick, and who therefore led the
Arabs and Berbers to Spain to satisfy his vengeance. Few characters in
the earlier history of Islam have interested the historians to such an
extent as this Julian, of whom it is not definitely known to which
nation he belonged and to which sovereignty he owed allegiance.
According to the reconstruction of Wellhausen and Codera he was not
named Julian at all, but Urban; he was probably of Moorish ancestry
and a vassal of the Gothic kings, but all beyond this is pure hypothesis.
Induced apparently by the struggles for the throne in the Gothic
kingdom, and probably less with a view to conquer than to plunder,
Tarik crossed into Spain in the year 711 with 7000 Berbers, who were
subsequently supplemented to a total of 12,000, and landed near to the
rock which still bears his name. (Gibraltar = Gebel Tarik = Mount
Tarik. ) After having collected his troops, Tarik appears to have
practised highway robbery along the coast from Gibraltar west-
wards and to have gone around the Laguna de la Janda in the
south. King Roderick opposed him in the valley of the WadI Bekka,
nowadays called Salado, between the lake and the town of Medina
Sidonia. According to the earliest Spanish tradition the site is also
named after the neighbouring Transductine promontory (Cape Spartel).
24—2
## p. 372 (#404) ############################################
372 Conquest of Spain [711-m
It was here, not at Vejer (or Jerez) de la Frontera, that the great decisive
battle was fought in July 711, in which the Gothic army, thanks to the
treachery of Roderick's political enemies, was defeated by Tank's troops.
The king himself probably fell in the battle, for he disappeared at all
events from this day forward1.
This great success led to an unexampled triumphal procession, which
can only be explained by the fact that the rule of the Goths was deeply
hated among the native population. As on Byzantine ground, so here
too had political and religious blunders set the various elements of the
population at variance, and thus prepared the way for the invasion.
The Jews especially, against whom an unscrupulous war of extermination
had been waged by the fanatical orthodox section, welcomed the Arabs
and Berbers as their deliverers. The towns alone, in which the Gothic
knighthood held predominance, offered any effective resistance. Tarik
must have been very accurately informed of the condition of the country;
the authorities represent him as advised in his arrangements for the
whole of the further campaign by Julian (Urban). The sequel certainly
justified the daring plan of pushing forward to Toledo, the capital of
the Gothic kings; the more important cities of the south, e. g. Seville,
were left to themselves, others, as Malaga and Archidona, were subdued
by small detachments; the main body of the army proceeded by Ecija
and Cordova to Toledo. It was only at Ecija that Tarik met with any
vigorous resistance, and at this point a battle ensued, which is described
as the most severe and stubborn of the whole campaign. Cordova and
Toledo fell by treachery. The aristocracy and the higher ranks of the
priesthood did not even await the arrival of the Muslims, but either
repaired to places of safety or sought union with the conquerors.
Tarik was thus master of the half of Spain by the end of the summer
of 711. His unprecedented successes aroused the jealousy of Musa, his
superior officer and patron, who had remained passively in Northern
Africa, because a systematic conquest of Spain was not intended in
Tank's expedition—only one of the customary summer raids of the
Muslim troops. Tarik had however now destroyed the Gothic kingdom.
Musa nevertheless, desiring for himself the fame and the material
advantages attending on the conquest of wealthy Spain, advanced
thither also with 18,000 troops in the following spring, and landed in
June. Purposely avoiding Tank's tracks, he first of all conquered the
towns which still held out, prominent among which were Medina Sidonia.
Carmona and Seville. Seville was the intellectual centre of Spain; it
had been the seat of government for centuries under the Romans, and
under the Goths it had not lost its former splendour. It was only
captured after a siege of several months' duration. From the campaign
of Musa. it can be seen that Tank's stratagem had by no means
destroyed all resistance, but that the heavy work of the conquest of the
1 Another view is fliven in Ch. ti. p. 185.
## p. 373 (#405) ############################################
712-718] Crossing of the Pyrenees 373
country had to follow the rapid occupation of the capital. The Arabs
would scarcely have succeeded in the conquest of Spain without the internal
disorders which had preceded their arrival, and the consequent want of
discipline and unity. Even as it was, after the fall of Seville, Musa
still met with obstinate resistance before Merida, whose impregnable
walls resisted all attempts at undermining. The inhabitants however
finally recognised their advantage in peacefully surrendering the town
(30 June 718). Seville too rose once more in revolt, but was finally
subjugated by Musas son, 'Abd-al-'AzIz. It was only after all these
successes that Musa could enter Toledo, where Tank awaited him.
finally found expression in open revolt. These fanatical partisans were
of opinion that Othman was the man against whom the real holy war
should be waged. The Kufa men were first to rebel against the
governor nominated by Othman (655); with unaccountable weakness
Othman immediately abandoned his representative. The Egyptians were
the most energetic in their protest, and started for Medina in April 655
to the number of about 500. The disquiet which was simmering on all
sides was secretly fomented by the disappointed Companions in Medina;
they were the real plotters who made use of the discontent of the
provincials. When after long discussion the Egyptians besieged Othman
in his own house these Companions looked on inactively, or at the most
excused themselves by a few pretended manoeuvres, but in fact they were
not displeased when the rebels stormed the house and slew the defence-
less old Caliph whilst at prayer (17 June 655).
From this time onward fate took its own course. Among the Medina
companions Ali was now doubtless the nearest claimant to the Caliphate,
and some even went so far as to render him homage. On the other hand,
would he not certainly appear to all the Umayyads, and especially to the
powerful governor of Syria, as the murderer of Othman? Mu'awiya was
firmly established in Syria, and was in a position to venture, under this pre-
text—to him probably more than a pretext—to dispute the Caliphate
even with the son-in-law of the prophet. The Umayyads moreover were
not the only enemies that Ali had to contend with. His former allies,
Zubair and Talha, who were at least as much to blame as he, roused the
people against him, and this was done even more determinedly by the
prophet's widow 'A'isha, who had always been opposed to him. They
were supported by the Basra tribes, whilst Ali sought support with the
Kufa people. Near Basra the quarrel came to a decision, in the so-
called Camel battle, which takes its name from the fact that 'A'isha, in
accordance with old Arabian custom, was present at the battle in *
camel-palanquin, as a sacred sign of war. Ali conquered and 'A'isha's
part was played out. Talha and Zubair were killed in the fight (9 Dec.
656). Ali was thus master of 'Irak, and Kufa became his residence.
Hereupon Arabia ceased to be the centre of the empire, and Medina
sank to the status of a provincial town, in which piety and easy-going
elegance had the necessary quiet for development. The history of
Nearer Asia however again resolved itself, as it did before Islam, into the
opposition between 'Irak and Syria. The two halves of the empire
armed themselves for the fight for supremacy, Muslims against Muslims.
At first the better discipline of the Syrians and their higher culture
## p. 357 (#389) ############################################
656-658] Ali and Mu'awiya 357
carried the day. The recollection however of the brief political
splendour of 'Irak formed the basis for a movement which was
destined to gain strength, which a century later swept away the rule of
the Umayyads. Once more was the capital of the latest Asiatic world-
power transferred to Babylon.
After the Camel battle Ali's position was thoroughly favourable, as
Mu'awiya could not take any energetic steps against him so long as Egypt
remained on Ali's side. Mu'awiya's main attention was therefore fixed on
Egypt; and in this view he was aided and abetted by 'Amr, the first
conqueror of Egypt, who had allied himself with Mu'awiya in the hope
of attaining through him the governorship of Egypt. For that reason
he rendered Mu'awiya most important services in the war against Ali,
and as Ali at this juncture advanced against Mu'awiya a battle extending
over several days ensued, after long delay, at Siffln on the Syrian border,
not far distant from Rakka (26-27 July 657). Ali's victory appeared
certain, when 'Amr conceived the idea of fastening copies of the Koran
to the points of the lances and calling on the holy book for a decision.
This trick succeeded, and much against his will Ali was forced to yield
to the pressure of the pious members of his army. A court of arbitra-
tion was thereupon agreed on. Mu'awiya's confidential representative was
of course 'Amr, whilst Ali had forced upon him in a like capacity Musa
al-Ash'ari, a man by no means thoroughly devoted to him. They had
scarcely parted when those same pious members of his army altered
their views, and now blamed Ali for having placed men, instead of God
and the sword, as judges over him. Several thousand men separated
from Ali and entered into a separate camp at Harura, whence they
were called Hariirites or secessionists, Kharijites. They resisted Ali by
force, and he was compelled to cut down most of them at Nahrawan
(7 July 658). Later on they split into innumerable small sects and
still gave much trouble to Ali and the Umayyads. The sense of
independence and the robber-knight ideas of the ancient Arabians lived
still in them, but under a religious cloak. Offshoots from these people,
the so-called Ibadites, exist even to-day in South Arabia and in East and
North Africa.
The information we have as to the result of the court of arbitration
is untrustworthy. In any case the clever 'Amr outwitted his coadjudicator
by persuading him also to deal with Ali and Mu'awiya as being on the
same footing, whilst of course Ali was the only one who had a Caliphate
to lose. Ali appears actually to have been divested of this dignity by
decree of the arbitration, but this decision did not induce him to abdicate.
This arbitration court was held at Adhruh in the year 658. Even more
painful for Ali than this failure was the loss of Egypt, which 'Amr
shortly afterwards reconquered for himself, and administered until his
death more as a viceroy than a governor. No definite decision was brought
about between Ali and Mu'awiya, as their forces were about equally
## p. 358 (#390) ############################################
358 Mu'awiya Caliph [66O-680
balanced. It was not until July 660 that Mu'Swiya caused himself to be
proclaimed Caliph at Jerusalem. Six months later Ali succumbed to the
dagger of an assassin (24 Jan. 661). Mu'awiya had to thank this
circumstance for his victory, for Ali's son and successor Hasan came to
terms with him in return for an allowance. Herewith began the
rule of the Umayyads, and Damascus became the capital of the empire.
This has been rightly termed the Arabian Empire, for it was founded
on a national basis, in marked contrast to the subsequent State of the
Abbasids, for which Islam served as a foundation. The first Caliphs
had striven after a theocracy, but, as all the members of the theocracy
were Arabs, an Arabian national empire was created. For a time the
migration of the tribes had more weight than religion. We see this
most clearly by the fact that no longer the pious companions, but the old
Arabian aristocracy, no longer Ansar and Muhajirun, but the Arabian
tribes of Syria and 'Irak, determined the destinies of the empire. The
great expansion however was only able to hold back religion for a time.
Religion soon served fo give authority to the government in power, but
at the same time provided a special motive for all kinds of opposition.
That is shewn by the domestic policy of the Umayyad State; in the first
place to force the discipline of the State on the ruling class, %je. , the
Arabs, without which no successful combined social life was possible, and
in the second place it was necessary to regulate their relations with the
non-Arabian subordinate class.
The fight for the supremacy in the State, which appeared to the 'Irak
after the days of Ali as the rule of the hated Syrians, formed the life-
task of all the great Caliphs of the house of Umayya. Mu'awiya had still
most of all the manners of an old Arabian prince; he appeared to the
Romaic element simply as the 7rpo>Tocrv/i/3ouXos of his governors,
<rvfi/3ov\oi. In Syria they had been accustomed to such things since the
days of the Ghassanids, and to that may be ascribed the better discipline
of the Syrian Arabs, who in all respects stood on a higher plane of
culture than those of 'Irak. Mu'awiya was a clever prince, and ruled by
wisdom over the tribes, whose naturally selfish rivalries supported the
structure of his State like the opposing spans of an arch. His rule was
so patriarchal, and his advisers had so much voice in the matter, that
some have thought to have found traces of parliamentary government
under Mu'awiya. Nevertheless Mu'awiya knew quite well how to carry
his point for the State, i. e. , for himself, though he avoided the
absolutist forms and the pomp of later Caliphs. The nepotism d
Othman was quite foreign to his rule; although his relatives did not
fare badly under him he nevertheless looked afte*- th° pricijjj^ ■pf Strtj
in preference to them. /He had a brilliant talent for winning important
\ men. On the same principles as the Caliph in Damascus, the Thakifite:
Ziyad, whom he had adopted as a brother, ruled as an independent viceroy
1 I. e. of the tribe of Thaklf- See p. 325.
## p. 359 (#391) ############################################
680-683] Murder of Husain at Karbala 369
over the eastern half of the kingdom. Mu'awiya's aspirations in state
policy were finally to found a dynasty. He proclaimed his son Yazid
as his successor, although this act was opposed not only to the ancient
common law based on usage but also to the mode of election of the
theocracy.
On Mu'awiya's death (18 April 680) Yazid was accordingly recognised
in the West and partially also in 'Irak. At once a double opposition
began to foment; that of the Ali party in 'Irak, which had already
begun to revive under Mu'awiya,and the theocratic opposition of the Hijaz.
Thejaidjeayour to transfer the central government once more, respectively
to 'Irak and to the Hijaz, probably underlay the opposition in both
cases. As regards 'Irak that theory is a certainty, for the families of
Kufa and Basra had not forgotten that in Ali's time they had been the
masters of the empire. Now however Ali's Shl'a (party) was thrust into
the background by the Syrians. They looked back to Ali, and their
ardent desire was a restoration of that golden period for Kufa. Their
enthusiasm for Ali and his kin is therefore nothing more than a
glorification of their own special province, of the one and only 'Irak Caliph.
This brilliant period they hoped after the death of the great Mu'awiya
to recover for themselves by selecting Husain, the second son of Ali.
Husain complied with the solicitations of the Kufa people. These how-
ever, unsteady and undisciplined as ever, shrank from rebellion and failed
him at the last moment. Husain and those remaining faithful to him
were cut down at Karbala (10 Oct. 680). Ali's son had thereby, like
others before him, fallen as a martyr to the cause of Shi'ism. Political
aspirations slowly assumed a religious tinge. The death of the prophet's
grandson in the cause of the Kufa people, their remorse on that account,
their faded hopes, their hatred of the Syrians, and, last but not least,
heterodox currents which now began to shew themselves, prepared the
way for the great Shiite insurrection a few years later under Mukhtar. Ali
is now no longer simply the companion and son-in-law of the prophet,
but has become the heir of his prophetic spirit, which then lives on in his
sons. The Ali dynasty—so at least say the legitimists—are the only true
priestly Imams, the only legal Caliphs. The struggle for the house of
the prophet, for the Banu Hashim, becomes more and more the watch-
word of the opposition party, who, after their political overthrow in 'Irak,
removed their sphere of operation to Persia. There however this
Arabian legitimism united with Iranian claims, and, in the fight for the
Banu Hashim, the Persians were arrayed against the Arabs. With
this war-cry the Abbasids conquered.
Although Husain's expedition to Karbala had ended in a fiasco, the
Umayyads were not destined to get off so lightly against the opposition
of the Medina people, an opposition of the old elective theocracy against
the new Syrian dynasty. Their opposition candidate was 'Abdallah, son
of that Zubair who had fallen in the fight against Ali. Yazid was
CH. XI.
## p. 360 (#392) ############################################
360 Civil War [683-685
compelled to undertake a campaign against the holy cities, which earned
for him the hate of later generations. The matter was however not so
bad as it has been represented, and was moreover a political necessity.
His military commander broke up the resistance of the Medina party in
the battle on the Harra (26 Aug. 683), subsequently besieging the
opposition Caliph in Mecca. Just at this time Yazld died (11 Nov. 683),
and now the succession became a difficult question. Ibn az-Zubair had the
best chance of being universally recognised, as Yazid's youthful son and
successor, Mu'awiya II, a man of no authority, died only a few months
after his father. In Syria too large groups of the people, especially the
-V members of the Kais race, sided with the Zubair party, whilst the Kalb
9 race, who had been long resident in Syria, and with whom Mu'awiya had
become related by marriage, allied themselves unreservedly with the
Umayyads. The Kalb knew only too well that the Umayyad rule
meant the supremacy of Syria. And now the question arose, which
branch of the family should rule. Practical necessities and traditional
claims led to the Umayyad party finally selecting on the principle of
seniority a man already known to us, Marwan ibn al-Hakam, to be
Caliph. The decisive battle against the Zubair faction took place at
Marj Rahit in the beginning of 684. The Umayyads were victorious,
and Marwan was proclaimed Caliph in Syria.
The Umayyads had however to pay dearly for this victory, for it
destroyed the fundamental principles of the Arabian Empire. Hate once
generated at Marj Rahit, the blood-feud there arising was so bitter
that even the ever-growing religious spirit of Islam was unable to make
headway against it. The Arabs had previously been divided into
numerous factions warring against each other, but now the battle of
Marj Rahit created that ineradicable race hatred between the Kais and
Kalb tribes, which spread to other older racial opponents. The Kais
were distributed throughout the entire kingdom; the opposition towards
them drove their opponents into the ranks of the Kalb. The political
parties became genealogical branches according to the theory of the
Arabs, which regarded all political relationship from an ethnical stand-
point. And now for the first time, not in the remote past, arose that
opposition between the Northern and Southern Arabians which per-
meated public life, and which only in part coincided with actual racial
descent. Here it was the Kais, there the Kalb, and under these party
cries the Arabs tore at each other henceforward throughout the whole
empire, and this purely political and particularist tribal feud undermined
the rule of the Arabs at least as much as their religious political
opposition to the authority of the State, for it was just the authority of
the State itself which was thereby ruined; the governors could no
longer permanently hold aloof from the parties, and finally the Caliphs
themselves were unable to do so. But for the time being the actual
zenith of the dynasty followed these disorders.
## p. 361 (#393) ############################################
685-705] Organisation of the Arabian Empire 361
Marwan quickly succeeded in conquering Egypt, and then died,
leaving a difficult inheritance to his son 'Abd-al-Malik (685-705).
Complications with the Byzantines, who had incited the Mardaites, an
unconquered mountain tribe in the Amanus, against him, rendered it
impossible for him during his first years of office to take energetic steps
in 'Irak. The Zubair faction represented by Zubair's brother Mus'ab
ruled there nominally. Apart from these however the Shiites had
now attained to eminence and had organised a great insurrection under
Mukhtar. They defeated an army sent out by 'Abd-al-Malik, but were
then themselves defeated by the Zubairite Mus'ab. The latter was
hindered in his fight against 'Abd-al-Malik by the Kharijites, who
offered opposition to any and every form of state government and had
developed into an actual scourge. In the decisive battle against 'Abd-
al-Malik on the Tigris (690) Mus'ab accordingly succumbed to the
military and diplomatic superiority of the Syrian Caliph. The opposi-
tion Caliph still maintained his resistance in Mecca. 'Abd-al-Malik
despatched against him one of his best men, Hajjaj, who managed
in 692 to put an end both to the Caliphate and to the life of the
Zubairite.
This Hajjaj became later 'Abd-al-Malik's Ziyad, or almost un-
restricted viceroy, of the eastern half of the empire. He exercised the
authority of the State in a very energetic manner, and his reward is
to be shamefully misrepresented in the historical account given of
him by the tradition of 'Irak, created by those who had been afFected
by his energetic methods. Hajjaj was also a Thakifite. He carried
out in 'Irak what 'Abd-al-Malik endeavoured to do in Syria, namely,
the consolidation of the empire. The constitutional principles of the
dominions of Islam were, according to tradition, formulated by Omar,
but the extent to which tradition ascribes these to him is impossible, for
the ten years of his reign, occupied as they were with enormous military
expeditions, did not leave him the necessary time and quiet. For this
reason later investigators consider that the chief merit must be attributed
to Mu'awiya. Probably however the honours must be divided between
Omar, Mu'awiya and 'Abd-al-Malik, jiossibly including Hisham. Omar
made the Arabs supreme over the taxpaying subjected peoples, and
avoided particularism by the introduction of the state treasury. Mu'awiya
placed the Arabian Empire on a dynastic basis and disciplined the tribes
by introducing the political in place of the religious state authority.
'Abd-al-Malik however was the first to create the actual Arabian
administration, and this was followed under Hisham by the abolition of
the agrarian political prerogative of the Arabs, to be discussed later.
This process in the economic life was followed under the Abbasids by
its extension to politics.
The Arabs were not so foolish as many modern conquerors, who first
destroy the administrative organisation which they find in newly conquered
## p. 362 (#394) ############################################
362 Economic reasons for spread of Islam
foreign countries, and then suddenly stand face to face with insuper-
able difficulties. In accordance with their fundamental political point
of view they left all such matters as they found them, contenting them-
selves with the punctual payment by the local authorities of the stipulated
tribute. How this was collected was a matter of small moment to them.
Only the supreme heads of the more important administrative depart-
ments were Arabs. All the middle and lower administrative positions
were filled by natives as late as the eighth century, and even later.
This complicated system was not interfered with until the reign of 'Abd-
al-Malik and his successor Walid, and then not in the sense of im-
mediately making it Arabian, though it was placed on a bilingual basis
by the introduction of Arabic. Arab-Greek documents of this period,
from Egypt, have been preserved to us in profusion. But in other
matters also the result of the more settled conditions was seen in the
changes made by 'Abd-al-Malik. He is regarded as the founder of the
Arabian coinage; true, he accepted here the already existing systems,
that is, for the Byzantine districts he renewed the old gold coinage,
and for the Persian territories the old silver coinage was adopted.
The principal point however seems to be that under this ruler it
was first recognised that Omar's fiscal system was untenable, and that
both in principle and in form it must cease. Hitherto the Muslims
had remained exempt from taxation and the subjected peoples had pro-
vided the necessary revenue. At the outset they had forgotten that
through the extension of Islam as a religion the number of taxpayers
would of necessity become smaller and smaller, so that thereby religion
would sap the foundations of the Arabian State. With the foundation
of the military camps, which soon grew into large towns, the natives had
on the spot a much better source of income than in the country, where
the peasants had to pay their quota of tribute. Thus an exodus from
the country began, and at the same time the number of converts to
Islam increased. As the new believers ceased to be subject to taxes, the.
result of this process on the state treasury may easily be imagined. At
the same time it became thus evident that the form of Omars regula-
tions was unsuitable, for this exodus from the country simply necessitated
an individual treatment of the districts liable to pay duty, and these
conditions compelled the Arabs to concern themselves with details. But
in doing so the Arabian upper class was of necessity deeply concerned
with the construction of the whole system of government. This process
commences under 'Abd-al-Malik. His representative Hajjaj sought
to avoid the evil consequences for the treasury by including the newly
converted believers as liable to taxation, thus deviating from Omar's
system.
The increasing settlement of Arabs in the fertile country, which had
been liable to tribute whilst in the possession of non-Muslims, had the
same result as the change of religion in the subjected peoples. Omar II
## p. 363 (#395) ############################################
705-744] Later Umayyad Caliphs 363
sought to obviate this by forbidding the sale of such country. It was
not however till later, and probably by degrees, that it was decided,
principally under the Caliph Hisham, to alter the principle of taxation,
though the alteration is much obscured by tradition. The tribute,
which was principally drawn from the ground tax, was converted into a
ground tax pure and simple, and was levied irrespective of creed on all
property owners; the tribute intended to demonstrate the dominion of
the Arabs was resolved into an individual poll-tax of the old sort, which
was only payable by non-Muslims and ceased in the event of conversion.
This state of affairs is regarded by tradition as Omar's work, but it is
the result of gradual development extending over a century. This very
energetic manner in which the Arabs applied themselves to the adminis-
tration commenced with 'Abd-al-Malik and found its termination under
the Abbasids.
Under 'Abd-al-Malik and his viceroys, his brother 'Abd-al-'AzIz
in Egypt and Hajjaj in 'Irak, an executive authority was founded,
which, although occasionally shaken by serious revolts, was nevertheless
strong, so that his successor Walid (705-715) was again able to consider
the question of an extension of the boundaries. Under his rule the
Arabian Empire attained its greatest expansion; Spain was conquered,
and the Arabs penetrated into the Punjab and far into Central Asia,
right to the borders of China. These incursions however do not fall
within the range of our present observation. Under 'Abd-al-Malik and
Walid the empire, and above all Syria, stands on the pinnacle of
prosperity; the most stately buildings were erected, such as the Omar
Mosque in Jerusalem, and the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. Poetry
flourished at the brilliant Syrian court, and, guided by Christian learning,
Arabian science begins to make its appearance.
Now however the traces of impending collapse begin to appear.
It was only with difficulty that Hajjaj suppressed a powerful military
. revolt. The supremacy of the State could only be maintained in 'Irak
with the assistance of Syrian troops. In the eastern provinces the Kais
and Kalb wage constant warfare with each other, and the reign of the
later Umayyads is occupied in a struggle with these permanently
mutinous eastern districts. Most of the later Umayyads enjoyed but
a brief reign, Sulaiman 715-717, Omar II till 720, Yazid II till 724.
Hisham, 724-743, who grappled seriously with the problem of agrarian
policy, and secured once again in Khalid al-Kasri a viceroy for the
East after the style of Ziyad and Hajjaj, was the only one capable
of restoring once more a certain amount of quiet.
Thereupon however followed the irretrievable decline of the Umayyad
State. The political opposition of Kais and Kalb converted the Caliph
into the puppet of inter-tribal feuds; Umayyads fought against Umay-
yads. The rulers succeeded each other in rapid succession. History
records four Umayyad Caliphs in the period of 743 to 744. It would
CH. XI.
## p. 364 (#396) ############################################
364 The Abbasids [744-750
occupy too much space here to trace all these disturbances. When
Marwan II, the last of the Umayyads, a man by no means personally
incapable, ascended the throne in the year 744^ the game was already
lost. Particularism had won the day. The general fight between all
parties was however essentially a fight against Syria and the Umayyads.
In this cause the new combination, which made its first efforts in the
far east, in Khorasan, attained success. In no other place were the
Arabs so intermingled with the subject peoples as here, and here too the
religious opposition against the Umayyads was taken up more vigorously
than anywhere else. It has already been indicated above that the ShPa
was destined to prevail in Persia. In their fight for the family of the
prophet, the Abbasids, under their general Abu Muslim, were victorious,
and then, supported by the Persian element, they conquered first the
eastern Arabs and subsequently the Syrians. In the year 750 the
Umayyad rule was at an end.
The victory of the Abbasids was a victory of the Persians over the
Arabs.
The subjected classes had slowly raised themselves to a level
with the Arabs. When Christians and Persians first accepted Islam it
was not possible to include them in the theocracy in any other way than
by attaching them as clients (Mawali) to the Arabian tribal system.
They were the better educated and the more highly cultivated of the
two races. In the numerous revolts they fought on the side of the
Arabs. The contrast between the Arabs and the Mawali had its cause
in the constitution of the State as founded by Omar. The more the
Mawali increased in importance and the more they permeated the
Arabian tribes, so the universalistic, i. e. , the democratic tendency of
Islam was bound in corresponding degree to force its way into wider
circles. On the other hand the continuous fights of the Arabian tribes
against the authority of the State and against each otljer led to a
dissolution of the political and ethnical conditions under which Islam
had caused the preponderance oFthe Arabian element. Thus grew more
and more a tendency to level Arabs and non-Arabs. Both became
merged in the term Muslim which even to this day represents for many
peoples their nationality. The Persians were much more religious than
the Arabs, and they accepted the political ideal of the ShJ'a, which was
tinged with religion, more than actually religious. This religious move-
ment then swept away the dominion of the Umayyads, and thereby the
international empire of the Abbasids took the place of the national
Arabian Empire. The Arabian class disappeared and was superseded
by a mixed "official aristocracy, based no longer on religious merit and
noble descent, but on authority delegated by the ruling prince. Thus
arose out of'the patriarchal kingdom of the Umayyads the absolutist
rule of the Abbasids and therewith Persian civilisation made ife
entrance into Islam. The ancient East had conquered.
## p. 365 (#397) ############################################
366
CHAPTER XII.
THE EXPANSION OF THE SARACENS (continued).
AFRICA AND EUROPE.
We are dividing the history of the expansion of the Saracens into
an Asiatic-Egyptian and an African-European order of development.
This division is founded not on outward, but on internal reasons. Even
at the present time Islam in Northern Africa presents an appearance
quite different from the Islam of Asia and Egypt. The reason for this
must be sought in the totally different composition of the population.
The Aramaic element of Nearer Asia and Coptic Egypt offered much less
resistance to the Arabian nationality and the Arabian language than did
the Persian element in Mid-Asia. The Berbers or Moors of Northern
Africa take up a middle position between these two; they certainly
accepted Islam and Arabian culture, but they remodelled them, and
preserved their own nationality in their customs and to a large extent
also in their language. Moreover, an encroachment of Islam into Europe
in so significant a form as that experienced in the Middle Ages would
have been scarcely conceivable without the great masses of the Berbers,
who were always on the move. Later too the Saracens of Southern
Europe continually appear in political relations with Africa. The
history of Islam in Europe, is therefore indissolubly connected with its
history in Northern Africa, whilst on the other hand it is in reality
merely associated with the history of the Eastern Caliphate by a certain
community of culture and religion.
The commixture of Arabs and Berbers, which gave the impress to
the whole of the Islam of the West, was a slow process. Centuries
passed, but in the end Islam has attained what Phoenicians and
Romans strove for in vain. These two great colonising nations
always settled principally in the towns on the coast, and doubtless
assimilated the Berbers crowding round them; in spite however of all
the settlements of colonists by Rome, the flat country and especially
the hinterland remained in Berber hands. As Mommsen says, the
Phoenicians and Romans have been swept away, but the Berbers
have remained, like the palm trees and the desert sand. With the
## p. 366 (#398) ############################################
366 Occupation of Alexandria [640-6«
destruction of the Roman power the influence of the widespread organ-
isation of the Berber tribes grew and the Byzantine restoration under
Justinian was limited by the growth of the Berber element. The
exarchs had continually to deal with insurrections of the Berbers, and
were probably scarcely able to exercise authority outside the limits of
the ever decreasing number of towns held by garrisons which commanded
respect. It is therefore clear from the beginning that it was not the
Byzantines who made the occupation of Northern Africa difficult for the
Arabians, but the Berbers, who in their time of need made common
cause with their former tyrants against the new intruder. The Arabs
had much trouble to make it clear to the Berbers at the point of the
sword that their real interest lay with Islam and not against it. As
soon as they had once realised this fact they accepted the Arabs for their
leaders and flooded Southern Europe, while in Africa the nascent civilisa-
tion of Islam effected an entrance, though it received a Berber national
colouring.
The continued occupation of Alexandria called for a screening of
the flank by occupying also the adjoining territory of Barka1. Barka
was the leading community of the ancient Pentapolis. The rich towns
of this group at once experienced the consequence of the occupation of
Egypt when the Arabians appeared before them. It has been already
mentioned that the Arabs through 'Amr made peace with Barka im-
mediately after the occupation of Alexandria. That took place as earlv
as the autumn of the year 642 and the winter thereupon following,
under the leadership of 'Ukba ibn Nafi', of whom more is yet to be said.
The Pentapolis belonged thenceforward permanently to the Empire of
Islam, although retaining in the first instance administrative inde-
pendence. Bordering on Barka was the ancient Proconsular Africa,
the eastern half of which, lying between the Greater and the Lesser
Syrtis, was clearly distinguished by the Arabs under the title of Tripolis,
from the northern half, with the capital Carthage, this latter territory
being termed by them simply Africa (Ifrlklya). After the occupation
of Barka various raids took place even under 'Amr (642-643), these
extending throughout the whole territory of Tripolis, while individual
detachments went southward into the desert. There can be little doubt
that even at that time 'Ukba pushed forward as far as Fezzan (Zawlla)
and another Amir of the name of Busr penetrated to the Oasis of Jufra
(Waddan). This latter incident took place while 'Amr was besieging
Tripolis, which he finally occupied at least temporarily. At the Nafusa
mountains 'Amr turned back, as the Caliph was averse to pushing forward
any further. In spite of these successes there was for the time being no
question of any permanent settlement of the Arabs westward of Barka.
'Ukba may have undertaken some small isolated expeditions with Barka
1 The following exposition is based on a critical re-examination of the sources of
the works of Caudel and Wellhausen.
## p. 367 (#399) ############################################
643-664] Attacks on Byzantine Africa 367
as a base, but the main fighting forces of Egypt were concentrated round
Alexandria, which once more had temporarily fallen into the hands of
the Byzantines.
Only after Alexandria had been reconquered and 'Abdallah ibn Sa'd
had become governor of Egypt was a new expedition to the west on a
larger scale undertaken under his guidance, probably as early as the end of
647. The Byzantine state authority was now in complete dissolution.
The Patricius Gregory of Carthage had revolted the year before, probably
because, after the second fall of Alexandria, he considered himself safe
from any energetic steps on the part of the Greeks. Nevertheless
Carthage itself does not appear to have given him its adhesion, and he
based his rule in fact on the Berbers, for which reason he took up his
residence in the interior, in the ancient Sufetula, the present Sbeitla.
To how small an extent he must have been master of the situation is
proved by the fact that he did not even take the field against 'Abdallah.
The latter, with separated detachments, plundered the territory of
Tripolis, without being able to take the town itself; one Arab division
in fact appears at that time to have penetrated to Ghadames. When
'Abdallah arrived at the site of the subsequent Kairawan he turned and
marched on Sbeitla, where he annihilated Gregory's army. The fate of
the Patricius himself is uncertain; probably he fell in battle. This
battle is also named after 'Akuba, a place lying somewhat further to the
north. But here again no consolidation of the Arabian rule resulted.
A counter attack on the part of the still unconquered towns was to be
feared, and 'Abdallah therefore allowed himself to be persuaded to retire
on payment of an enormous sum of money, stated to have been 800 talents.
The whole expedition lasted somewhat more than a year (647-648).
Hereupon the confusion following on the assassination of the Caliph
Othman brought the expansion for the time being to a standstill.
When however Mu'awiya had asserted his authority and his faithful ally
'Amr had again become master in Egypt, the expeditions towards the
west were renewed, and in these 'Amr's nephew, the 'Ukba ibn Nafi' above
mentioned, appears to have been the moving spirit, operating from Barka
as a base. Along with him a number of other leaders are mentioned,
who undertook small excursions against various Berber tribes and against
such towns as the ancient Lepta (660-663). All details are dubious; of
the subsequent period too our knowledge is but scanty. Probably after
the death of 'Amr Africa was entrusted, at all events temporarily, as
a separate province to Mu'awiya ibn Hudaij, the head of Mu'awiya's
Egyptian party in his fight against Othman; this man was sent out
directly by the Caliph with a considerable army against the united
Byzantines and Berbers, and defeated them. The fortress of Jalula was
taken by him. Mu'awiya's expedition was in conjunction with a diversion
of the fleet against Sicily, of which more remains to be said. This event
may be dated with tolerable accuracy as having occurred in the year 664.
## p. 368 (#400) ############################################
368 Policy of Hindr [670-682
Shortly afterwards 'Ukba ibn Nafi' appears to have become the suc-
cessor of Ibn Hudaij. After a brilliant raid through the chain of oases
on the northern fringe of the Sahara, where he renewed the Arabian
dominion, he undertook in the year 670 an expedition against the
so-called Proconsular Africa, where he founded, as an Arabian camp and
strategical point of support, on the same lines as Basra and Kufa,
Kairawan, which became later so famous. Shortly afterwards, at most
in a few years, he was recalled.
Under Ibn Hudaij and 'Ukba Africa had grown into a province
independent of Egypt; now it was once more attached to Egypt. The
new governor-general Maslama ibn Mukhallad sent his freedman Dinar
Abu-1-Muhajir as 'Ukba's successor. By him 'Ukba was put in chains;
Maslama plainly disapproved 'Ukba's policy. He had good reason
for his disagreement, for 'Ukba was the type of the arbitrary, reckless
leader of the Arabian horsemen; proud as he was, he knew no such
thing as compromise, and in his view the Arabs were to conquer by the
sword and not by diplomacy; he punished all renegades without mercy.
Many Berbers had indeed accepted Islam as long as a contingent of
Arabian troops was in their neighbourhood, only to secede as soon as
the latter had withdrawn. 'Ukba treated with impolitic haughtiness the
proud leaders of the Berbers who allied themselves with him. His
much-renowned raids were displays of bravado without lasting success,
but they were in accordance with the taste of Arabian circles and as
later on he met his death on one of these expeditions in the far west,
his fame was still further enhanced by the martyr's crown. Thus even
at the present day Sidi 'Ukba is a popular saint in Northern Africa.
Tested by the judgment of history his less-known successor Dinar was a
much greater man, for it was he who first vigorously opposed the
Byzantines and at the same time he was the pioneer in paving the way
to an understanding with the Berbers.
After having proved his superior strength, Dinar appears to have won
over the Berbers, especially their leader Kusaila, by conciliatory tactics.
With their assistance he proceeded against the Byzantines of Carthage.
Though he could not yet take the town he occupied other neighbouring
portions of their territory. Thereupon he undertook an advance far to
the westward, right away to Tlemcen, which he could do without risk
owing to his relations with the Berbers.
In the meantime 'Ukba had succeeded in obtaining once more from
the Caliph Yazld the supreme command in Northern Africa (681-682).
He took revenge on Dinar by leading him around in chains on all his
expeditions. He again formed the main Muslim camp at Kairawan,
whence Dinar had removed it, and he approached the Berbers once
again with true Arabian haughtiness—in short, in all matters he acted
on lines diametrically opposed to those of his predecessor. The result
proves the correctness of Dinar's policy, for the powerful Kusaila incited
## p. 369 (#401) ############################################
682-697] Saracen disasters in Africa 369
the Berbers against 'Ukba and fled on the earliest opportunity from his
camp. 'Ukba therefore proceeded westwards under much less favourable
conditions than Dinar, and though he advanced beyond Tlemcen to
Tangier and appears after crossing the Atlas to have even penetrated
right to the Atlantic Ocean, yet on the return journey both he and his
prisoner Dinar were cut down by mutinous Berbers. They could not
have been surprised if he had not fancied the whole of the west already
conquered, and therefore divided up his army into small detachments.
Or it may be that he was no longer able to keep together the troops,
who were laden with booty. And thus at Tahudha, not far from Biskra,
he suffered the martyr's death (683). This was the signal for a
general rising of the Berbers and the renewal of their co-operation with
the Byzantines. The Arabs were compelled to relinquish Africa, and
Zubair ibn Kais, the commandant of Kairawan, led the troops back.
Kusaila was enabled to wander unpunished with his bands throughout
all Africa. Thus at the time of the death of the Caliph Yazid the
whole of Africa beyond Barka was again lost. This fact further con-
firms our judgment of the vastly too much celebrated 'Ukba.
'Abd-al-Malik attempted as early as 688-689, if we may believe the
unanimous opinion of the Arabs, to restore the Caliph's authority in
Africa. He did not wait, as might have been expected, until after the
conclusion of the civil war against the opposition Caliph, 'Abdallah ibn
Zubair. This new expedition however, commanded by the same Zubair,
did not proceed against the Byzantines, but against Kusaila, for in
all these wars the Byzantine towns managed in a masterly way to make
use of the Berbers as a bulwark. First of all Kairawan which had
drifted under Berber rule was freed, and then a further advance was
made against the Mons Aurasius, Kusaila's base. Kusaila was defeated
in a bloody battle and fell, whilst Zubair's troops penetrated as far as
Sicca Veneria, the present Kef, and it may be even further. The energy
of the Arabs was however then exhausted. On the return march a fate
similar to 'Ukba's overtook Zubair, and from similar causes. The
Byzantines had in fact taken advantage of his absence to attack Barka.
Zubair with a few faithful followers was cut down by them.
Kairawan however remained in the hands of the Arabs and now
began from this point outwards the work of the real pacificator, Hassan ibn
an-Nu'man, though we do not quite know when the arrangement of the
conditions was placed in his hands. As the first Syrian Amir on African
soil he thoroughly understood how to combine severe discipline with
astute diplomacy. In all material points he adopted Dinar's policy.
Like Dinar he recognised in the first instance the Byzantines as his
main enemy. As soon as the arrival of the auxiliary troops sent by
the Caliph permitted him to do so, he advanced against the still
unvanquished Carthage, and conquered it in the summer of 697.
Following this up he defeated the united Byzantines and Berbers at
C. UED. H. VOL. II. C'H. XII. 24
## p. 370 (#402) ############################################
370 Pacification of Africa [698-703
Satfura, to the north-east of Tunis, but without being able to prevent
them from again concentrating at Bizerta. In the autumn of the same
year certainly the Arabs lost Carthage again to the Patricius Johannes,
but his powerful fleet was dispersed in the summer of 698 by a still
greater Arabian fleet, and thus the fate of the town was sealed. From
this time onward the Arabs were supreme at sea, so that it is by no
means the land troops only of Hassan which decided the final fate of
Northern Africa. In his policy towards the Berbers he was at first not
fortunate. A holy prophetess, the so-called Kahina, had roused the
Berber tribes to a united advance and had thus become the successor of
Kusaila. On the banks of the little river Nini, not far distant from
Bagai, on one of the spurs of Mons Aurasius, she defeated Hassan's
army, which was driven back as far as Tripolis. But in the long run
the Kahina was not able to maintain her position, and the clever
diplomacy of Hassan appears also to have won over several tribes and
leaders from her circle. Thus Hassan's final victory over the Kahina a
few years later at Gafes becomes at the same time the commencement
of a fraternisation with the Berbers. It is extremely difficult to fix the
chronological sequence of the fights against the Kahina in regard to
the expeditions against Carthage. If they are placed between the two
conquests of Carthage, as has been done, then the whole chronological
structure falls to pieces; it is therefore the simplest to assume the date
of Hassan's defeat as occurring only after the final fall of Carthage and
to date his victory as about 703. For in the end it was not the land
army but the fleet which rendered possible the occupation and retention
of the Byzantine coast towns. The peace with the Berbers however
led them into the camp of the Arabs and thus too the final fate of such
Byzantine towns as might still be holding out was sealed. And now,
with Islam as their watchword, heads of certain of the Berber tribes,
appointed by the Arabs, advanced against the tribes of the west, who
JAj^mained independent. The prospect of booty and land united the
formeren&nSJ68' wno were moreover so similar to each other in their
whole style oflrVrh2£r; *ne moment now approaches when Africa becomes
too confined for this rieV" wave of population, which the influx of Islam
has brought to flood level. . 3^ latinised and hellenised population of
the towns appears to a large Vxtent to have migrated to Spain and
Sicily, for in a remarkably shorT time Latin civilisation disappeared
from Northern Africa. ',
The Arabs onlv conquered Northern\Africa after they had relinquished
their first policy of plunder for that of as^ermanent occupation. The
commencement of the new policy was 'Ukba'fe foundation of Kairawan.
By that step however in the first place only fthe starting-place for the
raids was changed. Dinar was the first seriously ua consider the question
of not merely plundering the open country but on taking the fortified
towns; and in this design his Berber policy was to support him, These
## p. 371 (#403) ############################################
708-7ii] Invasion of Spain 371
plans however could only be carried out when more troops became
available for Africa after the restoration of unity in the empire by
'Abd-al-Malik, further when the fleet began also to co-operate, and when
simultaneously a clever diplomatist effected the execution of Dinar's
plans in regard to the Berbers in more extended style. This man
however was Hassan ibn an-Nu'man.
'His policy was continued by Musa ibn Nusair, who is regarded in
history as the actual pacificator of Northern Africa and the conqueror
of Spain. Musa appears to have assumed office in the year 708, though
tradition on the point is rather shaky. The first years of his govern-
ment were occupied with the subjection of the western Berbers, the
latter years being devoted to the conquest of Spain, in which work his
freedman and military commander Tarik had paved the way for him.
The conquest of Spain must be ascribed less to the craving of the
Arabs for expansion than to the fact that the newly-subjected tribes
of Moors, whom the prospect of booty had lured to the banner of Islam,
had to be kept employed. At the seat of the Caliphate these far-
reaching enterprises were followed with a certain amount of misgiving.
There certainly was little time available to intervene, for events
followed one after the other in precipitate haste, and the frail kingdom
of the Goths fell into the hands of the conquerors like a ripe fruit by a
windfall. The actual cause is obscure. History tells of disputes in
regard to the succession, and that the last king of the Goths, Roderick,
who succumbed to the Arabs, was a usurper (cf. Chap. vi). Tradition
tells of a certain Count Julian, the Christian ruler of Ceuta, whose
daughter had been violated by Roderick, and who therefore led the
Arabs and Berbers to Spain to satisfy his vengeance. Few characters in
the earlier history of Islam have interested the historians to such an
extent as this Julian, of whom it is not definitely known to which
nation he belonged and to which sovereignty he owed allegiance.
According to the reconstruction of Wellhausen and Codera he was not
named Julian at all, but Urban; he was probably of Moorish ancestry
and a vassal of the Gothic kings, but all beyond this is pure hypothesis.
Induced apparently by the struggles for the throne in the Gothic
kingdom, and probably less with a view to conquer than to plunder,
Tarik crossed into Spain in the year 711 with 7000 Berbers, who were
subsequently supplemented to a total of 12,000, and landed near to the
rock which still bears his name. (Gibraltar = Gebel Tarik = Mount
Tarik. ) After having collected his troops, Tarik appears to have
practised highway robbery along the coast from Gibraltar west-
wards and to have gone around the Laguna de la Janda in the
south. King Roderick opposed him in the valley of the WadI Bekka,
nowadays called Salado, between the lake and the town of Medina
Sidonia. According to the earliest Spanish tradition the site is also
named after the neighbouring Transductine promontory (Cape Spartel).
24—2
## p. 372 (#404) ############################################
372 Conquest of Spain [711-m
It was here, not at Vejer (or Jerez) de la Frontera, that the great decisive
battle was fought in July 711, in which the Gothic army, thanks to the
treachery of Roderick's political enemies, was defeated by Tank's troops.
The king himself probably fell in the battle, for he disappeared at all
events from this day forward1.
This great success led to an unexampled triumphal procession, which
can only be explained by the fact that the rule of the Goths was deeply
hated among the native population. As on Byzantine ground, so here
too had political and religious blunders set the various elements of the
population at variance, and thus prepared the way for the invasion.
The Jews especially, against whom an unscrupulous war of extermination
had been waged by the fanatical orthodox section, welcomed the Arabs
and Berbers as their deliverers. The towns alone, in which the Gothic
knighthood held predominance, offered any effective resistance. Tarik
must have been very accurately informed of the condition of the country;
the authorities represent him as advised in his arrangements for the
whole of the further campaign by Julian (Urban). The sequel certainly
justified the daring plan of pushing forward to Toledo, the capital of
the Gothic kings; the more important cities of the south, e. g. Seville,
were left to themselves, others, as Malaga and Archidona, were subdued
by small detachments; the main body of the army proceeded by Ecija
and Cordova to Toledo. It was only at Ecija that Tarik met with any
vigorous resistance, and at this point a battle ensued, which is described
as the most severe and stubborn of the whole campaign. Cordova and
Toledo fell by treachery. The aristocracy and the higher ranks of the
priesthood did not even await the arrival of the Muslims, but either
repaired to places of safety or sought union with the conquerors.
Tarik was thus master of the half of Spain by the end of the summer
of 711. His unprecedented successes aroused the jealousy of Musa, his
superior officer and patron, who had remained passively in Northern
Africa, because a systematic conquest of Spain was not intended in
Tank's expedition—only one of the customary summer raids of the
Muslim troops. Tarik had however now destroyed the Gothic kingdom.
Musa nevertheless, desiring for himself the fame and the material
advantages attending on the conquest of wealthy Spain, advanced
thither also with 18,000 troops in the following spring, and landed in
June. Purposely avoiding Tank's tracks, he first of all conquered the
towns which still held out, prominent among which were Medina Sidonia.
Carmona and Seville. Seville was the intellectual centre of Spain; it
had been the seat of government for centuries under the Romans, and
under the Goths it had not lost its former splendour. It was only
captured after a siege of several months' duration. From the campaign
of Musa. it can be seen that Tank's stratagem had by no means
destroyed all resistance, but that the heavy work of the conquest of the
1 Another view is fliven in Ch. ti. p. 185.
## p. 373 (#405) ############################################
712-718] Crossing of the Pyrenees 373
country had to follow the rapid occupation of the capital. The Arabs
would scarcely have succeeded in the conquest of Spain without the internal
disorders which had preceded their arrival, and the consequent want of
discipline and unity. Even as it was, after the fall of Seville, Musa
still met with obstinate resistance before Merida, whose impregnable
walls resisted all attempts at undermining. The inhabitants however
finally recognised their advantage in peacefully surrendering the town
(30 June 718). Seville too rose once more in revolt, but was finally
subjugated by Musas son, 'Abd-al-'AzIz. It was only after all these
successes that Musa could enter Toledo, where Tank awaited him.
