No More Learning

»
we
The continual transitions that occur, forbid our
speaking of the “individual," etc. ; the "number”
of beings itself fluctuates. We should know no-
thing of time or of movement, if, in a rough way,
we did not believe we saw things "standing still ”
behind or in front of things moving. We should
also know just as little about cause and effect, and
without the erroneous idea of “empty space
should never have arrived at the concept of space
at all. The principle of identity is based on the
"fact of appearance" that there are some things
alike. Strictly speaking, it would not be possible
to “ understand” and “ know an evolving world;
something which is called "knowledge” exists
only in so far as the “understanding and
knowing” intellect already finds an adjusted
and rough world to hand, fashioned out of a host
of mere appearances, but become fixed to the
extent in which this kind of appearance has helped
to preserve life; only to this extent is "knowledge
possible—that is to say, as a measuring of earlier
and more recent errors by one another.
66
521.
Concerning “ logical appearance. " - The concept
“ individual and the concept "species” are
equally false and only apparent. Species” only
expresses the fact that an abundance of similar
creatures come forth at the same time, and that
the speed of their further growth and of their


## p. 36 (#66) ##############################################

36
THE WILL TO POWER.
a
further transformation has been made almost
imperceptible for a long time: so that the
actual and trivial changes and increase of growth
are of no account at all (-a stage of evolution in
which the process of evolving is not visible, so
that, not only does a state of equilibrium seem
to have been reached, but the road is also made
clear for the error of supposing that an actual goal
has been reached and that evolution had
goal . . . ).
The form seems to be something enduring, and
therefore valuable ; but the form was invented
merely by ourselves; and however often “the
same form is attained,” it does not signify that
it is the same form, because something new always
appears; and we alone, who compare, reckon the
new with the old, in so far as it resembles the
latter, and embody the two in the unity of " form. ”
As if a type had to be reached and were actually
intended by the formative processes.
Form, species, law, idea, purpose—the same fault
is made in respect of all these concepts, namely,
that of giving a false realism to a piece of fiction :
as if all phenomena were infused with some sort of
obedient spirit—an artificial distinction is here
made between that which acts and that which
guides action (but both these things are only
fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical
dogma: they are not “facts”).
We should not interpret this constraint in our-
selves, to imagine concepts, species, forms, purposes,
and laws (“a world of identical cases ") as if we were
in a position to construct a real world; but as


## p. 37 (#67) ##############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
37
a constraint to adjust a world by means of which
our existence will be ensured : we thereby create
a world which is determinable, simplified, com-
prehensible, etc. , for us.
The very same constraint is active in the
functions of the senses which support the reason-
by means of simplification, coarsening, accentua-
tion, and interpretation; whereon all “recognition,"
all the ability of making one's self intelligible
rests. Our needs have made our senses so precise,
that the “same world of appearance” always
returns, and has thus acquired the semblance of
reality.
Our subjective constraint to have faith in logic,
is expressive only of the fact that long before
logic itself became conscious in us, we did nothing
save introduce its postulates into the nature of
things: now we find ourselves in their presence, -
we can no longer help it,—and now we would fain
believe that this constraint is a guarantee of “truth. ”
We it was who created the “ thing," the
thing," the subject, the attribute, the action, the ob-
ject, the substance, and the form, after we had carried
the process of equalising, coarsening, and simplify-
ing as far as possible. The world seems logical
to us, because we have already made it logical.
It
same
y,
n:
of
Lere
zich
only
gical
522.
our-
poses,
were
ut as
Fundamental solution. We believe in reason :
this is, however, the philosophy of colourless
concepts. Language is built upon the most naïf
prejudices.


## p. 38 (#68) ##############################################

38
THE WILL TO POWER.
Now we read discord and problems into things,
because we are able to think only in the form of
language--we also believe in the "eternal truth "
of “wisdom” (for instance, subject, attribute, etc. ).
We cease from thinking if we do not wish to
think under the control of language; the most we
can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt con-
cerning the question whether the boundary here
really is a boundary.
Rational thought is a process of interpreting
according to a scheme which we cannot reject.
U CONSCIOUSNESS.
523.
There is no greater error than that of making
psychical and physical phenomena the two faces,
the two manifestations of the same substance.
By this means nothing is explained: the concept
“substance" is utterly useless as a means of explana-
tion. Consciousness may be regarded as secondary,
almost an indifferent and superfluous thing, prob-
ably destined to disappear and to be superseded
by perfect automatism
When we observe mental phenomena we may
be likened to the deaf and dumb who divine the
spoken word, which they do not hear, from the
movements of the speaker's lips. From the
appearance of the inner mind we draw conclusions
concerning invisible and other phenomena, which
we could ascertain if our powers of observation
were adequate for the purpose.


## p. 39 (#69) ##############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
39
For this inner world we have no finer organs,
and that is why a complexity which is thousandfold
reaches our consciousness as a simple entity, and
we invent a process of causation in it, despite the
fact that we can perceive no cause either of the
movement or of the change the sequence of
thoughts and feelings is nothing more than their
becoming visible to consciousness. That this
sequence has anything to do with a chain of causes
is not worthy of belief: consciousness never com-
municates an example of cause and effect to us.
-
pi
a.
;,
524.
The part "consciousness" plays. -It is essential
that one should not mistake the part that con-
sciousness" plays: it is our relation to the outer
world; it was the outer world that developed it.
On the other hand, the direction—that is to say,
the care and cautiousness which is concerned with
the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does
not enter into our consciousness any more than
does the storing activity of the intellect: that there
is a superior controlling force at work in these
things cannot be doubted—a sort of directing com-
mittee, in which the various leading desires make
their votes and their power felt. “ Pleasure" and
“pain" are indications which reach us from this
sphere: as are also acts of will and ideas.
In short : That which becomes conscious has
causal relations which are completely and absolutely
concealed from our knowledge-the sequence of
thoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, does
ሃ
ta


## p. 40 (#70) ##############################################

40
THE WILL TO POWER.
not signify that the order in which they come is
a causal order : it is so apparently, however, in the
highest degree. We have based the whole of our
notion of intellect, reason, logic, etc. , upon this
apparent truth (all these things do not exist : they
are imaginary syntheses and entities), and we then
projected the latter into and behind all things !
As a rule consciousness itself is understood to be
the general sensorium and highest ruling centre;
albeit, it is only a means of communication: it was
developed by intercourse, and with a view to the in-
terests of intercourse. “ Intercourse " is under-
stood, here, as "relation," and is intended to cover
the action of the outer world upon us and our
necessary response to it, as also our actual influence
upon the outer world. It is not the conducting
force, but an organ of the latter.
$
525.
My principle, compressed into a formula which
savours of antiquity, of Christianity, Scholasticism,
and other kinds of musk: in the. concept, “ God is
spirit," God as perfection is denied.
526.
Wherever people have observed a certain unity
in the grouping of things, spirit has always been
regarded as the cause of this co-ordination : an
assumption for which reasons are entirely lack-
ing. Why should the idea of a complex fact be
one of the conditions of that fact? Or why should


## p. 41 (#71) ##############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
41
the notion of a complex fact have to precede it as
its cause?
We must be on our guard against explaining
finality by the spirit : there is absolutely no
reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the peculiar
power of organising and systematising. The
domain of the nervous system is much more ex-
tensive: the realm of consciousness is superadded.
In the collective process of adaptation and systema-
tising, consciousness plays no part at all.
527
Physiologists, like philosophers, believe that
consciousness increases in value in proportion as
it gains in clearness: the most lucid consciousness
and the most logical and impassive thought are of
the first order. Meanwhile-according to what
standard is this value determined ? -In regard to
the discharge of will-power the most superficial and
most simple thought is the most useful-it might
therefore, etc. etc. (because it leaves few motives
over).
Precision in action is opposed to the far-sighted
and often uncertain judgments of caution: the
latter is led by the deeper instinct.
528.
The chief error of psychologists: they regard the
indistinct idea as of a lower kind than the distinct;
but that which keeps at a distance from our con-
sciousness and which is therefore obscure, may on


## p. 42 (#72) ##############################################

42
THE WILL TO POWER.
that very account be quite clear in itself. The fact
that a thing becomes obscure is a question of the
perspective of consciousness
529.
The great misapprehensions :
(1) The senseless overestimation of consciousness,
its elevation to the dignity of an entity: “a spirit,”
"a soul,” something that feels, thinks, and wills;
(2) The spirit regarded as a cause, especially
where finality, system, and co-ordination appear;
(3) Consciousness classed as the highest form
attainable, as the most superior kind of being, as
“God”;
(4) Will introduced wherever effects are observed;
(5) The “real world” regarded as the spiritual
world, accessible by means of the facts of con-
sciousness;
(6) Absolute knowledge regarded as the faculty
of consciousness, wherever knowledge exists at all.
Consequences :
Every step forward consists of a step forward
in consciousness; every step backwards is a step
into unconsciousness (unconsciousness was regarded
as a falling-back upon the passions and senses-
as a state of animalism. . . ).
Man approaches reality and “real being
through dialectics: man departs from them by
means of instincts, senses, and automatism.
To convert man into a spirit, would mean to
make a god of him: spirit, will, goodness—all
.
"
one,


## p. 43 (#73) ##############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
43
All goodness must take its root in spirituality,
must be a fact of consciousness.
Every step made towards something better can
be only a step forward in consciousness.
(8) JUDGMENT. TRUE=FALSE.
530.
C
Kant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmat-
ism, his moraloutlook,ruled,guided,and directed him.
The πρώτον ψεύδος: how is the fact knowledge
possible? Is knowledge a fact at all ? What is
knowledge? If we do not know what knowledge
is, we cannot possibly reply to the question," Is
there such a thing as knowledge ? "-_ Very fine. !
But if I do not already "know " whether there is, or
can be, such a thing as knowledge, I cannot reason-
ably ask the question, "What is knowledge ? ” Kant
believes in the fact of knowledge: what he requires
is a piece of naïveté : the knowledge of knowledge !
Knowledge is judgment. ” But judgment is
a belief that something is this or that! And
not knowledge ! "All knowledge consists in
synthetic judgments" which have the character of
being universally true (the fact is so in all cases, and
does not change), and which have the character of
being necessary (the reverse of the proposition
cannot be imagined to exist).
The validity of a belief in knowledge is always
taken for granted; as is also the validity of the
feelings which conscience dictates. Here mioral
ontology is the ruling bias.
D
d
"
by
n to
---all
!


## p. 44 (#74) ##############################################

44
THE WILL TO POWER.
The conclusion, therefore, is : (1) there are pro-
positions which we believe to be universally true
and necessary.
(2) This character of universal truth and of
necessity cannot spring from experience.
(3) Consequently it must base itself upon no
experience at all, but upon something else; it must
be derived from another source of knowledge !
(Kant concludes (1) that there are some pro-
positions which hold good only on one condition ;
(2) this condition is that they do not spring from
experience, but from pure reason. )
Thus, the question is, whence do we derive our
reasons for believing in the truth of such proposi-
tions ? No, whence does our belief get its cause?
But the origin of a belief, of a strong conviction,
is a psychological problem: and very limited and
narrow experience frequently brings about such a
belief! It already presupposes that there are not
only “data a posteriori” but also "data a priori”—
that is to say, "previous to experience. " Neces-
sary and universal truth cannot be given by experi-
ence: it is therefore quite clear that it has come to.
us without experience at all?
There is no such thing as an isolated judgment !
An isolated judgment is never “true,” it is never
knowledge; only in connection with, and when
related to, many other judgments, is a guarantee
of its truth forthcoming.
What is the difference between true and false
belief? What is knowledge ? He “knows" it,
that is heavenly!
Necessary and universal truth cannot be given


## p. 45 (#75) ##############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
45
by experience! It is therefore independent of ex-
perience, of all experience! The view which comes
quite a priori, and therefore independent of all ex-
perience, merely out of reason, is "pure knowledge”!
“ The principles of logic, the principle of identity
and of contradiction, are examples of pure know-
ledge, because they precede all experience. "-But
these principles are not cognitions, but regulative
articles of faith.
In order to establish the a priori character (the
pure rationality) of mathematical axioms, space
must be conceived as a form of pure reason.
Hume had declared that there were no a priori
synthetic judgments. Kant says there are the
mathematical ones! And if there are such judg-
ments, there may also be such things as metaphysics
and a knowledge of things by means of pure reason !
Mathematics is possible under conditions which
are not allowed to metaphysics. All human know-
ledge is either experience or mathematics.
A judgment is synthetic—that is to say, it co-
ordinates various ideas. It is a priori— that is to
say, this co-ordination is universally true and
necessary, and is arrived at, not by sensual experi-
ence, but by pure reason.
If there are such thingsas a priori judgments, then
reason must be able to co-ordinate: co-ordination
is a form. Reason must possess a formative faculty.
531.
Judging is our oldest faith; it is our habit of
believing this to be true or false, of asserting or
i i


## p. 46 (#76) ##############################################

46
THE WILL TO POWER.
:
denying, our certainty that something is thus and
not otherwise, our belief that we really "know-
what is believed to be true in all judgments ?
What are attributes ? —We did not regard
changes in ourselves merely as such, but as “ things
in themselves," which are strange to us, and which
we only "perceive"; and we did not class them as
phenomena, but as Being, as "attributes"; and in
addition we invented a creature to which they attach
themselves—taat is to say, we made the effect the
working cause, and the latter we made Being. But
even in this plain statement, the concept "effect”
is arbitrary: for in regard to those changes which
occur in us, and of which we are convinced we
ourselves are not the cause, we still argue that
they must be effects: and this is in accordance
with the belief that “every change must have its
author";—but this belief in itself is already
mythology; for it separates the working cause from
the cause in work. When I say the “lightning
flashes," I set the flash down, once as an action and
a second time as a subject acting; and thus a
a
thing is fancifully affixed to a phenomenon, which
is not one with it, but which is stable, which is, and
does not "come. ”—To make the phenomenon the
working cause, and to make the effect into a thing
-into Being : this is the double error, or interpreta-
tion, of which we are guilty.
"
532.
The Judgment—that is the faith: “This and
this is so. ” In every judgment, therefore, there lies
>


## p. 47 (#77) ##############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
47
the admission that an “identical case " has been
met with: it thus takes some sort of comparison
for granted, with the help of the memory. Judg.
ment does not create the idea that an identical case
seems to be there. It believes rather that it actu-
ally perceives such a case; it works on the
hypothesis that there are such things as identical
cases.
But what is that much older function called,
which must have been active much earlier, and
which in itself equalises unequal cases and makes
them alike? What is that second function called,
which with this first one as a basis, etc. etc.
“ That
which provokes the same sensations as another
thing is equal to that other thing": but what is
that called which makes sensations equal, which
regards them as equal ? — There could be no judg-
ments if a sort of equalising process were not active
within all sensations: memory is only possible by
means of the underscoring of all that has already
been experienced and learned. Before a judgment
can be formed, the process of assimilation must
already have been completed: thus, even here, an
intellectual activity is to be observed which does not
enter consciousness in at all the same way as the
pain which accompanies a wound. Probably the
psychic phenomena correspond to all the organic
functions—that is to say, they consist of assimila-
tion, rejection, growth, etc.
The essential thing is to start out from the body
and to use it as the general clue. It is by far the
richer phenomenon, and allows of much more accur-
ate observation. The belief in the body is much
more soundly established than the belief in spirit.


## p. 48 (#78) ##############################################

48
THE WILL TO POWER.
“However strongly a thing may be believed, the
degree of belief is no criterion of its truth. ” But
what is truth? Perhaps it is a form of faith, which
has become a condition of existence ? Then
strength would certainly be a criterion; for in-
stance, in regard to causality.
533.
Logical accuracy, transparency, considered as
the criterion of truth (“omne illud verum est, quod
clare et distincte percipitur. ”—Descartes): by this
means the mechanical hypothesis of the world
becomes desirable and credible.
But this is gross confusion : like simplex sigillum
veri. Whence comes the knowledge that the real
nature of things stands in this relation to our
intellect? Could it not be otherwise ? Could it
not be this, that the hypothesis which gives the
intellect the greatest feeling of power and security,
is preferred, valued, and marked as true ? —The
intellect sets its freest and strongest faculty and
ability as the criterion of what is most valuable,
consequently of what is true. . . .
"True"-from the standpoint of sentiment—is
that which most provokes senti-
ment (“I");
from the standpoint of thought—is
that which gives thought the
greatest sensation of strength;
from the standpoint of touch, sight,
and hearing—is that which calls
forth the greatest resistance.


## p. 49 (#79) ##############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
49
--
Thus it is the highest degrees of activity which
awaken belief in regard to the object, in regard to
its “reality. " The sensations of strength, struggle,
and resistance convince the subject that there is
something which is being resisted.
534.
The criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of
the feeling of power.
535.
According to my way of thinking, “truth” does
not necessarily mean the opposite of error, but, in
the most fundamental cases, merely the relation of
different errors to each other: thus one error
might be older, deeper than another, perhaps
altogether ineradicable, one without which organic
creatures like ourselves could not exist; whereas
other errors might not tyrannise over us to that
extent as conditions of existence, but when
measured according to the standard of those other
tyrants,” could even be laid aside and “refuted. ”
Why should an irrefutable assumption neces-
sarily be "true"? This question may exasperate
the logicians who limit things according to the
limitations they find in themselves : but I have
long since declared war with this logician's
optimism.
536.
Everything simple is simply imaginary, but not
« true. ” That which is real and true is, however,
neither a unity nor reducible to a unity.
D
G
VOL. ÍI.


## p. 50 (#80) ##############################################

50
THE WILL TO POWER.
537.
What is truth ? -Inertia ; that hypothesis which
brings satisfaction, the smallest expense of intel-
lectual strength, etc.
.
538.
First proposition. The easier way of thinking
always triumphs over the more difficult way ;-
dogmatically: simplex sigillum veri. —Dico: to sup-
pose that clearness is any proof of truth, is absolute
childishness,
Second proposition. The teaching of Being, of
things, and of all those constant entities, is a hun-
dred times more easy than the teaching of Becoming
and of evolution. . .
Third proposition. Logic was intended to be a
method of facilitating thought: a means of expres-
sion, not truth. . . . Later on it got to act like
.
truth.
539.
Parmenides said: “One can form no concept of
the non-existent” -we are at the other extreme,
and say, "That of which a concept can be formed,
is certainly fictional. "
540.
There are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx
has eyes—therefore there must be many kinds of
"truths," and consequently there can be no truth.


## p. 51 (#81) ##############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
51
541.
Inscriptions over the porch of a
modern lunatic asylum.
“That which is necessarily true in thought must
be necessarily true in morality. ” — HERBERT
SPENCER.
“ The ultimate test of the truth of a proposition
is the inconceivableness of its negation. " —HERBERT
SPENCER.
542.
If the character of existence were false,- and
this would be possible, -what would truth then be,
all our truth? . . . An unprincipled falsification
of the false ? A higher degree of falseness? . . .
543
In a world which was essentially false, truthful-
ness would be an anti-natural tendency: its only
purpose would be to provide a means of attaining
to a higher degree of falsity. For a world of
truth and Being to be simulated, the truthful one
would first have to be created (it being understood
that he must believe himself to be “truthful”).
Simple, transparent, not in contradiction with
himself, lasting, remaining always the same to him-
self, free from faults, sudden changes, dissimulation,
and form : such a man conceives a world of Being
as “God” in His own image.
In order that truthfulness may be possible, the


## p. 52 (#82) ##############################################

52
THE WILL TO POWER.
whole sphere in which man moves must be very
tidy, small, and respectable: the advantage in every
respect must be with the truthful one. -Lies, tricks,
dissimulations, must cause astonishment.
544.
“ Dissimulation" increases in accordance with
the rising order of rank among organic beings.
In the inorganic world it seems to be entirely
absent. There power opposes power quite roughly
-ruse begins in the organic world; plants are
already masters of it. The greatest men, such as
Cæsar and Napoleon (see Stendhal's remark con-
cerning him),* as also the higher races (the Italians),
the Greeks (Odysseus); the most supreme cunning,
belongs to the very essence of the elevation of man.
The problem of the actor. My Dionysian
ideal. The optics of all the organic functions,
of all the strongest vital instincts: the power which
will have error in all life; error as the very first
principle of thought itself. Before " thought" is
possible, "fancy" must first have done its work ;
the picturing of identical cases, of the seemingness
of identity, is more primeval than the cognition of
identity.
.
* The reference to Stendhal here, seems to point to a
passage in his Life of Napoleon (Preface, p. xv) of which
Nietzsche had made a note in another place, and which
reads : “Une croyance presque instinctive chez moi c'est
que tout homme puissant ment quand il parle et à plus forte
raison quand il écrit. ”


## p. 53 (#83) ##############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
53
(h) AGAINST CAUSALITY.
545.
I believe in absolute space as the basis of force,
and I believe the latter to be limited and formed.
Time, eternal. But space and time as things in
themselves do not exist. “Changes” are only
appearances (or mere processes of our senses to
us); if we set recurrence, however regular, between
them, nothing is proved. beyond the fact that it
has always happened so. The feeling that post
hoc is propter hoc, is easily explained as the result
of a misunderstanding; it is comprehensible. But
appearances cannot be “causes”!
546.
The interpretation of a phenomenon, either as an
action or as the endurance of an action (that is
to say, every action involves the suffering of it),
amounts to this : every change, every differentia-
tion, presupposes the existence of an agent and
somebody acted upon, who is "altered. "
547.
Psychological history of the concept “subject. ”
The body, the thing, the "whole,” which is visual-
ised by the eye, awakens the thought of distin-
guishing between an action and an agent; the
idea that the agent is the cause of the action, after
having been repeatedly refined, at length left the
subject” over.


## p. 54 (#84) ##############################################

54
THE WILL TO POWER.
548
Qur absurd habit of regarding a mere mnemonic
sign or abbreviated formula as an independentbeing,
and ultimately as a cause; as, for instance, when we
say of lightning that “it flashes. " Or even the
little word “I. ” A sort of double-sight in seeing
which makes sight a cause of seeing in itself: this
was the feat in the invention of the “subject” of
the “ego. "
549.
“Şubject," " object," "attribute"_these distinc-
tions have been made, and are now used like
schemes to cover all apparent facts. The false
fundamental observation is this, that I believe it
is I who does something, who suffers something,
who "has" something, who “has” a quality.
»
550.
In every judgment lies the whole faith in sub-
ject, attribute, or cause and effect (in the form of
an assumption that every effect is the result of
activity, and that all activity presupposes an agent);
and even this last belief is only an isolated case of
the first, so that faith remains as the most funda-
mental belief: there are such things as subjects,
everything that happens is related attributively to
a subject of some sort.
I notice something, and try to discover the
reason of it: originally this was, I look for an
intention behind it, and, above all, I look for one
who has an intention, for a subject, an agent :


## p. 55 (#85) ##############################################

THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
55
-
mnemonic
fent being
; when we
even the
in seeing
lf: this
iect" of
stinc-
like
false
e it
ing,
every phenomenon is an action--formerly inten-
tions were seen behind all phenomena, this is our
oldest habit. Has the animal also this habit ?
As a living organism, is it not also compelled to
interpret things through itself. The question
"why? ” is always a question concerning the
causa finalis, and the general “purpose" of things.
We have no sign of the “sense of the efficient
cause"; in this respect Hume is quite right, habit
(but not only that of the individual) allows us to
expect that a certain process, frequently observed,
will follow upon another, but nothing more! That
which gives us such an extraordinarily firm faith in
causality, is not the rough habit of observing the
sequence of processes; but our inability to interpret
a phenomenon otherwise than as the result of de-
sign. It is the belief in living and thinking things,
as the only agents of causation; it is the belief
in will, in design—the belief that all phenomena
are actions, and that all actions presuppose an
agent; it is the belief in the “subject. ” Is not
this belief in the concepts subject and object an
arrant absurdity?
Question: Is the design the cause of a pheno-
menon ? Or is that also illusion ?
Is it not the phenomenon itself?
551.
A criticism of the concept "cause. ”—We have
absolutely no experience concerning cause; viewed
psychologically we derive the whole concept from
the subjective conviction, that we ourselves are
causes-that is to say, that the arm moves. . . . But


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56
THE WILL TO POWER.
that is an error. We distinguish ourselves, the
agents, from the action, and everywhere we make
use of this scheme-we try to discover an agent
behind every phenomenon. What have we done?
We have misunderstood a feeling of power, tension,
resistance, a muscular feeling, which is already the
beginning of the action, and posited it as a cause;
or we have understood the will to do this or that,
as a cause, because the action follows it. There
is no such thing as “Cause," in those few cases in
which it seemed to be given, and in which we pro-
jected it out of ourselves in order to understand a
phenomenon, it has been shown to be an illusion.
Our understanding of a phenomenon consisted in
our inventing a subject who was responsible for
something happening, and for the manner in which
it happened. In our concept“cause" we have em-
braced our feeling of will, our feeling of “freedom,"
our feeling of responsibility and our design to do
an action: causa efficiens and causa finalis are
fundamentally one. -
We believed that an effect was explained when
we could point to a state in which it was inherent.
As a matter of fact, we invent all causes according
to the scheme of the effect: the latter is known to
us. . . . On the other hand, we are not in a position
to say of any particular thing how it will “act. ”
The thing, the subject the will, the design-all
inherent in the conception "cause. " We try to
discover things in order to explain why something
has changed. Even the "atom” is one of these
fanciful inventions like the "thing” and the
' primitive subject. ”
.
>
»


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THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
57
he
ke
nt
e?
n,
ne
=;
.
At last we understand that things—consequently
also atoms-effect nothing: because they are non-
existent; and that the concept causality is quite
useless. Out of a necessary sequence of states,
the latter's causal relationship does not follow
(that would be equivalent to extending their active
principle from 1 to 2, to 3, to 4, to 5). There is
no such thing as a cause or an effect. From the
standpoint of language we do not know how to
rid ourselves of them. But that does not matter.
If I imagine muscle separated from its “effects," I
have denied it. .
In short: a phenomenon is neither effected nor
capable of effecting. Causa is a faculty to effect
something, superadded fancifully to what hap-
pens.
The interpretation of causality is an illusion. . . .
.
A “thing" is the sum of its effects, synthetically
united by means of a concept, an image. As a
matter of fact, science has robbed the concept caus-
ality of all meaning, and has reserved it merely as
an allegorical formula, which has made it a matter
of indifference whether cause or effect be put on
this side or on that. It is asserted that in two
complex states (centres of force) the quantities of
energy remain constant.
The calculability of a phenomenon does not lie
in the fact that a rule is observed, or that a neces-
sity is obeyed, or that we have projected a law of
causality into every phenomenon: it lies in the
recurrence of “identical cases. ”
There is no such thing as a sense of causality,
as Kant would have us believe. We are aghast,


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58
THE WILL TO POWER.
we feel insecure, we will have something familiar,
which can be relied upon. . . . As soon as we
are shown the existence of something old in a
new thing, we are pacified. The so-called instinct
of causality is nothing more than the fear of the
unfamiliar, and the attempt at finding something
in it which is already known. -It is not a search
for causes, but for the familiar.
552.
To combat determinism and teleology. - From
the fact that something happens regularly, and
that its occurrence may be reckoned upon, it does
not follow that it happens necessarily. If a quantity
of force determines and conducts itself in a certain
way in every particular case, it does not prove
that it has “ no free will. " “ Mechanical necessity”
is not an established fact: it was we who first
read it into the nature of all phenomena. We
interpreted the possibility of formularising pheno-
mena as a result of the dominion of necessary law
over all existence. But it does not follow, because
I do a determined thing, that I am bound to do
it. Compulsion cannot be demonstrated in things:
all that the rule proves is this, that one and the
same phenomenon is not another phenomenon.
Owing to the very fact that we fancied the ex-
istence of subjects "agents” in things, the notion
arose that all phenomena are the consequence of a
compulsory force exercised over the subject- exer-
cised by whom? once more by an “agent. ” The
concept "Cause and Effect" is a dangerous one, ,


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THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
59
iar,
we
a
so long as people believe in something that causes,
and a something that is caused.
(a) Necessity is not an established fact, but an
interpretation.
*
ict
the
ng
ch
n
d
S
7
1
(6) When it is understood that the “subject”
is nothing that acts, but only a thing of fancy,
there is much that follows.
Only with the subject as model we invented
thingness and read it into the pell-mell of sensa-
tions. If we cease from believing in the acting
subject, the belief in acting things, in reciprocal
action, in cause and effect between phenomena
which we call things, also falls to pieces.
In this case the world of acting atoms also dis-
appears : for this world is always assumed to
exist on the pre-determined grounds that subjects
are necessary
Ultimately, of course, " the thing-in-itself” also
disappears: for at bottom it is the conception of
a “subject-in-itself. ” But we have seen that the
subject is an imaginary thing. The antithesis
thing-in-itself” and “appearance” is untenable ;
but in this way the concept " appearance” also
disappears.
(c) If we abandon the idea of the acting subject,
we also abandon the object acted upon. Duration,
equality to self, Being, are inherent neither in
what is called subject, nor in what is called object :
they are complex phenomena, and in regard to
other phenomena are apparently durable--they are


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60
THE WILL TO POWER.
distinguishable, for instance, by the different tempo
with which they happen (repose—movement, fixed
-loose : all'antitheses which do not exist in them-
selves and by means of which differences of degree
only are expressed; from a certain limited point
of view, though, they seem to be antitheses. There
are no such things as antitheses; it is from logic
that we derive our concept of contrasts — and
starting out from its standpoint we spread the
error over all things).
(d) If we abandon the ideas “subject ' and
"object ”; then we must also abandon the idea
"substance"—and therefore its various modifications
too; for instance: "matter," "spirit,” and other
hypothetical things, "eternity and the immuta-
bility of matter," etc. We are then rid of materi-
ality.
From a moral standpoint the world is false.
But inasmuch as morality itself is a part of this
world, morality also is false. The will to truth is
a process of establishing things; it is a process of
making things true and lasting, a total elimination
of that false character, a transvaluation of it into
being? Thus,“ truth” is not something which is
present and which has to be found and discovered;
it is something which has to be created and which
gives its name to a process, or, better still, to the
Will to overpower, which in itself has no purpose :
to introduce truth is a processus in infinitum, an
active determining—it is not a process of be-


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THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.
61
coming conscious of something, which in itself is
fixed and determined. It is merely a word for
« The Will to Power.