Thus, the
expansion
of the war in 1793 is largely consistent with the theory set forth in chapter 2.
Revolution and War_nodrm
Holland Rose, "The Struggle with Revolutionary France," in Ward and Gooch, British Foreign Policy, 1:226-27.
118 After the French conquest of Belgium, Grenville stated, "The only probable means of averting the danger is to meet it with firmness. . . . The King's intentions should be early and publicly notified, both to give encouragement to the Dutch Government . . . and to apprize those who may have hostile intentions of all the extent of those consequences which must arise from the execution of their plans. " Quoted in J. Holland Rose, "Documents Relating to the Rupture with France in 1793, Part 1," English Historical Review 27, no. 105 (1912), 1 19.
119 British intelligence had intercepted a letter from Dumouriez stating that he was "count- ing on carrying liberty to the Batavians as I have to the Belgians. " Lebrun expressed similar ambitions in a letter to Dumouriez on November 22, and Dumouriez responded by predict- ing that "the Bat01vian Legion will promptly push the Revolution to the point where it will break out at the moment I appear on the Dutch border. " See Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:73-74, 76, 84; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 141; and Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 235, 272.
120 The reform movement in England and the effects of the revolution are examined in Al- bert Goodwin, The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movemen t in the Age of the French Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); esp. chaps. 4 and 6; H. T. Dickinson,
British Radicalism and the French Revolution (London: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Clive Emsley, British Society and the French Revolution, I79J-IBI5 (Totowa, N. J. : Rowman and Littlefield, 1979); Mark Philp, ed. , The French Revolution and British Popular Politics (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1991); and Colin Jones, ed. , Britain and Revolutionary France: Conflict, Subversion, and Propaganda (Exeter, England: University of Exeter, 1985).
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that similar upheavals would soon occur in England. 121 The fear of revohn- tionary subversion was compounded by the bellicose rhetoric emanating from the Convention itself, on the one hand, and the enthusiastic welcome the deputies had extended to foreign sympathizers, on the other. 122 British leaders were also concerned by the growing number of French agents i? n London, and especially by emigre warnings of a French-backed plot to over- throw the govemment. 123
These developments brought a swift end to English complacency. By No- vember 18, Pitt said that "the unexpected tum of events in France is but too much likely to give encouragement to the forces of disorder in every part of the world," and Home Secretary Henry Dundas warned that "if the spirit of liberty and equality continues to spread with the same rapidity, . . . it must soon break out in open sedition. " These dangers were blamed on "secrefr
machinations" and "dangerous and unprincipled emissaries. " Lord Auck- land told one confidant at the end of November, "We may expect in about six months to be walking about on all fours in the woods, at least as many of us as can save our throats from the knife of liberty. "124 In response, the govern- ment called out the militia in December and began a campaign to discredit the radical forces and promote popular support for the govemment. 125
121 Aradical society in Rochester wrote Lebrun that "a great part of this generous nation is ready to make common cause with France," and emissaries from the Society for Constitu- tional Information appeared at the Convention in November and stated that "after the ex- ample given by France, revolutions will become easy. . . . [It) would not be extraordinary if in a much less space of time than can be imagined, the French should send addresses of con- gratulations to a National Convention of England. " A delegation of Irish and English radicals told the deputies, "It is for the French nation to free all Europe," adding that these beliefs were shared by "the vast majority of our compatriots. " For these and similar statements, see Goodwin, Friends ofLiberty, 244? 7, 501-12; Rose, Life ofPitt, 7o--'J1; and Marianne Elliott, Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1982), 55?
122 Pitt told one French agent that the Decree on Liberty "must be considered as an act of hostility to neutral nations. " When the agent explained that the Decree had been passed in a "moment of fermentation" and was not a general invitation to revolt, Grenville invoked the
"public reception given [by the Convention] to promoters of sedition in this country" as evi- dence of France's revolutionary aims. Quoted in Rose, "Struggle with Revolutionary France," 232-33? and Life ofPitt, 2:8<>-81; and Goodwin, Friends ofLiberty, 256-57.
123 Lebrun began sending agents to England at the end of August in an attempt to ascertain the government's intentions and boost public support for neutrality. This policy reflected lin- gering Frenclh suspicions of England, the revolutionaries' distaste for traditional diplomacy, and their predilection for direct appeals to the people. Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War,"32-40,63. . 3. S .
124 Quoted in Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 185, 202.
125 The royal proclamation calling out the militia declared: "The utmost industry is still being employed by evil-disposed persons within this Kingdom, acting in concert with persons in foreign parts, with a view to subverting the laws and established constitution of this realm and to destroy all order and government therein. " Quoted in Murley, "Origin of the Anglo- French War," 217-18 (emphasis added); and Dickinson, British Radicalism and French Revolu- tion, chap. 2.
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Ironically, the French government discounted English warnings because its members shared many of the same beliefs about England's revolutionary potential. This erroneous assessment was based on ill-informed and self- serving reporfts from the French agents in London, reinforced by the enthu- siastic but unreliable testimony of English radicals. In September, a French agent advised Lebrun, "We can always count on [English] neutrality"; the same agent reported one month later, "Our victories have had a marked im- pact on popular opinion . . . which is more favorable day by day. " French agents were soon predicting an imminent upheaval, assuring Lebrun that
"all that is needed is a little spark to cause a terrible explosion. "126 The for- mer French ambassador, Bernard Chauvelin, abandoned his initial caution and reported a financial panic in the City of London, a naval mutiny, and an uprising in Ireland, while another agent suggested that "to the eyes of an outside observer, England offers precisely the same prospect that France did in 1789. . . . All the symptoms indicate that revolutionary movements cannot be far off. " With his own prejudices thus reinforced, Lebrun reassured the Convention, "If the court of St. James adopts a policy of severity and resis- tance, it will inevitably provoke an insurrection. . . . The results would be fatal for the monarchy and the government. "127
These optimistic visions were sustained by French ignorance about the true state of popular opinion and party politics in England. Misinterpreting Pitt's retreat in the Ochakov affair with Russia in 1791 and overestimating the influence of Whig leader Charles Fox, Lebrun and others convinced themselves thaft Parliament would not support a war. The idea that England would do anything to remain neutral was confirmed by French diplomats at the Hague, whose accounts of the negotiations with England and Holland conveyed a misleading impression of English spinelessness. And even if England were to resist, French leaders believed that war would provoke a fi- nancial crisis in London and an uprising against the govemment. 128
Thus, French intransigence remained intact, scuttling efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution. Lebrun and his agents tried several times to continue the negotiations, but the belief that England could not afford to fight led them to drive an excessively hard bargain. Even when it became clear that
126 Other reports reinforced these views. One agent wrote Lebrun, "Each cry in favor of the French Republic has been followed by a cry against the abuses of the English government," and another reported that Ireland "awaits only the moment of explosion, and the first can- non-shot fired by Great Britain will be the signal for a general insurrection. " Quoted in Mur- ley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 143-45.
127 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 152-53; and Goodwin, Friends ofLiberty, 257-61, esp. n. 234?
128 See Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 222-40. In January, a Girondin deputy told the Convention, "The credit of England rests on fictitious wealth, the real riches of the people are scattered everywhere" (i. e. , in vulnerable overseas colonies). Quoted in Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:102.
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England would not back down, Lebrun refused to rescind the opening of the Scheidt and continued making threatening remarks in the Convention. His freedom of action was constrained in any case, as the deputies were all too willing to take on another adversary. As one deputy told the Convention: "We have no reason to fear war [with England] since our fishing boats are ready to carry 100,000 men across the Channel, who will put an end to the
contest on tlhe ruins of the Tower [of London]. "129 French optimism increased further when Geneva voted to place itself under French protection-a step that reinforced an image of irresistible revolutionary momentum-and when the Dutch Patriots reported that Zeeland was defenseless and urged an immediate attack. By this time, the atmosphere in the Convention would have made it nearly impossible for Lebrun to avoid a war even if he had wanted toP0
English expectations were equally optimistic. By December, fears of an immediate uprising had faded and a rift in the Whig Party had given Pitt a comfortable majority in Parliament. The French Army of the North had
been weakened by desertions, and several Prussian triumphs in December restored an image of French inferiority, convincing Pitt that "it will be a short war, and certainly ended in one or two campaigns. " English confi- dence was heightened by a sense of fortunate timing; as Pitt told the lord chancellor in January, war was "inevitable, and the sooner begun the bet- ter. "131 Adding to the support for the war was the prospect of colonial ex- pansion, with the Times of London predicting that the loss of France's Caribbean possessions would be such a blow that "it would require ages for France to recover to the political balance of Europe that preponderancy, which she enjoyed previous to the Revolution. "132
By the end of December, therefore, both England and France were con- vinced that the other was unalterably aggressive and yet easy to defeat. These conditions made war virtually inevitable, and when Chauvelin told Grenville on December 27 that France would not rescind the Decree on Lib-
129 Similarly, the Navy Minister, Gaspard Monge, issued a proclamation declaring that he would "effect a landing in England, throw 50,000 red caps of liberty upon the shore, and raise the English republic on the ruins of the throne. " See Von Sybel, French Revolution, 2:304; and Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:95, 102-i03.
130 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 156-57.
131 Pitt reportedly believed that "the nation was now prepared for war, which might not be the case six weeks hence . . . [France) had only six ships of the line in the Mediterranean, we upwards of twenty. . . . The Dutch were quite right, and in earnest. . . . Russia will to go all lengths, Spain was ready to join, and all the little Powers only waited our giving the signal. " Grenville shared this view, writing to Auckland, "To you privately I may say that our confi- dence . . . is very great indeed. " Quoted in Blanning, French Revolu tionary Wars, 154.
132 Quoted in Michael Duffy, "War, Revolution, and the Crisis of the British Empire," in Philp, French Revolution and British Politics, 118-19. English optimism was also based on the expectation that other states (such as Austria) would do most of the fighting on the Conti- nent.
[86]
? ? The French Revolution
erty or reverse the opening of the River Scheidt, the foreign minister coldly dismissed his explanations of the decree, declared that the French position on the Scheidt was unacceptable, and warned that England would never allow France to "make herself, either directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries, or general arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe. " The line was now drawn, and although Lebrun made several last-minute ef- forts to continue the negotiations, the Convention was uncompromising. 133 ChauvelinwasorderedtoleaveEnglandonJanuary21, 1793, andthenews of his expulsion sparked another outburst in Paris. The Executive Council authorized the invasion of Holland on January 31; the Convention voted an official declaration of war on February 1 . 134
The fundamental cause of the conflict was a clash of aims and interests- centered on the Low Countries-but each side exaggerated the other's hos- tility in precisely the manner described above in chapter 2. English officials overstated the importance of the Decree on Liberty and failed to recognize the ambivalence France's new leaders felt about their role as Europe's revo- lutionary vanguard. A clear sign of this ambivalence was the Executive Council's earlier refusal to authorize an invasion of Holland, despite Du- mouriez's desire to do so and the repeated entreaties of the Dutch Patriots.
English leaders did not realize that the bellicose rhetoric emanating from France was partly a product of the political struggle within the country; if they had, they might have discounted some of the deputies' inflammatory statements and gone to greater lengths to find a modus vivendi. British offi- cials also overstated the degree of coordination between France and the var- ious radical movements in England; although French agents did meet with radical leaders on several occasions, there is no evidence of an active French attempt to promote a revolution in England. English officials also took the large number of French agents in England as evidence of French hostility, but most of these men were there for other purposes and none of them had a significant impact on English attitudes. 135 Lebrun tried to convince En-
133 See David Williams, "The Missions of David Williams and James Tilly Matthews to En- gland (1793)," English Historical Review 53, no. 212 (1938); and Murley, "Origin of the Anglo- French War," 455-92.
134 On January 31, Jean Marie Collot d'Herbois told his fellow Jacobins, "Our soldiers will plant the tree of liberty . . . under the windows of King George, [who] will leave his palace as Louis Capet left the Tuileries. " Danton told the Convention the following day, "No power can stop us. It is fruitless to fear the wrath of kings. You have thrown down the glove. That glove is the head of a king. . . . The tyrants of England are dead. The people will be free. " Brissot seems to have had doubts as war approached, but he also believed that "if we had hesitated, the Moun- tain would have taken power from us. " Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 49<r502.
135 In addition to conducting unofficial negotiations, French agents in England were trying to locate the sources of forged French currency, to find the thieves who had stolen the French crown jewels, and to monitor the activities of French emigres. Unfortunately, "the mere pres- ence of so many French agents in London . . . helped to give greater credibility to stories passed on to the Home Office by French emigre sources" (Goodwin, Friends ofLiberty, 261).
? ? ? ? Revolution and War
gland's leaders that the November 19 decree was an isolated act rather than a blueprint for expansion; however, his own conduct was inconsistent and did little to undo the damage. 136
French observations of England were equally distorted. Perceptions of a threat from England first arose after the withdrawal of the British ambas- sador in August, a step France mistakenly interpreted as evidence of monar- chical hostility. Lebrun was soon convinced that Pitt was engaged in a variety of anti-French conspiracies, and French leaders interpreted the Anfti- Sedition and Alien acts as anti-French gestures. They were also upset by the cordial (albeit reserved) welcome given to French emigres in England. 137 Pitt's decision to call up 20,000 sailors in December and halt grain ship- ments to France in January was correctly seen as evidence of English oppo- sition, but the French seem not to have realized their own role in triggering these responses.
Indeed! , what is perhaps most striking is the degree to which English op- position was based on France's external conduct rather than its internal arrangements. Auckland proposed recognizing the republic at the begin- ning of November. Even after the invasion of the Netherlands, Home Secre- tary Dundas argued that "the strength of our cause consists in maintaining that we have nothing to do with the internal politics of foreign nations. " When Catherine II invited England to join a concert against France in De- cember, Grenville's reply stressed that England would confine its actions to opposing "the intrigues and ambitious plans pursued by France" while ab. . staining from "any interference in the interior government of that country. " Thus, English opposition was based on the danger of French expansion and not on hostility to the revolution itself, a distinction the French missed com- pletely. 138
This spiral of hostility was exacerbated by several factors: Lebrun's inex- perience, rivalries between the main French agents in England, and these agents' need to adopt extreme positions in London in order to protect their credibility at home. These factors did not cause the conflict, of course, buft
136 See Marianne Elliott, "French Subversion in Britain in the French Revolution," in Jones, Britain and Revolutionary France, 41-42, and Partners in Revolution, 53-54.
137 In October, for example, Lebrun believed England was about to sign an offensive al- liance with Spain, and he later accused England of directing Prussian and Genevan resistance to French demands. Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 84.
138 Grenville's instructions to the British ambassador in Russia outlined the following war aims: "the withdrawing of [French) arms within the limits of French territory; the abandon- ing of their conquests; the rescinding of any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any other nations; and the giving, in some public and unequivocal manner, a pledge of their in- tention no longer to foment troubles and to excite disturbances against their own Govern- ments. " See Rose, "Struggle with Revolutionary France," 22o-3o, "Documents Relating to the Rupture with France," 122, and Life ofPitt, 2:100.
[88]
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they contributed to French misperceptions and hindered efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. 139
Finally, it should be noted that English and French expectations were both mistaken, particularly on the crucial question of whether the revolution was likely to spread. These errors confirm both the inherent difficulty of gauging a society's revolutionary potential, as well as the danger that revolutionary elites and foreign leaders will draw unwarranted conclusions based on their ideological predispositions, unexpected events in one country, and the bi- ased information at their disposal.
The expansion of the war in 1793 arose from a combination of insecurity and overconfidence that strikingly resembled the forces that had led to war with Austria and Prussia the previous year. Once again, the Girondins had sought to strengthen their internal position by invoking foreign threats and universalistic ambitions. Although their arguments seemed vindicated by the conquest of Belgium, Savoy, and the Rhineland, the Girondins eventu- ally became trapped by radical sentiment within the Convention and lost control of foreign policy. The deputies' enthusiasm overrode earlier coun- sels of prudence and moderate voices were silenced by the fear of damaging their own revolutionary credentials.
Both English <md French leaders were convinced of each other's hostility by the end of 1792; even worse, they also believed that the other was not a very formidable adversary. These beliefs arose from each side's ideological predispositions; the domestic conflicts within France; biased information from emigres, revolutionary agents, and sympathizers; and the inherent dif- ficulty of gauging the broader appeal of French revolutionary ideals. Taken together, they left both sides more willing to use force.
Thus, the expansion of the war in 1793 is largely consistent with the theory set forth in chapter 2.
The Conduct ofthe War
England's entry soon brought most of Europe into the anti-French coali- tion. England and Holland were already allied. Spain and Sardinia declared war on France in March, along with Naples, Tuscany, Venice, and Modena. Portugal joined England shortly thereafter, as did Hanover, Baden, Hesse- Castel, and Hesse-Darmstadt. The Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire declared war on France in April, and England worked to strengthen the
139 Chauvelin had tried to reassure Paris about English intentions in September and warned that the activities of other French agents were confirming English suspicions. By November, however, as a result of his desire to retain his influence in Paris, he took a more radical position and wrote Lebrun that "the spectacle given to other countries by France will accelerate the era of revolution. " Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 78, 82, and passim.
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coalitionbynegotiatingbilateralalliancetreaties(orloansorsubsidies)with Austria and Prussia. 140
The War of the First Coalition supports the idea that social revolutions are both difficult to reverse and hard to export. The Republic proved to be a fmr more fonnidable adversary than its opponents expected: it was adept at mo? ? bilizing the nation's resources for war, and the patriotic sentiments aroused by the revolution enhanced France's military power and reduced its vul- nerability to counterrevolution. At the same time, the war was hardly the swift parade of revolutionary upheavals that the Girondins had predicted. Although France eventually established "sister republics" in the areas it conquered, those regimes were dependent on French military support, and they cost thousands of lives to create and maintain. Repeated efforts to ig- nite a rebellion in Great Britain failed (because France was unable to land at11 army there), and the "sister republics" are more accurately seen as the prod-
ucts of imperial expansion rather than of revolutionary contagion.
The evolution of French policy during the War of the First Coalition also substantiates the claim that revolutionary states will moderate their conduct in response to external pressure. In fact, the survival of the revolution was due in large part to its leaders' willingness to subordinate their universalis- tic idealism to a narrower conception of national interest. These ideals were not repudiated completely, but their impact on foreign policy declined as
the French Republic responded to the demands of the war.
Domestic rivalries within France continued to affect relations with other states as well. The republic, still divided into hostile factions, was obsessed with fears of foreign plots. These conditions made it more difficult for France to take advantage of its military achievements and negotiate a fa- vorable peace, even when its opponents were willing to offer one.
The Jacobin Dictatorship. The republic faced its greatest challenge in the spring and summer of 1793. The volunteers who had flocked to defend Ia patrie in 1792 returned home after their triumphs in the fall, and the French armies shrank from roughly 450,000 in November to less than 300,000 in February. 141 Meanwhile, the anti-French coalition had been strengthened by its new members, and these shifts enabled Prussia to recapture most of the left bank of the Rhine by the end of April. The Army of the North suffered similar setbacks: Dumouriez invaded Holland on February 1, but his out- numbered forces were forced to withdraw after an Austrian army beat them badly at Neerwinden and Louvain in March. Alarmed by the execution of
140 Lefebvre, French Revolution, 2:4; Ross, European Diplomatic History, 66-(,7; and John M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1 793-1815 (Cam- bridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 17-33.
141 Lynn, Bayonets ofthe Republic, 53? Biro reports that the French army in Belgium declined from roughfy 100,000 troops to about 45,000. German Policy, 1:112.
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the king and upset by the Convention's policy of requisitions (which alien- ated the Belgian population and threatened his own ambitions there), Du- mouriez negotiated an armistice with the Austrian commanders and tried to launch a coup to restore the monarchy. His troops refused to follow him, however, and Dumouriez was forced to defect to the Austrians. This unex- pected act of treason sparked a new wave of suspicion within France-if its leading general could not be trusted, who could? Meanwhile, the Austrian and Prussian armies continued a slow advance in the north while Sardinia and Spain advanced in the south, placing the republic in imminent danger once again. 142
The new regime also faced growing unrest in the provinces and the im- minent loss of several valuable colonies. Motives for provincial resistance ranged from die-hard royalism to the defense of local autonomy, and the
struggle was exacerbated by conscription, economic hardship, and the var- ious anticlerical measures adopted since 1789. By the summer, "federalist" uprisings had broken out in several areas and a full-scale civil war was rag- ing in the Vendee. An English squadron landed at Toulon in August to sup- port the counterrevolutionary uprising there, and England also invaded the French colonies at Tobago and Santo Domingo in April and September. With France now facing both foreign invasion and internal rebellion, Pitt told the House of Commons in June that "every circumstance concurs to favor the hope of being able completely to accomplish every object of the war. "143
Yet not only did the revolutionary regime survive, it was to regain the ini- tiative in the fall of 1793 and begin a campaign of expansion that would de- stroy the First Coalition and create a substantial European empire. This unexpected reversal of fortune was the result of the mobilization of the re- public by the Committee on Public Safety and the self-defeating rivalries within the enemy coalition.
In the spring of 1793, the French Republic's efforts to mobilize for war led to the creation of a Committee on General Security, to deal with suspected counterrevolutionaries, and a Committee on Public Safety (CPS), to coordi- nate the activities of each ministry. The Convention imposed the death penalty on emigres and dissident priests and established a revolutionary tri- bunal to try suspected counterrevolutionaries. It also began dispatching so-
142 The actual threat was more apparent than real, as members of the Coalition were deeply divided in their war aims and none of them intended to march on Paris and restore the old regime. See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, esp. 12? 30.
143 Quoted in Ehrman, Reluctant Transition, 284. On the provincial revolts, see Doyle, History of the French Revolu tion, chap. 10; Norman Hampson, A Social History of the French Revolution (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 15? 1, 17<r-75; and Sutherland, France, 66-82. British aid to the French counterrevolutionaries is described in detail in Mitchell, Under- ground War; and Maurice Hutt, Chouannerie and Counterrevolution: Puisaye, the Princes, and the British Government in the 1790s, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
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called representants en mission to oversee the mobilization effort in the provinces and to suppress counterrevolutionary resistance. 144
Meanwhile, repeated military setbacks during this period brought the struggle between the Girondins and the Montagnards to a climax. The stale- mate between them was finally broken by another popular uprising in Paris: a new Commune was formed on May 31 and thousands of angry sans-culottes surrounded the Convention and forced it to remove and arrest twenty-nine Girondin leaders. The upheaval left the Montagnards in control of the Convention and the government, although their own freedom of ac- tion was constrained by the threat of another popular uprising. 145
The ouster of the Girondins cleared the way for more extreme measures.
The CPS was reorganized and given near-dictatorial powers, and a new and more radical constitution was approved in August. 146 The CPS began a bru- tal campaign against provincial rebels and suspected counterrevolutionar- ies, aided by local revolutionary committees and paramilitary bands knoWll1l as armies revolutionnaires. 147 In August, the CPS proclaimed the famous levee en masse, which made all French citizens eligible for national service. Frenclh armed strength increased to nearly 6oo,ooo men by the fall of 1 793 and more than a million one year later, and new military industries were created and manned. 148 The Law of the General Maximum imposed price controls il! 1l September, a Law on Suspects enhanced the CPS's powers to arrest poten- tial traitors, and the Law of 14 Frimaire, Year II (December 5, 1793}, gave itt authority over all public officials and legislated the denunciation of traitors before revolutionary tribunals. 149
These measures were accompanied by a deliberate effort to transform the symbolic and moral bases of French society. The CPS adopted the metric system in August and replaced the Christian calendar with a revolutionary one as part of an overt campaign of dechristianization. 150 In addition to en-
144 See Hampson, Social History, 168-69.
145 On the fall of the Girondins, see Mathiez, French Revolution, chap. 10.
146 The Constitution of the Year I was suspended until the end of the war and was never im-
plemented. For its text, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 454-68; for its background, see Maoc Bouloiseau, The Jacobin Republic, 1792-1 794, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1983), 67-68; and Thompson, French Revolution, 36o-63.
147 The definitive treatment of. the armees revolutionnaires is Richard Cobb, Tire People's Armies, trans. M. Elliott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). On the revolutionary com- mittees, see John Black Sirich, fhe Revolutionary Commitees in the Departments of France, 1793-94 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943).
148 The text of the decree is in Stewart, Documentary History, 472-74. For discussions of its effects, see Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, 56-61; Ross, E u ropean Diplomatic History, 8o; and Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution.
149 These decrees are in Stewart, Documentary Survey, 477-90.
150 The new calendar dated Year I from the founding of the republic on September 22, 1793. There were twelve months of thirty days each and a five-day festival period. See Mona Ozouf, "Revolutionary Calendar," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 538-47.
? ? The French Revolution
couraging popular patriotism, these efforts reflected the beliefs that the re- public required new symbolic and moral foundations and that direct gov- ernment action should be taken to promote civic virtue.
The establishment of the Jacobin dictatorship did not bring the struggle for power to an end; if anything, factional quarrels became even more in- tense. At one extreme were the so-called Hebertists (after the radical leader Jacques-Rene Hebert), who favored economic policies to benefit the poor, radical dechristianization, rigorous measures against hoarders and political criminals, and the aggressive export of revolution. 151 At the other extreme stood Danton and the Indulgents, who favored a negotiated peace, the re-
laxation of the Terror, and a return to constitutional rule. Between them stood Robespierre, Louis-Antoine de Saint-Just, and their followers, who were increasingly suspicious of both groups and preoccupied with estab- lishing a "Republic of Virtue. "152 Fostering conflict among these groups was a paranoid political climate in which accusations of treason and fears of for- eign plots abounded. Under these conditions, virtually any disagreement could be interpreted as a sign of disloyalty. Or as Saint-Just put it in March 1794: "Every faction is then criminal, because it tends to divide the citizens . . . [and] neutralizes the power of public virtue. " In the Jacobin Republic, dissent had become an act of treason. 153
Although the leaders of the Republic did not abandon all of their ideologi- cal aims and continued to rely on unconventional diplomatic means, the CPS abandoned their predecessors' utopian approach to foreign policy in favor of a more hardheaded realpolitik. Evidence of this deradicalization was most apparent in the declining commitment to the universalist goal of "promoting liberty," on the one hand, and the priority given to exploiting other peoples rather than liberating them, on the other. In contrast to its earlier support for foreign revolutionaries, for example, the Convention rejected a request for the formation of an Italian legion in February 1793. 154 The Convention revoked the Decree on Liberty in April and declared that henceforth it would "not in-
151 The Hebertists were also known as "ultras" or "enrages. " See Denis Richet, "He- bertists," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 363-69; and Schama, Citizens, 805-17.
152 The belief that dlomestic opponents constituted the main threat to the revolution was a consistent theme in Robespierre's political thought. David P. Jordan, The Revolutionary Career ofMaximilien Robespierre (New York: Free Press, 1985), 17o-172.
153 Robespierre also warned of the danger of factions in the fall of 1793, telling the Conven- tion that "whoever seeks to debase, divide, or paralyze the Convention is an enemy of our country, whether he sits in this hall or is a foreigner. " Quotations from R. R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled: The Year ofthe Terror in the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 71, 291, and also see 263-66.
154 In a report to the Diplomatic Committee, Lazare Carnot suggested that the simplest means of establishing a universal republic would be "to establish within the bounds Nature has traced for us [such] prosperity [that] . . . neighboring peoples . . . will be led to imitate [us]. . . . The first interest to consult is that of the [French] Republic itself. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 1:220 n. 268.
? ? ? terfere in any manner in the government of other powers. "155 By the fall, Robespierre was insisting the revolution should be spread not by force but by example, telling the Convention that "the French are not afflicted with a mania for rendering any nation happy and free despite itsel? . "156 Similarly, when it became clear that efforts to "promote liberty" via propaganda and
subversion were undermining French relations with several neutral powers (such as the United States and the Swiss Confederation), France's leaders re- called their agents and suspended their subversive efforts. 157
The waning of revolutionary internationalism was accompanied by a growing xenophobia, once again triggered by the pervasive fear of foreign plots. 158 In December, Robespierre accused foreign revolutionaries such as Anacharsis Cloots of dragging France into a dangerous and unprofitable war, informing the Jacobin Club, "! distrust without distinction all those for- eigners . . . who endeavour to appear more republican and energetic than we are. "159 While serving as representant en mission in Alsace in December, Saint-Just disbanded a group of local republicans who advocated universal liberty; one of his assistants advised Robespierre "not to listen to these cos- mopolitan charlatans and to trust only in ourselves. " The CPS denied a pe- tition for assistance from a group 'of Dutch revolutionaries in March, and nt eventually dissolved the foreign legions that the Assembly had created in
1792. Thus, by 1794 the earlier visions of a universal crusade for liberty had faded almost completely. 160
Moderation was also apparent in French policy toward neutral states. De- spite an improving military posture, pressure from local officials, and the
155 As Da11t1 on told the deputies: "In a moment of enthusiasm you passed a decree whose motive was doubtless fine . . . [but) this decree appeared to commit you to support a few p<? ? triots who might wish to start a revolution in China. Above all we need to look to the preser? vation of our own body politic and lay the foundation of French greatness. " Quoted i111 Blanning, French Revolution and Germany, 70; and see also Stewart, Documentary Survey, 426-27.
156 Robespierre also emphasized the need to stop "our generals and our armies [from in- terfering) in [others') political affairs; it is the only means of preventing intrigues which can terminate our glorious revolution. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 1:18? 9.
157 See Eugene R. Sheridan, "The Recall of Edmund Charles Genet," Diplomatic History 18, no. 4 (1994); and David Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of the Robes- pierrist Committee on Public Safety" (Ph. D. diss. , University of Washington, 1974}, 56-65, 94o 96-103.
Revolution and War
? 158 The fear of foreign plots, magnified by Dumouriez's treason, helped lead to the ouster of the Girondin leaders in June. These fears grew in the fall, when a Montagnard deputy in- formed the CPS that the republic faced a vast foreign conspiracy whose members included Convention deputies, foreign ministry officials, and Marie-Joseph Herault de Sechelles, a member of the CPS itself. See Mathiez, Revolution et les etrangers, 164? 6; and Silverman, "In- formal Diplomacy," 106-107.
159 Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 419; and see also Silverman, "Informal Diplo- macy," 130.
160 Quoted in Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy," 108 n. 5?
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massacre of several French sailors by a group of English seamen, the CPS chose to respect Genoese neutrality during the fall of 1793. When an attempt to undermine English commerce with a discriminatory Navigation Act damaged relations with neutral states and brought French foreign trade to a standstill, the CPS promptly suspended the act and embarked on efforts to rebuild ties with neutral powers. 161
As noted earlier, the exigencies of war had also forced the republic to abandon its idealistic principles and systematically exploit conquered re- gions in order to sustain its war effort. The tension between universal ideals and selfish national interests was already apparent in the fall of 1792, and the decree of December 15, 1792, was the first step toward a more self-serving policy. The issue was moot so long as France was on the defensive, but when its military fortunes improved, the Convention or- dered army commanders to renounce "every philanthropic idea previ- ously adopted by the French people with the intention of making foreign nations appreciate the values and benefits of liberty. " Now, the French armies were to "behave towards the enemies of France in just the same way that the powers of the Coalition have behaved towards them . . . and exercise . . . the customary rights of war. " In a sharp departure from its original ideals, therefore, the republic was now justifying the exploitation of occupied territories on the grounds that other great powers acted the same wayP62 As the French armies continued to advance, the exploitation of conquered territory became a way of life. The CPS established agencies of evacuation to coordinate the exploitation of foreign resources in May 1794, and Carnot, who was responsible for military mobilization, de- clared, "We must live at the expense of the enemy . . . , we are not entering his territory to bring him money. "163 Even measures of apparent restraint masked self-interested motives: prior to the occupation of Holland in Jan- uary 1795, the CPS informed its generals that "the interest of the Republic is to reassure the Dutch so that they do not emigrate with their riches. . . . It is necessary to safeguard the rights of property so that Holland will fur- nish us with provisions.
118 After the French conquest of Belgium, Grenville stated, "The only probable means of averting the danger is to meet it with firmness. . . . The King's intentions should be early and publicly notified, both to give encouragement to the Dutch Government . . . and to apprize those who may have hostile intentions of all the extent of those consequences which must arise from the execution of their plans. " Quoted in J. Holland Rose, "Documents Relating to the Rupture with France in 1793, Part 1," English Historical Review 27, no. 105 (1912), 1 19.
119 British intelligence had intercepted a letter from Dumouriez stating that he was "count- ing on carrying liberty to the Batavians as I have to the Belgians. " Lebrun expressed similar ambitions in a letter to Dumouriez on November 22, and Dumouriez responded by predict- ing that "the Bat01vian Legion will promptly push the Revolution to the point where it will break out at the moment I appear on the Dutch border. " See Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:73-74, 76, 84; Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 141; and Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 235, 272.
120 The reform movement in England and the effects of the revolution are examined in Al- bert Goodwin, The Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movemen t in the Age of the French Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); esp. chaps. 4 and 6; H. T. Dickinson,
British Radicalism and the French Revolution (London: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Clive Emsley, British Society and the French Revolution, I79J-IBI5 (Totowa, N. J. : Rowman and Littlefield, 1979); Mark Philp, ed. , The French Revolution and British Popular Politics (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1991); and Colin Jones, ed. , Britain and Revolutionary France: Conflict, Subversion, and Propaganda (Exeter, England: University of Exeter, 1985).
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that similar upheavals would soon occur in England. 121 The fear of revohn- tionary subversion was compounded by the bellicose rhetoric emanating from the Convention itself, on the one hand, and the enthusiastic welcome the deputies had extended to foreign sympathizers, on the other. 122 British leaders were also concerned by the growing number of French agents i? n London, and especially by emigre warnings of a French-backed plot to over- throw the govemment. 123
These developments brought a swift end to English complacency. By No- vember 18, Pitt said that "the unexpected tum of events in France is but too much likely to give encouragement to the forces of disorder in every part of the world," and Home Secretary Henry Dundas warned that "if the spirit of liberty and equality continues to spread with the same rapidity, . . . it must soon break out in open sedition. " These dangers were blamed on "secrefr
machinations" and "dangerous and unprincipled emissaries. " Lord Auck- land told one confidant at the end of November, "We may expect in about six months to be walking about on all fours in the woods, at least as many of us as can save our throats from the knife of liberty. "124 In response, the govern- ment called out the militia in December and began a campaign to discredit the radical forces and promote popular support for the govemment. 125
121 Aradical society in Rochester wrote Lebrun that "a great part of this generous nation is ready to make common cause with France," and emissaries from the Society for Constitu- tional Information appeared at the Convention in November and stated that "after the ex- ample given by France, revolutions will become easy. . . . [It) would not be extraordinary if in a much less space of time than can be imagined, the French should send addresses of con- gratulations to a National Convention of England. " A delegation of Irish and English radicals told the deputies, "It is for the French nation to free all Europe," adding that these beliefs were shared by "the vast majority of our compatriots. " For these and similar statements, see Goodwin, Friends ofLiberty, 244? 7, 501-12; Rose, Life ofPitt, 7o--'J1; and Marianne Elliott, Partners in Revolution: The United Irishmen and France (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1982), 55?
122 Pitt told one French agent that the Decree on Liberty "must be considered as an act of hostility to neutral nations. " When the agent explained that the Decree had been passed in a "moment of fermentation" and was not a general invitation to revolt, Grenville invoked the
"public reception given [by the Convention] to promoters of sedition in this country" as evi- dence of France's revolutionary aims. Quoted in Rose, "Struggle with Revolutionary France," 232-33? and Life ofPitt, 2:8<>-81; and Goodwin, Friends ofLiberty, 256-57.
123 Lebrun began sending agents to England at the end of August in an attempt to ascertain the government's intentions and boost public support for neutrality. This policy reflected lin- gering Frenclh suspicions of England, the revolutionaries' distaste for traditional diplomacy, and their predilection for direct appeals to the people. Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War,"32-40,63. . 3. S .
124 Quoted in Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 185, 202.
125 The royal proclamation calling out the militia declared: "The utmost industry is still being employed by evil-disposed persons within this Kingdom, acting in concert with persons in foreign parts, with a view to subverting the laws and established constitution of this realm and to destroy all order and government therein. " Quoted in Murley, "Origin of the Anglo- French War," 217-18 (emphasis added); and Dickinson, British Radicalism and French Revolu- tion, chap. 2.
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Ironically, the French government discounted English warnings because its members shared many of the same beliefs about England's revolutionary potential. This erroneous assessment was based on ill-informed and self- serving reporfts from the French agents in London, reinforced by the enthu- siastic but unreliable testimony of English radicals. In September, a French agent advised Lebrun, "We can always count on [English] neutrality"; the same agent reported one month later, "Our victories have had a marked im- pact on popular opinion . . . which is more favorable day by day. " French agents were soon predicting an imminent upheaval, assuring Lebrun that
"all that is needed is a little spark to cause a terrible explosion. "126 The for- mer French ambassador, Bernard Chauvelin, abandoned his initial caution and reported a financial panic in the City of London, a naval mutiny, and an uprising in Ireland, while another agent suggested that "to the eyes of an outside observer, England offers precisely the same prospect that France did in 1789. . . . All the symptoms indicate that revolutionary movements cannot be far off. " With his own prejudices thus reinforced, Lebrun reassured the Convention, "If the court of St. James adopts a policy of severity and resis- tance, it will inevitably provoke an insurrection. . . . The results would be fatal for the monarchy and the government. "127
These optimistic visions were sustained by French ignorance about the true state of popular opinion and party politics in England. Misinterpreting Pitt's retreat in the Ochakov affair with Russia in 1791 and overestimating the influence of Whig leader Charles Fox, Lebrun and others convinced themselves thaft Parliament would not support a war. The idea that England would do anything to remain neutral was confirmed by French diplomats at the Hague, whose accounts of the negotiations with England and Holland conveyed a misleading impression of English spinelessness. And even if England were to resist, French leaders believed that war would provoke a fi- nancial crisis in London and an uprising against the govemment. 128
Thus, French intransigence remained intact, scuttling efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution. Lebrun and his agents tried several times to continue the negotiations, but the belief that England could not afford to fight led them to drive an excessively hard bargain. Even when it became clear that
126 Other reports reinforced these views. One agent wrote Lebrun, "Each cry in favor of the French Republic has been followed by a cry against the abuses of the English government," and another reported that Ireland "awaits only the moment of explosion, and the first can- non-shot fired by Great Britain will be the signal for a general insurrection. " Quoted in Mur- ley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 143-45.
127 Quoted in Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 152-53; and Goodwin, Friends ofLiberty, 257-61, esp. n. 234?
128 See Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 222-40. In January, a Girondin deputy told the Convention, "The credit of England rests on fictitious wealth, the real riches of the people are scattered everywhere" (i. e. , in vulnerable overseas colonies). Quoted in Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:102.
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England would not back down, Lebrun refused to rescind the opening of the Scheidt and continued making threatening remarks in the Convention. His freedom of action was constrained in any case, as the deputies were all too willing to take on another adversary. As one deputy told the Convention: "We have no reason to fear war [with England] since our fishing boats are ready to carry 100,000 men across the Channel, who will put an end to the
contest on tlhe ruins of the Tower [of London]. "129 French optimism increased further when Geneva voted to place itself under French protection-a step that reinforced an image of irresistible revolutionary momentum-and when the Dutch Patriots reported that Zeeland was defenseless and urged an immediate attack. By this time, the atmosphere in the Convention would have made it nearly impossible for Lebrun to avoid a war even if he had wanted toP0
English expectations were equally optimistic. By December, fears of an immediate uprising had faded and a rift in the Whig Party had given Pitt a comfortable majority in Parliament. The French Army of the North had
been weakened by desertions, and several Prussian triumphs in December restored an image of French inferiority, convincing Pitt that "it will be a short war, and certainly ended in one or two campaigns. " English confi- dence was heightened by a sense of fortunate timing; as Pitt told the lord chancellor in January, war was "inevitable, and the sooner begun the bet- ter. "131 Adding to the support for the war was the prospect of colonial ex- pansion, with the Times of London predicting that the loss of France's Caribbean possessions would be such a blow that "it would require ages for France to recover to the political balance of Europe that preponderancy, which she enjoyed previous to the Revolution. "132
By the end of December, therefore, both England and France were con- vinced that the other was unalterably aggressive and yet easy to defeat. These conditions made war virtually inevitable, and when Chauvelin told Grenville on December 27 that France would not rescind the Decree on Lib-
129 Similarly, the Navy Minister, Gaspard Monge, issued a proclamation declaring that he would "effect a landing in England, throw 50,000 red caps of liberty upon the shore, and raise the English republic on the ruins of the throne. " See Von Sybel, French Revolution, 2:304; and Rose, Life ofPitt, 2:95, 102-i03.
130 See Blanning, French Revolutionary Wars, 156-57.
131 Pitt reportedly believed that "the nation was now prepared for war, which might not be the case six weeks hence . . . [France) had only six ships of the line in the Mediterranean, we upwards of twenty. . . . The Dutch were quite right, and in earnest. . . . Russia will to go all lengths, Spain was ready to join, and all the little Powers only waited our giving the signal. " Grenville shared this view, writing to Auckland, "To you privately I may say that our confi- dence . . . is very great indeed. " Quoted in Blanning, French Revolu tionary Wars, 154.
132 Quoted in Michael Duffy, "War, Revolution, and the Crisis of the British Empire," in Philp, French Revolution and British Politics, 118-19. English optimism was also based on the expectation that other states (such as Austria) would do most of the fighting on the Conti- nent.
[86]
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erty or reverse the opening of the River Scheidt, the foreign minister coldly dismissed his explanations of the decree, declared that the French position on the Scheidt was unacceptable, and warned that England would never allow France to "make herself, either directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries, or general arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe. " The line was now drawn, and although Lebrun made several last-minute ef- forts to continue the negotiations, the Convention was uncompromising. 133 ChauvelinwasorderedtoleaveEnglandonJanuary21, 1793, andthenews of his expulsion sparked another outburst in Paris. The Executive Council authorized the invasion of Holland on January 31; the Convention voted an official declaration of war on February 1 . 134
The fundamental cause of the conflict was a clash of aims and interests- centered on the Low Countries-but each side exaggerated the other's hos- tility in precisely the manner described above in chapter 2. English officials overstated the importance of the Decree on Liberty and failed to recognize the ambivalence France's new leaders felt about their role as Europe's revo- lutionary vanguard. A clear sign of this ambivalence was the Executive Council's earlier refusal to authorize an invasion of Holland, despite Du- mouriez's desire to do so and the repeated entreaties of the Dutch Patriots.
English leaders did not realize that the bellicose rhetoric emanating from France was partly a product of the political struggle within the country; if they had, they might have discounted some of the deputies' inflammatory statements and gone to greater lengths to find a modus vivendi. British offi- cials also overstated the degree of coordination between France and the var- ious radical movements in England; although French agents did meet with radical leaders on several occasions, there is no evidence of an active French attempt to promote a revolution in England. English officials also took the large number of French agents in England as evidence of French hostility, but most of these men were there for other purposes and none of them had a significant impact on English attitudes. 135 Lebrun tried to convince En-
133 See David Williams, "The Missions of David Williams and James Tilly Matthews to En- gland (1793)," English Historical Review 53, no. 212 (1938); and Murley, "Origin of the Anglo- French War," 455-92.
134 On January 31, Jean Marie Collot d'Herbois told his fellow Jacobins, "Our soldiers will plant the tree of liberty . . . under the windows of King George, [who] will leave his palace as Louis Capet left the Tuileries. " Danton told the Convention the following day, "No power can stop us. It is fruitless to fear the wrath of kings. You have thrown down the glove. That glove is the head of a king. . . . The tyrants of England are dead. The people will be free. " Brissot seems to have had doubts as war approached, but he also believed that "if we had hesitated, the Moun- tain would have taken power from us. " Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 49<r502.
135 In addition to conducting unofficial negotiations, French agents in England were trying to locate the sources of forged French currency, to find the thieves who had stolen the French crown jewels, and to monitor the activities of French emigres. Unfortunately, "the mere pres- ence of so many French agents in London . . . helped to give greater credibility to stories passed on to the Home Office by French emigre sources" (Goodwin, Friends ofLiberty, 261).
? ? ? ? Revolution and War
gland's leaders that the November 19 decree was an isolated act rather than a blueprint for expansion; however, his own conduct was inconsistent and did little to undo the damage. 136
French observations of England were equally distorted. Perceptions of a threat from England first arose after the withdrawal of the British ambas- sador in August, a step France mistakenly interpreted as evidence of monar- chical hostility. Lebrun was soon convinced that Pitt was engaged in a variety of anti-French conspiracies, and French leaders interpreted the Anfti- Sedition and Alien acts as anti-French gestures. They were also upset by the cordial (albeit reserved) welcome given to French emigres in England. 137 Pitt's decision to call up 20,000 sailors in December and halt grain ship- ments to France in January was correctly seen as evidence of English oppo- sition, but the French seem not to have realized their own role in triggering these responses.
Indeed! , what is perhaps most striking is the degree to which English op- position was based on France's external conduct rather than its internal arrangements. Auckland proposed recognizing the republic at the begin- ning of November. Even after the invasion of the Netherlands, Home Secre- tary Dundas argued that "the strength of our cause consists in maintaining that we have nothing to do with the internal politics of foreign nations. " When Catherine II invited England to join a concert against France in De- cember, Grenville's reply stressed that England would confine its actions to opposing "the intrigues and ambitious plans pursued by France" while ab. . staining from "any interference in the interior government of that country. " Thus, English opposition was based on the danger of French expansion and not on hostility to the revolution itself, a distinction the French missed com- pletely. 138
This spiral of hostility was exacerbated by several factors: Lebrun's inex- perience, rivalries between the main French agents in England, and these agents' need to adopt extreme positions in London in order to protect their credibility at home. These factors did not cause the conflict, of course, buft
136 See Marianne Elliott, "French Subversion in Britain in the French Revolution," in Jones, Britain and Revolutionary France, 41-42, and Partners in Revolution, 53-54.
137 In October, for example, Lebrun believed England was about to sign an offensive al- liance with Spain, and he later accused England of directing Prussian and Genevan resistance to French demands. Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 84.
138 Grenville's instructions to the British ambassador in Russia outlined the following war aims: "the withdrawing of [French) arms within the limits of French territory; the abandon- ing of their conquests; the rescinding of any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of any other nations; and the giving, in some public and unequivocal manner, a pledge of their in- tention no longer to foment troubles and to excite disturbances against their own Govern- ments. " See Rose, "Struggle with Revolutionary France," 22o-3o, "Documents Relating to the Rupture with France," 122, and Life ofPitt, 2:100.
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they contributed to French misperceptions and hindered efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. 139
Finally, it should be noted that English and French expectations were both mistaken, particularly on the crucial question of whether the revolution was likely to spread. These errors confirm both the inherent difficulty of gauging a society's revolutionary potential, as well as the danger that revolutionary elites and foreign leaders will draw unwarranted conclusions based on their ideological predispositions, unexpected events in one country, and the bi- ased information at their disposal.
The expansion of the war in 1793 arose from a combination of insecurity and overconfidence that strikingly resembled the forces that had led to war with Austria and Prussia the previous year. Once again, the Girondins had sought to strengthen their internal position by invoking foreign threats and universalistic ambitions. Although their arguments seemed vindicated by the conquest of Belgium, Savoy, and the Rhineland, the Girondins eventu- ally became trapped by radical sentiment within the Convention and lost control of foreign policy. The deputies' enthusiasm overrode earlier coun- sels of prudence and moderate voices were silenced by the fear of damaging their own revolutionary credentials.
Both English <md French leaders were convinced of each other's hostility by the end of 1792; even worse, they also believed that the other was not a very formidable adversary. These beliefs arose from each side's ideological predispositions; the domestic conflicts within France; biased information from emigres, revolutionary agents, and sympathizers; and the inherent dif- ficulty of gauging the broader appeal of French revolutionary ideals. Taken together, they left both sides more willing to use force.
Thus, the expansion of the war in 1793 is largely consistent with the theory set forth in chapter 2.
The Conduct ofthe War
England's entry soon brought most of Europe into the anti-French coali- tion. England and Holland were already allied. Spain and Sardinia declared war on France in March, along with Naples, Tuscany, Venice, and Modena. Portugal joined England shortly thereafter, as did Hanover, Baden, Hesse- Castel, and Hesse-Darmstadt. The Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire declared war on France in April, and England worked to strengthen the
139 Chauvelin had tried to reassure Paris about English intentions in September and warned that the activities of other French agents were confirming English suspicions. By November, however, as a result of his desire to retain his influence in Paris, he took a more radical position and wrote Lebrun that "the spectacle given to other countries by France will accelerate the era of revolution. " Murley, "Origin of the Anglo-French War," 78, 82, and passim.
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coalitionbynegotiatingbilateralalliancetreaties(orloansorsubsidies)with Austria and Prussia. 140
The War of the First Coalition supports the idea that social revolutions are both difficult to reverse and hard to export. The Republic proved to be a fmr more fonnidable adversary than its opponents expected: it was adept at mo? ? bilizing the nation's resources for war, and the patriotic sentiments aroused by the revolution enhanced France's military power and reduced its vul- nerability to counterrevolution. At the same time, the war was hardly the swift parade of revolutionary upheavals that the Girondins had predicted. Although France eventually established "sister republics" in the areas it conquered, those regimes were dependent on French military support, and they cost thousands of lives to create and maintain. Repeated efforts to ig- nite a rebellion in Great Britain failed (because France was unable to land at11 army there), and the "sister republics" are more accurately seen as the prod-
ucts of imperial expansion rather than of revolutionary contagion.
The evolution of French policy during the War of the First Coalition also substantiates the claim that revolutionary states will moderate their conduct in response to external pressure. In fact, the survival of the revolution was due in large part to its leaders' willingness to subordinate their universalis- tic idealism to a narrower conception of national interest. These ideals were not repudiated completely, but their impact on foreign policy declined as
the French Republic responded to the demands of the war.
Domestic rivalries within France continued to affect relations with other states as well. The republic, still divided into hostile factions, was obsessed with fears of foreign plots. These conditions made it more difficult for France to take advantage of its military achievements and negotiate a fa- vorable peace, even when its opponents were willing to offer one.
The Jacobin Dictatorship. The republic faced its greatest challenge in the spring and summer of 1793. The volunteers who had flocked to defend Ia patrie in 1792 returned home after their triumphs in the fall, and the French armies shrank from roughly 450,000 in November to less than 300,000 in February. 141 Meanwhile, the anti-French coalition had been strengthened by its new members, and these shifts enabled Prussia to recapture most of the left bank of the Rhine by the end of April. The Army of the North suffered similar setbacks: Dumouriez invaded Holland on February 1, but his out- numbered forces were forced to withdraw after an Austrian army beat them badly at Neerwinden and Louvain in March. Alarmed by the execution of
140 Lefebvre, French Revolution, 2:4; Ross, European Diplomatic History, 66-(,7; and John M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder: British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France, 1 793-1815 (Cam- bridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 17-33.
141 Lynn, Bayonets ofthe Republic, 53? Biro reports that the French army in Belgium declined from roughfy 100,000 troops to about 45,000. German Policy, 1:112.
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the king and upset by the Convention's policy of requisitions (which alien- ated the Belgian population and threatened his own ambitions there), Du- mouriez negotiated an armistice with the Austrian commanders and tried to launch a coup to restore the monarchy. His troops refused to follow him, however, and Dumouriez was forced to defect to the Austrians. This unex- pected act of treason sparked a new wave of suspicion within France-if its leading general could not be trusted, who could? Meanwhile, the Austrian and Prussian armies continued a slow advance in the north while Sardinia and Spain advanced in the south, placing the republic in imminent danger once again. 142
The new regime also faced growing unrest in the provinces and the im- minent loss of several valuable colonies. Motives for provincial resistance ranged from die-hard royalism to the defense of local autonomy, and the
struggle was exacerbated by conscription, economic hardship, and the var- ious anticlerical measures adopted since 1789. By the summer, "federalist" uprisings had broken out in several areas and a full-scale civil war was rag- ing in the Vendee. An English squadron landed at Toulon in August to sup- port the counterrevolutionary uprising there, and England also invaded the French colonies at Tobago and Santo Domingo in April and September. With France now facing both foreign invasion and internal rebellion, Pitt told the House of Commons in June that "every circumstance concurs to favor the hope of being able completely to accomplish every object of the war. "143
Yet not only did the revolutionary regime survive, it was to regain the ini- tiative in the fall of 1793 and begin a campaign of expansion that would de- stroy the First Coalition and create a substantial European empire. This unexpected reversal of fortune was the result of the mobilization of the re- public by the Committee on Public Safety and the self-defeating rivalries within the enemy coalition.
In the spring of 1793, the French Republic's efforts to mobilize for war led to the creation of a Committee on General Security, to deal with suspected counterrevolutionaries, and a Committee on Public Safety (CPS), to coordi- nate the activities of each ministry. The Convention imposed the death penalty on emigres and dissident priests and established a revolutionary tri- bunal to try suspected counterrevolutionaries. It also began dispatching so-
142 The actual threat was more apparent than real, as members of the Coalition were deeply divided in their war aims and none of them intended to march on Paris and restore the old regime. See Schroeder, Transformation ofEuropean Politics, esp. 12? 30.
143 Quoted in Ehrman, Reluctant Transition, 284. On the provincial revolts, see Doyle, History of the French Revolu tion, chap. 10; Norman Hampson, A Social History of the French Revolution (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), 15? 1, 17<r-75; and Sutherland, France, 66-82. British aid to the French counterrevolutionaries is described in detail in Mitchell, Under- ground War; and Maurice Hutt, Chouannerie and Counterrevolution: Puisaye, the Princes, and the British Government in the 1790s, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
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called representants en mission to oversee the mobilization effort in the provinces and to suppress counterrevolutionary resistance. 144
Meanwhile, repeated military setbacks during this period brought the struggle between the Girondins and the Montagnards to a climax. The stale- mate between them was finally broken by another popular uprising in Paris: a new Commune was formed on May 31 and thousands of angry sans-culottes surrounded the Convention and forced it to remove and arrest twenty-nine Girondin leaders. The upheaval left the Montagnards in control of the Convention and the government, although their own freedom of ac- tion was constrained by the threat of another popular uprising. 145
The ouster of the Girondins cleared the way for more extreme measures.
The CPS was reorganized and given near-dictatorial powers, and a new and more radical constitution was approved in August. 146 The CPS began a bru- tal campaign against provincial rebels and suspected counterrevolutionar- ies, aided by local revolutionary committees and paramilitary bands knoWll1l as armies revolutionnaires. 147 In August, the CPS proclaimed the famous levee en masse, which made all French citizens eligible for national service. Frenclh armed strength increased to nearly 6oo,ooo men by the fall of 1 793 and more than a million one year later, and new military industries were created and manned. 148 The Law of the General Maximum imposed price controls il! 1l September, a Law on Suspects enhanced the CPS's powers to arrest poten- tial traitors, and the Law of 14 Frimaire, Year II (December 5, 1793}, gave itt authority over all public officials and legislated the denunciation of traitors before revolutionary tribunals. 149
These measures were accompanied by a deliberate effort to transform the symbolic and moral bases of French society. The CPS adopted the metric system in August and replaced the Christian calendar with a revolutionary one as part of an overt campaign of dechristianization. 150 In addition to en-
144 See Hampson, Social History, 168-69.
145 On the fall of the Girondins, see Mathiez, French Revolution, chap. 10.
146 The Constitution of the Year I was suspended until the end of the war and was never im-
plemented. For its text, see Stewart, Documentary Survey, 454-68; for its background, see Maoc Bouloiseau, The Jacobin Republic, 1792-1 794, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1983), 67-68; and Thompson, French Revolution, 36o-63.
147 The definitive treatment of. the armees revolutionnaires is Richard Cobb, Tire People's Armies, trans. M. Elliott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). On the revolutionary com- mittees, see John Black Sirich, fhe Revolutionary Commitees in the Departments of France, 1793-94 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943).
148 The text of the decree is in Stewart, Documentary History, 472-74. For discussions of its effects, see Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, 56-61; Ross, E u ropean Diplomatic History, 8o; and Bertaud, Army ofthe French Revolution.
149 These decrees are in Stewart, Documentary Survey, 477-90.
150 The new calendar dated Year I from the founding of the republic on September 22, 1793. There were twelve months of thirty days each and a five-day festival period. See Mona Ozouf, "Revolutionary Calendar," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 538-47.
? ? The French Revolution
couraging popular patriotism, these efforts reflected the beliefs that the re- public required new symbolic and moral foundations and that direct gov- ernment action should be taken to promote civic virtue.
The establishment of the Jacobin dictatorship did not bring the struggle for power to an end; if anything, factional quarrels became even more in- tense. At one extreme were the so-called Hebertists (after the radical leader Jacques-Rene Hebert), who favored economic policies to benefit the poor, radical dechristianization, rigorous measures against hoarders and political criminals, and the aggressive export of revolution. 151 At the other extreme stood Danton and the Indulgents, who favored a negotiated peace, the re-
laxation of the Terror, and a return to constitutional rule. Between them stood Robespierre, Louis-Antoine de Saint-Just, and their followers, who were increasingly suspicious of both groups and preoccupied with estab- lishing a "Republic of Virtue. "152 Fostering conflict among these groups was a paranoid political climate in which accusations of treason and fears of for- eign plots abounded. Under these conditions, virtually any disagreement could be interpreted as a sign of disloyalty. Or as Saint-Just put it in March 1794: "Every faction is then criminal, because it tends to divide the citizens . . . [and] neutralizes the power of public virtue. " In the Jacobin Republic, dissent had become an act of treason. 153
Although the leaders of the Republic did not abandon all of their ideologi- cal aims and continued to rely on unconventional diplomatic means, the CPS abandoned their predecessors' utopian approach to foreign policy in favor of a more hardheaded realpolitik. Evidence of this deradicalization was most apparent in the declining commitment to the universalist goal of "promoting liberty," on the one hand, and the priority given to exploiting other peoples rather than liberating them, on the other. In contrast to its earlier support for foreign revolutionaries, for example, the Convention rejected a request for the formation of an Italian legion in February 1793. 154 The Convention revoked the Decree on Liberty in April and declared that henceforth it would "not in-
151 The Hebertists were also known as "ultras" or "enrages. " See Denis Richet, "He- bertists," in Furet and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 363-69; and Schama, Citizens, 805-17.
152 The belief that dlomestic opponents constituted the main threat to the revolution was a consistent theme in Robespierre's political thought. David P. Jordan, The Revolutionary Career ofMaximilien Robespierre (New York: Free Press, 1985), 17o-172.
153 Robespierre also warned of the danger of factions in the fall of 1793, telling the Conven- tion that "whoever seeks to debase, divide, or paralyze the Convention is an enemy of our country, whether he sits in this hall or is a foreigner. " Quotations from R. R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled: The Year ofthe Terror in the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), 71, 291, and also see 263-66.
154 In a report to the Diplomatic Committee, Lazare Carnot suggested that the simplest means of establishing a universal republic would be "to establish within the bounds Nature has traced for us [such] prosperity [that] . . . neighboring peoples . . . will be led to imitate [us]. . . . The first interest to consult is that of the [French] Republic itself. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 1:220 n. 268.
? ? ? terfere in any manner in the government of other powers. "155 By the fall, Robespierre was insisting the revolution should be spread not by force but by example, telling the Convention that "the French are not afflicted with a mania for rendering any nation happy and free despite itsel? . "156 Similarly, when it became clear that efforts to "promote liberty" via propaganda and
subversion were undermining French relations with several neutral powers (such as the United States and the Swiss Confederation), France's leaders re- called their agents and suspended their subversive efforts. 157
The waning of revolutionary internationalism was accompanied by a growing xenophobia, once again triggered by the pervasive fear of foreign plots. 158 In December, Robespierre accused foreign revolutionaries such as Anacharsis Cloots of dragging France into a dangerous and unprofitable war, informing the Jacobin Club, "! distrust without distinction all those for- eigners . . . who endeavour to appear more republican and energetic than we are. "159 While serving as representant en mission in Alsace in December, Saint-Just disbanded a group of local republicans who advocated universal liberty; one of his assistants advised Robespierre "not to listen to these cos- mopolitan charlatans and to trust only in ourselves. " The CPS denied a pe- tition for assistance from a group 'of Dutch revolutionaries in March, and nt eventually dissolved the foreign legions that the Assembly had created in
1792. Thus, by 1794 the earlier visions of a universal crusade for liberty had faded almost completely. 160
Moderation was also apparent in French policy toward neutral states. De- spite an improving military posture, pressure from local officials, and the
155 As Da11t1 on told the deputies: "In a moment of enthusiasm you passed a decree whose motive was doubtless fine . . . [but) this decree appeared to commit you to support a few p<? ? triots who might wish to start a revolution in China. Above all we need to look to the preser? vation of our own body politic and lay the foundation of French greatness. " Quoted i111 Blanning, French Revolution and Germany, 70; and see also Stewart, Documentary Survey, 426-27.
156 Robespierre also emphasized the need to stop "our generals and our armies [from in- terfering) in [others') political affairs; it is the only means of preventing intrigues which can terminate our glorious revolution. " Quoted in Biro, German Policy, 1:18? 9.
157 See Eugene R. Sheridan, "The Recall of Edmund Charles Genet," Diplomatic History 18, no. 4 (1994); and David Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of the Robes- pierrist Committee on Public Safety" (Ph. D. diss. , University of Washington, 1974}, 56-65, 94o 96-103.
Revolution and War
? 158 The fear of foreign plots, magnified by Dumouriez's treason, helped lead to the ouster of the Girondin leaders in June. These fears grew in the fall, when a Montagnard deputy in- formed the CPS that the republic faced a vast foreign conspiracy whose members included Convention deputies, foreign ministry officials, and Marie-Joseph Herault de Sechelles, a member of the CPS itself. See Mathiez, Revolution et les etrangers, 164? 6; and Silverman, "In- formal Diplomacy," 106-107.
159 Quoted in Mathiez, French Revolution, 419; and see also Silverman, "Informal Diplo- macy," 130.
160 Quoted in Silverman, "Informal Diplomacy," 108 n. 5?
? ? The French Revolution
massacre of several French sailors by a group of English seamen, the CPS chose to respect Genoese neutrality during the fall of 1793. When an attempt to undermine English commerce with a discriminatory Navigation Act damaged relations with neutral states and brought French foreign trade to a standstill, the CPS promptly suspended the act and embarked on efforts to rebuild ties with neutral powers. 161
As noted earlier, the exigencies of war had also forced the republic to abandon its idealistic principles and systematically exploit conquered re- gions in order to sustain its war effort. The tension between universal ideals and selfish national interests was already apparent in the fall of 1792, and the decree of December 15, 1792, was the first step toward a more self-serving policy. The issue was moot so long as France was on the defensive, but when its military fortunes improved, the Convention or- dered army commanders to renounce "every philanthropic idea previ- ously adopted by the French people with the intention of making foreign nations appreciate the values and benefits of liberty. " Now, the French armies were to "behave towards the enemies of France in just the same way that the powers of the Coalition have behaved towards them . . . and exercise . . . the customary rights of war. " In a sharp departure from its original ideals, therefore, the republic was now justifying the exploitation of occupied territories on the grounds that other great powers acted the same wayP62 As the French armies continued to advance, the exploitation of conquered territory became a way of life. The CPS established agencies of evacuation to coordinate the exploitation of foreign resources in May 1794, and Carnot, who was responsible for military mobilization, de- clared, "We must live at the expense of the enemy . . . , we are not entering his territory to bring him money. "163 Even measures of apparent restraint masked self-interested motives: prior to the occupation of Holland in Jan- uary 1795, the CPS informed its generals that "the interest of the Republic is to reassure the Dutch so that they do not emigrate with their riches. . . . It is necessary to safeguard the rights of property so that Holland will fur- nish us with provisions.
