But for this religious sanction
and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence
should we obtain our right to trust in existence ?
and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence
should we obtain our right to trust in existence ?
Nietzsche - v14 - Will to Power - a
.
Moral philosophy is the most
suspicious period in the history of the human
intellect.
The first great example: in the name of
morality and under its patronage, a great wrong
was committed, which as a matter of fact was
in every respect an act of decadence. Sufficient
stress cannot be laid upon this fact, that the
great Greek philosophers not only represented
.
## p. 348 (#372) ############################################
348
THE WILL TO POWER.
»
the decadence of every kind of Greek ability, but
also made it contagious. . . . This “virtue" made
wholly abstract was the highest form of seduction;
to make oneself abstract means to turn one's back
on the world.
The moment is a very remarkable one: the
Sophists are within sight of the first criticism of
morality, the first knowledge of morality :—they
classify the majority of moral valuations (in view
of their dependence upon local conditions) together;
- they lead one to understand that every form of
morality is capable of being upheld dialectically:
that is to say, they guessed that all the funda-
mental principles of a morality must be sophistical
-a proposition which was afterwards proved in
the grandest possible style by the ancient philoso-
phers from Plato onwards (up to Kant) ;—they
postulate the primary truth that there is no such
thing as a "moral per se," a "good per se," and
that it is madness to talk of “truth” in this
respect.
Wherever was intellectual uprightness to be found
in those days?
The Greek culture of the Sophists had grown
out of all the Greek instincts; it belongs to the
culture of the age of Pericles as necessarily as
Plato does not: it has its predecessors in Hera-
clitus, Democritus, and in the scientific types of
the old philosophy; it finds expression in the
elevated culture of Thucydides, for instance, And
—it has ultimately shown itself to be right: every
step in the science of epistemology and morality
has confirmed the attitude of the Sophists. . . . Our
## p. 349 (#373) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
349
.
modern attitude of mind is, to a great extent,
Heraclitean, Democritean, and Protagorean .
to say that it is Protagorean is even sufficient :
because Protagoras was in himself a synthesis of
the two men Heraclitus and Democritus.
(Plato : a great Cagliostro, let us think of how
Epicurus judged him; how Timon, Pyrrho's friend,
judged him Is Plato's integrity by any chance
beyond question ? . . . But we at least know
what he wished to have taught as absolute truth
-namely, things which were to him not even
relative truths: the separate and immortal life of
souls. ")
429.
.
The Sophists are nothing more nor less than
realists: they elevate all the values and practices
which are common property to the rank of values
—they have the courage, peculiar to all strong
intellects, which consists in knowing their im-
morality.
Is it to be supposed that these small Greek
independent republics, so filled with rage and envy
that they would fain have devoured each other,
were led by principles of humanity and honesty?
Is Thucydides by any chance reproached with
the words he puts into the mouths of the Athenian
ambassadors when they were treating with the
Melii anent the question of destruction or sub-
mission ? Only the most perfect Tartuffes could
have been able to speak of virtue in the midst of
that dreadful strain—or if not Tartuffes, at least
detached philosophers, anchorites, exiles, and fleers
## p. 350 (#374) ############################################
350
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
from reality. . . . All of them, people who denied
things in order to be able to exist.
The Sophists were Greeks: when Socrates and
Plato adopted the cause of virtue and justice, they
were Jews or I know not what. Grote's tactics
in the defence of the Sophists are false: he would
like to raise them to the rank of men of honour
and moralisers-but it was their honour not to
indulge in any humbug with grand words and
virtues,
430.
The great reasonableness underlying all moral
education lay in the fact that it always attempted
to attain to the certainty of an instinct: so that
neither good intentions nor good means, as such,
first required to enter consciousness. Just as the
soldier learns his exercises, so should man learn
how to act in life, In truth this unconsciousness
belongs to every kind of perfection: even the
mathematician carries out his calculations un-
consciously. .
What, then, does Socrates' reaction mean, which
recommended dialectics as the way to virtue, and
which was amused when morality was unable to
justify itself logically ? But this is precisely what
proves its superiority--without unconsciousness it
is worth nothing!
In reality it means the dissolution of Greek
instincts, when demonstrability is posited as the
first condition of personal excellence in virtue.
All these great "men of virtue" and of words are
themselves types of dissolution.
## p. 351 (#375) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
351
»
In practice, it means that moral judgments have
been torn from the conditions among which they
grew and in which alone they had some sense, from
their Greek and Græco-political soil, in order to
be denaturalised under the cover of being sub-
limated. The great concepts "good" and "just"
are divorced from the first principles of which they
form a part, and, as “ideas” become free, degenerate
into subjects for discussion. A certain truth is
sought behind them; they are regarded as entities
or as symbols of entities: a world is invented where
they are “at home," and from which they are
supposed to hail.
In short: the scandal reaches its apotheosis in
Plato. . . . And then it was necessary to invent
the abstract perfect man also good, just, wise,
and a dialectician to boot-in short, the scarecrow
of the ancient philosopher: a plant without any
soil whatsoever; a human race devoid of all
definite ruling instincts; a virtue which“ justifies
itself with reasons. The perfectly absurd “in-
dividual” per se! the highest form of Artifici-
ality. . . .
Briefly, the denaturalisation of moral values
resulted in the creation of a degenerate type of
man—"the good man," "the happy man," "the
“
wise man. "-Socrates represents a moment of the
most profound perversity in the history of values.
.
"
431.
Socrates. This veering round of Greek taste
in favour of dialectics is a great question. What
## p. 352 (#376) ############################################
352
THE WILL TO POWER,
1
1
3
really happened then ? Socrates, the roturier
who was responsible for it, was thus able to
triumph over a more noble taste, the taste of the
noble :—the mob gets the upper hand along with
dialectics. Previous to Socrates dialectic manners
were repudiated in good society; they were re-
garded as indecent; the youths were warned
against them. What was the purpose of this
display of reasons? Why demonstrate? Against
others one could use authority. One commanded,
and that sufficed. Among friends, inter pares,
there was tradition—also a form of authority:
and last but not least, one understood each other,
There was no room found for dialectics. Besides,
all such modes of presenting reasons were dis-
trusted. All honest things do not carry their
reasons in their hands in such fashion. It is
indecent to show all the five fingers at the same
time. That which can be “demonstrated” is
little worth. The instinct of every party-speaker
tells him that dialectics excites mistrust and
carries little conviction. Nothing is more easily
wiped away than the effect of a dialectician. It can
a
only be a means of self-defence. One must be in an
extremity ; it is necessary to have to extort one's
rights; otherwise one makes no use of dialectics.
That is why the Jews were dialecticians, Reynard
the Fox was a dialectician, and so was Socrates,
As a dialectician a person has a merciless instru-
ment in his hand: he can play the tyrant with
it; he compromises when he conquers. The
dialectician leaves it to his opponent to demon-
strate that he is not an idiot; he is made furious
1
## p. 353 (#377) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
353
O
and helpless, while the dialectician himself remains
calm and still possessed of his triumphant reason-
ing powers—he paralyses his opponent's intellect.
—The dialectician's irony is a form of mob-
revenge: the ferocity of the oppressed lies in the
cold knife-cuts of the syllogism. .
In Plato, as in all men of excessive sensuality
and wild fancies, the charm of concepts was so
great, that he involuntarily honoured and deified
the concept as a form of ideal. Dialectical intori-
cation: as the consciousness of being able to
exercise control over one's self by means of it-
as an instrument of the Will to Power.
432.
a
The problem of Socrates. The two antitheses :
.
the tragic and the Socratic spirits — measured
according to the law of Life.
To what extent is the Socratic spirit a
decadent phenomenon ? to what extent are
robust health and power still revealed by the
whole attitude of the scientific man, his dialectics,
his ability, and his severity? (the health of the
plebeian; whose malice, esprit frondeur, whose
astuteness, whose rascally depths, are held in
check by his cleverness; the whole type is “ugly").
Uglification : self-derision, dialectical dryness,
intelligence in the form of a tyrant against the
" tyrant” (instinct). Everything in Socrates is
exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature; he is
buffoon with the blood of Voltaire in his veins,
z
a
VOL. I.
## p. 354 (#378) ############################################
354
THE WILL TO POWER.
He discovers a new form of agon; he is the first
fencing-master in the superior classes of Athens;
he stands for nothing else than the highest form of
cleverness: he calls it “virtue" (he regarded it
as a means of salvation; he did not choose to be
clever, cleverness was de rigueur); the proper
thing is to control one's self in suchwise that one
enters into a struggle not with passions but with
reasons as one's weapons (Spinoza's stratagem
-the unravelment of the errors of passion) ;—it is
desirable to discover how every one may be caught
once he is goaded into a passion, and to know
how illogically passion proceeds; self-mockery is
practised in order to injure the very roots of the
feelings of resentment.
It is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic
states form a part of the Socratic problem : its
association of reason, virtue, and happiness. With
this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things
it succeeded in charming the world : ancient philo-
sophy could not rid itself of this doctrine.
Absolute lack of objective interest: hatred of
science: the idiosyncrasy of considering one's self
a problem. Acoustic hallucinations in Socrates :
.
morbid element. When the intellect is rich and
independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying
itself with morality. How is it that Socrates is
a moral-maniac? —Every “practical” philosophy
"
immediately steps into the foreground in times of
distress. When morality and religion become the
chief interests of a community, they are signs of a
state of distress
»
1
## p. 355 (#379) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
433.
Intelligence, clearness, hardness, and logic as
weapons against the wildness of the instincts.
The latter must be dangerous and must threaten
ruin, otherwise no purpose can be served by
developing intelligence to this degree of tyranny.
In order to make a tyrant of intelligence the
instincts must first have proved themselves tyrants.
This is the problem. It was a very timely one
in those days. Reason became virtue - virtue
equalled happiness.
Solution : Greek philosophers stand upon the
same fundamental fact of their inner experiences as
Socrates does; five feet from excess, from anarchy
and from dissolution-all decadent men.
They
regard him as a doctor : Logic as will to power, as
will to control self, as will to “happiness. ” The
wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a
sign of decadence, as is also the superfotation
of logic and clear reasoning in him.
Both are
abnormities, each belongs to the other.
Criticism. Decadence reveals itself in this con-
cern about "happiness" (i. e. about the "salvation
of the soul"; i. e. to feel that one's condition is a
danger). Its fanatical interest in "happiness
)
shows the pathological condition of the subcon-
scious self: it was a vital interest. The alternative
which faced them all was: to be reasonable or to
perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows
that they felt they were in danger,
2)
3)
## p. 356 (#380) ############################################
356
THE WILL TO POWER.
434.
Why everything resolved itself into mummery. -
Rudimentary psychology, which only considered
the conscious lapses of men (as causes), which re-
garded “ consciousness” as an attribute of the soul,
and which sought a will behind every action (i. e.
an intention), could only answer “Happiness” to
the question : “ What does man desire ? ” (it was
impossible to answer “Power," because that would
have been immoral);—consequently behind all
men's actions there is the intention of attaining
to happiness by means of them. Secondly: if
man as a matter of fact does not attain to happi-
ness, why is it?
Because he mistakes the means
thereto. - What is the unfailing means of acquiring
happiness ? Answer: virtue. —Why virtue? Be-
cause virtue is supreme rationalness, and rational-
ness makes mistakes in the choice of means
impossible: virtue in the form of reason is the
way to happiness. Dialectics is the constant
occupation of virtue, because it does away with
passion and intellectual cloudiness.
As a matter of fact, man does not desire
“ happiness. " Pleasure is a sensation of power: :
if the passions are excluded, those states of the
mind are also excluded which afford the greatest
sensation of power and therefore of pleasure. The
highest rationalism is a state of cool clearness,
which is very far from being able to bring about
that feeling of power which every kind of exalta-
tion involves.
The ancient philosophers combat everything
.
## p. 357 (#381) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
357
220":
ix:
ind
LOK
odby:
hann
that intoxicates and exalts—everything that im-
pairs the perfect coolness and impartiality of the
mind. . . They were consistent with their first
false principle: that consciousness was the highest,
the supreme state of mind, the prerequisite of
perfection—whereas the reverse is true.
Any kind of action is imperfect in proportion as
it has been willed or conscious. The philosophers
of antiquity were the greatest duffers in practice,
because they condemned themselves theoretically
to dufferdom. . . . In practice everything resolved
itself into theatricalness: and he who saw through
it, as Pyrrho did, for instance, thought as every-
body did—that is to say, that in goodness and
uprightness “paltry people” were far superior to
philosophers.
All the deeper natures of antiquity were dis-
gusted at the philosophers of virtue; all people
saw in them was brawlers and actors. (This was
the judgment passed on Plato by Epicurus and
Pyrrho. )
Result : In practical life, in patience, goodness,
and mutual assistance, paltry people were above
them :—this is something like the judgment
Dostoiewsky or Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks:
they are more philosophical in practice, they are
more courageous in their way of dealing with the
exigencies of life. . . .
- messi
Tquiries
7 Bio
ationa?
meas,
Osta
with
desire
Ower
of the
eatest
The
.
mness
about
ulti-
435.
A criticism of the philosopher. -Philosophers and
moralists merely deceive themselves when they
Ching
## p. 358 (#382) ############################################
358
THE WILL TO POWER.
imagine that they escape from decadence by
opposing it. That lies beyond their wills: and
however little they may be aware of the fact, it
is generally discovered subsequently that they
were among the most powerful promoters of
decadence.
Let us examine the philosophers of Greece-
Plato, for instance, He it was who separated the
instincts from the polis, from the love of contest,
from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the
mysteries, and the belief in tradition and in
ancestors. . . . He was the seducer of the nobles :
he himself seduces through the roturier Socrates.
. . . He denied all the first principles of the
“noble Greek” of sterling worth; he made
dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with
the tyrants, dabbled in politics for the future, and
was the example of a man whose instincts were
most perfectly separated from tradition. He is
profound and passionate in everything that is
anti-Hellenic. .
One after the other, these great philosophers
represent the typical forms of decadence: the
moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, nihilism,
(ådıápopa), cynicism, hardening principles, hedon-
ism, and reaction.
The question of "happiness," of "virtue," and
“
of the “salvation of the soul,” is the expression of
physiological contradictoriness in these declining
natures: their instincts lack all balance and
purpose.
1
## p. 359 (#383) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
436.
To what extent do dialectics and the faith in
reason rest upon moral prejudices ? With Plato
we are as the temporary inhabitants of an in-
telligible world of goodness, still in possession of
a bequest from former times: divine dialectics
taking its root in goodness leads to everything
good (it follows, therefore, that it must lead
" backwards "). Even Descartes had a notion of
the fact that, according to a thoroughly Christian
and moral attitude of mind, which includes a
belief in a good God as the Creator of all things,
the truthfulness of God guarantees the judgments
of our senses for us.
But for this religious sanction
and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence
should we obtain our right to trust in existence ?
That thinking must be a measure of reality,—that
what cannot be the subject of thought, cannot
exist is a coarse non plus ultra of a moral blind
confidence (in the essential principle of truth at
the root of all things); this in itself is a mad
assumption which our experience contradicts every
minute. We cannot think of anything precisely
as it is. .
437.
The real philosophers of Greece are those which
came before Socrates (with Socrates something
changes). They are all distinguished men, they
take their stand away from the people and from
usage; they have travelled; they are earnest to
## p. 360 (#384) ############################################
360
THE WILL TO POWER
tie pint of ssbreness, their eyes are calm, and
they are not usacquaisted with the business of
state and diplomacy. They anticipated all the
great concepts which coming sages were to have
concerning things in general: they themselves re-
presented these concepts, they made systems out
of themselves. Nothing can give a higher idea
of Greek intellect thar this sudden fruitfulness in
types, than this invo'untary completeness in the
drawing up of all the great possibilities of the
philsophical ideal. I can see only one original
figure in those that came afterwards: a late
arrival, but necessarily the last-Pyrrho the
nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the in-
fluences which had become ascendant in the mean-
time: the Socratic school, Plato, and the artistic
optimism of Heraclitus. (Pyrrho goes back to
Democritus via Protagoras. . . . )
.
Wise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly
among the humble. Devoid of pride. To live
in the vulgar way; to honour and believe what
every one believes. To be on one's guard against
science and intellect, and against everything that
puff's one out. . . . To be simply patient in the
extreme, careless and mild ;-årádela, or, better
still, mpactns. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid
πραύτης.
the tumult of the Schools; born after his time;
weary; an example of the protest of weariness
against the eagerness of dialecticians; the in-
credulity of the tired man in regard to the im-
## p. 361 (#385) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
361
.
portance of everything. He had seen Alexander;
he had seen the Indian penitents. To such late-
arrivals and creatures of great subtlety, every-
thing lowly, poor, and idiotic, is seductive. It
narcoticises : it gives them relaxation (Pascal).
On the other hand, by mixing with the crowd,
and getting confounded with the rest, they get
a little warmth. These weary creatures need
warmth. . . . To overcome contradiction; to do
away with contests ; to have no will to excel in
any way: to deny the Greek instincts. (Pyrrho
lived with his sister, who was a midwife. ) To rig
out wisdom in such a way that it no longer dis-
tinguishes; to give it the ragged mantle of poverty ;
to perform the lowest offices, and to go to market
and sell sucking-pigs. . . Sweetness, clearness,
indifference; no need of virtues that require atti-
tudes; to be equal to all even in virtue : final
conquest of one's self, final indifference,
Pyrrho and Epicurus :two forms of Greek
decadence: they are related in their hatred of
dialectics and all theatrical virtues. These two
things together were then called philosophy;
Pyrrho and Epicurus intentionally held that which
they loved in low esteem; they chose common and
even contemptible names for it, and they re-
presented a state in which one is neither ill,
healthy, lively, nor dead. . . . Epicurus was more
naif, more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more
experience of the world, had travelled more, and
was more nihilistic.
His life was a protest against
the great doctrine of Identity (Happiness = Virtue
·
= Knowledge). The proper way of living is not
promoted by science: wisdom does not make
## p. 362 (#386) ############################################
362
THE WILL TO POWER.
"wise. " . . . The proper way of living does not desire
happiness, it turns away from happiness.
438.
"
The war against the “old faith,” as Epicurus
waged it, was, strictly speaking, a struggle against
pre-existing Christianity—the struggle against a
world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified
throughout with feelings of guilt, and grown old
and sick.
Not the "moral corruption" of antiquity, but
precisely its moral infectedness was the prerequisite
which enabled Christianity to become its master.
Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed
paganism by transvaluing its values and poisoning
its innocence. We ought at last to understand
that what was then destroyed was higher than what
prevailed! Christianity grew on the soil of
psychological corruption, and could only take
root in rotten ground.
439.
Science : as a disciplinary measure or as an
instinct. --I see a decline of the instincts in Greek
philosophers : otherwise they could not have been
guilty of the profound error of regarding the
conscious state as the more valuable state. The
intensity of consciousness stands in the inverse
ratio to the ease and speed of cerebral transmis-
sion. Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view,
which is always the sign of weakened instincts.
## p. 363 (#387) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
363
We must, in sooth, seek perfect life there where
it is least conscious (that is to say, there where it is
least aware of its logic, its reasons, its means, its
intentions, and its utility). The return to the
facts of common sense, the facts of the common
man and of “paltry people. ” Honesty and intelli-
gence stored up for generations by people who are
quite unconscious of their principles, and who
even have some fear of principles. It is not
reasonable to desire a reasoning virtue. . . . A А
philosopher is compromised by such a desire.
.
.
440.
When morality—that is to say, refinement,
prudence, bravery, and equity-have been stored
up in the same way, thanks to the moral efforts
of a whole succession of generations, the collec-
tive power of this hoard of virtue projects its
rays even into that sphere where honesty is most
seldom present—the sphere of intellect. When
a thing becomes conscious, it is the sign of a
state of ill-ease in the organism; something new
has got to be found, the organism is not satisfied
or adapted, it is subject to distress, suspense, and
it is hypersensitive-precisely all this is con-
sciousness.
Genius lies in the instincts; goodness does
too. One only acts perfectly when one acts in-
stinctively. Even from the moral point of view
.
all thinking which is conscious is merely a process
of groping, and in the majority of cases an attack
on morality. Scientific honesty is always sacrificed
## p. 364 (#388) ############################################
364
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try
the experiment: put the wisest man in the
balance, and
then let him discourse upon
morality.
It could also be proved that the whole of a
man's conscious thinking shows a much lower
standard of morality than the thoughts of the
same man would show if they were led by his
instincts.
441.
The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all
the Socratic schools, proceeds from the profound
instinct that man is not made better when he is
shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based
upon reason. . . . This in the end is the nig-
gardly fact, it was the agonal instinct in all these
born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify
their personal abilities as the highest of all qualities,
and to represent every other form of goodness as
conditioned by them. The anti-scientific spirit
of all this "philosophy”: it will never admit that
it is not right.
442.
This is extraordinary. From its very earliest
beginnings, Greek philosophy carries on a struggle
against science with the weapons of a theory of
knowledge, especially of scepticism: and why is
this ? . It is always in favour of morality.
(Physicists and medical men are hated. ) Socrates,
Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics,
Epicurus, and Pyrrhoma general onslaught upon
## p. 365 (#389) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
365
.
knowledge in favour of morality. (Hatred of
dialectics also. ) There is still a problem to be
solved: they approach sophistry in order to be
rid of science. On the other hand, the physicists
are subjected to such an extent that, among
their first principles, they include the theory of
truth and of real being: for instance, the atom,
the four elements (juxtaposition of being, in order
to explain its multiformity and its transformations).
Contempt of objectivity in interests is taught:
return to practical interest, and to the personal
utility of all knowledge.
The struggle against science is directed at:
(1) its pathos (objectivity); (2) its means (that is
to say, at its utility); (3) its results (which are
considered childish). It is the same struggle
which is taken up later on by the Church in the
name of piety: the Church inherited the whole
arsenal of antiquity for her war with science.
The theory of knowledge played the same part
in the affair as it did in Kant's or the Indians'
case. There is no desire whatever to be troubled
with it, a free hand is wanted for the "purpose
that is envisaged.
Against what powers are they actually defend-
ing themselves ? Against dutifulness, against
obedience to law, against the compulsion of going
hand in hand—I believe this is what is called
Freedom. . . .
.
This is how decadence manifests itself: the
instinct of solidarity is so degenerate that solidarity
itself gets to be regarded as tyranny: no authority
or solidarity is brooked, nobody any longer
## p. 366 (#390) ############################################
366
THE WILL TO POWER.
desires to fall in with the rank and file, and to
adopt its ignobly slow pace. The slow move-
ment which is the tempo of science is generally
hated, as are also the scientific man's indifference
in regard to getting on, his long breath, and his
impersonal attitude.
443.
At bottom, morality is hostile to science:
Socrates was so already too—and the reason is,
that science considers certain things important
which have no relation whatsoever to “good”
and “evil," and which therefore reduce the gravity
of our feelings concerning “good” and “evil. "
What morality requires is that the whole of a
man should serve it with all his power: it
considers it waste on the part of a creature that
can ill afford waste, when a man earnestly troubles
his head about stars or plants.
or plants. That is why
science very quickly declined in Greece, once
Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the
disease of morality.
The mental altitudes
reached by a Democritus, a Hippocrates, and a
Thucydides, have not been reached a second
time.
444.
The problem of the philosopher and of the
scientific man. -The influence of age; depressing
habits (sedentary study à la Kant; over-work;
inadequate nourishment of the brain; reading).
A more essential question still: is it not already
perhaps a symptom of decadence when thinking
tends to establish generalities ?
## p. 367 (#391) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
367
as
Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the
will (to be able to remain detached as
possible . . . . This presupposes a tremendous
adiaphora in regard to the strong passions : a
kind of isolation, an exceptional position, opposi-
tion to the normal passions.
Type: desertion of home-country; emigrants go
ever greater distances afield; growing exoticism;
the voice of the old imperative dies away ;-and
the continual question “whither? ” (“happiness')
is a sign of emancipation from forms of organisa-
tion, a sign of breaking loose from everything.
Problem: is the man of science more of a
decadent symptom than the philosopher ? —as a
whole the scientific man is not cut loose from
everything, only a part of his being is consecrated
exclusively to the service of knowledge and
disciplined to maintain a special attitude and
point of view; in his department he is in need
of all the virtues of a strong race, of robust
health, of great severity, manliness, and intelli-
gence. He is rather a symptom of the great
multiformity of culture than of the effeteness of
the latter. The decadent scholar is a
a bad
scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has
always been reckoned hitherto as the typical
philosopher.
445
Among philosophers, nothing is more rare than
intellectual uprightness: they perhaps say the very
reverse, and even believe it.
But the prerequisite
of all their work is, that they can only admit of
## p. 368 (#392) ############################################
368
THE WILL TO POWER.
certain truths; they know what they have to
prove; and the fact that they must be agreed as to
these “ truths” is almost what makes them recog-
nise one another as philosophers. There are, for
instance, the truths of morality. But belief in
morality is not a proof of morality: there are
cases—and the philosopher's case is one in point
—when a belief of this sort is simply a piece of
immorality.
446.
What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher ?
--He teaches that the qualities which he happens
to possess are the only qualities that exist, that
they are indispensable to those who wish to attain
to the “highest good” (for instance, dialectics with
Plato). He would have all men raise themselves,
gradatim, to his type as the highest. He de-
spises what is generally esteemed—by him a gulf
is cleft between the highest priestly values and the
values of the world. He knows what is true, who
God is, what every one's goal should be, and the
way thereto. . . . The typical philosopher is
thus an absolute dogmatist ;-if he requires scepti-
cism at all it is only in order to be able to speak
dogmatically of his principal purpose.
447.
When the philosopher is confronted with his
rival-science, for instance, he becomes a sceptic;
then he appropriates a form of knowledge which
he denies to the man of science; he goes hand in
## p. 369 (#393) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
369
hand with the priest so that he may not be sus-
pected of atheism or materialism; he considers
an attack made upon himself as an attack upon
morals, religion, virtue, and order-he knows how
to bring his opponents into ill repute by calling
them seducers and “underminers”: then he
marches shoulder to shoulder with power.
The philosopher at war with other philosophers:
-he does his best to compel them to appear like
anarchists, disbelievers, opponents of authority.
In short, when he fights, he fights exactly like a
priest and like the priesthood.
3. THE TRUTHS AND ERRORS OF
PHILOSOPHERS.
448.
Philosophy defined by Kant: “ The science of
the limitations of reason”! !
449.
According to Aristotle, Philosophy is the art
of discovering truth. On the other hand, the
Epicureans, who availed themselves of Aristotle's
sensual theory of knowledge, retorted in ironical
opposition to the search for truth : “Philosophy is
the art of Life. "
450.
The three great naïvetés :-
Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if .
. );
VOL. I.
2 A
## p. 370 (#394) ############################################
370
THE WILL TO POWER.
Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if . . . );
Knowledge as a means to the “ denial of Life"
-inasmuch as it leads to disappointment-(as
if . . . ).
451.
As if there were one“ truth" which one could
by some means approach!
452.
.
.
suspicious period in the history of the human
intellect.
The first great example: in the name of
morality and under its patronage, a great wrong
was committed, which as a matter of fact was
in every respect an act of decadence. Sufficient
stress cannot be laid upon this fact, that the
great Greek philosophers not only represented
.
## p. 348 (#372) ############################################
348
THE WILL TO POWER.
»
the decadence of every kind of Greek ability, but
also made it contagious. . . . This “virtue" made
wholly abstract was the highest form of seduction;
to make oneself abstract means to turn one's back
on the world.
The moment is a very remarkable one: the
Sophists are within sight of the first criticism of
morality, the first knowledge of morality :—they
classify the majority of moral valuations (in view
of their dependence upon local conditions) together;
- they lead one to understand that every form of
morality is capable of being upheld dialectically:
that is to say, they guessed that all the funda-
mental principles of a morality must be sophistical
-a proposition which was afterwards proved in
the grandest possible style by the ancient philoso-
phers from Plato onwards (up to Kant) ;—they
postulate the primary truth that there is no such
thing as a "moral per se," a "good per se," and
that it is madness to talk of “truth” in this
respect.
Wherever was intellectual uprightness to be found
in those days?
The Greek culture of the Sophists had grown
out of all the Greek instincts; it belongs to the
culture of the age of Pericles as necessarily as
Plato does not: it has its predecessors in Hera-
clitus, Democritus, and in the scientific types of
the old philosophy; it finds expression in the
elevated culture of Thucydides, for instance, And
—it has ultimately shown itself to be right: every
step in the science of epistemology and morality
has confirmed the attitude of the Sophists. . . . Our
## p. 349 (#373) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
349
.
modern attitude of mind is, to a great extent,
Heraclitean, Democritean, and Protagorean .
to say that it is Protagorean is even sufficient :
because Protagoras was in himself a synthesis of
the two men Heraclitus and Democritus.
(Plato : a great Cagliostro, let us think of how
Epicurus judged him; how Timon, Pyrrho's friend,
judged him Is Plato's integrity by any chance
beyond question ? . . . But we at least know
what he wished to have taught as absolute truth
-namely, things which were to him not even
relative truths: the separate and immortal life of
souls. ")
429.
.
The Sophists are nothing more nor less than
realists: they elevate all the values and practices
which are common property to the rank of values
—they have the courage, peculiar to all strong
intellects, which consists in knowing their im-
morality.
Is it to be supposed that these small Greek
independent republics, so filled with rage and envy
that they would fain have devoured each other,
were led by principles of humanity and honesty?
Is Thucydides by any chance reproached with
the words he puts into the mouths of the Athenian
ambassadors when they were treating with the
Melii anent the question of destruction or sub-
mission ? Only the most perfect Tartuffes could
have been able to speak of virtue in the midst of
that dreadful strain—or if not Tartuffes, at least
detached philosophers, anchorites, exiles, and fleers
## p. 350 (#374) ############################################
350
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
from reality. . . . All of them, people who denied
things in order to be able to exist.
The Sophists were Greeks: when Socrates and
Plato adopted the cause of virtue and justice, they
were Jews or I know not what. Grote's tactics
in the defence of the Sophists are false: he would
like to raise them to the rank of men of honour
and moralisers-but it was their honour not to
indulge in any humbug with grand words and
virtues,
430.
The great reasonableness underlying all moral
education lay in the fact that it always attempted
to attain to the certainty of an instinct: so that
neither good intentions nor good means, as such,
first required to enter consciousness. Just as the
soldier learns his exercises, so should man learn
how to act in life, In truth this unconsciousness
belongs to every kind of perfection: even the
mathematician carries out his calculations un-
consciously. .
What, then, does Socrates' reaction mean, which
recommended dialectics as the way to virtue, and
which was amused when morality was unable to
justify itself logically ? But this is precisely what
proves its superiority--without unconsciousness it
is worth nothing!
In reality it means the dissolution of Greek
instincts, when demonstrability is posited as the
first condition of personal excellence in virtue.
All these great "men of virtue" and of words are
themselves types of dissolution.
## p. 351 (#375) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
351
»
In practice, it means that moral judgments have
been torn from the conditions among which they
grew and in which alone they had some sense, from
their Greek and Græco-political soil, in order to
be denaturalised under the cover of being sub-
limated. The great concepts "good" and "just"
are divorced from the first principles of which they
form a part, and, as “ideas” become free, degenerate
into subjects for discussion. A certain truth is
sought behind them; they are regarded as entities
or as symbols of entities: a world is invented where
they are “at home," and from which they are
supposed to hail.
In short: the scandal reaches its apotheosis in
Plato. . . . And then it was necessary to invent
the abstract perfect man also good, just, wise,
and a dialectician to boot-in short, the scarecrow
of the ancient philosopher: a plant without any
soil whatsoever; a human race devoid of all
definite ruling instincts; a virtue which“ justifies
itself with reasons. The perfectly absurd “in-
dividual” per se! the highest form of Artifici-
ality. . . .
Briefly, the denaturalisation of moral values
resulted in the creation of a degenerate type of
man—"the good man," "the happy man," "the
“
wise man. "-Socrates represents a moment of the
most profound perversity in the history of values.
.
"
431.
Socrates. This veering round of Greek taste
in favour of dialectics is a great question. What
## p. 352 (#376) ############################################
352
THE WILL TO POWER,
1
1
3
really happened then ? Socrates, the roturier
who was responsible for it, was thus able to
triumph over a more noble taste, the taste of the
noble :—the mob gets the upper hand along with
dialectics. Previous to Socrates dialectic manners
were repudiated in good society; they were re-
garded as indecent; the youths were warned
against them. What was the purpose of this
display of reasons? Why demonstrate? Against
others one could use authority. One commanded,
and that sufficed. Among friends, inter pares,
there was tradition—also a form of authority:
and last but not least, one understood each other,
There was no room found for dialectics. Besides,
all such modes of presenting reasons were dis-
trusted. All honest things do not carry their
reasons in their hands in such fashion. It is
indecent to show all the five fingers at the same
time. That which can be “demonstrated” is
little worth. The instinct of every party-speaker
tells him that dialectics excites mistrust and
carries little conviction. Nothing is more easily
wiped away than the effect of a dialectician. It can
a
only be a means of self-defence. One must be in an
extremity ; it is necessary to have to extort one's
rights; otherwise one makes no use of dialectics.
That is why the Jews were dialecticians, Reynard
the Fox was a dialectician, and so was Socrates,
As a dialectician a person has a merciless instru-
ment in his hand: he can play the tyrant with
it; he compromises when he conquers. The
dialectician leaves it to his opponent to demon-
strate that he is not an idiot; he is made furious
1
## p. 353 (#377) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
353
O
and helpless, while the dialectician himself remains
calm and still possessed of his triumphant reason-
ing powers—he paralyses his opponent's intellect.
—The dialectician's irony is a form of mob-
revenge: the ferocity of the oppressed lies in the
cold knife-cuts of the syllogism. .
In Plato, as in all men of excessive sensuality
and wild fancies, the charm of concepts was so
great, that he involuntarily honoured and deified
the concept as a form of ideal. Dialectical intori-
cation: as the consciousness of being able to
exercise control over one's self by means of it-
as an instrument of the Will to Power.
432.
a
The problem of Socrates. The two antitheses :
.
the tragic and the Socratic spirits — measured
according to the law of Life.
To what extent is the Socratic spirit a
decadent phenomenon ? to what extent are
robust health and power still revealed by the
whole attitude of the scientific man, his dialectics,
his ability, and his severity? (the health of the
plebeian; whose malice, esprit frondeur, whose
astuteness, whose rascally depths, are held in
check by his cleverness; the whole type is “ugly").
Uglification : self-derision, dialectical dryness,
intelligence in the form of a tyrant against the
" tyrant” (instinct). Everything in Socrates is
exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature; he is
buffoon with the blood of Voltaire in his veins,
z
a
VOL. I.
## p. 354 (#378) ############################################
354
THE WILL TO POWER.
He discovers a new form of agon; he is the first
fencing-master in the superior classes of Athens;
he stands for nothing else than the highest form of
cleverness: he calls it “virtue" (he regarded it
as a means of salvation; he did not choose to be
clever, cleverness was de rigueur); the proper
thing is to control one's self in suchwise that one
enters into a struggle not with passions but with
reasons as one's weapons (Spinoza's stratagem
-the unravelment of the errors of passion) ;—it is
desirable to discover how every one may be caught
once he is goaded into a passion, and to know
how illogically passion proceeds; self-mockery is
practised in order to injure the very roots of the
feelings of resentment.
It is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic
states form a part of the Socratic problem : its
association of reason, virtue, and happiness. With
this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things
it succeeded in charming the world : ancient philo-
sophy could not rid itself of this doctrine.
Absolute lack of objective interest: hatred of
science: the idiosyncrasy of considering one's self
a problem. Acoustic hallucinations in Socrates :
.
morbid element. When the intellect is rich and
independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying
itself with morality. How is it that Socrates is
a moral-maniac? —Every “practical” philosophy
"
immediately steps into the foreground in times of
distress. When morality and religion become the
chief interests of a community, they are signs of a
state of distress
»
1
## p. 355 (#379) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY,
433.
Intelligence, clearness, hardness, and logic as
weapons against the wildness of the instincts.
The latter must be dangerous and must threaten
ruin, otherwise no purpose can be served by
developing intelligence to this degree of tyranny.
In order to make a tyrant of intelligence the
instincts must first have proved themselves tyrants.
This is the problem. It was a very timely one
in those days. Reason became virtue - virtue
equalled happiness.
Solution : Greek philosophers stand upon the
same fundamental fact of their inner experiences as
Socrates does; five feet from excess, from anarchy
and from dissolution-all decadent men.
They
regard him as a doctor : Logic as will to power, as
will to control self, as will to “happiness. ” The
wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a
sign of decadence, as is also the superfotation
of logic and clear reasoning in him.
Both are
abnormities, each belongs to the other.
Criticism. Decadence reveals itself in this con-
cern about "happiness" (i. e. about the "salvation
of the soul"; i. e. to feel that one's condition is a
danger). Its fanatical interest in "happiness
)
shows the pathological condition of the subcon-
scious self: it was a vital interest. The alternative
which faced them all was: to be reasonable or to
perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows
that they felt they were in danger,
2)
3)
## p. 356 (#380) ############################################
356
THE WILL TO POWER.
434.
Why everything resolved itself into mummery. -
Rudimentary psychology, which only considered
the conscious lapses of men (as causes), which re-
garded “ consciousness” as an attribute of the soul,
and which sought a will behind every action (i. e.
an intention), could only answer “Happiness” to
the question : “ What does man desire ? ” (it was
impossible to answer “Power," because that would
have been immoral);—consequently behind all
men's actions there is the intention of attaining
to happiness by means of them. Secondly: if
man as a matter of fact does not attain to happi-
ness, why is it?
Because he mistakes the means
thereto. - What is the unfailing means of acquiring
happiness ? Answer: virtue. —Why virtue? Be-
cause virtue is supreme rationalness, and rational-
ness makes mistakes in the choice of means
impossible: virtue in the form of reason is the
way to happiness. Dialectics is the constant
occupation of virtue, because it does away with
passion and intellectual cloudiness.
As a matter of fact, man does not desire
“ happiness. " Pleasure is a sensation of power: :
if the passions are excluded, those states of the
mind are also excluded which afford the greatest
sensation of power and therefore of pleasure. The
highest rationalism is a state of cool clearness,
which is very far from being able to bring about
that feeling of power which every kind of exalta-
tion involves.
The ancient philosophers combat everything
.
## p. 357 (#381) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
357
220":
ix:
ind
LOK
odby:
hann
that intoxicates and exalts—everything that im-
pairs the perfect coolness and impartiality of the
mind. . . They were consistent with their first
false principle: that consciousness was the highest,
the supreme state of mind, the prerequisite of
perfection—whereas the reverse is true.
Any kind of action is imperfect in proportion as
it has been willed or conscious. The philosophers
of antiquity were the greatest duffers in practice,
because they condemned themselves theoretically
to dufferdom. . . . In practice everything resolved
itself into theatricalness: and he who saw through
it, as Pyrrho did, for instance, thought as every-
body did—that is to say, that in goodness and
uprightness “paltry people” were far superior to
philosophers.
All the deeper natures of antiquity were dis-
gusted at the philosophers of virtue; all people
saw in them was brawlers and actors. (This was
the judgment passed on Plato by Epicurus and
Pyrrho. )
Result : In practical life, in patience, goodness,
and mutual assistance, paltry people were above
them :—this is something like the judgment
Dostoiewsky or Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks:
they are more philosophical in practice, they are
more courageous in their way of dealing with the
exigencies of life. . . .
- messi
Tquiries
7 Bio
ationa?
meas,
Osta
with
desire
Ower
of the
eatest
The
.
mness
about
ulti-
435.
A criticism of the philosopher. -Philosophers and
moralists merely deceive themselves when they
Ching
## p. 358 (#382) ############################################
358
THE WILL TO POWER.
imagine that they escape from decadence by
opposing it. That lies beyond their wills: and
however little they may be aware of the fact, it
is generally discovered subsequently that they
were among the most powerful promoters of
decadence.
Let us examine the philosophers of Greece-
Plato, for instance, He it was who separated the
instincts from the polis, from the love of contest,
from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the
mysteries, and the belief in tradition and in
ancestors. . . . He was the seducer of the nobles :
he himself seduces through the roturier Socrates.
. . . He denied all the first principles of the
“noble Greek” of sterling worth; he made
dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with
the tyrants, dabbled in politics for the future, and
was the example of a man whose instincts were
most perfectly separated from tradition. He is
profound and passionate in everything that is
anti-Hellenic. .
One after the other, these great philosophers
represent the typical forms of decadence: the
moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy, nihilism,
(ådıápopa), cynicism, hardening principles, hedon-
ism, and reaction.
The question of "happiness," of "virtue," and
“
of the “salvation of the soul,” is the expression of
physiological contradictoriness in these declining
natures: their instincts lack all balance and
purpose.
1
## p. 359 (#383) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
436.
To what extent do dialectics and the faith in
reason rest upon moral prejudices ? With Plato
we are as the temporary inhabitants of an in-
telligible world of goodness, still in possession of
a bequest from former times: divine dialectics
taking its root in goodness leads to everything
good (it follows, therefore, that it must lead
" backwards "). Even Descartes had a notion of
the fact that, according to a thoroughly Christian
and moral attitude of mind, which includes a
belief in a good God as the Creator of all things,
the truthfulness of God guarantees the judgments
of our senses for us.
But for this religious sanction
and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence
should we obtain our right to trust in existence ?
That thinking must be a measure of reality,—that
what cannot be the subject of thought, cannot
exist is a coarse non plus ultra of a moral blind
confidence (in the essential principle of truth at
the root of all things); this in itself is a mad
assumption which our experience contradicts every
minute. We cannot think of anything precisely
as it is. .
437.
The real philosophers of Greece are those which
came before Socrates (with Socrates something
changes). They are all distinguished men, they
take their stand away from the people and from
usage; they have travelled; they are earnest to
## p. 360 (#384) ############################################
360
THE WILL TO POWER
tie pint of ssbreness, their eyes are calm, and
they are not usacquaisted with the business of
state and diplomacy. They anticipated all the
great concepts which coming sages were to have
concerning things in general: they themselves re-
presented these concepts, they made systems out
of themselves. Nothing can give a higher idea
of Greek intellect thar this sudden fruitfulness in
types, than this invo'untary completeness in the
drawing up of all the great possibilities of the
philsophical ideal. I can see only one original
figure in those that came afterwards: a late
arrival, but necessarily the last-Pyrrho the
nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the in-
fluences which had become ascendant in the mean-
time: the Socratic school, Plato, and the artistic
optimism of Heraclitus. (Pyrrho goes back to
Democritus via Protagoras. . . . )
.
Wise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly
among the humble. Devoid of pride. To live
in the vulgar way; to honour and believe what
every one believes. To be on one's guard against
science and intellect, and against everything that
puff's one out. . . . To be simply patient in the
extreme, careless and mild ;-årádela, or, better
still, mpactns. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid
πραύτης.
the tumult of the Schools; born after his time;
weary; an example of the protest of weariness
against the eagerness of dialecticians; the in-
credulity of the tired man in regard to the im-
## p. 361 (#385) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
361
.
portance of everything. He had seen Alexander;
he had seen the Indian penitents. To such late-
arrivals and creatures of great subtlety, every-
thing lowly, poor, and idiotic, is seductive. It
narcoticises : it gives them relaxation (Pascal).
On the other hand, by mixing with the crowd,
and getting confounded with the rest, they get
a little warmth. These weary creatures need
warmth. . . . To overcome contradiction; to do
away with contests ; to have no will to excel in
any way: to deny the Greek instincts. (Pyrrho
lived with his sister, who was a midwife. ) To rig
out wisdom in such a way that it no longer dis-
tinguishes; to give it the ragged mantle of poverty ;
to perform the lowest offices, and to go to market
and sell sucking-pigs. . . Sweetness, clearness,
indifference; no need of virtues that require atti-
tudes; to be equal to all even in virtue : final
conquest of one's self, final indifference,
Pyrrho and Epicurus :two forms of Greek
decadence: they are related in their hatred of
dialectics and all theatrical virtues. These two
things together were then called philosophy;
Pyrrho and Epicurus intentionally held that which
they loved in low esteem; they chose common and
even contemptible names for it, and they re-
presented a state in which one is neither ill,
healthy, lively, nor dead. . . . Epicurus was more
naif, more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more
experience of the world, had travelled more, and
was more nihilistic.
His life was a protest against
the great doctrine of Identity (Happiness = Virtue
·
= Knowledge). The proper way of living is not
promoted by science: wisdom does not make
## p. 362 (#386) ############################################
362
THE WILL TO POWER.
"wise. " . . . The proper way of living does not desire
happiness, it turns away from happiness.
438.
"
The war against the “old faith,” as Epicurus
waged it, was, strictly speaking, a struggle against
pre-existing Christianity—the struggle against a
world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified
throughout with feelings of guilt, and grown old
and sick.
Not the "moral corruption" of antiquity, but
precisely its moral infectedness was the prerequisite
which enabled Christianity to become its master.
Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed
paganism by transvaluing its values and poisoning
its innocence. We ought at last to understand
that what was then destroyed was higher than what
prevailed! Christianity grew on the soil of
psychological corruption, and could only take
root in rotten ground.
439.
Science : as a disciplinary measure or as an
instinct. --I see a decline of the instincts in Greek
philosophers : otherwise they could not have been
guilty of the profound error of regarding the
conscious state as the more valuable state. The
intensity of consciousness stands in the inverse
ratio to the ease and speed of cerebral transmis-
sion. Greek philosophy upheld the opposite view,
which is always the sign of weakened instincts.
## p. 363 (#387) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
363
We must, in sooth, seek perfect life there where
it is least conscious (that is to say, there where it is
least aware of its logic, its reasons, its means, its
intentions, and its utility). The return to the
facts of common sense, the facts of the common
man and of “paltry people. ” Honesty and intelli-
gence stored up for generations by people who are
quite unconscious of their principles, and who
even have some fear of principles. It is not
reasonable to desire a reasoning virtue. . . . A А
philosopher is compromised by such a desire.
.
.
440.
When morality—that is to say, refinement,
prudence, bravery, and equity-have been stored
up in the same way, thanks to the moral efforts
of a whole succession of generations, the collec-
tive power of this hoard of virtue projects its
rays even into that sphere where honesty is most
seldom present—the sphere of intellect. When
a thing becomes conscious, it is the sign of a
state of ill-ease in the organism; something new
has got to be found, the organism is not satisfied
or adapted, it is subject to distress, suspense, and
it is hypersensitive-precisely all this is con-
sciousness.
Genius lies in the instincts; goodness does
too. One only acts perfectly when one acts in-
stinctively. Even from the moral point of view
.
all thinking which is conscious is merely a process
of groping, and in the majority of cases an attack
on morality. Scientific honesty is always sacrificed
## p. 364 (#388) ############################################
364
THE WILL TO POWER.
.
when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try
the experiment: put the wisest man in the
balance, and
then let him discourse upon
morality.
It could also be proved that the whole of a
man's conscious thinking shows a much lower
standard of morality than the thoughts of the
same man would show if they were led by his
instincts.
441.
The struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all
the Socratic schools, proceeds from the profound
instinct that man is not made better when he is
shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based
upon reason. . . . This in the end is the nig-
gardly fact, it was the agonal instinct in all these
born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify
their personal abilities as the highest of all qualities,
and to represent every other form of goodness as
conditioned by them. The anti-scientific spirit
of all this "philosophy”: it will never admit that
it is not right.
442.
This is extraordinary. From its very earliest
beginnings, Greek philosophy carries on a struggle
against science with the weapons of a theory of
knowledge, especially of scepticism: and why is
this ? . It is always in favour of morality.
(Physicists and medical men are hated. ) Socrates,
Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics,
Epicurus, and Pyrrhoma general onslaught upon
## p. 365 (#389) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
365
.
knowledge in favour of morality. (Hatred of
dialectics also. ) There is still a problem to be
solved: they approach sophistry in order to be
rid of science. On the other hand, the physicists
are subjected to such an extent that, among
their first principles, they include the theory of
truth and of real being: for instance, the atom,
the four elements (juxtaposition of being, in order
to explain its multiformity and its transformations).
Contempt of objectivity in interests is taught:
return to practical interest, and to the personal
utility of all knowledge.
The struggle against science is directed at:
(1) its pathos (objectivity); (2) its means (that is
to say, at its utility); (3) its results (which are
considered childish). It is the same struggle
which is taken up later on by the Church in the
name of piety: the Church inherited the whole
arsenal of antiquity for her war with science.
The theory of knowledge played the same part
in the affair as it did in Kant's or the Indians'
case. There is no desire whatever to be troubled
with it, a free hand is wanted for the "purpose
that is envisaged.
Against what powers are they actually defend-
ing themselves ? Against dutifulness, against
obedience to law, against the compulsion of going
hand in hand—I believe this is what is called
Freedom. . . .
.
This is how decadence manifests itself: the
instinct of solidarity is so degenerate that solidarity
itself gets to be regarded as tyranny: no authority
or solidarity is brooked, nobody any longer
## p. 366 (#390) ############################################
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THE WILL TO POWER.
desires to fall in with the rank and file, and to
adopt its ignobly slow pace. The slow move-
ment which is the tempo of science is generally
hated, as are also the scientific man's indifference
in regard to getting on, his long breath, and his
impersonal attitude.
443.
At bottom, morality is hostile to science:
Socrates was so already too—and the reason is,
that science considers certain things important
which have no relation whatsoever to “good”
and “evil," and which therefore reduce the gravity
of our feelings concerning “good” and “evil. "
What morality requires is that the whole of a
man should serve it with all his power: it
considers it waste on the part of a creature that
can ill afford waste, when a man earnestly troubles
his head about stars or plants.
or plants. That is why
science very quickly declined in Greece, once
Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the
disease of morality.
The mental altitudes
reached by a Democritus, a Hippocrates, and a
Thucydides, have not been reached a second
time.
444.
The problem of the philosopher and of the
scientific man. -The influence of age; depressing
habits (sedentary study à la Kant; over-work;
inadequate nourishment of the brain; reading).
A more essential question still: is it not already
perhaps a symptom of decadence when thinking
tends to establish generalities ?
## p. 367 (#391) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
367
as
Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the
will (to be able to remain detached as
possible . . . . This presupposes a tremendous
adiaphora in regard to the strong passions : a
kind of isolation, an exceptional position, opposi-
tion to the normal passions.
Type: desertion of home-country; emigrants go
ever greater distances afield; growing exoticism;
the voice of the old imperative dies away ;-and
the continual question “whither? ” (“happiness')
is a sign of emancipation from forms of organisa-
tion, a sign of breaking loose from everything.
Problem: is the man of science more of a
decadent symptom than the philosopher ? —as a
whole the scientific man is not cut loose from
everything, only a part of his being is consecrated
exclusively to the service of knowledge and
disciplined to maintain a special attitude and
point of view; in his department he is in need
of all the virtues of a strong race, of robust
health, of great severity, manliness, and intelli-
gence. He is rather a symptom of the great
multiformity of culture than of the effeteness of
the latter. The decadent scholar is a
a bad
scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has
always been reckoned hitherto as the typical
philosopher.
445
Among philosophers, nothing is more rare than
intellectual uprightness: they perhaps say the very
reverse, and even believe it.
But the prerequisite
of all their work is, that they can only admit of
## p. 368 (#392) ############################################
368
THE WILL TO POWER.
certain truths; they know what they have to
prove; and the fact that they must be agreed as to
these “ truths” is almost what makes them recog-
nise one another as philosophers. There are, for
instance, the truths of morality. But belief in
morality is not a proof of morality: there are
cases—and the philosopher's case is one in point
—when a belief of this sort is simply a piece of
immorality.
446.
What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher ?
--He teaches that the qualities which he happens
to possess are the only qualities that exist, that
they are indispensable to those who wish to attain
to the “highest good” (for instance, dialectics with
Plato). He would have all men raise themselves,
gradatim, to his type as the highest. He de-
spises what is generally esteemed—by him a gulf
is cleft between the highest priestly values and the
values of the world. He knows what is true, who
God is, what every one's goal should be, and the
way thereto. . . . The typical philosopher is
thus an absolute dogmatist ;-if he requires scepti-
cism at all it is only in order to be able to speak
dogmatically of his principal purpose.
447.
When the philosopher is confronted with his
rival-science, for instance, he becomes a sceptic;
then he appropriates a form of knowledge which
he denies to the man of science; he goes hand in
## p. 369 (#393) ############################################
CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.
369
hand with the priest so that he may not be sus-
pected of atheism or materialism; he considers
an attack made upon himself as an attack upon
morals, religion, virtue, and order-he knows how
to bring his opponents into ill repute by calling
them seducers and “underminers”: then he
marches shoulder to shoulder with power.
The philosopher at war with other philosophers:
-he does his best to compel them to appear like
anarchists, disbelievers, opponents of authority.
In short, when he fights, he fights exactly like a
priest and like the priesthood.
3. THE TRUTHS AND ERRORS OF
PHILOSOPHERS.
448.
Philosophy defined by Kant: “ The science of
the limitations of reason”! !
449.
According to Aristotle, Philosophy is the art
of discovering truth. On the other hand, the
Epicureans, who availed themselves of Aristotle's
sensual theory of knowledge, retorted in ironical
opposition to the search for truth : “Philosophy is
the art of Life. "
450.
The three great naïvetés :-
Knowledge as a means of happiness (as if .
. );
VOL. I.
2 A
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THE WILL TO POWER.
Knowledge as a means to virtue (as if . . . );
Knowledge as a means to the “ denial of Life"
-inasmuch as it leads to disappointment-(as
if . . . ).
451.
As if there were one“ truth" which one could
by some means approach!
452.
.
.
