No More Learning

ButnottooffendaPersonso nice and tender j (for Alcibiades being accustom'd to the diversified and florid Discourses of the Sophists,
did not like to hear the fame thing twice, but lov'd Change and Variety in Language as well as in his Clothes) Socrates takes another Course, and asks him, ifthat whichisComely orHonourable isalways good, orwhetheritsometimesceasestobeso.
Alcibiades
? ? [02
An Abridgment of the
Alabiadesarrfwers,thatthereare Comely andHo
norableThings which aresometimesEvil. ForEx
ample, ina Battle, whenaMan succours hisFriend
and is kill'd in the Action,this Action is Honourable ,
but'tisFatal. AnotherabandonshisFriend, ande- scapesdanger? ,thisActionisEvilbut 'tisuseful.
Socratesanswers, thatthesuccour aMan gives his Friend is, that which is calFd Valour, which is athingquitedifferentfromDeath, andthatthere foretheseoughttobeconsider'dseperately. Sothat t h e Q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r V a l o u r b e a G o o d o r a n Evil.
Alabiadesanswers, that'tisagreatGood, and that he would not preserve his Life upon the Condition ofbeing a Coward.
Then(says&Krrfto)you confess that Cowardiscisa
greater Evil than Death : So that Valour is a greater
Good than Life, and consequently the Action of
succouringone'sFriendisgood,consider'dasabstracted
fromallitsconsequences-,ifitisGood itisHonour
able, anditcan'tbeHonourable, withoutbeinguse
ful ; for whatsoever is Comely isGood, and that
w h i c h i s G o o d i s U s e f u l :, t h e r e b e i n g n o t h i n g t h a t
is C o m e l y and Honourable that can be Evil so far as itisHonourable ? ,nor any thing which isShameful,
thatcanbeGood sofarasitisShameful,whichhe proves by this invincible Argument : Those that do goodActionsarehappy :Men can'tbehappy butby thePossessionofGood; thePossessionofGood isthe Consequence of a good Life $ therefore Happiness necessarily attends those that do good Actions ; so that HappineiS is a Comely and Honourable Thing,
and consequently that which isgood, that which is comely, and thatwhichisuseful,areneverdiffe
rentonefromanother. ThereforeJusticebeingCome lyandGood can'tbeoppos'dtoUtility; . ?
Alcibiades not only grants all these Truths ; hxitii thePersonthataffirms'em';forheis convinfc'dby himself and 'tis himself that makes the'Answers. He thereforeadmireshow itcomestopassxh. itth6 Things about which Sctrates interso'gates'hist! ,appeaf
? ? Ftrjl Alcibiades? 30$
to him with quite another aspectthan they had done before:Hereupon heaskshowitcomesabout,that upon the fame Subject he is forc'd to answer some timesafteronemanner, andsometimesafteranother.
Socrates informs him that this proceeds from his
Ignorance, because we never contradict our selves
intheThings we know;but'tisimpossibleforthe
Mind not to errinthoseThingsofwhich we are
ignorant. Butthisdoesnotariseabsolutelyfrom Ignorance? ,since'tiscertainwe nevercommit any
Fault in Things of which w e are ignorant, provided w e k n o w o u r o w n I g n o r a n c e -, b u t i t s p r i n g s f r o m a conceal'd Ignorance, when we think we know what
indeedwedonotunderstand. Andthiswasexact lytheCaseofAlcibiades, whowasgoingtointer meddle with Affairs of State in which he had not beeninstructed. AdeplorableCondition! Butsuch aswascommon to him withalmostallthathadgo vern'dtheAthenians, onlyPericlesperhapsmay be excepted.
Alcibiades observesthatPericlesdidnotarriveat so great a Capacity ofhimself , but had acquir'd his great Abilities in the Conversation of Philosophers andPoliticians. Forstill(fayshe)asoldasheis, he converses with Damon the greatest ofall our Po liticians.
Socrates, who perceivestheTendencyofthisAn swerofAlcibiaies, insinuatestohim, thattheCom panyofthosegreatMen wasveryusefulforthe, Acquirement ofVertue,inwhichtrueAccomplish mentaloneconsists. AndthisheprovesbytheEx ample ofPericleshimself,whohadnotbeenable to teach his o w n Children any thing, a sure sign that Vertuecannotbetaught, andthathehimselfhadnot learn'd it from Men, because "tis the Gift of Gcd, and there is nothing of Good in us, but what he implants j but this being too general a Question he reserves itto be treated elsewhere,and confining him selftohisSubject, hecarriesonhisDesign, which istoconfoundthePrideofAlcibiades. Therefore
he
? ? j04 Jn Abridgmentof the
he asks him how he intends to dispose ofhimself; Alciblades answers, that hell endeavour to get himself instructed ; but at the same time gives him
1to understand, that since they who then concern'd
themselves in Affairs of State were most of 'em ig norant Persons, he should not be obliged to give
himself"so much trouble to excel 'em ? , and that
since he had good Natural Parts itwould be an easy matter for him to out-do 'em:
Socrates amaz'd at the baseness of this Sentiment, whichisbuttoocommon,givesMm anadmirable Lessonuponit. Herepresents-tohim,thatnothing ismoreunworthyofagreatMind,thanforaMan topropose tohimselfonlytosurpassignorantPeo ple and Slaves : That a Statesman will never serve his Countrey well, if he is not a greater Man, not onlythantheCitizenswhom hegoverns,biitalso than their Enemies j that the Athenians being com monly in W a r with the Lacedemonians, or the King ofPersia ; he ought to strive to excel those Enemies in Capacity and Vertue.
AlcibiadeslikeayoungSpark fullofVanity^asks ifthe Kings of Lacedemonia, and the*King of Persia were not made like otherMen.
Socratesshewshim, thatifitwereso, heought toformagreatIdeaof'eminhisMind5 thatsohe mighttakethegreatercareofhimself, andrender himselfstillmoreAccomplish'd. Butthattherewas solittleTruthinthis,viz-, thattheyweremade like other men,that no Persons in the world seem'dsogreat as they, either for Birth, or Education, or the extent of
theirDominions. And tomortifyAlcibiadesthemore, . he Opposes the manner of his Birth and Education to thatoftheKingsof'Persia: WhenaKingofPersia is born (fays Socrates) all the People that are spread overthatvastEmpirecelebratehisNativity, and afterwardsthatDayisannuallykept asoneoftheir
greatestFestivals, sothatinalltheProvinces. of Asia, nothingistobeseenbutSacrificesand. Feasts. -' Whereas (fayshe) when we areborn, my DearAl-
abiddesi
? ? First Alcibiades.
3 0 5
cibiades, that Passage cf the Comtek Poet may be applied to us.
%he ~Newsfcar. ee to our nearest Neighbours comes-. When the, Child is born he is nurs'd under the Con ductofthemostvertuousEunuchs, who snapsand fashionhisBody. When heisabout sevenYearsofAge
they begin to let him fee Horses, and to put him
undertheCareofQuerries. HeperformshisEx
ercisestillheisfourteen, audfromthatAgethey
give him four of the greatest, and most vertuous
LordsoftheCountry/ ThefirstteacheshimPie
ty; the second forms his Mind to Truth and Jus1
ticej. thethirdinstructshim tobefree,. andtocon quer his Passions ? , and the last teaches him to de
spise Dangers and Death: For if a King should be fearfulhewouldbecomeaSlave. Whereasyou Alcibiades, have been brought up by a vile Thraci- anSlave, who wasgood forno otherOffice,because of his extream old Age. As for Riches, there is still as great a Disproportion ; the Lacedemonians
being richer than all Greece together, and yet hav inganEstatebutlikethatofaprivateMan incom parisonoftheKingofYerfia. Infine(sayshe) there is so great a disparity in every thing, between these Kings and you, that if one should go and tell theMotherofKingAgis,ortheMotherofArtax-
erxes, that a Citizen of Athens, nam'd Alcibiades, waspreparingtogoandmakeWarintheirCoun try, they would certainly imagine that long Exer cise, great Experience, and a consummate Wisdom hadinspir'dyouwithsogreataDesign. Buthow would they be surpriz'd, if they should ,be told that 'tis no such Matter ! that you are you;ig, ignorant and presumptuous ; that you never would take care to cultivate your Mind, and that you have no other Fund to carry on so great a Design, but your Beauty, your fine Shape, your Extraction,
your Riches, and the Advantages of a happy Genius ! They would look upon you as a Fool, because in all these things the Lacedemoni-
X ans
? ? io6
An Abridgmentofthe
ansandPersiansinfinitelysurpassus. Isitnota
very shameful thing, that the very Women among
our Enemies know better than you your felt what
you ought tobe, to attempt to make War against
'em with any hope of Success? Don't think there
forethatyouhavetodowithordinaryMen. But
imagine you have the greatest Project in the World
inyourheadj andeitherrenounceyourAmbition,
or rouze irom this Stupidity into which you have
castyour ielf. The Glory with which you are so
much charm'd is not acquir'd without a great deal of Toil and Labour ? , and if you would attain it
? you must take care of your self-, that is, you must
endeavourto become very good. ButsincetheWordGoodisageneralTerm,that
signifies several very different things, the Question is in what such a M a n as Alcibiades ought to endea vour tobecome good. He answers, that'tisindoing those things which the best Citizens ought to do. The best Citizens (he fays) are thole whom we callwife and prudent -,and Wisdom and Prudence are necessary to all Arts : Thus the Answer of Al cibiadesisyettooindefinite. Who thenarethebest Citizens ? Alcibiades again answers, that they are those who know how to command Men that live . under the same Government, who mutually assist e a c h o t h e r -, b u t w h a t i s t h i s S c i e n c e t h a t t e a c h e s howtocommandMenwhomakeoneandthefame PoliticalBody, andwhatisitsend? Alcibiadesfays *cis good Counsel, and that the end of governing
w e l l is t o p r o c u r e t h e W e l f a r e o f t h e P e o p l e . Socrates asks him what ought to be done to go vernaStatewell. Alcibiadesanswers,thatAmity
and Concord should be made to reign in it.
The QuestiontheniswhatArtproducesthisAmi
ty orConcordinStates. Alcibiadesanswers, that thisisbrought about when everyMan minds his own Bufineis.
ThisisnotasufficientAnswer, andSocratesre- futes it with a great deal of Address and Solidity,
? ? FirstMdbhdesl io;7
byshowing that when every Man onlymindshis own Affairs, Amity can't be among 'em, because there'snoConcord. Forhowshouldtheyaccord about things which are known to some of em, and unknowntoothers?
Alabiades is so embarrass'd that he is oblig'd to deny a Truth which he had before acknowledg d, and to confess, that when the Citizens do that which is just, yet they can't tell h o w to love one a- nother. HedoesnotfeewhatSocratesaimsat: HisDesignistoshew, thatwhenMen onlymind theirAffairs, theytakecareonlyofwhatbelongs to themselves, and so confine themselves to the knowledg ofparticularthings,anddon'tascendto that of the Essence of universal things, the only knowledg that produces Charity the Mother of U- nion and Concord : Whereas the knowledg only of particular things, produces Disorder and Division.
So that to make Concord reign inaState, 'tisnot
enough that every one takescare of what appertains
to himself, he must also take care of himselt ;these
beingtwoverydifferentArts. FortheArtbywhich
we takecareofourselvesisnotthefamewiththat
bywhichwetakecareofthatwhichappertainsto
us. Now totakecareofone'sselfistoknow
One's self: But what is it to know one's self? Just
asanArtificeruseshisTools,soaManmakesuse
ofhisBody. SothattheBody isnottheMan,
fortheBodycan'tuseandgovernitself. Noris
the Compound the Man, for if one of the things
of which we arecompounded does not govern, 'tis
impossiblethey should governbothtogether:And
consequently, since neither the Body, nor thecom
pound of Soul and Body together are the Man, it
must be the Soul alone :Tis then only necessary that
weknowtheSoul,andtakecareof that, ifwe
wouldbecometrulywise. ;Fortotakecareofour
Bodies is to take care of what belongs to us ; but to t a k e c a r e o f o u r S o u l s i s t o t a k e c a r e o t o u r s e l v e s ? ,
to be employed with the Care of amassing Riches, is X2 to
? ? 108
An Abridgment of the
toleemploy'd about things still more remote thah those that appertain to us. Thus they who love Alcibiades his Body, don't love Alcibiades himself butthatwhichbelongstoAlcibiades. ToloveAl cibiades is to love his Soul, to love that w h i c h is h i m self,andnotthatwhichbelongstohim. There forewe feethosethatloveonlyhisBody,retirefrom him When the Beauty of this Body is fading j and thosewholovehisSoul,donotceasetolovehim as long as he is vertuous, and labours by thisMeans
to render himself as lovely as possible ? , and this
(fays Socrates) is the Cause of the Inconstancy of my Rivals, and of my Steadiness.
But what must we do to come to the sight and knowledg of our Souls ? Socrates speaks divinely toAlcibiadesonthisoccasion. AsourEye,(fays he) can't fee it self but in the Objects that repre sentit,orinanotherEye; thatis,inthatpart of the Eye, which is the most excellent, namely that whereintheSightis:SotheSoultofeeandknow it self, must view it self in that part of the Soul in which Wisdom a"nd Vertue are generated, <Jr rather
in that Soul, of which ours is but the Image, and inwhichWisdom,Vertue andPrudencearefound intheirsovereignPerfection,thatis,inGod. For 'tis by this means only that the Soul can k n o w God, and her Self, which istrue Wisdom. When (he knows her self, (he'll also 'know what belongs to h e r ? , f o r w e m u s t f i r s t k n o w o u r S e l v e s b e f o r e w e canknowwhatbelongstous. Shelllikewiseknow whatever respects the things that belong to her, and whatrespectsthethingsthatbelongtoothers. For one Art is sufficient for all this, and this Art is the true fort of Prudence.
He therefore that is ignorant of himself, is igno r a n t o f t h a t w h i c h a p p e r t a i n s b o t h t o h i m s e l f a n d ci thers, and not knowing what belongs to others, he knows notwhatbelongstotheCommon-wealth, and consequentlycan'tbeagoodMinisterofState. Nay heisnot'capable togovernaFamily,norsomuch as
to
? ? Ftrji Alcibiades. 309
t o c o n d u c t h i m s e l f , f o r b e c a u s e h e is i g n o r a n t , 'tis i m possible but he must commit faults; in commiting faults, he does ill,1indoing illhe ismiserable, and renderstholemiserablewhoobeyhim. Thushewho is not wife or prudent cannot be happy, and he whoiswickedcan'tbutbemiserable. Sothatthe happiness ofa City depends neither on its Riches:, nor the strength or* its Fortifications, nor the great
number ofitsTroops,noritsGalleys,northemagni ficence of its Arsenals, but on Vertue, without which there is nothing but Misery in the World.
Therefore to govern a State well, 'tis necessary to provide Vertue for those that compose it, and to en deavourtocommunicateitto'em. Andcon sequently,Alcibiades,tosatissieyour Ambition, you oughtnottothinkofacquiringgreatDominion and exorbitantPower, eitherforyourself*,oryourRe- publick, butthatJusticeandPrudence forwhichyou havesomuchoccasion. Forwhileyou,andothers actjustlyand prudently,you'llpleaseGod, who is the Source oftrue Felicity $ and you'll govern your s e l f a f t e r t h i s M a n n e r ? , i f ( a s I j u s t n o w t o l d y o u ) you constantly look upon the Deity, that Light in which alone you can know your selfand all that be longstoyou. Butifyougovernyourselfunjustly,
and turn away your Eyes from the Deity to unite yourselftodarkObjects,you'llneitherknow your your selfat all, nor the things that belong to you : And your Actions will be nothing but Works of Darkness ; and the more Power you have, the more unhappy youll be. Alcibiades can't dissent from thesegreatTruths. ButSocratesdoesnotstophere; but gives the finishing stroke to mortifie his Pride inaskinghim,whetheritisnotmorefortheAd-, vantageofthosewho arenotyetenduedwithVer- tue,to obey such as are betterthanthemielves,than to be abandon'd to their own Conduct-: And (lays he) is not that which is molt profitable most beautiful, and that which ismost beautifulmolt becoming, andfutable>Alcibiadesagreestothis. Then(fays
X 3 Socra-
? ? p o
A n Abridgment of the First Alcibiades.
Socrates) "tis becoming that vicious Persons should beSlaves,andbemade toobey? ,andconsequently
Vice is a base thing, and finable to a Slave, as on the contrary Vertue is beautiful, and sutable to a Free-man. InwhataConditionthenareyou?
AlcibiaJesissensiblewhathemeans, andconfesses h e is n o t w o r t h y o f a n y t h i n g b u t S l a v e r y , b u t h o p e s in a little time to get rid of his Vices, if Socrates pleases.
You don'tspeakwell (replies Socrates-,)you ought tofay, itGodpleases, forwe candonothingwith out him.
Well then (fays'Alcibiades)Ifay(ifGod pleases) and1add, letusforthefuturechangePersons-,and as you have hitherto made your Court to me, I'll forthefuturemakeminetoyou. I'llfollowyou wherever you go, and I solemnly protest to you, Til now carefullyapplymy selftoRighteousness.
Iwishyoumay (faysSocratesconcludingtheDis course. ) ButwhatevergoodOpinionIhaveofyouj jam affraidoftheContagionofourRepublick,and can't but tremble at the Examples that reign in it, lesttheyshouldbetoostrongforyouandme too. F o r 'tis a v e r y d i f f i c u l t M a t t e r t o b e w i f e i n t h e m i d s t of so blind and corrupt a People.
And
? ? An Abridgment OFTHE
SecondALCIBIADES, OR
Of Prayer.
SOcratesmeetsAlcibiadesgoingintoaTempleto pray, and feeing him very pensive, and with hisEyesfix'dontheEarth,heaskshimonwhathe
was thinking. What mould 1 think on > (replies. Alcibiades very faintly) being more concerned about
hisambitiousDesignsthanhisPrayers. Itmusthe on some very important Matters, (lays Socrates)for since'tiscertain, thattheGods oftenhearourPray ers, there'snothingthatrequiresmorePrudenceand, W i s d o m t h a n t o p r a y w e l l -,. s o a s n o t t o r e q u e s t E - . vilsof'em, whilewe thinkwe areaskingGoods^ or not to ask Evils of 'em willingly and knowingly as Oedipus did, w h o m Euripides brings in Praying that his Children might decide their rights by the Sword.
YoutellmeofamadMan (faysAlcibiades)does; any Man, who is in his lenses make such Prayers as those to the Gods ?
Hereupon Socrates asks him ifbeing mad is not oppos'd to being Prudent : If M e n are not wife or foolish, as they are either in Health or Sick : for asthereisnoMedium between Healthand Sickness, neitheristhereanybetweenWisdomandFolly. To, which Alcibiades agrees.
Since Madness then isoppos'd to Wisdom,fays Sacra-.
tes, Folly and Madness are but one and the lame thing. ? X4 For
1*1
? ? ^\%
An Abridgmentof the
For one single Subject can't have two contr^i^s pppos'd to it, and consequently every Fool is Mad. And feeing there are always a thousand Fools to one wife-Man in the World, while we live in itwe
are among mad Men.
T h e only thing that can militate against this Prin
ciple, isthatitwould be impossibletoliveamong sogreataNumberofmadMen;andthewife,whose Number isbutsmall,couldneverescapetheirFury. A n d yet wise M e n live in Cities, therefore it seems nottruetofaytheylivewithmadMen. Thisis what Socrates objects against the Truth which he has made Alcibiades acknowledge : But he resolves this Difficulty in shewing that there are divers, D e
greesofFolly, astherearediversfortsofDiseases:
T h e Fever is a Disease, but every Disease is not the
Fever. 'TisjustsowithFolly. AllmadMenare
Fools,butallFoolsarenotmad. ADiseaseisa
GeniuswhichcomprehendsmanySpecies. Follyor
Imprudence in likemanner comprehends many Spe
cies,whichdifferindegree. AsMenhavedivided
Arts and Trades among 'emjso they have fhar'd Folly
among themselves too -,those who have the great e s t s h a r e o f i t a r e s a i d t o b e d i s t r a c t e d a n d m a d ? , a n d
theywho havesomewhat lessarecairdFools and stupid. ButbecauseMenseektohidetheseVices
underspeciousNames, theycalltheformerMenof Magnanimity, and ofgreat Spirit? ,and they call
the others Simple ,ojelfe they fay they are harmless Men, but havelittleExperienceandmuchYouth. There are besides these a multitude ofNames with
which all forts of Vice are difguis'd. ThenextQuestionisinwhatWisdomandFolly
consist. A wiseManisonethatknowswhatought tobesaidanddone,andaFoolisonethatisigno rantofboth. ' Butishethatisthusignorant, inthis Conditionwithoutknowingit? Yescertainly. 0- edipus, forInstance(faysSocrates)was inthisCon dition when he made that Prayer which we spoke
of before ; but we shall find a great many others,'
? ? Second Alcibiades^ 3 1 }
who without being transported with Anger like him will request real Evilsof God while they think they areaskingrealGoods. ForasforOedipus,ifhe did not ask for what was good neither did he think he ask'dit;whereasothersdothecontrary. Tobe ginwithyourself,Alcibiai. es:. IfsheGodtowhom you are going to pray should suddenly appear to you, and ask "you,* if you would not be willing to be King oftheAthenians, ofallGreece, nayofallEurope, or (if that seem'd too little for your Ambition) of the whole World, would you not be extremely pleas'd, andreturn^homewithabundanceofJoy,as onewho hadreceiv'dthegreatestGood intheWorld ? Whowouldnotbetransportedwithsuchathingas this? (replies Alcibiades. ) But (fays Socrates) would you give your Life for the Empire ofthe Greeks, or that of all the Barbarians together ? N o certainly (faysAlcibiadts)forthenIcouldnotenjoyit. But w h a t i f y o u c o u l d e n j o y it, ( c o n t i n u e s S o c r a t e s ) a n d -
this Enjoyment must needs prove fatal to you ? No. (faysAlcibia&es)Iwouldnotdo itonthatCondition. You feeby thistherefore(saysSocrates)thatitisnot
safetodesireoracceptwhatweknownot. How many Men aftertheyhavepassionatelydesir'dtobe Kings, and have left no Stone unturn'd to obtain their End ; have become the Sacrifices of their extra vagant Ambition ? The Story of Archelaus King of MacedoniaisyetfreshinMemory. Heascendedthe Throne by his Crimes, and was assassinated by-his Favourite, whocouldnotmaintainhimselfinita- hove3or4days;butwasmurder'dbyathirdwho was ambitious to fill the fame Place.
But without looking after foreign Examples, how manyoftheGeneralsofourArrfiyhavebeen cbndemn'dtoDeathinourownCity! howmanyof
'em exil'dVandhow many othershave we seen, who aftertheyhadpafs'dthroughinnumerableDan gers, Toils and Labours, have fallen in themidst of theirTriumphs, bytheCalumniesoftheirEnemies!
A great m. an. y other Persons, after they have ardent- " ':? ? lr
? ? 314
An Abridgment of the
ly defir'd Children, have been very unhappy in ob taining'em. And thus itiswiththerestofour Desires? ,and tho'nothing is more common than
Instances of this kind, yet there's scarce any M a n who would refuse the Thing he desires, if God should offer itto him, or who wouid cease to ask it, ifhe wete iiire to obtain it. And we may every Day fee Persons repenting their for mer Prayers, and making luch as arc quite con trary to 'em, Therefore we must acknowledy die TruthofwhatHomerfays,viz.
Thatnoaiuigis more unjust than the Complaints Mea make a- gainst the Gods, w h o m they accuse ot being the the Cause of their Miseries, whereas they are the occasion of 'em themselves, who by their folly draw down Mischiefs on theirown Heads, which were not design'd for 'em.
A great Poet who knew the Ignorance of Man kind upon this Account, endeavour'd to cure it by giving 'em this Prayer, which I think is an admira ble one. Great God, who knowest better than we what is necessaryfor us, give us the good things we need, whether we ask V/>> or not; and keep evil things
from us, even when we ask 'em of thee.
Then Ignorance is a very fatal thing (fays Aid- biades) feeing it changes our Prayers into Curses,
and prompts us to beg of God our own Miseries. Hold a little, fzysSocrates, don't condemn Igno
rance in Geneial ; if one fort of it is pernicious, there's another that is very useful. For instance, would not Orestes have been happy if he had not known his Mother, when he sought after her to kill her? Forifhehadnotknownher,hehadnotkill'd
her,hisdesignbeingonlyagainsther. Sothatthis kind of Ignorance would have been very good for him : There isan Ignorance then (fayshe) which ought to be commended ; and this he proves with greatEvidence. Andnowhelaysdownthisasa Principle, that all the Sciences in the Wotld with outthatbywhichweknowwhatisverygood,are
not
? ? Second Alcibiades, *
not only useless, but most commonly extremely dangerous.
"Tis not sufficient (says he) that in the Council ofaPrince,orofaRepublics,therebeMenofA- bility in every thing that relates to Peace, War, and and all other things belonging to Politicks, jf they are not expert in the knowledg of what is very good ; that is if they are not under tht Direction of the Divine Spirit, and do not well understand what is best, and most just, they are incapable of govern ingaStatewell-,sothatnothingbut Ljusticeand Discordwillbeseofctoreigninit. Forwhilethese Ministers think thejofcow what indeed they do not undeistand, and contmualiy suffer themselves to be led by Opinion, and not by knowledg, they never
judgarightbutbyAccident. TheyarelikeShips
well stor'dwith every thing needful fora longVoy
age ; but which for want of a Pilot can't choose
butbelostinalittletime. Itwouldbemuchmore
useful for these Men to be ignorant of what they know, provided they were convinced of their Igno
rance j for then they would not intrude themselves to give Counsel in things which they don't under- 'stand,andyetthinktheydo. ThereforethatSoul, that City or that Republick that would be happy must acquire this Science, which alone makes o- thers turn to a good Account $ without it, the
greater Fortune either particular M e n or States en joy, the more impplsible itis lor 'em not to commit verygreatCrimes, eitherinacquiringRichesoraug mentingtheirforces,orthelike. WithoutthisSci ence a Man may have all others and yet never be
the better for 'em : A nd to such a one tha cVer se w h i c h Homer made againstMargites may beapply'd.
He knew many things, but knew them allamiss. For this wise and divine Poet does not mean by this, thathedidnotknow'emwell, asifonecouldpro perly know amiss what one knows ; but signi fies by this Enigmatical Expression, that he knew 'em all unhappily, or that it is was a great Unphinaepi-s
? ? ? V16 AnAbridgmentofthe
pinesstohimtoknow'em. Forwheretheknowledg ofGodisnot,thereisnoGood. AndiftheseScien ces are unhappy to us, 'twould be better for us to be ignorant of 'em, and consequently there is a fort of IgnorancemoreusefulthantheSciences. Thisis stillmore true in Prayer than in all the other Acti
onsofLife. AndMsbettertoasknothingofGod, thantoaskwhatisEvilofhim,whenwethinkwe are asking Good , and consequently the Prayer I have been speaking of-is the most perfect of all others.
UponthisModelthePrayerstheLacedemoni ans was form'd ; W h o are J^ptent to fay, Lord, grantuswhatseemsgood,andcomelytothee. They never request any thing but this, and yet are the happiestPeopleintheWorld. Tothispurpose Socrates relates a Story which he had heard tola by someoldPeople. Hesays,theAthenianshaving beenoftenovercomeintheWarstheyhadwith the Lacedemonians, resolv'd to send to the Oracle of JupiterAmman,toknowtheReasonwhytheGods
rather favour'd the Lacedemonians than the Atheni
ans who ofFer'd 'em more Sacrifices, erected more
Temples and Statues in their Honour, and made
3em more Presents, and more magnificent Oblati
onsthanalltheGreekstogether. WhereastheLace
demonians were so guilty of Avarice in their W o r
ship, that they scarce sacrific'd any Beasts but what w e r e b l e m i f h ' d , a n d m u t i l a t e d ? , t h o t h e y w e r e v e r y
Rich. TheProphetanswer'd'eminafewWords. The Benediiiions of the Lacedemonians are more a- greeable to Jupiter than all the Sacrifices of the Greeks. He calls their Prayers Benediiiions. So
that the Lacedemonians were belov'd of God, be causetheyknewhowtopray-,whereastherestof the Greeks were hated of him, because they did notunderstandhowtoofterSacrifice. AndHomer (fayshe) signifiesthelame thing, when he fays the Trojans, when they built a Fort, ojfer'd whole He- catombes to the Gods, thesmoke ofwhich ascended to
Heaven0
? ? Second Alcibiades^ 517 Heaven, but the Gods refused to accept 'em because
theybated thesacred CityofTroy, King Priamus,d/zi bis People. The Occasion of this hatred, was be causetheTrojansknewnothowtopray,butwould haveoblig'dGodbytheirSacrificestodo, nothis own Will, buttheirs. But God suffersnothimself to be corrupted by Giftslike a Usurer;and thatman mustbeafool,whothinkstoobtainhisFavourby suchSacrificesastheWickedare. betterabletooffer. , thantheRighteous. God onlyregardstheSanctity and Purity'of the Soul, and esteems nothing but JusticeandWisdom. Now nonearetrulyJust andWisebutthosewhoknowhowtoperformtheir DutytowardGod andMen bothintheirWords andActions. Whatdoyouthinkofallthis,Alci- biades ?
Alcibiades struck with the Evidence of these Truths,answers, that heisnotsosenseless,asto oppose his weak Understanding to that of God, aud to contradict his Oracles.
Then don't be in so much haste, Alcibiades, (con tinuesSocrates)toofferyourPrayers,lestGod to punish you, should answer the Imprecations you are going to utter against your self: For you are not a Man likely to use the Prayer of the Lacedemoni ans-, you are too proud, for that is the softest name I can give your Imprudence; therefore wait till you
arebetterinstructedhow todemeanyourself,bothto ward God and Men.
Alas ! W h e n shall I be instructed in this? (replies Alcibiades) and who shall be my Master? what Pleasure I should take in obeying him !
Itmust be hewho takescareofyoxx(&ys$ocrates) andwhotrulylovesyou;thatisGod,'tishethat mustteachyoutopraywell. Butbeforehecom municates to you this Knowledg of what is very
good, which alone can make you discern what is your true Good, and suggest such Prayers to you as
willbeforyourAdvantage, hemustdissipatethe D a r k n e s s t h a t b e c l o u d s y o u r S o u l ? , a s M ^ e r v a , i n
Ho? ner,
? ? 318 AnAbridgmentoftheSecondAlcibiades;
Homer, dispell'dtheMistthatcover'dDiomedcs his Eyes, and hinder'd him from distinguishing God fromMan. Forwhilewearedestituteoftheknow- ledg of God, we are incapable, either of under standinghim, oroffollowinghim, andconsequent ly 'tis impossible tor us to pray well.
, Lethimscatterthen,(repliesAlcibiaies)lethim destroythisDarknessofmine; Iabandonmy self to his Conduct: : and till that happy day comes, which, ifitpleaieGod, Ishallnotbelongexpect ing,I'lldefermy PrayersandmySacrifice. Inthe mean time give me leave to express my Thanks to you, for your wise Counsel, by putting this Crown on your head which I wear on mine.
I readily accept that Favour (fays Socrates) and as in the Phenicians of Euripides, Creon seeing Ti- refias coming to him with a Crown of Gold, which was the firstFruits of the Spoil of the Enemy, and
'with which theAthenians had honour'd him for his Art,said,ItakeyourCrown,whichisthesignof Vithry,foragoodOmen,foryouseewearealsoin agreatjlormofWar. SoImustfayItaketheHo nour, I now receive at your hands for a happy Pre s a g e -, f o r I a m e n g a g ' d i n n o l e s s a C o n f l i c t t h a n Creon;whilelam endeavouringtogaintheVicto ry over all your Lovers.
nrr>>i --
THE
? ? THE
Ab ridgment
Of EVTTP HRON, OR
Of Holiness.
EUtyphron meets SocratesintheKingsPorch, whichwasaPlaceontherightHandoftheO-
rantique,whereoneoftheIX Archons,whowas call'd
theKingpresidedduringhisyear. Surpriz'datthis
Novelty, (foritwas thefirsttimethatSocrateshad
appear'd inthisplace) he askshim whatitwas that
could oblige him to leave Lyceus to come into this
Porch. For'tisnotlikely(fayshe)thatyouhave
anyProcesshere before the King, asIhave. Tis
worse than that, (fays Socrates) the Business I have
is that which the Athenians call an Accusation.
How (faysEutyphron)doesanyoneaccuseyouthen?
For I can't imagine that you would accuse any Bo
dy. Eutyphronwho isgoingtoaccusehisownFa
ther, can't believe that Socrates would accuse any
Man; of such a strange piece ofExtravagance, and
ofso foundanOpinionofhimselfisasuperstitious
Mancapable. AndPlatoimproves[thiswitha
great deal of Address to insinuate that at Athens
honestMen nevetfollow'dtheTradeofAccusers. Socrates fays, he accused no Body. Who is it
that accuses you then ? (fays Eutyphron) I don't ve rywellknow him (faysSocrates)heisayoungMan : AndnotcontenttotellhimhisNameandthePlace (C)f his Birth, he draws, his Picture ; which is that
of
3'9
? ? gio
Ah Abridgment
ofaManwhosePhysiognomyPromisesnothingof Good : He has, fays he, Lank Hair, a Thin Beard, andaCrookedNose. AlltheseMarkscan'tmake himknown. ThisyoungMan(continuesSocrates) like a great Politician, has. caus'dme to be cited be forethe City as our common Mother, and accuses me of forging new Gods and rejecting the old.
Oh (faysEutyphron) I perceive what the Matter is, because you say you have a familiar Genius, a Godthatconductsyou,Melitusaccusesyouofin troducing new Opinions, knowing very well that all such things as these are suspected by the com mon People,who are always ready to receive Accu sationsofthiskind. WhatdonotIsuffer,whenI speakof divineThings intheAssemblies,. andam predicting what shall come to pass ! The People laughatmeasifIwereaFool:Notthatanything that I have foretold has fail'd of itsA ccomplimment ? but'tisbecauserheynaturallyenvyallsuchaswe are.
M y dear Eutyphron, (replies Socrates) perhaps 'tis no such great Misfortune to be laugh'd at. The Athenians don't much trouble their Hgads about a
Man's Ability, provided he concerns not himself to teachotherswhatheknows; butifanyonemakes a Profession of teaching, they are downright angry with him, either out of Envy, as you fay, or for someotherReasonwhichweknownot. Idon'tat all desire (says Eutyphron) tomaketryal (asyou have done)tomy Cost,what Sentiments theAthenianshave of me.
There'sa greatdealofdifference(repliesSocrates, improving this Confession of Eutyphron to show, in the PersonofthisDiviner, theCharacterof those that presided to teach Religion, viz. that they taught nothing, but through fear left the People in igno rance) perhaps you are very resefv'd and refuse to
teach what you know ; whereas I fear, the Athe nianswillthinktheloveIbeartoailMankind in ducesmetotell'emtoofreelyallIknow, with outaskinganyRewardof'em. Butiftheywould
only
? ? The Abridgment of Eatyphton; 211
onlylaughatme (asIsaidjustnow)asyoulaythey do at you, it would be no very troublesome or un pleasant thing to pals a few hours in laughing and jesting. ButiftheytakeuptheMatterinearnest- t h e n 'tis o n l y f o r s u c h D i v i n e r s as- y o u t o k n o w w h a t will be the Event.
Itmaybe (faysEutyphronlikeagreatDiviner) you'll sustain no Damage by it, and I hope you'll have a happy Issueof your Business, as well as I of mine.
Then you have some Business here, (replies So crates)areyouPlaintifforDefendant ? lam Plaintiff, faysEutyphron. Whomdoyouprosecute(saysSo crates) I prosecute m y Father (fays th'other) your Father, good God ! (fays Socrates) and what isthe Accusation then ? Of what do you accuse your Fa ther>Iaccusehim of Murder, (replies Eutyphron*) OfMurder! (faysSocrates)ThatindeedisanAc cusationabovethereachofthePeople, Who willne vercomprehendthatitcanbeJust. Forthisisnot anAttemptforanordinaryMan, butforonewhois arriv'd to theutmost pitch ofWisdom.
You lay true, Sosrates, (replies Eutyphron) de ludedbythisCommendation. But(faystheother) is it any one of your Relations that your Father has killed? without doubt (continues he) it must be so, for you would not bring your Father before a Court of Justice, if he had only kiil'd a Stranger.
W h a t anAbsurdity is that(says Eutyphron)to think there's a difference in this reipect between a Relati onanda Stranger:TheCafeisequal1 theonly thing to be regarded is the Justice or Injustice of the Action ; for if the Action be evil you are oblig'd to prosecute the Anthor of it, whatever Friendship or Relation isbetweenyou^ foryou renderyourself an Accomplice of his Crime to have the least Fami liaritywithhim, andnottoendeavourtobringhim to punishment, which alone can purge and expiate youboth. ButtoapprizeyouoftheFact,theDe ceased was one of our Farmers, when we liy'd at
Y ffaxJXj
? ? 311 7he Abridgment ofEutyphron]
Naxus, heheldapieceofLandofus;oneDayha-
? vingdranktoomuch hefellintoaPassionwithone ofourSlaves,andknockedhimO'th'Head:My Fa
ther put him into a deep Pit, bound Hand and Foot, and lent hither to consult those who have the In spection of all Matters of Religion, and Cafes of Conscience, toknow whatheshoulddo, andduring all this time neglected the poor Prisoner, as an As- i a s s i n w h o s e L i f e w a s o f n o c o n s e q u e n c e -, a n d s o h e d y e d ? , H u n g e r , T h i r s t a n d t h e w e i g h t o f h i s I r o n s
kill'd him, before the return of the Messenger that myFathersent. Upon thisthewholeFamilyis mightilydifturb'datme, becauseforthesakeofan AssassinIaccusemyFatherofMurder, whichthey pretend he has not committed : and if he had com mitted it, they maintain that I ought not to prose cute him, seeing the Deceased was a Villain and a Murderer % besides that 'tis an Impious Action for a
S o n t o b r i n g a c r i m i n a l P r o c e s s a g a i n s t h i s F a t h e r ? , soignorantaretheyofDivineThings, andsoinca pable of discerning what isProfane and Impious from what isJust and Holy.
Socrates amaz'd at a Position so presumptuous and false, askshim ifhe thinkshe soexactlyknows all Divine' Things, and can so precisely distinguish that W h i c h i s h o l y f r o m . t h a t w h i c h i s p r o f a n e -, t h a t t h e Cafe being as he relates it, he can prosecute his Fa ther without fearing to commit an Impious Act.
Eutyphron, like a Superstitious Bigot, who de spises all the World beside, and thinks he fees more clearly intoMatters of Religion than any Body else, answers, What Advantage should Ihave above other Men, if I did not very exactly know all these things ?
Socrates feigns himself extremely pleas d that he hadfoundaManofsoclearaHeadandsogreatA- bilities,whomightgivehim somuch assistanceinthe troublesomeAffair inwhichAE^/i/<<s had engag'd him^
\ and earnestly conjures him to teach him what is pro perlyholy,andwhatprofane3andtogivehim such
? ? *\she Abridgment o/Eutyphron^ 32$
a just Idea of both, as may always enable him to distinguish em with certainty.
Eutyphron here still keeps his Character very
well. That isholy (fays he) which I am doing,
namely to prosecute in a Court of Judicature every
one -that commits Murder, Sacrilege, or any other
unjust Act of the like Nature, without any distincti
on;LetitbeFather,Mother,Brother;&c. 'Tis the fame thing. -? :? -
This Definition, which springs rather from blind" Zeal, than theknowledg of Holiness, not satisfying. Socrates, Eutyphron attempts to prove it by Authori ty. He. maintains that all Religion consisting in agitatingtheGods, hecouldnotdoamorepious
and holy thing than to prosecute his own Father, feeingJupiter putSaturninChains becausehede- v o u r ' d h i s C h i l d r e n -, a n d S a t u r n h i m s e l f ' h a d t r e a t e d Ccehk with yet more Rigour for some other Fault.
Socrates,insinuates thathedoubtsofthetruthof
these Stories, because even Reason teaches us not to
attributeanyunworthythingtotheDeity. How
ever (faysheIronicallytoEutyphronafterhisusual
manner)ifyou,whoaresoableaManinReligious
Matters,agree with theCommonPeopleinthis,
and believe these Traditions as well as they, 'tisab
solutely necessary that I should believe 'em too, I.
whoambutignorantinthesethings. ThereforeI
entreatyouintheName ofthatGodwhopresides!
overFriendship,donotdeceiveme,butteilme if
you believe that thereever were iuchthings, as you have been relating. "'-. . ? :;;
T h i s B i g o t w h o is a l w a y s c r e d u l o u s a n d conceited. ,- '
makes no scruple not only to lay, that he. believes it,:
butadds that he-believesthings"yetmore surprizing,
of which the Common People are ignorant, mean
ing without doubt the Mysteries that were known
only to those that were Initiated \ and maintains,all
the Fables of Poets and Fancies of Painters as funda mentalPointsofReligion. -:? ?
Y 2
Socra-
? ? . Swrates doesJK>t trouble himselfwith . thsConfii- tationof'em^ that would fetfh Jthp Diipute too soon,andheisnotwillingtooffendhim. There- fore he proceeds to ask him, as ifhe were willing to he instructed . by him, what. it is. that :he calls pious and holy, and desires -him to give aclear and distinct Idea \/j which he may j<<dg ? f evei7 thing that"is. pious and holy, for a true Definition ought to. majteknown theEssenceandNature. (C)J"tha,twhich is/defin'd. . 7 ,- ? . -. ] '
? Eittypbron answers, that it is ;tlvat Wihjcfi is plea-
lingto theGods,and conleque. ntiy. ^titMtas. pipi^Be and impious which is displeasing ? o 'erri.
Soecrates tafcesadvantage of this Definition, ari. (hows that the Gods being often divided among themselves, theirQuarrels must needs arisefrom tihek. disagreementaboutwhasisjustqrunjust; pro faneorholy. Andthataccording,tothis,oneand the fame thing is holy and profane, seeiqg. it pleases femeof"emanddispleasesothers. Thereforethe Definition of holy and profane carft subsist with the Plurality ofGods.
* t. This Consequence is certain, and would be suffi cient to reclaim a wise M a n from that Error, and toconvincehimthatthereisbutoneGod. But Eufyphron preserves his Character better than so. 'Tisno such ealy matter to undeceive a superstitious Man. ToeludethisConsequenceheengagesto. prove that the Action of his lather was diipleasing to all the Gods, and that his was agreable to 'em.
Socrates does not press him with theAbsurdity of this Persuasion, which is radier a Supposition than a Certainty, for since their Theologie acknowledges thattheGodsareveryoften contestingaboutMat tersof thisNature, how couldEutypbronbe cer tain that they agreed about the Action he was going to undertake ? In an Affair :of this Consequence a'
greater Certainty, is requisite than that which arises. 11omOpinion:ItwasveryeasybythisMeansto reduce him to an Absurdity :but Socrates takes ano-.
tfier
? ? ThejfyrMgmwtofEutyphron. 31c
{her course to expose the Ignorance of the M a n still m o r e ? , a n d t h e r e b y t o o v e r t h r o w a R e l i g i o n w h i c h h a d
nobetterPropsthanthese- Thereiforeheconvinces him that this Definition is not perfect.
Eutyphron thinks to rectifie it by laying, that whichisHolyi. swhatpleasesalltheGods-,But Socrates answers, that this is only to explain one of Jheyroperties of a holyThingJinstead of discovering theEijfenceofit. Hedoesnotaskifthatwhichis Holy is. belov'dofthe Gods, noBody doubts ofthat: He -wp,uldknow why itislov'd, and what itisthat fendersitworthyofLove. Forifthatwhichisho ly, and that which is. belov'd of the Gods were the l a r n e t h i n g -, s i n c e t h e G o d s l o v e t h a t w h i c h i s h o l y onlybecauseitisholv, theywouldlovethatwhich theyloveonlybecauseitwasbelov'dof'em. And on the other hand, ifthat which is 'be'loy'd of the Gods were belov'd of'em only because they love it, itwouldfollowthattheGods lovewithoutreason, andthat. thatwhichisholywould beholyonlybe cause itwas belov'd. In a word, (he fays)thereisa great deal ofdifference between these 2 Terms, Holy andBelov'doftheGojs, addtheyareentirelyoppo site. For oneMan islov'donlybecausetheylove
him, andanotherislov'd,becausehedeserves. tobe lov'd. Thatistolay,ThatwhichisHolyisbelov'd of the Gods only because itisHoly, but'tisnotHo lybecause'tisbelov'dofthem. TheMatterinhand therefore is to explain the Nature of that which is Holy, and not its Qualities, and to define what it isandwhytheGodsloveit. Thisisveryperplex ing-to"asuperstitiousMan,who continuallytakesup things without Examination, and believes a thing on ly because he believesit.
Eutyphron does not dissemble his Trouble but con fessesthathisThoughtsarefluctuating, and thathe knowsnothowtofix'em.