No More Learning

And yet the whole intellectual system of Leibnitz is based upon this false principle, and with it must necessarily fall to (he ground, together with all the ambiguous principles in reference to the employment of the understanding which have thence originated.
Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition, that, if in the conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found, it is also not to be met with in things themselves ;
? that, consequently, all tnings are completely identical (numero eadem) which are not distinguishable from each other (as to quality or quantity) in our conceptions of them. But, as in the mere conception of anything abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition, that of which abstrac tion has been made is rashly held to be non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is contained in its conception.
The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their being in different places (they are numero
and these places are conditions of intuition, wherein the object of this conception given, and which do not belong to the conception, but to the faculty of sensibility. In like manner, there in the conception of thing no contradiction when negative not connected with an affirmative and merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in conjunction, produce any negation. But in sensuous intuition, wherein reality (take for example, motion) given, we find conditions (opposite directions) -- of which abstraction has been made the con
diversa)
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is is
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? THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION.
ception of motion in general --which render possible a contra, diction or opposition (not indeed of a logical kind) --and wLich from pure positives produce zero = 0. We arc therefore not justified in saying, that all reality is in perfect agreement and harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among ita conceptions. * According to mere conceptions, that which is internal is the substratum of all relations or external deter minations. When, therefore, I abstract all conditions of in tuition, and confine myself solely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make abstraction of all external relations, and there must nevertheless remain a conception of that which in dicates no relation, but merely internal determinations. Now it seems to follow, that in everything (substance) there is something which is absolutely internal, and which antecedes all external determinations, inasmuch as it renders them pos sible ; and that therefore this substratum is something which does not contain any external relations, and is consequently simple (for corporeal things are never any thing but relations, at least of their parts external to each other) ; and inasmuch as we know of no other absolutely internal determinations than those of the internal sense, this substratum is not only simple, but also, analogously with our internal sense, deter mined through representations, that is to say, all things are properly monads, or simple beings endowed with the power of representation. Now all this would be perfectly correct, if the conception of a thing were the only necessary condition of the presentation of objects of external intuition. It is, on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phsenomenon in space (impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and nothing that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum of all external perception. By mere concep tions I cannot think any thing external, without, at the same
* If any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge, and to say, that at least reatitatet noumena cannot be in opposition to each other, it will be requisite for him to adduce an example of this pure and non-sensuous reality, that it may be understood whether the notion re presents something or nothing. But an example cannot be found except in experience, which never presents to us anything more than phenomena ,. and thus the proposition means nothing more than that the conception which contains only affirmatives, does not contain anything negative-- a Imposition nobody ever doubted.
203
? ? ? ? 204 DOCTItlNE Or ELEMENTS.
time, thinking something internal, for the reason that cor*
ceptions of relations presuppose given things, and without these are impossible. But, as in intuition there is something
space, which, with all contains, consists of purely formal, or, indeed, real relations) which not found in the mere conception of thing in general, and this presents to us the
substratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone, cannot say because tiling cannot be represented
mere conceptions without something absolutely internal, there also, in the things themselves which are contained under these conceptions, and in their intuition nothing external to which something absolutely internal does not serve as the foundation. For, when we have made abstraction of all the conditions of intuition, there certainly remains in the mere conception nothing but the internal in general, through which alone the external possible. But this necessity, which grounded upon abstraction alone, does not obtain in the cane of things themselves, in so far as they are given in intuition with such determinations as express mere relations, without having any thing internal as their foundation for they are not things in themselves, but only phenomena. What we cognize in matter nothing but relations (what we call its internal determinations are but comparatively internal). But there are some self-subsistent and permanent, through which
determined object given. That when abstraction is
made of these relations, have nothing more to think, does
not destroy the conception of thing as phenomenon, nor the conception of an object in abstracto, but does away with
the possibility of an object that determinable according to
(that
? certainly startling to hear that thing consists solely of relations but this thing simply phenomenon, and cannot be cogitated
bv means of the mere categories does itself consist in the mere relation of some thing in general to the senses. In the tame way, we cannot cogitate relations of things in nbstracto,
we commence with conceptions alone, in any other manner than that one the cause of determinations the other fot that itself the conception of the understanding or category of relation. But, as in this case we make abstraction of all intuition, we lose altogether the mode which the manifold
determines to each of its parti, its place, that the form
mere conceptions, that of noumenon.
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? TOE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF KEPLECTIOW. 205
sensibility (space) ; and yet this mode antccedes all empirical causality.
If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought by means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of our sensuous intuition, whereby objects are given ; and, if we make abstraction of the latter, the former can have no relation to an object. And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition from our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or signification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term, objects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our categories are not valid, and of which we can accordingly have no knowledge (neither intuition nor conception), in this merely negative sense noumeua must be admitted. For this is no more than saying that our mode of intuition is not ap plicable to all things, but only to objects of our senses, that consequently its objective validity is limited, and that room is therefore left for another kind of intuition, and thus also for things that may be objects of it. But in this sense the conception of a nonmenon is problematical, that is to say, it is the notion of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible, nor that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions than the categories --a mode of in tuition and a kind of conception neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on this account incom petent to extend the sphere of our objects of thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the existence of objects of pure thought, that of noumena, inasmuch as these have no true positive signification. For must be con fessed of the categories, that they are not of themselves suffi cient for the cognition of things in themselves, and without the data of sensibility are mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding. Thought certainly not product of
? the senses, and in so far not limited by them, but does not therefore follow that may be employed purely and with out the intervention of sensibility, for would then be with out reference to an object. And we cannot call noumenon an object of pure thougLt for the representation thereof
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it is
it
is it
is,
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? 206 DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.
but the problematical conception of an object for a perfectly different intuition and a perfectly different understanding from ours, both of which are consequently themselves problematical. The conception of a noumenon is therefore not the conception of an object, but merely a problematical conception insepar ably connected with the limitation of our sensibility. That is to say, this conception contains the answer to the question -- Are there objects quite unconnected with, and independent of, our intuition ? -- a question to which only an indeterminate answer can be given. That answer is : Inasmuch as sensuous intuition does not apply to all things without distinction, there remains room for other and different objects. The existence of these problematical objects is therefore not absolutely denied, in the absence of a determinate conception of them, but, as no category is valid in respect of them, neither must they be ad mitted as objects for our understanding.
Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same time enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it for bids sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and restricts it to the sphere of phenomena, it cogitates an object in itself, only, however, as a transcendental object, which is the cause of a phenomenon (consequently not itself a phenomenon), and which cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality, or as substance (because these conceptions always require sensuous forms in which to determine an object) --an object, therefore, of which we are quite unable to say whether it can be met with in ourselves or out of us, whether it would be annihilated together with sensibility, or, if this were taken away, would continue to exist. If we wish to call this object a noumenon, because the
? representation
of it is uon-sensuous, we are at liberty to do so.
But as we can apply to it none of the conceptions of onr under
standing, the representation is for us quite void, and is avail
able only for the indication of the limits of our sensuous intni- iton, thereby leaving at the same time an empty space, which we are competent to fill by the aid neither of possible experi ence, nor of the pure understanding.
The Critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit us to create for ourselves a new field of objects be. yond those which are presented to us as phenomena, and tc stray into intelligible worlds ; nay, it does not even allow us to
? ? ? TEX JLMPHEBOLT OF THE CONCEPTIONS 0! REFLECTION.
20/
endeavour to form so much as a conception of them. The spe cious error which leads to this--and which is a perfectly excusable one --lies in the fact that the employment of the understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and destination, is made tran scendental, and objects, that possible intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to conceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according to the intui tions, on which alone their own objective validity rests. Now the reason of this again that apperception, and with
thought, antecedes all possible determinate arrrangement of representa tions. Accordingly we think something in general, and de
termine on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other, distinguish the general and in abslracto represented object from this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains mode of determining the object by mere thought, which really but logical form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a mode of the existence of the ob ject in itself (noumenon), without regard to intuition which limited to our senses.
? Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an addition, which, although in itself of no particular import ance, seems to be necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest conception, with which transcendental philosophy commonly begins, the division into possible and impossible. But as all division pre-supposes divided conception, a still higher one must exist, and this the conception of an object
general --problematically understood, and without its being decided, whether something or nothing. As the categories are the only conceptions, which apply to objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories.
To the categories of quantity, that the conceptions of all, many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that the conception of none opposed. And thus the object of conception, to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is=nothing. That conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena, which cannot be considered
ible in the sphere of reality, though they must not there- be held to be impossible, --or like certa'n new funda
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is a a
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is
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? 208 DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.
mental forces in matter, the existence of which is cogitable without contradiction, though, as examples from experience are not forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible.
2. Reality is something ; negation is nothing, that is, a conception of the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil privativum).
3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as phenomenon), as pure space and pure time. These are cer tainly something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited [ens imaginarium).
4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is nothing, because the conception is nothing -- is impossible, as a figure composed of two straight lines (nihil negativum).
The table of this division of the conception of nothing corresponding division of the conception of something does not require special description,) must therefore be arranged as follows :
Nothing.
As 1.
Empty conception without object, ens rationis.
? 2.
Empty object of a conception, nihil privativum.
(the
3.
Empty intuition without object,
ens imaginarium.
4.
Empty object without conception,
nihil negativum.
We see that the ens rationt* is distinguished from the nihil negativum or pure nothing by the consideration, that the for mer must not be reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction --though not self-contradictory, while the latter is completely opposed to all possibility, inasmuch as the concep tion annihilates itself. Both, however, are empty conceptions. On the other hand, the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium are empty data for conceptions. If light be not given to the senses, we cannot represent to ourselves darkness,
and if extended objects are not perceived, we cannot represent space.
Neither the negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, with out something real, be an object.
? ? ? IKrHODDCTIOX.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. SECOND DIVISION.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION.
I.
Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.
Tliis does not signify a doctrine of probability ;f for probability U truth, only cognised upon insufficient grounds, and though
We termed Dialectic in general a logic of appearance. *
? the information it gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must not be separated from tl e analytical part of logic. Still less must phenomenon % and appearance be held to be identical. For truth or illusory appearance doea not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment upon the object, in so far as it is thought. It is there fore quite correct to say that the senses do not err, not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not
judge at all. Hence truth and error, consequently also, illu sory appearance as the cause of error, are only to be found in a judgment, that in the relation of an object to our under
In cognition, which completely harmonises with the laws of the understanding, no error can exist. In a representation of the senses -- as not containing any judgment -- there also no error. But no power of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence neither the understanding
per *e (without the influence of auother cause), nor the senses per te, would fall into error the former could not, because,
standing.
acts only according to its own laws, the effect (the judg ment) must necessarily accord with these laws. But accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element
all truth. In the senses there no judgment --neither true nor false one. But, as we have no source of cognition besides these two, follows, that error caused solely the unobserved influence of the sensibility upon the understanding. And thus happens that the subjective giounds of judgment blend and are confounded with the objective, and cause them
? Scbem. WalirscheinlicUKeit. Erscheinung.
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f it
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? 210 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
to deviate from their proper determination,* just as a body in motion would always of itself proceed in a straight line, but if another impetus gives to it a different direction, it will then start off into a curvilinear line of motion. To distinguish the peculiar action of the understanding from the power which mingles with necessary to consider an erroneous judg ment as the diagonal between two forces, that determine the judgment two different directions, which, as were, form an angle, and to resolve this composite operation into the simple ones of the understanding aud the sensibility. In pure
priori judgments this must be done by means of transcen dental reflection, whereby, as has been already shown, each representation has its place appointed in the corresponding faculty of cognition, and consequently the influence of the one
faculty upon the other made apparent.
not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory
appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding, and in which the judgment misled the influence of imagination. Our purpose to speak of trans- cemtental illusory appearance, which influences principles --that are not even applied to experience, for in this case we should possess sure test of their correctness--but which leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of criticism, com pletely beyond the empirical employment of the categories, and deludes us with the chimera of an extension of the sphere of the pure understanding. We shall term those principles, the application of which confined entirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent; those, on the other hand, which transgress these limits, we shall call transcendent principles. But by these latter do not understand principles of the transcendental use or misuse of the categories, which in
mere fault of the judgment when not under due restraint from criticism, and therefore not paying sufficient attention to the limits of the sphere in which the pure under standing allowed to exercise its functions but real principles which exhort us to break down all those barriers, and to lay
* Sensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object upon which Ibe understanding employs its functions, the source of real cognitions. But, in so far as exercises an influence upon the action of the under standing, and determines to judgment, sensibility itself the cause of error.
? reality
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? nrraoDUCTion. 21 1
claim to a perfectly new field of cognition, which recognise* no line of demarcation. Thus transcendental and transcendent are not identical terms. The principles of the pure under standing, which we have already propounded, ought to be of empirical and not of transcendental use, that they are not applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience. principle which removes these limits, nay, which authorizes us to overstep them, called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in exposing the illusion in these pretended principles, those which are limited in their employment to the sphere of experience, may be called, in opposition to the others, immanent principles of the pure understanding.
Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form of reason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely from want of due attention to logical rules. So soon as the attention awakened to the case before us, this illusion totally disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease to exist, even after has been exposed, and its nothingness clearly perceived means of transcendental criticism. --Take, for example, the illusion in the proposition, "The world must have beginning in time. " --The cause of this as follows. In our reason, subjectively considered as faculty of human cognition, there exist fundamental rules and maxims of its exercise, which have completely the appearance of objective principles. Now from this cause happens, that the subjective necessity of certain connection of our concep tions, regarded as an objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This illusion impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea appears to be higher at distance than near the shore, because we see the former means of higher rays than the latter, or, which
still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time afterwards, although he not deceived this illusion.
Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the illusory appearance in transcendental judgments, and guarding us against but to make as in the case of logical illusion, entirely disappear and cease to be illu sion, utterly beyond its power. For we have here to do with natural and unavoidable illusion, which rests upon subjective principles, and imposes these upon us as objective,
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a
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it
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? 212 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
while logical dialectic, in the detection of sophism*, has to do merely with an error in the logical consequence of the pro- Dositions, or with an artificially constructed illusion, in imitation of the natural error. There is therefore a natural and unavoid able dialectic of pure reason --not that in which the bungler, from want of the requisite knowledge, involves himself, nor that which the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading, but that which is an inseparable adjunct of human reason, and
which, even after its illusions have been exposed, does not cease to deceive, and continually to lead reason into momen tary errors, which it becomes necessary continually to remove.
II.
Of Pure Reason as the Seat of the Transcendental Illusory
Appearance. A.
OF BEASON IN CXKXBAL.
All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of
At this stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this, the highest faculty of cognition, and I confess I find myself here in some difficulty. Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely formal, that logical use, in which makes abstraction of all content of cognition but there also real use, inasmuch as contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles, which does not borrow either from the senses or the understanding. The former faculty has been long defined by logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immedi ate conclusions {consequently immediate:) but the nature of the latter, which itself generates conceptions, not to be understood from this definition. Now as division of reason into logical and transcendental faculty presents itself here,
becomes necessary to seek for higher conception of this source of cognition which shall comprehend both conceptions. In this we may expect, according to the analogy of the con ceptions of the understanding, that the logical conception will give us the key to the transcendental, and that the table of the functions of the former will present us with the clue to the Conceptions of reason.
? thought.
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;
? IKTHODtJCTION. -- OF REA8OK IS GENERAL. 213
la the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the understanding to be the faculty of rules ; reason may be distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles.
The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a cognition that may be employed as a principle ; although it is not in itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction. Every general proposition, even if derived from experience by the process of induction, may serve as the majcr in a syllogism ; but it is not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example, there can be only one straight line between two points. ) are general & priori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles, relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them.
But I cannot for this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line from principles -- I cognize it only in purt intuition.
Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in whick I cognize the particular in the general by means of concept tions. Thus every syllogism is a form of the deduction of a
? cognition from a principle. For the major always gives a conception, through which everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof, is cognized according to a principle. Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general & priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in re spect of their possible use.
But if we consider these principles of the pure understand ing in relation to their origin, we shall find them to be any thing rather than cognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be possible & priori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in mathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible experience. That every thing that happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from the general conception of that which happens ; on the contrary the prin ciple of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which happens a determinate empirical conception.
Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot supply, and they alone are entitled to be called prin ciples. At the same time, all general propositions may bo termed comparative principles. --
It has been a long-cherished wish
that, (who knows how
? ? ? 21 1 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
late,) rcay one day be happily accomplished --that the princi ples of the endless variety of civil laws should be investigated and exposed ; for in this way alone can we find the secret of sim plifying legislation. But ill this case, laws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon conditions under which it subsists in perfect harmony with itself ; they consequently have for their object that which is completely our own work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these conceptions. But how objects as things in themselves -- how the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be
determined according to conceptions, is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to answer. Be this however as it may -- for on this point our investigation is yet to be made -- it is at least manifest from what we have said, that cognition from principles is something very different from cognition by means of the understanding, which may indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a principle, but in itself--in so far as it is synthetical --is neither based upon mere thought, nor contains a general proposition drawn from conceptions alone.
The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phsenomena by virtue of rules ; the reason is a faculty
for the production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. Reason, therefore, never applies directly to
experience, or to any sensuous object ; its object on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which gives uuity priori by means of conceptions -- unity which may be called rational unity, and which of nature very different from that of the unity produced the understanding.
The above the general conception of the faculty of reason, in so far as has been possible to make comprehensible in the absence of examples. These will be given in the sequel.
B.
OF THE LO01CAL TJSE OF REA80N.
distinction commonly made between that which immediately cognized and that which inferred or concluded, 'iliat in figure which bounded three straight lines, there are three angles, an immediate cognition but that these angles are together equal to two right angles, an inference
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? nfTRODUCTION. --OF TI1E LOGICAL USB OF REASON. 215
or conclusion. Now, as we are constantly employing this mode of thought, and have thus become quite accustomed to
we uo longer remark the above distinction, and, as in the case of the so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately perceived, what has really been inferred. In every reasoning or syllogism, there fundamental proposition, afterwards second drawn from and finally the conclusion, which con nects the truth in the first with the truth in the second --and that infallibly. the judgment concluded so contained in the first proposition, that can be deduced from without the mediation of third notion, the conclusion called imme diate (consequentia immediata) :* prefer the term conclusion of the understanding. But in addition to the fundamental cognition, second judgment necessary for the production of the conclusion, called conclusion of the reason. In the proposition, All m? n are mortal, are contained the propo sitions, Some men are mortal, Nothing that not mortal a man, and these are therefore immediate conclusions from the first. On the other hand, the proposition, All the learned are
mortal, not contained in the main proposition (for the con ception of learned man does not occur in it), and can bu deduced from the main proposition only by means of me diating judgment.
In every syllogism first cogitate rule (the major) means of the understanding. In the next place subsume cognition under the condition of the rule (and this the minor)
means of the judgment. And finally determine my cog nition by means of the predicate of the rule (this the conclusio), consequently, determine priori means of the reason. The relations, therefore, which the major propo sition, as the rule, represents between cognition and its condition, constitute the different kinds of syllogisms. These are just threefold -- analogously with all judgments, in so far as they differ in the mode of expressing the relation of cog nition in the understanding --namely, categorical, hypotheti, al
and disjunctive.
con-ieyutntia immediata -- there really be such thing, and
lie not contradiction in terms -- evideutly does not belong to the spbera of logic proper, the oliject-matter of which the syllogism, which always consists of three propositions, either in thought or expressed. This indeed
tantamount to declaring that there uo such mode ot reasoning. -- Tr.
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? 216 THAKSflCNDEKTAL DIALECTIC.
When, as often happens, the conclusion is a judgment which may follow from other given judgments, through which a per fectly different object is cogitated, I endeavour to discover in the understanding whether the assertion in this conclusion does not stand under certain conditions according to a general rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object mentioned in the conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, then this conclusion follows from a rule which is also valid for other objects of cognition. From this we see that reason endeavours to subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to the smallest possible number of principles (general conditions), and thus to produce in it the highest unity.
C.
Or THE PtTCE T7SE OF REASON.
Can we isolate reason, and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar
source of conceptions and judgments which spring from it alone, and through which it can be applied to objects; or is it merely a subordinate faculty, whose duty it is to give a certain form to given cognitions -- a form which is called logical, and through which the cognitions of the understanding are subor dinated to each other, and lower rules to higher (those, to wit, whose condition comprises in its sphere the condition of the others), in so far as this can be done by comparison ? This is the question which we have at present to answer. Manifold variety of rules and unity of principles is a requirement of rea son, for the purpose of bringing the understanding into complete accordance with itself, just as understanding subjects the manifold content of intuition to conceptions, and thereby introduces connection into it. But this principle prescribes no law to objects, and does not contain any ground of the possi bility of cognizing, or of determining them as such, but is merely a subjective law for the proper arrangement of the content of the understanding. The purpose of this law comparison of the conceptions of the understanding, to reduce them to the smallest possible number, although, at the same time, does not justify us demanding from objects them selves such an uniformity as might contribute to the convenience and the enlargement of the sphere of the understanding, or expecting that will itself thus receive from them objective
validity. In one w<<nL the question does reason in itselC
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by in a
is,
? nrrBODucTion. --of the tube use of beaboit. 217
that does pure reason contain priori synthetical principles and rules, and what are those principles
The formal and logical procedure of reason syllogisms gives us sufficient information in regard to the ground on which the transcendental principle of reason in its pure syn thetical cognition will rest.
Reason, as observed in the syllogistic process, not appli cable to intuitions, for the purpose of subjecting tbem to rules -- for this the province of the understanding with its categories--
but to conceptions and judgments. If pure reason does apply to objects and the intuition of them, does so not immediately,
? but mediately-- through the understanding and its judgments, which have direct relation to the senses and their intuition, for
the purpose of determining their objects. The unity of reason therefore not the unity of possible experience, but essenti
ally different from this unity, which that of the understanding. That everything which happens has cause, not principle cognized and prescribed reason. This principle makes the unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, which, without reference to possible experience, could never have produced means of mere conceptions any such synthe tical unity.
Reason, its logical use, endeavours to discover the general condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and syllogism itself nothing but judgment means of the subsumption of its condition under general rule (the major). Now as this rule may itself be subjected to the same process of reason, and thus the condition of the condition be sought (by means of prosyllogism) as long as the process can be con tinued, very manifest that the peculiar principle of reason in its logical use --to find for the conditioned cognition of the understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity of the former
completed.
But this logical maxim cannot be principle ofpure reason,
unless we admit that, the conditioned given, the whole ? eries of conditions subordinated to one another -- series which consequently itself unconditioned -- also given, that
contained in the object and its connection.
But this principle of pure reason evidently synthetical
for analytically, the conditioned certainly relates to some con dition, but not to the unconditioned. From this principle
? ? is
Is,
is
is
is
is,
is is
1
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a
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it
a ;a
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it
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is
a a
a
is
a
by
is a
2.
1.
in
by a
by
a
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? 218 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
also there must originate different synthetical proposition*, 0/ which the pure understanding is perfectly ignorant, for it has to do only with objects of a possible experience, the cognition and synthesis of which is always conditioned. The uncondi tioned, if it does really exist, must be especially considered in
to (he determinations which distinguish it from what ever is conditioned, and will thus afford us material for many & priori synthetical propositions.
The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason will, however, be transcendent in relation to phsenomena,
that is to say, it will be impossible to make any adequate empi rical use of this principle. It is therefore completely different from all principles of the understanding, the use made of which is entirely immanent, their object and purpose being merely the possibility of experience. Now our duty in the transcendental dialectic is as follows. To discover whether the principle, that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of phsenomena, or of thought in general) extends to the uncon ditioned, is objectively true, or not ; what consequences re sult therefrom affecting the empirical use of the understand ing, or rather whether there exists any such objectively valid proposition of reason, and whether it is not, on the contrary, a merely logical precept which directs us to ascend perpetually to still higher conditions, to approach completeness in the series of them, and thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of reason. We must ascertain, I say, whether this requirement of reason has not been regarded, by a misunderstanding, as a transcendental principle of pure reason, which postulates a thorough completeness in the series of conditions in objects themselves. We must show, more over, the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into syllo gisms, the major proposition of which pure reason has sup plied -- a proposition which has perhaps more of the character of apetitio than of ipos tula turn --and that proceed from experi ence upwards to its conditions. The solution of these pro blems is our task in transcendental dialectic, which we are about to expose even at its source, that lies deep in human reason. We shall divide it into two parts, the first of which will treat of the transcendent conceptions of pure reason, the second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms.
regard
? ? ? ? 219
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK I.
OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE SEASON.
The conceptions of pure reason -- we do not here speak of the possibility of them--are not obtained by reflection, but by inference or conclusion. The conceptions of understanding are also cogitated a priort antecedently to experience, and render it possible ; but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena, in so far as these must necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness. Through them alone are cognition and the determination of an object possible. It ia from them, accordingly, that we receive material for reasoning, and antecedently to them we possess no a priori conceptions of objects from which they might be deduced. On the other hand, the sole basis of their objective reality consists in the necessity imposed on them, as containing the intellectual form of all experience, of restricting their application and influence to the sphere of experience.
But the term, conception of reason or rational conception, itself indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of experience, because its object-matter is a cognition, of which every empirical cognition is but a part -- nay, the whole of possible experience may be itself but a part of -- cogni tion to which no actual experience ever fully attains, although
does always pertain to it. The aim of rational conceptions
the comprehension, as that of the conceptions of understand ing the understanding of perceptions. If they contain the unconditioned, they relate to that to which all experience sub ordinate, but which never itself an object of experience, -- that towards which reason tends in all its conclusions from ex perience, and the standard of which estimates the degree of their empirical use, but which never itself an element in an empirical synthesis. If, notwithstanding, such conceptions possess objective validity, they may be called conceptus ratio- cinati (conceptions legitimately concluded) in cases where they do not, they have been admitted on account cf hay ing the appearance of being correctly concluded, and may be called conceptus ratiocinantes (sophistical conceptious). But as this cau only be sufficiently demonstrated in that part
? ? ? it ;
is
by
is
is
is it is
it, a
? 220 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC
of our treatise which relates to the dialectical conclusions of reason, we shall omit any consideration of it in this place. As we called the pure conceptions of the understanding cate gories, we shall also distinguish those of pure reason by a new name, and call them transcendental ideas. These terms, however, we must in the first place explain and justify.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK I.
Sect. I. --OfIdeas in General.
? Spite
guages possess, the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited to his conception, for want of which he is unable to make himself intelligible either to others or to nimself. To coin new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful ; and, before recourse is taken to so desperate an expedient, it is advisable to examine the dead and learned languages, with the hope and the pro bability that we may there meet with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds. In this case, even if the original meaning of the word has become somewhat uncertain, from carelessness or want of caution on the part of the authors of -- always better to adhere to and confirm its proper
of the great wealth of words which European lan'
was formerly used in exactly this sense --than to make our labour
meaning even although may
Tain want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible. For this reason, when happens that there exists only
single word to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual acceptation, thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate distinction of which from related conceptions
of great importance, we ought not to employ the expression improvideutly, or, for tlie sake of variety and elegance of style, use as synonyme for other cognate words. our duty, on the contrary, carefully to preserve its peculiar signification, as otherwise easily happens that when the attention of the reader no longer particularly attracted to the expression, and lost amid the multitude of other words of very differ ent import, the thought which conveyed, and which alone eonveyed, lost with it.
Plato employed the expression Idea way that plainly
be doubtful whether
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it
it is a
it is
it a
by
it, it is
it
It is
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? OF IDEAS IN GENERAL. 281
showed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, bat which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding, (with which Aristotle occupied himself,) in asmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experi ences, like the categories. In his view they flow from the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged with great labour to recal by reminiscence --. which is called philosophy -- the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher attached to this
I shall content myself with remarking that it ia nothing unusual, in common conversatioi. as well as in written works, by comparing the thoughts which an author has de livered upon a subject, to understand him better than he un derstood himself, --inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently determined his conception, and thus have sometimes spoken, nay even thought, in opposition to his own opinions.
Plato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the feeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely spelling out phsenomena according to synthetical unity, for the purpose of being able to read them as experience, and that our reason naturally raises itself to cognitions far too elevated to admit of the possibility of an object given by experience corresponding to them--cognitions which are nevertheless real, and are not mere phantoms of the brain.
This philosopher found his ideas especially it all that is practical,* that which rests upon freedom, which in ita turn ranks under cognitions that are the peculiar product of reason. He who would derive from experience the con-
He certainly extended the application of his conception to speculative cognitions also, provided they were given pure and completely a priori, nay, even to mathematics, although this science cannot possess an object otherwhere than in pouitle experience. cannot follow him this, and as little can follow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or ia his hypostatization of them although, in truth, the elevaled and exag gerated language which he employed in describing them quite capable) of an interpretation more subdued and more in accordance with fact ant] the nature of things.
? expression.
? ? :
is
in
I
I
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is,
? 222 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
ceptions of virtue, who would make (as many have really done) that, which at beat can but serve as an imperfectly illustrative example, a model for the formation of a perfectly adequate idea on the subject, would in fact transform virtue into a nonentity changeable according to time and circum stance, and utterly incapable of being employed as a rule. On the contrary, every one is conscious that, when any one is held up to him as a model of virtue, he compares this so-called model with the true original which he possesses in his own mind, and values him according to this standard. But this standard is the idea of virtue, in relation to which all possible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as examples- proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that which the conception of virtue demands -- but certainly not as arche
That the actions of man will never be in perfect ac cordance with all the requirements of the pure ideas of reason, does not prove the thought to be chimerical. For only through this idea are all judgments as to moral merit or demerit pos sible ; it consequently lies at the foundation of every approach to moral perfection, however far removed from it the obstacles in human nature --indeterminable as to degree--may keep us.
? types.
The Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an ex
ample -- and a striking one -- of imaginary perfection, such as can exist only in the brain of the idle thinker ; and Brucker
ridicules the philosopher for maintaining that a prince can never govern well, unless he is participant in the ideas. But we should do better to follow up this thought, and, where this admirable thinker leaves us without assistance, employ new efforts to place it in clearer light, rather than carelessly fling it aside as useless, under the very miserable and pernicious pretext of impracticability. A constitution of the greatest possible human freedom according to laws, by \pMch the liberty of every individual can consist with the liberty ' every other, (not of the greatest possible happiness, for tliih follows neces sarily from the former ;) to say the least, necessary idea, which must be placed at the foundation not only of the first plan of the constitution of state, but of all its laws. And in this, not necessary at the outset to take account of the obstacles which lie in our way--obstacles which perhaps do not necessarily arise from the character of human nature, but rather from the previous neglect of true ideas in legislation.
? ? it is
a
is,
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? OF IDEAS IN GENERAL. 223
For there is nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of a philosopher, man the vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse
which indeed would not have existed, if those institutions had been established at the proper time and in accordance with ideas ; whi'e instead of this, conceptions, crude for the very reason that they have been drawn from ex perience, have marred and frustrated all our better views and in tentions. The more legislation and government are in harmony
with this idea, the more rare do punishments become, and thus it is quite reasonable to maintain, as Plato did, that in a
perfect state no punishments at all would be necessary. Now although a perfect state may never exist, the idea is not on that account the less just, which holds up this Maximum as the archetype or standard of a constitution, in order to bring legislative government always nearer and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For at what precise degree human nature must stop in its progress, and how wide must be the chasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its realiza tion, are problems which no one can or ought to determine, --and for this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to overstep all assigned limits between itself and the idea.
But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and where ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects), that is to say, in the region of ethics, but also in regard to nature herself, Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A plant, an animal, the regular order of nature --probably also the disposition of the whole universe -- give manifest evidence that they are possible only by means of and according to ideas ; that, indeed, no one creature, under the individual conditions of its existence, perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind--just as little as man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions ; that, notwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individu ally, unchangeably and completely determined, and are the original causes of things ; and that the totality of connected objects in the universe is alone fully adequate to that idea.
Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the writings ot this philosopher, the mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode* of regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof according to ends, that
experience,
? ? ? is,
? TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
ideas, is an effort which deserves imitation and claims respect But as regards the principles of ethics, of legislation and of religion, spheres in which ideas alone render experience pos sible, although they never attain to full expression therein, he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit, which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very empirical rules, the validity of which as principles is destroyed by ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us with rules and is the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws experience is the parent of illusion, and it is in the highest
to limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do, from what is done.
We must, however, omit the consideration of these important subjects, the development of which is in reality the peculiar
duty and dignity of philosophy, and confine ourselves for the present to the more humble but not less useful task of pre paring a firm foundation for those majestic edifices of mora, science. For this foundation has been hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which reason in its con fident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions. Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason, its principles and ideas, that we may be able properly to determine and value its influence and real worth. But before bringing these introductory remarks to a close, I beg those who really have philosophy at heart --and their number is but small, -- if they shall find themselves convinced by the considerations follow
ing as well as by those above, to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea its original signification, and to take care that it be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are loosely designated, -- that the interests of science may not thereby suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon terms which are proper to others. The following is a gradu ated list of them. The genus is representation in general
degree reprehensible
? Under it stands representation with consci ousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the
subject as a modification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is a cognition {cognitio). A cognition is either an intuition or a conception (intuitus vel conceptus)
(representatio).
? ? ? OtT IDEAS IN (3EHE&AL. 225
The former has an immediate relation to the object and is singular and individual ; the latter has but a mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark which may be common to several things. A conception is either empirical or pure. A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understand ing alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image,* is called notio. A conception formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason. To one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it must be quite intolerable to hear the
of the colour red called an idea. It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of understanding.
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
BOOK I.
Sect.