Therefore
God cannot make anything from
nothing, or create.
nothing, or create.
Summa Theologica
This reason does not prove that a
man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect
of grace.
The answers to the objections appear from the above.
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TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-46)
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THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS
(FOUR ARTICLES)
After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must
consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration will
be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the
distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and government.
Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1)
the first cause of beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures from
the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?
(2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent
coordinate principle with Him?
(3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are
other exemplar causes?
(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?
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Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be
created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be
found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its
cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be
understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and
therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by God.
Objection 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to
exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an
efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever
necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many
necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from
God.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated
by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the
efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3);
therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause.
On the contrary, It is said (Rom. 11:36): "Of Him, and by Him, and in
Him are all things. "
I answer that, It must be said that every being in any way existing is
from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be
caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes
ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above ([371]Q[3], A[4]) when
treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially
self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown ([372]Q[11], AA[3],4) that
subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it
would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients.
Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are
beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are
diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or
less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most
perfectly.
Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude;
and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in
being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every
truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all
heat.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of
the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence,
on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has
being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a
being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without
having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter
into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to
find a being uncaused.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection has led some to say that what is
necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly
false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the
causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph.
v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of
their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is required is
not merely because the effect is not necessary, but because the effect
might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is
true, whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible.
Reply to Objection 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as
though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not
abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an
efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object
of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that
cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of
the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from
its efficient cause.
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Whether primary matter is created by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by God.
For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else
(Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore
primary matter cannot have been made by God.
Objection 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a
division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first
passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two
principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the
other.
Objection 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since
every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that
everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in
potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against
the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast
Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other
nigh unto nothing"---viz. primary matter.
I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step
by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser
mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible
bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it
except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to
rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation. And supposing as
they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, they assigned
certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity,
discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when
they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial
form and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when
they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to
essential forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain
universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according
to Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must
take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a
determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is
contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being;
for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore,
considered "being" under some particular aspect, either as "this" or as
"such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things.
Then others there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as
being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as
"such," but as "beings. "
Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be
the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by
accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial
forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in
any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is
created by the universal cause of things.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking
of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either
accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according
to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which
emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from
the former mode of being made.
Reply to Objection 2: Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is
reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the
first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one
perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle
says (Metaph. xii, text 40).
Reply to Objection 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is
not created, but that it is not created without form; for though
everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is
necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all
that belongs to its being is created.
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Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides
God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures are far
from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to
something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as
stated above [373](A[1]). But whatever exists in sensible things exists
only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that
in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species,
but also individuating principles added to the principles of the
species. Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as
for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which
are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
Objection 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with
species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because
there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there
are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular
things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion
follows as above.
Objection 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says
(Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting
life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.
On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas,
according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which
are contained in the divine intelligence. " Therefore the exemplars of
things are not outside God.
I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof
whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an
exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a
determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in
matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar
beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in the mind.
Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate
forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom
as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the
universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore
we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things,
which types we have called ideas---i. e. exemplar forms existing in the
divine mind ([374]Q[15], A[1]). And these ideas, though multiplied by
their relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine
essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared
diversely by different things. In this manner therefore God Himself is
the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may
be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness
thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of
imitation.
Reply to Objection 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural
likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten
is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him,
forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is
like to the house in the architect's mind.
Reply to Objection 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a
man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular
man is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to
anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species,
such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.
Reply to Objection 3: Although every science and definition is
concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing
should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our
understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active
intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that
the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be
their exemplars.
Reply to Objection 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by
"self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God
Himself, sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any
self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
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Whether God is the final cause of all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the final cause of all
things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God
needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing
generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70),
because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But
God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the
final cause of all things.
Objection 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things do
not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the
end of all things.
Objection 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If,
therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows
that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord has made all things
for Himself. "
I answer that, Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would
not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it
were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered
as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the
impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient
intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are
both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents,
and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition
of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent
only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to
communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every creature
intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the
divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the
end of all things.
Reply to Objection 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect
agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not
belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal
giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own
goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The form of the thing generated is not the end of
generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the
generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the
form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator,
since the end is more noble than the means to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: All things desire God as their end, when they
desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or
sensible, or natural, i. e. without knowledge; because nothing is good
and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to
God.
Reply to Objection 4: Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the
final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it
follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But
this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him,
some of which come into our mind before others.
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THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the
First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight points
of inquiry:
(1) What is creation?
(2) Whether God can create anything?
(3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?
(4) To what things it belongs to be created?
(5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
(6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any
one Person?
(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?
(8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature
and of the will?
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Whether to create is to make something from nothing?
Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from
nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To make
concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something
by bringing forth something from what was already. "
Objection 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is
considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to
good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But
creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all
actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from
being to being.
Objection 3: Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of
some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a
statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being,
nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something
from nothing.
On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, "In the beginning God created,"
etc. , the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing. "
I answer that, As said above ([375]Q[44], A[2]), we must consider not
only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but
also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God;
and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what
proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation;
as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from
"not-man," and white from "not-white. " Hence if the emanation of the
whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is
impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation.
For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a
man is from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is
the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is "nothing. "
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal
sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as
when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of
creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
Reply to Objection 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the
term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto. " Therefore a change is
more perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is
more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding
to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply
nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form
is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the
substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more
imperfect than the contrary, which is the term "wherefrom" in
alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than
generation and alteration, because the term "whereto" is the whole
substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term
"wherefrom" is simply not-being.
Reply to Objection 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing,
this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but
only order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i. e. after
morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition "from"
[ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing,"
or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm
the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous
non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the
order is denied, and the sense is, "It is made from nothing---i. e. it
is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of
nothing," because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified
in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But
in the first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has
been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material
cause, which is denied.
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Whether God can create anything?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot create anything, because,
according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient
philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing
is made from nothing. " But the power of God does not extend to the
contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make
the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation
are both true at the same time.
Therefore God cannot make anything from
nothing, or create.
Objection 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing,
to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore
creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears
by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of what is in
potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of
nothing by God.
Objection 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been
becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same time,
is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is
becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it would
follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore
when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having been made. But
this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which the becoming is
sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from
nothing.
Objection 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite
distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not happen
that something is made from nothing.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. "
I answer that, Not only is it not impossible that anything should be
created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created
by God, as appears from what has been said ([376]Q[44], A[1]). For when
anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he
makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action;
thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which
are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So
also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but
presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act from something
presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be
caused by Him. Now it has been shown above ([377]Q[44], AA[1],2), that
nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of
all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God brings things into
being from nothing.
Reply to Objection 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above
([378]Q[44], A[2]), considered only the emanation of particular effects
from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their
action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from
nothing. " But this has no place in the first emanation from the
universal principle of things.
Reply to Objection 2: Creation is not change, except according to a
mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should
be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the
same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in
motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is
the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the
subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole
substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as
different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so
that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards
as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the substance of
motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text
20,21), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse
relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the
mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said
above ([379]Q[13], A[1]), creation is signified by mode of change; and
on this account it is said that to create is to make something from
nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable
expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to
make" and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of
effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
Reply to Objection 3: In things which are made without movement, to
become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is
the term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated
and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of
movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same
time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak of its
being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not previously.
Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and
is already created at the same time.
Reply to Objection 4: This objection proceeds from a false imagination,
as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is
plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken
to signify a change existing between two forms.
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Whether creation is anything in the creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that creation is not anything in the
creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the
creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the
Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator,
because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something
temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the
creature.
Objection 2: Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the
creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both:
since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the
creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same
reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity.
Therefore creation is not anything in the creature.
Objection 3: Further, if creation is anything besides the created
substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident
is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of
creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term
of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the
accident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the
action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action
and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.
On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made according to its
entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or
accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby
anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form,
is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation,
whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in
the thing created.
I answer that, Creation places something in the thing created according
to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or
by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from
something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular
productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all
being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by
creation produces things without movement. Now when movement is removed
from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above
(A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation
to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion,
which implies movement, is implied a relation to the principle of
motion.
Reply to Objection 1: Creation signified actively means the divine
action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in
God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a
relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a
real relation, as was said above ([380]Q[13], A[7]) in treating of the
divine names.
Reply to Objection 2: Because creation is signified as a change, as was
said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the
mover and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium
between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is
in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further
creation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature
being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations,
but by themselves; as was also shown above ([381]Q[42], A[1], ad 4), in
treating of the equality of the Persons.
Reply to Objection 3: The creature is the term of creation as
signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real
relation, and is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the
accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the
part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of
the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it
should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature
to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
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Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?
Objection 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to
composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv)
it is said, "The first of creatures is being. " But the being of a thing
created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does
not belong to subsisting and composite things.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But
composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own
component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.
Objection 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is
properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the
natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the
thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and
not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. " But heaven and earth are subsisting composite
things. Therefore creation belongs to them.
I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown
above ([382]Q[44], A[2], ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the
being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to
whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting
things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate
substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For
being belongs to that which has being---that is, to what subsists in
its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings,
not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as
whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it.
Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is
more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being. " Therefore, as
accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said
to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather
"concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created
things are subsisting beings.
Reply to Objection 1: In the proposition "the first of created things
is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation,
but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created
thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is "this"
being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal
Being, as was said above [383](A[1]). We use a similar way of speaking
when we say that "the first visible thing is color," although, strictly
speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.
Reply to Objection 2: Creation does not mean the building up of a
composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the
"composite" is created so that it is brought into being at the same
time with all its principles.
Reply to Objection 3: This reason does not prove that matter alone is
created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for
creation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.
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Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to
create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34),
what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are
more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their
own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an
immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself. But
immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it has no
matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the
thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But a
"contrary" resists more than "nothing. " Therefore it requires more
power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a
creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore
can a creature do this.
Objection 3: Further, the power of the maker is considered according to
the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we proved
above when treating of the infinity of God ([384]Q[7], AA[2],3,4).
Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by
creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a
creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor
bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other
creatures.
I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according
to what precedes [385](A[1]), that to create can be the action of God
alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more
universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is
being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and
most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis
prop. , iii) that "neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being,
except inasmuch as it works by divine operation. " Now to produce being
absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is
manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.
It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of
another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts
by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of
fire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper
act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the
power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that
the first separate substance created by God created another after
itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the
substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in
the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can
communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can
create ministerially, not by its own power.
But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause
does not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch
as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of
the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what
is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any
need of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a
saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form,
produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the
principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is
presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence
nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect,
since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed
by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible
for any creature to create, either by its own power or
instrumentally---that is, ministerially.
And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no
body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its
action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is
contrary to the very idea of creation.
Reply to Objection 1: A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a
likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by
applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the
cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of
himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten;
and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter whereby he
is an individual man. But as an individual man participates human
nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of
being; for God alone is His own being, as we have said above
([386]Q[7], AA[1],2). Therefore no created being can produce a being
absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it
is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before
the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in an immaterial
substance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this
thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being,
since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial substance cannot
produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its
being, but only as regards some added perfection; as we may say that a
superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
iv, x). In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle
says (Eph. 3:15): "From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is
named. " From which evidently appears that no created being can cause
anything, unless something is presupposed; which is against the very
idea of creation.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is made from its contrary indirectly
(Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in
potentiality. And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it
impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to
induce, as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to
itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby
the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to
act; and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is
required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much greater
power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus
therefore it appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a
thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the maker is reckoned not only from
the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being
made; for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore
although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, yet
to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears
from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater power is required in
the agent in proportion to the distance of the potentiality from the
act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no
presupposed potentiality is infinite, because there is no proportion
between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power
of a natural agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and
"being. " And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any more
than it has an infinite being, as was proved above ([387]Q[7], A[2]),
it follows that no creature can create.
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Whether to create is proper to any person?
Objection 1: It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For
what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect is
the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person
is prior to the procession of the creature: and is more perfect,
because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its
principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude.
Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of the
processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.
Objection 2: Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each
other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever
difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them
according to the processions and relations of the Persons. But the
causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons;
for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that "He is the Creator
of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by
Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He
is "Lord and Life-giver. " Therefore the causation of creatures belongs
to the Persons according to processions and relations.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature
flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person,
this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is
caused by every essential attribute---viz. by power, goodness and
wisdom---and thus does not belong to one more than to another.
Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed
to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished in
creating according to relations and processions.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused
are the common work of the whole Godhead.
I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the
being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of
action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be
fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God
according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the
three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one Person, but is
common to the whole Trinity.
Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their
procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as
was said above ([388]Q[14], A[8]; [389]Q[19], A[4]), when treating of
the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His
intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made
by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his
mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Hence
also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His
Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the
processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures
inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.
Reply to Objection 1: The processions of the divine Persons are the
cause of creation, as above explained.
Reply to Objection 2: As the divine nature, although common to the
three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as
the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost
from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the
three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives
it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to be the
Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not receive the
power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said (Jn. 1:3),
"Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power,
but from another; for this preposition "through" usually denotes a
mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle. " But to the Holy
Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is attributed that by His sway
He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son.
Again, the reason for this particular appropriation may be taken from
the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes.
For, as above stated ([390]Q[39], A[8], ad 3), to the Father is
appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it
is attributed to Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated
wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is
said: "Through Whom all things were made. " And to the Holy Ghost is
appropriated goodness, to which belong both government, which brings
things to their proper end, and the giving of life---for life consists
in a certain interior movement; and the first mover is the end, and
goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: Although every effect of God proceeds from each
attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is
naturally connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom,"
and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness" poured
out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very
substance of a thing, is reduced to "power. "
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Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?
Objection 1: It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily
found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its
traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures,
as was above stated ([391]Q[32], A[1]). Therefore there is no trace of
the Trinity in creatures.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if
the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of
their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity,
it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each of these
(properties): and so on to infinitude.
Objection 3: Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the
causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to the
relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore
in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the
unity of essence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin.
man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect
of grace.
The answers to the objections appear from the above.
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TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44-46)
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THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS
(FOUR ARTICLES)
After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must
consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration will
be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the
distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and government.
Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1)
the first cause of beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures from
the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?
(2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent
coordinate principle with Him?
(3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are
other exemplar causes?
(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?
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Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be
created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being
without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be
found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its
cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be
understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and
therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by God.
Objection 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to
exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an
efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever
necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many
necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from
God.
Objection 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated
by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the
efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3);
therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause.
On the contrary, It is said (Rom. 11:36): "Of Him, and by Him, and in
Him are all things. "
I answer that, It must be said that every being in any way existing is
from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be
caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes
ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above ([371]Q[3], A[4]) when
treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially
self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown ([372]Q[11], AA[3],4) that
subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it
would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients.
Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are
beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are
diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or
less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most
perfectly.
Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude;
and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in
being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every
truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all
heat.
Reply to Objection 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of
the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence,
on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has
being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a
being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without
having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter
into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to
find a being uncaused.
Reply to Objection 2: This objection has led some to say that what is
necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly
false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the
causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph.
v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of
their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is required is
not merely because the effect is not necessary, but because the effect
might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is
true, whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible.
Reply to Objection 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as
though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not
abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an
efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object
of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that
cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of
the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from
its efficient cause.
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Whether primary matter is created by God?
Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by God.
For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else
(Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore
primary matter cannot have been made by God.
Objection 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a
division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first
passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two
principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the
other.
Objection 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since
every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that
everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in
potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against
the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two "things hast
Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself"---viz. angels---"the other
nigh unto nothing"---viz. primary matter.
I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step
by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser
mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible
bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it
except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to
rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation. And supposing as
they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, they assigned
certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity,
discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when
they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial
form and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when
they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to
essential forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain
universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according
to Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must
take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a
determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is
contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being;
for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore,
considered "being" under some particular aspect, either as "this" or as
"such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things.
Then others there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as
being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as
"such," but as "beings. "
Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be
the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by
accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial
forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in
any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is
created by the universal cause of things.
Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking
of "becoming" in particular---that is, from form to form, either
accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according
to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which
emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from
the former mode of being made.
Reply to Objection 2: Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is
reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the
first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one
perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle
says (Metaph. xii, text 40).
Reply to Objection 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is
not created, but that it is not created without form; for though
everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is
necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all
that belongs to its being is created.
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Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides
God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures are far
from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to
something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as
stated above [373](A[1]). But whatever exists in sensible things exists
only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that
in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species,
but also individuating principles added to the principles of the
species. Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as
for instance, a "per se" man, and a "per se" horse, and the like, which
are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.
Objection 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with
species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because
there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there
are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular
things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion
follows as above.
Objection 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says
(Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting
life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.
On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas,
according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are "the master forms, which
are contained in the divine intelligence. " Therefore the exemplars of
things are not outside God.
I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof
whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an
exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a
determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in
matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar
beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in the mind.
Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate
forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom
as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the
universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore
we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things,
which types we have called ideas---i. e. exemplar forms existing in the
divine mind ([374]Q[15], A[1]). And these ideas, though multiplied by
their relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine
essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared
diversely by different things. In this manner therefore God Himself is
the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may
be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness
thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of
imitation.
Reply to Objection 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural
likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten
is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him,
forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is
like to the house in the architect's mind.
Reply to Objection 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a
man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular
man is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to
anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species,
such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.
Reply to Objection 3: Although every science and definition is
concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing
should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our
understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active
intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that
the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be
their exemplars.
Reply to Objection 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by
"self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God
Himself, sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any
self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.
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Whether God is the final cause of all things?
Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the final cause of all
things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God
needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.
Objection 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing
generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70),
because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But
God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the
final cause of all things.
Objection 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things do
not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the
end of all things.
Objection 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If,
therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows
that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.
On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord has made all things
for Himself. "
I answer that, Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would
not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it
were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered
as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the
impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient
intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are
both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents,
and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition
of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent
only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to
communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every creature
intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the
divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the
end of all things.
Reply to Objection 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect
agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not
belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal
giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own
goodness.
Reply to Objection 2: The form of the thing generated is not the end of
generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the
generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the
form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator,
since the end is more noble than the means to the end.
Reply to Objection 3: All things desire God as their end, when they
desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or
sensible, or natural, i. e. without knowledge; because nothing is good
and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to
God.
Reply to Objection 4: Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the
final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it
follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But
this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him,
some of which come into our mind before others.
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THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)
The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the
First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight points
of inquiry:
(1) What is creation?
(2) Whether God can create anything?
(3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?
(4) To what things it belongs to be created?
(5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
(6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any
one Person?
(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?
(8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature
and of the will?
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Whether to create is to make something from nothing?
Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from
nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): "To make
concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something
by bringing forth something from what was already. "
Objection 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is
considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to
good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But
creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all
actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from
being to being.
Objection 3: Further, the preposition "from" [ex] imports relation of
some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a
statue is made from brass. But "nothing" cannot be the matter of being,
nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something
from nothing.
On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, "In the beginning God created,"
etc. , the gloss has, "To create is to make something from nothing. "
I answer that, As said above ([375]Q[44], A[2]), we must consider not
only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but
also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God;
and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what
proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation;
as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from
"not-man," and white from "not-white. " Hence if the emanation of the
whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is
impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation.
For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a
man is from the "not-being" which is "not-man," so creation, which is
the emanation of all being, is from the "not-being" which is "nothing. "
Reply to Objection 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal
sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as
when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of
creation in that way here, but as it is described above.
Reply to Objection 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the
term "wherefrom," but from the term "whereto. " Therefore a change is
more perfect and excellent when the term "whereto" of the change is
more noble and excellent, although the term "wherefrom," corresponding
to the term "whereto," may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply
nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form
is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the
substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more
imperfect than the contrary, which is the term "wherefrom" in
alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than
generation and alteration, because the term "whereto" is the whole
substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term
"wherefrom" is simply not-being.
Reply to Objection 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing,
this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but
only order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"--i. e. after
morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition "from"
[ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing,"
or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm
the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous
non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the
order is denied, and the sense is, "It is made from nothing---i. e. it
is not made from anything"---as if we were to say, "He speaks of
nothing," because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified
in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But
in the first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has
been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material
cause, which is denied.
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Whether God can create anything?
Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot create anything, because,
according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient
philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing
is made from nothing. " But the power of God does not extend to the
contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make
the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation
are both true at the same time.
Therefore God cannot make anything from
nothing, or create.
Objection 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing,
to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore
creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears
by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of what is in
potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of
nothing by God.
Objection 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been
becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same time,
is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is
becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it would
follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore
when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having been made. But
this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which the becoming is
sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from
nothing.
Objection 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite
distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not happen
that something is made from nothing.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. "
I answer that, Not only is it not impossible that anything should be
created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created
by God, as appears from what has been said ([376]Q[44], A[1]). For when
anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he
makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action;
thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which
are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So
also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but
presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act from something
presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be
caused by Him. Now it has been shown above ([377]Q[44], AA[1],2), that
nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of
all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God brings things into
being from nothing.
Reply to Objection 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above
([378]Q[44], A[2]), considered only the emanation of particular effects
from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their
action; whence came their common opinion that "nothing is made from
nothing. " But this has no place in the first emanation from the
universal principle of things.
Reply to Objection 2: Creation is not change, except according to a
mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should
be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the
same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in
motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is
the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the
subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole
substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as
different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so
that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards
as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the substance of
motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text
20,21), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse
relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the
mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said
above ([379]Q[13], A[1]), creation is signified by mode of change; and
on this account it is said that to create is to make something from
nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable
expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to
make" and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of
effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.
Reply to Objection 3: In things which are made without movement, to
become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is
the term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated
and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of
movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same
time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak of its
being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not previously.
Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and
is already created at the same time.
Reply to Objection 4: This objection proceeds from a false imagination,
as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is
plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken
to signify a change existing between two forms.
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Whether creation is anything in the creature?
Objection 1: It would seem that creation is not anything in the
creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the
creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the
Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator,
because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something
temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the
creature.
Objection 2: Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the
creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both:
since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the
creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same
reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity.
Therefore creation is not anything in the creature.
Objection 3: Further, if creation is anything besides the created
substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident
is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of
creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term
of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the
accident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the
action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action
and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.
On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made according to its
entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or
accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby
anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form,
is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation,
whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in
the thing created.
I answer that, Creation places something in the thing created according
to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or
by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from
something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular
productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all
being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by
creation produces things without movement. Now when movement is removed
from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above
(A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation
to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion,
which implies movement, is implied a relation to the principle of
motion.
Reply to Objection 1: Creation signified actively means the divine
action, which is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in
God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a
relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a
real relation, as was said above ([380]Q[13], A[7]) in treating of the
divine names.
Reply to Objection 2: Because creation is signified as a change, as was
said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the
mover and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium
between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is
in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further
creation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature
being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations,
but by themselves; as was also shown above ([381]Q[42], A[1], ad 4), in
treating of the equality of the Persons.
Reply to Objection 3: The creature is the term of creation as
signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real
relation, and is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the
accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the
part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of
the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it
should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature
to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.
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Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?
Objection 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to
composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv)
it is said, "The first of creatures is being. " But the being of a thing
created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does
not belong to subsisting and composite things.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But
composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own
component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.
Objection 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is
properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the
natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the
thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and
not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.
On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): "In the beginning God created
heaven and earth. " But heaven and earth are subsisting composite
things. Therefore creation belongs to them.
I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown
above ([382]Q[44], A[2], ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the
being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to
whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting
things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate
substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For
being belongs to that which has being---that is, to what subsists in
its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings,
not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as
whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it.
Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is
more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being. " Therefore, as
accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said
to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather
"concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created
things are subsisting beings.
Reply to Objection 1: In the proposition "the first of created things
is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation,
but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created
thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is "this"
being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal
Being, as was said above [383](A[1]). We use a similar way of speaking
when we say that "the first visible thing is color," although, strictly
speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.
Reply to Objection 2: Creation does not mean the building up of a
composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the
"composite" is created so that it is brought into being at the same
time with all its principles.
Reply to Objection 3: This reason does not prove that matter alone is
created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for
creation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.
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Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to
create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34),
what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are
more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their
own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an
immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself. But
immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it has no
matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.
Objection 2: Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the
thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But a
"contrary" resists more than "nothing. " Therefore it requires more
power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a
creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore
can a creature do this.
Objection 3: Further, the power of the maker is considered according to
the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we proved
above when treating of the infinity of God ([384]Q[7], AA[2],3,4).
Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by
creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a
creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor
bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other
creatures.
I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according
to what precedes [385](A[1]), that to create can be the action of God
alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more
universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is
being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and
most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis
prop. , iii) that "neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being,
except inasmuch as it works by divine operation. " Now to produce being
absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is
manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.
It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of
another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts
by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of
fire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper
act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the
power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that
the first separate substance created by God created another after
itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the
substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in
the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can
communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can
create ministerially, not by its own power.
But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause
does not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch
as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of
the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what
is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any
need of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a
saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form,
produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the
principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is
presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence
nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect,
since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed
by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible
for any creature to create, either by its own power or
instrumentally---that is, ministerially.
And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no
body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its
action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is
contrary to the very idea of creation.
Reply to Objection 1: A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a
likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by
applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the
cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of
himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten;
and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter whereby he
is an individual man. But as an individual man participates human
nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of
being; for God alone is His own being, as we have said above
([386]Q[7], AA[1],2). Therefore no created being can produce a being
absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes "being" in "this": and so it
is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before
the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in an immaterial
substance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this
thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being,
since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial substance cannot
produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its
being, but only as regards some added perfection; as we may say that a
superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.
iv, x). In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle
says (Eph. 3:15): "From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is
named. " From which evidently appears that no created being can cause
anything, unless something is presupposed; which is against the very
idea of creation.
Reply to Objection 2: A thing is made from its contrary indirectly
(Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in
potentiality. And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it
impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to
induce, as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to
itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby
the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to
act; and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is
required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much greater
power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus
therefore it appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a
thing from nothing, than from its contrary.
Reply to Objection 3: The power of the maker is reckoned not only from
the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being
made; for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore
although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, yet
to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears
from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater power is required in
the agent in proportion to the distance of the potentiality from the
act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no
presupposed potentiality is infinite, because there is no proportion
between "no potentiality" and the potentiality presupposed by the power
of a natural agent, as there is no proportion between "not being" and
"being. " And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any more
than it has an infinite being, as was proved above ([387]Q[7], A[2]),
it follows that no creature can create.
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Whether to create is proper to any person?
Objection 1: It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For
what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect is
the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person
is prior to the procession of the creature: and is more perfect,
because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its
principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude.
Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of the
processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.
Objection 2: Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each
other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever
difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them
according to the processions and relations of the Persons. But the
causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons;
for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that "He is the Creator
of all things visible and invisible"; to the Son is attributed that by
Him "all things were made"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He
is "Lord and Life-giver. " Therefore the causation of creatures belongs
to the Persons according to processions and relations.
Objection 3: Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature
flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person,
this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is
caused by every essential attribute---viz. by power, goodness and
wisdom---and thus does not belong to one more than to another.
Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed
to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished in
creating according to relations and processions.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused
are the common work of the whole Godhead.
I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the
being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of
action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be
fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God
according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the
three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one Person, but is
common to the whole Trinity.
Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their
procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as
was said above ([388]Q[14], A[8]; [389]Q[19], A[4]), when treating of
the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His
intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made
by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his
mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Hence
also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His
Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the
processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures
inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.
Reply to Objection 1: The processions of the divine Persons are the
cause of creation, as above explained.
Reply to Objection 2: As the divine nature, although common to the
three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as
the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost
from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the
three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives
it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to be the
Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not receive the
power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said (Jn. 1:3),
"Through Him all things were made," inasmuch as He has the same power,
but from another; for this preposition "through" usually denotes a
mediate cause, or "a principle from a principle. " But to the Holy
Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is attributed that by His sway
He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son.
Again, the reason for this particular appropriation may be taken from
the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes.
For, as above stated ([390]Q[39], A[8], ad 3), to the Father is
appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it
is attributed to Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated
wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is
said: "Through Whom all things were made. " And to the Holy Ghost is
appropriated goodness, to which belong both government, which brings
things to their proper end, and the giving of life---for life consists
in a certain interior movement; and the first mover is the end, and
goodness.
Reply to Objection 3: Although every effect of God proceeds from each
attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is
naturally connected; thus the order of things is reduced to "wisdom,"
and the justification of the sinner to "mercy" and "goodness" poured
out super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very
substance of a thing, is reduced to "power. "
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Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?
Objection 1: It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily
found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its
traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures,
as was above stated ([391]Q[32], A[1]). Therefore there is no trace of
the Trinity in creatures.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if
the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of
their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity,
it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each of these
(properties): and so on to infinitude.
Objection 3: Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the
causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to the
relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore
in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the
unity of essence.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin.
